

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91142
Folder ID Number: 91142-008

Folder Title:
Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Jordan Foreign Minister Marwan Kasem, Friday, July 12, 2:30 p.m. (1 pp.)	7/12/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Letter	King Hussein I to President Bush (6 pp.)	6/24/90	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary General, Wednesday, July 18, 2:00 p.m. (1 pp.)	7/17/90	(b)(1)	C
02b. Cable	Re: SYG's Report on the Aime Mission (3 pp.)	7/13/90	(b)(1)	C
03a. Letter	President Bush to King Hussein I (5 pp.)	7/21/90	(b)(1)	
03b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to King Hussein (1 pp.)	7/20/90	(b)(1)	S
03c. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to King Hussein (1 pp.)	7/16/90	(b)(1)	S
03d. Letter	King Hussein I to President Bush (6 pp.)	6/24/90	(b)(1)	
04a. Memo	George Van Eron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary as of July 20 (1 pp.)	7/20/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1187
OA/ID Number: 91142-008
Date Closed: 5/21/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (2 pp.)	7/23	(b)(1)	C
04c. Letter	UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to President Bush (2 pp.)	7/17/90	(b)(1)	
04d. Letter	Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	7/16/90	(b)(1)	
04e. Letter	Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to President Bush [Hungarian] (2 pp.)	7/16/90	(b)(1)	
04f. Letter	Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad to President Bush (1 pp.)	7/10/90	(b)(1)	
04g. Letter	President-elect Alberto Fujimori to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)	7/6/90	(b)(1)	
04h. Letter	President-elect Alberto Fujimori to President Bush [Spanish] (1 pp.)	7/6/90	(b)(1)	
04i. Letter	President-elect Alberto Fujimori to President Bush [English] (1 pp.)	7/6/90	(b)(1)	
04j. Letter	Prime Minister Michael Manley to President Bush (1 pp.)	6/29/90	(b)(1)	
04k. Letter	Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

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OA/ID Number: 91142-008
Date Closed: 5/21/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04l. Letter	Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki to President Bush [Polish] (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	
05. Memo	Richard Haass to John Kelly and Dennis Ross Re: Thinking about the Levy visit (3 pp.)	7/27/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 3 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1187
OA/ID Number: 91142-008
Date Closed: 5/21/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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
~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005604
RECEIVED: 12 JUL 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 12 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: JORDAN

ANSA

PERSONS: KASEM, MARWAN

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT MTG W/ JORDAN FOMIN KASEM / JUL 13

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 16 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GANTT

NSC CHRON

WELCH

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Col NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: RLG

LOG # 5604

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOS CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>[Signature]</i> Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>		
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	APNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>LMS 7/13</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 JUL 12 P 8. 29

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*req w/ Jordanian FoMin Kasem
on July 13 at 2:30pm*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5604

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 12, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *RAH*
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *CDW*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jordan Foreign Minister Marwan Kasem, Friday, July 13, 2:30 p.m.

Kasem wants to get a sense of where we are in the peace process. He is also likely to lay on a saccharine view of Iraq. We need to convey our seriousness about the next phase whereby Israel's new government gets a fair but finite chance to give us a go-ahead for a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. For the longer term, the best way to address King Hussein's moody frame of mind is to signal that we are prepared to work more with Jordan but this requires that Jordan play a more central role. You should mention to Kasem that the President will be offering the King a meeting followed by private dinner on October 1, if that is agreeable with the Jordanians.

Although Kasem is personally pro-American, he is very outspoken about Jordan's disappointments with the United States. (Some of his acerbity may be defensiveness against political sniping in Jordan because of Kasem's American education and wife.) My guess is that he was the principal drafter of Hussein's bitter letter (attached at Tab I). Hussein likes and respects Kasem, but he is not Hussein's closest friend or adviser. In short, he is not the fellow with whom to have a heart-to-heart about the unusually blunt Hussein letter, the King's mercurial mood, and the unfortunate Karen Elliot House interview (also attached at Tab II). We are, by the way, clearing with State a proposed response to Hussein.

Kasem spent a lot of time in his meetings with Dennis Ross and John Kelly stressing that we misunderstand Saddam Hussein and that Israel really does have designs on Iraq. The point to make when he gets into the flow on Iraq is that we don't want a confrontation with Iraq and that we aren't part of any plot, but that Saddam's behavior should be responsible and restrained. We will also be going to the Jordanians formally to request their help with Iraq because we have recent information of Iraqi dalliance with Abu Nidal and the PLF.

Attachments

Tab A King Hussein's Letter
Tab B Karen Elliot House Interview

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0375-112
28 10126115

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Letter	King Hussein I to President Bush (6 pp.)	6/24/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed: 5/21/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Mandela Pledge Wins Over U.S. Business Leaders

By JOE DAVIDSON

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Nelson Mandela won over U.S. business leaders with a pledge that free enterprise would play an important role in a post-apartheid South Africa.

Mr. Mandela, who has been drawing a flood of support and good will on a tour of U.S. cities, has stressed the need to keep applying pressure on South Africa's white-minority government. It is a message he pushed at a meeting of more than 200 business leaders in New York Friday and is expected to repeat to President Bush today.

While the New York business leaders were divided over the continued use of economic sanctions, they were uniformly impressed with the African National Congress's deputy president, who was freed in February after nearly 28 years in prison. "The business community was very positive, and Mr. Mandela came off very, very well," said Preston Robert Tisch, president of Lowe's Corp. and the incoming chairman of the New York Partnership.

