

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91142
Folder ID Number: 91142-007

Folder Title:
Middle East Peace (June 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Nancy Bearg Dyke to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Perez de Cuellar, June 6, 3:30 p.m., Willard Hotel (1 pp.)	6/5/90	(b)(1)	C
02. Memo	C. David Welch Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arad, Friday, June 8, 10:00 - 10:30 a.m. (1 pp.)	6/7/90	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memo	Nancy Bearg Dyke to William F. Sittmann Re: Memorandum of Conversation between General Scowcroft and United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, Willard Hotel, June 6, 1990, 3:30 p.m. - 4:10 p.m. (1 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	6/6/90	(b)(1)	S
03c. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from President Mubarak on June 12, 1990 at 12:45 p.m. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (June 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1186
OA/ID Number: 91142-007
Date Closed: 5/20/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05a. Letter	From President Bush to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	6/15/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Shamir (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Shamir (1 pp.)	6/15/90	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt (1 pp.)	6/22/90	(b)(1)	S
06b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06c. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt (1 pp.)	6/21/90	(b)(1)	S
07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan (1 pp.)	6/22/90	(b)(1)	S
07b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King Hussein (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07c. Cable	American Embassy Amman to Secretary of State Washington DC Re: Message from King Hussein to President Bush (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07d. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan (1 pp.)	6/21/90	(b)(1)	C
08a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Middle East Update (1 pp.)	6/22/90	(b)(1)	C
08b. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Middle East Update (1 pp.)	6/22/90	(b)(1)	C
09a. Memo	Richard N. Haass to William F. Sittmann Re: Memorandum of Conversation with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid (1 pp.)	6/26/90	(b)(1)	S
09b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid (4 pp.)	6/26/90	(b)(1)	S
09c. Outline	Re: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid (2 pp.)	6/25/90	(b)(1)	S
09d. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid (1 pp.)	6/25/90	(b)(1)	S
09e. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09f. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	3/27/89	(b)(1)	S

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Date Closed: 5/20/2009
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09g. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister (1 pp.)	6/25/90	(b)(1)	
09h. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Joseph W. Hagen Re: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abdel Meguid (2 pp.)	6/26/90	(b)(1)	
09i. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Official Working Visit of Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid and Osama El Baz (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09j. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	6/29/90	(b)(1)	C
10b. Letter	President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak to President Bush (6 pp.)	6/23/90	(b)(1)	

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004513
RECEIVED: 05 JUN 90 15

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: DYKE
MILLER

CHRON FILE
DOC DATE: 05 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: UN
ISRAEL

MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS: PEREZ DE CUELLAR, JAVIER

SUBJECT: MTG W/ PEREZ DE CUELLAR 6 JUN ARAB - ISRAELI DISPUTES

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 08 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DYKE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Col NARA, Date 5/20/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJRP

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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4513

June 5, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR. *MILLER*

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE *NBD*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Perez de Cuellar,
June 6, 3:30 p.m., Willard Hotel

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

Your meeting at 3:30 p.m., June 6, with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar at the Willard Hotel provides an opportunity to discuss issues not covered in the President's meeting. When Under Secretary Kimmitt met with Perez de Cuellar Monday afternoon, the subjects were basically those discussed with the President.

Of most interest may be the Secretary General's Hill meetings, which he will have completed. The President had specifically asked yesterday for a readout on those meetings.

Unless it came up in the President's one-on-one meeting, a surprising omission from the talks has been the Arab efforts to win either a resolution against Soviet Jews settling in the Occupied Territories or sending of an observer mission to the Occupied Territories. You may wish to ask the Secretary General where he thinks the Arab effort is headed. There was one report that the Arabs may take it to the UNGA for a "uniting for peace" resolution. The UNGA could call for a commission or peacekeeping force but it would have little practical effect as Israel would refuse.

Of interest in the same general region is Iran. You may wish to ask the Secretary General his views on the current leadership and situation there.

If ONUCA comes up again, we should reiterate the importance of ONUCA staying until the job is done and the need to extend the June 10 deadline.

Another area of interest is peacekeeping, and it would be worthwhile to probe the Secretary General's sense of new peacekeeping requirements.

Concurrences by: David *DAR* Welch, David Pacelli

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0371-M2
E8 12/21/15

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	C. David Welch Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arad, Friday, June 8, 10:00 - 10:30 a.m. (1 pp.)	6/7/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (June 1990)

Document Partially Declassified

(Copy of Document Follows)

By ES On 5/9/22

Date Closed: 5/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0371-MR (501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/2/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
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 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile


Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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4595



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

June 7, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arad,
Friday, June 8, 10:00 - 10:30 a.m.

CHRON FILE

Arad will be seeking a readout of the summit. The meeting is also a good occasion to make points on the peace process, the Secretary General sending an envoy to the Occupied Territories, and the U.S.-PLO dialogue.

Peace Process: You should tell Arad that once Israel has a new government, we intend to start from where we left off in the peace process. Specifically, we will ask Israel if it is prepared to answer Jim Baker's proposals affirmatively, i.e., with the understanding that one or two deportees and East Jerusalemites will be involved. ^{1.4(d)}

UNSYG Envoy: Following up on your talk with Perez de Cuellar, we will be sending instructions to Bill Brown to press the Israelis to accept a UNSYG-dispatched envoy to review the situation in the Occupied Territories and report back. You should mention this position to Arad, reminding him of the heat we are taking for our veto, and ask for flexibility by Israel, pointing out that Israel had accepted such a mission in the past.

The U.S.-PLO Dialogue: Arad will push for a cut-off. We think you should tell him that we have not made any decisions yet, that the incident is still under discussion with the PLO, that we are still reviewing ^{1.4(c); 1.4(d)}

If there is time, it might be interesting to hear Arad's views on Shamir's domestic political options, including who might be in a new Likud government if he goes that route.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2010-0371-MR
28 8/15

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004585
RECEIVED: 07 JUN 90 15

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: DYKE
MILLER

DOC DATE: 08 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UN

MEMCON

PERSONS: PEREZ DE CUELLAR, JAVIER

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF SCOWCROFT MTG W/ UN SEC GEN DE CUELLAR / JUN 6

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 11 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE

LOGREF: 9004544

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DYKE

MILLER

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 5/20/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9004585

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SITTMANN
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90060817 FOR DECISION
X 90061110 SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/20/2009

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

4585

June 8, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR. *ABD for*

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE *ABD*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between General Scowcroft and United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, Willard Hotel, June 6, 1990, 3:30 p.m. - 4:10 p.m. (U)

Attached at Tab I is the memcon between General Scowcroft and United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar at the Willard Hotel.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve and file the attached memorandum for the record. ✓

Attachments

Tab I Memcon between General Scowcroft and United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar

Tab A Non-paper/Talking Points on Ethiopia

CC: Richard Haass
David Welch
Sandy Charles
John Ordway

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/31/2013

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	6/6/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (June 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/14/2023

Date Closed: 5/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0371-MR(502.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/5/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



4585

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Wolf, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations
Nancy Bearg Dyke, Director, International Programs and Public Diplomacy, NSC (Notetaker)

Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary General
Ronald I. Spiers, Under Secretary General for Political and General Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services
Alvaro de Soto, Executive Assistant to the Secretary General
John L. Washburn, Director in the Executive Office of the Secretary General (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME: June 6, 1990, 3:30 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: Willard Hotel

Exchange of greetings. (U)

General Scowcroft: How were your Hill meetings in general? (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Useful with good questions, though two were cancelled. I hope to see Dole and Mitchell tonight. (U)

General Scowcroft: I am sure the Senators and Congressmen are responsive but in their priorities, it is easily deferred (the arrearages). (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I gave Cambodia as an example of an expected dire need for reserve funding. (U)

General Scowcroft: We are planning on the UN in several instances. (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Yes, we could have the Western Sahara, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and El Salvador all at the same time as new requirements. And we do not have a single penny of reserve. (U)

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0371-MR

MM 2/5/2016

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General Scowcroft: Maybe, if it is of direct interest to the US, we can go up to the Hill for a supplemental. I would be delighted if you can get to that point. It would mean success. The President is determined to pay the arrearages but I don't know when it will happen. (U)

