

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91143
Folder ID Number: 91143-005

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (July 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from President Mubarak on June 8 (between 10:25am and 11:15am) (1 pp.)	6/7/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from President Mubarak of Egypt (1 pp.)	6/7/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Gulf Contingency Planning (2 pp.)	7/25/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	White House Situation Room to Charles and Gate Re: Iraq/Kuwait: Ambassador's Meeting with Saddam (2 pp.)	7/25/90	(b)(1)	S
02c. Cable	Re: Saddam's Message of Friendship to President Bush (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Prince Bandar Bin Sultan (2 pp.)	7/26/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Prince Bandar Bin Sultan (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Prince Bandar Bin Sultan (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (July 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1192
OA/ID Number: 91143-005
Date Closed: 5/21/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03d. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03e. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting for Prince Bandar with President Bush (1 pp.)	7/25/90	(b)(1)	S
04a. Profile Sheet	Charles and Haass to Scowcroft Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	7/27/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	7/27/90	(b)(1)	S
04c. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	7/27/90	(b)(1)	S
04d. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	7/27/90	(b)(1)	S
04e. Routing Slip	Re: National Security Council The White House (1 pp.)	7/27/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Proposed Expansion of Export Controls on Iraq (2 pp.)	7/27/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Letter	James A. Baker, III to Robert A. Mosbacher (1 pp.)	7/25/90	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Joseph Casper Re: Department of Commerce (3 pp.)	7/25/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (July 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1192
OA/ID Number: 91143-005
Date Closed: 5/21/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Memo	C. David Welch to William F. Sittmann Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan, July 28, 1990 (1 pp.)	7/30/90	(b)(1)	C
06b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	7/28/90	(b)(1)	C
07a. Memo	C. David Welch to William F. Sittmann Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan, July 31, 1990 (1 pp.)	7/31/90	(b)(1)	C
07b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	7/31/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 3 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (July 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1192
OA/ID Number: 91143-005
Date Closed: 5/21/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004584
RECEIVED: 07 JUN 90 15

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 07 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
TELCALL

PLO

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SUBJECT: TELCALL FM PRES MUBARAK ON 8 JUN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 11 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

WELCH

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CJ NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

*Get my message
Reveal my " "*

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT

- I understand your concern about the PLO dialogue. Believe me, I know the value of the dialogue and I can appreciate the consequences if it is interrupted or cut.
- But there are some basic choices here for Arafat. First, he has not given us anything to work with.
- We asked the PLO to denounce the PLF raid, to disassociate itself from it, and to take steps to suspend or remove Abu Abbas from the Executive Committee.
- So far, the only thing the PLO has done is to disassociate itself, and even that was half-hearted. Furthermore, we have heard nothing encouraging in private either.
- Hosni, let me add a second point. I will be frank with you. We have other serious concerns about the PLO and terrorism beyond this event alone.
- I think the bottom line could not be clearer: we would prefer to keep the dialogue going, but the PLO needs to make that choice too.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0384-MR
E8 6/29/15

Something

*Some factions want destroy
Abbu Abbas*

~~SECRET~~

*Habash want
to put it in corner "*

matter of balance between factions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

- They need to help themselves, or I will have to draw the conclusion that they do not want to bear the responsibility for their actions. If that is the way they feel about it, I would have to draw the conclusion that they do not care if the dialogue is suspended.
- Perhaps you can help to persuade Arafat of the gravity of this situation.
- We have some time, but not much. Within the next few days we need something from the PLO to work with, or else the consensus behind our efforts in the peace process will quickly erode in Israel, within the Palestinian community, and here in the United States.
- If it helps, feel free to remind them that we stand ready to support the UNSYG sending an envoy to the occupied territories.
- We will also push the new Israeli government on the peace process and settlements.
- We are prepared to do our part to meet some PLO concerns, but for now, the next move must come from the PLO.

① ~~not~~ great dialogue

I'll try with him - Arafat
Doing " Try

" composition of council
is terrible " (YIP said control)
I'll

Get

Send Abu Abbas out of Libya
Telzy Sharine - not to break -

Neighson is terrible mess -
Talk Tough with him going
to Yemen
Starting

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4584

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Mubarak
on June 8 (between 10:25am and 11:15am)

President Hosni Mubarak asked for this call to urge you not to rush into a decision to suspend or cut off the U.S.-PLO dialogue. He is deeply worried that the peace process is in grave jeopardy, and that a break in the dialogue could spark another deterioration in the situation. Egypt, furthermore, is very exposed, given its efforts to promote the peace process in cooperation with us and the essential role it has played in getting the PLO not to oppose a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue.

So far, our efforts to elicit something from the PLO that would give us a basis to continue our dialogue have not borne fruit. We are prepared to meet some of Arafat's concerns, but the terrorism problem must be met forthrightly. You should lay that out for Mubarak, as well as warn him that this attack is not the only evidence we have that calls into question PLO intentions. Unless Arafat acts, your options will narrow very rapidly. Finally, Mubarak may yet be of some help; undoubtedly, he will try with Arafat, and you should thank him for that.

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0384-MR
Eg 6/29/15

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 17

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 3

DTG 0800001ZJ

RELEASER STACK

FROM/LOCATION

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. MR. ROBERT GATES/ CHICAGO

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 12/1/2009

TOR: _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Telephone call (IMMED. ATEN)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

4584

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 7, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Mubarak of Egypt

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President conveying talking points (Tab A) or his telephone conversation Friday, June 8, with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. The call will take place between 10:25am and 11:15am.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 8/1/2013

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HAASS

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 25 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
IRAQ
UAE

OPEC
KUWAIT

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: GULF CONTINGENCY PLANNING

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 28 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Ce NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

Gulf Contingency Planning

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # **5895**

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM **PRS** NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG **DAR** A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Ken Hill</i>	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 JUL 25 12:50

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5895

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

*Brent - As I said,
things may have
changed. I stand
April 1990*

July 25, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS *RN*
SUBJECT: Gulf Contingency Planning

As you know, OPEC is about to convene in Geneva. Iraq wants agreement on production levels and price. Kuwait is likely to cave (for now) on production quotas and go along with a higher price but not one as high as Iraq and others want. All this is taking place against a backdrop of Iraqi pressure on both Kuwait and the UAE. The invective is pretty rough even by local standards; on the ground, the Iraqis have massed several divisions on the Kuwait border.

Iraq seems to be engaging in a form of gunboat diplomacy that should pass peacefully, although in a manner that only papers over OPEC's internal divisions, increases suspicions of Iraq, and increases Iraqi propensity to bully. This said, what Iraq has massed represents such overkill that one has to wonder if they don't intend to act. Also, Iraq might find itself forced to act (if only to save face) if Kuwait and the UAE do not give in. If they did act, the most likely scenario is an Iraqi grab of the disputed territory and oil field. Less likely is an attack on a UAE platform. Least likely (though by no means out of the question) is a full-scale invasion of Kuwait.

If Iraq chooses to use force, it cannot be stopped or even slowed more than a few hours by any conceivable combination of its neighbors. They could launch such an attack now with no further preparations, although they would accomplish their goals even more quickly if they beefed up their C3. DIA estimates they could occupy all of Kuwait in under a week.