That view was shared by Peter Farber, a tax lawyer and trustee of the New York Chamber of Commerce, who says that sanctions hurt black South Africans more than anyone. "He seems very well-informed about business and the economy," Mr. Farber said. "He took pains to dispel the notion that there would be wholesale nationalization of industries. Free enterprise would play a major role, including foreign investment."

In a speech Saturday at the Kennedy Library at the University of Massachusetts in Boston, Mr. Mandela called for a "large inflow of foreign capital, including U.S. capital," once democracy comes to South Africa. Limited nationalization of industry, he said, was an option to be considered.

Mr. Mandela expressed immediate interest in a proposal by Peter Goldmark, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, to establish a South African development bank—"a place to channel investment the minute a just government is elected," Mr. Goldmark said. "There are businesses and foundations that would be interested in building the machinery for such a bank, whether our government was ready or not," he said. Mr. Mandela indicated he would like to follow up on the bank idea before leaving the U.S.

Mr. Mandela has already demonstrated enormous fund-raising prowess. Some aides estimate the amount raised so far during his trip at well over \$1 million, with the biggest fund-raising events yet to occur. Contributions to the ANC have come from excited, emotional crowds at big gatherings, such as the huge outdoor rally aturdays, as well as at smaller functions with the rich and famous.

Mr. Mandela will also ask Mr. Bush to

King Hussein Fears Mideast Strife Could Flare Into War, Chides U.S.

By KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE
And GERALDINE BROOKS

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

AMMAN, Jordan — King Hussein, alarmed by rising Middle East friction, said the region is approaching the same state of hair-trigger tension that led to the outbreak of an Arab-Israeli war in 1967.

"We are at the most dangerous crossroads we have found ourselves in the 37 years of my life serving in this area," he said in an interview.

The 54-year-old monarch, who led Jordan into that war, seemed almost resigned to another war as he dispassionately listed what he sees as U.S. missteps that have led to a decline in Arab-Israeli relations. He called for an urgent reassessment of U.S. Mideast policy. The point that now has been reached, he said, echoes all too closely the June 1967 situation: rising tension, righteous rhetoric and, finally, rash action.

"The 1967 situation was a trap set by Israel into which the Arabs fell," he said, "and I'm afraid this situation is very similar." Asked if the Arabs may again fall into war, the king said, "They may have no other choice."

It is this fear of inexorable collision between frustrated Arabs and a seemingly frozen Israeli government that is producing widespread talk of a new Mideast war. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's repeated declaration that Iraq will retaliate if Israel strikes also has heightened war talk. Jordanian officials believe Israel soon will hit Libya to retaliate for a recent abortive guerrilla raid on the Israeli coast.

With a photograph of the Iraqi president just behind his shoulder, King Hussein, a longtime U.S. ally and Arab moderate, laid out his own alarmist assessment in the comfortable sitting room of his palace.

As the king sees it, the winds of change that brought freedom and human rights to Eastern Europe have brought Palestinians nothing but a flood of Soviet Jewish immigrants who may push them out of their land—something he says the U.S. refuses to see. That plus the election of a hard-line

encourage Mr. de Klerk to work to stem violence in Natal province, where factional warfare has been under way for years.

In addition to speaking with the president, Mr. Mandela also will address a joint session of Congress while in Washington. His reception on Capitol Hill tomorrow may be somewhat muted by senators and representatives whose constituents strongly objected to Mr. Mandela's words of support for Fidel Castro, Moammar Gadhafi and Yasser Arafat—the leaders of Cuba, Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization, respectively.

On a PBS special Friday, Mr. Mandela said he was "astonished" at the critical reaction his remarks have generated, explaining that the three men have long been supporters of the ANC struggle.

—New York Times contributed to this article

government in Israel and the U.S.'s suspension last week of its dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization have combined to raise Arab "anger and frustration," he said.

His own frustration with the Bush administration is clearly rising, too. In March, the monarch expressed faith in the president's knowledge of the region and said he was the right man at the right time to bring progress towards peace. Now, he says he can't distinguish between President Bush and President Reagan, who never visited the Middle East and who was widely perceived by Arabs to be biased toward Israel.

He listed what he called U.S. missteps dating from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's theory that a stronger Israel would be a more moderate Israel to Vice President Dan Quayle's recent adoption of the Israeli terms Judea and Samaria in referring to the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River.

"My honest concern is that if the U.S. doesn't reassess the current problems against this background, it can't play the role it must play based on the principles it upholds and responsibilities far greater than existed when there was a Cold War," the king said.

Without some U.S. action, King Hussein said, he fears that Israel might spark a war in one of two ways—by forcing a mass exit of Palestinians from the West Bank or by some military adventure in the region. "My concern is that Israel could act in a way to force an exodus from the territories to give room for settlers," he said.

Any exodus of West Bank Palestinians is particularly frightening to the Jordanian monarch, as they would inevitably flee next door to his small, poor nation where already half the population is Palestinian—mostly refugees from previous wars. Many in the new Israeli government have long argued that Jordan is in fact a Palestinian state and that declaring it to be so is the real solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. The king says about 46,000 Palestinians have crossed to Jordan from the West Bank since the beginning of the Palestinian uprising, or *intifada*, in 1987.