Mr. Spiers: Sarbanes says the President should say it on the Hill. (U)

General Scowcroft: Okay. Is there any subject you wish to raise? (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Afghanistan. Is the status of Najibullah the only remaining problem between you and the Soviets? (S)

General Scowcroft: It is the main one. (U)

Discussion followed about options for Najibullah and the possibility of a shura or a role for the king. (S)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Many mujahadin are against the king. How to set up a situation which the leaders will accept is a big problem. (S)

General Scowcroft: The Pakistanis are giving most of their aid to Hekmatyar, but we do not like him. Masoud is the closest to a national leader we think we should support. We are definitely not at a solution yet. (S)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Cambodia. The news from Tokyo (meeting of Cambodian groups) is bad because Pol Pot is not a part of the agreement. I cannot provide security if all do not agree. (S)

Mr. Spiers: On the Zionism is Racism resolution, how much of a head of steam is built up here? Moynihan wants to repeal it. (S)

General Scowcroft: The Israelis raise it every time as an objection to the UN. The President mentioned it to Gorbachev. (S)

Secretary General de Cuellar: It is necessary to not try too early to repeal it and be defeated. It is actually dead but the Israelis have kept it alive. I will be the first to vote for a resolution against it but we must be careful that the resolution will not lose. (S)

Mr. de Soto: It is linked to other issues too. If we raise it, the Arabs will say the Israelis demonstrate what is in the resolution in the Occupied Territories. (S)

General Scowcroft: If it can be done quietly, it is better than with much fanfare. (S)

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~~SECRET~~

Mrs. Dyke:

1.4(d)

(C)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: It can be a mistake to revive this. (C)

General Scowcroft: That is my view too. It is an irritant but not worth spending any time on. (C)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I explained as I have to you. Eastern Europe is changing -- establishing relations with Israel. As I told Vice President Quayle, I am willing to help but there is no tradition of directly repealing a UNGA resolution. (C)

Mr. de Soto:

1.4(d)

(C)

Mr. Spiers:

1.4(d)

General Scowcroft: No, there is no sign of that. It would be foolish to pursue it unless we knew we had the votes to do it quietly. (C)

General Scowcroft: I hope you know we support your sending Goulding to Israel. (C)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar:

1.4(d)

1.4(d)

(C)

General Scowcroft: We would work hard to get an emissary accepted by Israel. (C)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Yes, I want to send a man. It will be a humanitarian mission. In 10 days, I could send a mission quietly, (C)

Aimé is my man on the Middle East.

(C)

Mr. Wolf: There is some pressure to go to the UNGA. (C)

Mr. Spiers: Yes, the Arabs are thinking about asking for a UNGA session 18 June. (C)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Maybe, I can advance my announcement. They respect Aimé. (C)

Mr. Spiers:

1.4(d)

(C)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar:

1.4(d)

1.4(d)

I need the green light. (C)

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General Scowcroft: We are prepared to help. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: Rafsanjani. I understand he made some comments today at a press conference. (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Yes, he is asking me to go to Tehran. Tomorrow I will see the Ambassador of Iraq. If the trip works out, it can be important. I will keep you informed. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Middle East. My great frustration is that we are not moving. If you accepted, the UN Security Council could begin quietly discussing it. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: We are reaching a moment of truth on our own peace process. ^{1.4(d)}

(S)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: What are the chances for Shamir? (Ø)

General Scowcroft: The experts think yes. The question deep down is if Shamir wants election reform. A coalition government is in both their interests. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Shamir is courageous. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: But he seems to feel any alternative is worse than where he is now. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: ^{1.4(d)}

After the formal meeting, John Wolf gave the UN Secretary General the attached non-paper on Ethiopia and mentioned its main points. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

Attachment

Tab A Non-paper/Talking Points on Ethiopia

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Talking Points

- Political developments now permit us to move vigorously towards opening Massawa to relief shipments.
- The donor community is looking to the UN for effective coordination and leadership in these efforts.
- We would suggest an immediate effort to draw up a plan for the receipt and distribution of food, and obtain Ethiopian and Eritrean agreement to the plan.
- The plan should provide for the cessation of military activity in and around Massawa and the establishment of corridors for the safe, unhindered movement of relief into Asmara and the rest of Eritrea.
- We appreciate your designation of Charles Lamuniere as your action officer on Massawa. It may be desirable to designate an experienced UN agency as well to help formulate the plan, elicit agreement to it, and oversee its implementation. Your direct participation may become necessary if political problems arise in obtaining agreement.
- You can count on political support from the USG and the rest of the donor community in working with the parties in conflict.
- The plan will have to spell out what (if any) representatives from the relief organizations maintained by the Eritreans and the government will be invited to observe or assist UN operations in Massawa. A limited presence by their NGO's may prove politically desirable.
- The plan should also address how the grain offloaded at Massawa will be allocated between government-controlled areas and rebel areas.
- We have more suggestions of a technical nature which we will pass on to Lamuniere.
- Your acceptance of Ethiopia's invitation of a UN observer in the Carter peace talks opens the way for early resumption of these talks. Mr. Carter has been following developments closely, and is anxious to resume the talks.
- An international conference on peace in the Horn of Africa would complement, not supplant, President Carter's efforts. We would welcome your ideas on the nature of such a conference and its timing.

- During the recent summit, the U.S. and USSR noted the following:
 - that the Ethiopian Government has agreed to open Massawa to food shipments;
 - that the Ethiopian Government has agreed to accept a UN observer in the Carter peace talks;
 - U.S./Soviet agreement on a joint U.S./Soviet airlift of relief supplies to Asmara;
 - U.S./Soviet support for an international conference on the Horn of Africa.
- We have called in the EPLF to get their re-affirmation of willingness to participate in a UN effort to move food through Massawa.
- Embassy Addis will be working with their Soviet counterparts to plan the Asmara airlift.
- The EPLF has told us it remains willing to engage in the Carter peace talks with a UN role. We have briefed Carter on developments; he is ready to resume his efforts quickly.
- The SYG told HFAC he has designated Charles Lamuniere as his point man on Massawa.
- The SYG also told HFAC he has informed Carter he will accept Ethiopia's invitation to send an observer to the Carter peace talks.

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NSC/S PROFILE


RECORD ID: 9004698
RECEIVED: 12 JUN 90 09

TO: PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~
~~SUSPENSE~~

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 12 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: EGYPT
TELCALL

PLO
MEMCON

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CALL FM PRES MUBARAK ON JUN 12 RE PLO DIALOGUE

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
WELCH

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Dates 5/20/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND _____ W/ATTCH _____

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DOC 2 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 4698

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SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
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A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT

- I appreciate everything you have been doing about the PLO dialogue. I also appreciate your measured reaction to the new Israeli government.
- As you know from my message, we asked the PLO to denounce the PLF raid, to disassociate itself from it, and to take steps to suspend or remove Abu Abbas from the Executive Committee.
- Hosni, I have seen the PLO's June 11 statement. It is helpful on terrorism and on the PLO's December 1988 commitments.
- However, the statement ignores the two critical points I mentioned in my message to you: denunciation of the PLF attack; and, discipline of Abu Abbas.
- For us to have anything to work with, the PLO must be more explicit and public on these points.
- As I told you on Friday when we spoke, we need clear evidence of the PLO's good faith, since we have information about other concerns in the area of terrorism that has me very worried.
- Believe me, I know the value of the dialogue for the peace process. But I also must balance this with our concerns about terrorism.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-03-11-M2
08 12/21/15

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

1. *1st try Bids -*
2. *Trying hard w/ PLO*
3. *Romer Comm to investigate*
2 weeks.
Sum - Birthday + "will keep trying" on PLO

- Hosni, I also want to give you a very private indication about my options. I think that unless the PLO position changes, that by Friday I will have little choice but to suspend the dialogue.
- I know you are trying hard, and I appreciate it. Maybe you can get something from Arafat, but please understand that I will not drag this out.
- We would prefer to keep the dialogue going, but the PLO needs to make that choice too.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Mubarak on
June 12, 1990 at 12:45 p.m.

