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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91142
Folder ID Number: 91142-006

Folder Title:
Middle East Peace (May 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Insert	Re: Page 7 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Nicholas Rostow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Israeli Settlements Resolution (3 pp.)	5/10/90	(b)(1)	✓
02b. Cable	Re: Occupied Territories Resolution (5 pp.)	5/9/90	(b)(1)	✓
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt (1 pp.)	5/22/90	(b)(1)	✓
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points for May 23 Phone Call to Mubarak (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03c. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt (1 pp.)	5/22/90	(b)(1)	✓
04. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Q's and A's on Peace Process Issues for "This Week with David Brinkley" (4 pp.)	5/25/90	(b)(1)	✓
05a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to The Chief of Staff Re: Reply of Crown Prince El Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan (1 pp.)	5/30/90	(b)(1)	
05b. Summary	Re: Executive Summary (12 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (May 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1185
OA/ID Number: 91142-006
Date Closed: 5/20/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003790
RECEIVED: 11 MAY 90 18

TO: SUNUNU, J

CHRON FILE

FROM: HAMARNEH, MICHEL

DOC DATE: 01 MAY 90
SOURCE REF: 143700

KEYWORDS: JORDAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REVISED PAGE FOR POSITION PAPER FM PRINCE HASSAN ON MIDDLE EAST
ISSUES

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 29 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

WELCH

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/21/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSJWD

DOC 4 OF 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



143700
3790

THE ROYAL PALACE
AMMAN JORDAN

1 May, 1990

Dear Governor Sununu,

Further to the recent letter of 22 April you received from His Royal Highness The Crown Prince I enclose herewith a revised page 7 for insertion in the original text.

Please accept my sincere apologies for this inconvenience.

With my best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Michel Hamarneh
Director

Mr John Sununu,
White House Chief of Staff.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Insert	Re: Page 7 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (May 1990)

Date Closed: 5/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91142-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

FG-006-03

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 23, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. MICHEL HAMARNEH

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES A REVISED PAGE FOR INSERTION INTO
THE LETTER GOVERNOR SUNUNU RECEIVED FROM THE
CROWN PRINCE ON APR 22

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
JOHN SUNUNU		ORG	90/05/23		C 90/05/24
REFERRAL NOTE:					
Bill Sittmann		I	90/5/30		C 90/5/30
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS:

See #138615

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		*OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE *			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY *			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

3668

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 10, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *N.R.*
SUBJECT: Israeli Settlements Resolution

*Good memo.
Thanks -
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

Attached at Tab I is a cable of May 9 containing a new draft Security Council Resolution on Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories. A decision on how to vote may have to be taken urgently. The following comments are addressed to the new draft Resolution -- paragraph 9 of the cable.

Preambular paragraph 1: By failing to track the language of Security Council Resolution 242 (November 1967), which referred to "territories occupied in the recent conflict," and by using "the Palestinian or other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem," this Resolution would suggest that, as a legal matter, the territories are Arab and/or Palestinian (that is, belonging to a state of Palestine, which we do not recognize as meeting the international legal standard for statehood and which we do not believe should be established). Whereas Resolution 242 contemplated adjustments in the 1949 Armistice lines as part of a peace treaty that would establish "secure and recognized boundaries," this Resolution would suggest that those same Armistice lines are the proper boundary of Israel, notwithstanding that the Armistice agreements say otherwise and that the United States regards the final status of the Occupied Territories as something to be determined in the negotiations. Further, the Resolution's reference to Jerusalem blurs the legal distinctions between East and West Jerusalem.

This descriptive language is repeated in operative paragraphs 2 and 5. This language is now part of U.N. boilerplate notwithstanding the changed context due to the 1988 declaration of a "State of Palestine." Our past explanations of vote deny the legal or political significance of this formula and say that the status of the territories must be determined through negotiation. If we are unable to scale it back in this Resolution, I recommend that we again issue such a statement.

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-03701MR
28 7/10/15

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2

Preambular paragraph 3: This paragraph recalls a number of Security Council Resolutions, which I summarize here for your information. Resolution 237 (June 1967) called on "Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities; recommend[ed] to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;" and requested the Secretary General to follow effective implementation of the Resolution and to report to the Security Council. Recalling this Resolution does not appear to pose a problem.

