

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91143
Folder ID Number: 91143-007

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part II

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: UN Military Staff Committee in the Middle East (1 pp.)	8/11/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Sheikh Issa (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memo	Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: Possible Use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) (2 pp.)	8/13/90	(b)(1)	C
03b. Report	Re: Coordinated Stock Draw (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03c. Report	Re: Procedures for Drawing Down the SPR (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Kaifu, Japan (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Call to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05a. Memcon	Re: Telcon with President al-Assad of Syria (2 pp.)	8/12/90	(b)(1)	C
05b. Memo	C. David Welch to William F. Sittmann Re: The President's Phone Call to President al-Assad of Syria, August 12, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/13/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 5

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part II

Pinksheet Number: cap1194
OA/ID Number: 91143-007
Date Closed: 5/22/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05c. Memo	C. David Welch to William F. Sittmann Re: The President's Phone Call to President al-Assad of Syria, August 12, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/13/90	(b)(1)	✓
06a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Defense Department Leadership (1 pp.)	8/14/90	(b)(1)	✓
06b. Talking Points	Re: Issues for Joint Chiefs "Tank" Session (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
06c. List	Re: Participants in Tank Briefing (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
06d. Talking Points	Re: Other Issues for Meeting with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
06e. Talking Points	Re: Presidential Authority for Selected Reserve Call-Up and Potential Requirements for Middle East Crisis (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
06f. List	Re: Participants in Secdef [Secretary of Defense] Meeting (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
06g. Memo	Don Pilling/Michael Hayden to Brent Scowcroft Re: President's Visit to the Pentagon on August 15, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/13/90	(b)(1)	✓
07a. Memcon	Re: Telephone Conversation to Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (3 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	✓
07b. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to William F. Sittmann Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (1 pp.)	8/14/90	(b)(1)	✓

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Sheikh Sabah Al-Sabah (2 pp.)	8/14/90	(b)(1)	S
08b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Sheikh Sabah Al-Sabah (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08c. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Photo Opportunity for Sheikh Saud al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister (1 pp.)	8/14/90	(b)(1)	S
09a. Memo	Richard Haass to Bob Gates Re: 3:00 p.m. Meeting on Aug. 16 with Saudis (1 pp.)	8/15/91	(b)(1)	S
09b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10b. Letter	Prime Minsiter Mitsotakis to President Bush (1 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	S
11a. Outline	Re: Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan (4 pp.)	8/16/90	(b)(1)	S
11b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 3 of 5

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11d. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Official Working Visit of King Hussein of Jordan (4 pp.)	8/15/90	(b)(1)	S
11e. Outline	Re: Contingencies in Jordan (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11f. Outline	Re: Upcoming U.S. Decisions on Jordan (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11g. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting of King Hussein of Jordan with the President (1 pp.)	8/15/90	(b)(1)	S
12a. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Managing the Oil Supply Disruption: Next Steps (5 pp.)	8/16/90	(b)(1)	S
12b. Memo	John E. Robson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Report of the Economic Analysis Group on the Oil Supply Situation (1 pp.)	8/14/90	(b)(1)	S
13. Memo	Robert L. Huthcings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Keeping the Europeans on Board the Iraq Sanctions Regime (3 pp.)	8/18/90	(b)(1)	TS
14a. Memo	Adrain Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Keeping the French from Straying Further (1 pp.)	8/17/90	(b)(1)	S
14b. Letter	Re: Scowcroft Letter to Lanxade (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

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Pinksheet Number: cap1194
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
15. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Egypt's FMS Debt (1 pp.)	8/17/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part II

Pinksheet Number: cap1194
OA/ID Number: 91143-007
Date Closed: 5/22/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006756
RECEIVED: 23 AUG 90 19

TO: PRESIDENT


CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 11 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UN
IRAQ

DEFENSE POLICY
MIDDLE EAST



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: UN MILITARY STAFF COM IN MIDDLE EAST

ACTION: PRES APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 27 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES
DYKE
GORDON
HAASS
HAYDEN

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 4/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

11 August 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Brent Scowcroft *BS*

SUBJECT: UN Military Staff Committee in the Middle East

As you directed at today's meeting, we have reformulated the recommendation for consultations on the Multinational Force and naval enforcement of UN sanctions in the UN Military Staff Committee.

-- ISSUE: Whether to discuss multinational military efforts against Iraq in the UN Military Staff Committee.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve 1) US agreement, in concert with the UN Perm Five, to discuss military cooperation against Iraq in the Military Staff Committee, but that 2) the US focus discussion in the Military Committee on the naval enforcement of UN sanctions effort and reject any notion of US forces being placed under any kind of UN command or organizational structure.

Approve

✓
CB
8-11

Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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2010-0394-MR
ef 10/19/15

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006510
RECEIVED: 13 AUG 90 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 13 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BAHRAIN
IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF

SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
AP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR PRES TELCALL TO SHEIKH ISSA OF BAHRAIN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 16 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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CHARLES

HAASS

NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/22/2009

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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LOG # 6510

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>I</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 AUG 13 10:00

[Handwritten signature]

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SHEIKH ISSA

- Your Highness, as I'm sure that you know by now, I have agreed to King Fahd's request that U.S. forces deploy to Saudi Arabia to help in the defense of the Kingdom in the event of Iraqi aggression.
- In my speech to the American people today, I said that our troops would be ready to defend themselves, Saudi Arabia, and our other friends in the Gulf.
- Your Highness, Bahrain has long been a friend of the United States. I want you to know that I was thinking of you when I made my decision. We will stand by our friends.
- Our mission must be successful, or Iraq will not be deterred and removed from Kuwait.
- Success depends on your help.
- In the first instance, let me thank you for receiving Paul Wolfowitz. I appreciate your agreement in principle for our use of Bahrain facilities. Be assured, we will work with you, not overwhelm you.
- I would like to ask your further help. Bahrain's political endorsement of Saudi Arabia's decision and our deployment, would, more than anything else, send the right political signal of our firm solidarity to the other Arabs and especially to Iraq.

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E8 10/16/15

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2

- I know that I can count on you.
- Over the past few days, you may have been concerned about our posture and our determination in the face of Saddam's brutal aggression. It should be unmistakably clear by now that we intend to stand by our friends. Iraq will not win this confrontation.
- Again, I hope that you can help politically. Thank you again for your willingness to help on the ground.
- If you have any specific requests or if you need special help, please feel free to ask me.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006492
RECEIVED: 13 AUG 90 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: MELBY
DEAL

SECRET
DOC DATE: 13 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: OIL

STOCKPILES STRATEGIC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE USE OF STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE / SPR

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 16 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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FOR INFO

DEAL
MELBY
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/22/2009

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Possible use
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LOG # 6492

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG NO AIO _____

Ken Hill

Ken Hill

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

KH

I

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

2

✓

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

3

M 10/18

4

PM 10/5

N

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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6492

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

August 13, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*
FROM: ERIC MELBY *EM*
SUBJECT: Possible Use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)

cont: also has a copy of memo
This memo follows up on our August 9 meeting on possible use of the SPR. Should a decision be taken to use the SPR, the draw down should be coordinated with similar action by Japan and Germany and complementary action by other IEA countries who do not hold strategic stocks (e.g., demand restraint and fuel-switching). Were the U.S. to act alone, we would severely damage the credibility of the IEA's strategic stock policy, which the U.S. was instrumental in shaping in 1984. We would also give Iraq an opportunity to point to differences among the allies.

more suggestion of a early heavy lift of the SPR
In determining whether to draw down the SPR, we need to assess how much oil will first be available from increased production, company stocks and conservation and/or fuel-switching. We must also take into account increases in demand in coming months due to heating needs in the northern hemisphere.

A decision to initiate a coordinated draw of IEA strategic stocks has some benefits beyond the oil it would bring to the market. It would:

- Help prove utility of SPR and U.S. efforts to ensure allied capability for coordinated stock draw measures.
- Counter Congressional and public criticism that SPR is not being used for intended purpose.
- Help forestall Congressional efforts to get further involved in management of SPR.
- Help reduce damage to the U.S. economy caused by tight oil supplies.
- Help reduce prices paid by oil-importing developing countries.
- Increase Federal revenues by amount of contracted sales.

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E8 10/16/15

At Tab I is a description of how a coordinated stock draw could be implemented. Tab II describes the steps involved in drawing down the SPR. Tab III is a sample of a draft Presidential determination, which would be issued in the event of a supply disruption.

Concurrences by: *WJH* Richard Haass and *DL* Dan Levin

Attachments

Tab I Description of Coordinated Stock Draw
Tab II Steps for Drawing Down the SPR
Tab III Draft Presidential Determination

Coordinated Stock Draw

Proposal: After taking into account oil supplies derived from increased production, draw down of company stocks and conservation/fuel-switching, U.S. and allies should institute coordinated stock draw of strategic stocks to provide needed additional supplies.

Strategy:

1. U.S. decides to draw down SPR at, for example, 500,000 barrels/day for three months (would reduce SPR from 590 mbd to 545 mbd after 90 days).
2. President gets political commitment from Kaifu/Kohl to support U.S. move by drawing Japanese/German government stocks. U.S. contacts other IEA governments to urge complementary action.
3. IEA Governing Board meets to coordinate implementation of strategic stock draw and agree on complementary measures (demand restraint, fuel switching). Action taken pursuant to July 1984 IEA Stocks Decision (which was U.S. initiative to ensure coordinated action in the event of a U.S. decision to draw down SPR).
4. Coordinated public announcement in Paris, Washington, Tokyo and Bonn. President signs determination directing Secretary of Energy to draw down SPR.
5. Secretary of Energy begins SPR draw down. U.S. talks with companies to ensure they do not add SPR oil to inventories.

Procedures for Drawing Down the SPR

1. President determines that draw down and distribution of SPR is required due to severe energy supply interruption or by obligations of the U.S. under the International Energy Program of the IEA. Severe energy supply interruption is defined by law as:
 - is, or is likely to be, of significant scope and duration, and is of an emergency nature;
 - may cause major adverse impact on national safety or the national economy; and
 - results, or is likely to result, from an interruption in the supply of imported petroleum products, from sabotage or an act of God.
2. President directs Secretary of Energy to draw down SPR.
3. Secretary of Energy implements existing draw down plan:
 - Day 1 - DOE issues notice of sale for first month draw from SPR
 - Day 8 - Companies respond with offers to buy at certain price
 - Day 10-12 - DOE evaluates offers and notifies successful bidders
 - Day 12-16 - Successful bidders provide financial guarantees to DOE; revenues of SPR sales go to U.S. Treasury
 - Day 12-30 - DOE schedules deliveries
 - Day 15-19 - DOE awards contracts
 - Day 16 - Initial delivery (continuing until all contracted oil is loaded)
4. Day 31 - DOE begins cycle again for following month's sale (if one is required)

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

SUBJECT: Drawdown and Distribution of the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6241, I hereby determine and find that implementation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Plan is required by a severe energy supply disruption, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 6202(8), and by obligations of the United States under the international energy program.

You are authorized and directed to transmit this Determination to the Congress and to arrange for its publication in the Federal Register.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006502
RECEIVED: 13 AUG 90 16

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 13 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JAPAN
TELCALL

PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCALL TO PM KAIFU RE PARTICIPATION IN PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

ACTION: PRES MADE PHONE CALL

DUE DATE: 16 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JACKSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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HAASS
JACKSON
NSC CHRON
WELCH

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/22/2009

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	2	228/14	N
NSC Secretariat	3	_____	N/R
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A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Telephone call has been made

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6502

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister
Kaifu, Japan.

DATE: Monday, August 13, 1990

PURPOSE: To request Japanese participation in the
Persian Gulf crisis.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open.

INTERPRETER: Frances Seeds. Prime Minister Kaifu
does not speak English. He understands
some English.

PHONE NUMBER: 011-81-3-581-6081.

CONTACT PERSON:

TIME DIFFERENCE: +13

SUGGESTED TIMES: 7:00 a.m., Monday, August 13, 1990.

TOPICS OF
DISCUSSION: There are three ways in which Japan
should be asked to help in the Persian
Gulf crisis: direct participation by
sending ships to the Persian Gulf;
increased economic assistance to Turkey,
Egypt, and Jordan; increased host nation
support for U.S. Forces Japan (allowing
Japan to assume U.S. costs in Japan
thereby allowing us to spend in the Gulf
what we would have spent on USFJ).

In the last Persian Gulf crisis Japan
contributed assistance to Jordan and
Oman and increased its contributions to
U.S. Forces Japan. In 1987, it
considered, but did not send, a coast
guard cutter to the Gulf.

