

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91143
Folder ID Number: 91143-002

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (April 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S. Policy Considerations for Iraq (3 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S. Policy Considerations for Iraq (3 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Iraq (3 pp.)	4/5/90	(b)(1)	S
04a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from Senator Bob Dole (1 pp.)	4/11/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Senator Bob Dole (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Cable	From American Embassy Cairo to Secretary of State Re: Codel Meeting with Saddam Hussein [101613Z Apr 90] (2 pp.)	4/10/90	(b)(1)	S
04d. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from Senator Bob Dole (1 pp.)	4/10/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: The United States and Iraq (3 pp.)	4/11/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (April 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1190
OA/ID Number: 91143-002
Date Closed: 5/21/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05b. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: The United States and Iraq (1 pp.)	4/10/90	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Frederick D. McClure Re: Presidential Meeting with Senators Returning from Middle East, Tuesday, April 17, 1990, 4:30 pm (1 pp.)	4/16/90	(b)(1)	C
06b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Meeting with Senator Dole (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06c. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Meeting with Senators Returning from the Middle East, Tuesday, April 17, 1990, 4:30pm (1 pp.)	4/16/90	(b)(1)	C
07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Fred McClure Re: Points for the President's Meeting with the Congressional Leadership (1 pp.)	4/23/90	(b)(1)	C
07b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Congressional Leadership (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07c. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Points for President's April 24 Meeting with the Congressional Leadership (1 pp.)	4/23/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
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2

National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: USA LOG # 2623
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRB NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Bill Sittmann</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>27.4/11</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>RLG</u> <u>4/11</u>	<u>N/K</u>

RECEIVED

90 APR 4 P 5: 28

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

US Policy Considerations
for Iraq

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2623

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 4, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Considerations for Iraq

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

We are going through one of the most difficult periods in the U.S./Iraqi relations since 1984, when relations were restored. In the past few months, there have been a number of disturbing developments, including: continued human rights abuses, the Barzofi execution, Saddam's statements criticizing the US military presence in the Gulf, his recent threats of retaliation (possibly using CW) against an Israeli attack, a murder for hire scheme, possible Iraqi government involvement in the Italian bank scandal, deployment of surface to surface missiles clearly aimed at Israel, and the attempted illegal procurement here of nuclear triggering devices.

Much of this recent behavior stems from Saddam's paranoia that the United States, Israel and the UK are out to get him, confirmed -- in his view -- by the VOA editorial earlier this year that called for people in police states (Iraq was cited by name) to overthrow their governments. In the post war period, Saddam is clearly feeling his oats with a defeated Iran and a weakened Syria no longer posing the threats that they had before. In his mind, Iraq should have assumed a predominant position in the region, militarily and politically; however, it has not been given that deference. Saddam also is worried that we intend to improve our ties with Iran as the greater strategic prize. This said, Saddam does want improved relations with the West, the United States in particular, primarily for economic reasons but without the political baggage or influence western ties usually entail.

Strategically, Iraq has become more important to the United States in energy and economic terms. Our dependence on Gulf oil will rise through the decade, with about 70% of the free world's proven reserves in the Gulf and Iraq as the second largest holder of reserves. Iraq is a major market for U.S. agriculture, and we are its largest supplier of other non-military commodities. Long term trade opportunities are projected at \$12 billion over the next few years.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0381-MR

MM 4/7/2016

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Our leverage with Iraq is limited. A cutoff of our modest programs would not do much. As we discussed last night, on our side, there are \$1 billion in commodity credit (ccc) loan guarantees, a six-year program that is mutually beneficial to American farmers and Iraq, a modest line of EXIM bank credits (\$200M) used to buy US products, and the occasional export of US commercial products with no military application. On Iraq's side, in the commercial sector, U.S. businessmen are pursuing billions of dollars worth of opportunities in Iraqi reconstruction, and there is our growing dependence on Iraqi oil.

OPTIONS

It is clear things cannot continue in our relationship as is. Congress and the public will expect some signs of Administration displeasure and our intentions to get tough with Iraq. Also, there are solid reasons for reacting to what Iraq has said and done. The question is how to do it so as not to make matters worse or penalize ourselves.

