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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91143
Folder ID Number: 91143-006

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part I

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Telcon	Re: Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (4 pp.)	8/2/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (6 pp.)	8/4/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	Sandra L. Charles to William F. Sittmann Re: Presidential Phone Calls to King Fahd (1 pp.)	8/4/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 6, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/6/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Philip D. Zelikow to William F. Sittmann Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 6, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/6/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Secretary General Manfred Woerner (2 pp.)	8/6/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Secretary General Manfred Woerner (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03c. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Woerner on Monday, August 6 (1 pp.)	8/5/90	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part I

Pinksheet Number: cap1193
OA/ID Number: 91143-006
Date Closed: 5/22/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04a. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Dinner with Prime Minister Mulroney on Monday, August 6 (1 pp.)	8/6/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Outline	Re: Dinner with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (2 pp.)	8/6/90	(b)(1)	S
04c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Dinner with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Draft	Re: Core Elements of a Possible NATO Statement (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (2 pp.)	8/6/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher on Monday, August 6 (1 pp.)	8/5/90	(b)(1)	S
05d. Draft	Re: Core Elements of a Possible NATO Statement (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Kuwaiti Ambassador Saud Nasir Al-Sabah (1 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	S
06b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Kuwaiti Ambassador Saud Nasir Al-Sabah (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06c. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Ambassador Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Ambassador to the U.S., on Wednesday, August 8, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	S
07. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Iraq: Dealing with the Oil Shortfall (2 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	C
08. Memo	Re: Iraq Crisis: Long-Term Implications (2 pp.)	8/8/90	(b)(1)	S
09. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Certification Waiving Statutory Restrictions on Sale of Additional F-15s to Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	8/8/90	(b)(1)	C
10. Memo	Karl Jackson to Brent Scowcroft/Wilma G. Hall Re: Possible Japanese assistance in Iraq crisis (2 pp.)	8/8/90	(b)(1)	S
11a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Bob Hawke (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11b. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Phone Call to Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia (1 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	
11c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Bob Hawke (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12. Letter	Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to President Bush (2 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	TS

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13. Talking Points	Re: Embassy of Israel (2 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	S
14a. Memo	Philip D. Zelikow to William F. Sittmann Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 7, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/10/90	(b)(1)	S
14b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 7, 1990 (2 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	S
15a. Letter	President Bush to King Hussein I (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
15b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to King Hussein (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 09006207
RECEIVED: 02 AUG 90 08

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RADEMAKER
ROSTOW

DOC DATE: 02 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FREEZE ON US ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 06 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RADEMAKER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
RADEMAKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

4 bag

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6207

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	_____	<i>(Memo)</i>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>24.9.6</u>	<u>OK</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Correction made
Went

General said he would not sign this, that the Pres has seen & given his OK, and it was machine signed. Doesn't want it to get to Pres. Done

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6207

August 2, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *NR*
FROM: STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER *SR*
SUBJECT: Freeze on U.S. Assistance to Iraq

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President recommending that he sign a memorandum to the heads of all departments and agencies directing the immediate termination of all forms of assistance to Iraq (Tab A). Such a memorandum should help forestall any sanctions legislation.

Concurrences by: Sandy Charles, Richard Haass, Eric Melby, *DM*
Virginia Lampley *AL*

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Memorandum to the Heads of All Departments and
Agencies

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6207

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Freeze on U.S. Assistance to Iraq

Purpose

Formally to notify all departments and agencies immediately to cease all forms of assistance to Iraq.

Background

At Tab A is a memorandum for the heads of all departments and agencies directing them to cease immediately all forms of assistance for Iraq. Although we do not anticipate that any agencies would be providing such assistance, formally directing them not to should help forestall any sanctions legislation.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum to the Heads of All Departments and Agencies

cc Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Withholding of Assistance to Iraq

Effective immediately, you are instructed to withhold all forms of assistance to Iraq, including, but not limited to, financial assistance, loan guarantees, and export licenses.

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: CHARLES
HAASS

DOC DATE: 04 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA
MEMCON

TELCON

PERSONS: FAHD

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ KING FAHD AUG 2 & MEMCON AUG 4 RE KUWAIT & IRAQ

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 09 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES

HAASS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 9/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND _____ W/ATTCH _____

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd

Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME August 2, 1990, 6:43 - 7:21pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Your Majesty, how are you? (U)

King Fahd: I am sorry to be so late taking your call. (U)

The President: That's OK. I wanted to tell you our thinking and more importantly hear your views regarding the terrible invasion.
(S)

King Fahd: First thank you for your interest in this most serious matter in the Middle East from a country that doesn't understand what it means to be a neighbor. My opinion of this situation is that it is very difficult. It must be stopped soon in any way because it is a very serious principle when a country with arms attacks a small neighbor. (S)

The President: Exactly. (S)

King Fahd: This attack took place at 2:30 am Saudi time. As you know representatives from Iraq and Kuwait were here with me two days ago. I tried to reconcile matters, and both expressed willingness to do so. It was decided a delegation from Kuwait would go to Iraq and another session would be held in Kuwait so that an agreement could be reached. But unfortunately, although Saddam assured us he had no interest to attack Kuwait, the opposite happened. (S)

The President: Exactly. (S)

King Fahd: This is because he is conceited. He doesn't realize the implications of his actions are upsetting the world order. He seems to think only of himself. He is following Hitler in creating world problems with one difference -- one was conceited, and one is both conceited and crazy. I believe nothing will work with Saddam but use of force. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1998-0099- F13
8/21/2009 JAM

I spoke with Saddam at 4:00 Saudi time and told him he was making a mistake and with what law and logic can you attack a small country with force of arms? And I reminded him that during the Arab Summit in Baghdad he suggested a nonaggression pact among the Arab countries, agreeing not to intervene in each others affairs. He is a liar. My conversation with him today was strict and strong and I asked him to withdraw from Kuwait now, and that we would not consider any regime a representative of Kuwaiti public opinion or Arab public opinion. And Saddam told me he tried to reach agreement with Kuwait, but Kuwait not responsive. I told him that was an unacceptable excuse -- if he had found Kuwait unresponsive, he could have contacted us and we would have done what we could to reach an understanding. He had no excuse to use in his conversation. That is why I say he is arrogant. He believes what he has done will pass easily. And then he told me let me ask you to allow me to send my Vice President to meet you at 11:00 am Saudi time tomorrow. Then I told him if you realize your mistake, and withdraw from Kuwait, then it is possible to see and meet your Vice President. So he asked me again to receive his representative tomorrow and maybe we will find a solution. And I told him that I hold him responsible for the safety for all people in Kuwait -- Kuwaiti or not. (S)

Mr. President, we will see his representative tomorrow and will speak briefly to him. Either he must understand Iraqi troops are withdrawn and things smoothed or we will tell his representative to return quickly. Saddam will either withdraw from Kuwait into Iraq quickly or the only other solution is the use of force. Mr. President, this is a matter that is extremely serious and grave. It involves a principle that can't be approved or condoned by any reasonable principle or moral. Mubarak contacted me about requesting an Arab Summit be held. I told him it was a good move. Arab leaders must be convinced what has happened is a poor move and through Mubarak and me, we will convene an Arab Summit the day after tomorrow. Tomorrow Saddam's representative will let me know if he will rectify matters and withdraw from Kuwait or not. And any information from Saddam's representative will be relayed to you. Mr. President what Saddam has done, we can't possible remain silent about. (S)

I hope matters can be resolved peacefully. If not Saddam must be taught a lesson he will not forget the rest of his life if he remains alive. (S)

I want to thank you and the American people, and Europe and the world for your firm stand against Iraqi action to make Saddam realize his grave mistake against Kuwait. Also allow me to propose preparedness because we don't know what Saddam will do. This information is for you; now do you have any questions? Please ask as a friend -- and I will answer as a friend. (S)

The President: I have one question, are the Kuwaiti leaders in Saudi Arabia, the Crown Prince and the Amir, safe and well? (S)

King Fahd: Many people from the royal family in Kuwait are safe here and welcome. (S)

The President: Very good. We will be making a joint statement with the Soviets condemning the Iraqi invasion when Baker is in Moscow for a few minutes to make a strong statement between us and the Soviets. (S)

King Fahd: This is very good news. (S)

The President: Our goal like yours is to get Iraq out and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. (S)

King Fahd: I told Saddam that we don't buy this national government in Kuwait. We know no one in Kuwait who agrees to the removal of the legitimate ruler. If they brought Iraqis in place in the leadership, which is possible, then that is totally unacceptable. (S)

The President: Total fraud. (S)

King Fahd: At any rate from now until tomorrow we will find out what the situation is. (S)

The President: Thanks. In the meantime, we are doing what you expressed an interest in. We are making preparations in my government on diplomatic, military, economic options. We should consider additional diplomatic, economic and military options as well. We have implemented comprehensive economic sanctions, and are now considering other economic measures against Iraq in conjunction with Chapter 7 sanctions at the UN. Another would be to consider closing down his oil export capability, either by cutting off pipelines or an embargo of Iraq. Obviously we need to talk further to consider a wide array of options, but I hope Arab efforts succeed on a withdrawal and to restore the legitimate government to Kuwait. (S)