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2010-0394-MP
28 1011615

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CALL TO
PRIME MINISTER TOSHIKI KAIFU

- I know that you are sending Foreign Minister Nakayama to the Middle East in a few days to express Japan's support for countries in the Gulf, while you remain in Tokyo to manage the overall Japanese response to this crisis.
- I wish to thank you personally for Japan's strong support for the sanctions voted by the U.N. Security Council.
- I have been rallying America's allies to contribute diplomatically, economically, and militarily to ensure that the opposition to Saddam Hussein will be a truly global one. Thus far, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Australia have agreed to contribute naval forces under UN Security Council Resolution 661. It looks as if Spain and Italy will do likewise.
- As our most important Pacific ally and the second largest economy in the world, I hope Japan will contribute economically and militarily.
- On the economic side, I would hope that you could extend significant new assistance to the countries making the largest sacrifices: Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt.
- On the military side, I would hope that Japan could pick up a larger share of the costs of U.S. Forces Japan so that we could shift these expenditures to the Persian Gulf.
- Apparently you did this during the last Persian Gulf crisis. Also, on the military side, I believe we need to demonstrate Japan's full partnership in international efforts to resolve

this crisis. I strongly believe that we need a direct Japanese contribution to the multinational naval force.

- I realize this would be a watershed event in the post war history of Japan; however, Japan's inclusion in this effort is needed to protect our common interests and to demonstrate unmistakably that Japan is a full participant in the western alliance.
- This multinational peacekeeping effort will most likely be coordinated through the United Nations' military staff committee. I hope Japan will participate in these consultations.
- Although these issues require further consultation, initial ideas involve such tasks as mine sweeping and providing ships to carry equipment from Egypt to Saudi Arabia.
- However, I would emphasize that the vital point involved here is a commitment by Japan to participate fully in the resolution of this crisis. Otherwise, regardless of how generous Japan might be financially, there will be those who will still say that Japan did not step up to its full international responsibility in the force being formed under Article 51 of the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolution 661.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006499
RECEIVED: 13 AUG 90 15

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 13 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SYRIA

TELCON

PERSONS: ASSAD, HAFIZ

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES ASSAD / AUG 12

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 16 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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HAASS

NSC CHRON

WELCH

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/22/2009

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CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

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6499

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with President al-Assad of Syria

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hafiz al-Assad

Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME August 12, 1990, 6:13 - 6:28 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

President Bush initiated the call. President Assad exchanged greetings in English, but worked through the translator for the substantive exchange.

The President: Good morning, Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Assad: (In English) Good morning, sir, how are you? (U)

The President: I wanted to call to tell you how pleased I am at the outcome of the Arab League Summit. I am pleased that Syria took a very appropriate and strong leadership role in trying to undo the injustice done by Saddam Hussein. I wanted to assure you as I have other leaders in the area that the United States wants to implement UN sanctions and restore the rightful leaders to Kuwait to bring peace to that part of the Gulf. I would be very interested, sir, to have your views on how this situation looks now. (C)

President Assad: (In Arabic) Thank you Mr. President. Actually, we were shocked at what happened to Kuwait. We know nations do have different views and opinions about things in the world; sometimes these can be sharp. But it is not right or permissible as a result of these differences -- regardless of who might be right or wrong -- that a nation should attack with arms and result in a country going out of existence. And especially at this time in world history, one nation cannot remove or eliminate another nation with force of arms, against the will of the people. That is why we emphasized our views since the first day. Kuwait is a member of the United Nations and the Arab League; it is an independent, sovereign state. Iraqi troops must be withdrawn and the legitimate government must be restored. No one else can change Kuwait's government. That is an internal matter, up to the Kuwaitis. Our position is based on principle, regardless of our bilateral relations with either Iraq or Kuwait. That was the basis for our position at the Arab League Summit in Cairo. The outcome of the Summit was positive. (C)

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President Bush: Very positive. I wonder this will make Saddam feel more isolated, or will it result in some other tactic, something more drastic? (C)

President Assad: Yes, there will be an effect, but it is difficult to define the effect, its size, and its depth. But it is an appropriate step. (C)

President Bush: The Arab League's decision is the single most significant step since the invasion of Kuwait. Because even though the United States had responded to the legitimate appeal from King Fahd, the worst thing would be to make this an Arab versus United States issue. But now other Arabs have pitched in -- Egypt, Morocco, and yourselves -- so now it is the world versus Saddam Hussein. (C)

President Assad: Our fellow Arabs discussed this at the Summit. Some took that position at the Arab League Summit; others took another position similar to your interpretation. This is based on the view that Saudi Arabia is a sovereign state and legally has the right to request assistance if in danger and need of defending itself. (C)

The President: I agree with that. Well, I wanted to call and wish you well. I am pleased that we are of the same view on this. Be assured that the United States will stand by the UN sanctions. I hope this means that down the road we will be working closer together. (C)

President Assad: Thank you very much. I too am pleased that we had this exchange. (C)

The President: We will talk again in the future. (U)

President Assad: (In English) I wish you good health. (U)

President Bush: Thank you and good luck. (U)

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6499

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 13, 1990

ACTION

NOT

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: The President's Phone Call to President al-Assad
of Syria, August 12, 1990

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation for
the President's telephone call to ~~King~~ al-Assad of Syria on
August 12, 1990. *President*

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve *KJH* Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *MM* NARA, Date *8/7/2013*

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6499

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 13, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: The President's Phone Call to President al-Assad
of Syria, August 12, 1990

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation for
the President's telephone call to President al-Assad of Syria on
August 12, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 8/7/2013

**National Security Council
The White House**

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LOG # 6499

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 Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008498
RECEIVED: 13 AUG 90 12

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 14 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY

AP

PERSONS: CHENEY, R

POWELL, C

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND & PARTICIPANTS FOR PRES MTG W/ DOD LEADERSHIP ON 15 AUG

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 16 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PILLING

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/22/2009

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DOC 2 OF 2

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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WED.

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Ken Hill

1

KH

A

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

2

has seen

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

3

D

NSC Secretariat

4

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A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

(Ex Sec Officer has diskette)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 14, 1990

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PER E.O. 13526

2013-0661-MR

11/3/2014 MM

MEETING WITH
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP

DATE: August 15, 1990

LOCATION: The Pentagon

TIME: 10:00 - 11:30 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To discuss current status of and plans for the U.S. military response to the Gulf crisis, to discuss Presidential Reserve Force call-up authority with the Secretary of Defense, and to thank Defense employees for their efforts in the crisis.

II. BACKGROUND

You will be briefed on operations and current intelligence by the Joint Staff and will meet privately with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. Brief remarks to Defense employees in the Pentagon's center court will provide the opportunity to reaffirm U.S. commitment and to publicly thank them for their efforts.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Participants and suggested issues to be raised at the Joint Staff briefing are at Tab A. Participants, background on Presidential Reserve call-up authority, and potential issues for the private meeting with the Secretary and Chairman are at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open Press during the Presidential remarks to Pentagon employees.

V. SEQUENCE

You will be briefed by the Joint Staff in the JCS "tank" (45 minutes). You will then address the Pentagon employees in the Pentagon's center court (suggested remarks at Tab B), and conclude your visit with a private meeting with the Secretary and the Chairman (30 minutes). You will also visit the Logistics Readiness Center enroute to the center court.

Attachments

Tab A Issues and Participants (Tank Briefing)
Tab B Remarks for Pentagon Center Court
Tab C Issues, Background, and Participants (SECDEF Meeting)

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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ISSUES FOR JOINT CHIEFS "TANK" SESSION

- What U.S. forces are already in place? What forces are in transit and when will they be in place? Is there any merit in deploying to Turkey U.S. assets based elsewhere in Europe, e.g., F-16s based in Spain?
- What forces from other countries are committed? Which will have military utility and which are primarily symbolic?
- What missions will the forces be capable of performing? When? What will they be unable to do?
- What facilities outside the Gulf are being used for staging U.S. forces? Are there others we might want to use? Possibility of obtaining permission to use?
- What problems are you experiencing? What has been the biggest surprise?
- What is the status of plans for the long-term sustainability of US ground forces? Transition to semi-permanent facilities in Saudi Arabia?
- Are we comfortable with the command relationships being set up for the multi-national forces?

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PARTICIPANTS IN TANK BRIEFING

The President
Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Donald Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Colin Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral David Jeremiah, USN, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Michael Stone, Secretary of the Army
Lawrence Garrett, Secretary of the Navy
Donald Rice, Secretary of the Air Force
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
General Carl Vuono, USA, Army Chief of Staff
Admiral Frank Kelso, USN, Chief of Naval Operations
General Michael Dugan, USAF, Air Force Chief of Staff
General Alfred Gray, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps
General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander, U.S. Central Command
Arnold Kanter, Senior Director, Defense Policy and Arms Control
Richard Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs

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TO BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY

OTHER ISSUES FOR MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

- At what point will I have to exercise my 200,00 man reserve call-up authority? (note: 200K is a ceiling and Defense estimates have ranged from the tens of thousands to as high as 150,000)
- Do we need to engage the civil agencies (like FEMA, DOT) for support?
- Are there any military options to protect US citizens still in Kuwait and Iraq?
- What are the contingency plans if Iraq deploys forces into Jordan?
- How should we respond if the Iraqis use chemical or biological weapons on US forces? If used elsewhere?
- Where should we conduct the interdiction effort? Should we include the Gulf of Aqaba and the Eastern Med?
- What are we learning now that will help us properly shape our forces for the future?

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2010-0395-MR

MM 8/8/2016

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PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY FOR SELECTED
RESERVE CALL-UP AND POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Secretary Cheney will want to discuss whether to use your authority for the selective call-up of reserves in support of our deployment to the Gulf. Working levels at the Pentagon are looking at call-ups as high as 150,000, although this represents the largest number of reservists that might be required under a range of scenarios and not what would be needed immediately.

Such a request does not reflect an overall shortage of manpower but rather past policy decisions that have placed all or most of the capability to perform some critical military activities in the reserves. These include port security, cargo handling, combat search/rescue, civil affairs, psychological operations, aerial port squadrons and aeromedical evacuation. For example, over 80% of the Army's combat service support (ammo handling, truck companies, fuel storage, etc.) is in the reserves.

Reserves are already engaged in our operations in the Gulf (they make up more than 50% of airlift crews, for example) but all are currently volunteers. As our needs increase and the operation continues, volunteers will not suffice and an involuntary call-up of reservists with critical skills will be necessary.

If you determine it necessary to augment the Active forces for any operational mission, you have the authority to authorize the Secretary of Defense to order up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve to active duty for up to 90 days, and then extend the period an additional 90 days, with or without declaring a national emergency. You must notify Congress but their approval is not required. At the end of 180 days, we would have to go back to relying on active forces (augmented by volunteer reservists), or you would have to declare a national emergency. If you declare a national emergency, you may invoke additional authority, under which the Service Secretaries can order up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve to active duty for up to 24 months.

The last time reserves were called up involuntarily for a military action was in 1968 when 37,000 were called in response to the Tet offensive and the PUEBLO crisis. (President Nixon also used some 26,000 reservists during the 1970 postal strike.) In 1961 President Kennedy activated some 150,000 reservists during the Berlin crisis.

It will be important to learn from Secretary Cheney when these various units will be required and to discuss whether activation should be done incrementally or decided and announced as a complete package (e.g., a 150,000 call-up).

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MM 8/8/2016

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PARTICIPANTS IN SECDEF MEETING

The President

Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense

John Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary

Donald Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense

General Colin Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Arnold Kanter, Senior Director, Defense Policy and Arms Control

Richard Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 13, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DON PIELING/MICHAEL HAYDEN

SUBJECT: President's Visit to the Pentagon on August 15, 1990

At Tab I is a Meeting Memo for the President's visit. It forwards the listing of participants and some suggested issues for the President to raise during his session in the "tank" with the service secretaries and service chiefs, remarks to Defense employees, and a background paper on reserve call-up authority and requirements for the President's private session with Secretary Cheney and General Powell.