A wholesale cutoff of U.S./Iraqi programs, which Congressman Berman is trying to legislate, would clearly send a strong signal. However, such action on our part is likely to result in an even stronger negative, more defiant reaction from Saddam. While it may be hard to believe, the Iraq that existed before we renewed ties in 1984 was much more dangerous and threatening. In addition, our political dialogue has had some -- albeit limited -- effect on Iraq's behavior, usually after we have been tough with them (i.e., George Shultz' public condemnation of Iraq cw use).

Our best chance to change Iraq's behavior is by maintaining relations while increasing the pressure for change. As you noted, we have never really told Iraq what we expect from them. We renewed our ties at the height of the Gulf war when we feared an Iranian victory. At that time, we were content with Iraqi behavior because they advocated a diplomatic end to the war and had renounced ties to terrorism. It is time we sent unambiguous, concise instructions to April to tell Iraq what we want:

- essentially, that we are not happy with the state of U.S./Iraqi relations in the post war period, citing the incidents of the past several months; and in the current political environment here, particularly on the Hill, we cannot continue with business as usual, including the ccc and exim programs, unless there is a clear change in Iraq's behavior. We should provide a few examples of actions they might take, particularly on human rights and proliferation, to improve their reputation.

Our demarche might be more effective if it was delivered personally by a senior Administration official, possibly Bob Kimmitt. No USG official above the Assistant Secretary level has visited Iraq since relations were restored. (A presidential

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Republican HFAC members, sharing our views on Iraq, have offered compromise legislation to Berman's proposed amendment that would exempt the CCC program from any cut-off, and give the President the authority to waive other sanctions if he deemed it to be in the national interest. This would allow us to proceed with the second approach outlined above. While we could live with the Republican version, as a general rule we would rather not have legislation preempt presidential foreign policy prerogatives. Since this amendment did not go forward today, we appear to have a reprieve until late April.

Since it is important for us to react fairly soon in order to have any real effect with the Iraqis, you might want to discuss this with Jim Baker and the President at some early opportunity.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9002623
RECEIVED: 04 APR 90 15

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: CHARLES
HAASS

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 04 APR 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: IRAQ

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: US POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR IRAQ

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 07 APR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES

HAASS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Dates 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: CEA LOG # 2623
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Bill Sittmann</i>	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
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Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	APNSA Has Seen	
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RECEIVED

90 APR 4 P 5: 28

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*US Policy Considerations
for Iraq*

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2623

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 4, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Considerations for Iraq

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0381-MR

MM 4/7/2016

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2

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9002664
RECEIVED: 05 APR 90 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RODMAN

DOC DATE: 05 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

DS/DS

KEYWORDS: IRAQ

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: IRAQ & US REALTIONS

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 09 APR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RODMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES
HAASS
RODMAN

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Col NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSDGR DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9002664

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90040519 FOR DECISION
X 90040714 SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 5/21/2009

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2664

April 5, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PR*

SUBJECT: Iraq

I share the growing concern that Iraq, deliberately or inadvertently, is moving toward a position of strategic confrontation with the U.S. Before things reach that point, the Iraqis need to be talked to in an adult fashion about the strategic choice they are now facing.

What Has Happened

I say this as one who has long held high hopes that there was a convergence of interest between us and Iraq. My premise was that as long as Iraq was situated between two radical neighbors, Syria and Iran, there was a durable objective basis for Iraq's turn toward the Arab moderates, the West, and us. The striking recent development is the relative quiescence of Iran and weakness of Syria, freeing Iraq of regional restraints. This wouldn't all be happening if Saddam had more to worry about from his neighbors:

- Iran under Rafsanjani is clearly tamer than before, as well as preoccupied by its internal divisions.
- Syria is economically weak, embarrassed by the Soviets as they publicly distance themselves from Asad's ambitions, and mired in Lebanon. It is a tired regime. The intifada also deprived Asad of his claim to a role in the Palestinian issue. (This collapse of Syria as a major regional factor is the most unexpected new element.)

a bit overdrawn?