The other potential flashpoint, he said, would be "a military adventure" by Israel such as its 1981 destruction of an Iraqi nuclear reactor. "Israel cannot continue to throw its weight around without response," he said. "The Arabs have taken all they can take." In a speech on Baghdad radio in April, Iraq's president warned: "We will make the fire eat up half of Israel if it tries to do anything against Iraq. We are not carrying the banner of challenge. But if anyone challenges us, he will find us stronger than a diamond. . . . We will not be trampled upon."

The king said the U.S. could act to reduce these tensions by opening its doors to more emigrating Soviet Jews, many of whom would rather settle in the U.S. than in Israel.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE


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TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 17 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: UN
ANSA

ISRAEL

PERSONS: AIME, JEAN CLAUDE

PEREZ DE CUELLAR, JAVIER

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT MTG W/ UN SEC GEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON AIME MISSION RE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES & PROTECTION FOR PALESTINE / 18 JUL

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 20 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF: 9005777

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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~~NSC CHRON~~

WELCH

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Caf NARA, Date 6/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5725

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0375-MR
E8 10120115

July 17, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

Next Sec Advisor
has seen

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN
Secretary General, Wednesday, July 18, 2:00 p.m.

Last week, Perez de Cuellar delivered an oral report to the Security Council on Aime's mission, thus capping the first stage of the Secretary General's effort to consider the situation in the Occupied Territories and measures for the protection of the Palestinians. (See Tab I.) De Cuellar and Aime have skillfully avoided contentious Security Council action by focusing on practical steps to provide greater security for Palestinians; the Arabs and Arafat have apparently agreed to go along with this approach "for a reasonable period of time." Key to making it work, however, is Israeli cooperation -- Aime feels that he left Defense Minister Arens with the obligation to look into a number of specific Israeli practices. It is early yet to judge Israeli performance.

We support this step-by-step approach, i.e. giving Israel specific ideas to consider and the time to work out solutions. Some of Aime's ideas are reflective of our own human rights concerns: unnecessary use of deadly force; beatings; expansion of settlements; a "civil guard" of settlers; tax policy; and family reunification. We prefer to keep these questions out of the Security Council, where the action is more provocative than effective. Further down the road, we would like to avoid a situation where the United Nations advocates a greater UN role in physical protection (e.g., redeployed UNTSO observers) in the face of Israeli refusal, and we are forced to pick a side.

If Perez de Cuellar raises Permanent Five exchanges on the Middle East, we need to hear more details about how such a process would work. You should give him a sense of where we are in the peace process, citing our strategy to clarify with Israel within a finite period whether the approach we have been pushing can be made to work. Only then will we look at alternatives.

Attachment

Tab I Oral Report by Perez de Cuellar to the Security Council

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9304
INFO RUEHKK/ARAB/ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3696

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SYG'S REPORT ON THE AIME MISSION

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01957
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, JO, UNSC

SUBJECT: SYG'S REPORT ON THE AIME MISSION

REF: USUN 1953

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~--ENTIRE TEXT)

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: THE SYG DELIVERED AN ORAL TO REPORT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE AIME MISSION JULY 13. AIME HAD HAD FREE ACCESS TO HIGH RANKING ISRAELI OFFICIALS AND PALESTINIANS OF ALL WALKS OF LIFE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH DETAINEES AT THE AL-ANSAR CAMP III IN THE NEGEV. ALL PALESTINIANS SAID THEY WERE VULNERABLE, AND HAD NO RECOURSE TO ANY AUTHORITY EXECPT THE OCCUPATION FORCES. AIME HAD RECOMMENDED TO ARENS THAT THE ISRAELIS RECOGNIZE THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS UNDER THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. IN PARTICULAR, THE ISRAELIS SHOULD LIMIT THE USE OF FORCE, BEATINGS OF CHILDREN, EXPANSION OF SETTLEMENTS, INTRODUCTION OF THE CIVIL GUARDS INTO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND DISRUPTION OF RELIGIOUS AND PUBLIC CEREMONIES SUCH AS FUNERALS. PALESTINIANS SAW THE INTIFADA AS A "STRUGGLE AGAINST DISPOSSESSION." LAND SEIZURES, PARTICULARLY WHEN MADE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, WERE PARTICULARLY RESENTED. THIS RESENTMENT WAS COMPOUNDED WHEN COUPLED WITH SUBSEQUENT DENIAL OF ACCESS BY THE PALESTINIANS TO WATER WHICH WAS THEN USED IN THE NEW SETTLEMENTS. THE SYG MADE IT CLEAR THAT UNTSO'S ROLE COULD NOT BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITHOUT ACTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND COOPERATION OF THE ISRAELIS. ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROTECTING POWER FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNDER THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION SHOULD BE PURSUED THROUGH THE ICRC IN GENEVA. THE AIME MISSION WOULD CONTINUE. END SUMMARY

3. DURING A CLOSED SESSION JULY 13, UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR DELIVERED HIS VERBAL REPORT ON THE JEAN CLAUDE AIME MISSION TO ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (OTHER ITEMS REPORTED SEPTELS). PUTTING THE AIME MISSION IN CONTEXT, THE SYG SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO SEND HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE REGION WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD FAILED TO TAKE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE PALESTINIANS AT THE MAY 25-26 MEETINGS IN GENEVA AND THE SUBSEQUENT MAY 31 MEETING IN NEW YORK. HE USED HIS GOOD OFFICES TO SEND AIME TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITH THE INSTRUCTION TO FOCUS ON PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIANS.