King Fahd: We too hope Arab efforts are successful but all the measures and options you mentioned are measures that would be helpful in deterring Saddam. (S)

The President: On Saudi Arabia, we believe we should consider deploying TACAIR which we need to discuss with you because your security is important to us and want to do everything possible to deter any Iraqi aggression against the Kingdom, and to work with you to take whatever steps are necessary to convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you for what you said about Saudi Arabia. In view of what happens tomorrow, I would be delighted to discuss this further. (S)

The President: You should know we are moving our carrier nearer to the Gulf. We think collective Arab action would be good. We salute your efforts, and hope tomorrow is successful. I look forward to hearing the results. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you for your interest, and I thank you on behalf of the Saudi people. (S)

The President: I have one other favor. Please convey to the Amir, Sheik Jaber, my personal regards and tell him how deeply I despise this outrageous, brutal act against his country, and tell him that he has our support. I would appreciate your conveying this to the Amir. (S)

King Fahd: I will convey it to Amir. (S)

The President: Thank you. Blessings to you and the Saudi people. Good luck with your heroic efforts toward peace. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you. Thanks for friendship between the Kingdom and the United States for more than 60 years. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd

Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME August 4, 1990, 1:50-2:42 pm
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello Your Majesty. How are you? I can hear you loud and clear. (U)

King Fahd: How are you, Mr. Bush? (U)

The President: Fine, and you? (U)

King Fahd: Fine and I want to thank you very, very much for your interest and your call. (S)

The President: I know we have both been busy this past 48 hours. I have been in touch with a number of world leaders, and they are terribly concerned and, as we told your Ambassador, we want to help in a military way. I have seen the reports but I wanted to hear from you on the state of play there. (S)

King Fahd: First, my thanks to you, Mr. President, for your interest in Saudi Arabia, a friendly country. I am thankful for our friends in Europe and everywhere for their concern about this unfortunate incident. At the same time, we are waiting for a team of Americans to come so we can organize matters in a desirable and effective fashion. (S)

The President: What is this team supposed to do? I wasn't aware of it. I am prepared to instruct General Powell to start deploying forces to the Kingdom. Is that what you are talking about? (S)

King Fahd: No, I understand from my Ambassador that a team would be sent to organize and coordinate matters that were agreed upon. (S)

The President: I was not told, but it is easily done. We'll get them on the way right away. But we need your view on a US force presence. I am very concerned about a possible Iraqi move south across your border. And I want you to know we will support you

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AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
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and stay as long as it takes to protect you, to get the Iraqis out and to restore the government of Kuwait. You referred to this guy as a Hitler and a liar. You are absolutely right. (S)

King Fahd: I am referring to thank you for your interest in Saudi affairs. I am talking about a team that would arrive in Saudi Arabia to coordinate in a fashion that is comfortable to us and you for a resolution. (S)

The President: I understand, but I am worried that this man is talking about withdrawal but is installing a puppet government. This is unacceptable to us and other countries. I have talked with many leaders and there is much unified opinion to make a stand with our Arab friends against this naked aggression. I also want to understand your feelings on why this meeting was postponed and what you are hearing from Iraq now. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with you. I had understood a team would arrive today. That was my understanding yesterday. The team would be able to talk and to coordinate things satisfactorily. (S)

The President: If a team is not underway, I will get it so. This is a matter of extreme urgency. I am glad you want to receive it. I will guarantee that it will be leaving soon. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you, and I will take care of them and meet with them personally. (S)

The President: Good. But I want to know where you think matters stand on the ground. What about Iraq's statements on withdrawal? Will the Amir return? Are you worried about Iraq moving across your border? We worry about that very much. (S)

King Fahd: First, the only solution must involve the return of the Amir to Kuwait. (S)

The President: I am glad to hear you say that. We're for you and will stand with you on that as the only solution. That's good thinking. (S)

King Fahd: Second, there are no Iraqi troops near the Saudi borders, but Saddam is not to be trusted. That is why it is important for a team to come as soon as possible to coordinate matters to prevent that from happening. Regarding the Amir, his family and his government, they are all here in Saudi Arabia and we are communicating and coordinating continuously. (S)

The President: Good, but I would also like your views on this report that Saddam will withdraw tomorrow. Is there any credibility to it at all? (S)

King Fahd: I'll tell you my thinking on this report. With regard to the situation in Kuwait, we sent our people to Kuwait

and they got in. It is in complete chaos. The men in Kuwait are not responding to Saddam's request to form a government. The confirmed news we have shows Saddam may withdraw heavy troops but will organize a militia to control matters there. (S)

The President: I see.

King Fahd: The people we've sent and the news reports we've received on the neutral zone show Saddam has some estimated numbers of troops and hardware there: 20 tanks, 30 armored vehicles and 45 trucks and jeeps. According to the information we've received and the eye witness reports we have, this force is located near Kuwaiti wells in the neutral zone. The guns are pointed out to sea. Apparently, the Iraqi fear of an attack from the sea. In Kuwait City, there is chaos as a result of the Iraqi army and militia they are trying to organize in Kuwait. They also have plundered stores, banks, jewelry stores -- any places where there are valuables, they have plundered in a strange way. (S)

The President: How terrible.

King Fahd: That is why when the team arrives quickly and soon, we can share particulars on the situation that are hard to explain over the phone to enable us to coordinate to develop a positive plan to deal with the situation. (S)

The President: Can you tell me why the Arab Summit was postponed? (S)

King Fahd: The Summit was postponed because the statements by the Gulf States, Mubarak, the Foreign Ministers, Bendjedid, King Hussein showed that if the Summit was held the outcome would not be positive. The Summit would not come out with a unanimous resolution. Because of the seriousness, the resolution should be unanimous. So we are striving to coordinate and organize matters so when the meeting is held, we will have a united resolution. (S)

The President: Let me sum up my feelings for you at this moment on this. (S)

King Fahd: I am happy to hear them. (S)

The President: First, I was disturbed by the response you got from the Iraqi Vice President. As we understand it was not nearly enough. Not only must the withdrawal be immediate, complete and unconditional, it must lead to the return of the legal Kuwait government which I am glad you agree with. It is also important for the west to keep economic sanctions on especially if there is a puppet regime there. We can't let Saddam get control of the economic resources of Kuwait. (S)

Second, I just completed at Camp David getting a total military and intelligence briefing, and in my view, we cannot wait any

longer to effectively deter an Iraqi move south and to pressure Saddam to withdraw and permit the return of the Kuwaiti government. We must now begin taking the actions we described in detail to Bandar. And we can't wait until it is too late. In that regard, the team you want will be on its way immediately. And that team is one that will do total military planning, logistics and what we are thinking in working with you on the military front, correct? (S)

King Fahd: This would be best. I agree also that is very good that the boycott continue and freezing assets and economic sanctions. I will continue my response after the interpretation. (S)

The President: On the team, it will be on its way and it will be prepared to talk about what we think is best -- all the options. I am sorry for the confusion on this. (S)

King Fahd: No, Mr. President, there is no misunderstanding. I agree with you one hundred percent on the team. I would like to add that the larger Iraqi force west of Kuwait is not near the Saudi border. It is there we believe as a precaution in case of involvement in warfare. Therefore, planning is important and needed to deal with this possibility successfully. (S)

The President: I am familiar with that force and while the force differs from the forces to the east, we still view them with great concern. Now, with your permission, I would like to make one or two more points. (S)

King Fahd: Fine. (S)

The President: The first one is a sensitive point. The Amir of Kuwait asked us for military intervention, but Iraqi troops had already occupied Kuwait city and there was nothing the US could do. It takes a long time to deploy troops. And that is why I am worried about Saudi Arabia. It was not possible to help him once they had crossed the border. Maybe we can help him down the line but now we can help Saudi Arabia, but we have long lines of supply and we have to move forces long distances. Saddam lied. He is unpredictable and ruthless. He told you, my Ambassador, Mubarak that he wouldn't attack Kuwait. He told them all and he lied. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with what you are saying. It is probable that Iraq could attack, but then an invasion may not happen. That is why it is important to work with your team on plans for all contingencies to assure success. (S)

The President: Well, we should be developing plans. But we must be viewing this with more urgency. We need to get those forces there soon or Saddam, flushed with victory, might grab the oil fields and the eastern province. We have no credible presence side by side with Saudi Arabia, and without enhanced air, there is nothing to inhibit him militarily. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with you, but my view is based on the information we have. We think we have a few days to coordinate, to make a tight, successful plan. That's all we want. A tight plan that will be successful and resolve the situation once and for all. (S)

The President: I agree. We will get the team underway. Another point I want to make here involves my word of honor. The security of Saudi Arabia is vital --- basically fundamental -- to US interests and really to the interests of the western world. And I am determined that Saddam will not get away with this infamy. When we work out a plan, once we are there, we will stay until we are asked to leave. You have my solemn word on this. I am sick and tired of Saddam and his lying to other countries. (S)