Resolution 465 (1980) determined that Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories, including Jerusalem, that changed "the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 . . . have no legal validity" and that Israeli settlement practices "constitute a flagrant violation of the [Fourth] Geneva Convention;" "stongly deplore[d]" such practices; and called on Israel "to dismantle the existing settlements." The Carter Administration voted for this Resolution but subsequently said the vote should have been an abstention, explaining that it represented no change in policy with respect to Jerusalem or existing settlements. Recalling this Resolution has some significance given what it says. But it is hard to prevent such preambular references to earlier Security Council Resolutions. The use of "recall" is an improvement on earlier drafts, which suggested "reaffirming" the Resolution.

Resolution 478 (1980) on which the United States abstained; censured Israel for its "basic law" on Jerusalem; affirmed that such law violated "international law" and does not affect "the continued application" of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories; determined that "all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel . . . which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;" and "decide[d]" not to "recognize the basic law. (Israel issued a statement saying the law had municipal effects only -- that is, did not affect anything as matter of international law.) Referencing this Resolution reemphasizes what already is strong beer on the question.

Operative Paragraphs: The operative paragraphs call on Israel to cease settling civilians in the Occupied Territories, "including Jerusalem;" call on all states not to provide assistance to Israel "to be used specifically in connection with the settlement

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of parts of its civilian population and new immigrants in the Occupied Territory;" requests the Secretary General to keep the situation under "close review and to report as appropriate" to the Security Council on the implementation of this Resolution;" and "decides" to keep the situation in the Territories under review.

The use of the singular "territory" in operative paragraph 3 to refer to all territories occupied by Israel suggests that the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza are indivisible. Read in conjunction with describing such territories as "Palestinian" suggests they belong to the so-called State of Palestine (the "Arab" Territories would refer to the Golan Heights and parts of Lebanon). This is perhaps a technical point, which could be handled in a statement if not corrected in negotiation.

The State Legal Adviser's Office reports that "deplores" is rare in Security Council Resolutions and that, therefore, the International Organizations Bureau prefers "deeply regrets." The Legal Adviser's Office also reports that a "yes" vote would be unprecedented in the Reagan-Bush era. While Abe Sofaer's policy preference would be for abstention (a preference I share), he like I believe the Administration has a legal free hand on how to vote and recommend only that a decision reflect overall strategy on the peace process.

Concurrence by: Richard Haass, Peter Rodman *N/A*

Attachment

Tab I May 9, 1990, Cable

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-May-1990 16:54 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JNET%"ROSTOW@VAXC"@WHSR"@MRGATE

FROM: VMSMail User _JNET%"WHSR
(_JNET%"WHSR@WHSR"@MRGATE)

SUBJECT:

Received: From WHSR(WHSR) by VAXC with Jnet id 1312
for ROSTOW@VAXC; Wed, 9 May 90 16:54 EST
Date: Wed, 9 May 90 16:49 EST
From: <WHSR@WHSR>
To: ROSTOW@VAXC
Original_To: JNET%"ROSTOW@VAXC"

<DIST>
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN BRANSCUM
SIT: FILE HAASS ROSTOW SIT SUM VAX WELCH

<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
~~SECRET~~
<OSRI>
RUEHDT
<DTG>
091712Z MAY 90

<ORIG>
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

<TO>
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8414

<SUBJ>
SUBJECT: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES RESOLUTION

<TEXT>
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01305
NODIS
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UN
SUBJECT: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES RESOLUTION
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0370-MR
EJ 7/10/15