4. AIME LEFT JUNE 17 FOR GENEVA WHERE HE HELD EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ICRC ON APPLICABILITY OF THE THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. TURNING TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A PROTECTIVE

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POWER FOR THE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THE SYG NOTED THAT AIME'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ICRC LED HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES WERE ALONE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH A DECISION. IN ADDITION, ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROTECTING POWER WOULD BY DEFINITION REQUIRE THE COOPERATION OF THE ISRAELIS. IN A CONVERSATION AFTER THE SYG'S REPORT, AIME TOLD USUN MISOFF THAT THE SYG'S INTENTION IN INCLUDING THE REFERENCE TO THE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ICRC HAD BEEN TO CLARIFY THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROTECTING POWER FOR THE TERRITORIES DID NOT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

5. AIME HAD ARRIVED IN ISRAEL JUNE 21, WHERE HE MET EXTENSIVELY AND WITHOUT HINDRANCE WITH A RANGE OF ISRAELI OFFICIALS AND PALESTINIANS. IN ADDITION TO MEETINGS WITH SHAMIR, LEVY, ARENS AND IDF OFFICERS, AIME HAD TRAVELED THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORIES, INCLUDING GAZA, NABLUS, BETHLEHEM, JERICHO, RAMALLAH AND JERUSALEM. THE ISRAELIS HAD COOPERATED WITH THIS TRAVEL AND HAD EVEN PROVIDED ACCESS TO THE 6,000 DETAINEES IN AL-ANSAR III IN THE NEGEV, WHERE HE HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH INDIVIDUALS. THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES "IN NO WAY HINDERED HIS MOVEMENT OR CONTACTS." IN HIS MEETINGS, AIME HAD MET WITH PALESTINIANS OF ALL STRIPES: MAYORS, TRADESMEN, DOCTORS, UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS, JOURNALISTS, WOMEN'S CHARITABLE SOCIETIES AND "SOME OF THE MOST DESTITUTE RESIDENTS OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS."

6. THE DOMINANT THEME AIME ENCOUNTERED FROM THE PALESTINIANS, DE CUELLAR SAID, WAS A "PROFOUND FEELING
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01957
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, JO, UNSC

SUBJECT: SYG'S REPORT ON THE AIME MISSION OF VULNERABILITY AT ALL TIMES, WHETHER IN THE WORK PLACE, SCHOOLS, INSIDE THE HOME OR SIMPLY WALKING DOWN THE STREET." THE PALESTINIANS HAD NO RECOURSE TO ANY AUTHORITY "OTHER THAN THE SECURITY FORCES THEMSELVES." PALESTINIANS FEARED THAT THEY WERE UNSAFE EVERYWHERE, AND WERE CONSTANTLY SUBJECT TO MIDNIGHT SEARCHES IN THEIR HOMES AND BEATINGS. COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENTS INCLUDING CURFEWS, DEMOLITION OF HOUSES, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTIONS, AND UPROOTING OF TREES EXACERBATED THE SITUATION.

7. THE SYG SAID AIME ALSO ENCOUNTERED BITTER RESENTMENT AGAINST ISRAELI SEIZURE OF LAND. PALESTINIANS CHARACTERIZED THE INTIFADA AS "A STRUGGLE AGAINST DISPOSESSION," AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN FULL HUMAN, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. THIS RESENTMENT AGAINST LAND SEIZURES WAS EVEN MORE ACUTE WHEN, AS FREQUENTLY HAPPENED, LAND WAS CONFISCATED FOR ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. IT WAS FURTHER COMPOUNDED WHEN, AFTER LAND SEIZURE, PALESTINIAN ACCESS TO WATER WAS RESTRICTED TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE SETTLEMENTS.

8. THE PALESTINIANS HAD TOLD AIME THAT THEY NEEDED CONCRETE ACTIONS, NOT UN REPORTS. THEY HAD POINTED TO NUMEROUS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WHICH WERE STILL NOT IMPLEMENTED, AND THEY WERE DISTRAUGHT THAT THE PEACE PROCESS HAD FALTERED OVER THE LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE PALESTINIANS BELIEVED THAT THE TIME FOR A PROCESS LEADING TO THE END OF THE OCCUPATION AND A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT HAD ARRIVED. RESPECT FOR THEIR BASIC RIGHTS HAD TO BE INSURED. AIME HAD HEARD THEIR MESSAGE.

9. AIME HAD USED HIS SECOND MEETING WITH DEFMIN ARENS TO RELAY THESE POINTS, PARTICULARLY THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD RESTRICT THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE, BEATINGS OF

CHILDREN, UNJUST TAXATION, EXPANSION OF THE SETTLEMENTS, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CIVIL GUARDS IN THE TERRITORIES, AND DISRUPTION OF PUBLIC AND RELIGIOUS EVENTS SUCH AS FUNERALS. AIME HAD URGED ARENS TO APPLY THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION TO THE TERRITORIES AND TO RECOGNIZE THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS UNDER THAT CONVENTION. THE ISRAELIS SHOULD ALSO ADDRESS THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

10. MANY ISRAELIS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN EXCESSES BY THE ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES AND THAT PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC RIGHTS HAD TO BE DEALT WITH. DEFMIN ARENS HAD SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD BE AS CONCERNED WITH THE HUNDREDS OF PALESTINIANS KILLED BY PALESTINIANS AS IT WAS WITH PALESTINIANS KILLED BY ISRAELIS. THE CIVIL GUARD SHOULD POSE NO PROBLEM FOR THE PALESTINIANS, ARENS HAD ALSO SAID, BECAUSE THE CIVIL GUARD WAS AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE ONLY WITHIN THE SETTLEMENTS. THERE SHOULD THEREFORE BE NO CONTACT BETWEEN THE CIVIL GUARDS AND THE PALESTINIANS. ARENS AGREED TO LOOK INTO A NUMBER OF ISRAELI PRACTICES WHICH AIME HAD RAISED. THE SYG SAID AIME WOULD WORK ON THESE ISSUES IN THE COMING WEEKS.