Concurrence by: *not available*
Roman Popadiuk

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Issues and Participants (Tank Briefing)

Tab B Remarks for Pentagon Center Court

Tab C Issues, Background, and Participants (SECDEF Meeting)

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MM 8/8/2016

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RECORD ID: 9006500
RECEIVED: 13 AUG 90 15

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HUTCHINGS

DOC DATE: 14 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA
PERSIAN GULF

TELCON

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PM MULRONEY RE IRAQ & PERSIAN GULF SITUATION / AUG 9

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 16 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/22/2009

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6500

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 9, 1990, 5:40 - 5:52 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office (U)

The President: Brian, I just got through talking with Bob Hawke, who asked me to call you to discuss a naval presence in the multilateral force. He said he could provide two frigates and a supply vessel and indicated you had talked and that there would probably be Canadian involvement. He wants to go forward. We will sort out the command and control mechanisms. He also asked about the force being under a UN flag. I talked to Brent about UN flagging, and we think that it is not very hopeful. Hawke would like to do this with Canadian participation and asked me to call you now, prior to his press conference in several hours. It would be wonderful to have some vessels from Canada involved, and I was enthusiastic when I heard Australia wants to participate. He said he will also call you on this. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: George, he called me last night. He thought it would be multinational, under UN auspices. He wanted to know, if he were invited by the Saudis or the UN, what our reaction would be. I said, Bob, we are by no means a superpower, but I could understand the benefit to the President of the United States. I said we will join in and support the effort. I told him that whatever his decision, we would support it. Let me tell you, George, what we're looking at, but don't hold me to it. (U)

The President: No, no. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We're looking at a squadron of 12 CF-18s with about 200 service personnel, two destroyers, helicopters, and a major naval supply ship with another 800 Canadian sailors. We could make this force available in short order. (U)

The President: It would be a very significant force. You referred to an invitation by the Saudis or the UN. Clearly, an invitation could come from the Saudis. They are looking for help. I didn't touch on that with Bob. (U)

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Another encouraging thing: Oman and the UAE have been very forthcoming regarding porting and supply vessels at their ports. They are the only two I have talked to -- the Sultan of Oman and the Sheik -- but they are very supportive. It is encouraging -- not surprising, but encouraging. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I felt, George, that as the coordinator of the multinational force you would be happy if the Canadians and Australians joined. (C)

The President: I would be more than happy; I would be delighted. It would strengthen the multilateral aspect. We are taking some shots here, though they don't worry me. Brent was asked some questions like, where is this multinational force? There will be others. Confidentially, the Moroccans will be joining. But it would be a very, very good signal if you and Australia joined. So color me enthusiastic, and grateful as well. Brian, do you want to coordinate with Hawke? More important than my hogging all the credit, you should announce this any way you want. He said he would announce in two hours. I said that was fine and that we would just say that we welcomed the announcement. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The first thing after our meeting the other night, I got together with our people to go over what we could do if asked. I readily understand the merits of a multinational force. I will coordinate with Hawke and then later with you. (C)

The President: Okay. I may be out, but Brent will be here. Barb and I are going out for Mexican food with some of the grandkids, but I can come back. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Not at all. I will be happy to talk to Brent. (U)

The President: I can be reached within three minutes, anyway. I am very, very pleased. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: How are things going generally? (U)

The President: Very, very well, although there are uncertainties, of course. We have heard terrible stories of brutality in Kuwait, from one of the Sheiks and also from Thatcher, who said that a British stewardess had been raped. I think we will have more reports of this kind. The Arab Summit is interesting, but I have no knowledge of what will happen. King Hussein might go along. He has pulled back from his isolated and rather pathetic position. Turkey is standing tall. The military side went smoothly. We have no information of forward movement by the Iraqis, but they are digging in. So that's where we are. Saddam Hussein is trying to portray this as the Arabs against the rest of the world, and Dan Rather had a silly report about the haves versus the have nots. But generally speaking I think there will be a strong condemnation from the Arab League. There ought to be. (C)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: I am pleased. We will do what we can.
(U)

The President: It is very helpful. Your visit here was very important. It emphasized the multinational aspect. This sends a good signal, that it is not just the U.S. taking some kind of vengeance against Iraq. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'll be back as soon as I can. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6500

August 14, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *R218*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney
of Canada

NOTED

At Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's telephone call to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 9, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I be filed for the record.

Approve *KJA for*

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 8/7/2013

**National Security Council
The White House**

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Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>DA 8/15</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Telecom - PH Mulroney 8/10

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RECORD ID: 9006503
RECEIVED: 13 AUG 90 16

TO: CICCONI, J

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 14 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ECONOMICS
PUBLIC STATEMENTS

WH REFERRAL



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES STATEMENT RE BUDGET PROBLEMS & URGENT NEED FOR A RESOLUTION

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 16 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

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DOC 3 OF 3

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. CICCONI

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement: The Budget

The NSC concurs with the attached.

*Jim: This is very harsh - not
calculated to get Democrat
support for our Gulf
operations.*

(Lange/Cawley)
August 6, 1990
7:30 P.M.
[BUDGET.DOC]

1990 AUG -6 PM 7:40

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT: THE BUDGET
PRESS BRIEFING ROOM
TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1990
~~10:00 A.M.~~
3:30 PM

Every President is required to submit a budget to the Congress, every year. But this year was different.

Because after I submitted my budget, I invited the Congressional leadership to join me in a bipartisan budget summit.

Then, I presented a revised proposal.

Then I went further, agreeing to put everything on the table in those negotiations, to make those budget talks a success.

But as time went by, it seemed cynicism was outrunning good sense -- and too many were taking the opportunity to make political hay instead of progress.

Still, to keep those budget talks going, I remained silent, worked in earnest, held meeting after meeting, without any pre-conditions -- and emphasized the need, above all, for progress to reduce the deficit.

I am disappointed in the degree of cynicism shown by those more interested in scoring political points than solving a serious national problem.

On the day we were ready to submit our ideas for deficit reduction, we notified the Democratic leadership, and asked them for theirs. Our plan was leaked -- then attacked by special

interests -- and seeing the outcry, the Democrats pulled back and refused to offer any concrete proposals at all.

Instead, there was cynical commentary from the Democratic leadership. A summit member, no less, saying, "We did not pledge that every time the Republicans slit their wrists, we would slit ours."

What the Democratic leadership did pledge to do was bargain in good faith. But instead, we've seen the triumph of gamesmanship at the expense of leadership. A budget solution is now delayed, undermining confidence in the government's ability to keep this expansion on track. Too many seem willing to risk selling out the economy for a handful of soundbites.

Let's be clear on what the problem is. Congress has the power of the purse. A President can't spend a dime. He only has the power of the veto pen. I've used it -- and I'll use it again.

But what is truly needed is fundamental reform, to bring this accelerating spending machine screeching to a halt. And that begins with a determination to bring spending under control.

Because in spite of the budget summit, the House has already passed ten appropriations bills, eight of which exceed my request for discretionary spending by 14 billion dollars -- and are 25 billion dollars higher than the budget for last year.

And in spite of our calls for budget reform, the Senate Budget Committee voted on a bill that **weakened** the budget process.

Meanwhile, the Senate is asking that the public now pay up to \$150 million to finance their campaigns. I oppose asking the taxpayer to pay more for the re-election of Members of Congress, and I will veto any such bill that slouches toward my desk.

Congress has now gone on recess. And 93 days after I called on the Democrat leaders in the Congress to work with me toward a bipartisan budget solution -- after three full months -- the Democrats have yet to offer one single proposal.

I've been reluctant to go public in this manner. I have dealt in good faith with the leaders. Shot after shot has been aimed at the White House -- and I have declined to retaliate. Now, it is up to the Democrats in Congress.

When the Congress comes back, let them understand this: I will veto any and every spending bill that busts the budget. I will sign no bill that exceeds my request. And I will expect them to come forward with concrete proposals to cut the deficit.

I will remain steadfast in my conviction that if the Congress really wants economic growth and increased government revenues, the place to start is not with tax increases -- it's with a capital gains tax cut.

And I will neither yield nor compromise in my determination to put America's fiscal house in order.

#

RECEIVED URGENT

80 AUG 13

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 6503

ACTION OFFICER: DEAL *concurs* DUE: ASAP

☒ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/~~Cicconi~~ ☐ Appropriate Action

☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi ☐ Prepare Memo for Sittmann

☐ Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 3622

- | FYI | FYI | FYI |
|-------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| ☐ Barth | ☐ Johnson | ☐ Pryce |
| ☐ Basora | ☐ Kaeuper | ☐ Rademaker |
| ☐ Beers | ☐ Kanter | ☐ Rice |
| ☐ Blackwill | ☐ Kitchen | ☐ Rodman |
| ☐ Broome | ☐ LaMagna | ☐ Rostow |
| ☐ Burns | ☐ Lampley | ☐ Salvetti |
| ☐ Chamberlin | ☐ Levin | ☐ Tilley |
| ☐ Charles | ☐ Lundsager | ☐ Tobey |
| ☐ Coulson | ☐ Mandel | ☐ Van Eron |
| ☐ Davis | ☒ Melby <i>concurs</i> | ☐ Watson |
| ☐ Deal | ☐ Menan | ☐ Welch |
| ☐ Dorminey | ☐ Merchant | ☐ Whitley |
| ☐ Dyke | ☐ Miller | ☐ Wilson |
| ☐ Fry | ☐ Needels | ☐ Working |
| ☐ Gaughan | ☐ O'Leary | ☐ Zelikow |
| ☐ Gordon | ☐ Ordway | ☐ _____ |
| ☐ Haass | ☐ Paal | ☐ _____ |
| ☐ Hayden | ☐ Pacelli | ☐ _____ |
| ☐ Hutchings | ☐ Pilling | ☐ _____ |
| ☐ Jackson | ☐ Popadiuk | ☐ _____ |

INFORMATION ☐ Sittmann ☒ Deputy Exec. Sec. ☐ Exec. Sec. Desk

☐ Scowcroft (advance) ☐ Gates (advance) ☒ Secretariat

COMMENTS CRW#:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006512
RECEIVED: 14 AUG 90 08

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 14 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KUWAIT
IRAQ

AP

CHRON FILE



PERSONS: SAUD, AL-SABAH

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ SHEIKH SAUD AL-SABAH ON 14 AUG / TALKING POINTS /
PARTICIPANTS LIST

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 17 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES
HAASS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Caf NARA, Date 5/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

MEETING WITH
SHEIKH SABAH AL-SABAH
DATE: August 14, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 4:45 - 4:50 p.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To reiterate U.S. policy in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, to discuss the international community's overwhelming support for Kuwait, and to reassure the Foreign Minister that we will stay the course until his government is returned to its rightful place.

II. BACKGROUND

Sheikh Sabah al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, has come to meet senior U.S. officials for the first time since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2. He will want to discuss his government's views of the Iraqi occupation, express his government's gratitude for our strong diplomatic and military show of support, and hear our views on prospects for resolving the crisis. He undoubtedly will have some vivid reports of the Iraqi invasion and the Arab Summit to share.

Underscoring your previous policy statements calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government will be welcome words. You should also convey your reassurance that we intend to remain engaged as long as it takes to see that justice is done. Sheikh Saud should be encouraged to launch a major media/public relations campaign to insure that Saddam's atrocities do not gain support in the Arab world. You also should ask him about the resistance groups that reportedly are continuing to fight against the Iraqi invaders to recover their homeland.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262010-0395-MR
MM 8/8/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~₂

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE

4:45 - 4:50 p.m - Photo Opportunity and Brief Remarks

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE
FOR MEETING WITH SHEIKH SABAH AL-SABAH

IRAQ/KUWAIT

- I cannot express adequately the outrage we feel at Iraq's blatant aggression against Kuwait and the atrocities being committed against innocent people in your country. His actions set a dangerous precedent that cannot go unchecked. Please assure His Highness, the Amir, that there should be no question that we will stand by our friends to see that justice is done.
- In these difficult times, I know you must be heartened by the global unanimity in condemning Iraq and imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Saddam's regime.
- I have been receiving reports that there are still pockets of Kuwaiti resistance continuing to fight against Iraq's occupying forces. Could you tell us more about this?
- One serious matter is Saddam's effort to generate popular support throughout the Middle East for his criminal actions by using Arab nationalism as his cover. It is extremely important for you to counter this public relations campaign. We are prepared to help.
- Please assure His Highness, the Amir, that he has my unwavering support, and that of the American people, in these difficult times. Our thoughts and prayers are with him and with all those who have been victimized by Iraq's aggression.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0396-116
EJ 12/21/15

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker III, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Edward Gnehm, U.S. Ambassador-Designate to Kuwait

Sandra Charles, Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs

Kuwait

Sheikh Sabah Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister

Sheikh Abdul Wahhab Al-Fawzan, Minister of Health

Sheikh Saud Nasir al-Sabah, Kuwait Ambassador to the U.S.

THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN
08/14/90

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6512

August 14, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~S~~SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Photo Opportunity for Sheikh Saud al-Sabah, the
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum for the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister's Photo Op with the President on Tuesday, August 14 at 4:45 p.m. Sheikh Saud will want to discuss the current situation in the Gulf and express his thanks for U.S. actions in support of the legitimate Kuwaiti government.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0396-142
28 12/21/15

Presidents mtg w/ Kuwaiti
National Security Council
The White House

For Min

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6572
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>John</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>2</u>	<u>APNSA Has</u>	<u>Seen</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>8/14AE</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP ✓ Sununu ✓ Other RMG BS

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS
For Presidents mtg w/ Kuwaiti
For Min on Tues, Aug 14, 4:45 p.m.
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
Exec Sec's ofc has diskette

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006522
RECEIVED: 14 AUG 90 15

TO: SKINNER, S

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 14 AUG 90
SOURCE REF: PD 90-29



KEYWORDS: AVIATION
KUWAIT
WH REFERRAL

IRAQ
PD

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PROVISION OF AVIATION INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIER
SERVICE IN AREAS AFFECTED BY IRAQI INVASION

ACTION: PD DISPATCHED BY EXEC CLERK DUE DATE: 17 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS
MELBY
NSC CHRON
PILLING
ROSTOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCDM

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 14, 1990

Presidential Determination
No. 90-29


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

SUBJECT: Provision of Aviation Insurance Coverage
for Commercial Air Carrier Service

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1302 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 ("the Act"), 49 U.S.C. App. 1532, I hereby:

- (1) determine that continuation of commercial air services to and from Saudi Arabia is necessary to carry out the foreign policy of the United States. Such commercial air services facilitate, in particular, actions in support of the United States and international response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the evacuation of American citizens from areas affected by the invasion. These services facilitate, in addition, the maintenance of normal political and commercial exchange with the countries of the region.
- (2) approve provision by the Secretary of Transportation of insurance against loss or damage arising out of any risk from the operation of an aircraft in the manner and to the extent provided in Title XIII of the Act, 49 U.S.C. App. 1531, et seq., whenever he determines that such insurance cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and conditions from any company authorized to conduct an insurance business in a State of the United States.