Thus, Saddam is free to bid for Arab leadership, based on his bid for military parity with Israel, bolstered by the military self-confidence resulting from the endgame of the war with Iran - and fueled also by projections of Iraq's future as an oil giant. (See the stunning article in the Wall Street Journal at Tab I).

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What to Do

We will make no headway with Iraq if we focus only on the specific irritants that are manifestations of a larger problem -- the VOA editorial, Saddam's speech, the Heathrow sting, nonproliferation. Saddam's incentive to behave better in these areas will not come from our badgering or a moral conversion but from a residual sense of convergence of strategic interest. Paradoxically, this calls for a message to him of both reassurance and warning:

-- The reassurance is that, indeed, the U.S. still sees some strategic common interests in the region (i.e., our concerns about Syria and Iran, our support for the Arab moderates). This kind of discussion is the most credible way to argue to him we are not plotting against Iraq; it is also the most credible way to convince him he still has something to lose, i.e., the potential for a better relationship.

? -- The warning is that some of his recent behavior -- particularly his bid for military dominance -- has put Iraq at a fork in the road. If he goes the wrong way, he makes us his strategic adversary, with serious consequences for Iraq and for the Arab world generally.

Saddam told John Kelly on February 12 that the collapse of the Soviets left the U.S. as the only outside power that counted in the region. His subsequent paranoia about perceived slights may only testify to his genuine fear of us. This is an asset, if used wisely. And Iraq's growing importance argues for not letting our relationship with it be torn apart if at all avoidable.

I would suggest the following:

First, a high-level emissary. Sandy tells me Bob Kimmitt is under consideration. He would be good. You should also know that the Iraqis have extended to me an open-ended invitation. I used to spend time with Hamdoun talking in broad strategic terms; they regard me as a friend of Iraq. I would not die unfulfilled if I didn't go. (Richard also would argue against a White House connection.)

Second, if a Labour government emerges in Israel, this will offer an opportunity to discuss some redlines to avoid an Iraqi-Israeli war by miscalculation. Rabin and others, I believe, would be interested in this. Perhaps some mutual pledges of no-surprise-attack, or no-first-use of weapons of mass destruction would calm what seems to be a case of mutual insecurity. We have to continue our nonproliferation efforts, but in the long run this is the best hope of avoiding war.

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Third, we should highlight our own traditional principle stand that we have an interest in ensuring the failure of any resort to the military option in the Middle East. This is a way to warn Iraq implicitly that we will not allow Israel to be defeated; yet the formulation implies we will oppose unilateral Israeli military action as well. However, it would justify some more ostentatious joint planning with the Israelis on anti-missile (Arrow) and anti-CW systems.

Tough

I find the notion that Iraq may think this possible because

Fourth, to be on the safe side, we should do some quiet contingency planning for an Israeli-Iraqi war. (Up to now, most scenarios have probably been Israeli-Syrian.) (Richard tells me this is underway.)

wow

Fifth, I would continue a quiet regular relationship with Syria. If the Iraqi dialogue proves fruitless, we could tilt toward Syria and (I'm surprised to hear myself say this) try to pump them up again. However, this should be calibrated to the need vis-a-vis Iraq, and not overdone.

I do not pretend that a "dialogue" is the answer. However, a dialogue that focuses on strategic interests may make an impression. (And the same U.S. message should be conveyed to our other Arab friends.) I am not yet ready to forsake the Iraqi relationship, which was one of our strategic gains of the mid-80's. I believe Saddam's comment to Kelly makes clear he takes us very seriously. Perhaps we can calm down his immediate paranoia and insecurity and lay out for him lucidly the long-term strategic choice he is really facing.

Concurrence by: Richard Haass and Sandy Charles.

RECOMMENDATION

That we discuss this further.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

How much of the current "Iraqi menace" is the Israelis laying the groundwork for a strike?

Attachment

Tab I Wall Street Journal Article

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Iraq Is Fast Rebuilding Its Ravaged Oil Trade Into a World Leader

It Already Outproduces Iran,
Its Old Foe, and Still Has
Major Reserves to Tap
More Shipments to the U.S.