11. IN HIS MEETINGS IN GENEVA JULY 8, THE SYG SAID ARAFAT HAD ASKED FOR UNTSO TO ASSUME AN OBSERVER ROLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FOR PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE SYG HAD TOLD ARAFAT THAT ALTERATION OF UNTSO'S MANDATE WOULD REQUIRE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, AS WELL AS COOPERATION BY THE ISRAELIS TO IMPLEMENT THE CHANGE ON THE GROUND. THE SYG TOLD ARAFAT THAT HE WOULD FOCUS ON PRACTICAL STEPS TO PROVIDE GREATER SECURITY FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE REPEATED THAT HE HAD MET WITH THE ICRC IN GENEVA AND THAT BOTH THE ICRC AND UNRWA HAD TRIPLED THEIR STAFFS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THERE WERE NOW 100 INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL IN THE TERRITORIES WHO WERE IN EFFECT WITNESS TO THE SITUATION. IT WAS THE SYG'S OBSERVATION THAT THE SIMPLE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL HELPED TO DEFUSE TENSION ON BOTH THE ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN SIDES. UNRWA, HOWEVER, HAD NO MANDATE PER SE TO PROTECT THE PALESTINIANS. THE SYG HAD PROMISED TO REVIEW UNRWA ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE HOW SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS COULD BE IMPROVED.

12. THE SYG CONCLUDED THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAD DETERIORATED IN THE LAST
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01957
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, JO, UNSC

SUBJECT: SYG'S REPORT ON THE AIME MISSION

THIRTY MONTHS. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS HAD TO BE INSURED, BUT THE UNDERLYING NEED WAS FOR A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT. THE SYG DID NOT MAKE ANY SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT HE NOTED THAT HIS COMMENTS ON PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS WHICH HE HAD MADE IN HIS REPORT OF JANUARY 21, 1988, AT THE TIME OF THE THE GOULDING MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, REMAINED VALID. WILKINSON

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03<SSN> 1957<STOR> 900714002638 MSG000269223998
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03<SSN> 1957<STOR> 900714002723 MSG000269224043
<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03<SSN> 1957<STOR> 900714002729 MSG000269224049
<TOR>900714004012

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: WEA

LOG # 5725

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>W. Hill</i> Ken Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

90 JUL 17 P 5. 37

APNSA Has Seen

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS
*mtg w/ Javier Perez de Cuellar on
July 18 at 2:00pm
2:15 - 3:00 pm at Willard Hotel*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005396
RECEIVED: 05 JUL 90 13

TO: HUSSEIN I

~~SECRET~~

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 21 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN
PAKISTAN
PLO

ISRAEL
HS

PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: LTR TO KING HUSSEIN

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH	DUE DATE: 09 JUL 90	STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: STATE	LOGREF: 9003490	9003706
FILES: WH	NSCP:	CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Dates 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY ALW DATE 7/24 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 4 OF 4

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: HUSSEIN I

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 21 JUL 90

SUBJ: LTR TO KING HUSSEIN

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 24 JUL 90

COMMENT:

FOR

Amy Wagner
GEORGE VAN ERON

for
DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1990

Your Majesty:

I received your letter of June 24 and read it with great interest. I appreciate your frankness and consider it a sign of our close friendship. In the same spirit of candor and respect that inspired your words, I would like to respond, sharing some of my own concerns with you.

Over the last several weeks, I have spent a considerable amount of time preparing for and participating in the NATO and Houston Summits. Together with our European Allies and Japan, we are reaching some of the most exciting and far-reaching strategic decisions of the post-World War II era. It is truly a time of historic change, the hallmark of which is the triumph of political pluralism and free enterprise and a reduction in tension between longstanding adversaries.

By contrast, the dramatic changes bringing new hope for peace, democracy, and prosperity to other areas of the world appear to be painfully absent from the Middle East. In this troubled region, the forces of hostility and militancy appear to be ascendant, with little competition from a viable peaceful alternative.

Over the past three months, the trends have been disturbing. At a time when Arab moderation is needed more than ever before to shape the regional agenda and improve the prospects for peace, we have witnessed again resort to the politics of threat and militarism. Radical elements are extolling the path of "armed struggle" as if it were a genuine alternative to negotiation as a means of achieving Palestinian

political rights. At the same time, the Government of Israel could not make a decision to go forward on the basis of its own promising initiative -- one we have worked hard to implement. And weapons of mass destruction are proliferating throughout the region.