You are directed to bring this determination immediately to the attention of all air carriers within the meaning of section 101(3) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. App. 1301(3), and to arrange for its publication in the Federal Register.



WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 8/14/90

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 5:30 TODAY 8/14/90

SUBJECT: AVIATION INSURANCE COVERAGE

	ACTION FYI			ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	MCCLURE	☐	☐
SUNUNU	☐	☐	NEWMAN	☐	☐
SCOWCROFT	☒	☐	PORTER	☐	☐
DARMAN	☒	☐	ROGICH	☐	☐
CARD	☐	☐	UNTERMAYER	☐	☐
CICCONI	☐	☐	CLERK	☐	☒
DEMAREST	☐	☐		☐	☐
FITZWATER	☐	☐		☐	☐
GRAY	☒	☐		☐	☐
HAGIN	☐	☐		☐	☐
HOLIDAY	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:


Please provide your comments/recommendations directly to Ede Holiday's office with a copy to my office by 5:30 TODAY Tuesday, August 14. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

TO: EDE HOLIDAY

August 14, 1990

The NSC staff concurs with the attached as revised.



for William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

cc: James Cicconi

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702



THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

August 14, 1990

90 AUG 14 P3:50

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Secretary to the Cabinet

FROM: Samuel K. Skinner 
Secretary of Transportation

SUBJECT: Aviation Insurance Coverage

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Title XIII-AVIATION INSURANCE, provides that the Secretary of Transportation, with the approval of the President, and such consultation with interested agencies of the Government as the President may require, may provide insurance against loss or damage arising out of any risk from the operation of an aircraft in the manner and to the extent provided in Title XIII, whenever it is determined by the Secretary of Transportation that such insurance cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and conditions from any company authorized to conduct an insurance business in a State of the United States.

Title XIII also requires as a pre-requisite to the provision of such insurance that the President make a determination that the continuation of commercial operations is necessary to carry out the foreign policy of the United States.

The Department of Transportation has been informed by several commercial air carriers that their operations into many Middle East countries (Attachment 1) face exorbitant rate increases or complete cessation of commercial war risk insurance coverage.

Investigation of the availability of such aviation insurance has been made and it is my finding that such aviation insurance adequate for the needs of the air commerce of the United States cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and conditions.

The Department of State has advised that continuation of commercial air services to the Middle East is necessary to carry out the foreign policy of the United States (Attachment 2). Such commercial air services facilitate, in particular, actions in support of the United States and international response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the evacuation of American citizens from areas affected by the invasion. These services facilitate, in addition, the maintenance of normal political and commercial exchange with the countries of the region.

Your signature of the attached Presidential Determination will enable the Federal Aviation Administration to proceed with issuance of insurance coverage for commercial air carrier operations into the affected countries.

Attachments

Washington

August 14, 1990

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ~~HONORABLE SAMUEL K. SKINNER~~
~~The~~ Secretary of Transportation *all caps*

SUBJECT: Provision of Aviation Insurance Coverage
for Commercial Air Carrier Service.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 1302 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 ("the Act"), I hereby:

49 ~~U.S.C.~~ U.S.C. App.
1532,

- (1) determine that continuation of commercial air services to the Middle East is necessary to carry out the foreign policy of the United States. Such commercial air services facilitate, in particular, actions in support of the United States and international response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the evacuation of American citizens from areas affected by the invasion. These services facilitate, in addition, the maintenance of normal political and commercial exchange with the countries of the region.

- (2) *approve provision by*
~~determine that~~ the Secretary of Transportation ~~may~~
~~provide~~ insurance against loss or damage arising out of any risk from the operation of an aircraft in the manner and to the extent provided in Title XIII, *of the Act,*
whenever ~~it is~~ *he* determined ^S ~~by the Secretary of~~ *49 USC.*
~~Transportation~~ that such insurance cannot be obtained *App. 1531*
11 124

on reasonable terms and conditions from any company
authorized to conduct an insurance business in a
State of the United States.

directed
You are ~~requested~~ to bring this determination immediately to the
attention of all air carriers within the meaning of Section 101(3)
of the Act. *, 49 U.S.C. App. 1301(3), and to arrange for its publication*

~~This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.~~

ATTACHMENT 1

MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES IMPACTED
INSURANCE CANCELLATION AND INCREASES

INSURANCE WITHDRAWN

Saudi**
Kuwait*
Iraq*

IMPENDING RATE INCREASES

Turkey
Syria
Jordan
Egypt
Israel
Bahrain
Qatar
Yemen
South Yemem
Oman
U.A.E.

*Recently withdrawn

**Recently withdrawn by one of the three major reinsurance pools. Dramatic increases in place (double other Arab country increases), possible cancellation pending.

PAN AM.Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Pan Am Building
New York, New York 10166**VIA TELEFAX**

August 14, 1990

Mr. Douglas A. Thieman
Financial Analyst
Office of Policy and Plans
Federal Aviation Administration
APO 230
800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, DC 20591

Re: Title XIII War Risk Insurance

Dear Mr. Thieman:

In response to your request, this letter is to confirm our conversation wherein Pan Am advised you that its hull war risk insurance lead has given notice of the following restrictions of coverage and premium surcharges which become effective August 15, 1990:

1. Flights to Iraq and Kuwait - coverage excluded;
2. All scheduled and charter flights to Saudi Arabia: a surcharge of \$.025 per \$100 of aircraft insured value per operation, plus a surcharge of \$.025 per \$100 of aircraft insured value per overnight stay;
3. All scheduled and charter flights to - Israel, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, Syria Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt: a surcharge of \$.0125 per \$100 of aircraft insured value per operation, plus a surcharge of \$.0125 per \$100 of aircraft insured value per overnight stay.

In addition, we have been notified unofficially that liability insurers are promulgating surcharges on flights to the above countries as follows:

Saudi Arabia:	\$150 per seat
All Others Countries	\$100 per seat

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

Example of Immediate Cost Impact:

Saudi Arabia: **Twice weekly scheduled flights**
Aircraft: **A310-300's**
Insured Value: **\$64,000,000 or \$75,000,000**

Additional Insurance Costs:

Hull War: **\$16,000 or \$18,750**
Liability Estimate: **196 seats @ \$150 = \$29,400**

Tel Aviv: **Daily with overnight stay**
Aircraft: **B727-2D4's**
Insured Value: **\$13,000,000**

Additional Insurance Costs:

Hull War: **\$3,250**
Liability Estimate: **145 seats @ \$100 = \$14,500**

Mr. Douglas A. Thieman
Federal Aviation Administration

-2-

August 14, 1990

Please note that all of the foregoing surcharges are in addition to Pan Am's normal premium rates of:

Hull War:	\$.048 per \$100 insured value
Liability:	\$.25 per 1,000 RPM's

We herewith request Title XIII premium coverage. Enclosed is an illustration of actual cost impact on selected scheduled flights for your information. Also enclosed is a copy of the text of Pan Am's commercial hull war risk policy.

Please advise if anything further is required at this time.

Sincerely,



C. J. David Davies
Sr. Vice President and
Treasurer

Enclosures



Hangar 8 JFK International Airport Jamaica, New York 11430

August 13, 1990

cc: Mr. Douglas Thieman
FAA/APO

Mr. John Benson
Frank B. Hall & Co. Inc.
261 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10016

Re: Tower Air Flight to Dhahran
Hull and Liability "War Risks" Insurance

Dear Mr. Benson:

This communication cancels and supersedes my letter of August 10th to Ms. D. Delores and is to confirm the details of our telephone conversations of this morning on the above entitled matter.

Tower Air is planning to undertake one (1) round-trip flight to Dhahran today, Monday August 13th. The flight into Dhahran is a MAC troop movement, while the return is an evacuation flight by ARAMCO to bring their employees, all US citizens, to Houston. The number of passengers is not yet known but could be expected to reach the maximum of 480 persons on each flight.

Current plans are for Tower Air aircraft N603FF to perform this rotation, scheduled as follows:

MONDAY RIV → BGR → BRU → DHA/GJB → BRU → HOU
Tech Tech Tech
Stop Stop Arr 14/1912 Stop
13Aug90 Quick Turn
2300Z

MAC flight (troops) ARAMCO (evacuees)

The aircraft will be fully provisioned/catered prior to arrival in Dhahran, with maximum possible fuel load at landing.

During the 2½hr quick turn at DHA, we will only need to fuel the aircraft and enplane the passengers who will have been pre-assembled by ARAMCO.

Please revert as soon as possible, no later than this afternoon,
with any coverage/premium requirements for these flights.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Les Weiss', with a stylized, cursive script.

LES WEISS
Controller
TOWER AIR, INC.

Trans World Airlines, Inc.
100 South Bedford Road
Mt. Kisco, New York 10549

Staff Vice President &
Assistant Treasurer

August 14, 1990

Mr. John M. Rodgers
Director, Office of Aviation
Policy and Plans
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue S.W.
Washington, DC 20591

Dear Mr. Rodgers:

TWA requests that the Federal Aviation Administration petition for the activation of Title XIII premium insurance under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

As a result of the Middle East conflict, aviation hull, liability and war risk insurance coverage has become costly, uncertain and restrictive. For example, war risk underwriters have recently imposed territoriality limitations on coverage, consisting of exclusion of flights entering Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Airlines wanting war risk coverage for Saudi Arabian flights will be required to pay a special surcharge, estimated to range from \$10,000 to \$24,000 per flight. We have learned today that such a surcharge may be expanded to flights entering Egypt, Israel and Turkey. We also have been made aware of rumors pervading the insurance market that restrictions and/or special surcharges will be placed on our aviation liability coverage.

Recently, we informed the Military Airlift Command (MAC) of the restrictions in our war risk coverage and its impact on the viability of this program for Trans World Airlines. Attached is a copy of our letter to MAC.

Please communicate our concerns to the appropriate government officials, and our request for the activation of Title XIII premium insurance coverage.

Very truly yours,

Donald S. Arnstein
Donald S. Arnstein

Att.

FAAXIII

Leahn Enterprises

Trans World Airlines • ACF Industries, Inc. • Leahn & Co., Inc., Members NYSE • Baywater Realty & Capital Corp. • Foxfield Thoroughbreds, Inc.

ATTACHMENT 2: Department of State Finding



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Mr. Michael C. Moffet
Assistant Administrator for Policy,
Planning, and International Aviation
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Ave. S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

Dear Mr. Moffet:

I am responding to your letter of August 13, 1990 requesting advice whether continued commercial air service to the Middle East is necessary to carry out the foreign policy of the United States.

You wrote that FAA has received information from several air carriers that their commercial insurance coverage for specific areas in the Middle East is under review for possible cancellation and that rates had already been raised significantly. The escalating insurance costs threaten the economic viability of continued air service in these areas. Based on the reports, FAA believes it is probable that commercial air service to the Middle East will experience extensive disruption by this week due to lack of insurance coverage and/or the availability of reasonable rates. To allow activation of the program provided for under Title XIII of the Federal Aviation Act to provide insurance coverage to air carriers in extraordinary circumstances, you requested a finding that continuation of such service is in U.S. foreign policy interest.

I wish to inform you on behalf of the State Department that we have determined that continuation of commercial air services to affected Middle East countries is necessary to carry out the foreign policy of the United States. Such commercial air services facilitate, in particular, actions in support of the United States and international response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the evacuation of American citizens from areas affected by the invasion. These services facilitate, in addition, the maintenance of normal political and commercial exchange with the countries of the region.

- 2 -

The Department of State believes it is in the interest of the United States to provide insurance against loss or damage arising out of any risk from the commercial operation of an aircraft in the affected Middle East countries covered in Title XIII of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Aviation Insurance) whenever it is determined by the Secretary of Transportation that such insurance is not available or cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and conditions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Charles Angevine". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

Charles Angevine
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Transportation Affairs

URGENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

RECEIVED

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

6522

ACTION OFFICER:

MELBY M.

DUE:

ASAP

☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates

☐ Appropriate Action

☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi

☐ Prepare Memo for Sittmann

☒ Prepare Memo Sittmann

to Ede Holiday

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext.

