Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91142
Folder ID Number: 91142-002

Folder Title:
Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Presidential Message to King Hussein (1 pp.)	8/5/89	(b)(1)	C
01b. Draft Letter	President Bush to King Hussein I (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to King Hussein (1 pp.)	8/5/89	(b)(1)	C
01d. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to King Hussein from the President (1 pp.)	8/4/89	(b)(1)	C
01e. Draft Letter	President Bush to King Hussein I (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
01f. Cable	White House Situation Room to Charles Re: Presidential Letter to King Fahd on Jordan (2 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S
02. Letter	President Nixon to President Bush (5 pp.)	8/8/89	(b)(1)	
03. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft and Robert M. Gates Re: Visit to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan -- The Atmosphere of the Peace Process (4 pp.)	8/11/89	(b)(1)	S
04a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Proposed Response to Prime Minister Thatcher (1 pp.)	8/14/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1181
OA/ID Number: 91142-002
Date Closed: 5/19/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Draft Cable	From the White House to the Cabinet Office Re: Message for Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Cable	Cabinet Office London to White House Re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States (2 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	S
04d. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: President's Response to PM [Prime Minster] Thatcher (1 pp.)	8/10/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (1 pp.)	8/14/89	(b)(1)	
05b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Response to Prime Minister Shamir (1 pp.)	8/14/89	(b)(1)	S
05c. Cable	American Embassy Tel Aviv to Secretary of State Washington DC Re: Prime Minister's August 9 Letter to President Bush (2 pp.)	8/9/89	(b)(1)	S
05d. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: President's Response to PM [Prime Minister] Shamir (1 pp.)	8/11/89	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Middle East Peace Process: Coping with the Impasse (4 pp.)	9/7/89	(b)(1)	S
06b. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Middle East Peace Process (1 pp.)	8/25/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

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Date Closed: 5/19/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Friday, September 8, 2:30 p.m. - 3:00 p.m. (2 pp.)	9/7/89	(b)(1)	S
08a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan (2 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(1)	S
08b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
08c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
08d. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: President's Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan, September 12, 1989, 3:00 p.m. - 3:15 p.m. (1 pp.)	9/7/89	(b)(1)	S
08e. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	8/16/89	(b)(1)	S
08f. Memo	C. David Welch to G. Philip Hughes Re: Memorandum of Conversation with Crown Prince Hassan (1 pp.)	9/18/89	(b)(1)	C
08g. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	C
09. Memo	C. David Welch to Robert Gates Re: Your Meeting with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Wednesday, September 13, 1989 (2 pp.)	9/13/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1181
OA/ID Number: 91142-002
Date Closed: 5/19/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10a. Outline	Re: Meeting with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	9/30/89	(b)(1)	S
10b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for One on One Meeting with President Mubarak (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10e. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10f. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	1/3/89	(b)(1)	S
10g. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Briefing Memo for the President's Meeting with Egyptian President Mubarak (1 pp.)	9/28/89	(b)(1)	S
11a. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Briefing Memo for the President's Meeting with Egyptian President Mubarak (1 pp.)	9/28/89	(b)(1)	S
11b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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WHORM Cat.:
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Re-review Case #:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for One on One Meeting with President Mubarak (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11e. Outline	Re: Meeting with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	9/30/89	(b)(1)	S
11f. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11g. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	1/3/89	(b)(1)	S
12a. Profile Sheet	Welch and Haass to Hughes Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	9/26/89	(b)(1)	S
12b. Memo	C. David Welch to G. Philip Hughes Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	10/2/89	(b)(1)	S
12c. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12d. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (3 pp.)	9/27/89	(b)(1)	S
13a. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Phone Call to Shamir (1 pp.)	10/2/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1181
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Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
13b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
13c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Shamir (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
14. Message	Re: Text of A Message Dated 2 October 1989 from the Prime Minister to the President (1 pp.)	10/2/89	(b)(1)	S
15a. Memo	Richard N. Haass to G. Philip Hughes Re: Memorandum of Conversation for Meeting with the President and President Mubarak of Eygpt Monday, October 2, 1989 (1 pp.)	10/3/89	(b)(1)	S
15b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Mubarak of Egypt (5 pp.)	10/2/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1181
OA/ID Number: 91142-002
Date Closed: 5/19/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8905731
RECEIVED: 21 JUL 89 10

TO: DOLE, ROBERT J
MITCHELL, GEORGE L

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 20 JUL 89
SOURCE REF:

1

KEYWORDS: PLO CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTRS TO SENATORS FM PRES RE HELMS AMENDMENT TO STATE AUTHORIZATION BILL

ACTION: PRES SGD LTRS DUE DATE: 25 JUL 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHARLES
		EBNER
		GATES
		HAASS
		HUGHES
		LAMPLEY
		RODMAN
		SCOWCROFT
		SITTMANN
		WELCH
		WORKING

COMMENTS: LTRS HAND CARRIED TO HILL BY MCCLURE

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC CLOSED BY: NSMDC DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	89072110	PRES SGD LTRS

In addition, this amendment, if it were to become law, would constitute a substantial constraint on my ability to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. It is as a result wholly inconsistent with the Constitution, and would be an unwarranted and unacceptable intrusion by the legislative branch on the powers and responsibilities of the presidency.

I ask you to use your influence to see that this amendment is defeated. Its defeat is in the interests of all those who genuinely wish to contribute to Middle East peace.

Sincerely,

George Bush

The Honorable George J. Mitchell
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1989

Dear Senator Dole:

I am writing to you now to register my strong opposition to an amendment being offered by Senator Helms to the State Department Authorization bill. As you know, this amendment would under certain circumstances prohibit the use of public funds for negotiations between the United States and representatives of the PLO.

My Administration is actively committed to advancing the Middle East Peace process. In May, the Israeli government adopted a serious proposal for elections and negotiations. The Administration wholeheartedly endorsed that proposal and has sought to bring about a positive Palestinian and Arab response. Indeed, the Government of Israel asked for our assistance in eliciting a positive Arab response.

What warrants my writing to you now is my strong view--one shared by the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor--that this amendment would interfere significantly with, if not destroy, the ability of the United States to promote a viable peace process in the Middle East. After six months of careful preparation, we have arrived at a sensitive but promising diplomatic juncture. This is no time to take away from the executive a key tool of our diplomacy. Should this amendment become law, U.S. influence would be diminished and the prospects for peace significantly and possibly decisively undermined. The big losers would be Israel and ourselves. I am sure that you and your colleagues would not want to assume such a responsibility.

In addition, this amendment, if it were to become law, would constitute a substantial constraint on my ability to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. It is as a result wholly inconsistent with the Constitution, and would be an unwarranted and unacceptable intrusion by the legislative branch on the powers and responsibilities of the presidency.

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Sincerely,

George Bush

The Honorable Robert J. Dole
Minority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Sincerely,

George Bush

The Honorable George J. Mitchell
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8906134
RECEIVED: 04 AUG 89 13

CHRON FILE

TO: HUSSEIN I

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 05 AUG 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDON

1

PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO KING HUSSEIN

ACTION: PRES APPROVED / TO SEND CABLE DUE DATE: 08 AUG 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHARLES
		HAASS

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/19/2009

COMMENTS: NO HARD CY LTR TO FOLLOW

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC CLOSED BY: NSMDC DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 8906134

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	89080415	FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
002		X	89080709	HUGHES SGD MEMO
003		X	89080709	PRES APPROVED / TO SEND CABLE

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/19/2009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 6134

Date 5 AUG 89

Subject: PRES MSG TO KING HUSSEIN

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☒ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	#CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed for By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec. sec/Room 7241	ORIGINAL			
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION % ACDA, 5933 State				
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DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, VA				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg.				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W., Room 800				
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 18th & E. Street N.W., Room 6151				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th S.W., Room 200A				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg. 17 & F St. NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 1500 C Street, Room 828				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), Room 4125 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
THE SECRETARY OF HHS 200 Independence Avenue, NW, Room 615F				
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 451 7th Street SW, Room 10000				
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Room 4181				

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
~~E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006~~
By Cap NARA, Date 5/11/2009

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: WEST WING DESK, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE NO. 1047 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES _____ _____

(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES MSG TO KING HUSSEIN

LOG # 6134

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	MR. J. STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	

REMARKS: *FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING ***

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By GQ NARA, Date 5/11/2009

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

URGENT C

MESSAGE NO. 1047 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 2

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES GH.
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES MSG TO KING HUSSEIN

LOG # 6134

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	MR. J. STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	

REMARKS **FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING ***

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/19/2009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6134

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 5, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to King Hussein

Attached for dispatch via cable is the text of a Presidential message to King Hussein congratulating the King on the additional financial support Jordan has received from Saudi Arabia. There will be no signed original. (C)

George V. Grimes for
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Presidential Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0349-MR
MM 4/14/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Your Majesty:

I was delighted to hear that our good friend King Fahd has agreed to provide additional financial assistance to help Jordan's economy. Recalling our discussions, I recently shared my concerns with him and found that he was most understanding and sympathetic. He said he intended to do what he could to help out because of the friendship he has for you; therefore, I was pleased to hear that he had done so. I also understand that he also will be contacting some other countries, particularly those in the Gulf, to urge them to be responsive to your needs.

For our part, we are continuing to seek additional funding as you and I discussed, and are working with Congress to ensure that we obtain the levels of aid we requested for Jordan in fiscal year 1990.

In closing, let me thank you for your support on the current hostage situation. We are hopeful that our intensive diplomatic efforts will help bring this terrible situation to a peaceful end. Your Majesty, the American people and I would greatly appreciate anything you might be able to do in this regard.

Barbara and I send our warmest regards to you and Queen Noor.

Sincerely,

George Bush

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0349-MR
MM 4/14/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6134

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to King Hussein

Purpose

To congratulate the King on the additional financial support Jordan has received from Saudi Arabia.

Background

As you and I discussed, we have prepared a letter to King Hussein from you (Tab A) welcoming the news of King Fahd's decision to provide additional financial assistance to Jordan's economy (Tab B). The letter also mentions the conversation you had earlier this week with King Fahd so that King Hussein is aware of your personal intervention in this matter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to King Hussein at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to King Hussein
Tab B Message from Jeddah

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0349-MR
MM 4/14/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6134

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 4, 1989

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Letter to King Hussein from the President

In response to our earlier demarche to King Fahd (delivered this spring by Prince Bandar) and the President's phone call and letter this week to King Fahd, the Saudis have agreed to provide $200 million in economic assistance to Jordan, and to solicit additional funding for Jordan from the wealthy Gulf states. (We are not sure of the precise sequence, but it appears the Saudis decided after the phone call on Wednesday but before the letter was actually delivered.) Attached at Tab I is a proposed letter to King Hussein from the President welcoming this news (Tab A). Tab B contains background information.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to King Hussein
Tab B Message from Jeddah

Just arrived from State to P's cable text to Amman & letter to King for ASAP delivery. Doesn't need to go to the President per BS. S.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0349-MR
MM 4/14/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Your Majesty:

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For our part, we are continuing to seek additional funding as you and I discussed, and are working with Congress to ensure that we obtain the levels of aid we requested for Jordan in fiscal year 1990.

In closing, let me thank you for your support on the current hostage situation. We are hopeful that our intensive diplomatic efforts will help bring this terrible situation to a peaceful end. Your Majesty, the American people and I would greatly appreciate anything you might be able to do in this regard.

Barbara and I send our warmest regards to you and Queen Noor.

Sincerely,

His Majesty
Hussein I
King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Amman

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3-Aug-198.

—

MEMORANDUM FOR:
CHARLES

FROM: VMS MAIL user WHSR
(WHSR@VAXE@)

SUBJECT:

Received: From VAXE(WHSR) by VAXC with Jnet id 9096
for CHARLES@VAXC; Thu, 3 Aug 89 16:02 EDT
Date: Thu, 3-AUG-1989 16:00 EST
From: <WHSR@VAXE>
To: CHARLES@VAXC

<DIST>
SIT: BENKO CHARLES HAASS DORMINEY RODMAN VAX BRANSCUM WELCH

<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
~~SECRET~~
<OSRI>
RUEHJI
<DTG>
031437Z AUG 89

<ORIG>
FM AMCONSUL JEDDAH

<TO>
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6782

<SUBJ>
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO KING FAHD ON JORDAN

<TEXT>
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ JEDDAH 01519
NODIS
FROM CHARGE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: EAID, PREL, SA, JO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO KING FAHD ON JORDAN
REF: STATE 246209
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0349-MR
MM 4/14/2016

~BEGIN SUMMARY~
2. SUMMARY. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD ON AUGUST 3. SAUD CONFIRMED THAT THE SAUDIS AGREED TO PROVIDE 200 MILLION DOLLARS IN IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE DURING KING HUSSEIN'S JUST CONCLUDED VISIT TO JEDDAH. SAUD ECHOED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN JORDAN, URGED US TO DO EVEN MORE AND SAID THE SAG WILL BE CONTACTING OTHER GULF COUNTRIES TO URGE THEM TO HELP AS WELL. END SUMMARY.
~END SUMMARY~
3. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD AT HIS PALACE IN JEDDAH ON AUGUST 3. I PRESENTED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND MADE THE ADDITIONAL POINTS IN REFTEL. SAUD WAS AWARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATION WITH KING FAHD ON THIS SUBJECT. HE SAID THAT KING FAHD HAD UNDERTAKEN TO PROVIDE 200 MILLION DOLLARS IN IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO PROP UP THE DECLINING JORDANIAN DINAR. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT JORDAN WILL NEED EVEN MORE FUNDS. HE SAID THE MAJOR PROBLEM IS THE THREEFOLD DECLINE IN THE DINAR AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ORDINARY JORDANIAN'S STANDARD OF LIVING. HE SAID THE PROBLEM IS NOT A CHRONIC ONE LIKE THAT OF EGYPT OR BANGLADESH. A QUICK AND SUBSTANTIAL INFLOW OF FUNDS COULD BRING ABOUT A REAL CHANGE IN JORDAN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION.
4. HE CRITICIZED THE ISRAELIS AS DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO DESTABILIZE JORDAN THROUGH THE ECONOMIC MEASURES THEY ARE TAKING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE GOI APPARENTLY BELIEVES IT IS THE JORDANIAN DINAR WHICH IS FINANCING THE INTIFADA, HE SAID.
5. SAUD ALSO CRITICIZED U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN. HE SAID WE ARE PROVIDING THE SAME AMOUNT AS LAST YEAR AND HE ASSERTED THAT WE PROVIDED LESS ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN LAST YEAR THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE LAST SIX OR SEVEN YEARS. I SAID I DID NOT HAVE THE FACTS AT HAND BUT I DID NOT BELIEVE THIS TO BE TRUE. I CITED THE BUDGETARY AND CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES WHICH LIMIT OUR ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN.
6. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, SAUD ASSURED ME THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE CONTACTING OTHER COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE GULF COUNTRIES, TO URGE THEM TO INCREASE ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN.
7. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO AMMAN, KUWAIT AND RIYADH. FRERES
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SECT>
ECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN>
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8910436
RECEIVED: 29 DEC 89 13

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: NIXON, RICHARD M

DOC DATE: 08 AUG 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST ISRAEL

1

PERSONS: SHARON, ARIEL ARAFAT, YASSIR

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RE NIXON SOLUTIONS TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 02 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHARLES
		HAASS
		HAYDEN
		RODMAN
		ROSTOW
		WELCH
		WORKING

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAMM CLOSED BY: NSAMM DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

10436

RICHARD NIXON

NSA Has Seen

August 8, 1989

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

8-8-'89

Dear George,

The flap with Israel over the Higgins hostage incident once again illustrates the urgent need to develop new initiatives to deal with the Israeli-Arab conflict which has plagued U.S. foreign policy for forty years. In passing along some thoughts for your consideration, I hope you will not consider it presumptuous if I do so in my usual outline form.