Thus far, our own reaction has been words--expressions of support for our friends, veiled threats to Iraq, call for restraint by all--and modest actions, including ship movements by the Middle East Force, intelligence support for Kuwait and the UAE, and the tanker support for the latter. This is consistent with our historic role. Although we have no legally binding commitment to provide U.S. forces to defend any country in the Gulf, repeated statements made by U.S. presidents and senior officials constitute a de facto commitment, certainly to Saudi Arabia and the flow of oil, increasingly to the security of other friendly

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
1998-0099-F/2
7/27/2011 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

states and the containment of Iraq. The relevant policy document of this administration, NSD 26, states that "access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national security...the United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region...through the use of US military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own."

The question we are considering is what more we might do if conflict does break out. Here are some initial guidelines:

--We should continue doing what we are doing--rhetorically, militarily, intelligence exchange--until the situation calms. We should also use this time to refine our contingency planning.

--If we do use force, it should be 1) in response to a large use of force by Iraq; 2) at the invitation of local state(s) or better yet the GCC; 3) with access to their facilities; and 4) in concert with local military forces, even if cosmetic. We do not want to turn this into a U.S.-Iraq confrontation. My guess is that such conditions would only arise with a major attack on Kuwait that threatened its independence, not simply its control over the disputed territory or a few islands or oil fields.

--We should not try to counter Iraqi military force tank for tank or airplane for airplane at the point of attack. This would be playing to their strengths and our weaknesses. Instead, if Iraq uses force, we should use force against Iraqi targets of high value: oil installations, military bases, military-industrial plants. JCS is preparing various target sets.

--Any military planning should also include defending countries and areas of high value, especially Saudi Arabia. This would emphasize air and naval forces but not rule out ground forces.

--State is preparing a list of diplomatic and political steps that would accompany any such use of force by us. This would include such things as the Security Council, sanctions versus Iraq, congressional consultations, public statements, and so on.

--We would let the Israelis know that we do not want them in any way involving themselves in any crisis. They might be tempted to exploit one to attack Iraq. They should be discouraged, for if they did get involved, we would find Arab state willingness to cooperate with us markedly reduced.

--Similarly, we would warn Jordan not to allow itself to be used by Iraq. Iraq may pressure Amman for help, but this would only bring the Israelis in and spread the conflict.

As we discussed, we would convene a Deputies Committee or full NSC if the situation deteriorates. We are also holding a PCC to review our policy toward the Gulf and Iraq in particular.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

T
A
B
I

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-Jul-1990 11:53 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JNET% "CHARLES@VAXC" @WHSR" @MRGATE

FROM:

VMSMail User _JNET% "WHSR
(_JNET% "WHSR@WHSR" @MRGATE)

SUBJECT:

Received: From WHSR(WHSR) by VAXC with Jnet id 6608
for CHARLES@VAXC; Wed, 25 Jul 90 11:53 EST
Date: Wed, 25 Jul 90 11:52 EST
From: <WHSR@WHSR>
To: CHARLES@VAXC
Original_To: JNET% "CHARLES@VAXC"

<DIST>

PRT: SIT BRANSCUM

SIT: CALDWELL CHARLES HAASS SIT SUM VAX

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

RUESST

<DTG>

251104Z JUL 90

<ORIG>

FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

<TO>

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4626

<SUBJ>

SUBJ: IRAQ/KUWAIT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SADDAM
HUSAYN

1, (X-ENTIRE TEXT)

<TEXT>

BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 04235

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, IZ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958.
1998-0099-F/2
10/16/2001 MM

SUBJ: IRAQ/KUWAIT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSAYN

1, (X-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SEPTTEL, NOT NODIS, WILL CONTAIN DETAILS OF MY TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSAYN. HIS PURPOSE IN SUMMONING ME SEEMED TO BE TO ASSURE PRESIDENT BUSH THAT HIS INTENTIONS ARE PEACEFUL, AND THAT HE HOPED USG PUBLIC CRITICISM WILL BE DAMPED DOWN. IF PUBLICLY HUMILIATED, HE WARNED (OR, RATHER, PLEADED), IRAQ WOULD HAVE TO "RESPOND."

3. AFTER TALKING TO HUSNI MUBARAK BY TELEPHONE DURING THE MEETING, SADDAM TOLD ME THAT THE KUWAITIS HAVE NOW ACCEPTED A MEETING IN RIYADH AT THE LEVEL OF PRIME MINISTER (I.E, KUWAITI SHAYKH SA'D AND THE IRAQI RCC VICE-CHAIRMAN IZZAT IBRAHIM), TO BE FOLLOWED BY MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD, WITH SHAYKH SA'D AT THE HEAD OF THE WORKING KUWEITI DELEGATION. THE BAGHDAD MEETINGS WILL BEGIN SATURDAY, SUNDAY, OR MONDAY AT THE LATEST.

4. SADDAM EXPENDED CONSIDERABLE EMOTION SEEKING TO CONVEY HOW WRONG IRAQIS BELIEVE IT IS FOR THE KUWAITIS, WHO ARE RICH, NOT TO OPEN THEIR PURSES WHEN IRAQ, WHICH "BLED RIVERS" TO PROTECT THEM, IS SO FINANCIALLY STRAPPED THAT HE WILL SOON HAVE TO CUT THE PENSIONS OF WIDOWS AND ORPHANS OF DEAD IRAQI SOLDIERS.

5. SPEAKING OF HIS CONVICTION THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER, ESPECIALLY SINCE "SOME CIRCLES" OF THE USG CONTINUE TO WORK TO UNDERMINE HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS POLICIES, SADDAM STRESSED THAT HE PUT HIS HOPE IN PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER, WHO ARE FINE AND HONORABLE MEN, AS IS NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY KELLY. HE ASKED ME TO RETURN TO THE U.S. TO EXPLAIN IRAQ'S CONCERNS TO THE PRESIDENT, WHO HE SUPPOSED MIGHT HAVE QUESTIONS (SIC).

6. COMMENT: SADDAM, WHO IN THE MEMORY OF THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC CORPS, HAS NEVER SUMMONED AN AMBASSADOR, IS WORRIED. HE DOES NOT WANT TO FURTHER ANTAGONIZE US. WITH THE UAE MANOUVERS, WE HAVE FULLY CAUGHT HIS ATTENTION, AND THAT IS GOOD. I BELIEVE WE WOULD NOW BE WELL-ADVISED TO EASE OFF ON PUBLIC CRITICISM OF IRAQ UNTIL WE SEE HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS DEVELOP.

GLASPIE

BT

#4235

[SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

[SSN>

4235

[TOR>

900725114815 MSG000270215295

T
A
B
I.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 04237

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, US, KU, IZ

SUBJECT: SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO
PRESIDENT BUSH

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: SADDAM TOLD THE AMBASSADOR JULY 25 THAT MUBARAK HAS ARRANGED FOR KUWAITI AND IRAQI DELEGATIONS TO MEET IN RIYADH, AND THEN ON JULY 28, 29 OR 30, THE KUWAITI CROWN PRINCE WILL COME TO BAGHDAD FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. "NOTHING WILL HAPPEN" BEFORE THEN, SADDAM HAD PROMISED MUBARAK.

--SADDAM WISHED TO CONVEY AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH: IRAQ WANTS FRIENDSHIP, BUT DOES THE USG? IRAQ SUFFERED 100,000'S OF CASUALTIES AND IS NOW SO POOR THAT WAR ORPHAN PENSIONS WILL SOON BE CUT; YET RICH KUWAIT WILL NOT EVEN ACCEPT OPEC DISCIPLINE. IRAQ IS SICK OF WAR, BUT KUWAIT HAS IGNORED DIPLOMACY. USG MANEUVERS WITH THE UAE WILL ENCOURAGE THE UAE AND KUWAIT TO IGNORE CONVENTIONAL DIPLOMACY. IF IRAQ IS PUBLICLY HUMILIATED BY THE USG, IT WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO "RESPOND," HOWEVER ILLOGICAL AND SELF-DESTRUCTIVE THAT WOULD PROVE.