4985

FYI

☐ Barth
☐ Basora
☐ Beers
☐ Blackwill
☐ Broome
☐ Burns
☐ Chamberlin
☐ Charles
☐ Coulson
☐ Davis
☐ Deal
☐ Dorminey
☐ Dyke
☐ Fry
☐ Gaughan
☐ Gordon
☐ Haass
☒ Hayden
☐ Hutchings
☐ Jackson

FYI

☐ Johnson
☐ Kaeuper
☐ Kanter
☐ Kitchen
☐ LaMagna
☐ Lampley
☐ Levin
☐ Lundsager
☐ Mandel
☐ Melby
☐ Menan
☐ Merchant
☐ Miller
☐ Needels
☐ O'Leary
☐ Ordway
☐ Paal
☐ Pacelli
☒ Pilling
☐ Popadiuk

FYI

☐ Pryce
☐ Rademaker
☐ Rice
☐ Rodman
☒ Rostow (allus.)
☐ Salvetti
☐ Tilley
☐ Tobey
☐ Van Eron
☐ Watson
☐ Welch
☐ Whitley
☐ Wilson
☐ Working
☐ Zelikow
☐ _____
☐ _____
☐ _____
☐ _____
☐ _____

INFORMATION

☒ Sittmann
☐ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Deputy Exec. Sec.

☐ Gates (advance)

☐ Exec. Sec. Desk

☒ Secretariat

COMMENTS

CRW#:

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URGENT

Return to Secretariat

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6522

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>RM</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>CM 8/14</u>	<u>0</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS
WH Referral - due 48AP

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: RM. 235

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006597
RECEIVED: 16 AUG 90 17

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 15 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

IRAQ



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG W/ SAUDI FOMIN ON 16 AUG RE IRAQI INVASION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 20 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHARLES
HAASS
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

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Aug. 15

TO: Bob Gates
FROM: Richard Haass
RE: 3:00 p.m. Meeting on Aug. 16 with Saudis

We have no real sense of what the Saudi Foreign Minister and Bandar have on their minds. All we know is that this visit comes after some intense diplomacy among Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria and that Faisal speaks for the three. My hunch is that he will want to discuss a diplomatic approach to the current situation to complement all that is being done to defend Saudi Arabia and enforce sanctions. What such an approach might look like is anybody's guess, although knowing Faisal I would not be shocked if it included some mention of the Palestinian problem.

I think it important as well for us to use this meeting to move on our own agenda with the Saudis. In addition to giving them a read-out of the meeting with King Hussein to ensure there is no feeling that we are dealing behind their back, I suggest four other issues:

--We should push for increased Saudi oil production and a Saudi lead within OPEC for increased output by other producers. This is key to world economic health and to maintaining domestic political support for what we are doing.

--We need to urge the Saudis to join with others (Japan, the EC, other Gulf states including Kuwait) to provide compensation (money and where applicable oil) for countries most affected by supporting defense of Saudi Arabia and/or compliance with sanctions, eg, Turkey, Egypt, possibly Jordan, Morocco, Eastern Europeans, etc.

--We should discuss support for Kuwait "government in exile" in the realm of broadcasting, logistics support, etc.

--We could also discuss how best to combat Saddam's public diplomacy in the Arab world.

These are some initial ideas you are welcome to keep to yourself or share with the President. Brent has not seen this.

See you in the morning.

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2010-0396-MR
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CARD 1 OF 2

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER

- I HAD A GOOD MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN. I'D
BE GLAD TO GIVE YOU A DEBRIEF.
- INCREASED SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION AND A SAUDI
LEAD WITHIN OPEC FOR INCREASED OUTPUT BY OTHER
PRODUCERS WOULD GREATLY HELP US. THIS IS KEY
TO WORLD ECONOMIC HEALTH AND TO MAINTAINING
DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR WHAT WE ARE
DOING.

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CARD 2 OF 2

- I WOULD HOPE YOU COULD JOIN WITH OTHERS
(JAPAN, THE EC, OTHER GULF STATES INCLUDING
KUWAIT) TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION (MONEY AND
WHERE APPLICABLE OIL) FOR COUNTRIES MOST
AFFECTED BY SUPPORTING DEFENSE OF SAUDI ARABIA
AND/OR COMPLIANCE WITH SANCTIONS, EG, TURKEY,
EGYPT, POSSIBLY JORDAN, MOROCCO, EASTERN
EUROPEANS, ETC.
- IS THERE ANYTHING MORE THAT WE CAN DO TO
SUPPORT KUWAIT'S "GOVERNMENT IN EXILE" IN THE
REALM OF BROADCASTING, LOGISTICS SUPPORT, ETC?
- WHAT ARE YOUR IDEAS FOR HOW BEST TO COMBAT
SADDAM'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE ARAB WORLD?

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006520
RECEIVED: 14 AUG 90 12

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 16 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREECE
NIGERIA

TOGO
HS

PERSONS: EYADEMA, GNASSINGBE
MITSOTAKIS, CONSTATINE

BABANGIDA, IBRAHIM B

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF AUG 15

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 17 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 4/21/2007

COMMENTS: _____

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CLOSED BY: NSGAD

DOC 2 OF 2

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6520

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

Prime Minister Mitsotakis of Greece - August 9, 1990
(Received August 13)

✓ PM Mitsotakis condemns Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait and supports UN Resolution 660 and 661. Since the "annexation" of Kuwait by Iraq and other recent developments, Greece has joined the multinational naval force to deter any unprovoked attack against Saudi Arabia. He shares your views on the need to counter aggressive action against an independent nation.

President Eyadema of Togo - August 8, 1990
(Received August 9)

✓ President Eyadema supports your actions in response to Iraq's "annexation" of Kuwait. He also thanks you for the warm welcome he received during his recent visit.

President Babangida of Nigeria - July 21, 1990
(Received August 13)

✓ President Babangida opposes lifting sanctions against South Africa. Although there is a favorable momentum for change, he feels that President de Klerk is seeking to be rewarded for "modest gestures". His views were reinforced by his meeting with Nelson Mandela.

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2010-039614R
EJ 12/21/15

Athens, 9th August, 1990

Dear Mr. President,

Since the very first hours of the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait, Greece condemned this naked aggression and unreservedly supported and immediately enacted the implementation of Security Council Resolutions No 660 and 661.

In the light of the more recent developments and especially of the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, Greece has already positively reacted to your Government's appeal as to her participation along with other allied nations in a multinational naval force. Greece's participation aims at deterring any unprovoked attack against Saudi Arabia that might threaten our vital interests in the area.

The Greek Naval Attache in Washington has been instructed to inform your Government on the above as well as on certain questions of Greek concern that require clarification.

Mr. President,

I wholeheartedly share your views about the need to take serious steps in order to counter any aggressive action against the independence and the territorial integrity of a sovereign state and member of the United Nations and to restore international legality.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

With most friendly regards,

C. K. Kotsakis

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006556
RECEIVED: 15 AUG 90 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 16 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: JORDAN

AP

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON 16 AUG / TALKING POINTS /
PARTICIPANTS LIST

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 18 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

WELCH

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

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6556

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 16, 1990

MEETING WITH
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

DATE: August 16, 1990

LOCATION: Kennebunkport

TIME: 12:00 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To hear King Hussein's views on the current situation and to elicit greater cooperation from King Hussein in the Gulf crisis.

II. BACKGROUND

King Hussein's surprise visit has heightened expectations of a Jordanian-brokered negotiation between the United States and Iraq. We need to turn attention instead to our agenda: tightening sanctions; getting Iraq out of Kuwait as a precedent to any negotiations between them; and keeping any such negotiations de-linked from our presence in Saudi Arabia. Unless Hussein has promising ideas, the strategy for the Hussein visit should be to keep the focus on Iraq's intransigence and off the perception, and distraction, of a Jordanian mediation between us and Iraq. Then, the specific issues with Jordan should be whether it will impose sanctions, and if so, how this can be accomplished so that Jordan's domestic stability is preserved.

Jordan's position has evolved, but the progress has been slow, grudging and far from complete. Jordan's recent Arab League vote (reserving, not opposing), its non-recognition of the puppet Kuwait government, its rejection of the acquisition of territory by force, and the apparent decision to impose sanctions are all steps in the right direction.

On the negative side, Jordan -- with the King doing most of the talking -- continues its rhetorical support of Iraq, its opposition to the presence of "foreign" forces on Arab soil, and a quixotic pursuit of a negotiated Arab solution. Hussein is not alone among the Arab moderates in his

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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tolerance of Saddam (Ali Abdallah Salih and Ben Ali are perhaps even bigger disappointments since they have less at stake), but everyone expected more of the King because of his moderate, cautious image. Nonetheless, he has stubbornly stuck with a losing approach; had Hussein taken a different tack early on, his population would have been more prepared for the shift away from Iraq that compliance with sanctions would represent.

It is not clear what Hussein is bringing in his role as mediator; Zaid Bin Shaker told me there is no message from Saddam. In any case, I do not believe he can deliver Saddam for a deal that we would accept. He will undoubtedly describe Saddam's sense of paranoia that the United States and Israel are going to attack him. Hussein may digress about the historic roots of the conflict with Kuwait, the bitterness of the Arabs -- and his own family -- about Western paternalism, and the "irony" of U.S. inaction on Israel's acquisition of territory by force. Bin Shaker said that the King feels unfairly maligned, that Jordan's views are in fact close to ours, and that he wants to clear the air with you.

Hussein may nevertheless spring an "idea" on you, e.g., a package consisting of a mutual pullback of Iraq from Kuwait and the United States from Saudi Arabia, insertion of an Arab force, and lifting of sanctions. Any proposals should be evaluated against our basic principles: Iraq out of Kuwait unconditionally; restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; and our defense of friendly states in the area. The best approach would be to hear Hussein out, assure him of our interest in a negotiated solution, note that Iraq's credibility is manifestly poor, and restate our basic principles. We have strong arguments in Security Council and Arab League decisions. All have called for complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal as the sine qua non for negotiations. We should be supportive of the prospect of Iraqi negotiations with the legitimate Kuwait government, but realistic about the absence of any reasonable negotiating process and Saddam's duplicity so far.

The specific issue we need to address in this meeting with Hussein is sanctions. His balancing act between backing Saddam and exploring imposition of sanctions is only sustainable for a short time. We need to help him make the right choice; Jordan is a major loophole in the sanctions front. But if he does choose correctly, then -- in concert with others -- we need to be prepared to help, and to do so in a convincing and effective manner. This "package deal" should be the essence of your private talk with Hussein.

Hussein is cautious, but not without reason, since his economic and political security are at stake. Rigorous implementation of sanctions could cripple Jordan's already ailing economy. Up to \$900 million, 25 per cent of Jordan's GNP, could be gobbled up by cutting the economic cord to Iraq. By comparison, Turkey stands to lose \$2 billion, but only 3 percent of GNP. Jordan imports 95 per cent of its oil from Iraq, with the cost charged against Iraq's loan balance; this oil would need to be replaced, and Jordan simply does not have the spare foreign exchange to meet any additional payments, let alone its existing debt. Jordan is also heavily dependent on expatriate remittances, especially from some 200,000 workers in Kuwait, which are certain to drop sharply. The Jordanians will probably throw some spurious numbers at you, but the cold fact is that Jordan stands to lose grievously by sanctions -- probably more than any other nation relative to the size of its economy. The powerful rejoinder is that unless Jordan goes along with sanctions, it will risk foregoing external support, with even more serious consequences for the economy.

The political challenge is also serious. To weather imposition of sanctions, Hussein would need to accept aid from Iraq's enemies, in effect payment for acting against Saddam. The popular reaction in Jordan, perhaps exploited by Iraq, could be severe, especially if Hussein was pushed too quickly to a public U-turn away from Iraq. If Iraq meddles too much, an Israeli reaction might ensue, with the prospect of an Israeli-Iraqi war that would yank the rug out from under the tenuous Arab support for our presence in the region.

In short, we have a dilemma: we need to close Aqaba, funnel for 45 per cent of Baghdad's imports, ideally by Jordan imposing sanctions; but if sanctions are imposed, Hussein will be exposed. While we may perceive those risks as bearable in the context of the Iraq crisis, we have an enduring interest in a stable, moderate Jordan next to Israel.

The British have suggested providing Jordan with clear reassurance about financial help if Hussein implements sanctions. They have suggested approaching the Japanese, Saudis, and Kuwaitis, and are exploring how the United Kingdom could help. Inter-Arab animosities are high now, so any approach to the Saudis and Kuwaitis would need to be grounded in credible Jordanian performance.

To summarize, you should use this meeting to be candid about our disappointment with the King and Jordan. You should convey our sense of the enormity of the stakes in this for us. At the same time, you can express understanding for

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Jordan's difficult position, that its cooperation on sanctions is desired, and that we are prepared to work with Jordan to minimize any damage/pain/risk it may face. Jordan should also know that if it is not willing to impose sanctions that we are prepared to block Aqaba unilaterally and that our traditional readiness to come to Jordan's aid if it is threatened would be jeopardized. It would be hard to explain to the Congress and the American people why we were helping a country unwilling to help us.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE

One-on-one meeting followed by a luncheon.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Secretary Baker's Memo

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CARD 1 OF 7

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

U.S. - JORDAN RELATIONS

- I AM GLAD FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THE AIR. AS ALWAYS, I WELCOME YOUR VISIT AND THE CHANCE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS.
- OUR RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE CLOSE AND TRUSTING.
- OUR DISAPPOINTMENT WAS REAL. PERSONALLY, I FELT LET DOWN.
- THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A SERIOUS SLIPPAGE IN JORDAN'S IMAGE IN THE UNITED STATES THAT WILL TAKE TIME AND EFFORT TO REPAIR.