On the economic points, we need to stay together and we need to vigorously enforce this. I've talked with President Ozal and NATO is taking a collective position. Turkey is a member of NATO. And NATO views this as a matter of extreme urgency. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with everything you've said, specifically and generally. All I want is that we make a tight, coordinated plan so that the plan is one hundred percent successful. (S)

The President: I agree, and the team is on its way. We also are moving our carrier and the French and the British are moving ships into the Gulf. We need concerted action on economic sanctions. We are pushing Chapter 7 at the UN to tighten sanctions. Everyone must cooperate to economically bring this man to his knees. I've talked with the Japanese Prime Minister, the French President, the British Prime Minister and the West German Chancellor and they are all on your side. They expressed the same outrage about Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia, our valued friend. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with everything wholeheartedly. I thank you so much for everything you said. I am certain this man will come to an end with our efforts. (S)

The President: I also want you to know that I am disappointed with some of our Arab friends. I am not going to mention any names on this call. I understand that there is some pressure from Saddam Hussein on these countries. But this disappointment is being felt in the US Congress and elsewhere. And that will make it difficult to do business as usual with countries being apologists for Saddam. (S)

King Fahd: I appreciate what you've said. When things are hard, some rise to the challenge and others fail. (S)

The President: I have great respect for your leadership. That is why we are prepared to make an enormous sacrifice on the US part and to support you in any way. There is a great sense of

urgency. We will get our team of experts on the way immediately, and if necessary take the lead to show force to convince Saddam that he can't bully us. I have the greatest respect for you and I know you are in a difficult position. That is why you have the complete support of the United States. When our forces are deployed, they will not get out until justice is done. I salute you and respect you. But we must act on the economic and military front. (8)

King Fahd: I want to extend the thanks of my government and people. When we heard your statement, we realized that the United States is a good friend to Saudi Arabia. (8)

The President: Well, we want to do more and soon. I think it is in your interest and the rest of the world. Good-bye and my respects. Please call any time night or day.

King Fahd: To say thank you is not enough. I value your friendship very much. I value the friendship that Saudi Arabia has with a world leader who stands for justice and truth.

The President: God bless you and your country.

King Fahd (in English): And you my very close friend.

The President: I feel I am side by side with you as we fight this terrible problem. Thank you, and good-bye.

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~~SECRET~~

6296

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 4, 1990

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 


FROM: ~~ANDRA~~ L. CHARLES

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Calls to King Fahd

Attached are Presidential memorandum of conversation with King Fahd.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memcon, August ~~2~~, 1990
Tab II Memcon, August 4, 1990

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2001
By MM NARA, Date 8/7/2013

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: DC LOG # 6296
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Ken Hill</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>24.8/7</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
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90 AUG 6
ALL 18

<u>A = Action</u>	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006292
RECEIVED: 06 AUG 90 11

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: ZELIKOW

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA
AP

TELCON

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: MULRONEY, BRIAN

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & PM MULRONEY ON 6 AUG

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 09 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

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6292

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada on August 6, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 6, 1990, 10:07 - 10:10am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I had a long shot of an idea. We're meeting this afternoon with Margaret Thatcher and Manfred Woerner. Perhaps you could come down and have supper with me, or have lunch tomorrow at the White House. You've been so helpful with Ozal and everything else, I thought it just might be worth doing. If not, we can do it another time this week. Or we can just keep in touch by phone. I just thought, you've been with us shoulder to shoulder. It's Canada's business, and you're just an hour away.
(U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: That sounds very helpful. Is Margaret coming in today? (U)

The President: She's coming through on her way to the funeral. There is no pressing agenda, but there is a lot to talk about. Her remarks yesterday were very good. Come on down and bring who you want. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'll call you back. We're talking about tonight? (U)

The President: Right. Supper at 7:00, and we might even give you a drink at 6:30. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'll be right back to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6292

August 6, 1990

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: PHILIP D. ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada on August 6, 1990

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum of a telephone conversation the President had with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 6, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *PZ*

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2001
By MM NARA, Date 8/7/2013

**National Security Council
The White House**

LOG # 6292

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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Ken Hill

Bob Gates

Bill Sittmann

West Wing Desk

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A

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A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

CC: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Telecom - PH Mulroney

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006278
RECEIVED: 06 AUG 90 08

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
SAUDI ARABIA
SANCTIONS

KUWAIT
TURKEY
AP

PERSONS: WOERNER, MANFRED

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE / PARTICIPANTS LIST / ELEMENTS OF POSSIBLE NATO
STATEMENT RE PRES MTG W/ SEC GEN WOERNER 6 AUG

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 09 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS
NSC CHRON
RICE
ZELIKOW

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Dates 12/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSAJC

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
August 6, 1990

CHRON FILE

MEETING WITH
SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNERDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0390-MR

MM 3/28/2016

DATE: August 6, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 4:00 - 5:00pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To brief Secretary General Woerner on our diplomatic and military efforts and work with him on further measures to enlist NATO support for collective action, including reassurance for Turkey.

II. BACKGROUND

Woerner is returning early from a vacation in the woods of western Canada. He will know little about the situation beyond what he has heard or read in the press. You will want to be sure he understands our fundamental political position -- that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait immediately, completely, and unconditionally and that the legitimate government of Kuwait should be restored. You can then brief Woerner on our diplomatic strategy and military preparations and talk about next steps.

With Secretary General Woerner, you should focus on the role of NATO in the Western gameplan. If we can get a good sanctions resolution in the UN, we will need to reassure Turkey that NATO members will stand by Ankara if Turkey cuts the pipeline. Ozal needs to know that we will honor our treaty commitments.

Woerner should convene a meeting of the North Atlantic Council this week (Baker would like to attend in conjunction with his trip to Turkey). At that meeting, we hope he will help us get a solid statement from NATO, reaffirming the unconditional collective obligations to fellow members under the North Atlantic Treaty. Some ideas for such a statement are attached at Tab C.

Looking ahead, Western countries will need to coordinate their military preparations. We will want a multinational presence in the Gulf region that will include US, Saudi, British, French, and friendly Arab forces. These forces need to be in place soon in order to guard against a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, which could happen with little warning, and to help defend Saudi Arabia or Turkey if Iraq strikes out against them for cutting the pipelines. A blockade of parts facilitating Iraqi exports

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff~~SECRET~~

of oil is another option. Woerner can offer advice about whether European contributions to Saudi defense can best be organized with NATO help, or whether the Western European Union might be a more convenient umbrella for coordinating Europe's effort. If Turkey is the victim of attack, then obviously NATO's role is quite clear.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Open photo followed by meeting.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Elements of Possible NATO Statement

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POINTS TO BE MADE
FOR MEETING WITH SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER

Current Situation

- We've made our objectives clear. We want the complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait and a restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Anything less is unacceptable.
- The stakes are enormous. This naked Iraqi aggression undermines the global order, gives a dangerous dictator unacceptable leverage over OPEC and Western economies, allows Iraq to establish hegemony over the Persian Gulf, and endangers any prospect for Middle East peace.
- I hope you share our objectives in this crisis. Margaret was just here. I've also talked to Francois, Helmut, Andreotti, Kaifu, and others. They all agree the Iraqis must leave and that we will not accept a puppet regime in Kuwait. The French, in particular, have been very good.
- We've been watching the military situation in the Gulf, of course. It is worrisome. The Iraqis are continuing a general mobilization and putting heavy armored forces into place for a possible move into Saudi Arabia.
- On the diplomatic front, our immediate goal is to get a comprehensive sanctions resolution through the UN Security Council. That will lay the foundation for collective action. Our delegations in New York have been working well together. The Soviets and Chinese will obviously be critical.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0390-MR
MM 3/28/2016

What We're Doing

- In addition to our efforts in the UN, I've been working the phones to line up support for collective action after sanctions are imposed.
- I've also sent Dick Cheney to Saudi Arabia, along with Bob Gates and General Schwartzkopf, to discuss joint military planning. Our purpose is to deter an Iraqi attack and, if necessary, prepare to defend against one.
- We're increasing our military presence in the Middle East. We have naval forces there already, along with an augmented Middle East task force and a carrier battle group steaming into the northern Arabian Sea. We are moving additional naval and air forces and preparing other steps.
- We need to keep Iraq from intimidating other states in the region so that they are paralyzed or accept the status quo.

Next Steps: Reassuring Turkey with NATO Action

- Armed with a UN sanctions resolution, we would follow up with enforcement measures. This would include cutting the Saudi and Turkish pipelines and blockading ports used by Iraq. We would cut Iraq's economic lifeline. This will put Turkey on the spot.
- I've talked three times to Ozal in the last three days. He needs to know that, if he cuts the pipeline, he will not stand alone against Iraq. He told me yesterday that Saddam sent an envoy to Ankara who carried crude threats. Ozal

didn't seem intimidated. But he needs to know that his NATO allies will be with him.