These challenging circumstances pose a serious obstacle that we must surmount. The United States has tried to play the role of "honest broker" in a process where the parties disagree fundamentally over where we should go and how we can best get there. And our ability to prove to Israel that a serious Arab offer of peace exists has been eroded by continuing expressions of Arab hostility and non-acceptance of Israel (something that has been exacerbated by a frequent unwillingness to draw any distinction between the legitimate absorption of Soviet Jews into Israel and their unacceptable movement to the Occupied Territories). At the same time, our ability to prove to the Arabs that there is a serious Israeli partner for negotiations has stalled because of Israeli resistance to entering into a viable diplomatic exercise. The result, as we both know, is stalemate.

Yet I do not see any alternative course forward, Your Majesty, except for both of us to try to keep the focus on the pathway to a comprehensive peace settlement. Throughout, this will require serious concessions from each side. In the immediate period ahead, this means pressing for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue leading to elections and negotiations. Indeed, whatever its imperfections, this process remains the most promising way of breaking the stalemate and making real progress. If we are going to move toward a comprehensive peace, we must begin by engaging Israelis and Palestinians.

I know that Ambassador Suddarth has briefed you on our latest efforts. I realize that you have long been skeptical. But earlier this year before the fall of the Israeli Government we had come very close to being able to launch a dialogue. I believe we should now clarify

whether we can move forward toward peace with this initiative. Let me add that I have no intention of participating in the illusion of a process or in acquiescing in an exercise in stalling. The foundation of our approach will remain the same: negotiations based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. These negotiations must involve territory for peace, security and recognition for Israel, and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinians. If we should succeed in launching a process, I do not rule out that at some point, an appropriately structured international conference may indeed be useful in facilitating the negotiations. If our efforts do not bear fruit soon, then we will reconsider our position and look at alternatives for best advancing the cause of peace. But I assure you that we will not withdraw and give up our efforts to promote peace. I understand well that there can be no realistic process without us. But I also understand that if the will to make peace does not exist in the region, we cannot create it from outside the area.

Allow me, Your Majesty, to address Jordan and its role. For many years and through the tenures of successive U.S. Presidents, Jordan has been a key friend and ally of the United States. We have stood by Jordan, including during some dark moments. We will do so again, if necessary. In this regard, I fully reject the suggestion made by some that "Jordan is Palestine," which is belied by the facts that Jordan is a proud nation in its own right and that Palestinians do not seek satisfaction of their aspirations in Jordan. The sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Jordan as Jordan are integral to peace and stability in the region. There will be no comprehensive peace without recognition of this reality.

During nearly four decades, your personal involvement, commitment, and creativity have been instrumental in the search for peace. Even in the worst of times, you have always managed to push peace with new ideas and new initiatives

In the last two years, I have sorely missed Jordan's contributions to the peace process, and especially your own active and constructive role. As a complement to the peace process, Jordan may be particularly well placed in the period ahead to assist in efforts to promote the concept of an unconventional weapons free zone, an idea that our colleague President Mubarak has championed recently.

I look forward to a reinvigoration of our consultations that so greatly benefited the peace process, particularly in the last decade. With that in mind, I have asked John Kelly to visit you in Jordan. I have also picked a senior career diplomat, Roger Harrison, as my new Ambassador; he will be arriving soon. Most important, I look forward to continuing our personal talks in early October when you visit us.

Permit me to touch upon two other points raised in your letter. First, I too am worried about Iraq. You played an instrumental role in the steps leading to restoration of full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq in 1984, following Iraq's agreement to expel Abu Nidal and his organization. We are receiving persistent and credible reports, however, of renewed Iraqi association with terrorist organizations, including those that have targeted, or expressed a desire to target, United States citizens and interests. Any such threat is intolerable. Iraqi actions of this type would have the most serious implications for relations between Iraq and the United States. I would urge you to share these concerns with President Saddam Hussein in any way you feel will be effective. We are not looking for a confrontation with Iraq; nor are we engaged in any effort to weaken its leadership. But the future of our relationship with Baghdad requires responsible and restrained Iraqi behavior. I would welcome your further assistance and advice in this respect.

Second, with regard to your point on Jordan's

need for economic support, I intend to continue to do what I can with the Saudis and others. I realize that Jordan's considerable and laudable efforts for domestic economic and political reform have entailed some difficulties. Please understand that I fully appreciate the importance to Jordanian security (and regional stability) of addressing these problems.

I look forward to seeing you again in October and to further talks with you then. Barbara joins me in sending best wishes to you, Queen Noor, and your family.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Hussein', written in a cursive style.

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Amman

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5396
THE PRESIDENT IN
7-23-90

July 20, 1990

1990 JUL 21 PM 1:54

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to King Hussein

SIGNED

Purpose

To respond to King Hussein's June 24 letter.

Background

Hussein's June 24 letter to you (Tab B) was a long and sometimes bitter exegesis on the situation in the Middle East. We have prepared a response that attempts to deal with the range of Jordanian concerns, including the peace process, the Shamir government, Iraq, and U.S.-Jordanian relations. The response also reiterates some fundamentals that we expect Hussein would welcome: U.S. support for the territory-for-peace deal inherent in UNSC Resolution 242; and, our opposition to the thesis that "Jordan is Palestine."

That said, we cannot go as far as Hussein would like, and the letter also contains some points that speak to Arab responsibility to contribute to progress in the peace process. In particular, the reply observes that we have missed Jordan's role over the last two years and that we would welcome more active Jordanian participation.