By JAMES TANNER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

BASRAH. Iraq—Early in the Iraq-Iran war, waves of Iranian planes swooped over the big petroleum refinery here, blasting huge storage tanks and leaving behind piles of twisted steel. Then came a relentless rocket siege from Iranian troops only a few miles to the east. Eventually, the refinery quit working.

But Najem Hadi Mukhawar, the general manager, never did. He moved into the crippled plant—at night lying awake in makeshift sleeping quarters to “listen to the shells” and during the day supervising repairs, trying to keep up with newly inflicted damage.

Now, just 16 months after a cease-fire began, Mr. Mukhawar’s refinery is back running, at close to its prewar capacity of 140,000 barrels of oil a day. A new lube-oil unit is in production. Facilities to process huge amounts of liquefied petroleum gas for export are going up nearby. Construction is pushing ahead everywhere.

“We are working day and night,” proudly says the British-educated chemical engineer. “We lost a lot of things during the war. There is a need to rush.”

Iraq is indeed in a rush—and not just to bring one refinery back up to par.

Big Plans

This war-ravaged nation is getting ready to vault to the front rank of the world’s oil powers—a move that not only will help it finance an ambitious postwar reconstruction program but also will greatly enhance the influence of Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein in Arab and Mideast politics.

Oil is Iraq’s economic lifeblood. It finances government, provides jobs and earns essential foreign exchange. In short, oil pays the bills. Yet, for eight years, Iraq’s oil development was stalled by shortages of money, materials and manpower. About half Iraq’s oil employees had gone off to war. Few wells were drilled. Two oil fields fell into Iranian hands. Many facilities were damaged; the occupied Persian Gulf port of Fao was leveled. For most of the war, Iraqi oil couldn’t even reach the Gulf, its main export outlet.

Now, as the recovery of the Basrah refinery illustrates, Iraq is fast rebuilding and expanding its oil industry to capitalize on some of the richest reserves on earth. Iraqi engineers and geologists in the fields display a go-for-broke attitude akin to that of U.S. wildcatters of days gone by. Iraq already can outproduce its former foe, Iran, and its export capacity is growing faster than that of any other producer. Its status in world oil markets is rising.

Standing in OPEC

Pumping three million barrels a day of its claimed crude-oil capacity of 4.5 million, Iraq suddenly has emerged as the second-largest producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, after Saudi Arabia. And it has assumed a leadership role to match: It was Iraq’s oil minister, Issam Abdul Raheem Al-Chalabi,



who resolved OPEC’s longstanding deadlock over production quotas in November and devised a production accord that experts think may help keep oil prices stable this year.

Iraq’s political stature is growing, too. President Hussein is the architect of a new Baghdad-based Arab Cooperation Council, which is developing economic, scientific and financial ties among Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen.

Despite Iraq’s growing clout and the fact that the U.S. tilted toward Iraq during the war, Washington doesn’t appear to be pressing for closer political ties. However, the U.S. and Iraq are rapidly strengthening trade relations. U.S. exports to Iraq, especially in agricultural products and oil-field services, have been surging.

Although U.S. oil companies haven’t made much headway in their efforts to get bigger stakes in development of the Iraqi industry, they are buying more oil from Iraq. The U.S. now purchases more than 300,000 barrels of Iraqi oil a day, making Iraq the sixth-largest supplier of America’s fast-growing petroleum imports, right behind Mexico. The Iraqis are trying hard to increase those sales.

Just three of the more than 70 countries that produce oil—the Soviet Union, the U.S.

and Saudi Arabia—have more production capacity than Iraq does. Of these, the Soviets are plagued with operating problems and the U.S. is running dry. Only Saudi Arabia, now pumping about 5.4 million barrels a day, is expanding.

Iraq denies any intention of trying to catch Saudi Arabia, OPEC's longtime linchpin, and says it will adhere to its OPEC quota of 3.1 million barrels a day. "I'm not in competition with anybody," insists Mr. Al-Chalabi during an interview in Baghdad. He notes that he faces financial constraints despite oil's priority status.

But the 47-year-old former mechanical engineer says Iraq is spending \$2 billion a year on the industry and getting results.