- The North Atlantic Treaty is clear: an armed attack against any member of the Alliance shall be considered an attack against all the members of NATO.
- We've asked for the NAC to meet today for a general discussion. I hope you can reconvene the NAC to follow up on the UN action and endorse a statement that will give Ozal the signal he needs. The statement need only reiterate that the NATO treaty means what it says. That will send Ozal the message he needs.

Next Steps: Reassuring and Defending Saudi Arabia

- Iraq may well invade Saudi Arabia anytime, with little warning. Even if the invasion does not come right away, I think there is a good chance the Iraqis will strike if the Saudis close the pipeline.
- We must be ready to help the Saudis. In the end we will want a multinational force with Saudi forces, forces from friendly Gulf states and Arab countries like Egypt and Morocco, joining with units from the United States, the UK, France, and others.
- I'd like your views on what role NATO can play in organizing these preparations. How about the Western European Union? Of course, if Turkey is threatened or attacked, NATO's role is clear.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Vice President

James Baker, Secretary of State

John Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

NATO

Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General

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6278

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 5, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA *Rice*/RICHARD HAASS *W*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with NATO Secretary
General Woerner on Monday, August 6

The briefing material for the above meeting is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum to the President attached at
Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants
Tab C	Elements of Possible NATO Statement

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *MM* NARA, Date *8/7/2013*

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006320
RECEIVED: 06 AUG 90 16

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA

AP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES DINNER W/ PM MULRONEY / AUG 6

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 09 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR ACTION

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NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 2 OF 2

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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6320

August 6, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA *CR* RICE / RICHARD *CR* DAASS

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: The President's Dinner with Prime Minister
Mulroney on Monday, August 6

The briefing material for the above meeting is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum to the President attached at
Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants
Tab C Elements of Possible NATO Statement

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 8/7/2013

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DINNER WITH
PRIME MINISTER BRIAN MULRONEY
DATE: August 6, 1990
LOCATION: Executive Mansion
TIME: 6:30pm-8:30pm
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To brief Prime Minister Mulroney on our diplomatic and military efforts and work with him on further measures to back Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

II. BACKGROUND

Mulroney is with us on the fundamental political position -- that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait immediately, completely, and unconditionally and that the legitimate government of Kuwait should be restored. We also seek to assure the safety of US and other Western nationals and to insure the continued free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. In this meeting you should exchange notes on our diplomatic strategy and military preparations and talk about next steps.

With Mulroney, as with Mrs. Thatcher, you may wish to concentrate on three areas for further work:

First, we need to get tight economic sanctions in place. Canada has helped get a good resolution through the Security Council and Mulroney has worked with us to prepare Turkey to join in blocking the movement of Iraqi oil.

Second, we need to reassure Turkey that NATO members will stand by Ankara if Turkey cuts the pipeline. Ozal needs to know that we will honor our treaty commitments. Mulroney's August 5 call to Ozal has already helped. Canada should now help us get a solid statement from NATO. Some ideas for such a statement are attached at Tab C. You can also report on your discussion with Secretary General Woerner earlier today.

Third, we need to coordinate our military preparations. We will want a multinational presence in the Gulf region. Canada may wish to consider a token contribution. These forces need to be in place soon in order to guard against a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, which could happen

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PER E.O. 13526

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MM 3/28/2016

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without further warning. We should be prepared to defend Saudi Arabia or Turkey if Iraq strikes out against them for cutting the pipelines. A collective blockade of ports facilitating Iraq's oil flow is another option.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See attached list at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Open photo followed by dinner.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Elements of Possible NATO Statement

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER WITH
PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

Current Situation

- We've made our objectives clear. We want the complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait and a restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Anything less is unacceptable.
- I believe these are your objectives too. I've talked to Margaret, Francois, Helmut, Andreotti, Kaifu, and others. They all agree the Iraqis must leave and that we will not accept a puppet regime in Kuwait. The French, in particular, have been very good.
- We've been watching the military situation in the Gulf, of course. It is worrisome. The Iraqis are continuing a general mobilization and putting heavy armored forces into place for a possible move into Saudi Arabia.
- On the diplomatic front, we have achieved our immediate goal: to get a comprehensive sanctions resolution through the UN Security Council. That will lay the foundation for collective action. Canada has made a tremendous contribution to this success in New York.

What We're Doing

- In addition to our efforts in the UN, I've been working the phones to line up support for collective action

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PER E.O. 13526
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SCS 4/12/11

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after sanctions are imposed.

- I've also sent Dick Cheney to Saudi Arabia, along with Bob Gates and General Schwartzkopf, to discuss joint military planning. Our purpose is to deter an Iraqi attack and, if necessary, prepare to defend against one.
- We're increasing our military presence in the Middle East. We have naval forces there already, along with an augmented Middle East task force and a carrier battle group steaming into the northern Arabian Sea. We are moving additional naval and air forces and preparing other steps.
- We need to keep Iraq from intimidating other states in the region so that they are paralyzed or accept the status quo.

Next Steps: Blocking Movement of Iraqi Oil

- Armed with the UN sanctions resolution, we can now follow up with enforcement measures. This should include cutting the Saudi and Turkish pipelines and/or blockading ports used by Iraq. We will cut Iraq's economic lifeline.
- Do you see a way for Canada to show the flag in supporting such actions?

Next Steps: Reassuring Turkey with NATO Action

- Ozal needs to know that, if he cuts the pipeline, he will not stand alone against Iraq. He told me yesterday that Saddam sent an envoy to Ankara who carried crude threats.

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3

Ozal didn't seem intimidated. But he needs to know that his NATO allies will be with him.

- The North Atlantic Treaty is clear: an armed attack against any member of the Alliance shall be considered an attack against all the members of NATO.
- Manfred Woerner was here earlier this afternoon, and I talked with him about a possible statement NATO could issue tomorrow if we get a UN sanctions resolution today. The statement need only reiterate that the NATO treaty means what it says. That will send Ozal the message he needs.
- We've jotted down a few words such a statement could include. I'd be happy to have your thoughts on them.

Next Steps: Reassuring and Defending Saudi Arabia

- Iraq may well invade Saudi Arabia anytime, with little warning. Even if the invasion does not come right away, I think there is a good chance the Iraqis will strike if the Saudis close the pipeline.
- We must be ready to help the Saudis. In the end we will want a multinational force with Saudi forces, forces from friendly Gulf states and Arab countries like Egypt and Morocco, joining with units from the United States, the UK, France, and others.

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~~SECRET~~

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

Canada

Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister

Derek Birney, Ambassador to the United States

Stanley Hartt, Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

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Core Elements of a Possible NATO Statement

- Iraq has not complied with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations has moved to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq.
- The North Atlantic Alliance endorses actions which may be taken by NATO member states to enforce the mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations.
- Iraq has threatened possible retaliation against countries which adopt economic sanctions as part of this UN effort. We note that the North Atlantic Treaty provides clear and unconditional obligations in the area of collective defense. Article Five of the Treaty states that an armed attack against any member of the North Atlantic Alliance shall be considered an attack against all the members of the Alliance.
- Political consultations within NATO are continuing. We are prepared to convene a meeting of NATO foreign ministers at any time, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should the territorial integrity or security of any NATO member state be threatened. Such a meeting would discuss possible collective action that would supplement the immediate right of individual self-defense recognized by the UN Charter and automatic duty of each NATO member to assist another member that has been the victim of an armed attack.

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9/22/2014 MM

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RECORD ID: 9006277
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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
SAUDI ARABIA
SANCTIONS

KUWAIT
NATO
AP

PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE / PARTICIPANTS LIST / ELEMENTS OF POSSIBLE NATO
STATEMENT RE PRES MTG W/ PM THATCHER 6 AUG

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 09 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

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FOR ACTION

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RICE
ZELIKOW

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 1/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 2 OF 2

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 6, 1990

MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

DATE: August 6, 1990

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 2:45pm-3:45pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *WJ*

I. PURPOSE

To brief Prime Minister Thatcher on our diplomatic and military efforts and work with her on further measures to back Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

II. BACKGROUND

Thatcher is with us on the fundamental political position -- that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait immediately, completely, and unconditionally and that the legitimate government of Kuwait should be restored. In this meeting you should exchange notes on our diplomatic strategy and military preparations and talk about next steps.

With Mrs. Thatcher, you may wish to concentrate on three areas for further work:

First, we need to get tight economic sanctions in place. We will need Britain's help in moving a good resolution through the Security Council and in preparing countries -- especially Saudi Arabia and Turkey -- to join in blocking the movement of Iraqi oil.

Second, we need to reassure Turkey that NATO members will stand by Ankara if Turkey cuts the pipeline. Ozal needs to know that we will honor our treaty commitments. Britain should help us get a solid statement from NATO. Some ideas for such a statement are attached at Tab C. We will also be discussing these ideas with Secretary General Woerner later on Monday.