President Hosni Mubarak has again asked to speak to you. I expect his topic will be the same as last week: to urge you not to rush into a decision to suspend or cut off the U.S.-PLO dialogue. Since then, he received your message on our terms (denunciation, disassociation, and discipline) for continuing the U.S.-PLO dialogue, and probably has communicated these to Arafat.

Mubarak may argue that the PLO's June 11 statement constitutes the denunciation that we were seeking. Mubarak may also add that Arafat has established a secret investigatory committee that will look into disciplining Abul Abbas. We have seen no evidence to substantiate Mubarak's claim to you on Friday that Qadhafi has expelled the PLF from Libya; Mubarak may have made this argument in an effort to forestall Israeli retaliation and buy some time.

The PLO's June 11 statement does not condemn the PLF attack specifically; indeed, it does not mention it at all. The statement, however, did include a renunciation of "military action directed against civilians" as well as a reaffirmation of the PLO's December 1988 commitments (that led to the opening of the dialogue). No steps against Abul Abbas were mentioned or hinted at. For us to have anything to work with, Arafat needs to be more explicit and public in both his denunciation of the PLF attack and in suggesting steps that are being taken against Abul Abbas.

I think you should repeat these points to Mubarak. In addition, it is time to warn him that without further progress from the PLO, you face a decision by the end of the week to suspend the dialogue.

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0371-MR
E8 12/21/15

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RECORD ID: 9004780
RECEIVED: 14 JUN 90 11

TO: SHAMIR, YITZHAK


CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 15 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

HS



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO ISRAELI PM SHAMIR RE ISRAELI POLITICAL ISSUES

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 18 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
HAASS

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 3 OF 3

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National Security Council
The White House

CHRON FILE

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>LMS 6/19</u>	<u>N LDX</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
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90 JUN 19 11:48

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DATE: June 15, 1990

NSC/S

ORIGINAL TO BE HAND
CARRIED BY AMB ARAD.
PLEASE GIVE THEM TO
HAASS OFFICE.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9004780

REFERRAL

DATE: 19 JUN 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: HAASS

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: SHAMIR, YITZHAK

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 15 JUN 90

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO ISRAELI PM SHAMIR RE ISRAELI POLITICAL ISSUES

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 20 JUN 90

COMMENT:

FOR



GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Letter	From President Bush to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	6/15/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (June 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/14/2023

Date Closed: 5/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0371-MR(504)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/5/2016

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
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1990



Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Let me begin by congratulating you on the establishment of a new government. We in the United States wish you, your colleagues, and the people of Israel a period of prolonged peace and prosperity. We look forward to working with you on both these objectives. Israel's security and well-being remain an important concern of my Administration and for me personally.

One area where I look forward to continuing to work together is that of enhancing the freedom of Soviet Jews. As you know, supporting this modern exodus has long been a goal of the United States. Our work is far from complete, however. It remains the objective of the United States that all who wish to leave the USSR should be able to do so unconditionally, and that all who wish to remain there can do so in an environment free of anti-semitism. I want you to know that I raised these concerns when I met recently with President Gorbachev. I urged him to institute direct flights to your country, to speak out against anti-semitism, and to enact and implement a new law on emigration. We shall persevere in our efforts to see all of this realized.

As you know, President Gorbachev objects to the fact that some of the individuals leaving the Soviet Union are settling in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, and has voiced the possibility that the freedom to emigrate might be constrained unless Israel alters its settlement policy. I told him that it is our view that curtailing the freedom to emigrate would not constitute an acceptable response to Israeli settlement activity. Mr. Prime


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2010-0371-48

MM 2/5/2016

Minister, you know of my own strong objection to any settlement activity (including but not limited to new settlements) by Israel. It remains my conviction that such activity constitutes a significant obstacle to peace, particularly because it convinces everyone that Israel seeks to annex the territories and that Israel is determined to take unilateral steps to change the situation in advance of negotiations. Necessarily, therefore, it sours the atmosphere and makes it more difficult to produce an Arab partner for peace -- something you have asked us to help deliver. I am even more concerned now given the newly published guidelines of your government. I ask again that you reflect upon your priorities. Our mutual ability to promote peace will depend upon our two governments reaching an understanding in this area. In addition, ^{1.4(d)}



Mr. Prime Minister, my other reason for writing you now concerns the peace process more directly. As you know, both Secretary of State Baker and I have strongly supported the Israeli Government's May 14, 1989 initiative. We believed for the past year and we continue to believe that such a step-by-step approach constitutes the most realistic way forward. In this vein, we consistently shared with your government our view regarding what it would take to make the initiative viable. Consulting closely with your government at every step, the United States invested heavily in building international support on behalf of this approach to the peace process. Notwithstanding much skepticism internationally about the seriousness of your initiative, we succeeded in convincing everyone that this was the way to go. A pre-election dialogue and elections to begin a "political negotiating process" became the centerpiece of all diplomatic activity.

Accepting your desire not to deal with the PLO, we worked hard to produce a Palestinian interlocutor that had authority in the Arab world. By every account, we met with considerable success. By March of this year,

Israel, Egypt and the United States were on the verge of convening an historic dialogue in Cairo -- one between Israeli and Palestinian delegations -- designed to discuss elections and the resulting negotiating process. We worked out with you a letter of assurances we were willing to provide which met many of your concerns, including the PLO; I have asked our Ambassador to provide a copy. We put to you one question: "As regards the participation in the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, would the Government of Israel be ready to consider on a name-by-name basis any Palestinian who was a resident of the territories?" While you did not give us a negative answer, you would not give us an affirmative answer. We have made it clear for the last two and one half months that it was our hope and expectation that the next Israeli Government would resume this process without delay. This remains our strong hope.

As you are well aware, the key issue remaining to be resolved between us involves the composition of the Palestinian delegation. As Secretary Baker explained to Minister Arens, we posed the question just cited with the assumption that there would be some people on the Palestinian side who fit the category of deportees who would be eligible to return and some who had dual addresses. Mr. Prime Minister, it is our view that without such participation it will be impossible to launch a credible diplomatic effort.

We sought to develop a formula that met the needs of Palestinians from the territories without violating your principles. I know Jim Baker felt he had done that with the question he worked out with Misha Arens. Your government fell and we never received an answer to that question. What I need to know from you is whether you are prepared to go forward without any new preconditions on the basis of acknowledging that you will meet with a delegation of Palestinians from the territories that include a few individuals who fit the deportee and dual addressee categories.


Mr. Prime Minister, I hope we can go forward on this basis. But because I do not believe that

we can launch a credible diplomatic effort without such an understanding from you, I urge a positive, early reply. If you feel unable to do so, that is your sovereign prerogative. But I hope you will also understand that, absent that, Jim Baker and I will be forced to conclude that we no longer have any chance of implementing your initiative.

I write this in full awareness that any decision on our part to suspend our dialogue with the PLO because we conclude it has not lived up to its commitment to renounce terrorism will make it very difficult for any Palestinians from the territories to step forward and come to the table. Nevertheless, if the peace process cannot move ahead, I believe that it is important for our relationship that Israel not be seen as the principal impediment. In any event, and because these issues are entirely familiar to you, we do not believe that your government requires much time before it should be able to let us know the answer to this one question.

I can appreciate that there are those inside and outside your government who fear that such Palestinian participation, as described by Secretary Baker to Minister Arens, might prejudice subsequent negotiating outcomes and final status itself. Let me assure you that this is not the case. In addition to other assurances discussed with you by Secretary Baker, I want to underline the fact that the United States does not view any position adopted by Israel or any other party at this stage of the peace process as prejudicing the substance of interim or final status arrangements. I am not trying to persuade you that there is no risk for Israel in any of this, but rather that the risks are small and that they are clearly outweighed by both the potential benefits and the certain risks and costs of not moving forward toward peace. Let me assure you too that we do not see the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue as the sole focus of the peace process. Your May 14, 1989 initiative quite properly addressed Israel's relations with neighboring Arab states. This too requires attention, especially in light of the proliferation of


conventional and unconventional weaponry in the region. Based upon our extensive conversations with the Arab states, we believe that progress on the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue will make this and other steps toward reconciliation and peace possible. I truly believe this is the best way to proceed, ^{1.4(d)}



This then brings me to my final point. Mr. Prime Minister, I am increasingly concerned that without a peace process to provide hope to the people of the territories that violence will grow, in the process destroying not only peoples lives but also future prospects for peace. This is not my vision of an ideal future for either Israel or the United States. Your government has appropriately declared absorbing the Soviet immigrants to be its first priority. But Israel's ability to provide a comfortable and peaceful home to these and other Jews depends upon moving toward peace. What I ask you to do is to adopt policies that will enable us to work together and make this possible.