"The emphasis was, first of all, on our export outlets, but we are continuing development of the fields and exploration activity and will further develop refining," he says. "We have 32 to 33 drilling rigs running now, and I plan to increase them by five or six" in 1990, he adds. Last year, those rigs drilled some 130 wells in Iraq's oil-rich southern region alone.

How high can Iraq's production go? Mr. Al-Chalabi, who has helped shape Iraq's oil policies for two decades and now heads a government-owned industry employing 40,000 people, replies cautiously: "Easily, Iraq can produce, with its reserves and potential and fields, from six to eight million barrels a day, but we have no plans for that—yet." For now, he says, "we are keeping capacity at 4.5 (million) and will review it, if necessary, every year."

Besides restoring Iraq's export capability and adding capacity, Mr. Al-Chalabi has sought to increase efficiency by dissolving Iraq National Oil Co., which he once headed, and creating separate regional companies under the umbrella of the petroleum ministry. Here, for instance, Basrah-based South Oil Co. operates the giant southern oil fields that account for two of every three barrels Iraq produces.

Iraq is also trying to get a better idea of just how much oil it really has. The presence of oil here has been known since Biblical days; in the ancient city of Babylon, an hour's drive from Baghdad, pitch and tar seeping from the ground were once used to pave streets and hold together courtyards and walls. But "for years and years," a Western oil man says, "people have been underestimating Iraq's resources."

Official Reserves

Officially, Iraq's proven crude-oil reserves are put at 100 billion barrels—10% of the world's total and more than any country except Saudi Arabia. Now it appears that that estimate may be too low.

Iraqi experts are performing new studies, in some cases retaining Japanese, British, French and American companies to help interpret seismic data. Iraq is very conservative in estimating how much of the oil in its fields could actually be pumped out—a measure of proven reserves. It bases its projections for most

fields on about 10% to 12% of the oil in the ground; some governments use recovery factors as high as 75%.

Moreover, the big gains in Iraq's oil muscle aren't just on paper; they are coming from the countryside. Compared with many oil-producing regions, Iraq has hardly been touched by a drill bit.

"We think what we have discovered is less than half the oil potential" of Iraq, says Hashim F. Al-Kharsan, director general of Oil Exploration Co., the Iraqi industry's exploration arm. Only 104 exploratory wells have been drilled in Iraq over the past 20 years, he says, and 95% of the drilling activity was east of the Tigris River.

Nevertheless, 73 oil fields have been found, says Mr. Al-Kharsan, a geologist trained at the universities of Texas and Oklahoma. He says 23 are giant fields, each with up to five billion barrels of recoverable oil. And six of Iraq's known fields are so-called super giants, with more than five billion barrels each. One field, if it could be pumped fast enough, could supply the entire U.S. for a year or more.

Promising Untapped Area

In addition, Iraq has identified 400 potential oil-bearing geological structures, including 156 in the western desert. "The western half of Iraq, the frontier area, has never been touched by drilling," Mr. Al-Kharsan says.

The Mideast's first major oil field, the Kirkuk, was discovered in northern Iraq in 1927 and is still producing. In the south, where five of Iraq's biggest fields are located, Abdul Ellah Al-Zubaidi, South Oil's fields manager, says, "We also have many, many small fields," which he describes as those with proven reserves of only one billion barrels each.

Heading west from the marshlands near Basrah to the flat, dusty lands paralleling the Kuwait border, one still finds evidence of the war—concrete bunkers, gun emplacements and soldiers guarding the oil installations—and of the oil boom. "We've got plenty of people now," says Honer B. Nazhat, South Oil's chief of geology. He has increased his staff 10% in two years.

Highly Productive Wells

A visitor also finds similarities between Iraq's oil operations and those of Texas during the frenzied oil-boom years of the 1970s, except for the herds of camels among the reddish sand dunes here. But everything seems bigger in Iraq, from oil fields to storage tanks.

Three adjoining fields—the South Rumaila, the North Rumaila and the West Quraan—start at the Kuwait border and run north for 75 miles. At Pump Station No. 1—which can send crude southwest to an Iraqi pipeline across Saudi Arabia, north to a pipeline across Turkey or east to offshore terminals in the Gulf—10 beige storage

tanks hold as many as 400,000 barrels each.