Third, we need to coordinate our military preparations. We will want a multinational presence in the Gulf region that will include US, Saudi, British, French, and friendly Arab forces. These forces need to be in place soon in order to guard against a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, which could happen with little warning, and to help defend

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Saudi Arabia or Turkey if Iraq strikes out against them for cutting the pipelines. A collective blockade of ports facilitating Iraq's oil flow is another option.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See attached list at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Open photo followed by meeting.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Elements of Possible NATO Statement

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

Current Situation

- We've made our objectives clear. We want the complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait and a restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Anything less is unacceptable.
- I believe these are your objectives too. I've talked to Francois, Helmut, Andreotti, Kaifu, and others. They all agree the Iraqis must leave and that we will not accept a puppet regime in Kuwait. The French, in particular, have been very good.
- We've been watching the military situation in the Gulf, of course. It is worrisome. The Iraqis are continuing a general mobilization and putting heavy armored forces into place for a possible move into Saudi Arabia.
- On the diplomatic front, our immediate goal is to get a comprehensive sanctions resolution through the UN Security Council. That will lay the foundation for collective action. Our delegations in New York have been working well together. The Soviets and Chinese will obviously be critical.

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What We're Doing

- In addition to our efforts in the UN, I've been working the phones to line up support for collective action after sanctions are imposed.
- I've also sent Dick Cheney to Saudi Arabia, along with Bob Gates and General Schwartzkopf, to discuss joint military planning. Our purpose is to deter an Iraqi attack and, if necessary, prepare to defend against one.
- We're increasing our military presence in the Middle East. We have naval forces there already, along with an augmented Middle East task force and a carrier battle group steaming into the northern Arabian Sea. We are moving additional naval and air forces and preparing other steps. I appreciate your cooperation so far in the movement of aircraft we base in the United Kingdom and to Diego Garcia.
- We need to keep Iraq from intimidating other states in the region so that they are paralyzed or accept the status quo.

Next Steps: Blocking Movement of Iraqi Oil

- Armed with a UN sanctions resolution, we would follow up with enforcement measures. This would include cutting the Saudi and Turkish pipelines and/or blockading ports used by Iraq. We would cut Iraq's economic lifeline.
- We hope that British naval forces would be prepared to participate in such actions.

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Next Steps: Reassuring Turkey with NATO Action

- Ozal needs to know that, if he cuts the pipeline, he will not stand alone against Iraq. He told me yesterday that Saddam sent an envoy to Ankara who carried crude threats. Ozal didn't seem intimidated. But he needs to know that his NATO allies will be with him.
- The North Atlantic Treaty is clear: an armed attack against any member of the Alliance shall be considered an attack against all the members of NATO.
- Manfred Woerner will be here later this afternoon, and I will talk with him about a possible statement NATO could issue tomorrow if we get a UN sanctions resolution today. The statement need only reiterate that the NATO treaty means what it says. That will send Ozal the message he needs.
- We've jotted down a few words such a statement could include. I'd be happy to have your thoughts on them.

Next Steps: Reassuring and Defending Saudi Arabia

- Iraq may well invade Saudi Arabia anytime, with little warning. Even if the invasion does not come right away, I think there is a good chance the Iraqis will strike if the Saudis close the pipeline.
- We must be ready to help the Saudis. In the end we will want a multinational force with Saudi forces, forces from

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friendly Gulf states and Arab countries like Egypt and Morocco, joining with units from the United States, the UK, France, and others.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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August 5, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA ^{CR}RICE/RICHARD HAASS 

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW ^m

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Prime Minister
Thatcher on Monday, August 6

The briefing material for the above meeting is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum to the President attached at
Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants
Tab C	Elements of Possible NATO Statement

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AS AMENDED
2005-1152-MR
21 2/2/10

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
James Baker, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

UK

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to the United States
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

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Core Elements of a Possible NATO Statement

- Iraq has not complied with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations has moved to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq.
- Iraq has threatened possible retaliation against countries which adopt economic sanctions as part of this UN effort. We note that the North Atlantic Treaty provides clear and unconditional obligations in the area of collective defense. Article Five of the Treaty states that an armed attack against any member of the North Atlantic Alliance shall be considered an attack against all the members of the Alliance.
- Political consultations within NATO are continuing. We are prepared to convene a meeting of NATO foreign ministers at any time, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should the territorial integrity or security of any NATO member state be threatened. Such a meeting would discuss possible collective action that would supplement the immediate right of individual self-defense recognized by the UN Charter and automatic duty of each NATO member to assist another member that has been the victim of an armed attack.

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RECORD ID: 9006332
RECEIVED: 06 AUG 90 18

CHRON FILE

TO: CICCONI, J

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ARAB STATES
AP

MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PRES MTG W/ ARAB AMER BUSINESSMEN 7 AUG

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 09 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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HAASS
NSC CHRON
WELCH

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 2 OF 2

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 6, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. CICCONI

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN 

SUBJECT: Points to be Made for the President's Meeting
With Arab American Businessmen

Attached at Tab A are the points to be made for the Arab American
Businessmen meeting with the President on Tuesday, August 7.

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

TAB A

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
ARAB AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN

Introduction

- Let me welcome you. I've been wanting to see representatives of the Arab-American community for some time.
- Let me give a special welcome to Joseph Audi -- our newest American! (FYI - He became a citizen on his birthday, June 14, 1990).
- You represent a very important part of our public opinion. I want to hear your views, and to share some of my thoughts with you.
- Underneath the current tension in the Middle East is enduring U.S. friendship with almost all Arab nations.
- Those who see U.S. policy as anti-Arab could not be more wrong. We are willing to put a lot on the line for the security of our Arab friends and for the solution of regional conflicts.

Gulf Situation

- This crisis, perhaps the most serious challenge in the Middle East in 20 years, involves our vital national security interests.
- Saddam wants regional hegemony and control of oil. He cannot be allowed to succeed.

- Arab welfare is equally at stake. If force and intimidation succeed, the foundation of regional stability and peace will be completely corrupted.
- We must show strength, so that our Arab friends retain confidence and are not cowed.
- We also would welcome a viable Arab political process to resolve the situation, but not at Kuwait's expense.
- The world (the UNSC; NATO and the EC; USSR; China; Japan) and most of the Arabs are with us.
- I won't rule any options out (or in); that would only help Saddam.
- I would like your private and public support to show solidarity among all Americans, regardless of origin.

Peace Process

- The Gulf crisis has inevitably become the highest foreign policy priority now.
- But that doesn't mean that the peace process is permanently on the back burner.
- We still want to see if Israel is ready to move ahead on a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue leading to elections and negotiations.
- Realistically, however, it will be tough at this time to engage the Israelis, Arabs, or Palestinians.
- Our policy will remain firm: We are committed to a comprehensive peace through negotiations based on UNSC 242 and 338, and the principles of territory for peace, security and recognition for Israel, and legitimate political rights for the Palestinians.

Lebanon

- We have given strong support to President Hrawi and his efforts to strengthen central Lebanese authority and control.
- Our objective is genuine national reconciliation, so that Lebanon can be whole and free again, with no foreign military presence.
- The Taif process offers a way forward; it isn't perfect, but it has broad support.
- President Hrawi is not, in my view, anyone's puppet.
- General Aoun has done nothing to liberate Lebanon; it has only made things worse.
- The Hrawi government appears ready to consider broadening its base provided everyone accepts Taif and Hrawi's authority. (FYI - Aoun refused this.)
- We support President Hrawi in his efforts.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 6, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *rwj*
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *cdw*
SUBJECT: Points to be Made for the President's
Meeting With Arab American Businessmen

Attached at Tab I is are talking points for the President's meeting with Arab American Businessmen on Tuesday, August 7. These points will be incorporated in a package being prepared by Bobbie Kilberg.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to forward the points to Jim Cicconi.

Approve *B* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Jim Cicconi
Tab A Points to be Made

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006318
RECEIVED: 06 AUG 90 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 07 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KUWAIT

AP

PERSONS: AL-SABAH, SAUD N

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ KUWAITE AMB AL - SABAH ON 8 AUG / TALKING POINTS /
PARTICIPANTS LIST

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 09 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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By Cap NARA, Date 9/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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ON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1990


THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
8/8/90

MEETING WITH
KUWAITI AMBASSADOR SAUD NASIR AL-SABAH

DATE: August 8, 1990

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 11:00 - 11:15 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To demonstrate U.S. support for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and for the legitimate government of Kuwait.

II. BACKGROUND

We want to demonstrate that while our stated goal is to defend Saudi Arabia, that is not our only goal -- we are not writing off Kuwait. The meeting with Ambassador Saud Nasir al-Sabah is one way to convey this message in a public way. He has done an excellent job of serving as his nation's spokesman in the days since the Iraqi invasion. You should compliment him for his effective visibility, but urge him also to encourage his relative, the Amir, to do more to serve as a symbol of Kuwait's resolve and resistance.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo op followed by meeting.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Participants List

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POINTS TO BE MADE
FOR MEETING WITH KUWAITI AMBASSADOR SAUD NASIR AL-SABAH

- I wanted to have this meeting to congratulate you on what a tremendous job you are doing for your country -- indeed, for our interests -- in this extraordinary time.
- You really have become a spokesman for your nation, showing Americans the spirit of Kuwait to resist the Iraqi invasion.
- But I also wanted to tell you personally, just as I told the Amir, that while our goal is to defend Saudi Arabia if it is attacked, that is not our only goal.
- We also want to remove Iraq from your soil, and restore your family to its legitimate leadership position.
- I would also encourage you to seek additional opportunities for the Amir to speak out in public, to serve as a symbol that your people and all of us who back you can rally around.
- As a politician, I think that may be one of the most important parts of our job during the tough period ahead.