In closing, I just want to reiterate several key points. The United States stands behind Israel and wants a productive relationship with its new government. It is my view that the priority of Israel ought to be the absorption of new immigrants, not encouraging settlement activity. Most important, we need a positive, early reply on the question of Palestinian participation because that is essential if Israel's own peace initiative is to be viable.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 9004780
DATE 15 JUN 90

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO ISRAELI PM SHAMIR RE ISRAELI POLITICAL ISSUES
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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TIME

SIGNATURE

SHAMIR, YITZHAK

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 5/21/2009

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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~~SECRET~~

4780

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS for*

SUBJECT: Letter to Shamir

14
12-16

Purpose

To congratulate Israeli Prime Minister Shamir on forming a new government, at the same time pressing him on both settlements and the peace process.

Background

As you know, our Ambassador in Tel Aviv handed over the text of the letter from you to Shamir. Given the seriousness of our message, Jim Baker and I thought it a good idea to have you sign the letter so that the Ambassador can actually present the original.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Shamir at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Shamir

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0371-MR
E8 12/2/15

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~~SECRET~~

4780

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 15, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT: Letter to Shamir

Brent
letter should be
dated June 15,
the day Brent
delivered text to
Shamir! 

Attached at Tab A is the to be signed version of the letter from the President to Israeli Prime Minister Shamir.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo for the President
Tab A Letter to Shamir

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/31/2013

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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PAGE 1

MESSAGE NO. 0890

CLASSIFICATION

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMAN
(NAME)

PAGES 5

(EXTENSION)

(BOOK NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO PRIME MINISTER SHAWIR

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO:

OFFICE OF THE

EXTENSION

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MR. J. STAPLETON ROY

EXEC SEC

REMARKS

FOR IMMEDIATE CARLING / SIGNED ORIGINAL TO BE HAND CARRIED
BY MR. ARAD

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 2/21/2009

URGENT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

C

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN (NAME) _____ (EXTENSION) _____ (ROOM NUMBER) _____

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR

LOG 0

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
STATE	MR. J STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	

REMARKS FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING / SIGNED ORIGINAL TO BE HAND CARRIED BY AMB. ARAD

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cg NARA, Date 5/21/2009

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RECORD ID: 9004999
RECEIVED: 21 JUN 90 10

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 22 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
ISRAEL

TELCALL
PLO

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL TO PRES MUBARAK OF EGYPT ON 22 JUN / TALKING POINTS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 25 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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DOC 2 OF 2

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A/call to Mubarak

**National Security Council
The White House**

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>JS</i> Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>6/22</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N/R</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other RMG BS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres Telephone Call
on June 2

(Free See 0
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Barak of Egypt

(istette)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4999

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 JUN 22 A 9:14

June 22, 1990

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *Rg for*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt

DATE: June ²³22, 1990

PURPOSE: To "buck up" Mubarak saying that we need to work to keep things calm while we make a last attempt on the so-called Baker plan. It also requests help with the PLO and with Palestinians more broadly while we work on the Israelis. It would be premature to discuss in any detail what we might do should we fail as this would only be self-fulfilling.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open

INTERPRETER: None required

PHONE NUMBER: Not required

CONTACT PERSON: Ambassador El-Reedy

TIME DIFFERENCE: +~~3~~6

SUGGESTED TIMES: To be determined

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: Middle East peace process

Date of Submission:

Action:

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0372-MR
Eg 12/21/15

CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

- Hosni, I wanted to speak with you after my announcement on Wednesday. I know from Frank Wisner that there is concern and disappointment at your end. This is understandable.
- You know, I could not act otherwise. But I want to emphasize that what we did was a suspension. Arafat can make it possible to resume the dialogue by doing what we asked and making clear he renounces terrorism.
- The key now is to move forward. I am pushing the Israelis to agree to meet with a Palestinian delegation that would include deportees and people with a tie to Jerusalem. We should know soon enough if Shamir is willing to do this. We will not allow matters to drift.
- We also hope that Palestinians will not reject out of hand meeting with the Israelis and turn to violence. As ever, I would appreciate anything you could do to help here with the PLO and with those resident in the occupied territories.
- Hosni, let me just close by saying how much I value all you have done, and that I look forward to working closely with you as we go on from here, especially on next steps should it prove impossible to advance our current approach.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0370-MR
EJ 12/21/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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4999

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 21, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt

Per your instruction, attached is a schedule proposal and talking points for a call to Mubarak. As you can see, the principal purpose is a "buck up," saying that we need to work to keep things calm while we make a last attempt on the so-called Baker plan. It also requests help with the PLO and with Palestinians more broadly while we work on the Israelis. It would be premature to discuss in any detail what we might do should we fail as this would only be self-fulfilling.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0370-MR
28 12/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005000
RECEIVED: 21 JUN 90 10

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 22 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN
ISRAEL

TELCALL
PLO



PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL TO KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON 22 JUN / TALKING POINTS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 25 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSAMM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P/Call to King Hussein
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: GRP LOG # 5000
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LMG A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Bill</i> Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>6/22 AS</u>	<u>DP</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>W/R</u>
	<u>Re DO</u>		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other RMB BS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres of JC - 2 complete copies for BS/RMG
EXCEL (EXCEL) - 6 ~~extra~~ extra copies
King Hussein 23 (sketch)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT WAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 JUN 22 A9:14

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

June 22, 1990

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *Rg for*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan

DATE: ²³June 22, 1990

PURPOSE: To thank Hussein for his birthday message and to "buck up" the King, saying that we need to work to keep things calm while we make a last attempt on the so-called Baker plan. It also requests help with the PLO and with Palestinians in the territories while we work on the Israelis. It would be premature to discuss in any detail what we might do should we fail as this would only be self-fulfilling.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: None required. Hussein speaks fluent English.

PHONE NUMBER: None required

CONTACT PERSON:

TIME DIFFERENCE: +7 Hours

SUGGESTED TIMES: To be determined

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Thank Hussein for birthday message.
2. Middle East process.

Date of Submission:

Action:

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Letter from King Hussein

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0372-MR
E8 1212115

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING HUSSEIN

- Your Majesty, let me just begin by thanking you for your birthday message. Our personal relationship as well as the ties between our two countries remain special to me.
- I wanted to speak with you after my announcement on Wednesday. I know from our ambassador that there is considerable disappointment and concern at your end. This is understandable.
- ✓ -- I want you to know that I could not act otherwise. But I want to emphasize that what we did was a suspension. Arafat can make it possible to resume the dialogue by doing what we asked and making clear he renounces terrorism.
- The key now is to move forward. I am pushing the Israelis to agree to meet with a Palestinian delegation that would include deportees and people with a tie to Jerusalem. We should know soon enough if Shamir is willing to do this. We will not allow matters to drift.
- We also hope that Palestinians will not reject out of hand meeting with the Israelis and turn to violence. As ever, I would appreciate anything you could do to help here with the PLO and those resident in the occupied territories.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2010-0372-MR

28 12/2/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Your Majesty, let me just close by saying I appreciate that we could well be entering a difficult period in the region, and that I look forward to working closely with you as we go on from here, especially on next steps should it prove impossible to advance on our current course.
- Barbara joins me in sending our best to Queen Noor and the family.

very difficult
"helpless" etc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4987

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT VANERON

SIT: FILE HAASS MONTGOMERY PRES MSGS SIT VAX WELCH

PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 121422Z JUN 90

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3933

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 07571

FOR NEA/ARN - STUART BROWN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, JO

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT BUSH

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM KING
HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT BUSH. QUOTE:

MESSAGE FROM HIS MAJESTY THE KING TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR BIRTHDAY IT GIVES ME GREAT
PLEASURE TO EXPRESS TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, MY MOST
SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES FOR YOUR
CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH AND HAPPINESS.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REMARK
ON THE LONG TRADITION OF GOOD RELATIONS AND
CO-OPERATION THAT BINDS OUR TWO COUNTRIES TOGETHER IN
OUR MUTUAL QUEST TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE
MIDDLE EAST. THIS TRADITION PLACES UPON US A
RESPONSIBILITY TO REASSERT OUR DETERMINATION AND BOOST
OUR EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES THAT PREVENT THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THIS REGION.
QUEEN NOOR JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR WARM PERSONAL
REGARDS AND HIGH ESTEEM TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND TO
MRS. BUSH.