Flow rates of the Iraqi wells are on the same immense scale. Most wells are so far apart that an oil field doesn't look like an oil field. Iraq has only about 1,000 oil wells. But some can produce up to 50,000 barrels a day. Most average 3,000 to 4,000 barrels a day. Mr. Al-Chalabi, the oil minister, says. That compares with 600,000 U.S. wells, which average 13 barrels a day. And Mr. Al-Kharsan, the exploration chief, says Iraq doesn't bother with a discovery well that produces less than 2,000 barrels a day. "That's considered borderline," he says.

Despite Iraq's huge potential, something always stood in the way of tapping it, at least until recently. There was friction between Iraq and the companies that made the first oil finds but were slow to develop them. After nationalizing its oil in the 1970s, Iraq had difficulty getting equipment or people to handle it.

But many Iraqis studied engineering or geology at Western universities and, after returning home, provided a cadre of talent for Iraq's oil industry. Then, Iraq launched new exploration efforts with the help of some other foreigners, such as the Soviets, who still have eight drilling rigs here, and Brazil's Petrobras.

The war with Iran, which began in September 1980, put that initiative on hold. The loss of the Gulf as an outlet for oil exports was a severe blow. Before the war, Iraq could ship more than three million barrels of oil a day from its Gulf ports and terminals. It also had pipelines through Turkey and Syria.

War Damage Heavy

Early in the war, Iran severely damaged the two main offshore terminals at Khor Al-Amaya and Mina Al-Bakr and cut Iraq off from the Gulf. Then, Syria, an ally of Iran, stopped the flow of Iraqi oil in the trans-Syrian line. Iraq's sales plummeted, and it rushed into makeshift export arrangements, even truck convoys.

Iraq also began expanding the pipeline across Turkey and obtained Saudi approval to use spare capacity in the kingdom's line to the Red Sea. Now, Iraq has completed its own pipeline across Saudi Arabia. It has spent \$3 billion on expanding its pipelines, which now can export more than three million barrels a day.

So far, only one offshore terminal, the Mina Al-Bakr, has been restored to partial use. But with the pipelines and the tankers operating in the Gulf again, Iraq is the only producer with direct access to three waterways: the Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Iraqi officials forecast export capacity of six million barrels a day by the end of this year. And Iraq's export facilities already may be in better shape now than before the war.

Iraq's growing clout in the oil business may surprise many Westerners, but it doesn't surprise the Iraqis. Years ago, President Hussein told his people, "One of the last two barrels of oil produced in the world should be from Iraq."

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9002795
RECEIVED: 10 APR 90 17

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 11 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
CONGRESSIONAL

TELCALL

PERSONS: DOLE, ROBERT J

HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: PRES CALL FM SENATOR DOLE ON 11 APR / TALKING POINTS / MSG FM DOLE

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 13 APR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES

HAASS

LAMPLEY

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2795

CURRAN FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1990 APR 11 AM 10:27

April 11, 1990

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
04/11/90

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Senator Bob Dole

DATE: Wednesday, April 11, 1990

PURPOSE: Senator Dole has asked to discuss with you his upcoming meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein scheduled for Thursday, April 12 in Baghdad (Tab B).

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: None Required.

PHONE NUMBER: They will initiate the call, most likely from Amman, Jordan.

CONTACT PERSON: Al Lehn, Senate Staffer

TIME DIFFERENCE: +7

SUGGESTED TIME: 5:00 p.m. EST

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Discuss what should be said to Saddam in response to the recent spate of Iraqi actions and statements.
2. Express your appreciation for the Senator's taking on this task.