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CARD 2 OF 7

- BEFORE WE LOOK AT THE ISSUES IN DETAIL, I WANT TO BE SURE THAT WE SHARE AN APPRECIATION OF THE STAKES INVOLVED.
- FOR US, THE STAKES ARE ENORMOUS: OUR ECONOMIC SECURITY; THE DEFENSE OF OUR FRIENDS; THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FREEDOM AND PEACE. WE ARE NOT ABOUT TO BACK DOWN.

U.S. PRINCIPLES FOR A SOLUTION

- OUR AIM IS CLEAR: WE WANT AN IMMEDIATE, UNCONDITIONAL, AND COMPLETE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL; AND, KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT MUST BE RESTORED.
- WE HAVE DRAWN THE LINE TO CONTAIN SADDAM. NOW, THE GOAL IS TO GET HIM OUT OF KUWAIT.

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CARD 3 OF 7

- UNTIL THE IRAQI AGGRESSION IS RESOLVED, WE WILL LEAD THE WAY IN IMPOSING THE STRICTEST SANCTIONS POSSIBLE, ON ALL PRODUCTS, TO MAKE SADDAM REALIZE THE COSTS OF HIS ERROR.
- WE AREN'T TRYING TO SUPPLANT NEGOTIATIONS BY FORCE; ON THE CONTRARY, WE WANT TO SEE A REAL NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT.
- BUT I DON'T SEE HOW SADDAM HUSSEIN CAN BE BROUGHT TO THE TABLE WITHOUT DETERMINED EFFORT.
- HAD WE NOT ACTED, THERE IS NO TELLING WHERE THEY WOULD STOP. IN A MEETING WITH OUR CHARGE', HE SAID THAT "RULING FAMILIES HAVE COME AND GONE BEFORE IN THE REGION."

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CARD 4 OF 7

SANCTIONS

- OBVIOUSLY, THE LONGER THIS DRAGS ON, THE GREATER ITS DANGERS.
- THAT IS WHY WE ARE DETERMINED TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS VERY STRICTLY.
- VOLUNTARY ENFORCEMENT IS EXCELLENT SO FAR.
- INEVITABLY, THERE WILL BE LEAKS, BUT WE WILL CLOSE THOSE.
- IN THIS REGARD, I HAVE JUST ISSUED THE NECESSARY ORDERS TO OUR NAVY TO PERFORM INTERCEPT OPERATIONS AT ALL POSSIBLE TRANSHIPMENT POINTS FOR IRAQ.

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CARD 5 OF 7

EFFECT ON JORDAN OF SANCTIONS

- I HOPE, YOUR MAJESTY, THAT YOU WILL DO YOUR BEST RAPIDLY TO COMPLY WITH THE UNSC SANCTIONS RESOLUTION.
- MORE THAN ANY OTHER ACTION, THAT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE CHANCES THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION CAN BE OBTAINED.
- I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR APPRAISAL OF HOW JORDAN STANDS ON THIS.
- WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY RISKS FOR JORDAN.

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CARD 6 OF 7

- LET ME ASSURE YOU: JUST AS I HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD ON SANCTIONS, I WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN BUILDING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR HELPING JORDAN WEATHER THE CONSEQUENCES, IF YOU ARE WITH US.
- FURTHERMORE, THERE'S NO NEED TO MAKE A BIG PUBLIC SPLASH; WHAT WE WANT ARE EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS, NOT PUBLICITY.

JORDANIAN SECURITY

- THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG SUPPORTED JORDANIAN SECURITY.
- THE CURRENT CRISIS POSES REAL DANGERS FOR YOUR COUNTRY. YOU NEED TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL NOT TO PROVIDE ISRAEL A PRETEXT FOR ACTING AGAINST YOU. MOVING TOO CLOSE TO IRAQ IS ONE

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CARD 7 OF 7

SURE WAY TO DO THIS.

-- LET ME BE CANDID HERE. OUR ABILITY TO COME TO JORDAN'S AID IN A MOMENT OF CRISIS IS ON THE LINE. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO EXPLAIN TO THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHY AMERICAN BOYS WERE BEING PLACED AT RISK TO HELP A COUNTRY UNWILLING TO HELP US.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

U.S. - Jordan Relations

- I am glad for this opportunity to clear the air. As always, I welcome your visit and the chance to hear your views.
- Our relationship should be close and trusting.
- Our disappointment was real. Personally, I felt let down.
- There has also been a serious slippage in Jordan's image in the United States that will take time and effort to repair.
- Before we look at the issues in detail, I want to be sure that we share an appreciation of the stakes involved.
- For us, the stakes are enormous: our economic security; the defense of our friends; the fundamentals of freedom and peace. We are not about to back down.

U.S. Principles for a Solution

- Our aim is clear: we want an immediate, unconditional, and complete Iraqi withdrawal; and, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored.
- We have drawn the line to contain Saddam. Now, the goal is to get him out of Kuwait.
- Until the Iraqi aggression is resolved, we will lead the way in imposing the strictest sanctions possible, on all products, to make Saddam realize the costs of his error.

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- We aren't trying to supplant negotiations by force; on the contrary, we want to see a real negotiations process between Iraq and Kuwait.
- But I don't see how Saddam Hussein can be brought to the table without determined effort.
- Had we not acted, there is no telling where they would stop. In a meeting with our Charge', he said that "ruling families have come and gone before in the region."

Sanctions

- Obviously, the longer this drags on, the greater its dangers.
- That is why we are determined to enforce sanctions very strictly.
- Voluntary enforcement is excellent so far.
- Inevitably, there will be leaks, but we will close those.
- In this regard, I have just issued the necessary orders to our Navy to perform intercept operations at all possible transshipment points for Iraq.

Effect on Jordan of Sanctions

- I hope, your Majesty, that you will do your best rapidly to comply with the UNSC sanctions resolution.
- More than any other action, that would strengthen the chances that a peaceful solution can be obtained.
- I would like to hear your appraisal of how Jordan stands on this.

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- We are sensitive to the political, economic, and military risks for Jordan.
- Let me assure you: just as I have taken the lead on sanctions, I will take the lead in building international support for helping Jordan weather the consequences, if you are with us.
- Furthermore, there's no need to make a big public splash; what we want are effective sanctions, not publicity.

Jordanian Security

- The United States has long supported Jordanian security.
- The current crisis poses real dangers for your country. You need to be extremely careful not to provide Israel a pretext for acting against you. Moving too close to Iraq is one sure way to do this.
- Let me be candid here. Our ability to come to Jordan's aid in a moment of crisis is on the line. It would be difficult for me to explain to the Congress and the American people why American boys were being placed at risk to help a country unwilling to help us.

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PARTICIPANTS *

U.S.

The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs
Roger G. Harrison, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian
Affairs

Jordan

King Hussein of Jordan
Mudar Badran, Prime Minister
Zeid Bin Shaker, Chief of the Royal Court
Marwan Kasim, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Hussein Hammami, Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S.
Abdullah Salah, Jordanian Ambassador to the U.N.
Adnan Abu Odeh, Political Advisor to the King

* tentative

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11d. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Official Working Visit of King Hussein of Jordan (4 pp.)	8/15/90	(b)(1)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part II

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/6/2011

Date Closed:	5/22/2009	OA/ID Number:	91143-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1998-0099-F/2(540.03)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	7/6/2011	MR Disposition Date:	

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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August 15, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: James A. Baker, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: Official Working Visit of King Hussein
of Jordan

I. SETTING

- o Jordan has pursued an erratic course during the Gulf crisis. Jordanian public opinion solidly supports Iraq, and King Hussein does not want to buck a public that is economically down and frustrated over U.S. policies vis a vis Israel and the peace process.
- o Hussein fears that Likud policies and mass Soviet Jewish immigration are real destabilizers to his kingdom. He also fears Syrian intentions. He has seen ties with Iraq as a means of countering both of his neighbors.
- o Moreover, Jordan has deep economic ties to Baghdad and will suffer immediately from sanctions. A conservative estimate is that Jordan stands to lose \$1.5 billion by implementing sanctions. In particular, Jordan will need to spend \$450 million on oil imports to replace Iraqi oil that is provided in repayment of debt.
- o Jordan has undercut our efforts against Iraq in several ways. Least problematic are Jordan's agricultural exports to Iraq.
- o Much more troublesome are indications that Jordanian bankers face serious sanctions-busting in money laundering for Iraq and possible transshipment of oil and other trade.
- o The most serious problems we could face are activities that harm U.S. forces directly, e.g., possible arms shipments to Iraq, intelligence sharing on U.S. military movements, or provision of technical assistance (for example, helping Iraq operate captured Hawk missile batteries). Note that we have no real evidence that Jordan has yet crossed any of those red lines.

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DECL: OADR

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- o The King's latest effort to deal with these dilemmas is to take the diplomatic lead to resolve the crisis -- preserving his options and ties to all parties.

- o

(b)(1)

II. OBJECTIVES

- o Our long term interest in Jordan's stability has been highlighted by the crisis. We should not let this asset waste away, and we certainly should not write it off.
- o More immediately, we need to prevent any tacit alliance between Iraq and Jordan that could provide Iraq with a vehicle for undercutting sanctions. We also need to avoid a situation whereby Iraq draws Jordan into the Gulf conflict and thus crosses Israeli "red lines."
- o To address our interests, you will need to define clearly for the King what it is we seek:
 - Iraqi withdrawal and restoration of the legitimate leadership of Kuwait.
 - Peaceful resolution of financial and boundary disputes between Iraq and Kuwait.
- o It will be equally important to define clearly that we do not seek to punish Iraq or its people, or to deny Iraq military security.
- o To realize these interests, we should pursue three objectives during this visit.
 - Convey a blunt private message to the King that the future of U.S.-Jordanian relations hinges on his compliance with international efforts against Iraqi aggression.
 - Offer him a package of financial and economic offsets, incentives and security measures to bolster his ability to stand apart from Iraq.
 - Position ourselves, especially in the Arab world, as interested in keeping diplomatic doors open, but equally interested in maintaining solidarity with our friends in standing up to Iraqi aggression.

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- o In dealing with Hussein's diplomatic agenda, we should insist that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait precede any other elements of a diplomatic solution. We can listen carefully to other elements that Hussein may propose.
- o For example, he could propose a role for the Kuwait National Assembly in defining future political governance. Or, he could propose a neutral mechanism to deal with Iraq's financial and boundary claims. We need not oppose these, which are Kuwaiti decisions to make.
- o In general, while we will want to show some interest in a diplomatic package the King brings, we should be very cautious about leading him (or others) to believe that our interest in diplomacy represents a slackening of will to stand up to Iraq.

III. STRATEGY

- o If the King will join the Arab League and international consensus against Iraq, we should be prepared to discuss with him a package that protects him from serious financial or physical harm.
- o To offset economic damage to Jordan, we could propose:
 - Immediate oil supplies from the Saudis and financial aid from the Saudis and Kuwait.
 - Japanese cash (not project) assistance; you have already asked Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu to increase assistance to Jordan. Also, EC could include Jordan in its "compensation fund."
 - Transfer \$70 million in uncommitted AID funds. \$20 million is available in reprogrammed FMS funds.
 - Work with Jordan on sanctions relief under Article 50 for specified, non-threatening trade.
- o To provide incentives to Jordan, we could:
 - Include Jordan in any supplemental budget requests that apply to other regional states, like Egypt.
 - Restate our commitments to Jordan's security and to a just resolution of the Palestinian issue.
- o To protect Jordan from Iraq, we could:
 - Reaffirm our commitment to stand by Jordan if its sovereignty and independence are threatened.

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- Tell Israel to stay calm as Saddam blusters.
- o To put this into effect, King Hussein must agree to implement U.N. sanctions faithfully. You should indicate we are coordinating this approach carefully with the British.

Attachments:

- Tab 1: Contingencies in Jordan
- Tab 2: Upcoming U.S. Decisions on Jordan
- Tab 3: Public Themes for Visit of King Hussein

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CONTINGENCIES IN JORDAN

As we work to bring King Hussein into compliance with sanctions against Iraq, there are a number of contingencies we and the King may face that could affect his resolve and our ability to enforce sanctions. The following are illustrative:

A. Domestic Unrest: Both Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan have demonstrated in support of the Iraqi invasion. Saddam's action is popular in Jordan, and if the King gets tough on sanctions, we can expect that the Iraqis will work to inflame these sentiments. In addition, the King's political opposition, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, may join in any agitation in support of their own agenda. The Palestinians will attack the King's enforcement of sanctions as showing a Western "double standard," in contrast to the absence of sanctions in the case of Israeli occupation.