The reply has been cleared with State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to King Hussein at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to King Hussein of Jordan
Tab B Letter from King Hussein of Jordan

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0375-MR
28 10/26/15

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5396

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 16, 1990

Brent
This is long, but necessary
& useful given Hussein's
letter & mood.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH 
SUBJECT: Letter to King Hussein

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President providing a suggested response to King Hussein's June 24 letter (Tab B). The draft response at Tab A was cleared with State (Ross and Kelly).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to King Hussein
Tab B Letter from King Hussein

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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 20

By MM NARA, Date 7/31/2013

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Letter	King Hussein I to President Bush (6 pp.)	6/24/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed: 5/21/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN 7/24
(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Pres Hr to King Hussein re situation in Middle East

LOG # 5396

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

State

Mr. J. Stapleton Roy

Exec Sec

REMARKS For Immediate Cabling - Signed Original to Follow

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
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/21/2009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005857
RECEIVED: 20 JUL 90 10

CHRON FILE



TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 23 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
HUNGARY
PERU

UN
MALAYSIA
JAMAICA

PERSONS: PEREZ DE CUELLAR, JAVIER
MANLEY, MICHAEL

ANTALL, JOZSEF
FUJIMORI, ALBERTO

SUBJECT: HEAD OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 20 JUL

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 24 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9005811 9005827

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5857

July 20, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN *WFS for*
FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON *GVE for*
SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence Summary
as of July 20

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence received by the Secretariat since Wednesday, July 18.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Summary for the President	
Tab A	Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar	- UN
Tab B	PM Antall	- Hungary
Tab C	PM Mahathir	- Malaysia
Tab D	President-Elect Fujimore	- Peru
Tab E	PM Manley	- Jamaica
Tab F	PM Mazowiecki	- Poland

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Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/31/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7-23

5857

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

✓ **Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar of the UN - July 17, 1990**
(Received July 19)

Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar is concerned over the increasing instability and tension in the Middle East. His Personal Representative, Mr. Jean-Claude Aime, whom he sent to visit Israel and the occupied territories, reports of an extremely high level of frustration and anger prevailing throughout the territories; "People (in the occupied territories) expressed strong skepticism about the international community's interest in their plight and their fate".

Perez de Cuellar hopes to persuade Israel to abide by its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention, including Article 49. He asks for your assistance in persuading the Israelis to accept the de jure applicability of the Convention to the occupied territories.

He also plans to invite the Permanent Members of the Security Council to review the Middle East situation from time to time, this will indicate international support for dialogue and opposition to further tensions. He notes that such reviews will in no way prejudice or interfere with USG negotiation efforts.

Prime Minister Antall of Hungary - July 16, 1990
(Received July 19)

PM Antall appreciates your recent letter on the NATO Summit. He is pleased that your views mirror the initiatives of Hungarian foreign policy. He wishes to establish official relations with NATO and to participate in the shaping of the new European security structure. He also supports NATO's arms control decisions and feels that the reciprocal visits of military leaders between Hungary and NATO may eventually become institutionalized.

He looks forward to discussing bilateral and Hungarian-NATO relations during your October 18 meeting.

✓ **Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia - July 10, 1990**
(Received July 19)

PM Mahathir appreciates your condolences over the recent deaths of Malaysian pilgrims in Mecca. Current figures indicate that 132 Malaysians died in the tragedy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0375-14R
E8 10/26/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

President-Elect Fujimore of Peru - July 6, 1990
(Received July 19)

✓ President-elect Fujimore sends his greetings while passing through the U.S. enroute to Peru. He hopes for close bilateral relations, as well as a personal relationship, and is very eager to meet with you.

Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica - June 29, 1990
(Received July 18)

✓ PM Manley appreciates your support during his recent illness. He congratulates you on your "Initiative for the Americas" statement and looks forward to working with you in finding solutions to regional social and economic problems.

Prime Minister Mazowiecki of Poland - June 12, 1990
(Received July 20)

PM Mazowiecki acknowledges your June 4 letter informing him of the recent Summit discussions with Gorbachev. He hopes that close Polish-American relations will continue to increase.

He believes German unification is vital to European stability and that Germany must become a NATO member. He also deems it important that the U.S. maintain a military presence in Europe.

✓ He notes that your talks with Gorbachev have had a positive and powerful influence upon the Warsaw Treaty Organization's recent decision to overcome the division of Europe and build a new European security system.

On Lithuania, he shares your view that there should soon be an open dialogue between Moscow and Vilnius. This matter is of exceptional importance to Poland due its common borders with both Lithuania and the USSR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Letter	UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to President Bush (2 pp.)	7/17/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed: 5/21/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Letter	Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	7/16/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed:	5/21/2009	OA/ID Number:	91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04e. Letter	Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to President Bush [Hungarian] (2 pp.)	7/16/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed:	5/21/2009	OA/ID Number:	91142-008
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04f. Letter	Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad to President Bush (1 pp.)	7/10/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed:	5/21/2009	OA/ID Number:	91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04g. Letter	President-elect Alberto Fujimori to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)	7/6/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed:	5/21/2009	OA/ID Number:	91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04h. Letter	President-elect Alberto Fujimori to President Bush [Spanish] (1 pp.)	7/6/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed:	5/21/2009	OA/ID Number:	91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04i. Letter	President-elect Alberto Fujimori to President Bush [English] (1 pp.)	7/6/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed: 5/21/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04j. Letter	Prime Minister Michael Manley to President Bush (1 pp.)	6/29/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed:	5/21/2009	OA/ID Number:	91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04k. Letter	Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July 1990)

Date Closed: 5/21/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
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041. Letter	Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki to President Bush [Polish] (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008073
RECEIVED: 10 OCT 90 16