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PER E.O. 13526

2018-0391-MR
11/3/2014 MM

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Vice President

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates

Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security
Affairs

John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State, Near East
and South Asian Affairs

Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South
Asian Affairs

Kuwait

Sheikh Saud Nasir al-Sabah, Kuwait Ambassador to the U.S.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6318 ADD ON



August 7, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH 

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Ambassador Al-Sabah,
Kuwaiti Ambassador to the U.S., on Wednesday,
August 8, 1990

The briefing material for the above meeting is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum to the President attached at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants

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By MM NARA, Date 8/7/2013

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RECORD ID: 9006362
RECEIVED: 07 AUG 90 12

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 07 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: OIL

IRAQ

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DEALING W/ OIL SHORTFALL RESULTING FM IRAQ SITUATION

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 10 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Dates 1/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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fyI - Iraq: Oil Shortfall

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: 54.

LOG # 6262

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Ken Hill	<u>ARNSA</u>	<u>Has seen</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	<u>has seen</u>	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Sh _____

Brent: I gave a copy to Richard who may have some comments on the SPR question.

Tom

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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6362

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

August 7, 1990

Carol M. Meade
MD

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*
SUBJECT: Iraq: Dealing with the Oil Shortfall

I understand there has been senior-level discussion of drawing down the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to counter a potential supply shortfall because of the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude.

If we have not already made commitments along this line, I believe that we should first exhaust all efforts to:

- increase production from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Venezuela, Nigeria, the North Sea and other areas where surplus production is possible;
- get multinational oil companies in U.S., Europe and Japan to begin drawing down their very high commercial oil stocks; and
- allow current prices to begin to moderate consumer demand.

We should send a credible signal to the markets that we, in conjunction with our allies, are prepared to draw down strategic stocks if necessary. However, neither the oil companies nor other producers should think that strategic stock drawdown will take the place of their cooperation.

Oil companies have every incentive to cooperate, lest they be perceived as taking advantage of the consumer. It may be advisable, therefore, for senior Administration officials (Secretary Brady, Governor Sununu, Chairman Greenspan, Secretary Watkins) to meet with oil company CEOs to explain that the U.S. will draw stock only after companies have begun to reduce their large inventories. Otherwise, the President opens himself up to criticism that he is letting the companies benefit from the crisis. Jawboning ought to have some effect given the poor public image of the oil companies (e.g., EXXON).

If a decision is taken to draw the SPR, it must be coordinated with the EC and Japan to prevent free riders. The President will need to talk with Kaifu, Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterrand and Delors to ensure the necessary cooperation.

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Should Saudi oil be removed from the market, we and our allies should immediately direct the International Energy Agency to activate its coordinated stockdraw plan (as agreed to in July 1984). Disruption of Saudi supplies will require full access to the SPR.

In addition, policy makers might consider sending a strong message to markets that there is no reason for panic nor for sharply increasing crude or product prices at the present time. Why?

- o high company stocks which have not yet been drawn;
- o still four to six weeks oil on the seas from Iraq/Kuwait;
- o continued production from other countries;
- o surplus production, some of which is coming on stream (e.g., Venezuela reportedly plans to increase output by 450,000 b/d);
- o adequate government-controlled strategic stocks; and
- o possibility for increased conservation.

In short, we should not let our legitimate concerns about the impact of oil price hikes on a weakening economy drive us to draw on the SPR prematurely when we have not yet exhausted other remedies.

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RECORD ID: 9006365
RECEIVED: 07 AUG 90 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RODMAN

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 08 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: IRAQ CRISIS / LONGTERM IMPLICATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 10 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RODMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Co NARA, Date 5/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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6365

August 8, 1990

Thanks.
(B)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

SUBJECT: Iraq Crisis: Long-Term Implications

You need no instruction in how important this crisis is, but I thought I would try to enumerate some of its interesting longer-term aspects.

First of all, it can be truly said to be **the first Third World crisis of the post-cold war period**. It has many features that reflect the new era in international politics:

- the striking degree of U.S.-Soviet collaboration: One hopes it will prove durable. This should, inter alia, make an impression in Baghdad and help us rally wavering third countries.
- the key role of Europe and Japan: Without them no economic sanctions are conceivable. Their rapid response was also remarkable, as was the EC's cohesion.
- the utility of the UN as a policy instrument: This is, of course, the product of the new superpower harmony. The UNSC resolutions have strengthened our hand for possible unilateral action while helping us mobilize multilateral support.
- the salience of economics: This is one of the cliches of recent years but it is borne out. Our ability to withstand and contain disruption in the oil market will be crucial to our success (highlighting the need to reduce our energy vulnerability and get our economy in order).
- the proliferation of high-tech weaponry: The crisis is a test of our ability to deal with this problem in the way that counts, namely by defeating a bully who has sought to play this card.

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- the structural vulnerability of the Arab world: This region of weak regimes, traditional thuggery, and fundamentalist menace promises to be the arena of much future turmoil, with potential impact on Turkey, Soviet Central Asia, South and Southwest Asia, and even China.
- the pivotal role of the United States: Yet again, there is no substitute for our leadership in mobilizing a multilateral effort in the new international environment. And, as in other situations (e.g., Libya), our ability to mobilize a multilateral effort has depended heavily on our threat to act unilaterally, which spooks our friends and others into acting themselves. (I.e., our ability to sustain international economic sanctions may depend on our maintaining or escalating our military pressure.)

The stakes are high. This is, in a large sense, **a test of whether the industrial democracies together can dominate events in the new era.** It's a North-South issue of the crudest kind, testing whether the traditional major powers have truly regained their self-confidence in recent years or are helpless in the face of Third World bullying. (It reminds me of the Falklands.) The participation of the Soviets, as they begin to see themselves as a normal European power, ought to strengthen our hand (though it may also reveal how marginal their influence is these days).

It is an opportunity for us to display leadership, but **U.S. leadership is also being put to a make-or-break test.** The failure of the international campaign against Saddam will be seen as our failure, feeding perceptions of our impotence that are already being fueled by our domestic financial crisis and the assault on our defense budget. It will reinforce European and Japanese temptations to distance themselves from us in the future, as well as their normal instinct to appease Third World bullies, particularly in the Arab world. The euphoria about how the Revolution of 1989 has vindicated our system and our policy will give way to the perception of an anarchic world governed by no agreed concept of order or equilibrium or mechanism of discipline.

The payoff from success, needless to say, would be equally enormous.

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RECORD ID: 9006269
RECEIVED: 03 AUG 90 17

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TO: BAKER, J

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 08 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

ARMS SALES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATL INTEREST CERTIFICATION FOR SALE OF F-15S TO SAUDI ARABIA

ACTION: PRES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 07 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LEVIN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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By Cop NARA, Dates 5/2/2009

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DOC 3 OF 3

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9006269

REFERRAL

DATE: 08 AUG 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: BAKER, J

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 08 AUG 90

SUBJ: NATL INTEREST CERTIFICATION FOR SALE OF F-15S TO SAUDI ARABIA

REQUIRED ACTION: CERTIFY TO CONGRESS

*sent 8/8
JRS*

DUE DATE: 10 AUG 90

COMMENT:

URGENT

FOR

Julie Phillips

GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

ORIGINAL FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: National Interest Certification for Sale of F-15s
to Saudi Arabia

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 1306(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456), I hereby certify that it is in the national interest of the United States to waive section 1306(a) of that act.

You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this certification to Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Bush", is positioned in the lower right area of the document.

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6269

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1990

ACTION

8/8/90

100-100000-100000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK *dup for*

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Certification Waiving Statutory Restriction on
Sale of Additional F-15s to Saudi Arabia

Purpose

To waive the statutory restriction on the sale of additional F-15s to Saudi Arabia.

Background

The Saudis currently have 58 F-15s capable of deployment against Iraq's superior military forces. The Saudis purchased 12 additional F-15s on March 30, 1988. When we notified Congress of this sale, it included a provision in the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act which limited Saudi Arabia to no more than 60 F-15 aircraft at any one time.