--ALTHOUGH NOT QUITE EXPLICIT, SADDAM'S MESSAGE TO US SEEMED TO BE THAT HE WILL MAKE A MAJOR PUSH TO COOPERATE WITH MUBARAK'S DIPLOMACY, BUT WE MUST TRY TO UNDERSTAND KUWAITI/UAE "SELFISHNESS" IS UNBEARABLE. AMBASSADOR MADE CLEAR THAT WE CAN NEVER EXCUSE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BY OTHER THAN PEACEFUL MEANS. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

3. AMBASSADOR WAS SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN AT NOON JULY 25. ALSO PRESENT WERE FONMIN AZIZ, THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE DIRECTOR, TWO NOTETAKERS, AND THE IRAQI INTERPRETER.

4. SADDAM, WHOSE MANNER WAS CORDIAL, REASONABLE AND EVEN WARM THROUGHOUT THE ENSUING TWO HOURS, SAID HE WISHED THE AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH. SADDAM THEN RECALLED IN DETAIL THE HISTORY OF IRAQ'S DECISION TO REESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND ITS POSTPONING IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT DECISION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, RATHER THAN BE THOUGHT WEAK AND NEEDY. HE THEN SPOKE ABOUT THE MANY "BLOWS" OUR RELATIONS HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO SINCE 1984, CHIEF AMONG THEM IRANGATE. IT WAS AFTER THE FAW VICTORY, SADDAM SAID, THAT IRAQI MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT USG PURPOSES BEGAN TO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
1999-0461-F
1/31/2002 MM

SURFACE AGAIN, I.E., SUSPICIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT HAPPY TO SEE THE WAR END.

5. PICKING HIS WORDS WITH CARE, SADDAM SAID THAT THERE ARE "SOME CIRCLES" IN THE USG, INCLUDING IN CIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT, BUT EMPHATICALLY EXCLUDING THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY BAKER, WHO ARE NOT FRIENDLY TOWARD IRAQ-U.S. RELATIONS. HE THEN LISTED WHAT HE SEEMED TO REGARD AS FACTS TO SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION: "SOME CIRCLES ARE GATHERING INFORMATION ON WHO MIGHT BE SADDAM HUSAYN'S SUCCESSOR;" THEY KEPT UP CONTACTS IN THE GULF WARNING AGAINST IRAQ; THEY WORKED TO ENSURE NO HELP WOULD GO TO IRAQ (READ EXIM AND CCC).
6. IRAQ, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED, IS IN SERIOUS FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES, WITH 40 BILLION USD DEBTS. IRAQ, WHOSE VICTORY IN THE WAR AGAINST IRAN MADE AN HISTORIC DIFFERENCE TO THE ARAB WORLD AND THE WEST, NEEDS A MARSHALL PLAN. BUT "YOU WANT THE OIL PRICE DOWN," SADDAM CHARGED.

7. RESUMING HIS LIST OF GRIEVANCES WHICH HE BELIEVED WERE ALL INSPIRED BY "SOME CIRCLES" IN THE USG, HE RECALLED THE "USIA CAMPAIGN" AGAINST HIMSELF, AND THE GENERAL MEDIA ASSAULT ON IRAQ AND ITS PRESIDENT.

BT

#4237

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 BAGHDAD 04237

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, US, KU, IZ

SUBJECT: SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO

8. DESPITE ALL THESE BLOWS, SADDAM SAID, AND ALTHOUGH "WE WERE SOMEWHAT ANNOYED," WE STILL HOPED THAT WE COULD DEVELOP A GOOD RELATIONSHIP. BUT THOSE WHO FORCE OIL PRICES DOWN ARE ENGAGING IN ECONOMIC WARFARE AND IRAQ CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH A TRESPASS ON ITS DIGNITY AND PROSPERITY.

9. THE SPEARHEADS (FOR THE USG) HAVE BEEN KUWAIT AND THE UAE, SADDAM SAID. SADDAM SAID CAREFULLY THAT JUST AS IRAQ WILL NOT THREATEN OTHERS, IT WILL ACCEPT NO THREAT AGAINST ITSELF. "WE HOPE THE USG WILL NOT MISUNDERSTAND:" IRAQ ACCEPTS, AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID, THAT ANY COUNTRY MAY CHOOSE ITS FRIENDS. BUT THE USG KNOWS THAT IT WAS IRAQ, NOT THE USG, WHICH DECISIVELY PROTECTED THOSE USG FRIENDS DURING THE WAR--AND THAT IS UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE USG, TO SAY NOTHING OF GEOGRAPHY, WOULD HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT 10,000 DEAD IN A SINGLE BATTLE, AS IRAQ DID.

10. SADDAM ASKED WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE USG TO ANNOUNCE IT IS COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF ITS FRIENDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY. ANSWERING HIS OWN QUESTION, HE SAID THAT TO IRAQ IT MEANS FLAGRANT BIAS AGAINST THE GOI.
11. COMING TO ONE OF HIS MAIN POINTS, SADDAM ARGUED THAT USG MANEUVERS WITH THE UAE AND KUWAIT (SIC) ENCOURAGED THEM IN THEIR UNGENEROUS POLICIES. THE IRAQI RIGHTS, SADDAM EMPHASIZED, WILL BE RESTORED ONE BY ONE, THOUGH IT MAY TAKE A MONTH OR MUCH MORE THAN A YEAR. IRAQ HOPES THE USG WILL BE IN HARMONY WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO THIS DISPUTE.
12. SADDAM SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE USG IS DETERMINED TO KEEP THE OIL FLOWING AND TO MAINTAIN ITS FRIENDSHIPS IN THE GULF. WHAT HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND IS WHY WE ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO ARE DAMAGING IRAQ, WHICH IS WHAT OUR GULF MANEUVERS WILL DO.
13. SADDAM SAID HE FULLY BELIEVES THE USG WANTS PEACE, AND THAT IS GOOD. BUT DO NOT, HE ASKED, USE METHODS WHICH YOU SAY YOU DO NOT LIKE, METHODS LIKE ARM-TWISTING-
14. AT THIS POINT SADDAM SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT PRIDE OF IRAQIS, WHO BELIEVE IN "LIBERTY OR DEATH." IRAQ WILL HAVE TO RESPOND IF THE U.S. USES THESE METHODS. IRAQ KNOWS THE USG CAN SEND PLANES AND ROCKETS AND HURT IRAQ DEEPLY. SADDAM ASKS THAT THE USG NOT FORCE IRAQ TO THE POINT OF HUMILIATION AT WHICH LOGIC MUST BE DISREGARDED. IRAQ DOES NOT CONSIDER THE U.S. AN ENEMY AND HAS TRIED TO BE FRIENDS.
15. AS FOR THE INTRA-ARAB DISPUTES, SADDAM SAID HE IS NOT ASKING THE USG TO TAKE UP ANY PARTICULAR ROLE SINCE THE SOLUTIONS MUST COME THROUGH ARAB AND BILATERAL DIPLOMACY.
16. RETURNING TO HIS THEME THAT IRAQ WANTS DIGNITY AND FREEDOM AS WELL AS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE U.S., HE CHARGED THAT IN THE LAST YEAR THERE WERE MANY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS WHICH MADE IT SEEM THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO RECIPROCATATE. HOW, FOR EXAMPLE, SADDAM ASKED, CAN WE INTERPRET THE INVITATION FOR ARENS TO VISIT AT A TIME OF CRISIS IN THE GULF? WHY DID THE U.S- DEFENSE MINISTER MAKE "INFLAMMATORY" STATEMENTS?
17. SADDAM SAID THAT THE IRAQIS KNOW WHAT WAR IS, WANT NO MORE OF IT--"DO NOT PUSH US TO IT; DO NOT MAKE IT THE ONLY OPTION LEFT WITH WHICH WE CAN PROTECT OUR DIGNITY."
18. PRESIDENT BUSH, SADDAM SAID, HAS MADE NO MISTAKE

BT

#4237

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 BAGHDAD 04237

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, US, KU, IZ

SUBJECT: SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO
IN HIS PRESIDENCY VIS-A-VIS THE ARABS. THE DECISION
ON THE PLO DIALOGUE WAS "MISTAKEN," BUT IT WAS
TAKEN UNDER "ZIONIST PRESSURE" AND, SADDAM SAID, IS
PERHAPS A CLEVER TACTIC TO ABSORB THAT PRESSURE.