CHRON FILE

TO: KELLY, J
ROSS, D

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

PERSONS: LEVY, DAVID

SUBJECT: THINKING ABOUT LEVY VISIT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 13 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS

CLOSED BY: NSTAS *[Signature]*

DOC 1 OF 1

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Brent fyi *(MP)*

8073 1

~~SECRET~~

July 27, 1990

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

TO: NEA: John Kelly
S/P: Dennis Ross

FROM: NSC: Richard Haass *(MP)*

RE: Thinking about the Levy visit

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0377-MR
SCS 12/11/12

What follows are some initial thoughts as you folks put together the papers for your boss. I would think our objectives are as follows:

1) establish working relationship with Levy Some one-on-one with only a translator might help. Also, remember that he is extremely conscious of protocol and how he is treated and will resent any sign that he is not getting his due. This said, we should hold off for now making any decision about whether and in what context he meets with the President.

2) provide background to/rationale for our peace process approach We should include a somewhat longish presentation that goes along the following path: our support for Israel, a view that Israeli security benefits from a viable peace process, a need for progress on Palestinian front if we are to progress on state-to-state front, the value of elections as a means of building confidence and providing representatives both Palestinians and Israelis can live with, the need for a delegation composed of a mix of Palestinians including some with ties to Jerusalem and the outside, and our desire to move ahead on this approach if possible but on another if necessary. We should also allow some time for discussion of larger issues, and make our case for territory for peace, etc. We can repeat the theme in the President's letter to Shamir, namely, that any risks Israel might run in this process are less than those it faces by not supporting it, and that we are willing to work closely with Israel at every stage to minimize the risks.

3) give Levy clear sense of what we need to know and when It is important that there be no ambiguity this time around. On the Israel-Palestinian dialogue, we should make clear that what we are not interested in categories per se but in forming a credible delegation, and that we are willing to work it out on a name-by-

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name basis. But this means that at the end of a trilateral with Egypt Israel must be willing to agree to sit down with a delegation that includes deportees and those with ties to Jerusalem. Once this is agreed in principle, we can establish a commonly acceptable process of producing the names.

As for timing, we cannot require Levy to respond on the spot. But given all that has transpired, it is reasonable to let Levy know that we want a response quickly. We should propose that we would expect to hear before the end of the month, although we can let this slip a week or two if he asks to be in a position to respond in person when he returns to Washington in early September.

4) provide limited assurances Levy reportedly has three principal concerns in the realm of assurances: a) we join them in saying "no" to the PLO, b) any dialogue be limited to elections only, and c) we make clear our opposition to a Palestinian state. I suggest we rework the draft assurance letter in advance of Levy's trip, look at it again after he raises the issue of assurances, and give him a revised version of the letter to take home during the final session. On a), it is hard to see how we could go beyond the pledge (even if we wanted to) in the draft assurance letter, where we stated "it is not the aim of the US to bring Israel into dialogue or negotiations with the PLO." As for b), we cannot agree to an "elections only" dialogue--there must be some link and hence ability to talk about the subsequent process--but we can make clear that elections are the principal focus, especially once opening statements are out of the way. Regarding c), we can reiterate our own view toward a Palestinian state, repeating the AIPAC speech language that we do not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state. We can also reiterate our view that final status must be worked out gradually and in a manner acceptable to Palestinians, Jordan and Israel. I would refrain from expressing direct US opposition to a state; getting the Palestinians to work with us will be hard enough without adding this baggage. We could also extend the umbrella assurance that nothing agreed to now prejudices arrangements down the road.

5) provide terms for approving \$400 million in housing guarantees

It is true that only a handful of Soviet Jews are going into the West Bank and Gaza. We also have a pledge from Sharon that Israel will not direct Soviet Jews into these areas. And plans for housing seem do not seem to spend money "beyond the green line." The problem is that incentives continue to exist that are designed to steer Israelis into the West Bank and Gaza, and that these may look increasingly attractive as the housing crunch worsens. Also, there are plans for placing some 60,000 additional Israelis in what was/is East Jerusalem.

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What then to do? We should not expect or ask the Israelis to give up their principles or theology here. We should state our desire to be helpful if they meet us half way. We should explain again just why we see settlements as counterproductive. In this context, I suggest we ask them to pledge to us verbally or better yet in a letter that a) the government will not spend funds to build new settlements or expand existing ones in lands occupied since 1967 and b) that the government will eliminate any hidden subsidies or incentives designed to promote settlement of the occupied territories. We would thus "privatize" the process. This would not eliminate settlement activity--private sources would spring up, especially when it comes to Jerusalem--but it would reduce it significantly in terms of scale and impact. Even this will probably be unacceptable to the GOI when it comes to Jerusalem; we may have to consider whether we would accept a deal in which we provide the \$400 million so long as the GOI does not spend resources or channel people to the West Bank and Gaza. Implicit in this is that the GOI could continue on in Jerusalem so long as none of the \$400 million is directly used there. If this happens, we would have to look for other ways, i.e., the U.N. Security Council, to register our opposition to Israeli policy in Jerusalem.

6. discuss regional issues It would also be useful to discuss such matters as Jordan, Iraq, Syria, water, and arms control, including but not limited to the spread of unconventional weapons. On the latter, the visit affords a useful opportunity to make some points and stimulate Israeli thinking; I will circulate a short concept paper on this early next week.

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