By transferring the 12 F-15s now, the Saudis will possess 70 F-15 aircraft, which is not permissible unless this prohibition is waived. The prohibition may be waived if you certify to Congress that such action is in the national interest. State recommends (Tab B) that you make the certification now to permit Saudi Arabia to have all 12 additional F-15s to help deter Iraqi aggression and to provide for Saudi self-defense in the event of an armed attack by Iraq. In order to maximize your flexibility, we have drafted a broader waiver than originally recommended by State: the waiver permits sales beyond these twelve and also permits additional models of F-15s and inclusion of ground attack capability currently prohibited by the statute. The State Department concurs with this change.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/4/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The sale of these F-15s was notified to Congress in 1988, in accordance with the procedures of the Arms Export Control Act. There is no requirement that we again notify Congress of the sale, although we will transmit your certification to Congress. We will also informally consult with key Members.

The Saudis have requested additional equipment which may require further waivers in the next several days. We are in the process of analyzing their requests.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum (Tab A) certifying that it is in the national interest to waive section 1306(a).

Attachments

Tab A Presidential Certification
Tab B State Department Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008123
RECEIVED: 11 OCT 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: JACKSON

DOC DATE: 08 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
JAPAN

KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: JAPANESE ASSISTANCE IN IRAQ CRISIS

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 15 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JACKSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JACKSON

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # _____

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>RTAF</u>
<u>Jackson</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>77A</u>
_____	_____	_____	<u>OBE?</u>

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memo	Karl Jackson to Brent Scowcroft/Wilma G. Hall Re: Possible Japanese assistance in iraq crisis (2 pp.)	8/8/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part I

Date Closed: 5/22/2009	OA/ID Number: 91143-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006424
RECEIVED: 09 AUG 90 11

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 09 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: AUSTRALIA
UN

TELCALL
PERSIAN GULF



PERSONS: HAWKE, ROBERT

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE RE PRES TELCALL TO PM HAWKE 9 AUG

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 09 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON
PAAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: EF LOG # 6424
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG EF A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>EF 8/9</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>

90 AUG 9 P 3: 18

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____
 Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS
 Telephone call PM Hawke at 4:15pm
 today (8/9)

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
 Exec See office has diskette

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6424

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

RECEIVED
 90 AUG 13 A 9: 59

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

file
 (this page has been redone)

30 AUG 9 4:07

6424

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1990

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia

DATE: August 9, 1990

PURPOSE: To inquire about possible Australian contribution to Persian Gulf military effort.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: None required. The Prime Minister does speak English.

PHONE NUMBER: 011-61-62-732999

CONTACT PERSON: Sandy Holloway

TIME DIFFERENCE: +14

SUGGESTED TIMES: ~~4:15 - 5:00 p.m.~~ *5:15 pm - 5:30 pm* EDT August 9, 1990

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: 1. Australian assistance to Persian Gulf military effort.

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

*State Dept
on Australian
Censorship*

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BOB HAWKE

- Bob, my good friend, I am calling to stay in touch with you, as I always want to do, on important matters. Today it is the Persian Gulf.
- I know you have already banned your substantial grain sales to Iraq and that this will cost your treasury a lot of money (around \$600 million). That was a good step and it will help.
- I have heard you might also be able to join the multinational effort to support the sanctions under Resolution 661. That's good news.
- I certainly will applaud your decision to send ships to the Gulf.
- As you know, we are sending our forces to Saudi Arabia at Saudi invitation to help defend them. We are also considering how best to organize a force to support the sanctions, so I am not technically in a position to ask you to sign up. There may be a UN angle. It sure will help to have you with us enforcing the sanctions.
- Your forces exercise with ours. They will make welcome team mates.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 9, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: *for* KARL JACKSON *JK*
FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*
SUBJECT: Phone Call to Prime Minister Bob Hawke of
Australia

Attached is the memorandum for the President's telephone call to Prime Minister Hawke this afternoon. Hawke asked for the call so that he will be prepared to respond positively to reporters' questions later this evening about a possible Australian contribution to the Persian Gulf multinational force.

You should let the President know that the Australians would prefer to be asked by him only to enforce the sanctions and NOT to defend Saudi Arabia. (Old attitudes die hard in Australia.) The second to last talking point is constructed to walk the line between our hesitancy to do the asking and Australia's reluctance to be seen helping the Arabs.

Hawke is prepared to offer two frigates (FFG) and an oiler, for up to three months, and one frigate thereafter. JCS says they are welcome. Among other concerns, Hawke is interested in whether the task force will be under a UN mandate or not. He would prefer that Canada and Japan also join the force, but that is not a condition. He assumes the U.S. will command the force, even under a UN mandate. And he prefers that public reference be made to Australia's contribution to enforcing the sanctions and deterring aggression, and not to defending Saudi Arabia.

Concurrence by: Richard Haass *RH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BOB HAWKE

-- Bob, my good friend, I am calling to stay in touch with you, as I always want to do, on important matters. Today it is the Persian Gulf.

-- I know you have already banned your substantial grain sales to Iraq and that this will cost your treasury a lot of money (around \$600 million). That was a good step and it will help.

-- I have heard you might also be able to join the multinational effort to support the sanctions under Resolution 661. That's good news.

-- I certainly will applaud your decision to send ships to the Gulf.

-- As you know, we are sending our forces ^{to Saudi Arabia} ~~there~~ at Saudi invitation to help defend ^{them} ~~Saudi Arabia~~ ^{we are also considering how} and to support ^{best to} the sanctions, so I am not technically in a position to ^{organize a} ask you to sign up. ^{There may be a UN angle} ~~But~~ it sure will help to have you ^{force} with us enforcing the sanctions.

-- Your forces exercise with ours. They will make welcome team mates.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Letter	Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to President Bush (2 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part I

Date Closed: 5/22/2009	OA/ID Number: 91143-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

TO: CHENEY, R

FROM: ARENS, MOSHE

DOC DATE: 09 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
KUWAIT

IRAQ

PERSONS: ARENS, MOSHE

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: ISRAELI CONCERNS RE IRAQI THREAT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 17 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS
NSC CHRON
RODMAN
ROSTOW
WELCH
WORKING

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

United States Department of State

Deputy Secretary of State

8/9/90

The attached was delivered by
Arad to me this afternoon. It is
a letter from Arens to Cheney.
Copy givenus simply for information.

LSE

APNSA Has Seen

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Talking Points	Re: Embassy of Israel (2 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part I

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 1/13/2010

Date Closed:	5/22/2009	OA/ID Number:	91143-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1998-0099-F/3 (54.02)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	1/13/2010	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

August 9, 1990

1. We share your views on the threats which Saddam Hussein's aggression poses to the interests of the free world in general, and to our region in particular.
2. We would like to compliment the U.S. for the courageous decisions, the fast reaction and the demonstrated determination in coping with the situation.
3. I have instructed the MOD and the IDF to respond expeditiously to any request or need you may have. (b) (1)
(b) (1)
4. We are concerned with the Iraqi threats towards Israel, particularly after the false Iraqi allegations concerning Israeli intentions, and the alleged Israeli preparations to participate with the U.S. forces in hostilities against Iraq. These allegations help Iraq to create a plausible casus belli -- hoping to regain Arab unity and solidarity with Iraq.
5. An Iraqi attack against Israel may be the result of a deterioration on the Saudi front; or may be a unilateral Iraqi initiative.
6. Such an Iraqi attack on Israel may be carried out in one, or in a combination of the following:
 - Air attack;
 - Missile attack;
 - Land operation, i.e., deployment of forces in Jordan.
7. We are very concerned with Iraqi threats to use CW.
8. I have instructed the IDF to take required defensive measures and preparations to cope with these threats.

/Cont'd -2-

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

-2-

~~SECRET~~

9. We believe that the situation in the Gulf in general, and the threat Israel faces in particular, raises an urgent need for consultation and coordination between the U.S. and Israel. I am concerned with potential miscalculations which may result from lack of information and/or coordination.

10. (b)(1)

11.

12.

13.

14.

15. Greetings.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006392
RECEIVED: 08 AUG 90 11

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: ZELIKOW

DOC DATE: 10 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA
KUWAIT

TELCON
IRAQ

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: MULRONEY, BRIAN

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PM MULRONEY RE KUWAIT & IRAQ SITUATION / AUG 7

ACTION: HILL APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 11 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
O'LEARY
ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cep NARA, Date 5/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6392

August 10, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: PHILIP D. ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada on August 7, 1990

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada
on August 7, 1990, at 11:59am.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *KSH for*

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Telcon

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 8/7/2013

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6392

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada on August 7, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip D. Zelikow, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 7, 1990, 11:59am - 12:06pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Prime Minister Mulroney: Thanks for your hospitality. I spoke to President Mubarak this morning. Have you spoken to him lately? (U)

The President: I talked with him this morning at about 2:30am our time. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: About your visitor ... (U)

The President: Who was coming. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I spoke to him since he saw the visitor. He said Iraq came in and announced that Kuwait has \$500 million they can put their hands on. The first thing to do with that money would be to help Egypt. They were trying to tell Mubarak that there would be \$20 billion for Egypt if Egypt supported Iraq. Mubarak said we won't sell our principles. I congratulated him for being against aggression. Mubarak said he was tough on Iraq. Privately, he said, all the Arabs support Egypt on this except King Hussein and North Yemen. (S)

The Iraqi response is that they're ready to die. They are most unreasonable. Militarily, what do you expect? Mubarak had heard all kinds of rumors. He told the Iraqi he thought they would be driven out of Kuwait. The Iraqi response was that they would never accept that. Mubarak said the UN resolution should be strictly executed. He said the Soviets agree with Egypt's position. A boycott, he said, is very important. Mubarak views the UN resolution as the most significant development so far. It will provide cover for whoever wants to come on the side. Such leaders now have all the legitimacy to do it. What clearly happened is that the Iraqis have just robbed the bank and will split it up with whoever will support them. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
9/1/2000

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President: I spoke with the President of Yemen. He asked for more time, that we not enforce the UN sanctions. It was kind of a pathetic call. He and King Hussein are the only two on that wicket. I think it's money. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Mubarak told me we should make sure of the enforceability of the resolution. (S)

The President: I talked to Mitterrand. He was supportive of a NATO meeting. 'We will be there,' he said. I took the Mulroney Plan. I'm feeling a little groggy, but it worked out. Mitterrand was pleasant and matter of fact. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You're handling this situation extremely well. Keep going and God bless. (U)

The President: Thanks. Let me know if you get any more intel there. (S).