HUSSEIN I. UNQUOTE.

3. ORIGINAL LETTER WILL BE POUCHED ON JUNE 13 TO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0372-MR
EJ 12/21/15

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

NEA/ARN. SUDDARTH

BT

#7571

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5000

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 21, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan

Per your instruction, attached is a schedule proposal and talking points for a call to Hussein. The purpose of the call is to thank Hussein for his birthday message and to "buck up," saying that we need to work to keep things calm while we make a last attempt on the so-called Baker plan. It also requests help with the PLO and with Palestinians in the territories while we work on the Israelis. It would be premature to discuss in any detail what we might do should we fail as this would only be self-fulfilling.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Letter from King Hussein

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0378-LR
28 12/2/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005046
RECEIVED: 22 JUN 90 11

QUICK FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 22 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
JORDAN
ISRAEL

EGYPT
PLO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST UPDATE

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 26 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 5046

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	☒	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Tab I has been faxed
to the Pres (Camp David)*

6/22

TAB I faxed to C/LO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

30 JUN 22 P2: 56

June 22, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Middle East Update

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0372-MR
EJ 12/2/15

The initial reaction to your June 20 announcement to suspend the US-PLO dialogue has gone along predictable lines, if somewhat more muted than we expected. Arab and other international reaction is broadly critical. The decision is seen as additional evidence that the United States adheres to a one-sided, pro-Israel policy. At least so far, though, there has been no real violence. The only positive reactions in the Arab world are private statements by a few Palestinians that the suspension removes Israel's argument that the PLO and the US-PLO dialogue are the obstacle, thereby placing greater pressure on Israel to produce a viable interlocutor. Also, the Syrians are apparently pleased with this blow to Arafat. More specific reactions are as follows:

Egypt: The Egyptians issued a statement regretting the suspension, but President Mubarak asked that you be informed that it was as mild as was possible given the political realities. He is also concerned that all this will only help Arab extremists.

Jordan: Jordan's reaction resembled Egypt's. The suspension only reinforces Hussein's sense of gloom, already deep given his economic woes, the strength of the fundamentalists, and his fears that Shamir and those around him will try to "solve" the Palestinian problem by turning Jordan into the Palestinian state.

PLO: The PLO Executive Committee issued a relatively low-keyed statement that repeats PLO claims of disassociation from the May 30 incident, states that only the PNC can review the behavior of PLO members, and reaffirms the PLO commitment to peace. At the same time, the statement is critical of our decision to suspend the dialogue (termed a "step toward peace") and warns us and Israel of the futility of trying to find alternatives to the PLO.

Israel: Initial Israeli satisfaction with the suspension is already giving way to concern that it will lead to an increase in U.S. pressure on them to accept the terms spelled out in your June 15 letter to Shamir. There are also criticisms appearing in print over our choice of "suspension" rather than "termination". And already emerging is the new thrust of Israeli diplomacy, one that focuses on improving relations with Arab states (especially Jordan and Syria) rather than with the Palestinians.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5046

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 22, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT: Middle East Update

Per our conversation, attached at Tab I is a short update for the President. He should see it before he speaks with Mubarak early Saturday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memo for the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/31/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005086
RECEIVED: 25 JUN 90 09

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 26 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
VISIT
MEMCON

AP
SP

PERSONS: MEGUID, ABDEL

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & EGYPTIAN FOMIN MEGUID ON 26 JUN

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 28 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS
HILLIARD
NSC CHRON
WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 7 OF 7

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5086 ADD-ON 2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NOTED

June 26, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM:

RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT:


Memorandum of Conversation with Egyptian Foreign
Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
meeting between the President and Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat
Abdel Meguid on Tuesday, June 26, 1990, 10:07 p.m. - 10:30 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/31/2013

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid (4 pp.)	6/26/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (June 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By 78 On 5/9/22

Date Closed: 5/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #: 2000-0429-F(205)	MR Case #: 2010-0373-MR (508.01)
AR Disposition: Released in Part	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date: 8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date: 3/20/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5086 ADD-ON 2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs (Notetaker)

Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, Minister of Foreign Affairs
El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.
Osama el-Baz, Special Advisor to President Mubarak
Ahmed Abul Ghait, Aide to Foreign Minister Meguid

DATE, TIME June 26, 1990, 10:07 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Minister Meguid: We consider the peace process to be essential for the area. We will use the next few weeks to see what can be done. (U)

The President: How much trouble do you think we are in as a result of our decision to suspend the U.S.-PLO dialogue? I know it sent bad signals to our moderates friends in the area. What has been the reaction and what should we do? (Ø)

Minister Meguid: The reaction was one of regret. We believe dialogue between the United States and the PLO is essential. We are aware of the mistake behind the terrorist attack. But the problem with the decision was that it penalized the moderates in the PLO. Our goal now is to resume the dialogue. The PLO deserves credit for its November 1988 decision to recognize Israel's right to exist and UN (SCR) 242. (Ø)

The President: They also agreed to renounce terrorism. (U)

Minister Meguid: Yes. I was involved in the process leading to their decision. The PLO had rejected UN 242 for 21 years. UN

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2010-0373-MR
ef 3/20/15

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~~SECRET~~

242 is essential for the peace process. By accepting it, they paved the way for the dialogue, which was a real breakthrough. Suspending it was regrettable even though you have a point. (C)

The President: What can the PLO council do to reiterate their disapproval of terrorism? We made clear our decision was only a suspension. Can the PLO Executive Committee say he did the wrong thing and put him on probation? (C)

Minister Meguid: They are investigating. We are urging Arafat to discipline Abu Abbas and oust him. (C)

The President: That would be acceptable to us, right? (U)

Secretary Baker: Those are the conditions we have announced publicly. But there are other indications of terror, involving Force 17. What needs to be done publicly is just what we've said. But privately, we also need to end the toleration of Force 17's activities. (S)

Minister Meguid: I agree with Secretary Baker. We will discuss this at length this afternoon. (U)

The President: Does Arafat express any regret for what has taken place? (U)

Minister Meguid: Yes. But Arafat has does not have full control. There is a long history of trouble created by Abu Abbas. (C)

The President: If Arafat and the Executive Council kick him out, are you worried over the reaction of the extremists? (C)

Mr. el Baz: Legally speaking, Arafat cannot act without the PNC. The PNC is not meeting until October. We in Egypt are looking for how to fill this gap. We are speaking with the PLO. Arafat is now back in Tunis to consider what to do, away from Iraqi pressure. (C)

The President: We're trying to keep things on track with Iraq, something that is tough given Saddam. (C)

Minister Meguid: It takes patience. (U)

The President: It's not easy given his long gun that stretches out from here to the Washington Monument. Admittedly, some of what he has said he'd do was in response to Israel, but it sounds bad. On another subject, I spoke to King Hussein. He is worried. What should we be doing? (C)

Minister Meguid: He needs public and private assurances. (U)

Mr. el-Baz: Especially public assurances that you are committed to Jordan's integrity. (U)

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The President: Do you see him being pressured by radicals? (U)

Minister Meguid: Yes -- Islamic groups. (U)