19. AFTER A SHORT DIVERSION ON THE NEED FOR THE
U.S. TO CONSIDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 200,000
ARABS WITH THE SAME VIGOR AND INTEREST AS THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF THE ISRAELIS, SADDAM CONCLUDED BY
RESTATING THAT IRAQ WANTS AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP
"ALTHOUGH WE WILL NOT PANT FOR IT, WE WILL DO OUR
PART AS FRIENDS."

20. SADDAM THEN OFFERED AN ANECDOTE TO ILLUSTRATE
HIS POINT. HE HAD TOLD THE IRAQI KURDISH LEADER
IN 1974 THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE UP HALF OF
THE SHATT AL-ARAB TO IRAN TO OBTAIN ALL OF A
PROSPEROUS IRAQ. THE KURD HAD BET THAT SADDAM WOULD
NOT GIVE HALF THE SHATT--THE KURD WAS WRONG. EVEN
NOW, THE ONLY REAL ISSUE WITH IRAN IS THE SHATT, AND
IF GIVING AWAY HALF OF THE WATERWAY IS THE ONLY
THING STANDING BETWEEN THE CURRENT SITUATION AND
IRAQI PROSPERITY, SADDAM SAID HE WOULD BE GUIDED
BY WHAT HE DID IN 1974.

21. THE AMBASSADOR THANKED SADDAM FOR THE
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH HIM SOME OF
HIS AND OUR CONCERNS. PRESIDENT BUSH, TOO, WANTS
FRIENDSHIP, AS HE HAD WRITTEN AT THE 'ID AND ON
THE OCCASION OF IRAQ'S NATIONAL DAY. SADDAM
INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE HAD BEEN TOUCHED BY THOSE
MESSAGES.

22. AMBASSADOR RESUMED HER THEME, RECALLING THAT
THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED HER TO BROADEN AND
DEEPEN OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. SADDAM HAD REFERRED
TO "SOME CIRCLES" ANTIPATHETIC TO THAT AIM. SUCH
CIRCLES CERTAINLY EXISTED, BUT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION
IS INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT. ON THE OTHER HAND,
THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONTROL THE AMERICAN PRESS;
IF HE DID, CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT
EXIST. SADDAM AGAIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE UNDERSTOOD
THAT. THE AMBASSADOR SAID SHE HAD SEEN THE DIANE
SAWYER SHOW AND THOUGHT THAT IT WAS CHEAP AND UNFAIR.
BUT THE AMERICAN PRESS TREATS ALL POLITICIANS
WITHOUT KID GLOVES--THAT IS OUR WAY.

23. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS
VERY RECENTLY REAFFIRMED HIS DESIRE FOR A BETTER
RELATIONSHIP AND HAS PROVEN THAT BY, FOR EXAMPLE,
OPPOSING SANCTIONS BILLS. HERE SADDAM INTERRUPTED
AGAIN. LAUGHING, HE SAID THERE IS NOTHING LEFT
FOR IRAQ TO BUY IN THE U.S. EVERYTHING IS

PROHIBITED EXCEPT FOR WHEAT, AND NO DOUBT THAT WILL SOON BE DECLARED A DUAL-USE ITEM- SADDAM SAID, HOWEVER, HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO RAISE THIS ISSUE, BUT RATHER CONCENTRATE ON THE FAR MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES AT HAND.

24. AMBASSADOR SAID THERE WERE MANY ISSUES HE HAD RAISED SHE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON, BUT SHE WISHED TO USE HER LIMITED TIME WITH THE PRESIDENT TO STRESS FIRST PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESIRE FOR FRIENDSHIP AND, SECOND, HIS STRONG DESIRE, SHARED WE ASSUME BY IRAQ, FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MID EAST. IS IT NOT REASONABLE FOR US TO BE CONCERNED WHEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER BOTH SAY PUBLICLY THAT KUWAITI ACTIONS ARE THE EQUIVALENT OF MILITARY AGGRESSION, AND THEN WE LEARN THAT MANY UNITS OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE BORDER? IS IT NOT REASONABLE FOR US TO ASK, IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP, NOT CONFRONTATION, THE SIMPLE QUESTION: WHAT ARE YOUR INTENTIONS?

25. SADDAM SAID THAT WAS INDEED A REASONABLE QUESTION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE SHOULD BE CONCERNED FOR REGIONAL PEACE, IN FACT IT IS OUR DUTY AS A SUPERPOWER. "BUT HOW CAN WE MAKE THEM (KUWAIT AND UAE) UNDERSTAND HOW DEEPLY WE ARE SUFFERING." THE FINANCIAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT THE PENSIONS FOR WIDOWS AND ORPHANS WILL HAVE

BT

#4237

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 BAGHDAD 04237

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, US, KU, IZ

SUBJECT: SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO TO BE CUT. AT THIS POINT, THE INTERPRETER AND ONE OF THE NOTETAKERS BROKE DOWN AND WEPT.

26. AFTER A PAUSE FOR RECUPERATION, SADDAM SAID, IN EFFECT, BELIEVE ME I HAVE TRIED EVERYTHING: WE SENT ENVOYS, WROTE MESSAGES, ASKED FAHD TO ARRANGE QUADRAPARTITE SUMMIT (IRAQ, SAG, UAE, KUWAIT). FAHD SUGGESTED OIL MINISTERS INSTEAD AND WE AGREED TO THE JEDDAH AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH IT WAS WELL BELOW OUR HOPES. THEN, SADDAM CONTINUED, TWO DAYS LATER THE KUWAITI OIL MINISTER ANNOUNCED HE WOULD WANT TO ANNUL THAT AGREEMENT WITHIN TWO MONTHS. AS FOR THE UAE, SADDAM SAID, I BEGGED SHAYKH ZAYID TO UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEMS (WHEN SADDAM ENTERTAINED HIM IN MOSUL AFTER THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT), AND ZAYID SAID JUST WAIT UNTIL I GET BACK TO ABU DHABI. BUT THEN HIS MINISTER OF OIL MADE "BAD STATEMENTS."