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MEN

LOG # 6392

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG DA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Ken Hill</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>DA 8/14</u>	<u>R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>NR</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006475
RECEIVED: 10 AUG 90 17

TO: HUSSEIN I

FROM: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE
DOC DATE: 11 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN

PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: LTR TO KING HUSSEIN FM PRES RE IRAQ SITUATION

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH	DUE DATE: 14 AUG 90	STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: WELCH	LOGREF:	
FILES: PA	NSCP:	CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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NSC CHRON
WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/22/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Your Majesty:

In every friendship there is always a time when it is subject to serious strain and test. As you and I discussed on the phone, I had been personally disappointed by some recent Jordanian positions. I do not doubt that your efforts were motivated by a sincere dedication to the best interests of Jordan and the Arab people, but I simply could not agree that Jordan's positions would contribute to solving the problem of Iraq's aggression.

That is why, Your Majesty, I was personally very, very pleased to learn of your decision to have Jordan join the international community in imposing sanctions on Iraq. I am keenly aware of the serious implications of this decision for Jordan's domestic stability and security. Jordan has a justifiable concern that public handling of this decision not magnify those implications. My view is that public rhetoric is much less important than effective actions that bring home to Iraq the costs of its aggression. I have asked Ambassador Roger Harrison to bring some specific points to your attention in this regard.

Let me assure you that I am determined to see the confrontation with Iraq concluded on a basis that restores Kuwait to Kuwaitis, free of Iraqi occupiers and their surrogates. You should know, and I hope we have demonstrated, that we will stand by our friends who help.

With best personal wishes to you, Queen Noor, and your family,

Sincerely,

Q B

P.S. Today in a press conference I expressed the hope, and indeed my feeling, that U.S.-Jordan relations will be strong. I feel the same way about our friendship.

My Regards ~ Best Wishes
in which Barbara joins me

His Majesty
Hussein I
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan
Amman

Q B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to King Hussein

Purpose

To send a letter to King Hussein about Iraq.

Background

Jordan has moved closer to the international consensus on Iraq. King Hussein announced August 8 that Jordan would comply with UN sanctions on Iraq. At the recently concluded Arab Summit, Jordan backed further away from Iraq, leaving it isolated with the PLO and Libya.

Jordanian sanctions would complete the encirclement of Iraq. But the cost will be high, perhaps proportionately the most serious for any nation. Substantial help will be needed to offset the economic deflation of the Iraqi connection. In addition, public and political sentiment in Jordan is strongly pro-Iraq. One of Hussein's advisers said that the policy shift away from Saddam is like "making a U-turn into oncoming traffic." The risks for Hussein, and for the stability and security of Jordan, are very substantial.

Turmoil in Jordan would complicate Israel's eastern front. There is thus the risk that what we are urging Jordan to do vis-a-vis Iraq will create problems for us in another critical arena. The nightmare scenario is that the two become linked, with Israel headed to war with Iraq because of Jordan.

Now is the time to restore some warmth to the relationship with Hussein and consider ways that we can help him through the adjustment to life without Iraq. There is little point in rubbing his nose in past misjudgments, and we have other important long-term interests in keeping security on Israel's eastern front. The first step is to write Hussein (Tab A). The letter has been cleared by State. A handwritten postscript is also suggested.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to King Hussein at Tab A.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachment
Tab A Letter to King Hussein

~~SECRET~~

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RECORD ID: 9006428
RECEIVED: 09 AUG 90 13

TO: FOLEY, THOMAS S

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 10 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA
CONGRESSIONAL

DEFENSE POLICY



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DEPLOYMENT OF US TROOPS TO SAUDI ARABIA

ACTION: PRES SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK DUE DATE: 13 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW

LOGREF: 9006446

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

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FOR ACTION

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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President per WH
Executive Clerk

8/10/90

August 9, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Presidential Letters on Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia

Purpose

To report to Congress, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, regarding the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia.

Background

In connection with the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, it is appropriate for you to report to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." The Resolution requires a presidential report within 48 hours of, among other things, introducing Armed Forces "equipped for combat" into the territory of another country. The proposed letters are drafted to preserve an option not to send additional reports should Forces be deployed to other Persian Gulf countries. They also use the "consistent with" formulation to preserve the traditional Executive position that the Resolution is unconstitutional in whole or in part. You used this formulation in your report on military actions in Panama in December 1989.

Most counsel agree that Congress probably has the constitutional authority to require reports of the sort specified in section 4 of the War Powers Resolution. The letters are intended to fulfill that reporting requirement.

While thus designed to fulfill the requirements of section 4, the "consistent with" formulation also is intended to avoid any concession with respect to section 5 of the Resolution. That section purports to require the President, after he files a War

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Powers Report, to terminate certain deployments of U.S. Forces (1) within 60 to 90 days, unless Congress specifically authorizes their continued deployment; or (2) immediately if Congress, by concurrent resolution, so directs. Consistent with the views of all Presidents since the adoption of the War Powers Resolution, all senior Administration counsel agree that the legislative veto mechanisms of section 5 are unconstitutional and inapplicable.

State, Defense, JCS, Justice, and Boyden Gray have approved the text of the letters.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tabs A and B for delivery to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House by 9:00 a.m. Friday, August 10.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate
Tab B	Letter to the Speaker of the House

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied the sovereign state of Kuwait in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. In the period since August 2, Iraq has massed an enormous and sophisticated war machine on the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border and in southern Iraq, capable of initiating further hostilities with little or no additional preparation. Iraq's actions pose a direct threat to neighboring countries and to vital U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region.

In response to this threat and after receiving the request of the Government of Saudi Arabia, I ordered the forward deployment of substantial elements of the United States Armed Forces into the region. I am providing this report on the deployment and mission of our Armed Forces in accordance with my desire that Congress be fully informed and consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

Two squadrons of F-15 aircraft, one brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, and other elements of the Armed Forces began arriving in Saudi Arabia at approximately 9:00 a.m. (EDT) on August 8, 1990. Additional U.S. air, naval, and ground Forces also will be deployed. The Forces are equipped for combat, and their mission is defensive. They are prepared to take action in concert with Saudi forces, friendly regional forces, and others to deter Iraqi aggression and to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia.

I do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent; to the contrary, it is my belief that this deployment will facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis. If necessary, however, the Forces are fully prepared to defend themselves. Although it is not possible to predict the precise scope and duration of this deployment, our Armed Forces will remain so long as their presence is required to contribute to the security of the region and desired by the Saudi government to enhance the capability of Saudi armed forces to defend the Kingdom.

I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct our foreign relations and as Commander in Chief. These actions are in exercise of our inherent right of

individual and collective self-defense. I look forward to cooperation with the Congress in helping to restore peace and stability to the Persian Gulf region.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

cc: The Honorable Robert J. Dole
Republican Leader

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied the sovereign state of Kuwait in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. In the period since August 2, Iraq has massed an enormous and sophisticated war machine on the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border and in southern Iraq, capable of initiating further hostilities with little or no additional preparation. Iraq's actions pose a direct threat to neighboring countries and to vital U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region.

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I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct our foreign relations and as Commander in Chief. These actions are in exercise of our inherent right of

individual and collective self-defense. I look forward to cooperation with the Congress in helping to restore peace and stability to the Persian Gulf region.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc: The Honorable Robert H. Michel
Republican Leader

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 9, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *NR*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letters on Deployment of U.S. Armed
Forces to Saudi Arabia

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum for the President recommending that he sign letters to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House reporting on the recent deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Saudi Arabia.

These letters are consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

State, Defense, JCS, Justice, and Counsel to the President have cleared the text of the proposed letters (Tabs A and B).

Concurrence by: Richard Haas *RH*, Ginny Lampley *GL*, Arnold Kanter *AK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum for the President
Tab A	Letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate
Tab B	Letter to the Speaker of the House