The President: What is the worst case scenario? (U)

Mr. el-Baz: That the King will be toppled by the Israelis who think Jordan is a Palestinian state. Hussein believes that the U.S. would not come to his aid. (S)

Dennis Ross: It goes back to 1970, when some Israelis like Sharon said that Israeli should not have helped Hussein. (C)

Minister Meguid: The more assurance you give him the better. (U)

The President: Let's think how we can do this. Do his fears apply to Israeli armed forces? (C)

Secretary Baker: He worries that Israel might encourage forces inimical to him. (C)

The President: I'm glad we have had this talk. (U)

Secretary Baker: Was there a suggestion at the Baghdad Summit that Hussein might step down in favor of the Saudis? (C)

Minister Meguid: It was a rumor that was denied. (C)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: Let's consider what we can do to help him. (C)

Minister Meguid: I'd like to raise a second point, on economics. We just had a mission from the IMF. We will go into the details with Jim Baker. The situation is very serious. We are facing heavy installments in the next three months. About \$500 million is due. We don't have the money. We need a Brooke waiver and FMS debt relief. We also want a new IMF agreement and rescheduling. We are taking steps toward economic reform, including price increases. Our hope is that the G7 when it meets in Houston will consider how to assist us. Our position is comparable to Poland's. I hope you'll look into it Mr. President. (U)

The President: Are you seeing the Treasury people? (U)

Secretary Baker: We're working with Treasury on an approach to the IMF. (U)

The President: We want to help. To be candid, though, the whole aid program is under review since so much of it goes to a handful of countries, including Egypt. But this does show that Egypt has strong support in the Congress. We'll talk about this. (U)

SECRET

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4

~~SECRET~~

Minister Meguid: We were very pleased by the AID Director's visit. Some flexibility on aid will help us. (U)

The President: I'm glad you came. Please give my respects to your President. Maybe we can do something with the PLO dialogue. (U)

Minister Meguid: You can count on us. (U)

The President: What did you make of Sharon's statement? (U)

Minister Meguid: Not much Mr. President. (U)

Mr. el-Baz: We should take him up on it and move things further. (U)

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2010-0373 MR
28 3/20/15
6-26-90
PRESIDENT'S ADDITION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0373 MR
28 3/20/15

June 25, 1990

MEETING WITH
EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ESMAT ABDEL MEGUID

DATE: June 26, 1990

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 10:15 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To give the Egyptians a clear sense of our continued commitment to the peace process and of our willingness to resume the PLO dialogue if the PLO meets our tests on terrorism.

II. BACKGROUND

President Mubarak wants to work out a peace process strategy with us, including finding a way to resume the U.S. dialogue with the PLO. The Egyptians may believe that we are prepared to "write off" the peace process in the face of intransigence in Israel and militancy in the Arab position. In addition, Mubarak may believe that you were not serious about "suspension" of the dialogue. Meguid may also be carrying a message of some sort from Arafat.

You should use this brief meeting to leave Meguid with several key points. First, we need to convince Egypt, and through it the other Arabs, that we are sincere in our determination to push the peace process forward. Basically, this means that Meguid will need to hear that you intend to be firm with Shamir in getting an answer to the remaining question to be resolved for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and that a "no" or more equivocation will not do. In your talking points, we have noted some areas (UNSC resolution on settlements and stronger public diplomacy on Palestinian rights and an end to the occupation) where we can suggest to Meguid how we might turn up the heat on Shamir.

Second, we want Egypt to push the PLO to meet the tests for restarting the dialogue. You should tell Meguid that you chose the word "suspension" carefully, and that you mean it when you say that the dialogue will resume if the PLO meets our tests -- denunciation, disassociation, and discipline for those involved in terror. In this respect, you need to be careful that they understand that all problems relating to PLO terrorism need to be addressed, not just Abul Abbas and the May 30 attack.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

Third, Meguid may press some economic points. Egypt is flat broke and has some huge bills to pay to us in the next several months. In addition, Mubarak wants help with the IMF. Given the time constraints, however, it would be best to refer Meguid to Jim Baker and Nick Brady for follow-up on the economic issues, while noting that you understand Egypt's burdens and know of Egypt's importance to us.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open Photo.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo-op followed by meeting.

Prepared by:
C. David Welch

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Bio

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5086 ADD-ON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 25, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THOUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH 

SUBJECT: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to the President for his meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Meguid on June 26 at 10:00 a.m. - 10:15 a.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Bio

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID

Peace Process

- I want to continue our work together on the peace process. Egypt played such an important role, and I'm glad you have come now to compare notes on where we go.
- My "congratulatory" letter to Shamir was actually a request in very firm terms for a "yes" response to Jim Baker's ideas on how to get to an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.
- So, my first point for you is that we want to move forward. We aren't writing off the Middle East.
- If Shamir says "yes," then I will try with your help to move the process on. We will need to persuade Palestinians to sit down with Israelis even in the absence of a U.S.-PLO dialogue.
- If because of Israeli or Palestinian resistance we cannot move ahead on the current track, we will need to consult on possible alternatives. There must be an active peace process for the region.
- For my part, I would be willing as well to look at some tough measures, provided that they do not undermine our security relationship with Israel, which rests on broad political consensus here.
- In this regard, I have told President Mubarak before that I am prepared to introduce a clean settlements resolution, consistent with U.S. policy, in the Security Council.

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- We are also prepared for stronger public diplomacy: on human rights in the Occupied Territories; on Palestinian political rights generally; and on land for peace and an end to the occupation.
- I hope the Arabs will not misinterpret this: our commitment to Israel's security will always be totally firm, despite any deep differences we may have.
- My objective is to succeed in the peace process; failing that, it is to show that the current Israeli Government's policy is unreasonable and unsustainable. It would be very easy for the Arabs to derail or complicate this, for example by additional Palestinian terrorism or by overreaching on Soviet Jewish immigration.

PLO Dialogue

- Esmat (S-mot), I assure you that the PLO decision was a very tough one for me. I especially took President Mubarak's advice to heart.
- But let's face it: the PLO had the opportunity to deal with the problem and they didn't take it.
- The PLO must deal with its internal contradictions on this terrorism issue. It is not just Abul Abbas, and you know that we have concerns beyond the May 30 attack.
- I deliberately said that the dialogue was suspended.
- I want to resume the dialogue, and I will do so if the PLO meets our tests (denunciation, disassociation, and discipline), which will prove whether it can stick by its commitments to renounce terrorism.

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Economic Issues (if raised)

- I realize your economic problems are very pressing. I know Egypt is important, and we want to talk this through with you.
- I hope you can cover this ground in your meetings with Jim Baker and Nick Brady. We stand ready to help where we can.

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09f. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	3/27/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (June 1990)

Date Closed: 5/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Vice President

James A. Baker, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates

Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security
Affairs

Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian
Affairs

Egypt

Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, Minister of Foreign Affairs

El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.

Osama El-Baz, Special Advisor to President Mubarak

Ahmed Abul Ghait, Aide to Foreign Minister Meguid

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 25, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Egyptian Foreign
Minister

The President, in their June 23 telephone conversation, promised President Mubarak that he would see Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid on Tuesday, June 26. Foreign Minister Meguid was sent here by President Mubarak on the aftermath of the U.S. decision to suspend the dialogue with the PLO.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached Schedule Proposal (Tab I) for a meeting between the President and Egyptian Foreign Minister Meguid.

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, Deputy Assistant to the President for Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abdel Meguid

PURPOSE: To demonstrate strong U.S. commitment to continuing the Arab-Israeli peace process and to close U.S.-Egyptian coordination.

BACKGROUND: The President, in their June 23 telephone conversation, promised President Mubarak that he would see Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid on Tuesday, June 26. The Egyptians are keen to keep the United States engaged in the peace process and to reduce the negative impact of the suspension of the PLO dialogue.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE & TIME: Tuesday, June 26, 1990
DURATION: 20 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs

Egypt
Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, Minister of Foreign Affairs
El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.
Osama el-Bag, Special Advisor to President Mubarak

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo-op followed by meeting

REMARKS REQUIRED: Provided by NSC
MEDIA COVERAGE: Open Photo
RECOMMENDED BY: NSC
OPPOSED BY: None

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

5086 add-on

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: Official Working Visit of
Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid
and Osama El Baz

I. SETTING

- o Mubarak has dispatched his two top advisors -- Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid and Osama El Baz -- to probe a basic question: do we have a strategy for dealing with the Shamir government?
- o Mubarak's underlying concerns are deep: Since Peres' failure to form a government, Egypt's fortunes, and those of the peace process, have diminished. Iraq outflanked Egypt at the Arab summit, and Saddam Hussein's rhetoric vis-a-vis Israel and the U.S. has had resonance throughout the Arab world. Mubarak is concerned that the gains secured by Egypt through patient diplomacy and commitment to the peace process could be lost in a frenzy of Arab emotion directed against Israel and us.
- o If Mubarak went along with our peace process diplomacy for a year, it was not because he believes Shamir wants peace. Mubarak is persuaded that Shamir will do anything to avoid dealing with Palestinians over the future of the West Bank and Gaza. This is bad enough, but Mubarak is mostly nervous that we will let Shamir off the hook -- either because of domestic pressures or because of fatigue in dealing with a seemingly intractable problem.
- o Finally, Mubarak's position is the more tenuous because of his shaky economic and debt situation at home and the recent gains of Islamic political activists elsewhere in the region. Thus far, Mubarak has moved reluctantly toward economic reform, coupled with a tough crackdown on Islamic opposition. But the two problems scare him, for the economy serves as a constant explosive issue to be exploited by his opposition.

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II. OBJECTIVES

- o Peace Process: Outline our approach and steps we might consider in the absence of a "yes" from the Israelis. Solicit Egyptian suggestions.
- o U.S./PLO Dialogue: Stress our interest in resuming dialogue with the PLO and the need for the PLO to put its house in order on the issue of terrorism, so the dialogue can resume.
- o Egypt/IMF: Continue to urge the GOE to narrow the gap with the Fund. Point out that we are urging the Fund to be flexible as well.
- o FMS Debt, Brooke Waiver: Mubarak has said Egypt cannot make its remaining FMS payments through this fiscal year. If Abdel Meguid asks us for a Brooke waiver, indicate that we will do what we can, but underscore the difficulty of succeeding.

III. STRATEGY

- o We should tell the Egyptians that the PLO got itself into the renewed terrorism mess, and will have to get itself out. We should remind them that the Arab world has become blinded with fear over Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel. However, we should also reassure the Egyptians -- who have hung tough with us in promoting the peace process -- that we have a sure idea of where we are heading.
- o We should pursue three objectives during Meguid's visit:
- o Share with Meguid and El Baz our strategy in the peace process: Meguid and El Baz will need to hear that we intend to be firm with Shamir should he say no or equivocate in answering the remaining question on the road to an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. They should see that we intend to pursue a policy designed to change Israeli policy. We should tell Meguid that the focus of our policy with Israel will be on three issues:
 - Active steps and vocal diplomacy against settlements: including a possible U.S. initiative in the UNSC if the settlement activity picks up.
 - Active support for protection of the people under occupation: e.g. reducing the use of lethal force; promoting family reunification.

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- Strong public diplomacy, in support of Palestinian rights, land for peace and an end to the occupation.
- But also a clear, enduring commitment to Israel and its people, even if there are big differences with the Israeli government. We want to show that the government's policy is unreasonable -- all the while demonstrating that our policy takes very seriously Israel's security needs and the absorption of Soviet Jews into Israel.
- We should also make clear to Meguid that our security and military relationship with Israel will not be touched, and that the Arabs should not expect to drive a wedge between Israel and the U.S. It is especially important that Saddam Hussein not believe that it is possible to create such a wedge or that the U.S. security commitment to Israel is weakening. That could weaken the Israeli deterrent and produce another dangerous Iraqi miscalculation.
- o Develop an approach to resume the PLO dialogue: We understand Meguid is bringing a message from Arafat. We should seek Egypt's active intervention with the PLO to restart the dialogue. This will be easier to manage once Egypt sees that our policy vis-a-vis Israel has some teeth; but Egyptian efforts should start now. In this respect, we need to make clear to Meguid and El Baz that all problems relating to PLO terrorism need to be addressed, not only Abu Abbas.
- o Reassure Egypt on U.S. economic support, especially in terms of Egypt's debt burden and negotiations with the IMF: I will deal with the details of our efforts to keep IMF demands reasonable and to formulate a strategy for dealing with Egypt's FMS debt. You should provide strong, general assurances that our foreign policy priorities elsewhere have not diminished the importance of Egypt to U.S. interests.

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TALKING POINTS

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- o We want to work together to get the peace process restarted and enable the U.S./PLO dialogue to be resumed.

PLO Dialogue

- o In regard to the dialogue, you know we took our decision with regret and only after the most careful deliberations.
 - We gave the PLO every opportunity take remedial steps. We resisted heavy Congressional pressure to make our move sooner.
 - We couched our suspension of the dialogue in terms which provide the PLO some flexibility in responding.
- o I want to stress that I want to see the dialogue resumed.
- o But, the PLO cannot escape responsibility for the action of its leaders or for the consequences of those actions.
- o Moreover, you know that our concerns on PLO terrorism extend beyond the May 30 attack. The PLO needs to get its entire house in order on this issue.

Peace Process

- o On the broader peace process, I have written to Prime Minister Shamir in very firm terms asking for a "yes" on proceeding to a dialogue on the basis we have discussed.
- o I have asked for a response by the end of the month.
- o If we do get a "yes" I'll try to move forward.
- o If we come up short of a "yes" we will have to develop steps to encourage a more forthcoming Israeli policy. I would welcome your views.
- o We will be prepared to take tough measures, provided they are practical and do not undermine our important security relationship with Israel. For example:

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- We could step up our diplomacy against settlements, including a possible U.S. initiative in the UNSC if settlement activity picks up.
 - We want to support practical steps for the protection of the people under occupation. This could include looking for ways to bring an end to the use of lethal force and promoting family reunification.
 - We will look at stronger public diplomacy in support of Palestinian rights, land for peace and an end to the occupation.
- o It is important, however that the Arabs not overreach and try to turn these steps in directions we could no longer support.
 - o In this regard, you should know that the U.S. will maintain its essential commitment to Israel and its people, even if there are big differences with the Israeli government. We want to show that the Israeli government's policy is unreasonable -- all the while demonstrating that our policy takes very seriously Israel's security needs and the absorption of Soviet Jews into Israel.
 - o It is especially important that Saddam Hussein not believe that it is possible to create a wedge between us or that the U.S. security commitment to Israel is weakening. That could weaken the Israeli deterrent and produce another dangerous Iraqi miscalculation.

IMF DISCUSSIONS

- o I understand that an IMF team left Cairo last week in a positive mood after talks on the Egyptian economy. While you are still engaged in negotiations on a stand-by agreement, we are told progress was made.
- o When you were here in January, Jim Baker assured you of our support once you have come to agreement with the IMF.
- o I am fully behind his offer for the US to organize a "Friends of Egypt" donor group, and help you with financing a Fund-supported reform program.
- o I encourage you to move ahead to come to agreement with the fund. We are also asking the Fund to show flexibility.

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DEBT BURDEN

- o Jim Baker will be talking to you more about thinking in our government on Egypt's Foreign Military Sales debt, and efforts underway to look at Egypt's U.S.-held debt burden.
- o The Egypt-U.S. relationship is at the top of our foreign policy priorities. We will be looking at what can be done to ease the pressure of the debt.