27. AT THIS POINT, SADDAM LEFT THE ROOM TO TAKE AN URGENT CALL FROM MUBARAK. AFTER HIS RETURN,

THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF HE COULD TELL HER IF THERE HAS ANY PROGRESS IN FINDING A PEACEFUL WAY TO DEFUSE THE DISPUTE. THIS WAS SOMETHING PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD BE KEENLY INTERESTED TO KNOW. SADDAM SAID THAT HE HAD JUST LEARNED FROM MUBARAK THE KUWAITIS HAVE AGREED TO NEGOTIATE. THE KUWAITI CROWN PRINCE/PRIME MINISTER WOULD MEET IN RIYADH WITH SADDAM'S NUMBER TWO, IZZAT IBRAHIM, AND THEN THE KUWAITI WOULD COME TO BAGHDAD ON SATURDAY, SUNDAY OR, AT THE LATEST, MONDAY, JULY 30.

28. "I TOLD MUBARAK," SADDAM SAID, THAT "NOTHING WILL HAPPEN UNTIL THE MEETING," AND NOTHING WILL HAPPEN DURING OR AFTER THE MEETING IF THE KUWAITIS WILL AT LAST "GIVE US SOME HOPE."

29. THE AMBASSADOR SAID SHE WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR THIS GOOD NEWS. SADDAM THEN ASKED HER TO CONVEY HIS WARM GREETINGS TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND TO CONVEY HIS MESSAGE TO HIM.

30. NOTE: ON THE BORDER QUESTION, SADDAM REFERRED TO THE 1961 AGREEMENT AND A "LINE OF PATROL" IT HAD ESTABLISHED. THE KUWAITIS, HE SAID, HAD TOLD MUBARAK IRAQ WAS 20 KILOMETERS "IN FRONT" OF THIS LINE. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT SHE HAD SERVED IN KUWAIT 20 YEARS BEFORE; THEN, AS NOW, WE TOOK NO POSITION ON THESE ARAB AFFAIRS.

31. COMMENT: IN THE MEMORY OF THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC CORPS, SADDAM HAS NEVER SUMMONED AN AMBASSADOR. HE IS WORRIED. ACCORDING TO HIS OWN POLITICAL THEORIZING (U.S. THE SOLE MAJOR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST), HE NEEDS AT A MINIMUM A CORRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH US FOR OBVIOUS GEOPOLITICAL REASONS, ESPECIALLY AS LONG AS HE PERCEIVES MORTAL THREATS FROM ISRAEL AND IRAN. AMBASSADOR BELIEVES SADDAM SUSPECTS OUR DECISION SUDDENLY TO UNDERTAKE MANEUVERS WITH ABU DHABI IS A HARBINGER OF A USG DECISION TO TAKE SIDES. FURTHER, SADDAM, HIMSELF BEGINNING TO HAVE AN INKLING OF HOW MUCH HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ABOUT THE U.S., IS APPREHENSIVE THAT WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND CERTAIN POLITICAL FACTORS WHICH INHIBIT HIM, SUCH AS:

--HE CANNOT ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE PERCEIVED AS CAVING IN TO SUPERPOWER BULLYING (AS U/S HAMDUN FRANKLY WARNED US IN LATE 1988);
--IRAQ, WHICH LOST 100,000'S OF CASUALTIES, IS SUFFERING AND KUWAIT IS "MISERLY" AND "SELFISH."

32. IT WAS PROGRESS TO HAVE SADDAM ADMIT THAT THE USG HAS A "RESPONSIBILITY" IN THE REGION, AND HAS EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT AN ANSWER WHEN WE ASK IRAQ'S INTENTIONS. HIS RESPONSE IN EFFECT THAT HE TRIED VARIOUS

DIPLOMATIC/CHANNELS BEFORE RESORTING TO

BT

#4237

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 BAGHDAD 04237

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, US, KU, IZ

SUBJECT: SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO UNADULTERATED INTIMIDATION HAS AT LEAST THE VIRTUE OF FRANKNESS. HIS EMPHASIS THAT HE WANTS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS SURELY SINCERE (IRAQIS ARE SICK OF WAR), BUT THE TERMS SOUND DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. SADDAM SEEMS TO WANT PLEDGES NOW ON OIL PRICES AND PRODUCTION TO COVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

GLASPIE

BT

#4237

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 05

<SSN>

4237

<TOR>

900725112414 MSG000270213854

<SECT>

SECTION: 02 OF 05

<SSN>

4237

<TOR>

900725112450 MSG000270213889

<SECT>

SECTION: 03 OF 05

<SSN>

4237

<TOR>

900725112521 MSG000270213921

<SECT>

SECTION: 04 OF 05

<SSN>

4237

<TOR>

900725112613 MSG000270213973

<SECT>

SECTION: 05 OF 05

<SSN>

4237

<TOR>

900725112621 MSG000270213981

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 26 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA
IRAQ
LEBANON

KUWAIT
CHINA P R
AFGHANISTAN

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: BANDAR

SUBJECT: PRES PAPERS FOR MTG W/ PRINCE BANDAR / JUL 26

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 28 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES
HAASS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 2/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJRP

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Prince Bandar Bin Sultan (2 pp.)	7/26/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (July 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By ES On 7/13/22

Date Closed: 5/21/2009	OA/ID Number: 91143-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0384-MR (502)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/26/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

6001

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 26, 1990

MEETING WITH

PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN

DATE: July 26, 1990

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 5:00 - 5:10 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 



I. PURPOSE

To reiterate U.S. policy in the Gulf in view of the current tensions between Iraq and Kuwait, to discuss Bandar's China visit and their missile export assurances, and to receive a letter from King Fahd requesting U.S. support for Lebanon.

II. BACKGROUND

Prince Bandar has just returned from the Kingdom and is prepared to discuss the current tensions between Iraq and Kuwait, and prospects for resolving the matter. The Arabs are pleased with Mubarak's recent talks with Iraq and Kuwait, both of which have agreed to direct talks this week in Saudi Arabia. King Fahd also has conveyed to Saddam a warning about using military force against Kuwait, while sympathizing with Iraq's economic woes and its desire to get UAE and Kuwait to adhere to OPEC oil quotas. While appreciative of the U.S. show of support, the SAG believes this matter is best resolved by the Arabs.

In addition, Bandar visited Beijing and completed the final steps toward normal relations between the two countries that was announced last week. He had serious discussions with his Chinese hosts on the question of missile exports to radical states, and apparently obtained extensive assurances from them. There is some question about whether these assurances pertain to old contracts or just new ones. 1.4(d)



Bandar also has a letter for you from King Fahd requesting U.S. support for an international fund for Lebanon's reconstruction. In addition, Prince Bandar may want to talk with you briefly on Afghanistan and recent reports of a pending settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0384-MR
EJ 10/29/15

~~SECRET~~

2

Bandar also might raise the King's outstanding visit. There have been some indications that the Saudis might ask for an invitation in November. Given your current schedule, it might be difficult to schedule a state visit that month.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE

Brief meeting and photo op

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN

IRAQ/KUWAIT

- We are concerned about Iraq's intentions toward Kuwait given their sizeable troop movements. It seems like overkill just to pressure Kuwait on oil quotas.
- His using such tactics to try to influence events to his satisfaction is troubling and sets a dangerous precedent. There should be no question that we intend to stand by our friends.
- We are pleased with the King's and Mubarak's efforts to defuse tensions. How do you see this evolving?

SAUDI/CHINESE RELATIONS

- I understand you had some interesting talks with the Chinese on missile sales and obtained some assurances from them on foreign exports. I would appreciate hearing about this as well as your own plans on the future acquisition of Chinese missiles. What are the prospects for continued Saudi/Taiwanese cooperation?