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: AS A RESULT OF SUGGESTIONS FROM THE U.S., DEMOCRATIC YEMEN AND EGYPT, WE HAVE PREPARED A NEW TEXT ELIMINATING REFERENCE TO EVERYTHING BUT ISRAELI SETTLEMENT OF PART OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION AND IMMIGRANTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY. DEMOCRATIC YEMEN AND EGYPTIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES BELIEVE THEY HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF SELLING THIS TEXT TO THE ARAB GROUP AND THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS IN THE COUNCIL WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. THEY INTEND TO FIRST SELL THE CONCEPT OF A RESOLUTION DEVOTED ONLY TO THE SETTLEMENT OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ISSUE, PROMISING THE ARABS THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO GIVE AWAY NOTHING ELSE ON OTHER ISSUES IF THEY DO NOT INTRODUCE THOSE ISSUES INTO THE DEBATE NOW. TEXT INCLUDED BELOW ON BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THESE TWO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE SINCE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME THEY WISH TO INTRODUCE IT AS THEIR OWN. THEY WILL ALSO WANT TO HAVE OUR FIRM INDICATION OF HOW WE WOULD VOTE ON SUCH A TEXT. IN THEIR VIEW THIS WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO CLINCHING THE DEAL WITH THE ARAB SIDE. OUR RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE REVIEW THIS TEXT CAREFULLY AND IF IT CONTINUES TO BE IN FULL ACCORD WITH OUR POLICY AND THE CURRENT DIRECTION SIGNALLED TO ME IN MY INSTRUCTIONS, WE PROVIDE THE TWO ARAB NEGOTIATORS WITH AN INDICATION THAT WE WOULD VOTE FOR THIS TEXT WITHOUT ANY CHANGES WHATSOEVER AND THAT SUCH A COMMITMENT IS BASED ON AN EARLY ARAB AGREEMENT TO THIS TEXT AND IS THEREFORE LIMITED IN TIME AND SCOPE. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

3. AT THE END OF MAY 8TH, LEADERS OF THE ARAB GROUP SIGNALLED TO USUN THEIR INABILITY TO AGREE TO THE TEXT THEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR A RESOLUTION ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ARABS TOLD US THAT POINTS OF CONTENTION WERE MANY, BUT TENDED TO FOCUS ON U.S. LANGUAGE "IN CONTRAVENTION OF" AND U.S. OPPOSITION TO SYRIAN LANGUAGE ON DEALING WITH RIGHT OF RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS FROM GOLAN AND OTHER NON-PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES.

4. SUBSEQUENTLY, PICKERING MET INFORMALLY WITH AMBASSADOR AL-ASHTAL OF DEMOCRATIC YEMEN AND ARAB/UNSC NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS SPOKESMAN ON THIS ISSUE AND WAS LATER JOINED BY EGYPTIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE MOUSSA. PICKERING EXPLAINED THAT IN LIGHT OF WHAT THE ARABS HAD DONE, THERE WERE FAILING CHANCES TO GET A RESOLUTION AND THAT ISRAELI REACTION AND BACKLASH WAS BUILDING UP TO SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS. AS A RESULT ARAB GROUP SHOULD BE THINKING CLEARLY ABOUT WHERE TO GO NEXT. AFTER PROVIDING DETAILS OF VARIOUS OBJECTIONS TO THE RESOLUTION ON OUR SIDE,

PICKERING SUGGESTED THAT MAYBE THE WAY TO CUT THROUGH THE QUANDARY NOW WAS TO GO FOR A RESOLUTION FOCUSSED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ISSUE OF THE MOVEMENT OF IMMIGRANTS AND CIVILIANS INTO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ALL OTHER ISSUES WOULD BE SET ASIDE.

5. SURPRISINGLY, THE YEMENI AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THE EGYPTIAN AGREED. THEY THEN INDICATED THE LIST OF PARAGRAPHS FROM THE CURRENT RESOLUTION THAT MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN SUCH A DRAFT. THE MORNING OF MAY 9TH, WITH SUCH A DRAFT IN HAND, PICKERING MET WITH THE TWO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO CAME ALONE. AFTER FIRST REVIEWING THE BIDDING FROM THE NIGHT BEFORE, PICKERING PROVIDED THE TEXT. THE TWO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IMMEDIATELY AGREED THAT IT WAS PRECISELY WHAT THEY HAD ASKED FOR. AFTER LONG DISCUSSION, THEY AGREED THAT THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE TO SELL SUCH A TEXT TO THE ARAB GROUP. THEY MENTALLY DEVELOPED A STRATEGY FOR DOING SO INCLUDING FOCUSSED FOR TODAY IN THEIR CONSULTATIONS IN THE ARAB GROUP BEGINNING WITH THE PLO, JORDAN AND SYRIA, ON THE NEED TO CHANGE THE ARAB CONCEPTUAL APPROACH AND STRIKE FOR A RESOLUTION IN DEALING WITH THIS SINGLE ISSUE.

6. SUBSEQUENTLY, WHEN THEY HAVE ACHIEVED THAT

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BT

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NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UN

SUBJECT: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES RESOLUTION

GOAL, THEY WILL SURFACE THE TEXT AS THEIR OWN.

THEY WOULD THEREFORE WISH TO HAVE THE RUNNING ROOM AND BREATHING SPACE TO MOVE THE TEXT AND ASKED US TO AVOID CIRCULATING ANY TEXT FURTHER HERE AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO ASK OUR COLLEAGUES IN WASHINGTON TO BE MOST DISCREET IN AVOIDING PASSING THE TEXT AROUND TO ANYONE OUTSIDE THE SMALL CIRCLE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DEALING WITH THE ISSUE.

7. THEY NEXT RAISED WHAT HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT THEME OF THEIRS THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS. THEY FELT THAT THEY COULD CLINCH THE DEAL WITH THE ARAB GROUP AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT, PERHAPS IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS, IF THEY COULD INDICATE THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF THIS TEXT. PICKERING NOTED THAT THE U.S. VIEW HAD NOT YET BEEN SHAPED ON THIS SUBJECT. THE ONLY INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD WERE TO AVOID A TEXT ON WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO VETO. HE FELT THAT THIS TEXT WAS IN THAT BALLPARK. BOTH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES INSISTED THAT THIS WOULD NOT GOOD ENOUGH FOR THEM

AND THAT THEY NEEDED TO HAVE A CLEAR INDICATION AS TO WHETHER WE WOULD ABSTAIN OR VOTE FOR SUCH A TEXT. THE DIFFERENCES WOULD BE ENORMOUS IN TERMS OF THEIR IMPACT ON THE ARAB GROUP. AS A RESULT OF THEIR LONG AND TRYING MEETING WITH THE ARAB GROUP YESTERDAY, THEY FELT THAT THIS WOULD BE THE FINAL PIECE NECESSARY TO BRING THEM ALONG WITH SUCH A TEXT AND THAT IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IN U.S. INTEREST TO AVOID EXTENDED HAGGLING OVER EXTRANEIOUS AND DIFFICULT ISSUES SUCH AS LEGALITY, SETTLEMENTS, ETC.

8. ON THE BASIS OF THEIR APPROACH, I AGREED TO PASS IT ALONG IMMEDIATELY TO THE DEPARTMENT. THEY BELIEVE THEY WILL NOT NEED A RESPONSE UNTIL AFTER NOON ON THURSDAY, MAY 10TH. IT APPEARS TO US HERE THAT THE PRESENT TEXT INCORPORATES THE ESSENCE OF OUR INSTRUCTIONS. WHILE IT IS NOT COMPLETELY PERFECT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, IT COMES CLOSER THAN ANY OF US WOULD HAVE IMAGINED WE COULD GET IN THE WEEKS PAST. THE ARABS ARE ANXIOUS TO MOVE TO MAKE A POLITICAL STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF MOVING IMMIGRANTS INTO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AS A RESULT, MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT I BE AUTHORIZED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME BEFORE THE CRITICAL ARAB MEETING, TO SIGNAL TO MY TWO NEGOTIATING COLLEAGUES THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THIS TEXT BY A POSITIVE VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL PROVIDED ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WAS CHANGED AND PROVIDED THAT THIS PARTICULAR INDICATION OF SUPPORT WOULD BE FOR A SHORT TIME DURATION ONLY IN ORDER TO AVOID THE ARABS MOVING ON TO SOME KIND OF ADDITIONAL ENDLESS HAGGLE OVER THE QUESTION.

9. BEGIN TEXT:

PROPOSED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION:

- THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
- HAVING CONSIDERED THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM,
- RECALLING RESOLUTIONS 242 (1967) OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967 AND 338 (1973) OF 22 OCTOBER 1973,
- RECALLING ALSO RESOLUTIONS 237 (1967) OF 14 JUNE 1967, 465 (1980) OF 1 MARCH 1980, 478 (1980) OF 20 AUGUST 1980 AND OTHER RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS,
- AWARE OF THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL AND EXPRESSING CONCERN REGARDING RECENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS ABOUT SETTLING PARTS OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,
- 1. DEPLORES THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF ISRAEL TO SETTLE PARTS OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967,

INCLUDING JERUSALEM.

BT

#1305

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01305

NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UN

SUBJECT: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES RESOLUTION

- 2. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO CEASE ON AN URGENT BASIS THE SETTLING OF PARTS OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM.

- 3. ALSO CALLS UPON ALL STATES NOT TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH ANY ASSISTANCE TO BE USED SPECIFICALLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE SETTLEMENT OF PARTS OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

- 4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CLOSE REVIEW AND TO REPORT AS APPROPRIATE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

- 5. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, UNDER REVIEW.

END TEXT.

10. FOR S/S: WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR LIMITING DISTRIBUTION OF THIS CABLE TO IO, NEA, L, S/P, AND NSC STAFF ONLY FOR REASONS INDICATED IN TEXT ABOVE. PICKERING

BT

#1305

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 03

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1305

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SECTION: 02 OF 03

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SECTION: 03 OF 03

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CHRON FILE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

5-23 10 4079

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1990 MAY 22 PM 9 51

May 22, 1990

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt

DATE: May 23, 1990

PURPOSE: To discuss Arafat visa request.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open

INTERPRETER: None

PHONE NUMBER: To be determined

CONTACT PERSON: To be determined

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIMES: To be determined

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Arafat visa request.
2. Baghdad Summit.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Press Statement

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0370142
E8 7110115

POINTS FOR MAY 23 PHONE CALL TO MUBARAK

--Hosni, it is good to hear your voice. I understand from Jim Baker that the two of you had a good talk in Moscow last week.

--As I expect you know from Jim's conversation with Abdel Meguid, and from the statement we issued here yesterday, I am concerned about the increase in violence in Israel and the territories. I am also worried about this long break in the peace process.

--I am somewhat relieved that Arafat has chosen not to come to New York. His coming would only play into the hands of those Israelis who are looking for excuses not to move on peace. A point might come when Arafat's visiting here would help, but not now.

--Given the cost and the chance for unhelpful rhetoric, I must confess to having some misgivings about Geneva as well. But we will not pose a formal objection to a session there.

--Otherwise, and in a similar vein, I would appreciate anything you could do to keep things calm and moderate when you and your colleagues meet in Baghdad. Words count for a lot in the Middle East, and the last thing we all need are any more complications.

--In particular, I hope that any criticism of Soviet Jewish immigration carefully distinguishes between people going to Israel and those settling in the occupied territories. I also hope you can make clear that the United States is opening its doors to unprecedented numbers of Soviet citizens, up from just 20,000 two years ago to 70,000 this year.

--I also hope that the Arab summit does not come out against what you and we have been trying to do on the peace process. We face enough challenges as it is.

--Best of luck with it. I would appreciate Abdel Meguid keeping Jim Baker informed as things proceed.

IF RAISED:

--We would not object to UN Undersecretary General Marrick Goulding visiting the occupied territories and reporting back.

--And as Jim Baker mentioned to you when you met, we are prepared to vote "Yes" on a simple, clean Security Council resolution that deplores Israeli settlement activities in the territories occupied in 1967. We would even be prepared to table our own text along these lines given my personal concern over this issue.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 22, 1990

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The President wishes to extend his sympathies to the families of the Palestinian workers who lost their lives in the tragic killings in Israel on Sunday, May 20. The President is also deeply troubled by the violent aftermath to these deaths. Besides expressing condolences to the families of all those who have lost their lives amidst the subsequent violence, the President calls upon the Israeli security forces as well as others to act with maximum restraint. Additional bloodshed and loss of life will only compound the tragedy.

It is not enough, however, to deplore what has happened and to call for restraint. It is essential to address the political issues that lie at the core of the region's strife. Based on experience, we believe that violence in the Middle East will continue and possibly grow so long as there is an absence of a promising peace process that nourishes hope among Israelis and Palestinians alike.

The United States remains committed to promoting such a political process. We believe that the initiative of the Government of Israel, which the United States has been trying to implement, offers the best path to a negotiating process that would protect Israel's security, further the legitimate political rights of Palestinians, and bring about a broader reconciliation between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbors. We look forward to the quick emergence of an Israeli government that is capable of making decisions on issues of peace and is committed just as we are to moving ahead on the peace process.

#

CONFIDENTIAL

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4079

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 22, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS *RH*
SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt

Secretary Baker spoke to Abdel Meguid, and all but promised him that the President would be phoning Mubarak soon. As you can see, the points reluctantly accept the notion of a special session in Geneva if Arafat holds off asking for a visa to come here. My own view remains that despite the heartburn and dollars this is a pretty good deal for us if we can get it.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Press Statement

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RECORD ID: 9004026
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TO: HAGIN, J


CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 24 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN
SP

AP



PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: MTG W/ KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN 2 OCT

ACTION: GATES SGD SP TO HAGIN DUE DATE: 24 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

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DOC 2 OF 2

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 24, 1990

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, Director, Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

REQUEST: Meeting and private dinner for King Hussein of Jordan.

PURPOSE: To strengthen U.S.-Jordanian ties and demonstrate close personal relations between the King and the President.

BACKGROUND: On April 23, the President invited King Hussein for a "quiet dinner" during his visit in October. King Hussein has requested a substantive meeting beforehand.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President last met with King Hussein in early 1989. He has spoken with him numerous times since, and met with his brother, Crown Prince Hasan.

DATE AND TIME: October 2, 1990.

LOCATION: The Oval Office and residence

PARTICIPATION: For meeting: see Tab A.
Dinner: The President, Mrs. Bush and General Scowcroft

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity and meeting, followed by private dinner

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: State, NSC Staff

OPPOSED BY: None

Attachment
Tab A List of Participants

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates,
 Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security
 Affairs
John H. Kelly,
 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
 South Asian Affairs
C. David Welch,
 Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs

Jordan

King Hussein I

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 21, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH 

SUBJECT: Meeting and Supper for King Hussein

When the President called King Hussein in late April, he invited the King to a "quiet supper" during his October 2 visit to Washington. King Hussein has accepted the invitation to dinner, but would also like an office meeting beforehand.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached schedule proposal for an office meeting with King Hussein, followed by a private dinner.

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal

Tab A List of Participants

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4224
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CHRON FILE

May 25, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Q's and A's on Peace Process Issues for "This Week
with David Brinkley"

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Israeli Themes

Israeli public diplomacy in recent days has had four themes,
which we expect Shamir to echo:

- There is no connection between the act of a crazed person and the peace process. The Arabs and the PLO are exploiting this tragedy and inciting further violence, which Israel is doing its best to calm with a minimum of casualties.
- Israel opposes U.N. involvement of any sort in the situation in the Occupied Territories. The United Nations is historically anti-Israeli, so how can it be expected to play a balanced role?
- The major obstacle to the peace process is the refusal of the Arab states to accept Israel, recognize its right to exist, and enter direct negotiations. This is obvious from their opposition to Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel.
- Arafat's speech reveals the outrageous nature of PLO demands, contains gross characterizations of Israel, and calls for more violence in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Shamir's presentation will undoubtedly benefit from the ambitious demands in Arafat's Geneva speech (Tab I).

Your Themes

You may want to respond to some of what Shamir says, and of course the panel will direct the questioning, but in the back of your mind should be the following themes to leave with the audience:

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- A working peace process is an urgent necessity or the violence will continue. People must have hope.
- We have worked closely with Israel to implement Israel's peace initiative. It was born and raised in complete partnership.
- We were close to a real breakthrough, to finding a Palestinian partner for Israel, but Israel's National Unity Government collapsed when it was unable to move forward on Secretary Baker's proposals for implementing the Israeli plan.
- Our approach would have given Israel a Palestinian partner for peace negotiations. For 23 years Israel has unsuccessfully sought such a partner, but we came close. Moreover, we were not bringing in the PLO through the back door.
- We are not blaming Israel for the acts of an apparently sick person. What happened afterward in the Occupied Territories, i.e., the confrontation between the Israeli army and Palestinians, shows clearly that the situation, in the absence of a working peace process, is highly volatile and very dangerous.
- Arafat's speech is important as much for what it did not say, as what it did say. Its tone and substance was disappointing and dull. Instead of sending a message of peace and reconciliation, the speech was bitter and recriminatory. An opportunity to build for peace was missed. As far as its key points are concerned -- permanent U.N. envoy; an "emergency force" in the Occupied Territories; UNSC settlements resolution; Permreps meeting leading to international conference; and sanctions -- we will wait to see what happens in the Security Council, but generally we have major problems with these.
- In terms of a U.N. role, there are lots of ideas, some good and some bad. Put it in perspective: The United Nations has historically had an important and positive role in this conflict, e.g., U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338 and various peacekeeping missions (UNTSO, Sinai, Golan, and South Lebanon). Israel accepted these U.N. efforts; so did we.
- If it comes up, we are prepared to discuss the dispatch of a U.N. observer to check out the situation and report back. We are opposed to any permanent redeployment of U.N. observers or forces into the Occupied Territories in the absence of a broader political settlement. After all, U.N. forces only work when all the parties agree; Israel currently would not support a U.N. role.

Q: What did he

Questions and Answers:

A: We are

Q: Is the Administration pressuring Israel?

A: No, the contrary is the case. Israel is a close friend. We were asked to help implement Israel's peace initiative. We took it very far, despite a lot of international and Arab skepticism and desire for an international conference that we believed to be premature. We turned everyone around, so that the focus was on a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue on elections leading to negotiations. But things stopped when the Israeli government could not say "yes" to Jim Baker's points on how to move Israel's initiative to fruition.

Q: But why should Israel go along with your dialogue with the PLO? Doesn't the dialogue subvert any chance of getting moderate Palestinians to come forth from the Territories?

A: Look -- be realistic. No Palestinian will move in the peace process if the PLO opposes it. For 23 years, Israel has searched for a partner for peace and has not found one. We simply don't see any Palestinians in the territories who are prepared to come forward alone; in fact, they say the PLO is their representative. Israel said it would not talk to the PLO. We accepted that, and we believe we had a way to achieve a dialogue with a Palestinian partner **without** the PLO. But Israel could not move and the government collapsed. Once we get another government, we will try again.

Q: Why haven't you focussed on the Arabs, instead of the Palestinians?

A: We want to focus on both. It was our judgment, and Israel concurred, that we should place priority first on getting a Palestinian partner. The best way to move forward now is for an Israeli government to emerge that can say "yes" to Israel's initiative.

Q: Aren't you whitewashing the PLO's involvement in terror?

A: We believe that the PLO has met its commitment of December 1988 to renounce terrorism. There have been some questions, but our judgment, based on our assessment of all the evidence we have collected as well as that brought to our attention, is that the PLO has complied with its commitment. This is a complex problem to dissect, and the PLO is not a tightly run organization, but we are confident in the judgment we have made.

Q: What did Baker mean by a U.N. observer team?

A: We are prepared to **discuss** a U.N. observer team going to the territories to check the situation, **if that comes up**. Such a mission has occurred in the past (Goulding, January 1988). We are not prepared at this time to agree to permanent stationing of U.N. observers or forces in the territories. That would require broader political agreement from all the parties and we do not have that.

Q: What will the U.S. do if the new Israeli government refuses to say "yes" to the "Baker plan?"

A: We hope that it will say "yes." In our view the risks of doing so are much less than the risks and costs of drift. But if Israel says "no", we will have to consider how we can best promote alternative paths to peace.

Q: What is U.S. policy regarding Soviet Jews?

A: We are pleased with the expanded Soviet Jewish emigration -- indeed, we helped bring it about. We are taking in more Soviet Jews ourselves -- some 70,000 this year alone -- at the same time we support their going to Israel. We do not, however, support settling Soviet Jews (or any Israelis) in the territories occupied in 1967.

Q: Do you include Jerusalem here?

A: Yes.

Q: Arafat, noting the apparently successful use of sanctions versus South Africa, called for sanctions against Israel. Why wouldn't the U.S. go along with sanctions given our disagreements with Israel over settlements?

A: One can argue whether positive change in South Africa is coming because of sanctions or, in my view, in spite of them. But more to the point, it is my belief that sanctions against Israel would not be called for given our fundamental support for Israel and the fact that Israel still faces real threats to its security.

Attachments

- Tab I Arafat Speech in Geneva
- Tab II White House Press Statement, May 22, 1990
- Tab III Israeli Press Statement, May 23, 1990
- Tab IV Excerpt from Baker Press Briefing, May 23, 1990
- Tab V Kelly Testimony, May 24, 1990
- Tab VI Baker's Five Points
- Tab VII Israeli Peace Plan, May 14, 1989
- Tab VIII White House Press Statement, May 3, 1990
- Tab IX Secretary General Goulding Missions

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 30, 1990

CHRON FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *Bj fw*

SUBJECT: Reply to Crown Prince El Hassan Bin Talal
of Jordan

Attached at Tab A is a reply to a letter and position paper on the Middle East peace process from Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan (Tab B). Hassan's position paper lists Jordan's concerns about several issues in the Middle East and offers suggestions to expedite the peace process. Our reply acknowledges Prince Hassan's letter and position paper without going into substantive differences between his paper and U.S. policy.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Letter to Crown Prince Hassan
Tab B Letter and Position Paper from
Crown Prince Hassan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Your Royal Highness:

Thank you for your letter and thoughtful position paper of April 22. In it you have detailed with great clarity and eloquence your ideas about how to peacefully resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

I share your hopes that a peaceful resolution can be achieved and that all in the region will soon live in peace and security with their neighbors. Unfortunate recent events have proven that all need to rededicate themselves to the peace process. May I assure you that President Bush and his Administration are fully committed to assisting the parties in the Middle East toward attainment of a just and durable peace.

Sincerely,

John H. Sununu

His Royal Highness
El Hassan Bin Talal
Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan
Amman

~~138615~~
Guidance



EL HASSAN BIN TALAL
THE ROYAL PALACE
AMMAN JORDAN

22 April 1990

Dear Governor Sununu,

In order to express my continuing concerns about the number of troubling issues in the Middle East I am attaching a paper to which I invite your attention.

As you know I occasionally produce a position paper - with which you may choose to disagree. My purpose is solely to offer a perspective from the region and would, of course, welcome any comments and observations you may wish to make.

I look forward to hearing from you in due course.

With my best wishes and warm personal regards,

Yours truly,

El Hassan Bin Talal

The Honorable John Sununu,
White House Chief of Staff.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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05b. Summary	Re: Executive Summary (12 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
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Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (May 1990)

Date Closed:	5/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91142-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 07, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: HIS ROYAL HIGH. HASSAN BIN TALAL

SUBJECT: FORWARDS A POSITION PAPER REGARDING TROUBLING
ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
JOHN SUNUNU		ORG	90/05/07		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
<i>Bill Sittmann</i>		<i>D</i>	<i>90/05/11</i>		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
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*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	* CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
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LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: May 11, 1990

TO: BILL SITTMANN

FROM: GOVERNOR JOHN H. SUNUNU

Please have your office draft a
short acknowledgement for my
signature.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 24, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM:

C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT:

Reply for Governor Sununu to Crown Prince El
Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for Governor Sununu that forwards a reply (Tab A) to a letter and position paper on the Middle East (Tab B) from Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Governor Sununu.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to Governor Sununu
Tab A	Proposed Letter to Crown Prince Hassan
Tab B	Letter and Position Paper from Crown Prince Hassan

Reply for Sununu
Prince Hassan of Jordan

National Security Council
The White House

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Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>	<u>5/30 AC</u>	<u>AD</u>
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Gov SUNUNU Reply to Crown
Prime HASSAN B Jodax

National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Gates	<u>2</u>		
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West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>275/25</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat			
<u>Welch</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>For Redo</u>

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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WELCH

DISPOSITION

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N = No further Action

Other _____

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(Date/Time)

Staff urgently
to Welch
Due: May 14