Date of Submission:

Action:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0381-MF

MM 4/7/2016

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Message from Senator Dole

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SENATOR BOB DOLE

- I appreciate your taking on this unenviable task. Iraq has a major role to play in the region. It is a country that we are better off doing business with rather than isolating in order to influence its behavior.
- Saddam should understand the serious problem he has created for us in trying to sustain a "business as usual" relationship. He should know that I share the outrage over ✓ Iraq's procurement activity related to their nuclear program, his statements on chemical weapons and his threatening to retaliate with CW against an Israeli attack.
- ✓ You know my strong views on proliferation of unconventional weapons of all kinds, particularly in this region.
- I understand that his past problems with Israel and an ✓ unfortunate VOA editorial may have made him think there is a plot against him. You should tell him this is nonsense.
- We want to maintain good relations with Iraq, which is in our mutual interest; however, his continued public outbursts and threats, coupled with any further evidence of illegal activity on Iraq's part, will only erode what little support is left in this country for sustaining ties with Iraq.
- We have the CCC and the EX-IM programs under review. To be frank, our ability to continue them will depend almost entirely on Saddam's statements and actions. You should let him know this in no uncertain terms.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0381-ur
MM 4/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Apr-1990 15:09 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JNET%"HAASS@VAXC"@WHSR"@MRGATE

FROM:

VMSMail User _JNET%"WHSR
(_JNET%"WHSR@WHSR"@MRGATE)

SUBJECT:

Received: From WHSR(WHSR) by VAXC with Jnet id 4474
for HAASS@VAXC; Tue, 10 Apr 90 15:09 EST
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 90 15:06 EST
From: <WHSR@WHSR>
To: HAASS@VAXC
Original_To: JNET%"HAASS@VAXC"

<DIST>

PRT: GATES GRIMES SCOWCROFT SITTMANN SUNUNU
SIT: FILE HAASS LAMPLEY SIT

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

RUEHEG

<DTG>

101613Z APR 90

<ORIG>

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

<TO>

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3655

<SUBJ>

SUBJECT: CODEL MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

<TEXT>

BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 07505

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY BAKER, GOVERNOR SUNUNU, AND GENERAL
SCOWCROFT ONLY FROM SENATOR DOLE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE AND NSC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0381-112

4/7/2016

TAGS: OREP

SUBJECT: CODEL MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS YOU MAY BE AWARE, I AND THE FOUR SENATORS ON MY CODEL (SIMPSON, MCCLURE, MURKOWSKI AND METZENBAUM) WILL TRAVEL TO BAGHDAD ON THURSDAY TO MEET WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE MEETING WAS ARRANGED FOR US BY PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO PUT IN A PERSONAL CALL TO HUSSEIN DURING OUR CALL ON MUBARAK.

3. THE MESSAGE WE INTEND TO DELIVER IS BASICALLY TWOFOLD: (1) THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WANTS ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT; AND (2) AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT SEEK TO CREATE A CRISIS OR CONFRONTATION.

4. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO DELIVER A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HUSSEIN, IF THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL. I WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON THE MESSAGE OUR CODEL SHOULD DELIVER.

5. PLEASE REPLY TO EMBASSY AMMAN, OUR NEXT STOP, AND LAST STOP BEFORE BAGHDAD.

WISNER

BT

#7505

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

7505

<TOR>

900410150335 MSG000261068615

~~SECRET~~

2795

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 10, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~SC~~ SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Senator Bob Dole

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding talking points (Tab A) for a call he will receive tomorrow from Senator Dole concerning the Senator's upcoming meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Tab B).

State concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Message from Senator Dole

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/13

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: The United States and Iraq (3 pp.)	4/11/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (April 1990)

Date Closed: 5/21/2009	OA/ID Number: 91143-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 10, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS *RH*

SUBJECT: The United States and Iraq

Per your request, attached at Tab I is an information memo to the President on the state of our relationship with Iraq and what changes are being considered inside and outside of the Executive branch. I decided not to include anything on Syria here; instead, I will do something short for the President on the peace process not long after we have a new government in place in Israel.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President

2783
2883

Bob/Brent

*if at all possible the
President should read
this before he talks
to Dole.*

(RH)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
1998-0099-F/6
10/28/1999 MM

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9002936
RECEIVED: 16 APR 90 15

CHRON FILE

TO: MCCLURE, F

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 16 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
AP

CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS: DOLE, ROBERT J
METZENBAUM, HOWARD M

SIMPSON, ALAN K
MCCLURE, JAMES A

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ SENATORS RETURNING FM MIDDLE EAST 17 APR

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 19 APR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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MCCLURE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
LAMPLEY

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By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/2009

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DOC 2 OF 2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2936

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK D. McCLURE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *Rg fm*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Senators Returning from
the Middle East, Tuesday, April 17, 1990, 4:30 pm

Attached at Tab A are themes for the President's use in his
meeting with the group of Senators returning from the Middle
East.