AFGHANISTAN

- Please convey my gratitude to the King for continued Saudi support for Afghanistan, and assure him that U.S. support will continue although we anticipate some problems with Congress on funding levels. We will continue to consult closely with you (and Pakistan) on our efforts to broker a political solution.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0384-MR
E8 6/29/15

- We are encouraged by some flexibility in the Soviet position regarding Najibullah. They seem willing to divest him of certain powers which would be assumed by a transition authority until a final election process is held. Secretary Baker hopes to make further progress on this concept at his talks next month.
- If we can get them to agree to a fair and reasonable arrangement, we hope your government will support us in obtaining Resistance approval.

LEBANON

- We support Hrawi and your efforts to back his government with real steps on the ground.
- We support the goals of the International Fund for Assistance to Lebanon, and will be represented at its inauguration. Because of the traditional humanitarian and bilateral focus of our aid, we cannot make a financial contribution. Our humanitarian aid will, of course, continue.

FAHD STATE VISIT

- Please tell the King I still hope to see him at a mutually convenient time. My schedule for this year is pretty tight however.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CARD 1 OF 4

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN

IRAQ/KUWAIT

- WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT IRAQ'S INTENTIONS TOWARD KUWAIT GIVEN THEIR SIZEABLE TROOP MOVEMENTS. IT SEEMS LIKE OVERKILL JUST TO PRESSURE KUWAIT ON OIL QUOTAS.
- HIS USING SUCH TACTICS TO TRY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS TO HIS SATISFACTION IS TROUBLING AND SETS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT. THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION THAT WE INTEND TO STAND BY OUR FRIENDS.
- WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE KING'S AND MUBARAK'S EFFORTS TO DEFUSE TENSIONS. HOW DO YOU SEE THIS EVOLVING?

SECRET

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CARD 2 OF 4

SAUDI/CHINESE RELATIONS

- I UNDERSTAND YOU HAD SOME INTERESTING TALKS WITH THE CHINESE ON MISSILE SALES AND OBTAINED SOME ASSURANCES FROM THEM ON FOREIGN EXPORTS. I WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING ABOUT THIS AS WELL AS YOUR OWN PLANS ON THE FUTURE ACQUISITION OF CHINESE MISSILES. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED SAUDI/TAIWANESE COOPERATION?

AFGHANISTAN

- PLEASE CONVEY MY GRATITUDE TO THE KING FOR CONTINUED SAUDI SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN, AND ASSURE HIM THAT U.S. SUPPORT WILL CONTINUE ALTHOUGH WE ANTICIPATE SOME PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS ON FUNDING LEVELS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU (AND PAKISTAN) ON OUR EFFORTS TO BROKER A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0384-112
28 6/29/15

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CARD 3 OF 4

- WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION REGARDING NAJIBULLAH. THEY SEEM WILLING TO DIVEST HIM OF CERTAIN POWERS WHICH WOULD BE ASSUMED BY A TRANSITION AUTHORITY UNTIL A FINAL ELECTION PROCESS IS HELD. SECRETARY BAKER HOPES TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS ON THIS CONCEPT AT HIS TALKS NEXT MONTH.
- IF WE CAN GET THEM TO AGREE TO A FAIR AND REASONABLE ARRANGEMENT, WE HOPE YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT US IN OBTAINING RESISTANCE APPROVAL.

LEBANON

- WE SUPPORT HRAWI AND YOUR EFFORTS TO BACK HIS GOVERNMENT WITH REAL STEPS ON THE GROUND.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CARD 4 OF 4

- WE SUPPORT THE GOALS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON, AND WILL BE PRESENTED AT ITS INAUGURATION. BECAUSE OF THE TRADITIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND BILATERAL FOCUS OF OUR AID, WE CANNOT MAKE A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION. OUR HUMANITARIAN AID WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE.

FAHD STATE VISIT

- PLEASE TELL THE KING I STILL HOPE TO SEE HIM AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME. MY SCHEDULE FOR THIS YEAR IS PRETTY TIGHT HOWEVER.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Condoleezza Rice, Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs
(Acting)
Joseph Gildenhorn, Ambassador to Switzerland
Ralph Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Canadian Affairs
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

Switzerland

Jean Pascal Delamuraz, Federal Councilor
Edouard Brunner, Ambassador to the U.S.
Gerard Stoudmann, Personal Secretary to the Federal Councilor

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East and
South Asian Affairs

Sandra Charles, Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs

Saudi Arabia

Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, Saudi Ambassador to the U.S.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (July 1990)

Date Closed: 5/21/2009	OA/ID Number: 91143-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

6001

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAA ~~HAAS~~

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ CHARLES

SUBJECT: Meeting for Prince Bandar with President Bush

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum for Prince Bandar's meeting with the President on Thursday, July 26. Prince Bandar will want to discuss current tensions between Kuwait and Iraq, and his trip to Beijing to normalize Chinese/Saudi relations. He also is bringing a letter from King Fahd requesting a U.S. contribution to the international fund for Lebanon's reconstruction. In addition, he may be interested in recent reports of a political settlement with the Soviets on Afghanistan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Bio

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0385-MR

MM 7/11/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006083
RECEIVED: 27 JUL 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: CHARLES
HAASS

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
OPEC

IRAQ

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY MTG ON PERSIAN GULF

CHRON FILE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 31 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES
HAASS
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By AM NARA, Date 8/1/2013

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 27, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS (RH)

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Inter Agency Meeting on the Persian Gulf (C)

At Kimmitt's meeting today, we did a quick review of the intelligence situation, today's OPEC meeting, diplomatic and military initiatives ongoing, and other things we might do depending on how events evolve. The highlights follow.

- **Intelligence:** Saddam apparently has increased his military force strength by one division along the border. He (and his people) are extremely bitter toward Kuwait, primarily because economically he is on the ropes. Analysts believe that a shallow incursion into the northern oilfield, Rumaylah, cannot be ruled out, while drastic military action is also possible if less likely.
- **OPEC Meeting:** A new ceiling was set that allows UAE a higher quota, but less than their "cheat" level. Committees to enforce compliance were set up. A reference price of \$21 per barrel was established up from \$1877. Most analysts believe that the current oil surplus will keep these actions from affecting oil prices until later this winter. OPEC meets again in December. The bottomline: Saddam will not get quick monetary relief from oil exports.
- **Diplomacy:** Next steps will be a discussion between Baker and Shevardnadze, and cables to the EC and others following the Jeddah talks to advise them of our thinking on next steps. It also will preview upcoming congressional sanctions and export controls.
- **Military Deployments:** The tankers are still in UAE and are to be redeployed next Wednesday, August 1, unless UAE asks for an extension and we agree. Two Middle East Force ships are scheduled to turn over in a few weeks. The carrier battle group (CVBG) INDEPENDENCE is scheduled to arrive in the North Arabian Sea on August 12, but could be accelerated to arrive August 3 if it forgoes exercises off Diego Garcia. We agreed to consider keeping the tankers, extending the ship turnover a week (which would put nine ships in the Gulf) and accelerating the CVBG if nothing on the ground has changed.
- **Contingency Planning:** There was a disjointed discussion on this. We need to talk Monday about where we are heading.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 27, 1990

INFORMATIONNatl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS (RH)

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Inter Agency Meeting on the Persian Gulf (C)

At Kimmitt's meeting today, we did a quick review of the intelligence situation, today's OPEC meeting, diplomatic and military initiatives ongoing, and other things we might do depending on how events evolve. The highlights follow.