-- U.S. Options: The King must demonstrate that the Jordanian economy is not suffering because of sanctions. Much of Saddam's popular support in Jordan flows from perceptions of the Iraqi invasion as a victory of the have-nots over the haves, and the King must show that he has other friends who will come to Jordan's economic aid. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait's leadership will have to be persuaded to overcome their resentments and treat Jordan generously. On the Israeli/Palestinian question, Hussein will need a public affirmation that the United States remains committed to advancing the Peace Process. Statements by the Saudis, Mubarak and especially Arafat that the Palestinian cause is not advanced by a war of Arabs against Arabs will be important.

B. Iraqi Pressures to Enter Jordan: We have seen indications of Iraqi interest in moving military forces into Jordan and heard from the Israelis that the two countries plan to unify (the Jordanians were incredulous and strongly denied this). Saddam may keep up this pressure as a means of recasting the crisis into Arab-Israeli terms.

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-- U.S. Options: The Israelis have made it clear that they could not tolerate a move by Iraqi forces into Jordan. The King no doubt takes this seriously. He may fear, however, that if he strictly observes sanctions, the Iraqis may try to punish Jordan militarily. Hussein's ability to convince Saddam the Israelis mean it and Saddam's presumed interest in avoiding Armageddon are probably the best antidote to precipitous Iraqi action.

C. Terrorism

There are signs that the Iraqis (who can already count on Abu Abbas) are doing more with Abu Nidal. The Jordanians would be vulnerable to Iraqi-sponsored terrorism if they pursue sanctions seriously -- a more likely punishment than military action.

-- U.S. Options: Besides continued intelligence exchanges, there is little we can do directly to counter Iraqi-backed terrorism against the Jordanians. Jordan's own security service will be the most important bulwark. Jordan might ask for technical assistance in coping with infiltration. Arafat's loathing for Abu Nidal may drive him to cooperate with the Jordanians.

D. Jordanian Non-Compliance

Finally, it is possible that despite our best efforts, the King may decide that he can not or will not deny Iraqi access to Aqaba.

-- U.S. Options: If the King tells us that he cannot enforce sanctions because of some combination of domestic and Iraqi pressures outlined above, we should consult closely and quietly with him on a second line of interdiction, perhaps in the Strait of Tiran. If the King is acting out of duress rather than political volition, it may still be possible to deny the Iraqis the benefits of Aqaba and also prevent them from achieving a political victory by splitting Jordan off from the other Arabs.

The most critical element in getting the King on board for sanctions will be our ability to assure him that economic losses to Jordan will be offset. If the King can be confident that his fragile economy will be sustained, there is a good chance that he will have the political will to withstand the inevitable pressures the Iraqis will bring to bear.

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UPCOMING U.S. DECISIONS ON JORDAN

A. Rumayla

The "Rumayla," an Iraqi owned and flagged tanker, cleared Kuwait two days before the Iraqi attack with a cargo of 27,500 tons of fuel oil, a grant to Jordan from the legitimate Government of Kuwait. We believe the ship is in the Persian Gulf. PM Badran has asked us to help locate the ship. The USN sighted the ship on August 2 and believe it is now in the Persian Gulf.

DECISION: Whether to allow the ship to proceed to Jordan. If not, we could interdict the ship and prevent it from proceeding to Aqaba.

B. Balgees

This ship is enroute from Poland to Aqaba with a shipment of military equipment for Iraq. The Egyptians are undecided on whether to stop the ship at Suez.

DECISION: Whether to interdict the "Balgees," either before or after it transits the Suez. If it gets through, we must tell the Jordanians not to allow the cargo to be transported to Iraq.

C. Oil Supplies

Jordan will also be asking for U.S. assistance in immediately finding alternate sources of crude and fuel oil.

DECISION: Whether to press the Saudis to provide for Jordan's needs. Of first priority would be getting the Saudis to make the TAPline available for transporting oil to Jordan.

D. Economic

FY90 funds: \$31 million in Economic Support Funds from FY90 remain available. Also, \$36 million remains uncommitted from previous years. \$35 million of FY 91 money is earmarked in the House.

DECISION: Whether to convert all or part of that money into a cash transfer, as an incentive/relief.

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E. Agricultural

Jordan will count on continuation of at least current annual levels of grant food aid from the U.S. (\$27 million). Although Congress is still considering new food aid legislation for FY91, early programming for FY91 may still be possible.

DECISION: Whether to offer our "best efforts" to provide grant food aid at current or higher levels for early FY91.

DECISION: Whether to convert the commodities Jordan purchases via a U.S. credit guarantee program (GSM) to grant (Section 416/PL480 Title II) or concessionary loans (PL-480/Title I).

F. Military

Almost \$24 million remains unapportioned. This includes the \$20 million transferred from DOD.

DECISION: Whether and when to apportion these funds.

Jordan could theoretically be made eligible for Excess Defense Articles under "Southern Region Amendment" treatment, but its inclusion in this program would be hotly opposed by supporters of Israel.

DECISION: Whether to consider including Jordan in an EDA vehicle.

G. U.S. Approaches to Others

The EC has indicated it will try and help Jordan. Japan also has a big stake in helping and has helped in the past. The Saudis and other GCC countries have traditionally been Jordan's largest benefactors.

DECISION: Whether to approach the EC countries, Japan, and the GCC countries to urge more assistance for Jordan.

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UNCLASSIFIED

August 14, 1990

Public Themes for Visit of King Hussein

- o Jordan has been a key friend and ally for many years. We have stood together through some difficult moments.
- o My own personal respect and admiration for His Majesty King Hussein remain strong.
- o So does the U.S. commitment to Jordan's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, which are essential to peace and stability in the Middle East.
- o It is the violation of those same principles through Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait which lie at the heart of the current crisis in the Gulf.
- o As the United Nations Security Council has underscored in three resolutions, such aggression simply cannot be tolerated by the international community.
- o As part of an unprecedented international consensus, we seek to implement those resolutions and achieve Iraq's immediate and complete withdrawal, and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.
- o Let me be clear: our concern is to reverse Iraq's aggression against its Arab neighbor. We are not seeking to punish the Iraqi people. The issue here is stopping the intolerable behavior of the Saddam Hussein regime.
- o As we seek to resolve the Gulf crisis, we must not lose sight of the continuing importance of resolving other conflicts in the region.
- o In particular, I want to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, through negotiations based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, which in our view must involve territory for peace, Israel's security, and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinians.
- o Secretary Baker and I will continue to spare no effort to help the parties move toward negotiations.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 15, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Meeting of King Hussein of Jordan with the
President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President for his
meeting August 16 with King Hussein of Jordan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Secretary Baker's Memo

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 8/7/2013

**National Security Council
The White House**

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
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Pres mtg w/ King Hussein on Aug. 16 at NOON

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TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: DEAL

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DOC DATE: 16 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OIL
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ECONOMICS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MANAGING OIL SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION / NEXT STEPS

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 18 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF: 9006613

FILES: PA

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/22/2009

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 16, 1990

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E8 6/29/15

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL 

SUBJECT: Managing the Oil Supply Disruption: Next Steps

The interagency group under John Robson's chairmanship has completed its evaluation of the economic impact of the oil supply disruption caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The report (Tab I) poses six possible disruption scenarios without evaluating their likelihood. For example, in the case of a six-month disruption of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil with two-thirds of the shortfall offset by other OPEC production and/or drawdowns of commercial and government stocks (scenario 2D, page 1 of report), the economic effects in the U.S. would be:

Oil Price: an increase of \$4 per barrel *from what base?*
GNP: decline of 0.2 to 0.5%
Inflation: increase of 0.4 to 0.7% in Consumer Price Index
Unemployment: increase of 0.1 to 0.2%
Trade Deficit: increase in deficit of \$2-7 billion

All countries, except the oil producers, would suffer similar effects. Developing countries and Eastern Europe would be particularly hard hit.

The paper also points out, without aggregating the figures, that the 4.3 million barrel per day (mbd) disruption (Iraq and Kuwait combined) potentially could be offset as follows:

Increased Production: 4.5 mbd

from following sources:

Saudi Arabia	2.2
UAE	0.6
Venezuela	0.2
Nigeria	0.2
Other OPEC	0.6
Non-OPEC including U.S.	0.7

Draw Down of Stocks¹

Commercial	1.64 billion
Governments	.85 billion

¹ Note these are total figures for stocks, not barrels per day. Fifty percent of commercial stocks are not available for use since they comprise minimum operating inventories.

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A 1.5 mbd draw down of stocks, coupled with maximum production from all sources, would make available 6.0 mbd to cover the anticipated 4.3 mbd shortfall. Even more oil would be available to the extent that non-stock holding countries take action to reduce demand through restraint measures, fuel-switching, etc. This is merely an illustration of the possibilities, not a realistic forecast of what is likely to occur. But it does point out that we have the potential to cover the shortfall entirely if we can gain the cooperation of producing countries, the oil companies, and our partners in the International Energy Agency (IEA).

This is the key information to be gleaned from the interagency report. In addition to the Executive Summary, you might glance at the tables on pages 1, 3, 4 and 6. We believe a detailed discussion by the Deputies or the NSC of the scenarios, stock calculations, and macroeconomic forecasts is unnecessary. What we need to do now is use the analysis to evaluate our policy options. In that regard, a further round of interagency consultations on the alternatives would not be fruitful and would waste time just when the spot market appears to be turning up again. The remainder of this memo sets forth a strategy to minimize the economic impact of this disruption.

Strategy for Coping with the Shortfall

The Economic Directorate believes that we should begin now to develop a coordinated strategy to cope with the potential shortfall. Richard Haass, however, believes that such planning is premature at this moment, as we do not know what the actual shortfall will be. What follows is a proposal from the Economic Directorate; it does not necessarily reflect Richard's views.

There are several reasons why we believe the President should take now (and be seen as taking) a leadership role among the allies in coordinating a strategy to replace lost Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil:

- (a) Determining the supply shortfall is not a green-eyeshades' exercise. We cannot simply add up possible additions to supply, subtract the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude and draw a balance. Trader and consumer perceptions of available supply often determine prices, as we saw in 1973-74 and 1979-80.
- (b) Remaining Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil at sea will reach consumers within four weeks at the latest. Unless adequate replacement supplies are on the market then, trader psychology will begin pushing prices higher.
- (c) Any replacement supplies other than a draw down of company stocks will take time to reach the market. DOE estimates it will take at least three weeks for the first barrel of SPR oil to reach the market once the President has authorized a draw down. Additional supplies from Saudi Arabia and the UAE will take up to six weeks to reach North America.

- (d) There is likely to be strong pressure, when Congress reconvenes in early September, to force the Administration to draw down the SPR. The Administration should lead Congress, not follow it.
- (e) The U.S. has long pushed our IEA partners, particularly Japan and Germany, to build strategic stocks for first defense use in a major supply disruption. We have worked hard since 1984 to develop a system for a coordinated IEA stock draw. There are political and economic benefits to demonstrating to IEA publics (including their legislatures) and oil producers that IEA countries have a system that works.
- (f) Any oil IEA countries can bring to the market place will have a salutary effect on oil prices -- and thus on national economies. If oil prices decline significantly because of actions we take to complement increased production from oil producers, Eastern Europe and developing countries will benefit. We can do much more for these countries by pushing the price of oil down than by various proposals to assist them finance the higher costs through access to IMF or other IFI facilities. *True*
- (g) Market intervention would be more effective -- and certainly less costly to all consumers -- if we attack the problem while prices hover in the \$25-27 a barrel range than if they soar to \$32-35. *✓*

Although essentially this is an economic strategy, it has important political implications. As our embargo shuts off Iraqi access to necessary imports and prevents oil from moving out into the world market, the stranglehold on Saddam will tighten. If through a coordinated economic plan we can show Saddam, our own consumers, and the rest of the world that we need not suffer the economic consequences of Saddam's aggression, the failure of his effort would become more evident and pressure on Iraq would mount accordingly.

Efforts to get the OPEC surplus producers (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Nigeria, Venezuela) to increase production are stalled for want of a signal by Saudi Arabia that it will increase production. *Really?* There are various reports about Saudi intentions to increase production, but nothing definite or official thus far. It would be a mistake to wait for an OPEC meeting to be organized; OPEC does not have a record of making speedy decisions in the interest of consumers. We should press Saudi Arabia to increase production; if it does, at least some of the other countries are likely to follow suit. Kuwait's offer to "lend" Saudi Arabia its OPEC quota can provide Saudi Arabia cover (if our troops are not sufficient inducement). We would seek commitments before we consider a coordinated draw down of U.S. and other governmental strategic reserves.

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Even with best efforts by OPEC and other producers, we are likely to face a shortfall of at least one million barrels/day (not counting the need for spare capacity to cope with unusual demand, e.g., cold snap, oil field explosion, tanker accident). A commitment by IEA countries to put an additional 1.5 mbd on the market in September by drawing down strategic stocks and taking complementary measures would relieve pressures on oil prices significantly. Such a commitment is attainable only if the U.S. exerts leadership.