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RECORD ID: 9005136
RECEIVED: 26 JUN 90 11

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 27 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
JAMAICA
ITALY

EGYPT
COOK ISLAND
BOLIVIA

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI
HENRY, GEOFFREY A

MANLEY, MICHAEL
ANDREOTTI, GIULIO

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY FOR JUN 27

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 29 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

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*Mubarak letter
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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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Heads of State Correspondence Summary

President Mubarak of Egypt - June 23, 1990
(Received June 26)

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

6/29/90

✓ President Mubarak sends you a letter via his Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Meguid. He asks for four things. First, he asks that you discuss with Dr. Meguid plans for setting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in motion. Second, he hopes you will inspire the G7 at the Houston Summit to forgive Egypt of some of its foreign debts so that its internal reform programs might succeed. Third, he hopes that you will influence the IMF to consider favorably its recent Standby arrangements with Egypt. And fourth, he asks that you persuade Congress to enact a Brook-Waiver legislation in light of Egypt's unbearable burden of a \$500 million debt to the U.S.

Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica - June 19, 1990
(Received June 27)

✓ PM Manley thanks you for sending your good wishes for his health via Jeb. His hospital stay was delayed by further surgery to remove new blood clots in his right leg. He is much better now and appreciates your concern. He sends his kind regards to the first lady, though he has not yet had the pleasure of meeting her.

Prime Minister Henry of the Cook Islands - June 15, 1990
(Received June 22)

✓ PM Henry appreciates your hospitality during his recent visit to Washington. He is pleased by your interest in strengthening ties with the Cook Islands as well as other South Pacific states. He hopes for better bilateral relations and invites you to visit the Cook Islands.

Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy - June 12, 1990
(Received June 25)

✓ PM Andreotti acknowledges your letter concerning your discussions with Gorbachev. He is impressed by the progress you made in the areas of disarmament and is very pleased about the CW agreement.

He also believes that the commercial agreement constitutes a gesture of great political farsightedness on your part and proves the U.S.'s desire to support a new Soviet economic system. He will support any possible joint action of economic assistance to the USSR and suggests that such assistance be discussed at the Houston Summit.

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

The President

PRES NOTED SUMMARY



June 23rd, 1990

Dear George,

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, I deemed it appropriate to send you this letter with Dr. Esmat Abdel Meguid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to exchange views with you on certain matters of common concern.

First: I believe that you share with me a firm determination to move the peace process forward without delay. The suspension of the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue should be lifted as soon as possible if we are to proceed together towards initiating an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. You have made several useful statements in the past few days in the context of urging the Israeli Government to put an end to its procrastination and delaying tactics in order to enable us to move ahead. Further delay would certainly result in encouraging extremism and rejectionism on both sides to the detriment of the forces of peace. In the absence of such prompt movement, the situation in the occupied territories is certain to worsen rapidly. Matters could go out of control with all what this implies for us.

As I told you over the telephone, I am in constant touch with P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat, urging him to persevere and adopt a positive stand. Pressure is building up within Palestinian circles, both inside and outside the occupied territories, and in the Arab World at large. Certain steps will have

The President



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to be taken in order to reverse this trend and regenerate hope in the hearts of Arab masses. I entrusted Dr. Abdel Meguid to discuss with you some ideas which might enable us to establish the necessary opening for setting the process in motion.

Second: As you well know, I have strived since I assumed office in the tragic circumstances of October 1981 to impart to the Egyptian people my vision of a better, stronger, self-reliant Egypt dedicated to peace and progress in our troubled region. With the mandate of my people, I have attempted to prepare our economy for the challenges of the twenty-first century. We have built a modern infrastructure, modernized our capital base, developed our human resources and established the foundations for self-sustained growth and greater welfare for our people.

In the past two years, we have drawn plans for dismantling those structures and institutions that have hindered progress and economic development. I believe that we have succeeded to strengthening the Egyptian people's commitment to a market oriented economy, where the free interaction of market forces allocate resources, reward hard work and provide better standards of living in equity for all Egyptians.

In March of this year, our blueprint for the introduction of market forces in the economy was discussed and agreed with the World Bank. Its main features revolve around the full scale deregulation of the economy, the decontrol of

The President



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all prices, the gradual privatization of all economic activities, the liberalization of investment and foreign trade and the establishment of an environment that will foster greater competition among all in the economy.

In preparation for this fundamental change, we have taken measures, since 1986, that have weighed heavily on our people. Standards of living for the poorest segments of our society have declined significantly, unemployment has risen inevitably and production has been disrupted often. Nevertheless it has been my deeply held belief that these sacrifices were necessary to effect the transition we have set out to achieve.

With the International Monetary Fund, we have attempted to establish the proper macro-economic framework that will protect and assist in the fundamental restructuring of our economy. A first step, supported by the IMF in 1987, achieved a significant rectification in major tools of economic management such as the National Budget, the exchange rate, interest rates and energy prices.

Until this year, however, changes in these tools could only be implemented within existing systems. The budget deficit was brought down from 22% of our domestic income in 1986 to around 12% this year. The system of exchange rates was greatly simplified with the elimination of all but one administered rate. The value of our currency was depreciated to reflect the greater scarcity of foreign resources that our economy has experienced since 1985. Interest

The President



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rates have been brought closer to the levels that can generate the savings we need to maintain economic growth and fulfill our obligations abroad. These changes have been painful and have exacted a heavy price from all Egyptians.

We believe the time has come to effect a change in the systems and mechanisms that govern the behavior of the major variables in our economy. We have drafted a plan for macroeconomic reform and presented it to the International Monetary Fund this month. The plan frees market forces to determine variable such as interest rates and the exchange rate. It eliminates once and for all those policy tools that could not reflect the free interaction of supply and demand in the economy. In support of these changes, additional resources amounting to over five percentage points of our income have been generated in our National Budget bringing its deficit to some 7% of domestic income.

The short term outlook, however, remains extremely precarious. The large external debt accumulated in the past, threatens to jeopardize our entire reform effort. While it allowed us to provide for the basic needs of our people, convert a wartime society to peace, modernize our infrastructure and rebuild our capital base, the external debt has become the unbearable burden that threatens our reforms. Our external debt obligations cover well over 60% of our foreign currency resources and represents a drain of over 12% of our national income. The temporary relief provided for us by our first rescheduling, pushed forward external obligations that will require over 80% of our foreign

The President



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currency resources by 1995. Egypt's external debt stands at well over 120% of our national income. This situation has greatly affected our creditworthiness and has left us unable to muster the international financial support we need to implement our reforms successfully.

Clearly, additional rescheduling of our external obligations does not appear to be the solution. What Egypt needs to match and support its political and economic reforms is a sizeable forgiveness of its external obligations. I ask you as a close and reliable friend that the United States, as leader of the free world, and our major creditor to assist us in mobilizing the support of the leaders of the G7 participating in the 16th Summit to be held in Houston on July 7. Please rest assured that such an extraordinary effort by our creditors will inscribe itself within the comprehensive reform programme we have drafted and are implementing. Such strong and unambiguous backing from the 16th Summit of the industrialized countries will provide the people of Egypt with the confidence needed to face the inevitable uncertainties that our reforms will bring about in their daily lives. The assurance of the support of the G7 in this fashion, will generate the popular support needed for the implementation of, often painful adjustments, in the months to come.

As you certainly know, Egypt is among the ten highest indebted countries of the World as far as the value of foreign debt. It is also among the five highest indebted countries according to the ratio of debt to the GNP. Consequently, what's needed is a real relief in the form of cancelling the military debt as it did not contribute directly to the development process and effecting a considerable forgiveness of other debts.

The President

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Third; An IMF mission has just concluded a successful round of negotiations with our Government. As it is crucial for us to reach a Stand-by arrangement with the Fund in the coming few weeks, I hope that you and Secretaries Baker and Brady use your good influence with the management of the Fund in order to persuade it to take a favourable decision promptly.

Fourth; Assuming that we conclude a Stand-by arrangement with the Fund during the few months ahead, Egypt is faced with the dilemma of having to pay the U.S. over 500 Million Dollars in debt service. In light of the unbearable burden this is certainly to place on our economy, I appeal to you to ask Congress to enact a Brook-Waiver as it did in the case of other friendly countries.

I am aware that I am burdening you with these requests. But I found it imperative to address you on these matters frankly and in the spirit of profound friendship and understanding between us. You have always proved to be a reliable and thoughtful partner in peace and progress.

With best wishes and regards.

Sincerely,


Mohammad Hosni Mubarak

H.E. George Bush

President of the United States.