- **Intelligence:** Saddam apparently has increased his military force strength by one division along the border. He (and his people) are extremely bitter toward Kuwait, primarily because economically he is on the ropes. Analysts believe that a shallow incursion into the northern oilfield, Rumaylah, cannot be ruled out, while drastic military action is also possible if less likely.
- **OPEC Meeting:** A new ceiling was set that allows UAE a higher quota, but less than their "cheat" level. Committees to enforce compliance were set up. A reference price of \$21 per barrel was established up from \$1877. Most analysts believe that the current oil surplus will keep these actions from affecting oil prices until later this winter. OPEC meets again in December. The bottomline: Saddam will not get quick monetary relief from oil exports.
- **Diplomacy:** Next steps will be a discussion between Baker and Shevardnadze, and cables to the EC and others following the Jeddah talks to advise them of our thinking on next steps. It also will preview upcoming congressional sanctions and export controls.
- **Military Deployments:** The tankers are still in UAE and are to be redeployed next Wednesday, August 1, unless UAE asks for an extension and we agree. Two Middle East Force ships are scheduled to turn over in a few weeks. The carrier battle group (CVBG) INDEPENDENCE is scheduled to arrive in the North Arabian Sea on August 12, but could be accelerated to arrive August 3 if it forgoes exercises off Diego Garcia. We agreed to consider keeping the tankers, extending the ship turnover a week (which would put nine ships in the Gulf) and accelerating the CVBG if nothing on the ground has changed.
- **Contingency Planning:** There was a disjointed discussion on this. We need to talk Monday about where we are heading.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

MODE

SECURE FAX 108ADMIN FAX # PAGES 1DTG 272346RELEASER JD

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

FROM/LOCATION

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. GEN. SCOWCROFT2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. TOP 27-2348 27 JUL 90

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. 2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/2009~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506*BS has seen*

July 27, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *(RH)*FROM: *SA* SANDRA CHARLESSUBJECT: Inter Agency Meeting on the Persian Gulf *(C)*

At Kimmitt's meeting today, we did a quick review of the intelligence situation, today's OPEC meeting, diplomatic and military initiatives ongoing, and other things we might do depending on how events evolve. The highlights follow.

- **Intelligence:** Saddam apparently has increased his military force strength by one division along the border. He (and his people) are extremely bitter toward Kuwait, primarily because economically he is on the ropes. Analysts believe that a shallow incursion into the northern oilfield, Rumaylah, cannot be ruled out, while drastic military action is also possible if less likely.
- **OPEC Meeting:** A new ceiling was set that allows UAE a higher quota, but less than their "cheat" level. Committees to enforce compliance were set up. A reference price of \$21 per barrel was established up from \$1877. Most analysts believe that the current oil surplus will keep these actions from affecting oil prices until later this winter. OPEC meets again in December. The bottomline: Saddam will not get quick monetary relief from oil exports.
- **Diplomacy:** Next steps will be a discussion between Baker and Shevardnadze, and cables to the EC and others following the Jeddah talks to advise them of our thinking on next steps. It also will preview upcoming congressional sanctions and export controls.
- **Military Deployments:** The tankers are still in UAE and are to be redeployed next Wednesday, August 1, unless UAE asks for an extension and we agree. Two Middle East Force ships are scheduled to turn over in a few weeks. The carrier battle group (CVBG) INDEPENDENCE is scheduled to arrive in the North Arabian Sea on August 12, but could be accelerated to arrive August 3 if it forgoes exercises off Diego Garcia. We agreed to consider keeping the tankers, extending the ship turnover a week (which would put nine ships in the Gulf) and accelerating the CVBG if nothing on the ground has changed.
- **Contingency Planning:** There was a disjointed discussion on this. We need to talk Monday about where we are heading.

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6083

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG CH A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room	<u>2</u>	<u>AB</u>	<u>ACOM PER</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>247/30</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>NIR</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

1. ~~#6003~~, Inter Agency Mtg on the Persian Gulf. BS noted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006080
RECEIVED: 27 JUL 90 18

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: CHARLES
HAASS

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
INTL TRADE
NUCLEAR MATTERS

EXPORT CONTROLS
CBW

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PROPOSED EXPANSION OF EXPORT CONTROLS ON IRAQ

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 31 JUL 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHARLES
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJRP

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6080

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

July 27, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Proposed Expansion of Export Controls on Iraq (U)

As a result of the Iraq furnace and nuclear triggers export problems and in an effort to try to preempt further congressional action, the inter-agency agreed existing foreign policy controls and the COCOM list were insufficient to keep items with potential unconventional weapons application from being exported. As a result, we are preparing to put in place a new requirement for exporters to obtain an export licence for dual-use items going to countries or projects of proliferation concern. This new regional category of controls would be less stringent than those already in place for countries like North Korea, Vietnam, Libya, Syria, and Iran, but would still be quite demanding and fill a void that exists in our export controls.

Using his authority under Section 6 of the Export Administration Act, Secretary Baker has recommended to Secretary Mosbacher that additional foreign policy controls be placed on Iraq (Tab I). State and Commerce have agreed on a proposal to expand U.S. foreign policy export controls on items that could be diverted to Iraq's nuclear, missile or CBW programs. These controls will supplement the Nuclear Referral List and the controls under the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group.

To implement these new controls, Commerce has agreed to promulgate regulations to create a new category of countries that are potential missile and/or CBW proliferators. Iraq will be added to that category immediately; other countries (e.g., Pakistan) are likely to follow. These regulations would require an individual validated license for many items not now covered, and would permit denial of any item now requiring an individual validated license for a country in this category.

State and Commerce also are to create a new global list of additional dual-use items which can be used in missile, CBW, or nuclear programs. Under the new controls, Commerce would require a validated license for the export of any item to any non-COCOM destination for which the exporter knew or had reason to suspect might be used for such a program of concern.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0385-MR

MM 7/11/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Essentially, this would establish controls on items for potential missile and CBW use similar to the existing controls on nuclear items.

While bilateral controls are being put in place, Commerce and State will attempt to solicit multilateral agreement to enact similar controls.

Concurrences by: Judy ~~Man~~del and Richard ~~Bar~~th

Attachment

Tab I State Papers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


July 25, 1990

Dear Bob:

I have just had a memorandum forwarded to your Executive Secretary requesting that additional controls be placed on items that could contribute to Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and missile programs. Iraq's extraordinarily aggressive weapons proliferation efforts make this situation urgent. I therefore ask that these controls be instituted as quickly as possible.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,



JAMES A. BAKER, III

The Honorable
Robert A. Mosbacher,
Secretary of Commerce.

90 JUL 25 P1:56

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR JOSEPH CASPER July 25, 1990
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Following the contacts between Department of State and Department of Commerce representatives on this subject, the Department of State hereby requests that the Department of Commerce take the necessary steps to place foreign policy controls on dual-use items that could contribute to the nonconventional weapons programs of Iraq. These controls would supplement the Nuclear Referral List and the foreign policy controls now in place to implement the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group core and warning lists of chemical precursors.

To take these steps, the Department of State requests that, under the authority of Section 6 of the Export Administration Act, the Secretary of Commerce promulgate regulations to:

- Establish, for purposes of export control regulation, a new country group for countries of missile and chemical/biological weapons proliferation concern. The State Department recommends that Iraq be included in that category immediately.
- Permit denial of any item now requiring an individual validated license to any end-user in this country group that is engaged in missile, chemical or biological weapons proliferation activities or where there is a risk of diversion to such activities.
- Require an individual validated license for export to a country listed in this country group of goods or technology based on the attached list. (An interagency group should review this list to determine what items can or should be included on the existing nuclear or missile technology lists and what others can and should be subject to this foreign policy control.)
- Require an individual validated license for the export of any item to any non-COCON destination which the exporter knows or has reason to know is to be used in the design, testing or manufacturing of missiles, or the manufacture, testing or use of any chemical or biological weapon. This would extend to the areas of missile and CBW proliferation controls comparable to those now used to combat nuclear proliferation (Export Administration Regulation 778.3).