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

cc: James Cicconi

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/31/13

TAB A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
SENATOR DOLE

- It seems you had a quite a trip. I appreciate that it was not easy, either physically or politically. So at the outset let me just thank you and compliment you for a job well done.
- I would be interested in your assessment of how you found things in Israel. What are Peres' chances? Shamir's? Anyone else? How serious is the call for electoral reform?
- What was the response to your statements on possible cuts in aid and the problems with granting housing investment guarantees? How did they take your comments critical of the Senate resolution recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel?
- I think your stop in Baghdad was especially valuable. What is your assessment of what we should do with Saddam? Do you believe that we should put on hold or cancel those few economic dealings we do have? What do your colleagues in the Congress plan to do?
- Otherwise, I would be interested in what you have to say about Assad, Mubarak and King Hussein. Any surprises? Any advice?

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0382-MR
SCS 1/15/13

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2936

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 16, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Senators Returning from
the Middle East, Tuesday, April 17, 1990, 4:30 pm

As you know, Bob Dole is just back from leading a delegation of Senators (including Senators Alan Simpson, Howard Metzenbaum, James McClure and Frank Murkowski) to the Middle East. They stopped in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Syria. Attached are some themes for the President to use in his meeting with them.

Concurrence by: Ginny  Dempsey

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to Fred McClure at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Fred McClure
Tab A Talking Points

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 12/5/2011

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003156
RECEIVED: 23 APR 90 14

TO: MCCLURE, F

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 23 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ

CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POINTS FOR PRES MTG W/ CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 26 APR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHARLES

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 2 OF 2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9003156

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90042317 FOR SIGNATURE
X 90042411 SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cal NARA, Date 5/21/2009

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3156

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED MCCLURE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Points for the President's Meeting with the
Congressional Leadership

Attached at Tab A are some points on hostages and Iraq for the President's April 24 meeting with the congressional leadership.

Attachment
Tab A Points for the President

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By CAP NARA, Date 12/5/2011

cc: Jim Cicconi

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

HOSTAGES

- We are pleased with the release of Mr. Polhill and with the extensive efforts of both Iran and Syria in securing that release. In fact, I spoke with President Assad yesterday to thank him personally for his role in obtaining the release.
- I am convinced that both governments, but particularly Iran, do have influence that can be brought to bear on the hostage holders. As I have said many times before -- both publicly and privately -- I will continue to do whatever I can to secure the unconditional release of all the remaining hostages. We will not respond piecemeal to the release of individual hostages, however.
- The domestic political situation inside Iran remains murky, and it is unclear which of the groups inside Lebanon answer to Rafsanjani, and which are supported by the hard-line elements inside Iran. For this reason, engineering a comprehensive hostage release remains complicated, and is likely to take a good deal of time.

IRAQ (if asked)

- I was grateful that Senator Dole and his colleagues were able to make such a timely trip to Baghdad and help defuse tensions in our relations.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0382-MR
SCS 1/15/13

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- I understand that legislation is pending in the House that may impose sanctions on military and dual-use items, as well as our current EXIM program for Iraq.
- I would be interested in your views on the momentum in the Congress concerning possible punitive action against Iraq. For our part, we are unconvinced that such action would accomplish anything positive.
- We are taking steps to tighten up our export controls on items that adversely affect regional stability by enhancing the proliferation of missiles and other unconventional weapons capabilities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

3156

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 23, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 

FROM: ~~S~~ANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Points for President's April 24 Meeting with the
Congressional Leadership

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Fred McClure providing some points on hostages and Iraq for the President's meeting tomorrow with the Congressional leadership.

Concurrence by: Ginny  Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Fred McClure at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Fred McClure

Tab A Points for the President

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By cap NARA, Date 12/5/2011

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

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