A new Bush initiative is in America's interest.

In 1956, 1958, 1967, and 1973 Mideast crises brought the United States to the brink of war. The Mideast has the greatest potential of any area in the world of a conflict which could escalate into nuclear war. Almost forty percent of U.S. foreign aid which is supposed to help the four billion people in the third world goes to the two million who live in Israel. While, like me, you have always supported aid for Israel, this distortion in U.S. policy cannot and should not be tolerated. The Arab-Israeli conflict poisons our relations with strategically important nations in the Mideast and the Persian Gulf which were it not for that conflict would be staunch friends and allies of the United States.

A new initiative is in Israel's interest.

The head-in-the-sand Masada complex of Israel's extreme partisans both there and in the United States may be good short-term politics. It is disasterous long-term policy. Israel has won five wars since 1949. It will win the next war. But inevitably Israel will lose militarily because Arabs can learn to fight, as demonstrated by the fact that Israel's losses have increased in each war, and demographically because the exploding Arab population will overwhelm the Jewish population. Israel will inevitably become even more than now a tiny garrison island-state in a sea of implacable enemies.

As early as 1963, de Gaulle told me that the United States should "recognize China now when she is weak rather than later when China's strength forces you to do so." Israel is exactly in that position today. Time is running out for Israel to make a deal which would be in its interests. Divisions within Israel growing out of Sharon's escapade in Lebanon and the brutal repression in the occupied territories will eventually tear it apart. Israel's leaders have assumed that they will always have the support of the United States because of the political stroke they have been able to use so effectively against those like Percy and Finley who dared to oppose their policies. They can no longer assume that this will be the case. A recent ABC poll found that in April, by a margin of 50 to 30, Americans considered Israel to be a good ally. Now those numbers are completely reversed with only 28% replying that Israel is a good ally and 51% replying that it is not.

New positive developments in the Mideast.

While no one should ever be overly optimistic about resolving conflicts in the Mideast, there are three new factors which provide at least some hope. 1) There are good reasons why Israeli leaders should not trust Arafat. But his recognition of Israel's right to exist is light years away from his previous extreme PLO position. 2) While the hardliners still command the majority, there is growing and very substantial support for a land for peace policy in Israel. 3) Most significant is that the Soviet Union, which has always played a spoiler role in the Mideast, particularly in 1956 and again in 1973, will not play that kind of role against the next U.S. initiative because Gorbachev's first priority is better relations with the U.S. That will take precedence over whatever temptations he might have to cause us trouble in the Mideast.

The politics of the issue.

In the past, Presidents have hesitated to adopt an even-handed policy in the Mideast because of their fear of the political power of Israel's extreme supporters in the U.S. You are the first President since the end of World War II who politically can afford to adopt a policy which is in the U.S.'s interest and in Israel's interest, even though it will inevitably be opposed by Israel's more extreme supporters. Because you won by a landslide, you owe your election to no special interest group whatever. Because of your high popularity, you can afford to spend some of your approval rating in the event that Israel's extreme partisans in the U.S. take you on frontally. As I have pointed out, due to recent developments, the sentiment for an extreme pro-Israeli position in the U.S. has substantially eroded. I know you will do what you believe is in the interest of the United States in any event. I am simply observing that when some of your political operatives moan and groan about columns in the Times and Post taking you on and urging you to go along with the extreme pro-Israeli position, you can now afford to overrule them because of your uniquely strong political position.

What U.S. policy should be.

Everyone, understandably, will have different recommendations on this point. But I would suggest the following: 1) Secure borders for Israel. This will require that Israel give up most of the Palestinian territories it currently occupies. 2) Self-government for the Palestinians -- not self-determination. 3) No armed Palestinian state. 4) Vatican status for the holy sites in Jerusalem.

How to achieve these goals.

1) The Baker plan is an excellent start. It is nauseating that Baker has been criticized for being too even-handed. After all, there can be no

settlement of any issue unless it is fair to both sides. 2) The international conference idea is a non-starter. Israel cannot be expected to submit its fate to a stacked jury. 3) The bottom line is that there will be no settlement in the Mideast if we continue to go along with the idea that the parties must negotiate one between themselves. They will never do it. The United States must broker a settlement and then impose it. This means that we will have no choice but to squeeze Israel, as well as its neighbors, once we believe that a settlement is in Israel's interest, our interest, and the interest of peace in the area.

Some way-out ideas.

1) Jim Baker should not follow the example of George Shultz in making highly publicized junkets to the Mideast. What is needed is a heavyweight negotiator representing the President and reporting to the President and to the Secretary of State. Give him two years to come up with an agreement which would be finally consummated by the President. I would not presume to suggest a candidate. I would recommend, however, that you, Jim Baker, and Brent Scowcroft should agree on the most qualified man in or out of government who could be given this portfolio. These goals cannot be accomplished by a career officer, whether he be from the foreign service or from the NSC. 2) While it will raise hell with your good friends in the American-Jewish community, you should authorize your representative to negotiate directly with Arafat. I don't know Arafat, but from what I hear of him I don't like him or trust him. It is possible that you cannot have peace with him. It is certain that you cannot have peace without him. Therefore, the time has come to bite the bullet and bring him into the play. I would do the same with Assad. Qaddafi is crazy. Assad is crazy like a fox. If enough is put on the table which serves his interest, he will deal.

My final suggestion will probably send all of the experts up the wall. But if it is necessary to enlist Israel's support, I believe you might consider a formal treaty of mutual defense with Israel. As you know, all of the talk in the media to the effect that Israel is our ally is off the mark. We have no treaty with Israel. Our obligations for its survival are moral, and not legal, which in my view makes them even stronger. On the other hand, if a legal obligation would make them feel better, I would have no hesitation in going down that road.

As I complete this letter, I almost hesitate to sign it and send it to you. Having gone through the Suez crisis during the Eisenhower Administration, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, I know how well-intentioned people from the outside simply have no idea whatever how difficult it is to find some solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But as I have pointed out, you have the best chance of any President since World War II to do so. Above all, bear in mind that the time is past when whatever Israel wants Israel gets. In the interests of Israel as well as our own interests, you should insist that the only way to assure the survival of Israel is for the U.S. to support an initiative which has some chance to bring peace to the world's most explosive area.

Whatever you decide, you can count on my support both privately and publicly whenever you consider it useful.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dick

The Honorable
George Bush

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8906337
RECEIVED: 11 AUG 89 09

TO: SCOWCROFT
GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 11 AUG 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
JORDAN
EGYPT

1

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: VISIT TO ISRAEL / EGYPT / JORDAN

ACTION: ORIGINAL RETURNED TO FILE DUE DATE: 15 AUG 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/19/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS CLOSED BY: NSBTM DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NSC Advisor has seen

August 11, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Visit to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan -- The Atmosphere of the Peace Process

We thought you and Bob would be interested in a few candid impressions of the atmosphere in Israel, Egypt and Jordan, based on a trip I made there last week with NEA Assistant Secretary John Kelly.

The most striking impression of Israel is how hermetic the society is. The average Israeli -- Jewish Joe Sixpack -- lives in the Tel Aviv area and struggles against high prices, spartan housing, and horrendous traffic. Jerusalem is a beloved symbol, but Joe rarely goes there because the Orthodox Jews have made the town boring. He would prefer to stroll in downtown Tel Aviv, with its rich cafe and night life. In Tel Aviv, it is tough to imagine that there is an intifada; you could be in a fairly large West European city. The truth is that Joe Sixpack doesn't know any Arabs. As far as Joe is concerned, anyone who ventures into "Judea and Samaria" is either in the Army or a nut. Nor do the Israelis go out of their way to show the Occupied Territories to visitors -- the closest we got to the uprising was a ten-year old's futile stone hurled at our helicopter hundreds of feet overhead.

Israel's senior-most political leadership is also in its own special world. There is little promise of statesmanship from Shamir, Peres and Rabin. Shamir was unimaginative and brooding in our meeting, so much so that his staff passed him a note to be more upbeat, causing an immediate switch to a grin and a paean about strategic cooperation. Peres sounded weak and looked like a fading star. Rabin looked best mostly because of his competition, or the lack of it. The younger generation of politicians seems resigned to await the passing of their elders. Genuine leadership that could yank Israel out of its profound indecision is just not there nor is it likely to be for the foreseeable future.

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MM 4/14/2016

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The West Bankers and Gazans we met did not encourage us either. They appeared profoundly certain that one day we will understand the righteousness of their cause; when we do, we will deliver Israel. They are reluctant to enter a dialogue on the Israeli peace intiative without a sense in advance of the outcome, in this case self-determination and Palestinian national rights, i.e. an independent state. Short of that, negotiations mean capitulation. Absolutely no one will move without a PLO green or amber light, but they seem to want that light; the elections idea by itself is not sufficient incentive for the Palestinians to go it alone without PLO assent. One reason the Palestinians do not see elections as a terrific opportunity is that their paternal, clan-oriented leadership system, already shaken by the intifada, might be undermined further by a free political choice.

The Egyptians were most positive, both about the potential for progress in a U.S.-backed effort and about the chances that the parties could be brought closer together. Mubarak was determined to use Egypt's reclaimed leadership role and was confident that he could help with the PLO. The Jordanians were more skeptical; they simply cannot overcome their mistrust of Shamir's motives. But they too were willing to press the PLO on staying within the bounds of its commitments to the United States for the dialogue, and may even urge PLO acquiescence to the dialogue leading to elections and negotiations process.

Some thoughts on substance. Shamir, though hesitant about recounting his meetings with Palestinians, acknowledged that they had emphasized self-determination and "what comes afterward." He hinted that they had also put primacy on the PLO. In effect, this was an admission by Shamir that his own terms will not sell, even with the Palestinians Shamir has convinced to meet him. Shamir and his cohort blamed the U.S.-PLO dialogue as the cause, despite the reality that in the last 22 years Israel has not succeeded in eliciting a Palestinian partner on its own. It's the fact, and not the substance, of the dialogue that bothers Shamir.

In contrast, Rabin set a realistic standard for the U.S.-PLO dialogue -- "Does it bring us closer to success in the peace process?" Rabin also stated bluntly that the PLO would need to approve any Israeli-Palestinian dialogue under present circumstances, in contrast to Shamir's view that the PLO needs to be cut completely out of the act for a dialogue to happen.

Shamir also raised anew the other three points (the Egypt-Israel relationship, expanding peace with other Arab states, and refugee housing) of the Israeli initiative, saying that surely some Arab nation must be out there "among the 22" that would recognize Israel. (He did not appear to realize that the 22 members of the Arab League include the PLO state!) Again, Rabin was realistic: he described the essence of the initiative as finding a Palestinian partner via elections, and the other three points as "motherhood, fatherhood, and brotherhood." Rabin said that no

Arab nation would move an inch toward Israel unless the Palestinians did so; therefore, the search for another Arab partner for Israel was futile unless Israel succeeded first with the Palestinians.

Egypt and Jordan, of course, concentrated on the PLO as the address for a Palestinian interlocutor. They were confident Arafat wants to maintain the U.S.-PLO dialogue and that he would prevail at this week's Fatah Congress. The Egyptians argued that if Israel could assure Palestinians that land for peace was still the deal to be had by the Israeli elections initiative, then the PLO could probably be persuaded. In any case, the Egyptians were prepared to push the effort with Arafat. King Hussein was more skeptical about Shamir's motives, and urged us not to let the process drag out.

Interestingly, the Egyptians did not push the international conference and Hussein did not mention it at all. Both intimated, however, that some sort of consultations among the Security Council Permanent Members could play a supportive role. Hussein reminded us that the Soviet peace process position was closer to Jordan's views than was that of the United States.

Other notable points from Mubarak and Hussein included a strongly anti-Syrian view of the current Lebanon debacle (but without much warmth for Aoun). The Jordanians, and to a lesser degree the Egyptians, were very worried about Iranian influence in Lebanon and deeply suspicious of Iran generally. (Rafsanjani's rise did not seem to assuage this concern.) The Israelis continued to be worried about Iraq's post-war strategic aims, citing joint recce flights in Jordan and arms for the Maronites as examples of Saddam Hussein's flexing.

Hussein was also troubled by Jordan's economic situation. He was grateful for a message from President Bush on Saudi Arabia's recent donation of $200 million, but chided us about a previous letter from the President that promised to keep assistance at the previous fiscal year's level: "Please tell the President last year (sic) was the worst ever for Jordan and the United States..."

I also found it interesting that Mubarak and Hussein both received Kelly -- and very graciously, too. Neither Arab leader was available to meet Dennis Ross in May. This was an unmistakable signal.

Finally, of our Ambassadors in these three posts, Frank Wisner stood out as the strongest. The other two -- Bill Brown in Tel Aviv and Rocky Suddarth in Amman -- did not brace their host government interlocutors as forcefully as I would have. In particular, I got the sense that the Likud spearchuckers around Shamir (Rubinstein, Ben Aharon, Arens, Netanyahu) rarely get much argument from our Ambassador.

Some of my colleagues came away from this trip believing that we have time to play out the elections idea and that the parties must be the ones to make the necessary moves so that the situation ripens. I don't agree on either count. Unless the United States undertakes a more active role to narrow the gaps on the elections proposal between the Palestinians, i.e., the PLO, and Israel, these gaps will not narrow of their own accord. What I would suggest is U.S. bridging proposals on key elements of the process, including guarantees for political activity, modalities of elections (including a way for East Jerusalem Palestinians to participate), and the interlock to follow-on negotiations on interim and final status.

This role would probably require a senior envoy to work the problem in the region, as well as carefully timed U.S. public statements laying out our views on the key issues. We would also need to consider what to offer the PLO for its "OK" to a dialogue, e.g., a visa for Arafat to the UNGA or an upgrade in the U.S.-PLO dialogue. Otherwise, no party will be persuaded of anything near to a reasonable middle ground. The pressure of American diplomacy is essential to create an opportunity. The alternative of continuing at our present pace puts the process -- such as it is -- at risk from distractions, including hostage crises, terrorism, domestic pressures, etc.

A more active posture would require testing PLO and Israeli sincerity and flexibility with U.S. ideas, and thus entail greater risk of rejection and failure. I would argue that this risk is acceptable at this stage of the Administration. Furthermore, a process in slow, terminal decline may carry with it the PLO dialogue, and that would be a setback for our diplomatic arsenal and for our longer term goals of maintaining a moderate trend in Palestinian politics. The bottom line -- now's the time to move; if we don't, then our memos around World Series time will be much more downbeat.

~~SECRET~~

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6321

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
8/14/89

CHRON FILE

August 14, 1989

1

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Prime Minister Thatcher

Purpose

To communicate our views on the Middle East peace process to Prime Minister Thatcher.

Background

Several days ago Margaret Thatcher sent you a message setting forth her views on quite a few issues pertaining to the Middle East peace process. Subsequent to her letter, you talked to her over the phone, mentioning in passing that we would be getting back with a considered response. We have prepared a fairly long message that covers each of the points that she raises.

The State Department concurs with this response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to PM Thatcher.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Proposed Message to PM Thatcher
Tab B Incoming Message from PM Thatcher

Prepared by:
Richard N. Haass

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0349-MR
MM 4/14/2016

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

From the White House to the Cabinet Office

Message for Prime Minister Thatcher from the President

Dear Margaret:

I am sorry that I did not respond sooner to your thoughtful message on the peace process, but as you can well understand my energies have been focused of late on the hostage situation. This remains one of the most frustrating problems I have ever encountered in this or any other job. You should know, though, that our telephone conversation was a real source of comfort for me.

Let me say too how considerate it was of you to phone Robin Higgins. She is going through what few of us will ever know; I know that your reaching out and expressing your and Dennis's feelings meant a great deal to her. We shall continue to do everything possible to locate and return Lt. Col. Higgins' remains to the United States; anything you might be able to do to help bring this about would be deeply appreciated.

Your letter on the Middle East raises a good many of the central questions, and I shall try to do them all justice. I could not agree more about the need for urgent action. We are pressing the Palestinians--both the PLO and those who live in the occupied territories--to engage the Israeli government plan. Here too your assistance would be a great help. Only once such a dialogue begins can we begin to push the parties to compromise and find an acceptable formula for elections and their aftermath.

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It remains to be seen whether the Israelis would ever accept a Palestinian delegation that includes non-residents; as you know, this raises the difficult issue for them of an unlimited right of return that in their eyes would threaten to overwhelm them. My own view is that we ought to try to get this negotiation going with as few preconditions as possible. There will be time enough down the road to tackle the tough issues. That said, it would be entirely legitimate for the Palestinians to raise this question.

For our part, we will continue our dialogue with the PLO (despite the domestic political costs of so doing) so long as the PLO does not go back on its commitments of last year. The question of a visa for Arafat has not yet come up, but I would not be surprised if it did before long. If and when it does we will give it careful consideration, realizing that it would be far easier for us to be forthcoming if there is something positive to point to in the peace process.

I continue to harbor some doubts about the utility of involving the United Nations and the Security Council in the process at this point, even if we are just talking about the five permanent members on an informal basis. The Israelis are sure to see it as an inherently unsympathetic grouping, while the Arab side will be prone to see the international angle as an alternative to dealing directly and seriously with the Israelis. At some point we may want to revisit this question as well as that of the international conference, but for now my instincts are to proceed along the lines we have already set out.

I am glad that you mentioned Lebanon. It is painfully clear that despite the best efforts of the group of three that the Arab League effort has come to nought. I am open to new thinking, be it along the lines of reviving this effort or turning to a new approach. I cannot simply accept the advice of those who say to stand aside; there is simply too much suffering and destruction. That said, I will confess to being wary of getting too involved without strong backing in hand from the international community and the Arabs alike.

Let me close by saying a few things about Jordan. King Fahd has provided $200 million to help the Jordanian economy, and now we have news that the Kuwaitis and others will make available some additional resources. We are also planning on giving some modest amount ourselves. All this will not get Hussein out of the woods, but it will help a good deal. In a region where good news is rare, I suppose we should be thankful.

Thank you again for writing. I would hope that you would not hesitate to communicate if you have additional ideas about any of these subjects. Your counsel is always greatly valued here.

With warm regards,

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT DONLEY GATES SCOWCROFT SIT HUGHES SITTMANN
SIT CHARLES HAASS HOTLINE_IN WELCH

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG: 291400Z JUL 89

FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS
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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
DEAR GEORGE,

I WAS GLAD THAT WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS ARAB/ISRAEL MATTERS WHEN WE MET IN PARIS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW TO MAKE PROGRESS. AND I CERTAINLY SHARE SOME OF YOUR CONCERNS, NOTABLY ABOUT THE RISK THAT AN INCREASINGLY ISOLATED ISRAEL MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO STRIKE OUT, CAUSING ACUTE DANGER FOR ALL OF US. SHARONS RECENT REMARKS ABOUT ELIMINATING ARAFAT WERE A DISGRACE.

MY MAIN CONCERN IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT LET THIS YEAR SLIP BY WITHOUT ANY MOVEMENT. SHAMIRS PROPOSALS FOR ELECTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES APPEAR TO HAVE SURVIVED, UNENCUMBERED BY THE CONDITIONS WHICH THE LIKUD CENTRAL COMMITTEE TRIED TO IMPOSE. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SOME SLACKENING OF THE INTEFADA. I BELIEVE WE MUST CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE ARABS TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE SHAMIR PROPOSALS, WHILE GETTING THE ISRAELIS TO GIVE THEM MORE SUBSTANCE. BUT MY RECENT CONTACTS WITH ARAB HEADS OF STATE - INCLUDING KING HUSSEIN, THE SULTAN OF OMAN AND SHEIKH ZAYED OF ABU DHABI - REVEALED VERY LITTLE OPTIMISM ABOUT THE PROSPECTS SO LONG AS THE ISRAELIS REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE.

ONE POINT WHICH THEY ALL STRESSED WAS THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE MODERATE PALESTINIANS. I ASSUME THAT YOU PROPOSE TO CONTINUE THE CONTACTS WHICH YOUR AMBASSADOR IN TUNIS HAS WITH THE PLO. WE SHALL CONTINUE OUR OWN CONTACTS, WITHOUT ANY DRAMATIC ESCALATION IN

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THE LEVEL OF THEM. THE OTHER ASPECT IS THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONTACTS. ONE IDEA BEING FLOATED IS TO PUT TOGETHER A DELEGATION COMPRISING REPRESENTATIVES FROM WITHIN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND PALESTINIAN/AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS.

I FEAR YOU WILL FACE A DIFFICULT DECISION IF ARAFAT APPLIES FOR A VISA TO ATTEND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS AUTUMN. MY OWN VIEW FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, IS THAT REFUSAL WOULD BE GREETED WITH DISMAY BY OUR NATURAL FRIENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND LEAD TO ANOTHER EXPENSIVE AND DISRUPTIVE SWITCH OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO GENEVA.

I HAVE VERY FEW OTHER IDEAS AND MY IMPRESSION FROM OUR TALK IN PARIS WAS THAT YOU ALSO THOUGHT THE OPTIONS WERE VERY LIMITED. I CONTINUE TO SEE SOME ADVANTAGE IN CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN NEW YORK. I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WOULD NOT WANT SUCH DISCUSSIONS TO CUT ACROSS SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANTIAL. BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANYTHING BETTER, IT WOULD AT LEAST PROVIDE A FOCUS FOR DISCUSSION AND HOPE. WE WANT TO AVOID A VACUUM.

NONE OF MY ARAB VISITORS HAD ANY GREAT HOPES FOR THE ARAB LEAGUES EFFORTS TO REACH A SOLUTION IN LEBANON. I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY EXPECTED THE COMMITTEE OF THREE TO REPORT NO PROGRESS TO A FURTHER ARAB SUMMIT.

AS REGARDS JORDANS INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES, KING HUSSEIN ASSURED ME THAT THE WORST WAS NOW OVER AND THAT THE IMF PROGRAMME WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED IS TOLERABLE. BUT HIS HOPES REST ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AID FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES WILL RESUME. HE CLEARLY EXPECTS INCREASED AMERICAN HELP AS WELL.

I AM CONSCIOUS THAT THIS IS NOT A VERY HELPFUL MESSAGE. I WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED TO KNOW YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS. MEANWHILE, I AM GLAD THAT JOHN MAJOR WILL BE SEEING JIM BAKER AT THE OPENING OF THE CAMBODIA CONFERENCE IN PARIS. BOTH HAVE A TREASURY BACKGROUND - NO BAD THING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

WARM REGARDS

MARGARET.

~~SECRET~~ 6321

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 10, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS

SUBJECT: President's Response to PM Thatcher

Several days ago PM Thatcher sent the President a message setting forth a good many concerns and questions regarding the Middle East peace process (Tab B). Attached at Tab A is a response. It should go back via the White House/Cabinet Office channel.

Both Dennis Ross and John Kelly have signed off on my draft response.

Concurrence by: Adrian Basora RH/o

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo at Tab I to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Letter From PM Thatcher

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0350-MR
mm 1/28/2016

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

6311

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 14, 1989

1

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Immediately after our telephone conversation Wednesday I was handed your letter. Let me just say how much I appreciated your warm and generous words. I am aware that this cannot be an easy time for Israel, and it was most considerate of you to write.

Mr. Prime Minister, you are right to say that no stone should be left unturned in an effort to get back those held hostage. At the same time, there are differences in our policies toward hostages. We do not wish to impose our approach on you, but I did want you to know where we stand.

I cannot predict how the current situation will evolve, but I am certain that we will both face difficult challenges ahead. As I mentioned to you over the telephone, it is important that we understand one another's concerns and that there be no misunderstandings between us. There is little doubt that many are seeking to exploit circumstances to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States. We will not allow them to succeed.

I know, Mr. Prime Minister, that you are doing everything you can to achieve the release of all the hostages. You should know that I am doing the same. God willing we will succeed.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. 1084 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 1

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES RESPONSE TO PM SHAMIR

LOG # 6311

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	MR. J. STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	

REMARKS *** FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING *** SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW ***

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/19/2009

WHITE HOUSE

93 AUG 14 P1:28

[illegible] ROOM

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. 1084 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 1

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES GH.
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REMARKS *** FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING *** SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW ***

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cog NARA, Date 5/19/2009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ID 8906311

REFERRAL DATE: 14 AUG 89

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: SHAMIR, YITZHAK

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 14 AUG 89

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO ISRAELI PM RE HOSTAGE CRISIS

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE:

COMMENT:

FOR GEORGE VAN EROM

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 8906311
DATE 14 AUG 89

SUBJECT: RESPOSE TO ISRAELI PM RE HOSTAGE CRISIS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
ROY, J DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20590	_____	_____	_____ COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC/S RM 379 OEOB

~~SECRET~~ **~~SECRET~~** 6311

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 14, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Response to Prime Minister Shamir

Purpose

To reiterate the importance of close US-Israeli communications as regards the hostage situation and relations more generally.

Background

PM Shamir wrote to you concerning the hostage situation on August 9. He accompanied this letter with a phone call to you on the same subject.

We have prepared a response that expresses your appreciation for Shamir's kind words and support, while reiterating our policy.

State Department concurs with this response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to PM Shamir.

Attachments
Tab A Response to PM Shamir
Tab B Message From PM Shamir

Prepared by:
Richard N. Haass

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0350-MR
MM 1/28/2016

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

<DIST>PRT: DONLEY GATES HUGHES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: HAASS PRES_MSGS VAX WELCH

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUFHTV<DTG> 091537Z AUG 89
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8519

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S AUGUST 9 LETTER TO
PRESIDENT BUSH

<TEXT>
~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 11317
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, IS
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S AUGUST 9 LETTER TO
PRESIDENT BUSH
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON THE AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 9, YOSSI BEN AHARON, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, HANDED ME A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR TO PRESIDENT BUSH, SAME DATE. TEXT FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 4. SIGNED ORIGINAL IS BEING SENT BY REGISTERED POUCH.
3. COMMENT: BEN AHARON MADE CLEAR IN CONVEYING SHAMIR'S LETTER THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS TOP ADVISORS ARE DEEPLY AWARE OF THE IMPACT RECENT GOI ACTIONS HAVE HAD ON PERCEPTIONS IN WASHINGTON. BEN AHARON HAD SEEN A READ-OUT OF THE PRESIDENT'S AUGUST 8 MEETING WITH AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS AND REFERRED TO SENATOR DOLE'S STATEMENTS IN THE WAKE OF THE OBEID OPERATION. I TOLD BEN AHARON THAT, IN FACT, THERE WAS CONCERN IN WASHINGTON OVER WHAT SOME TOOK AS ISRAELI INSENSITIVITY TO OUR INTERESTS, AND OVER A SENSE THAT THE GOI IN THE WAKE OF OBEID'S SEIZURE HAS BEEN PLAYING ITS CARDS TOO CLOSE TO ITS CHEST. HE SEEMED TO TAKE THAT ON BOARD.
WHILE IT IS UNLIKE SHAMIR -- OR THE ISRAELIS -- TO APOLOGIZE, I BELIEVE THE CONCILIATORY TONE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER REFLECTS A GENUINE DESIRE TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE CONCERNS WE HAVE EXPRESSED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY. IT GIVES US A CLAIM ON FUTURE ISRAELI ACTIONS WHICH WE HAVE LACKED SINCE OBEID'S SEIZURE AND WHICH WILL BE IMPORTANT AS WE PROCEED.
4. BEGIN TEXT:
JERUSALEM, AUGUST 9, 1989
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
I AM WRITING TO EXPRESS MY PROFOUND ADMIRATION FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH YOU DETERMINED THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ISSUE OF THE HOSTAGES. I KNOW HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO STICK TO A PRINCIPLE OF POLICY REGARDING TERRORISTS AND KIDNAPPERS, WHEN LIVES ARE AT STAKE. IT IS TO YOUR CREDIT THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT REJECTED THE TEMPTATION TO ADOPT A NARROW, SELF-CENTERED APPROACH IN FAVOUR OF THE MORAL HIGH GROUND. IT SETS AMERICA APART FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, AND HAS GAINED OUR RESPECT AND PRAISE. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT I AM DEEPLY TOUCHED BY YOUR CONCERN FOR THE FEELINGS OF THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND YOUR IDENTIFICATION WITH THEM. OUR PEOPLE APPRECIATE SUCH FEELINGS BECAUSE WE FACE THIS PAINFUL EXPERIENCE EVER SO OFTEN. THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISREAL HAS SPECIAL MEANING FOR US PRECISELY BECAUSE THE WAY THE UNITED STATES ADDRESSES ITSELF TO SUCH ISSUES

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0350-MR
MM 1/28/2016

LET ME SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THE CHALLENGE WE ARE PRESENTLY FACING FROM THE HIZBULLAH TERRORISTS AND THEIR HOSTAGES.
WE CAN LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED UNTIL WE SECURE THE RELEASE OF OUR PRISONERS. THIS IS A CARDINAL PRINCIPLE OF OUTLOOK AND POLICY FOR US. WE ARE A SMALL NATION AND IN MANY RESPECTS WE FUNCTION LIKE A FAMILY. ONE OF THE SOURCES OF OUR STRENGTH IS THE KNOWLEDGE OF EVERY SOLDIER THAT HE WILL NEVER BE FORSAKEN AND THAT EVERYTHING WILL BE DONE TO SAVE HIM FROM HIS CAPTORS.
AT THE SAME TIME, WE FIGHT TERRORISM AND TERRORISTS WITH EVERY WEAPON AND MEASURE AT OUR DISPOSAL. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO DO SO, SINCE WE ARE DEALING WITH OUTLAWS WHO HAVE NOT THE SLIGHTEST RESPECT FOR LIFE, FOR DECENCY AND FOR HUMAN VALUES.
OUR DECISION TO APPREHEND SHEIKH ABD ELKARIM OBEID CAME AFTER PROTRACTED AND STRENUOUS ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF OUR PRISONERS PRODUCED NO RESULTS. WE HAVE NOT EVEN BEEN ABLE TO GAIN INFORMATION ON WHETHER THEY ARE ALIVE AND WELL.
AFTER MUCH DELIBERATION, WE TOOK THE DECISION TO ACT UNILATERALLY, AND WE ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT DECISION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
SINCE HIS CAPTURE, WE HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED IN OUR BELIEF THAT SHEIKH OBEID CAN PROVIDE US WITH A LEVER TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR OBJECTIVE. SHEIKH
~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 11317
OBEID HAS PLAYED A KEY AND LEADING ROLE IN HIZBULLAH TERROR ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES.
CLEARLY THE TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WILL MAKE EVERY ATTEMPT TO DIVIDE US FROM THE UNITED STATES AND EVEN TO SET US ON A COLLISION COURSE. WE WILL NOT PLAY INTO THEIR HANDS AND WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, WILL NOT PERMIT THIS TO HAPPEN.
WE SHALL ENDEAVOUR TO SECURE THE EXCHANGE OF ALL THE HOSTAGES IN THE HANDS OF THE SHI'ITE HIZBULLAH IN RETURN FOR THE SHI'ITES WE ARE HOLDING, INCLUDING SHEIKH OBEID. OUR AIM IS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON SUCH AN EXCAHNGE THROUGH A NEUTRAL AGENT, PREFERABLY THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS.
WITH PATIENCE AND PERSEVERENCE, I BELIEVE THERE IS A CHANCE OF OBTAINING THE SAFE RELEASE OF ALL THE HOSTAGES. WE SHALL ENDEAVOUR TO CONSULT FULLY WITH YOU, AND PROVIDE YOU WITH ALL THE INFORMATION THAT WILL REACH US. -AS ON MANY OTHER ISSUES, THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, WORKING TOGETHER CAN PRODUCE POSITIVE RESULTS AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF THIS TROUBLED REGION OF THE WORLD.
WARM REGARDS,
SINCERELY,
YITZHAK SHAMIR
PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC
END TEXT. BROWN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 1317<STOR> 890809114516 MSG000239975116
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 1317<STOR> 890809114530 MSG000239975130
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 11, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: President's Response to PM Shamir

The President requested a reply to Prime Minister Shamir's August 9 letter. Attached at Tab I is a memo to the President forwarding a suggested response to Prime Minister Shamir.

The response has been cleared with Dennis Ross and John Kelly at State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo to the President.


Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Proposed Response to PM Shamir
Tab B Message from PM Shamir

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2010-0350-MR
MM 1/28/2016

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TIME STAMP URGENT

89 AUG 10 P 4:56

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 6311

ACTION OFFICER: Welch DUE: ASAP

- ☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
- ☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi
- ☐ Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- ☒ Appropriate Action
- ☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

*PHONE** to action officer at ext. 3950

	FYI		FYI		FYI
☐	☐ Basora	☐	☐ Lampley	☐	☐ Rademaker
☐	☐ Beers	☐	☐ Leach	☐	☐ Reiss
☐	☐ Blackwill	☐	☐ Levin	☐	☐ Rice
☐	☐ Briggs	☐	☐ Lewis	☐	☐ Rodman
☐	☐ Brooks	☐	☐ Mahley	☐	☐ Rostow
☐	☐ Charles	☐	☐ Mandel	☐	☐ Salvetti
☐	☐ Coulson	☐	☐ McCue	☐	☐ Snider
☐	☐ Deal	☐	☐ Melby	☐	☐ Tilley
☐	☐ Donley	☐	☐ Menan	☐	☐ Tobey
☐	☐ Dyke	☐	☐ Miller	☐	☐ Welch
☐	☐ Ebner	☐	☐ Miskel	☐	☐ Whitley
☐	☐ Grant	☐	☐ Needels	☐	☐ Working
☐	☒ Haass	☐	☐ Paal	☐	☐ Zelikow
☐	☐ Hoffmann	☐	☐ Pacelli	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Hutchings	☐	☐ Passage	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Jackson	☐	☐ Popadiuk	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ LaMagna	☐	☐ Porter	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Kanter	☐	☐ Pryce	☐	☐ _____

INFORMATION

- ☒ Hughes
- ☒ Scowcroft (advance)
- ☒ Gates (advance)
- ☒ Secretariat
- ☐ Exec. Sec. Desk
- ☐ _____

COMMENTS

Logged By CDM

Return to Secretariat

CHRON FILE 6625

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 2, 1989

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Deputy Assistant to the President for Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Photo-op and meeting with Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt and President of the OAU.

PURPOSE: To consult with President Mubarak about the peace process and other Middle East and African issues.

BACKGROUND: President Mubarak's visit to the UNGA begins on September 28, so he will not overlap in New York with the President. In their August 9 telephone conversation, the President promised to find a way to get together with President Mubarak (here in his capacity as OAU President) during his visit to the U.S. President Mubarak offered to come to Washington on October 2 for this purpose.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Official Working Visit, April 3-5, 1989

DATE & TIME: October 2, 1989
DURATION: 45 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
C. David Welch, NSC

Egypt
President Mubarak
Ambassador El Reedy, Egypt's Ambassador to the United States

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo-op followed by meeting.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE:	Open Photo
RECOMMENDED BY:	NSC and State
OPPOSED BY:	None

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 22, 1989

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Visit of President Mubarak of Egypt

President Mubarak of Egypt has requested a meeting with the President during his visit to the United States from September 28 to October 2. President Mubarak is coming in his capacity as OAU President.

President Mubarak will be at the UNGA on September 28, 1989. His visit in New York will not overlap with that of the President, and President Mubarak is not able to come earlier. In their August 9 telephone conversation, the President promised to find a way to meet with President Mubarak during his visit to the United States. President Mubarak has offered to come to Washington on October 2 for this purpose.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached Schedule Proposal (Tab I) for a meeting between the President and President Mubarak on October 2.

Attachment
Tab I Schedule Proposal

~~SECRET~~ SECRET 6723

CHRON FILE

Has Seen

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON 89 SEP 7 AM : 38

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0350-MR
MM 1/28/2016

September 7, 1989

1

Brent
interesting paper
please discuss
my reactions
-B
9-8-89

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Middle East Peace Process:
Coping with the Impasse

We are at something of an impasse in our efforts to promote progress in the Middle East. Israel's elections proposal, its appeal diminished by the resolutions of the Likud Central Committee and by various statements by Israeli officials, remains unanswered. Palestinians living in the occupied territories, although interested in stepping forward, refuse to do so without PLO approval. But the PLO refuses to provide an amber (much less green) light to Palestinians in the territories to enter into a dialogue with the Israelis on elections. Meanwhile, the intifada continues, as radicals on all sides of the equation gain in strength.

What accounts for PLO behavior? In part it is that the PLO leadership is uncomfortable with a process that does not have its destination, i.e., the end of occupation and self-determination, spelled out in advance. But the PLO leadership is even more uncomfortable with a process that leaves its own role uncertain and instead raises up an alternative leadership. The Arabs may have declared the PLO to be the sole authorized representative of the Palestinian people, but those gathered in Tunis seem unsure.

To be fair, there may be other factors at work as well. The PLO does represent all Palestinians, not just those living in the West Bank and Gaza, and there is a legitimate concern that those living under Israeli rule are in a poor position to hold out for what most Palestinians want. In any event, the PLO's reaction is to press for a process that highlights their centrality. Their minimum requirement (at least for now) seems to be the inclusion of selected Palestinians from outside the territories in any delegation that would sit down with the Israelis to negotiate a formula for elections. These outsiders would strengthen the principle (included in Camp David) that others besides indigenous Palestinians (read the PLO) have a potential role to play.

It is for just this reason that the Israeli government is almost certain to reject this notion. The Israelis seek not only to cut

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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out the PLO, which they view as hopelessly irredentist, but also to nip in the bud any move that suggests that non-resident Palestinians have a claim. What Israel fears is a massive influx of Palestinians, especially those who understand "Palestine" to mean Haifa and Tel Aviv and not simply Ramallah or Nablus.

Our latest diplomatic tactic tries to use the Egyptians and to a lesser extent the Jordanians to move things along. The specific idea is to fasten upon the so-called 10 Points of the Egyptians--a collection of principles that flesh out the terms of the elections proposal--as a means of easing the PLO decision to allow a formal dialogue on elections to take place.

In principle, the idea is a good one. Egypt could provide the PLO some cover, the Israelis are always pleased to see Arab states in the middle of the process, and the PLO would have something in hand better than what Israel announced. But the reality is already proving different and more difficult.

The Israelis are making noises that they object both to some of the points--those dealing with no more settlements, territory for peace, and the inclusion of East ~~Jerusalemites in~~ any vote--as well to any attempt to use the 10 Points as an alternative to or substitute for their own proposal. The PLO is no happier. Nowhere is mentioned the idea of final status (much less self determination or a separate state), and nowhere is the PLO directly referred to. In short, the Egyptians appear to have put forward a proposal that appeals to neither key protagonist. Although this suggests there is substantive merit to their idea, it also suggests it is unlikely to make much of a difference.

The question, then, is what next? As usual, the menu contains several choices, none particularly appetizing. Nevertheless, here they are:

Stay the Course: This entails exactly what it implies. We would continue to press for a Palestinian, i.e., PLO, decision to enter into a formal dialogue on elections with the Israelis based upon the ~~latter's proposal~~. This could involve using the 10 Points, but the bottom line would be that it is up to the PLO to act and that it cannot expect to be rewarded if it does not.

The advantage of hanging tough is that there is no approach available that is demonstrably preferable to the one we already have. The gap between Israeli and Palestinian thinking remains large, and leadership on both sides remains unwilling and/or unable to take steps that would begin to bridge it.

The problem with continuing on much as we are is that we are unlikely to succeed. The PLO may not come around. Worse, today's leaders could be influenced by or even replaced by others more radical and less inclined toward compromise. The opportunity created by the intifada and the opening of the U.S.-PLO dialogue will have been lost.

Wholesale Change: The most obvious alternative to the approach we are currently pursuing is the international conference. As you know, it is one that remains anathema to most Israelis and in my view unworkable for the foreseeable future. In addition, a major change at this point would appear to reward PLO obstinacy and communicate to all an absence of firmness on our part. A conference continues to make sense only as something that would cap a successful peace effort, not substitute for one.

Suspend the US-PLO Dialogue: This is in effect a "do less" option. We are already beginning to hear voices calling for a halt to the Tunis dialogue. The argument is that we getting nothing for it, with the PLO's refusal to support an indigenous Palestinian-Israeli dialogue cited as evidence. There is ~~the~~ also the argument (heard more in Israel) that the dialogue actually stands in the way of Israelis and indigenous Palestinians finding a modus vivendi.

The problem with the second of these arguments is that it confuses cause and effect. We are talking with the PLO ~~because~~ it is a factor; the PLO is not a factor simply because we are talking with it. As for the first criticism, it simply makes no sense to walk away from the dialogue in the absence of the PLO breaking its commitments as regards terrorism and accepting 242 and Israel. To do so would only place the blame for the failure of diplomacy upon ourselves rather than on the parties directly responsible. It would also leave us with little ability to influence the process. We would likely be worse off than we are or if we continue as we are.

Adjusting Upwards: If the above three options or approaches can be characterized as "do the same," "do a lot more," and "do less," there is in principle a fourth approach: "do a bit more." This approach resembles most a decision to stay the course while incorporating some modest adjustments designed to get things off dead center. Examples of potential adjustments include:

-- Special Envoy: This variant would have you or Jim Baker appoint someone to bridge the gap between Palestinians and Israelis. Although such an envoy might prove useful to an already underway dialogue, it is highly problematic at this point because the individual would ~~be unacceptable in~~ Israel if he went to Tunis and unacceptable to Tunis if he did not contact the PLO directly.

-- Press Israel: This second variant would entail going back to the Israelis in an effort to get them to sweeten their proposal, be it by filling in some of the details, buying on to the 10 Points, or agreeing to the PLO's position on who constitutes the Palestinian delegation and how they are chosen, i.e., with a clear PLO hand. Again, the Israeli government is likely to reject anything that gives a direct role to the PLO or to outsiders closely associated with it.

The one exception here might be Israeli willingness to accept some individuals who have been deported from the West Bank and Gaza since 1967. ~~Again,~~ though, this may not satisfy the PLO.

-- Brokering a Deal with the Arafat Visa: Yet a third variant would involve a potential deal. We could suggest to the PLO that a visa for Yasir Arafat to come and speak at the United Nations this fall would be forthcoming if he demonstrated his commitment to moderation by allowing local Palestinians to enter into a dialogue with Israelis. The deal could also involve other inducements, including pressing Israel as described above, or going public with our views on election details (favoring inclusion of those from East Jerusalem) or making some sort of commitment about our willingness not to rule out a more direct role for the PLO in a later stage of the peace process.

The problem with this last variant is two-fold. The more we add inducements to elicit PLO approval, the more we are creating conditions in which an Israeli rejection becomes likely and a U.S.-Israeli showdown becomes unavoidable. Second, it is not clear we want to leverage the Arafat visa against the PLO's political behavior. Arafat might denounce the attempt as blackmail, in the process placing the onus for the impasse in the peace process on us. There are also all the legal arguments to sort out. It short, it may be a bluff that we do not want called.

Where, then, do I come out? For the time being, I think we ought mostly to stay with the approach we have, although adjusting it "upwards" at the margins to accommodate new developments, i.e., using the 10 Points, pushing for involvement of deportees in any delegation, making statements of guiding principles of U.S. policy, declaring a readiness to appoint an envoy if diplomatic prospects improve. By so doing, we would increase somewhat the odds that the elections might happen. Doing either much more or less promises to hurt our chances more than it would help. Continuing on exactly as we are would appear unwise given the results to date and the prospects for progress.

Even so, we have to be prepared for the likelihood that success will not be forthcoming any time soon, and that we will come under criticism for not doing enough. But with virtually intractable conflicts like the Middle East there is no substitute for tenacity and patience. We must be as tough as the parties we are dealing with if we are to have any chance of succeeding.

Prepared by:
Richard N. Haass

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 6723

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS

SUBJECT: Middle East Peace Process

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President on the state of play in the Middle East and our options for proceeding. I think it would be useful to send on to him in light of the current impasse and the near certainty he will be getting a good deal of unsolicited advice on what we should do.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0350-MR
MM 1/28/2016

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: SF. LOG # 6723

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SF A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	1	W	A
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	2	APNSA Has Seen	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	SF. 9/7	D N
NSC Secretariat	4		

89 AUG 25 P1:44
89 AUG 25 P1:16

A = Action ! = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Middle East Peace Process

National Security Council
The White House

LOG # 6723

PROOFED BY: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

DOCLOG RE A/O _____

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec			
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat	4		N

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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6572
ADD ON

1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

September 7, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Friday, September 8, 2:30 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.

This is Rabin's second visit to the United States this year; you last saw him in May. He will have seen Secretary Cheney earlier, and will be seeing Secretary Baker after you.

Rabin is the most effective advocate in the Israeli coalition for flexibility in the peace process. He privately acknowledges that the essence of the four point initiative is elections to find a Palestinian partner for negotiations, and downplays the other three points (strengthening peace with Egypt, broadening the peace to other Arab states, and rehabilitation of refugee housing). Although he is hardly a proponent of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, he has not joined in the Likud's sweeping attacks on this part of our diplomacy. Rabin prefers instead to point out that the dialogue has not so far contributed to advancing the Israeli peace initiative specifically or the peace process generally.

Baker will be meeting with Rabin one-on-one to discuss the peace process in detail. We have worked quietly with the Egyptians to set up a meeting between Rabin and Mubarak later this month in New York. We are trying to encourage a more vigorous Egyptian role in bringing the PLO to allow a dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis, perhaps on the basis of a set of ten points raised by Egypt concerning the Israeli initiative. Although Rabin personally is flexible on some of these points (e.g., a freeze on settlements during negotiations, finding a way for East Jerusalemites to participate in elections), he has argued that until Israel has a Palestinian interlocutor, it is not worthwhile to tackle issues which are sensitive in Israel. You could ask Rabin what he sees as the possibilities now in the peace process and how Israel's proposal might be made more attractive for the Palestinians. In particular, you might want to explore his current thinking about how to select a Palestinian negotiating team -- including such questions as a mechanism for choosing and the inclusion of deportees.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0350-MR
MM 1/28/2016

Rabin is also the architect of tough Israeli measures to control the intifada. The Palestinians, he has stressed, must come to understand that violence will be met by force; otherwise, they will not move to negotiations. The Palestinians, however, remain determined to continue the uprising, just as Israel is equally determined to suppress it. It would be useful to ask Rabin how he envisions the course of the uprising over the next several months and how successful Israel's measures have been so far.

Rabin will have covered bilateral military issues in his meeting with Cheney. He may, however, raise "fair pricing," a DOD initiative that seeks legislation to allow waivers of certain non-recurring and/or recouped R&D costs that are tacked onto FMS purchases. Congress so far has not agreed to this initiative, which would save Israel about 4% on its FMS purchases, or about $70 million per year. If Rabin raises this, you can say that the Administration is backing the fair pricing initiative on the Hill.

Last, Cheney and Baker alike will discuss the projected Saudi arms sales and how to moderate Israeli resistance. As things now stand, we will offer them an expanded prepo program contingent on their non-opposition to a tank sale. I would not raise this unless he does.

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: Ine

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

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LOG # 6572

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Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft	4		
Philip Hughes			
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West Wing Desk	5	GAD 9/8	
NSC Secretariat	6		R

89 SEP 7 AM: 56

APNSA Has Seen

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS FEB 1 10:18

Meeting w/ Yitzhak Rabin
9/8 2:30 pm

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WITH ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

6385 ADD-ON

1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 9, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0350-MR
MM 1/28/2016

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
09/12/89

MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN

DATE: September 12, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 3:00 - 3:15 p.m.

CHRON FILE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT BS

I. PURPOSE

To show support for Jordan and a close U.S.-Jordanian relationship.

II. BACKGROUND

Although Lebanon and the Middle East peace process may come up, economic issues will be uppermost on Crown Prince Hassan's mind. Jordan faces serious economic difficulties, perhaps the worst in twenty years. The riots in May (during King Hussein's visit here, while the Crown Prince was in charge at home) shook the Jordanian leadership. Prime Minister Rifa'i and his government were fired, the King turned to us and his Arab friends for help, and Jordan undertook a number of tough economic decisions. Fresh Arab aid, an IMF standby loan, and Paris Club rescheduling have all helped, but Jordan still faces sizable foreign exchange problems and an uncertain future for the value of its currency. To ease the pain of austerity measures, Jordan is subsidizing key imports and cushioning important political constituencies (e.g., the Army). The King has also decided to hold Parliamentary elections in November; he hopes that opening a valve for political expression will diffuse the responsibility for unpopular economic decisions.

Arab financial assistance to Jordan has been critical. Saudi Arabia gave $200 million in August, on top of $50 million in May. Others have given a total of $270 million. Hassan will probably make a pitch for increased U.S. aid levels, which have fallen precipitously from $111 million ESF in FY87 to $15 million in FY89; FMS assistance went down from $90 million in FY85 to $10 million in FY89. The Jordanians, in short, view the last two fiscal years of U.S. assistance as the worst in their memory.

We have raised the request to Congress for FY90 to $35 million ESF and $48 million FMS. In addition, you promised Hussein to continue food aid in FY90 at present levels, which give Amman $27 million in commodity aid and

$65 million in commodity export guarantees. We are trying now to arrange a $20 million reprogramming of FMS funds for FY89. We have also helped in the Paris Club rescheduling of Jordan's bilateral debt and encouraged other donors (e.g., you sent a letter to King Fahd and spoke to him on the phone).

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo Opportunity followed by brief meeting.

Prepared by:
C. David Welch

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE HASSAN

-- We have seen what Jordan has been doing in the economic area and admire its courageous decisions.

-- Jordan is a close friend and an important voice of moderation.

-- We want to help wherever we can. We have been in touch with Jordan's Arab friends and with other donors and creditors. We will keep up our efforts.

-- We are looking into every possibility in terms of our own assistance. I know you've heard about our budget problems before, so I'll only say that we'll do our best.

-- How do you think our support can be most effective?

-- In Lebanon, we remain committed to supporting the Arab League and its efforts to bring about a ceasefire, internal reform, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. We hope to reopen our embassy as soon as it is sufficiently safe to do so.

-- As regards the peace process, we are continuing to press Palestinians to engage the Israeli Government proposal. Anything you could do to encourage this would be appreciated.

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0351-MR
5/6/2014 MM

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates,
  Assistant to the President and Deputy for National
    Security Affairs
Roscoe S. Suddarth, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
C. David Welch,
  Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC

Jordan

Crown Prince Hassan
Marwan al-Kasim, Foreign Minister
Ziyad Fareez, Planning Minister
Hussein Hammani, Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE HASSAN

-- WE HAVE SEEN WHAT JORDAN HAS BEEN DOING IN THE ECONOMIC AREA AND ADMIRE ITS COURAGEOUS DECISIONS.

-- JORDAN IS A CLOSE FRIEND AND AN IMPORTANT VOICE OF MODERATION.

-- WE WANT TO HELP WHEREVER WE CAN. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH JORDAN'S ARAB FRIENDS AND WITH OTHER DONORS AND CREDITORS. WE WILL KEEP UP OUR EFFORTS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 2 OF 3

-- WE ARE LOOKING INTO EVERY POSSIBILITY IN TERMS OF OUR OWN ASSISTANCE. I KNOW YOU'VE HEARD ABOUT OUR BUDGET PROBLEMS BEFORE, SO I'LL ONLY SAY THAT WE'LL DO OUR BEST.

-- HOW DO YOU THINK OUR SUPPORT CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVE?

-- IN LEBANON, WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ITS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE, INTERNAL REFORM, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. WE HOPE TO REOPEN OUR EMBASSY AS SOON AS IT IS SUFFICIENTLY SAFE TO DO SO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 3 OF 3

-- AS REGARDS THE PEACE PROCESS, WE ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS PALESTINIANS TO ENGAGE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL. ANYTHING YOU COULD DO TO ENCOURAGE THIS WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0351-MR
5/6/2014 MM

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates,
  Assistant to the President and Deputy for National
    Security Affairs
Roscoe S. Suddarth, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
C. David Welch,
  Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC

Jordan

Crown Prince Hassan
Marwan al-Kasim, Foreign Minister
Ziyad Fareez, Planning Minister
Hussein Hammani, Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S.

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WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

6385 ADD-ON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 7, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan, September 12, 1989, 3:00 p.m. - 3:15 p.m.

Attached for your signature at Tab I is the memorandum to the President for his meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/25/2013

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08e. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	8/16/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6385

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	5	W	I
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates	B		
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	E. 7/13	N
NSC Secretariat	7		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

National Security Council
The White House

[redacted]

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6385

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Philip Hughes			
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West Wing Desk	4	MC 9/9	D IN
NSC Secretariat			

89 SEP 7 P5:02

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres Mtg w/ Crown Prince Hassan
9/12 3:00 pm

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8906385
RECEIVED: 12 AUG 89 12

TO: HUGHES

CARBON FILE

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 18 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN
PHOTO OP
AP
MEMCON

PERSONS: HASSAN

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PRINCE HASSAN

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES DUE DATE: 11 SEP 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF: 8907091

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cof NARA, Date 6/9/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC CLOSED BY: NSAMM DOC 8 OF 8

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6385 ADD-ON 2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CARLSON FILE

September 18, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Crown Prince Hassan

At Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Crown Prince Hassan on September 12, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Attachment
Tab I MEMCON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/26/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08g. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 3/4/2016

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0351-MR(507.06)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/6/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6385 ADD-ON 2

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
507.06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Roscoe S. Suddarth, U. S. Ambassador to Jordan
C. David Welch, NSC (Notetaker)


Crown Prince Hassan
Marwan al-Kasim, Foreign Minister
Ziyad Fareez, Planning Minister
Hussein Hammani, Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 12, 1989, 3:15 p.m. - 3:35 p.m.
The Oval Office

After greetings and pleasantries, the President welcomed Crown Prince Hassan and asked how the economic situation was in Jordan.

Crown Prince Hassan said that the main thing was to make the government's economic policies meaningful to the man in the street, particularly Jordan's many young people.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0351-MR
5/6/2014 MM

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

[redacted] He asked the President for his views on the Soviet role in the Middle East.

The President responded that he had not had the benefit of recent conversations with his advisers on this issue, but that he personally thought that the Soviets were not real spoilers at this time. He noted that Secretary Baker and NSC Adviser Scowcroft may have different views. The Soviets, the President continued, wanted to see things improve with the United States. While noting that he was suspicious of Soviet intentions, the President said that he did not see the Soviets pushing either directly or through their surrogates for a spoiler role.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger mentioned that the Soviets were playing some games in trying a push to improve relations with Iran.

NSC Adviser Scowcroft pointed out that the important question was how hard were the Soviets pushing for a solution in the Middle East.


Foreign Minister Kasim said that his view was that the Soviets were trying to derail the Arab League's Tripartite Committee effort on Lebanon via Iran.

The President asked if the Crown Prince had any advice on the question of recovering Colonel Higgins' body. He noted that the hanging had a dramatic effect on the American people. Interest had not dried up in the United States.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

[redacted]

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memo	C. David Welch to Robert Gates Re: Your Meeting with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Wednesday, September 13, 1989 (2 pp.)	9/13/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

6625
~~ADD ON~~ 01

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1989

1

MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK OF EGYPT
DATE: October 2, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 11:00 - 11:45 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To voice support for Mubarak's constructive diplomacy, especially in the peace process.

II. BACKGROUND

Mubarak is at the peak of his international influence: Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League this year; Mubarak chairs the OAU; Egypt is a leader of the new Arab Cooperation Council; and Mubarak played an important role at the Belgrade NAM Summit. Our relations are solid, and Mubarak is especially proud of his personal rapport with you.

In addition to the top priority peace process issue, Mubarak will have African issues and Egypt's economy on his mind. As OAU Chairman, Mubarak will raise some problem conflicts (Sudan, Somalia, Angola), African debt, and a North-South Conference. He may also seek your intervention with the IMF on Egypt's behalf. Egypt's economic situation is precarious. Mubarak wants us to "deliver" an IMF program, debt rescheduling, and a reduction of $6 billion in Egypt's FMS debt burden. There is still room for the Egyptians to negotiate with the IMF, after which we can see how best to weigh in with the IMF.

On the peace process, Mubarak's September 5 letter to you about Arafat's readiness to agree on the opening of a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue provided the most encouraging opening since the May 14 Israeli peace initiative. After your talks with Peres and Arens, Jim Baker met with Arens and Abd el-Meguid separately and in a trilateral in New York. He has given the Egyptians a detailed sense of what we think are the minimal requirements to make the process work. You should reiterate your commitment to our mutual objective of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and express your respect for Mubarak's personal efforts to bring a Palestinian partner

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0351-MR
5/6/2014 MM

to dialogue with Israel. On the critical question of the composition of a Palestinian delegation, which has emerged as the central PLO demand and a sticking point for Likud, we have told the Egyptians and Israelis that a creative way -- and political will -- should be found to deal with this question. But Mubarak needs also to be cautioned about too visible a PLO connection, since a "Made by the PLO" label could founder the process in Israel.

You should also raise Libya, since if Mubarak is determined to go ahead with the restoration of relations, we may want to explore turning his decision to our mutual advantage.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo op followed by meeting.

Prepared by:
C. David Welch

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
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By EJ On 7/12/22

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0351-MR (509.02)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/20/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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2010-0357-MR
#509.03

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

GENERAL POINTS

-- I'm impressed with your recent string of diplomatic successes and the constructive leading role you are playing on so many international issues.

-- We followed your efforts at the Belgrade NAM Summit, where there was a positive evolution in many areas.

-- Congratulations again on your election as OAU Chairman. We support the OAU and are pleased that you see a more active role for it in resolving African conflicts.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- I am pleased to have this chance to meet. Let me say, Hosni, that your efforts are nothing less than heroic.

-- Your ten points are most creative, and what you have been able to do with moderating Arafat is similarly impressive.

-- I believe that we are on threshold of a key accomplishment if we can get an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue launched. I like the idea of your issuing invitations to the two sides. As Jim Baker told Abdel Meguid and Moshe Arens, we would be glad to help screen names if this would help.

-- A few points seem clear to us as we proceed; for example:

  -- 1.4(d) [redacted]

  -- dialogue must be on basis of the Israeli government election proposal and focus primarily on elections;

  -- the 10 points are not an alternative basis for talks, but the Palestinian side can bring them to table;

  -- Israel need not sign on to the 10 points and is free to bring additional points of its own to any dialogue;

  -- Israel will have to show some creative flexibility on the make-up of the Palestinian delegation. Including one or two deportees looks to be the way to go.

-- In New York last week, we did what we could so that the Israelis do not reject what is essentially their own approach. We will continue to do what we can.

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2010-0357-MR
ES 5/20/15

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

-- As you know, there is not a lot of margin for error. We must continue to keep one another fully informed.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS

-- We have serious concerns about Qadhafi's CW program, his support for terrorism, and his meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. We are convinced that the proper approach is continued economic and diplomatic pressure.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

-- [redacted]

EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- Economic adjustment is a difficult task; and Egypt's commitment to policy liberalization is courageous. Comprehensive adjustment is the key to economic growth and development that will pay dividends into the next century.

-- I know that your economic team is now discussing some ideas with the IMF to move negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion which will suit your circumstances and meet the Fund's objectives.

-- We will do everything possible to support a sustainable program that can lay a foundation for future growth and mobilize the support of the World Bank and other donors.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for One on One Meeting with President Mubarak (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 7/12/22

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ONE ON ONE MEETING WITH

PRESIDENT MUBARAK

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- I may phone Shamir to give him a read-out of our meeting and to emphasize the importance we place on Israel finding a way to let this dialogue begin. I will stress that your 10 points are not an alternative and that Israel need not sign on to them, but again your personal offer could be key.

~~SECRET~~
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
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By ES On 7/12/22

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0351-MR (509.03)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/20/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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CARD 1 OF 13
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

GENERAL POINTS

-- I'M IMPRESSED WITH YOUR RECENT STRING OF DIPLOMATIC SUCCESSES AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE LEADING ROLE YOU ARE PLAYING ON SO MANY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

-- WE FOLLOWED YOUR EFFORTS AT THE BELGRADE NAM SUMMIT, WHERE THERE WAS A POSITIVE EVOLUTION IN MANY AREAS.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CARD 2 OF 13

-- CONGRATULATIONS AGAIN ON YOUR ELECTION AS OAU CHAIRMAN. WE SUPPORT THE OAU AND ARE PLEASED THAT YOU SEE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE FOR IT IN RESOLVING AFRICAN CONFLICTS.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS CHANCE TO MEET. LET ME SAY, HOSNI, THAT YOUR EFFORTS ARE NOTHING LESS THAN HEROIC.

-- YOUR TEN POINTS ARE MOST CREATIVE, AND WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN able TO DO WITH MODERATING ARAFAT IS SIMILARLY IMPRESSIVE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 3 OF 13

-- I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE ON THRESHOLD OF A KEY ACCOMPLISHMENT IF WE CAN GET AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE LAUNCHED. I LIKE THE IDEA OF YOUR ISSUING INVITATIONS TO THE TWO SIDES. AS JIM BAKER TOLD ABDEL MEGUID AND MOSHE ARENS, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO HELP SCREEN NAMES IF THIS WOULD HELP.

-- A FEW POINTS SEEM CLEAR TO US AS WE PROCEED; FOR EXAMPLE:

-- 1.4(d)

-- DIALOGUE MUST BE ON BASIS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ELECTION PROPOSAL AND FOCUS PRIMARILY ON ELECTIONS;

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CARD 6 OF 13

EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS

-- WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT QADHAFI'S CW PROGRAM, HIS SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, AND HIS MEDDLING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PROPER APPROACH IS CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 5 OF 13

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

-- AS YOU KNOW, THERE IS NOT A LOT OF MARGIN FOR ERROR. WE MUST CONTINUE TO KEEP ONE ANOTHER FULLY INFORMED.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ CARD 4 OF 13

-- THE 10 POINTS ARE NOT AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR TALKS, BUT THE PALESTINIAN SIDE CAN BRING THEM TO TABLE;

-- ISRAEL NEED NOT SIGN ON TO THE 10 POINTS AND IS FREE TO BRING ADDITIONAL POINTS OF ITS OWN TO ANY DIALOGUE;

-- ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO SHOW SOME CREATIVE FLEXIBILITY ON THE MAKE-UP OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION. INCLUDING ONE OR TWO DEPORTEES LOOKS TO BE THE WAY TO GO.

-- IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK, WE DID WHAT WE COULD SO THAT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT REJECT WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY THEIR OWN APPROACH. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO WHAT WE CAN.

~~SECRET~~

Call

Emir of Kuwait —

Spray reality Coca
in Bolivia and

~~SECRET~~ CARD 7 OF 13

-- [redacted] 1.4(d)

EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IS A DIFFICULT TASK; AND EGYPT'S COMMITMENT TO POLICY LIBERALIZATION IS COURAGEOUS. COMPREHENSIVE ADJUSTMENT IS THE KEY TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT THAT WILL PAY DIVIDENDS INTO THE NEXT CENTURY.

-- I KNOW THAT YOUR ECONOMIC TEAM IS NOW DISCUSSING SOME IDEAS WITH THE IMF TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION WHICH WILL SUIT YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES AND MEET THE FUND'S OBJECTIVES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 7 OF 13

--

1.4(d)

EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IS A DIFFICULT TASK, AND EGYPT'S COMMITMENT TO POLICY LIBERALIZATION IS COURAGEOUS. COMPREHENSIVE ADJUSTMENT IS THE KEY TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT THAT WILL PAY DIVIDENDS INTO THE NEXT CENTURY.

-- I KNOW THAT YOUR ECONOMIC TEAM IS NOW DISCUSSING SOME IDEAS WITH THE IMF TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION WHICH WILL SUIT YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES AND MEET THE FUND'S OBJECTIVES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 8 OF 13

-- WE WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT A SUSTAINABLE PROGRAM THAT CAN LAY A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE GROWTH AND MOBILIZE THE SUPPORT OF THE WORLD BANK AND OTHER DONORS.

AFRICAN ISSUES (IF RAISED)

AFRICAN DEBT

-- WE HAVE WORKED CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE IMF AND IBRD TO ADDRESS THE AFRICAN DEBT PROBLEM AND MOBILIZE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR AFRICA. WE DO NOT BELIEVE A CONFERENCE, SUCH AS THE OAU PROPOSES, IS APPROPRIATE AS IT NEEDLESSLY POLITICIZES THE ISSUE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 9 OF 13

-- WE ARE UNDERTAKING A DEBT FORGIVENESS INITIATIVE, LIMITED TO THE POOREST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, THAT WILL ELIMINATE SOME $800 MILLION IN DEBT SERVICE.

NORTH-SOUTH CONFERENCE

-- WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE NEED FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH, BUT WE QUESTION THE USEFULNESS OF YET ANOTHER FORUM FOR TALKS. DIALOGUE CAN BE CARRIED ON IN DISCUSSIONS ALREADY SCHEDULED OVER COMING YEARS, CHIEFLY IN UN AGENCIES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 10 OF 13

SUDAN

-- WE ARE WILLING TO GIVE PRESIDENT OMAR THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. HIS PROSPECTS TURN ON ACHIEVING PEACE IN THE SOUTH. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE OMAR REDUCE THE SKEPTICISM OF THE SUDANESE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY BY OFFERING NEW CONCESSIONS ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF SHARIA (ISLAMIC) LAW.

SOMALIA

-- PRESIDENT SAID IS TRYING TO TALK TO THE SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT (SNM) INSURGENTS. CAN EGYPT BRING SIAD AND THE SNM TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN SOMALIA?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 11 OF 13

ANGOLA

-- THE PRESENT PEACE PROCESS IS FRAGILE. WE SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE MOBUTU MEDIATION EFFORT.

-- THE GBADOLITE COMMUNIQUE PROVIDES THE ONLY AGREED BASIS FOR THE DIRECT, FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

NAMIBIA

-- WE ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS WILL SUCCEED AND TAKE SATISFACTION IN OUR ROLE. THE UN HAS DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 12 OF 13

SOUTH AFRICA

-- PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO END APARTHEID HAVE BEEN ENHANCED BY THE CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA. THE ANC IS SERIOUSLY RETHINKING THE UTILITY OF VIOLENCE AND HAS FURTHER DEFINED ITS POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS.

-- OUR POSITION IS CLEAR -- APARTHEID MUST END. WE LOOK TO THE NEW SAG TO MATCH INTENTIONS WITH ACTIONS. THE SAG MUST BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH LEGITIMATE BLACK LEADERS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRACY.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 13 OF 13

ETHIOPIA

-- WE ARE PLEASED BY THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE CARTER CENTER DISCUSSIONS. HAVE YOU BEEN APPROACHED ON POSSIBLY JOINING CARTER AS A MEDIATOR IN THE PEACE PROCESS?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 1 OF 2

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ONE ON ONE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

-- 1.4(d)

--

~~SECRET~~
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~~SECRET~~ CARD 2 OF 2

-- I MAY PHONE SHAMIR TO GIVE HIM A READ-OUT OF OUR MEETING AND TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE WE PLACE ON ISRAEL FINDING A WAY TO LET THIS DIALOGUE BEGIN. I WILL STRESS THAT YOUR 10 POINTS ARE NOT AN ALTERNATIVE AND THAT ISRAEL NEED NOT SIGN ON TO THEM, BUT AGAIN YOUR PERSONAL OFFER COULD BE KEY.

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10e. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
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By ES On 7/12/22

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0351-MR (509.04)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/20/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

GENERAL POINTS

-- I'm impressed with your recent string of diplomatic successes and the constructive leading role you are playing on so many international issues.

-- We followed your efforts at the Belgrade NAM Summit, where there was a positive evolution in many areas.

-- Congratulations again on your election as OAU Chairman. We support the OAU and are pleased that you see a more active role for it in resolving African conflicts.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- I especially appreciate your active and constructive role in the peace process. Your ten points were very helpful and the letter you sent me about Arafat's readiness to authorize a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue was very promising.

-- Following on your own efforts, over the past several days we've tried to bring the Israelis along by convincing them that failure to agree to a dialogue now would be tantamount to walking away from their own initiative.

-- In my meetings with Peres and Arens, I stressed that your approach is entirely compatible with theirs. We have said that the Egyptian ten points are not an alternative plan but reflect your acceptance of the elections concept and an effort to make it work.

~~SECRET~~
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2010-0357-MR
EB 5/20/15


-- We believe our meetings in New York advanced the prospects for beginning a dialogue. The Israeli Cabinet will now need to wrestle with the problem, including the issue of outside Palestinians.

-- One point, however, remains crucial for the Israelis if they are to agree to the dialogue: the talks must be on the basis of their proposal.

-- You and I agree that the Palestinians can bring their own position to the table; but discussions must start with the understanding that they're based on the Israeli proposal.

-- We understand the importance you and the Palestinians attach to including Palestinians from outside the territories in the Palestinian delegation. We agree that a creative way should be found to deal with this problem.

-- 1.4(d)



-- We will continue to do all we can to press forward. In particular, as we approach the need to draft documents and bridge positions on specific issues we look forward to coordinating closely with Egypt.

EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS

-- We have serious concerns about Qadhafi's CW program, his support for terrorism, and his meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. We are convinced that the proper approach is continued economic and diplomatic pressure.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

-- [redacted]

EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- Economic adjustment is a difficult task; and Egypt's commitment to policy liberalization is courageous. Comprehensive adjustment is the key to economic growth and development that will pay dividends into the next century.

-- I know that your economic team is now discussing some ideas with the IMF to move negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion which will suit your circumstances and meet the Fund's objectives.

-- We will do everything possible to support a sustainable program that can lay a foundation for future growth and mobilize the support of the World Bank and other donors.

AFRICAN ISSUES (If Raised)

African Debt

-- We have worked constructively in the IMF and IBRD to address the African debt problem and mobilize additional resources

for Africa. We do not believe a conference, such as the OAU proposes, is appropriate as it needlessly politicizes the issue.

-- We are undertaking a debt forgiveness initiative, limited to the poorest African countries, that will eliminate some $800 million in debt service.

North-South Conference

-- We are sympathetic to the need for discussion between North and South, but we question the usefulness of yet another forum for talks. Dialogue can be carried on in discussions already scheduled over coming years, chiefly in UN agencies.

Sudan

-- We are willing to give President Omar the benefit of the doubt. His prospects turn on achieving peace in the south. We would like to see Omar reduce the skepticism of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army by offering new concessions on the crucial issue of sharia (Islamic) law.

Somalia

-- President Siad is trying to talk to the Somali National Movement (SNM) insurgents. Can Egypt bring Siad and the SNM together to achieve national reconciliation in Somalia?

Angola

-- The present peace process is fragile. We see no alternative to the Mobutu mediation effort.

-- The Gbadolite communique provides the only agreed basis for the direct, face-to-face negotiations needed to achieve national reconciliation.

Namibia

-- We are optimistic that the independence process will succeed and take satisfaction in our role. The UN has done an excellent job under difficult circumstances.

South Africa

-- Prospects for negotiations to end apartheid have been enhanced by the change in leadership of white South Africa. The ANC is seriously rethinking the utility of violence and has further defined its position on negotiations.

-- Our position is clear -- apartheid must end. We look to the new SAG to match intentions with actions. The SAG must begin negotiations with legitimate black leaders leading to the establishment of a non-racial democracy.

Ethiopia

-- We are pleased by the progress made at the Carter Center discussions. Have you been approached on possibly joining Carter as a mediator in the peace process?

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates
Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Dennis Ross, Director for Plans and Policy, Department of State
John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)
Frank G. Wisner, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC Staff

Egypt

President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak
Esmat Abdel Meguid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ozama al Baz, First Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Director of the President's Cabinet for Political Affairs
El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10f. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	1/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
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RESTRICTION CODES

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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Where is the State briefing paper?

September 28, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for the President's Meeting with Egyptian President Mubarak

Attached is the briefing memo for the President's meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on Monday, October 2, at 11:00 a.m.

David Passage concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/26/2013

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 28, 1989

ACTION

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Tab A Points to be Made
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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/26/2013

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 7/12/22

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0357-MR (510.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/20/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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CARD 1 OF 13
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

GENERAL POINTS

-- I'M IMPRESSED WITH YOUR RECENT STRING OF DIPLOMATIC SUCCESSES AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE LEADING ROLE YOU ARE PLAYING ON SO MANY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

-- WE FOLLOWED YOUR EFFORTS AT THE BELGRADE NAM SUMMIT, WHERE THERE WAS A POSITIVE EVOLUTION IN MANY AREAS.

~~SECRET~~
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CARD 2 OF 13

-- CONGRATULATIONS AGAIN ON YOUR ELECTION AS OAU CHAIRMAN. WE SUPPORT THE OAU AND ARE PLEASED THAT YOU SEE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE FOR IT IN RESOLVING AFRICAN CONFLICTS.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS CHANCE TO MEET. LET ME SAY, HOSNI, THAT YOUR EFFORTS ARE NOTHING LESS THAN HEROIC.

-- YOUR TEN POINTS ARE MOST CREATIVE, AND WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO WITH MODERATING ARAFAT IS SIMILARLY IMPRESSIVE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 3 OF 13

-- I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE ON THRESHOLD OF A KEY ACCOMPLISHMENT IF WE CAN GET AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE LAUNCHED. I LIKE THE IDEA OF YOUR ISSUING INVITATIONS TO THE TWO SIDES. AS JIM BAKER TOLD ABDEL MEGUID AND MOSHE ARENS, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO HELP SCREEN NAMES IF THIS WOULD HELP.

-- A FEW POINTS SEEM CLEAR TO US AS WE PROCEED; FOR EXAMPLE:

-- 1.4(d)

-- DIALOGUE MUST BE ON BASIS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ELECTION PROPOSAL AND FOCUS PRIMARILY ON ELECTIONS;

~~SECRET~~

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CARD 6 OF 13

EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS

-- WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT QADHAFI'S CW PROGRAM, HIS SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, AND HIS MEDDLING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PROPER APPROACH IS CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 5 OF 13

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

-- AS YOU KNOW, THERE IS NOT A LOT OF MARGIN FOR ERROR. WE MUST CONTINUE TO KEEP ONE ANOTHER FULLY INFORMED.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ CARD 4 OF 13

-- THE 10 POINTS ARE NOT AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR TALKS, BUT THE PALESTINIAN SIDE CAN BRING THEM TO TABLE;

-- ISRAEL NEED NOT SIGN ON TO THE 10 POINTS AND IS FREE TO BRING ADDITIONAL POINTS OF ITS OWN TO ANY DIALOGUE;

-- ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO SHOW SOME CREATIVE FLEXIBILITY ON THE MAKE-UP OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION. INCLUDING ONE OR TWO DEPORTEES LOOKS TO BE THE WAY TO GO.

-- IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK, WE DID WHAT WE COULD SO THAT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT REJECT WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY THEIR OWN APPROACH. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO WHAT WE CAN.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 7 OF 13

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IS A DIFFICULT TASK, AND EGYPT'S COMMITMENT TO POLICY LIBERALIZATION IS COURAGEOUS. COMPREHENSIVE ADJUSTMENT IS THE KEY TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT THAT WILL PAY DIVIDENDS INTO THE NEXT CENTURY.

-- I KNOW THAT YOUR ECONOMIC TEAM IS NOW DISCUSSING SOME IDEAS WITH THE IMF TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION WHICH WILL SUIT YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES AND MEET THE FUND'S OBJECTIVES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 8 OF 13

-- WE WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT A SUSTAINABLE PROGRAM THAT CAN LAY A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE GROWTH AND MOBILIZE THE SUPPORT OF THE WORLD BANK AND OTHER DONORS.

AFRICAN ISSUES (IF RAISED)

AFRICAN DEBT

-- WE HAVE WORKED CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE IMF AND IBRD TO ADDRESS THE AFRICAN DEBT PROBLEM AND MOBILIZE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR AFRICA. WE DO NOT BELIEVE A CONFERENCE, SUCH AS THE OAU PROPOSES, IS APPROPRIATE AS IT NEEDLESSLY POLITICIZES THE ISSUE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 9 OF 13

-- WE ARE UNDERTAKING A DEBT FORGIVENESS INITIATIVE, LIMITED TO THE POOREST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, THAT WILL ELIMINATE SOME $800 MILLION IN DEBT SERVICE.

NORTH-SOUTH CONFERENCE

-- WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE NEED FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH, BUT WE QUESTION THE USEFULNESS OF YET ANOTHER FORUM FOR TALKS. DIALOGUE CAN BE CARRIED ON IN DISCUSSIONS ALREADY SCHEDULED OVER COMING YEARS, CHIEFLY IN UN AGENCIES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 10 OF 13

SUDAN

-- WE ARE WILLING TO GIVE PRESIDENT OMAR THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. HIS PROSPECTS TURN ON ACHIEVING PEACE IN THE SOUTH. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE OMAR REDUCE THE SKEPTICISM OF THE SUDANESE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY BY OFFERING NEW CONCESSIONS ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF SHARIA (ISLAMIC) LAW.

SOMALIA

-- PRESIDENT SAID IS TRYING TO TALK TO THE SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT (SNM) INSURGENTS. CAN EGYPT BRING SIAD AND THE SNM TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN SOMALIA?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 11 OF 13

ANGOLA

-- THE PRESENT PEACE PROCESS IS FRAGILE. WE SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE MOBUTU MEDIATION EFFORT.

-- THE GBADOLITE COMMUNIQUE PROVIDES THE ONLY AGREED BASIS FOR THE DIRECT, FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

NAMIBIA

-- WE ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS WILL SUCCEED AND TAKE SATISFACTION IN OUR ROLE. THE UN HAS DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 12 OF 13

SOUTH AFRICA

-- PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO END APARTHEID HAVE BEEN ENHANCED BY THE CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA. THE ANC IS SERIOUSLY RETHINKING THE UTILITY OF VIOLENCE AND HAS FURTHER DEFINED ITS POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS.

-- OUR POSITION IS CLEAR -- APARTHEID MUST END. WE LOOK TO THE NEW SAG TO MATCH INTENTIONS WITH ACTIONS. THE SAG MUST BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH LEGITIMATE BLACK LEADERS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRACY.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 13 OF 13

ETHIOPIA

-- WE ARE PLEASED BY THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE CARTER CENTER DISCUSSIONS. HAVE YOU BEEN APPROACHED ON POSSIBLY JOINING CARTER AS A MEDIATOR IN THE PEACE PROCESS?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CARD 1 OF 2

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ONE ON ONE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

-- 1.4(d)

--

~~SECRET~~
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~~SECRET~~ CARD 2 OF 2

-- I MAY PHONE SHAMIR TO GIVE HIM A READ-OUT OF OUR MEETING AND TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE WE PLACE ON ISRAEL FINDING A WAY TO LET THIS DIALOGUE BEGIN. I WILL STRESS THAT YOUR 10 POINTS ARE NOT AN ALTERNATIVE AND THAT ISRAEL NEED NOT SIGN ON TO THEM, BUT AGAIN YOUR PERSONAL OFFER COULD BE KEY.

~~SECRET~~

Call

Emir of Kuwait —

Spray reality Coca
in Bolivia and

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1989

GIFTS FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM PRESIDENT MUBURAK :

1. rug with President Bush's face in the middle (approximately 6 feet by 8 feet).

2. grey jogging suit

FOR MRS. BUSH:

1. snake skin purse (Protocol will advise Mrs. Bush's office of this.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By EJ On 7/12/22

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0357-MR (510.02)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/20/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

GENERAL POINTS

-- I'm impressed with your recent string of diplomatic successes and the constructive leading role you are playing on so many international issues.

-- We followed your efforts at the Belgrade NAM Summit, where there was a positive evolution in many areas.

-- Congratulations again on your election as OAU Chairman. We support the OAU and are pleased that you see a more active role for it in resolving African conflicts.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- I am pleased to have this chance to meet. Let me say, Hosni, that your efforts are nothing less than heroic.

-- Your ten points are most creative, and what you have been able to do with moderating Arafat is similarly impressive.

-- I believe that we are on threshold of a key accomplishment if we can get an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue launched. I like the idea of your issuing invitations to the two sides. As Jim Baker told Abdel Meguid and Moshe Arens, we would be glad to help screen names if this would help.

-- A few points seem clear to us as we proceed; for example:

  -- 1.4(d) [redacted]

  -- dialogue must be on basis of the Israeli government election proposal and focus primarily on elections;

  -- the 10 points are not an alternative basis for talks, but the Palestinian side can bring them to table;

  -- Israel need not sign on to the 10 points and is free to bring additional points of its own to any dialogue;

  -- Israel will have to show some creative flexibility on the make-up of the Palestinian delegation. Including one or two deportees looks to be the way to go.

-- In New York last week, we did what we could so that the Israelis do not reject what is essentially their own approach. We will continue to do what we can.

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-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

-- As you know, there is not a lot of margin for error. We must continue to keep one another fully informed.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS

-- We have serious concerns about Qadhafi's CW program, his support for terrorism, and his meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. We are convinced that the proper approach is continued economic and diplomatic pressure.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

--

EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- Economic adjustment is a difficult task; and Egypt's commitment to policy liberalization is courageous. Comprehensive adjustment is the key to economic growth and development that will pay dividends into the next century.

-- I know that your economic team is now discussing some ideas with the IMF to move negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion which will suit your circumstances and meet the Fund's objectives.

-- We will do everything possible to support a sustainable program that can lay a foundation for future growth and mobilize the support of the World Bank and other donors.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for One on One Meeting with President Mubarak (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By EJ On 7/12/22

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0357-MR (510.03)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/20/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ONE ON ONE MEETING WITH

PRESIDENT MUBARAK

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- I may phone Shamir to give him a read-out of our meeting and to emphasize the importance we place on Israel finding a way to let this dialogue begin. I will stress that your 10 points are not an alternative and that Israel need not sign on to them, but again your personal offer could be key.

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ADD ON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1989

MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK OF EGYPT

DATE: October 2, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 11:00 - 11:45 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To voice support for Mubarak's constructive diplomacy, especially in the peace process.

II. BACKGROUND

Mubarak is at the peak of his international influence: Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League this year; Mubarak chairs the OAU; Egypt is a leader of the new Arab Cooperation Council; and Mubarak played an important role at the Belgrade NAM Summit. Our relations are solid, and Mubarak is especially proud of his personal rapport with you.

In addition to the top priority peace process issue, Mubarak will have African issues and Egypt's economy on his mind. As OAU Chairman, Mubarak will raise some problem conflicts (Sudan, Somalia, Angola), African debt, and a North-South Conference. He may also seek your intervention with the IMF on Egypt's behalf. Egypt's economic situation is precarious. Mubarak wants us to "deliver" an IMF program, debt rescheduling, and a reduction of $6 billion in Egypt's FMS debt burden. There is still room for the Egyptians to negotiate with the IMF, after which we can see how best to weigh in with the IMF.

On the peace process, Mubarak's September 5 letter to you about Arafat's readiness to agree on the opening of a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue provided the most encouraging opening since the May 14 Israeli peace initiative. After your talks with Peres and Arens, Jim Baker met with Arens and Abd el-Meguid separately and in a trilateral in New York. He has given the Egyptians a detailed sense of what we think are the minimal requirements to make the process work. You should reiterate your commitment to our mutual objective of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and express your respect for Mubarak's personal efforts to bring a Palestinian partner

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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to dialogue with Israel. On the critical question of the composition of a Palestinian delegation, which has emerged as the central PLO demand and a sticking point for Likud, we have told the Egyptians and Israelis that a creative way -- and political will -- should be found to deal with this question. But Mubarak needs also to be cautioned about too visible a PLO connection, since a "Made by the PLO" label could founder the process in Israel.

You should also raise Libya, since if Mubarak is determined to go ahead with the restoration of relations, we may want to explore turning his decision to our mutual advantage.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo op followed by meeting.

Prepared by:
C. David Welch

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11f. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mubarak (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 7/12/22

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0357-MR (510.05)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

GENERAL POINTS

-- I'm impressed with your recent string of diplomatic successes and the constructive leading role you are playing on so many international issues.

-- We followed your efforts at the Belgrade NAM Summit, where there was a positive evolution in many areas.

-- Congratulations again on your election as OAU Chairman. We support the OAU and are pleased that you see a more active role for it in resolving African conflicts.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- I especially appreciate your active and constructive role in the peace process. Your ten points were very helpful and the letter you sent me about Arafat's readiness to authorize a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue was very promising.

-- Following on your own efforts, over the past several days we've tried to bring the Israelis along by convincing them that failure to agree to a dialogue now would be tantamount to walking away from their own initiative.

-- In my meetings with Peres and Arens, I stressed that your approach is entirely compatible with theirs. We have said that the Egyptian ten points are not an alternative plan but reflect your acceptance of the elections concept and an effort to make it work.

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2010-0357MR
EJ 5/20/15

-- We believe our meetings in New York advanced the prospects for beginning a dialogue. The Israeli Cabinet will now need to wrestle with the problem, including the issue of outside Palestinians.


-- One point, however, remains crucial for the Israelis if they are to agree to the dialogue: the talks must be on the basis of their proposal.

-- You and I agree that the Palestinians can bring their own position to the table; but discussions must start with the understanding that they're based on the Israeli proposal.

-- We understand the importance you and the Palestinians attach to including Palestinians from outside the territories in the Palestinian delegation. We agree that a creative way should be found to deal with this problem.

--

1.4(d)



--

-- We will continue to do all we can to press forward. In particular, as we approach the need to draft documents and bridge positions on specific issues we look forward to coordinating closely with Egypt.

EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS

-- We have serious concerns about Qadhafi's CW program, his support for terrorism, and his meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. We are convinced that the proper approach is continued economic and diplomatic pressure.

-- 1.4(d) [redacted]

-- [redacted]

EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- Economic adjustment is a difficult task; and Egypt's commitment to policy liberalization is courageous. Comprehensive adjustment is the key to economic growth and development that will pay dividends into the next century.

-- I know that your economic team is now discussing some ideas with the IMF to move negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion which will suit your circumstances and meet the Fund's objectives.

-- We will do everything possible to support a sustainable program that can lay a foundation for future growth and mobilize the support of the World Bank and other donors.

AFRICAN ISSUES (If Raised)

African Debt

-- We have worked constructively in the IMF and IBRD to address the African debt problem and mobilize additional resources

for Africa. We do not believe a conference, such as the OAU proposes, is appropriate as it needlessly politicizes the issue.

-- We are undertaking a debt forgiveness initiative, limited to the poorest African countries, that will eliminate some $800 million in debt service.

North-South Conference

-- We are sympathetic to the need for discussion between North and South, but we question the usefulness of yet another forum for talks. Dialogue can be carried on in discussions already scheduled over coming years, chiefly in UN agencies.

Sudan

-- We are willing to give President Omar the benefit of the doubt. His prospects turn on achieving peace in the south. We would like to see Omar reduce the skepticism of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army by offering new concessions on the crucial issue of sharia (Islamic) law.

Somalia

-- President Siad is trying to talk to the Somali National Movement (SNM) insurgents. Can Egypt bring Siad and the SNM together to achieve national reconciliation in Somalia?

Angola

-- The present peace process is fragile. We see no alternative to the Mobutu mediation effort.

-- The Gbadolite communique provides the only agreed basis for the direct, face-to-face negotiations needed to achieve national reconciliation.

Namibia

-- We are optimistic that the independence process will succeed and take satisfaction in our role. The UN has done an excellent job under difficult circumstances.

South Africa

-- Prospects for negotiations to end apartheid have been enhanced by the change in leadership of white South Africa. The ANC is seriously rethinking the utility of violence and has further defined its position on negotiations.

-- Our position is clear -- apartheid must end. We look to the new SAG to match intentions with actions. The SAG must begin negotiations with legitimate black leaders leading to the establishment of a non-racial democracy.

Ethiopia

-- We are pleased by the progress made at the Carter Center discussions. Have you been approached on possibly joining Carter as a mediator in the peace process?

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates
  Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Dennis Ross, Director for Plans and Policy, Department of State
John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)
Frank G. Wisner, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC Staff

Egypt

President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak
Esmat Abdel Meguid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ozama al Baz, First Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Director of the President's Cabinet for Political Affairs
El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11g. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	1/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Middle East Peace Process Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Middle East Peace (July - October 1989)

Date Closed:	5/19/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91142-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WWD

Dispatch, but send copy for Welch to answer Scowcroft's question

y Council House

LOG # 6625

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

DOCLOG CM A/O

		D	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
			W	A
			AFK	
Brent Scowcroft		4	✓	
Philip Hughes				
Situation Room				
West Wing Desk		5	CM 9/30	D
NSC Secretariat		6		N

88 SEP 28

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres mtg w/ Pres Mubarak of Egypt on Oct. 2 at 11:00 a.m.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907626
RECEIVED: 26 SEP 89 17

TO: HUGHES

CHRON FILE

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 02 OCT 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL ANSA
MEMCON

1

PERSONS: PERES, SHIMON

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PERES / SEP 27

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES DUE DATE: 29 SEP 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

_____

_____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJRP DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/26/2013

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 7625 ADD-ON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

NOTED

October 2, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Shimon Peres, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to J. Stapleton Roy transmitting the memorandum of conversation of General Scowcroft's meeting with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Shimon Peres on September 27, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

Upon approval of the Memorandum of Conversation, that you sign the Memorandum to Stapleton Roy at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to Stapleton Roy
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/26/2013

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Brent Scowcroft and Shimon Peres, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the General Scowcroft's meeting with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Shimon Peres on September 27, 1989. Distribution of Memorandum of Conversation must be handled via NODIS channels and should not be released below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. If the Department intends to forward this memorandum to Embassy Tel Aviv, it should be sent to the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(S)~~

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/26/2013

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 7626 ADD-ON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Shimon Peres of Israel ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

Shimon Peres, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
Nimrod Novick, Political Adviser
Avriham Gil, Media Adviser
Oded Eran, Deputy Chief of Mission

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 27, 1989, 3:40 p.m. - 4:05 p.m.
General Scowcroft's Office

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: The most important thing that is needed now is a clear U.S. position. ~~(S)~~

General Scowcroft: A clear position regarding what? ~~(S)~~

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: A clear position should be articulated on the (Egyptian) 10 points and the Government of Israel's plan. It is today one package. The sooner things happen, the more will happen. Egypt has now suggested guidelines for a Palestinian delegation that offers the possibility, the opportunity, of a Palestinian partner. The perception in certain quarters in Israel is that this will emerge as a PLO delegation because this effort has the approval of the PLO. Some others are not as bothered by that. I will be meeting Mubarak this week and I will tell him that the 10 points can be the basis of the Palestinian position; we do not need to sign on to them. ~~(S)~~

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: I know that there is a worry here regarding the possibility of a crisis in Israel and the fall of the coalition government. My view is that action will save the government; inaction will endanger it. This is a golden opportunity before us. The Soviets are outside the process. Jordan is distracted with its internal situation. Syria is imbedded in Lebanon. Somehow, Egypt has managed to engage the PLO. While the involvement of the PLO is not an ideal thing, it is better that the PLO agree than that it shoots people. Each of the two major Israeli parties would need to seek coalition partners it does not like in order to form a coalition; for this

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

reason, I do not think either party has the chance for a narrow coalition. I had a trauma with the London Agreement, so I don't want to miss this opportunity. (S)

General Scowcroft: I agree that this is a moment of opportunity and we want to be active. But we don't want to be in a position to interfere in internal politics. We wholeheartedly back the Israeli government's initiative. I do not think that we should directly endorse the 10 points, since that is the platform for the Palestinians. The critical point now is to get a Palestinian delegation formed in a way acceptable to you and without a PLO stamp of approval. Is there any possibility that 1-2 deportees could be included as members of the delegation? (S)

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: Some of us already agree to it. Rabin and I do not reject this. There are different sorts of deportees. Perhaps we should just agree on "agreed deportees." For example, Muhammad Milhim's name has been mentioned. Though he is not involved in violence personally, he is a member of the PLO Executive Committee, and thus unacceptable. In fact, under current Israeli policy some deportees are able to return in accord with their behavior. The agreement on a Palestinian delegation is something that should be done now. (S)

General Scowcroft: The important thing, you're right, is to get the delegation in order to move to the next step. Is there value in a Mubarak-Shamir meeting? I know Mubarak holds back. (S)

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: How can I say anything but yes? But Mubarak looks upon it as an incentive. This incentive is for the delivery, not for a promise. If Mubarak asks me tomorrow, then I would say yes. Let me remind you that we were instrumental in arranging a meeting (for Shamir) with another senior Arab. Did it help or not? I don't know. (S)

General Scowcroft: What can we do? (U)

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: The things you said and asked about the Palestinian delegation should become a clear U.S. call for action. We are talking about peace, not partisan politics. There must be a timetable, also. (S)

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: The second point I wanted to raise is regarding the Russians. They want trade with us. For our part, we are interested, because trade can spread our people throughout the USSR. With our large concentration of Russians, Israel is ideal in terms of being able to understand the Russians. They want three things from us: cooperation in agriculture; medical scanners; and cargo planes (sic). In this last one, there is a problem. We could use Soviet cargo planes to take our goods to the USSR, and return with Soviet Jews. However, these Soviet planes are only good for Russian pilots; we want to Westernize them. (S)

General Scowcroft: Would you own the planes? (S)

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: Yes -- they would be ours. With your permission we would like to put on U.S. engines and other equipment. If anything else is done with the aircraft, we would ask your permission as required by law. The Soviets know this -- I told them that we would need your permission. They have invited me to Moscow. On the Middle East, they show interest but I do not feel that they have a coherent involvement. The small Israeli Communist Party is old-fashioned -- it has not had a glasnost. (S)

General Scowcroft: We would have no problem in looking at this aircraft issue, if they are to be yours. (S)

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: The third point I wanted to raise is Soviet emigration. We have reached an agreement with the Jewish community that going to Israel will get a priority. Israel needs these Jews more than they do, and they need Israel. We are glad that the immigration decision will be in Moscow. We estimate that 100,000 Jews will want to come out over the next several years. To absorb them will cost $3 billion, and $2 billion of that will come from our budget over the next three years. It is expensive, but the value is greater than the cost. Jewish fund campaigns here can raise $500 million over the next three years. We need to fill the shortfall, and one source is guarantees for housing investment. We would like to get $400 million in U.S. AID housing investment guarantees. This would be an off-budget item, since Israel always pays its debts. (S)

DCM Eran: Our preliminary check is that it would have zero budget implications. (S)

General Scowcroft: We can look into this idea. Our resources are very limited. (S)

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: If Palestinians go for elections it will be a great example for the area. The first consideration is the time element; there must be an inner target. (S)

General Scowcroft: I agree, but there is a limit to what we can do. (S)

Deputy Prime Minister Peres: We don't know how far Mubarak can go. He is not terribly strong on the fine print and not great on our internal politics, either. (S)

The meeting adjourned. Mr. Peres remained behind for a few minutes to make some private points. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7802

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1989

CHRON FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS

SUBJECT: Phone Call to Shamir

1.

It is important that Shamir understand that we are 100% behind getting a dialogue launched between Israelis and Palestinians. It would also be useful to clarify our view of the ten points and just what we are asking (and not asking) of Israel at this time. Attached at Tab I is a telephone call proposal to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the telephone call proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0358-MR
10/24/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7802

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Shamir of Israel

DATE: October 2-3, 1989

PURPOSE: To debrief on meeting with President Mubarak and to promote peace process.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open

INTERPRETER: No

PHONE NUMBER:

CONTACT PERSON:

TIME DIFFERENCE:

SUGGESTED TIMES:

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:
1. Read out of meeting with President Mubarak
2. Need for Israel to allow dialogue on elections to go forward.

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0358-MR
10/24/2014 MM

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR

-- Mr. Prime Minister, let me begin by wishing you and Mrs. Shamir and indeed all Israelis a very happy new year.

-- I have just met with President Mubarak, and wanted to give you my impressions. You should know that he could not be more sincere in his desire for peace and in his willingness to help. I know he spoke with you the other day, and I hope it is not long before the two of you can sit down and discuss matters in person.

-- Based on my meeting with Mubarak, and Jim Baker's discussions with Moshe Arens and Abdel Meguid, I am persuaded we have a real opportunity to implement your government's elections initiative and in the process take a historic step toward peace.

-- What is needed above all else is a pre-elections dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. As you know, Mubarak is prepared to issue invitations and to host the meetings. The primary focus would be on how to make elections a reality.

-- My view, and one Mubarak shares, is that this dialogue ought to take place on the basis of the Israeli government proposal. I do not see the 10 points as an alternative; nor am I asking you or your government to sign on to them.

-- Rather, I simply see the 10 points as something the Palestinian side could take to the table, just as you would be free to bring ideas that flesh out your own proposal. It is important that we not lose sight of our long-standing goal of producing a Palestinian interlocutor other than the PLO that accepts your proposal in principle and is willing to work with you on the details.

-- I am aware that there are additional issues to settle--for example, regarding the composition of the Palestinian side--before we could convene a dialogue about elections. Here I would only ask that Israel demonstrate creativity and flexibility so that a genuine peace process can get underway. You have done so throughout your history; you can and should do no less now.

-- It is essential that no one be able to claim that Israel is saying no to its own initiative. I hope that your cabinet deliberations will make it possible for us to move forward.

-- Mr. Prime Minister, I can appreciate that these are not easy decisions for you. Please call upon me at any time. I am prepared to work closely with you as we move ahead.

-- Again, a happy new year, and may it be one of peace for us.

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7802

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec			
Philip Hughes	1		✓
Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft	3		
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat	5		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

10/2/89
P | Phone call took place — PRS said too late

~~SECRET~~

(Classification)

CHRON FILE

7873

4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8922784

Date October 12, 1989

For: Mr. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: The President From: Thatcher, Margaret

Date: 2 October 1989 Subject: COCOM Controls

Referral Dated: 3 October 89 ID# 8907873 (if any)

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 5/14/2009

Action Taken:

_____ A draft reply is attached.

_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.

_____ A translation is attached.

_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

XXX We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.

_____ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.

_____ Other (see remarks).

Remarks:

This is a courtesy response to letter sent by the President to Mrs. Thatcher.

for Director
Secretariat Staff

~~SECRET~~

(Classification)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ID 8907873

REFERRAL DATE: 03 OCT 89

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE 8922784

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: PRESIDENT '89 OCT-03 4:06 PM

SOURCE: THATCHER, MARGARET

DATE: 02 OCT 89

SUBJ: LTR FM PM THATCHER TO PRES RE COCOM

REQUIRED ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR PRES SIG

DUEDATE: 16 ~~SEP~~ oct 89

COMMENT:

Maria D. Clark

FOR GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

Received in 5/5-IRM/RMC
10/3 at 3:35 pm (CS)

This information has been communicated in confidence to the United States Government and should not be released without the agreement of the British Government

TEXT OF A MESSAGE DATED 2 OCTOBER 1989
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

Begins

Dear George

Thank you for your message of 25 September about COCOM. I very much agree about the need to encourage reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while still guarding our fundamental security interests. We certainly go on making serious and thorough strategic assessments of potential exports, and strictly enforcing our controls. We look forward to welcoming your team here as soon as it suits them to come.

I welcome what you say about streamlining the COCOM control lists so that they deal with items which have been identified as genuinely critical.

This applies with particular force to machine tools. The special group which has been set up under the COCOM Chairman should be given the necessary direction by members to enable it to reach agreement on revised controls. If the existing controls on machine tools are amended to reflect a realistic and up-to-date strategic assessment, COCOM will then be in a much stronger position when it comes to enforcement and compliance.

Yours Ever

Margaret

Ends

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0358 MR
ES 1/26/15

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8906625
RECEIVED: 22 AUG 89 15

TO: HUGHES

GORBON FILE

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 03 OCT 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
AP
MEMCON

VISIT
SP

1

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SUBJECT: MEMCON FM PRES MTG W/ MUBARAK / OCT 2

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES DUE DATE: 25 AUG 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 5/11/2007

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS CLOSED BY: NSGAD DOC 6 OF 6

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6625
ADD ON 2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 3, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for Meeting With The President and President Mubarak of Egypt Monday, October 2, 1989

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum of conversation for the meeting with the President and President Mubarak of Egypt.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and retain for record purposes.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memcon

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/26/13

~~SECRET~~

6625
ADD ON 2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Frank G. Wisner, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)
Dennis Ross, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Egypt
President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak
Esmat Abdel Meguid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Osama al Baz, First Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Director of the President's Cabinet for Political Affairs
El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 2, 1989, 11:00 - 11:45am EDT
The Oval Office

The President: It is a good day for us whenever you visit. I see you are wearing two hats, the OAU and the bilateral. I'd like to turn the floor over to you; feel free to talk about multi-national issues or the Middle East, where your role is most constructive. (U)

President Mubarak: Let's start with the Middle East. You are familiar with events since we gave the ten points to Representative Gray to deliver to Prime Minister Shamir. The substance of our message was to tell Shamir that we don't say no to elections, but that we need to clarify some issues to be able to persuade the Palestinians to go along. This was in early July; by September things began to work. I spoke to Shamir recently, making clear that my efforts were not in any way

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F

against his but were only an explanation for Israel's initiative. I also told him that any negotiation would require the involvement of Palestinians from outside the West Bank and that we were ready to suggest good, moderate names. Shamir told me he would not be ready to respond until after Arens and Peres returned. He also asked if I can meet with them and I said of course. Shamir told me that meeting with Rabin was not enough given the split in the government. I said, "But he is in your government." I told him I've met other members of his government, and invited him to bring all the Likud ministers to Cairo. Arens said that Shamir is sensitive and that it would be an error to just use Rabin. I am afraid that to meet with Shamir without a good result would create problems with the Egyptian public. To help, I phoned Shamir to wish him a happy new year. I told him I would like to meet but that we would need thorough preparations to meet expectations. He told me he agreed. I do not want to have to face my own people without results. Arens told me that Shamir was pleased with the call. I have no sensitivity about speaking with Shamir. But he cannot just say no to everything. I am trying to help him. He raised the issue of the Saudis and whether they would enter into diplomatic relations with Israel. I told him that the Saudis are not in a state of war with either the Soviets or China but they do not even have diplomatic relations with them. Also, the Saudis are helping with the peace process, so don't ask for diplomatic relations. If we make progress, then all this would follow. ~~(S)~~

The President: Was Shamir making diplomatic relations with the Saudis a condition for moving ahead? ~~(C)~~

President Mubarak: No. But why even raise the Saudis? They are not the key. Shamir then raised the issue of the Iraqis. I told him they have no intention to create a problem with the Israelis or start an offensive action. By the way, Saddam Hussein told me that the Americans and the CIA are working to overthrow him. ~~(S)~~

The President: He is crazy. Why would we want to do that? Tell Saddam you raised this with me and I said so. We don't have a history of close relations, but we are not out to get him. Why does he think this? ~~(S)~~

General Scowcroft: If anything, we are extending a hand to Iraq. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker: Maybe it is because we are discouraging Iraq shipping arms to Lebanon. ~~(C)~~

President Mubarak: We did the same. ~~(C)~~

The President: We have no beef with Hussein and we are trying to improve relations. ~~(C)~~

President Mubarak: He is ready for improved relations. ~~(C)~~

The President: He is more reasonable than he used to be. (C)

President Mubarak: I have spoken to him a lot and told him not to be a problem, and not to exert pressure on his Arab brothers. He promised me he would not. Then one day we found some Baathists in Egypt working against our government. I told him and he was furious. Saddam then told his people never to do this again against an Arab government -- except for Syria. (S)

The President: I want to raise a few points about the peace process, that I want you to hear from me. We think your ten points and efforts are very good. What you have done is strong and creative. Your role in moderating Arafat is useful; there is no disconnect between us here. We think we are on the threshold of a key accomplishment if we can get a dialogue launched. I like the idea of your issuing invitations to both sides. If we can help screen names, fine. We need to keep the PLO's fingerprints invisible. If there is a problem with Shamir we can reassure him that the dialogue is on the basis of the Israeli proposal. (S)

President Mubarak: I told him exactly this. (C)

The President: The ten points are not an alternative. (C)

President Mubarak: I said this too. (C)

The President: Palestinians should be able to bring the ten points to the table. Israel should also be able to bring its own points to the table. Israel will have to show flexibility on the matter of the Palestinian delegation, including one or two deportees. Shamir fears being excluded. We keep hearing this. Your call helped here but getting him to Cairo could be key. I met with both Peres and Arens -- this may have exacerbated Shamir's feelings by the way we did the Peres meeting. I always hear that I need to shore up Shamir. Again, your phone call helped and if you could invite him to Cairo it would help. (S)

President Mubarak: We are ready to meet with him but a meeting with no outcome would be very bad. (C)

The President: If there were a bad outcome, it would be bad, but there is no need to solve the whole problem if he comes. (C)

President Mubarak: But we need to solve at least part of the problem. Shamir needs to be flexible, to avoid saying no -- for example, on land for peace. We are trying to work with the Palestinians and we need something to work with. (C)

Secretary Baker: What if you could arrange a meeting in Cairo at which the question of Palestinian representation would be addressed by the US, Israel and Egypt. Would this be enough? (C)

President Mubarak: We could work discreetly with them on this question. (C)

Secretary Baker: We should not go down the ten points one by one to see which ones they accept. (C)

President Mubarak: I agree. What is important is that they just don't say no and don't increase our problems with the Palestinians. The Israelis need to be practical. I reminded Arens of what Dayan said, a "piece of land for a piece of peace." Right now, "peace for peace" is not practical. (C)

On Libya, Qadhafi is better than ever before. I am still being cautious, though. The big problem is Jallud, who gets Qadhafi upset. The latest news is that Jallud brought Iranian, Syrian and Palestinian representatives to Libya a month ago. Fortunately, Qadhafi rejected this anti-Arab coalition after I talked to him. Jallud is constantly working to upset my relationship with Qadhafi but Qadhafi is running after me now. (S)

The President: Why? Is he interested in you because of your OAU hat? (C)

President Mubarak: No. When we met in Casablanca I was frank with him. I told him you are alienating everyone with your terrorism and insults. He said that it was the first time anyone had ever spoken so frankly with him. (C)

The President: We have the greatest confidence in you and know you will not be taken in by Qadhafi. We are still not convinced. Don't let him get his hand in your pocket so he can steal your wallet. We always hear he wants better relations with us. (C)

President Mubarak: I told him he must change and stop supporting terrorism. (C)

The President: We have not seen this. (C)

Secretary Baker: Ask him why he still supports Abu Nidal. (S)

President Mubarak: I will. (C)

The President: Just meeting with you gives Qadhafi standing. This is good for him, but if you lecture him and give him direction, it is good. (C)

President Mubarak: I will meet him again but not in Cairo. If he behaves badly I will say so publicly. (C)

Mr. Al Baz: He has not moved against the PLO. (C)

The President: What about the Sudan? (C)

President Mubarak: He is acting better. (C)

The President: Chad? (C)

Mr. Al Baz: We have no illusions that he has converted but he is acting better. (C)

President Mubarak: In the Sudan he is doing nothing now. (C)

The President: If we see something, we will share it with you. I don't want to miss some opportunity, but we are still apprehensive about whether this leopard has changed his spots. (S)

President Mubarak: Let's give him some time; for now I am losing nothing. (C)

The President: How's Chadli doing? (C)

President Mubarak: He is fed up with Qadhafi. He is asking for my help. Sudat always spoke nicely to Qadhafi. I don't. When Qadhafi made some false claims about Sadat in Casablanca I told him to sit down and not to lecture us like students. After that I got him to shut up and just sit quietly for the meeting. (C)

(At that point the President and President Mubarak met for a one-on-one that lasted until about 12:15 p.m.)