The IEA Governing Board is scheduled to meet at the end of August or in an early September in Paris. We should go to the IEA meeting committed to achieving coordinated action to put additional supplies on the market. It is important that this decision be taken before Congress reconvenes to avoid Congress "instructing" the Administration to draw down the SPR unilaterally. Congressional mail already received strongly favors an early SPR draw.

Prior to the IEA meeting, the President would have to call Kaifu and Kohl to get their commitment to a coordinated stock draw. Without political direction from on high, Japanese and German officials will not want to commit strategic stocks. The Presidential calls to Kaifu and Kohl should be followed up with senior-level demarches to other IEA countries prior to the IEA Governing Board meeting.

Any coordinated IEA stock draw would have to be accompanied by vigorous action to ensure that companies in the OECD area continue to draw down their stocks in a prudent manner. It would be a political disaster if it appeared that companies were increasing commercial inventories by soaking up government reserves put on the market.

Even if the focus of the next Deputies or NSC meeting is the report of the interagency group, we believe it essential that the discussion move quickly to an action program, perhaps along the lines described here. Time is not on our side, and the goodwill and strong support for the President could dissipate quickly if oil prices begin to rise again from already high levels.

Richard Haass concurs in the transmittal of this memo to you, but, as indicated above, does not endorse the recommended strategy.

Concurrence by: Virginia  Lampley

RECOMMENDATION:

That at the earliest opportunity the NSC or the Deputies Committee consider an action plan to deal with the oil disruption.

Approve

Deputies

Disapprove

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Attachment
Tab I Interagency Report

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6549

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON

August 14, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: JOHN E. ROBSON *JR*
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

SUBJECT: Report of the Economic Analysis Group on the
Oil Supply Situation

As you requested of Secretary Brady, attached is a report from the Economic Analysis Group which studied the effects on the U.S. and world economies of various oil supply and oil price scenarios. This report is an interagency effort reflecting extensive participation by many agencies (see cover page of report). There was exceptional cooperation and intense work by all parties in producing this report.

We have considered different scenarios, primarily keyed off the supply interruption of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil. The scenarios assume varying supply gaps over timeframes ranging up to one year.

I should note a few things we have not tried to do in this study:

- o Consonant with our assignment to perform an economic analysis, and in light of the many uncertainties, we have not made judgments about which scenarios are more likely or attempted to draw policy conclusions.
- o We have not tried to capture certain indirect economic effects of the Mid-East developments which are not factored into the existing economic models. For example, possible effects on financial markets are not addressed.
- o We have focused our study of changes on the broader crude oil prices, not on possible impacts in particular sectors (e.g., impact on jet fuel price and the aviation industry).

Finally, while it is accurate to represent that there is consensus among the many participating agencies on the data contained in the report, one agency representative would have preferred a different format for presentation or chosen other supply gap scenarios.

Given the dynamic nature of events, let us know if you feel additional work would be useful.

cc: Secretary Brady

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PER E.O. 12958
1998-0099-F/1
8/6/2001 MM

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Report of the

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP

on the

PACT OF THE OIL SUPPLY SITUATION

August 14, 1990

Participating Agencies:

Central Intelligence Agency
Council of Economic Advisors
Economic Policy Council
Department of Energy
Energy Information Administration
Federal Reserve Board
National Security Council
Office of Management and Budget
Office of the Vice President
Department of State
Department of the Treasury
White House Office of Policy Development

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2001

By Cef NARA, Date 5/22/2009

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*Next Steps: Managing
oil supply
distribution*
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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FROM: HUTCHINGS

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SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAN
AUSTRIA
USSR

SANCTIONS
NATO
EUROPE EAST



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: KEEPING THE EUROPEANS ON BOARD THE IRAQ SANCTIONS REGIME

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 21 AUG 90 STATUS: C

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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August 18, 1990

*Thanks,
Cernother would
resolution help*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ADRIAN A. BASORA (Acting) *AAB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: Keeping the Europeans on Board the Iraq Sanctions Regime

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Despite the strong European support so far, we have had to work on several brushfires simultaneously:

Overflying Austrian Territory. Austria is considering withdrawal of its permission for U.S. MAC overflights, arguing that our interdiction policy does not have UNSC authorization, that our "blockade" is therefore an act of war, and that Austrian neutrality is incompatible with aiding a belligerent. Austrian denial of overflight rights would not only pose operational problems but would be a worrying break in Western solidarity that might encourage others to waver. We are coordinating with State a stiff demarche for delivery at the highest levels. Current overflight authority runs out August 21.

WEU Ministerial. The French pushed through an invitation to the non-WEU EC members (Denmark, Greece, and Ireland) to send observers to the Tuesday Ministerial to coordinate WEU deployments to the Gulf. They did not invite Turkey. We have worked with State and DoD to mount a full court press: letters from Secretary Baker and Secretary Cheney to their counterparts in the WEU, demarches here and in WEU capitals, and various bilateral initiatives. The French have relented so far as to agree to invite the Turks to observe, but only at Ambassadorial level. (In the process the French refused a request from the Norwegians, another non-WEU NATO member.) We will continue to campaign.

Solidifying Turkey's NATO links. We have been working to accelerate an already planned deployment of the 401st TFW to Turkey, although tanker refueling capabilities may preclude this. We are also encouraging the Turks to request deployment of the ACE Mobile Force, while simultaneously working at NATO to ensure a positive response to such a request. Mindful that Ozal will have to weigh the domestic and regional risks of getting too

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exposed militarily, we want to help him find acceptable ways of making NATO's security guarantees tangible. The deployment of the 401st would also serve to demonstrate the strategic importance of the 401st in view of the difficulties of maintaining Congressional support for its transfer to Italy.

Keeping NATO channels open and active. With the French now activating the WEU and trying to turn it into a combined WEU-EC forum, we need to ensure that NATO remains the primary consultative forum. We are working with State to insure that NATO's political and military channels remain open and active on virtually every issue arising from the conflict in the Gulf.

Maintaining Soviet support. Aside from reports of some Soviet undercutting of the economic embargo as well as some continuing technical military assistance, Moscow's posture has been supportive. Our differences over interdiction, however, could have broader repercussions, and we need to continue working to ensure that no wider gaps open between us. Our proposed Presidential letter to Gorbachev thanks him for supporting the UN embargo and stresses the need for "strictest observation" of the UN resolutions. It should reinforce Secretary Baker's communications with Shevardnadze.

East Europeans. We have twice demarched the Bulgarians, whom we believe were planning to take delivery of Iraqi crude, and have warned the Yugoslavs about their construction projects in Iraq. In a demarche to all East European capitals in response to requests for energy assistance, we signalled our readiness to help but also reiterated that we expect their full compliance with the sanctions regime. We are also encouraging those who have expressed readiness to commit direct support to the international effort. The task force chaired by Charles Dallara at Treasury which is exploring how best to cushion the impact on Eastern Europe of higher oil prices plans to forward its analysis and policy options to Larry Eagleburger on Wednesday.

The bottom line. Solidarity within NATO and Europe generally remains strong, but the perceived gap between our interdiction policy and the UNSC mandate is causing European support to fray around the edges. Austria's possible withdrawal of overflight rights is one example, as was the Swiss denial of such rights. French efforts to develop a WEU-EC caucus could prove to be another. Echoing views that we are hearing elsewhere, the Czechoslovaks have told us that they can no longer support us as fully because they believe we are too far out ahead of an international consensus. We need to narrow that perceived gap lest the remarkable degree of European support up to now begins to unravel. A more helpful stance by Perez de Cuellar, if we can get one, would help. Additional naval deployments from WEU

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countries to the Gulf, even if not involved in interdiction, will also strengthen the multinational aspect of our efforts. We will continue looking at ways to keep the Europeans, particularly the French, and the Soviets from straying too much further.

~~Richard~~ Haass concurs.

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CFE - NATO Agreement
on Manpower
National Security Council
The White House

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[Signature]
Ken Hill

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006619
RECEIVED: 17 AUG 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BASORA

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

IRAQ

PERSONS: LANXADE, JACQUES

SUBJECT: KEEPING THE FRENCH FM STRAYING FURTHER W/ RE TO GULF SITUATION

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 21 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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BASORA
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Caf NARA, Date 5/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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CLOSED BY: NSDAI

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6619

August 17, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AAB*

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

SUBJECT: Keeping the French from Straying Further

Although the French were among the first to commit naval forces and have been generally supportive of a strong response to the Iraqi aggression, predictably they are keeping some distance between themselves and us and emphasizing a separate European response. U.S. military actions to enforce the U.N. economic sanctions could increase that distance to the extent that they run counter to the traditional French legalism, of which the Quai D'Orsay is the prime custodian.

Although current French policy no doubt has the general blessing of the Elysee and is unlikely to change, keeping the channels open to the Elysee may prove helpful in avoiding further straying. Rather than suggesting a Presidential letter, we would suggest a message from you to Admiral Lanxade for this purpose.

RH
Richard Haass and Bob Hutchings concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize the letter at Tab I for transmission through White House channels.

Approve *B*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Letter to Lanxade

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2010-039714R
EJ 6/29/15

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Scowcroft letter to Lanxade

Dear Jacques:

I think it is important for us to stay in close touch as the Iraq-Kuwait situation develops. Although there will inevitably be some difference of approach among allies, I believe we should try to keep any public discrepancies to a minimum in view of Saddam Hussein's strategy of dividing his adversaries.

The prompt French decision to send naval forces to the Persian Gulf was very much welcomed here, as has been France's leadership in activating the WEU to ensure a fuller European role in protecting our mutual interests in the area. We were pleased to see that the initial oversight of not inviting the Turks to next week's WEU ministerial was quickly corrected, in view of the invitation to other observers less directly concerned with the crisis.

I am aware that France would prefer to have explicit UN authorization for military interdiction. Our own view is that the existing UNSC resolutions already provide the necessary juridical basis, and that there is thus no need to go back to the UN. At present, we believe that the urgent task at hand is to maximize the economic pressure on Iraq as quickly and as surely as possible.

Another matter of utmost concern is Iraq's illegal detention of foreign nationals in both Baghdad and Kuwait. As you know, we are actively considering appropriate UNSC action to address this problem. Your cooperation and support for this initiative will be deeply welcome.

As always, the President wishes to maintain the fullest communication with key allies, and he particularly welcomes and respects the views of President Mitterrand.

I look forward to seeing you on September 5, when we will be able to discuss these issues as well as the questions of Alliance strategy that arose at the London Summit. Should you, or President Mitterrand himself, have further thoughts on the Iraq/Kuwait crisis that you would like to share in the interim they would be most welcome indeed.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

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*Keeping the French
from sleeping further*
**National Security Council
The White House**

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Bill Sittmann	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Bob Gates	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Brent Scowcroft	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
Bill Sittmann	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Situation Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u> </u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u> </u>	<u>N</u>
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cc: VP Sununu Other

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(Date/Time)

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*(copy given to Sit room
Aug. 18 at 1:00pm)*

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RECORD ID: 9006625
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TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
IMF

FMS



PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SUBJECT: EGYPT FMS DEBT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 21 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS
NSC CHRON
WELCH

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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Egypt's Fms Lett

National Security Council
The White House

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[Signature]
Ken Hill

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Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

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A = Action

I = Information

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cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

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COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 17, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH 

SUBJECT: Egypt's FMS Debt

*Not Sec/Adm
has seen*

On September 1, Egypt must pay \$90 million in FMS arrears, or it will face the Brooke-Alexander guillotine. Mubarak told Cheney, as he has told every other visitor in recent months, that Egypt cannot make FMS debt payments falling due this year, and that he needs help with the IMF as well. State is moving forward with release of \$163 million in FY90 ESF to help Egypt over this latest cash crunch, but another will certainly come.

The picture of Egypt staggering under a massive \$6.1 billion FMS debt to the United States at a time when its strategic importance has been resoundingly confirmed by the Gulf crisis is not pretty. If we could resolve this problem in rapid and comprehensive fashion, it would send a very powerful signal to our Arab friends. Alternatively, if it festers, our Egyptian relationship will suffer and we risk being accused of siphoning off any extraordinary Gulf/Saudi aid Egypt may get.

All the options being explored by the interagency working group on this issue are predicated on use of Egypt's future assistance flows to meet future (though reduced) debt payments. Clearly, that assumption appears unsustainable now in view of the Iraqi threat and the large burden Egypt has assumed as the Arab counterweight. Egypt would certainly -- and, in my view, justifiably -- reject debt proposals that involve immediate losses in net assistance.

Now may be the best time to try a much more bold approach -- a comprehensive, unilateral write-off of all Egypt's FMS debt. There are some huge complications in this idea: the willingness of the Gulf states to help, particularly with sustained future flows; the political decision to delink debt reduction from economic reform; the budgetary impact (even though Egypt's poor record may mean that effect on net outlays is not great). But there may be no better time, particularly on the Hill, to tackle this thorny problem.

Jim Baker may raise this issue with you and the President at some point. We would recommend taking the bold course above, with instructions to the concerned agencies to prepare the necessary strategy, including draft legislation.

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