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0385-MR

MM 7/11/2016

ANNEX

Items to be Considered for Control

1. Technical data for currently controlled items, not otherwise controlled:
 - o Technical data for the production of precursors on Australia Group warning or core lists.
2. Missile dual-use items:
 - o Propulsion systems
 - Binders for solid rocket fuel
 - Mixers and other production equipment for solid propellant
 - Tanks, production equipment for liquid fuels and oxidizers
 - Pumps, seals, valves suitable for rocket engine applications
 - o Materials
 - Specialized materials with aerospace applications, e.g. high strength alloys, titanium, honeycomb.
 - Composite materials
 - Carbon-carbon
 - Maraging steel
 - Adhesive bonding, vacuum brazing, other bonding technology
 - o Electronics and instruments
 - Avionics
 - Telemetry systems
 - Range instrumentation, including radars and optical trackers
 - Test equipment, e.g. oscilloscopes, signal analyzers, data recording systems
 - Environmental test chambers, vibration and acceleration testers, simulators, etc.
 - Wind tunnels, other aerodynamic test equipment
 - o Software
 - Software for on-board systems of missiles or spacecraft
 - Design and simulation software, including CAD/CAM, fluid dynamics, structural dynamics, combustion simulation codes
 - o Production equipment
 - Numerically controlled machines tools
 - Equipment for fabricating exotic materials, e.g. furnaces
 - Spin forming/flow forming machines
 - Filament winding/tape laying machines
 - Quality control instrumentation (e.g. x-rays and other non-destructive testing)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. CBW Equipment

- o Items currently controlled on the Nuclear Referral List with potential chemical agent or precursor application (e.g. corrosion resistant valves), equipment for the production of hydrogen fluoride
- o Glass or teflon lined production vessels and pipes
- o Process control instruments, analytical laboratory instruments, related software
- o Equipment for treatment/disposal of toxic and corrosive chemical waste; HEPA filters and air handling systems for use with highly toxic agents
- o Protective clothing for industrial environments; other health and safety equipment

4. Dual-use Biological equipment:

- o Biohazard containment equipment
 - BL3 and BL4 micro-biological containment safety cabinets
 - air-supplied laboratory protective clothing
 - and high efficiency particulate air filters (HEPA filters).
- o High speed continuous flow centrifuges with BL3 and BL4 containment features.
- o Large scale lyophilizers and large-scale freeze dryers.
- o Highly instrumented, computer controlled, fermentation equipment with a built-in self-sterilization capability.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006116
RECEIVED: 30 JUL 90 14

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 30 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN
AP

TELCON

PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN 28 JUL

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 02 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS
NSC CHRON
WELCH

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Caf NARA, Date 6/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJRP

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6116

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


NOTED

July 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH 

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
King Hussein of Jordan, July 28, 1990

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for King Hussein's call to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab I be filed for the record.

Approve KJH for Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memo of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 8/1/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6116

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0429-F
SS 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
C. David Welch, NSC Staff, Notetaker

DATE, TIME July 28, 1990, 2:04 - 4:07 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

King Hussein initiated the telephone call to the President. (U)

The President: Your Majesty, how are you? (U)

King Hussein: I'm very well, thank you very much, sir. I appreciate your taking the call. (U)

The President: Well, I'm sitting here by the shore in Maine, just had lunch with Barbara, my daughter, and Brent Scowcroft. The seashore reminds me of Aqaba. Where are you? (U)

King Hussein: I'm in Amman. George, I would like to thank you for your recent letter. It was most reassuring and most encouraging. Really, it was very good. (Ø)

The President: Well, you know we are with you. Jordan is a good friend. I hear you are off on another mission. (Ø)

King Hussein: Yes, I'm going to Baghdad tomorrow and Kuwait the day after. I hope we can make some progress. (Ø)

The President: I certainly hope that that situation doesn't get out of hand. We are very worried about possible escalation. (Ø)

King Hussein: Really, sir, there is no possibility of that happening. It will not come to that. (Ø)

The President: I wish you good luck. There are some problems with Iraq's behavior that I could tell you about, but I'd rather not do it over this line. Perhaps we can talk again after your trip so we can share your observations. You remember our Congressional delegation that went there -- we tried to send some signals to Saddam Hussein with that delegation. I would love to talk to you when you return. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

King Hussein: I will call you as soon as I get back. (U)

The President: Best wishes to you and best regards from Barbara to you and the Queen. Brent says hello, too. (U)

King Hussein: Our love and best wishes to everyone. Please tell Scowcroft hello. Goodbye, sir. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

PROOFED BY: men LOG # 6116
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PR3 NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	A
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	SA. 91	N
NSC Secretariat	3		N/R

CC: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

menon - King Hussein

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006144
RECEIVED: 31 JUL 90 13

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 31 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: JORDAN

TELCON

PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & KING HUSSEIN ON 31 JUL

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 03 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS
NSC CHRON
WELCH

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/24/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6144

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1990

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *W*

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *W*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
King Hussein of Jordan, July 31, 1990

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for King Hussein's call to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab I be filed for the record.

Approve *KSH for* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By *CAP* NARA, Date *12/5/2011*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6144

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0419-F
SS 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
C. David Welch, NSC Staff, Notetaker

DATE, TIME July 31, 1990, 9:47 - 9:50 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

King Hussein initiated the telephone call to the President. (U)

The President: How are you, your Majesty? (U)

King Hussein: Really very well, sir, and you? (U)

The President: Very anxious to get this call; what's happening?
(U)

King Hussein: Well, sir, they are meeting -- I think right now or soon -- in Saudi Arabia. On the Iraqi side, they send their best regards and highest esteem to you, sir. They are a bit angry about the situation, but I believe that hopefully something will be worked out to the benefit of greater cooperation and development in the area. (Ø)

The President: Without any fighting? (Ø)

King Hussein: Oh yes, sir, that will be the case. (Ø)

The President: I see... (U)

King Hussein: If you will permit, sir, some thoughts on the future as they see it. They have been through a war of eight years, a terrible experience for the country. They need to repair and for that, stable oil prices are necessary. You know, some of our other brethren, oil-producers, also blame the two countries involved for over-producing. The atmosphere in Kuwait is good. They will seek to arrange things in a way that is satisfactory to all. Iraq feels a need for a broader plan for the area, in which a way can be found to help out those nations that are less fortunate -- for the haves to help the have-nots. Iraq will even pitch in as the first donor, perhaps to a development fund to meet the needs of others with larger populations and less resources. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President: Well, I appreciate this call. I take it you've just been to both places? (U)

King Hussein: Yes. Going in and out of the heat and air-conditioning I caught a terrible cold. I was going to call you last night but thought better of it. But the atmosphere is good. It looks tense but it will ease up. (Ø)

The President: Thanks very much for the call. (U)

King Hussein: I'll put down some thoughts in the next few days and maybe I'll have a chance to present them to you personally. (Ø)

The President: Would you object if we put out a release on this call; I always like to publicize these things if it's all right with you. (Ø)

King Hussein: No -- no objection. Best regards from Noor to Barbara, and all our love for everyone. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROOFED BY: LMS LOG # 6144
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG CM A/O

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

memcon King Hussein

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: