Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Economic Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91139
Folder ID Number: 91139-004

Folder Title:
Latin America - Economics (January - May 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Outline	Re: Meeting with President-Elect Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (3 pp.)	1/25/90	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President-Elect Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (3 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01c. Report	Government Report (2 pp.)	12/17/89	(b)(1)	C
01d. Report	Government Report (1 pp.)	2/12/87	(b)(1)	C
01e. Report	Government Report (1 pp.)	1/4/90	(b)(1)	S
01f. Memo	William T. Pryce to Brent Scowcroft Re: President's Meeting with President-Elect Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (1 pp.)	1/25/90	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01g. Scene Setter	Re: President's Meeting with Brazilian President-Elect Fernando Collor de Mello (2 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01h. Report	Re: Political/Economic Overview (2 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01i. Background Report	Re: U.S. - Brazil Relations (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01j. Talking Points	Re: U.S. - Brazil Relations (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Economics (January - May 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1157
OA/ID Number: 91139-004
Date Closed: 5/14/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01k. Background Report	Re: Regional Affairs (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01l. Talking Points	Re: Regional Affairs (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01m. Background Report	Re: Trade Policy (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01n. Talking Points	Re: Trade Policy (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01o. Report	Re: Bilateral Trade Issues (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01p. Talking Points	Re: Bilateral Trade Issues (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01q. Background Report	Re: Coffee (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01r. Talking Points	Re: Coffee (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01s. Background Report	Re: Debt (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01t. Talking Points	Re: Debt (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01u. Background Report	Re: Environment (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~

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(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01v. Talking Points	Re: Environment (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01w. Background Report	Re: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01x. Talking Points	Re: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01y. Background Report	Re: Narcotics (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
01z. Talking Points	Re: Narcotics (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
02. Memo	Meg Lundsager to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting on Latin American Debt: May 8, 5:30 p.m. (2 pp.)	5/7/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
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Date Closed: 5/14/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9000570
RECEIVED: 24 JAN 90 07

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PRYCE

DOC DATE: 25 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BRAZIL VISIT
AP

2.

PERSONS: COLLOR DE MELLO, FERNANDO

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PRES-ELECT COLLOR DE MELLO / JAN 26

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 26 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRYCE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		PACELLI
		PILLING
		PRYCE

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/14/09

COMMENTS: ______

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OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSJRP DOC 2 OF 2

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CHRON FILE 0570

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1652-MR
4/28/2014 MM

January 25, 1990

MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT-ELECT FERNANDO COLLOR DE MELLO OF BRAZIL

DATE: January 26, 1990
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. to 11:40 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To establish rapport with Collor and encourage him to vigorously pursue his economic reform program; to direct his country's foreign policy orientation away from its traditional Third World approach; to take a positive attitude toward a new coffee agreement; and to let him know that we want to have a constructive relationship across the board.

II. BACKGROUND

Collor came from nowhere to win the Brazilian election in a runoff by defeating his leftist opponent, "Lula" da Silva, 53 to 47 percent. His swift rise was due to his own charisma, a widespread disillusionment with Brazil's traditional politicians, and his adroit use of television. He campaigned as a center-right populist, but his political ideology is largely unknown. He promised economic reform, slashing government expenditures and payroll, and cutting the deficit, while at the same time pledging costly new programs for health, housing, and education which he hopes to fund out of enhanced tax recovery.

He inherits very serious problems; an economy nearing hyperinflation, internal and external debt levels each over $100 billion, a de facto debt moratorium and a society suffering from lack of political leadership and stark social and income inequities.

He will enter office on March 15 having created a mood of hopeful expectations, but also confronting serious political problems. He campaigned with few allies from Brazil's

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

political establishment. His small political party has only 22 representatives in the 570 member congress, but he can probably count on a slight majority from the center parties which are in a state of collapse. However, he will face increasing difficulties in the congress as he tries to implement a reform program.

Our bilateral relations with Brazil have been tense and President Sarney has complained frequently that the U.S. was ignoring Brazil. We threatened trade sanctions in several cases due to Brazilian import restrictions and lack of intellectual property protection. The Brazilians complain about our applications of countervailing duty and anti-dumping laws, tariffs on orange juice and steel, our farm export subsidies and our denial of certain technologies related to nuclear and missile development. Our dialogue has improved somewhat in the last few months. We have taken up Sarney's suggestion that we develop a bilateral "positive agenda" -- and have achieved progress on some trade issues and in the area of scientific and environmental cooperation. Collor has indicated that he wishes to accelerate this progress. We suggest high level Foreign Ministry and Treasury contacts after his inauguration to provide a framework.

Brazilian regional policy under President Sarney was heavily oriented towards closer relations with neighboring countries, particularly Argentina. He encouraged formation of the G-8 and reestablished relations with Cuba. Otherwise, Brazilian regional policy under its traditionalist Foreign Ministry has been unadventurous. It is based on opposition to any kind of intervention in the affairs of other Latin American states. Collor's pledge to shift Brazil's foreign policy towards closer relations with the U.S. and other OECD countries may result in a somewhat more open dialogue with the Brazilian government on regional questions. He is likely to be more forthcoming on both regional and bilateral issues than his Foreign Ministry.

Brazil has so far been unresponsive to our efforts to get it to take a more constructive position regarding a new coffee agreement. It continues to block new negotiations because of an unwillingness to lose a market share to the producers of mild coffee such as Colombia and Central America. We need to convince the Brazilians that stable prices from a new agreement will benefit all producers in the long run and contribute to economic prosperity in the region.

One of our major goals is to improve the multilateral trading system through the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. Although Brazil is well-situated to play a useful role in a number of issues, its participation has been less than constructive, particularly in the fields of agriculture and intellectual property--areas of major importance to the U.S.

Collor's support, as reflected in a more forthcoming GATT position, could help achieve U.S. goals.

Brazil has signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco which seeks to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin America, but it has not brought the Treaty into force. It has unsafeguarded, sensitive nuclear facilities which are under military control. Its constitution prohibits non-peaceful use of nuclear energy, and we have no evidence that Brazil has made a decision to pursue a nuclear weapons program. However, the Brazilian government is committed to developing a nuclear submarine. Brazil is also determined to develop its own space launch vehicle (SLV). Brazilian conventional arms sales to undesirable clients (Libya, Iran) are an added source of concern on the missile front. Collor has said little about the Brazilian nuclear program except that he wants to review it (and its costs) and favors continuing the submarine effort.

Because most of the drugs produced in Brazil are intended for domestic consumption, the government of Brazil has been both interested and cooperative in bilateral and multilateral drug eradication efforts. The $1.9 million narcotics control program for Brazil is geared to provide the Brazilian government with increased wherewithal to combat coca and marijuana cultivation. In addition, Brazilian programs are aimed at sensitizing the public to the narcotics threat to Brazilian society.

This is the first stop for Collor on a 20-day trip which will include Tokyo, Moscow and Europe. He and his advisors clearly view his meeting with you as the high point of the trip. Collar's primary goal will probably be to get your support for his future, and as yet undefined, economic programs. After seeing you, Collar will be hosted for lunch be Secretary Baker, have separate meetings with the Vice President, Secretaries Brady and Mosbacher, and Ambassador Hills. He will also address the National Press Club.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See list at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by discussion.

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made (with cards)
Tab B List of Participants
Tab C Biographies

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT-ELECT FERNANDO COLLOR DE MELLO OF BRAZIL

U.S. - Brazil Relations

-- We look to Brazil, as a major power, for help and ideas on important international issues.

-- Our relations with Brazil have been troubled but are now improving. The economic reforms you plan could accelerate this progress by alleviating trade tensions and improving relations with the international financial community.

-- Our first priority is to achieve a framework for improved relations. I suggest that, after your inauguration, we intensify high-level Foreign Ministry and Treasury contacts.

Regional Affairs

-- The U.S. and Brazil have a special responsibility for leadership in the region. We hope we can increase consultation on regional issues.

-- We are very heartened by the dramatic spread of democracy throughout the region. However, it is important that we not forget the threat posed by Cuba and Nicaragua.

-- We understand that Brazil has reservations over our actions in Panama. We take satisfaction in the reestablishment of democracy there. The important task now is to lend support to the Endara government.

-- The drug issue is now a major regional concern and we have enjoyed excellent cooperation with Brazil.

Trade

-- We welcome your commitment to trade liberalization and believe it could facilitate a solution to the problems we identified in our Super 301 case.

-- I know that there are irritants in our bilateral trade relationships on both sides. It is in both our interests to work together pragmatically to solve trade conflicts.

-- We look forward to greater cooperation with Brazil in the Uruguay Round of the GATT.

-- I hope your government will give attention to improved intellectual property rights protection. Extending patent protection to pharmaceuticals is a priority for us.

Coffee

-- We hope Brazil will play a positive role in reforming the coffee agreement which will benefit all producers.

Debt

-- The U.S. wishes to be as helpful as possible in assisting Brazil to resolve its debt problem, but Brazil must take the first bold steps.

-- Brazil's first priority should be implementing a credible structural reform package aimed at controlling inflation and balancing government finances. An IMF agreement will also be necessary.

-- Once these steps are taken, the U.S. will be able to see how Brazil could take advantage of the Brady Plan.

-- Little progress has been made in negotiating repayment terms for Brazil's debts to the USG under the Paris Club agreements. I hope you will make this a priority to avoid jeopardizing U.S. Export-Import Bank operations.

Narcotics

-- We appreciate Brazil's cooperation and support in anti-narcotics matters. I hope that cooperation continues. What are your Administration's anti-narcotics goals?

Nuclear

-- We have long-standing commitments to halting the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This includes restrictions on dual-use technology which can be used in weapons development. Our policy is global and is not aimed specifically at Brazil.

-- Brazil's own security, as well as the security of others, would be enhanced if it brought the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force and put all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

Environment

-- Over the past year we have become more optimistic about Brazil's efforts to preserve the Amazon region. I hope that Brazil will be prepared to work with others, including the international financial institutions, to design a sound development plan.

-- We support Brazil's bid to host the 1992 conference on the environment.

-- I am aware of your reservations about sovereignty in debt-for-nature swaps, but I would encourage you to keep an open mind on this issue.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates,
  Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Richard H. Melton, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Marcel Bouquet, Interpreter

Brazil

Fernando Affonso COLLOR de Mello, President-elect
Marcilio Marques MOREIRA, Ambassador to the United States
Marcos Antonia de Salvo COIMBRA, (Ambassador) Foreign Policy Advisor to the President Elect
Zelia Maria CARDOSO de Mello, Economic Advisor to the President-elect
Pericles Stussi, Interpreter


DOOR
DOOR
Melton
Aronson
Gov Sununu
Sec Baker
Int.
The President
Vice President
Brady
Scowcroft
Gates
Pryce
The Cabinet Room
Moreira
Pres Collor
Int.
Coimbra
Cardoso
DOOR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	12/17/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Economics (January - May 1990)

Date Closed: 5/14/2009	**OA/ID Number:** 91139-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S **Re-review Case #:** **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**	**Appeal Case #:** **Appeal Disposition:** **Disposition Date:**
AR Case #: **AR Disposition:** **AR Disposition Date:**	**MR Case #:** **MR Disposition:** **MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01d. Report	Government Report (1 pp.)	2/12/87	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Economics (January - May 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES on 2/14/14

Date Closed:	5/14/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91139-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2009-1118-MR (500.03)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	5/30/2013	**MR Disposition Date:**	

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(b)(1); (b)(3)

Marcílio Marques MOREIRA **BRAZIL**
(Phonetic: moRAYrah)

Ambassador to the United States
(since November 1986)



A highly respected international banker, Marcílio Moreira is a moderate who has opposed radical unilateral solutions (such as a debt moratorium) to Brazil's financial problems. (b)(1); (b)(3) He is mentioned in the press as a possible successor to Finance Minister Dilson Funaro should President José Sarney shuffle the Cabinet to redirect Brazil's faltering economic policies. Twice previously, however, Moreira has been invited to assume a ministerial post (once education and once planning) and has declined. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Moreira is widely noted for his (b)(1); (b)(3) credibility with European and US bankers. (b)(1); (b)(3) Moreira is also highly respected within the Brazilian Government and was once a key adviser to Antônio Delfim Neto, Planning Minister and economic czar of the previous (military) government. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Moreira joined the foreign service in 1954. He subsequently completed several courses at the Rio Branco (diplomatic) Institute and obtained a law degree from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. During 1957-63 he served as a third secretary and later a second secretary at the Embassy in Washington, where he also studied political science at Georgetown. In the mid-1960s Moreira participated in several international negotiations and conferences. (b)(1); (b)(3) He played a key role in the 1965 negotiations of the Investment Guaranty Agreement with the United States. He also served with the International Economic Development Bank in the 1960s and 1970s. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Moreira left the foreign service in the late 1970s to join Unibank—one of Brazil's largest private financial institutions. From at least 1978 until his nomination as ambassador he served as vice president of the bank and right-hand man to Walter Moreira Sales, president of the bank and himself a former Ambassador to the United States. He has been a key adviser to Sales on international and domestic issues and conducted liaison with international organizations and foreign banks. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Moreira, 56, speaks excellent English. He has traveled frequently to the United States, several European countries, and Japan to attend conferences on international debt issues. He is a professor of law and social sciences and the author of several books, including *The Brazilian Quandary*, which is about the debt crisis. (b)(1); (b)(3)

LDA M 87-10715
12 February 1987

(b)(1); (b)(3)

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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0570

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 25, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM T. PRYCE WTP

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with President-Elect Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President for use at his meeting with President-elect Collor of Brazil scheduled for Friday, January 26 in the Cabinet Room.

Concurrences by: Ms. Mandel, Mr. Melby and Mr. Beers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Points to be Made (President)
- Tab B List of Participants
- Tab C Biographies

Tab II State Incoming

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

9001518

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 #0570

January 23, 1990

UNCLASSIFIED with
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachments)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Materials for the President's Meeting With Brazilian President-Elect Fernando COLLOR de Mello, January 26, 11 a.m.

Attached are briefing materials prepared by the Department of State for the President's meeting with Brazilian President-Elect Fernando COLLOR de Mello.

J. Stapleton Roy

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Scene Setter
2. Political/Economic Overview
3. Background Papers/Talking Points
   - US-Brazil Relations
   - Regional Affairs
   - Trade Policy
   - Bilateral Trade Issues
   - Coffee
   - Debt
   - Environment
   - Nuclear and Missile Proliferation
   - Narcotics
4. List of Participants and Biographic Data
5. Economic Data Sheet

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
~~Department of State Guidelines~~
~~E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), July 21, 1997~~
~~By _____ NARA, Date _____~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
6/26/15

UNCLASSIFIED with
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachments)

PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH
BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT FERNANDO COLLOR DE MELLO

SCENE SETTER

Situation: A year ago, the 40-year old Collor was an obscure politician in one of the smallest states in Brazil's poverty-stricken Northeast. His swift ascendancy is due both to widespread disillusion with Brazil's traditional political class and Collor's own skill in mounting a television campaign to exploit this malaise. He campaigned as a center-right populist, but his political ideology is largely unknown.

Upon his inauguration March 15, Collor inherits an economy on the edge of hyper-inflation, external and internal debt levels each over $100 billion, a *de facto* external debt moratorium and a society suffering from lack of political leadership and stark social and income inequities.

Collor's ability to deal with these challenges is problematic. He campaigned with few allies from Brazil's political establishment and may have considerable difficulty in moving economic reform measures through the Brazilian Congress. He will have to contend with newly aggressive leftist forces, galvanized by their near-victory in the presidential election and seeking to gain increased power in next October's congressional and gubernatorial elections. Traditionally protected business interests will also resist serious attempts at reform.

On issues of importance to the USG, Collor has:

-- Generally supported reducing Brazilian import barriers and privatizing some state companies.

-- Called for renegotiation of Brazil's $112 billion external debt. On the approximately $65 billion owed to private banks, he has suggested that individual state debtors, e.g. state governments and public companies, renegotiate individually. This idea is anathema to the banks since it is tantamount to removing unilaterally the GOB's sovereign risk guarantee on most of this portion of the debt.

-- Called for concentrating Brazil's foreign policy focus on relations with the OECD countries rather than on the third world. On specifics, however, he has avoided any commitment on external political issues such as Central America and Panama (although he publicly criticized our Panama intervention). In fact, Collor appears to have few developed foreign policy positions.

-- Endorsed continuation of Brazil's nuclear submarine program. He has also given signs since the election of backing off campaign positions aimed at reform of and greater supervision over the Brazilian military. Therefore, prospects are not bright for any early change of GOB policy in the area of nuclear and missile development.

The U.S. is the first stop for Collor on a 20-day trip to capitals in the Americas, Europe and Asia. Collor and his advisers clearly view the meeting with President Bush as the high point of the trip.

<u>U.S. Objectives</u>: In order of priority, these should be:

- o To begin an effective, personal relationship between Collor and President Bush;
- o To achieve some general agreement with Collor on the framework for an improved U.S.-Brazilian relationship;
- o To underline the limits on our ability to help address Brazil's external debt problem unless and until Collor can implement a credible economic recovery plan and achieve an agreement with the IMF;
- o To explore Collor's ideas on subjects such as reducing the State's role in Brazil's economy, foreign investment, trade liberalization, Brazilian institution-building and important hemispheric questions such as drugs, the global environment and democratic progress.

<u>Collor's Objectives</u>: We expect that Collor will seek U.S. support for his future -- and as yet, undefined -- economic program. Collor's campaign, like those of his principal opponents, portrayed Brazil's external debt as the principal constraint on Brazilian economic recovery. He will probably be looking for early indications of Western support to provide him with political backing at home.

POLITICAL/ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

- Center-right populist Fernando Collor de Mello emerged the victor of the December 17 runoff, winning by about five points over the left-wing candidate, Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva of the Workers Party. The administration of incumbent President Jose Sarney has settled into a largely caretaker status, awaiting Collor's March 15 inauguration.

- Collor is a former governor of the small northeastern state of Alagoas. His widely publicized attacks on highly-paid, double-dipping civil servants (whom he scorned as "maharajas") struck a responsive chord with the electorate. He ran as an alternative to traditional politicians. He is center-right politically, but won due to strong support from the lower classes.

- The presidency has traditionally been a very strong symbol in Brazil. Collor, however, will have difficulty moving needed reforms through Congress, which faces reelection in October 1990. He does not have a strong party base in the Congress. For its part, the Congress is also new to its role under the 1988 constitution.

- Collor faces formidable economic problems. Brazil has been struggling with high inflation since at least the late 1970's. Inflation for the last 12 months is over 1700% and growing.

- The government has launched three anti-inflation programs since 1985: the Cruzado Plan (1986), Bresser Plan (1987), and Summer Plan (1989). The thrust of each was to control inflation temporarily through wage-price freezes. Unfortunately the government was -- and remains -- unable to attack its own deficit or otherwise reform the economy, and inflation returned after each plan.

- Despite strong trade performance, Brazil's reserves have fallen to a level that the government finds worrisome. Defense of foreign exchange reserves has become a major priority. Brazil did not make its commercial bank payment due in September and has entered a <u>de facto</u> moratorium. It is in arrears on official debt owed to the U.S. And it has centralized (and delayed) other foreign financial transactions, such as profit remittance and capital repatriation.

- Collor ran on a promise to renegotiate Brazil's $112 billion external debt. Like most of the other candidates, he encouraged the idea that foreign debt is the key constraint to revival of the Brazilian economy. He has also advanced some ideas on renegotiating the debt which are unlikely to be acceptable to creditor banks.

- Investment, whether domestic or foreign, remains quite low by historical standards. Domestic investors are uncertain of the country's leadership and direction; offshore investors are additionally put off by some provisions of the new constitution, including one which clearly provides preferential treatment for domestic investors.

- Brazil developed under a corporatist, import substitution model which some Brazilians now see as no longer effective. Although there have been calls for reform, including privatization, there are many in government, business and labor who prefer the protected status quo.

U.S. - BRAZIL RELATIONS

Background: In recent years, our bilateral relations with Brazil have been tense. The USG threatened trade sanctions in several cases due to Brazilian import restrictions and lack of intellectual property protection. We continued to deny certain technologies to Brazil out of concern with its nuclear and missile development programs. President Sarney's failure to take necessary economic reform measures made it impossible for us to be responsive on the key questions of Brazil's external debt and its collapsing economy. Sarney complained frequently that the U.S. was ignoring Brazil.

Our dialogue with the GOB has improved somewhat in the last few months. We have taken up Sarney's suggestion that we develop a bilateral "positive agenda" -- and have achieved progress on some trade issues and in the area of scientific and environmental cooperation. Collor has indicated that he wishes to accelerate this progress.

U.S. - BRAZIL RELATIONS

Talking Points:

-- Very pleased you could visit. We share your desire for a closer relationship.

-- We are both large, complex countries and will always have bilateral issues to resolve. We look to Brazil, as a major global power, for help and ideas on important international issues. Finally, we share a special responsibility for leadership in the hemisphere.

-- Our relations with Brazil have been troubled but are now improving. The liberalization and reform of the Brazilian economy you promise could accelerate this progress -- by alleviating trade tensions and creating a basis for understanding with the international financial community.

-- Our first priority is to achieve a workable framework for an improved relationship. I suggest that, after your inauguration, we intensify high-level foreign ministry and Treasury contacts at senior levels.

-- The purpose of these contacts would be to stimulate an early dialogue on issues such as your economic reform agenda, technology transfer, nuclear proliferation and consultation on global and hemispheric issues.

-- I also urge that we accelerate working level discussion of outstanding trade matters, in both capitals and in Geneva.

-- Finally, I suggest you consider returning to Washington for an official working visit, perhaps late this spring, so that we can review progress.

-- I would like to know your reaction to this agenda and your ideas on improving bilateral relations.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Background: President Sarney oriented Brazilian regional policy heavily towards closer relations with neighboring countries, particularly Argentina. He encouraged formation of the G-8 and reestablished relations with Cuba. Otherwise, Brazilian regional policy under its traditionalist foreign ministry has been unadventurous. It is essentially based on opposition to any kind of intervention in the affairs of other Latin American states -- and a desire not to allow conflict in areas which Brazil views as marginal to its interests, e.g. Central America, to interfere unduly with Brazilian - U.S. relations.

We do not expect Brazilian policy in Latin America to change significantly under a Collor administration. However, Collor's pledge to shift Brazil's foreign policy towards closer relations with the U.S. and other OECD countries may result in a somewhat more open dialogue with the GOB on regional questions. We expect that the Foreign Ministry will largely maintain a relatively inactive posture in the OAS and other regional groups. Collor's personal views are unknown on most regional issues; he has mildly criticized our Panama intervention.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Talking Points:

-- We see the U.S. and Brazil, the largest states of the hemisphere, as having a special responsibility for leadership in the region. We hope we can increase consultation with your government on regional issues.

-- We are very heartened by the dramatic spread of democracy throughout the region. However, it is important that we not forget the threat to regional security still posed by authoritarian regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua.

-- We understand that Brazil has reservations over our actions in Panama. We take satisfaction in the reestablishment of democracy there. The important task for the hemisphere now is to lend support to the Endara government.

-- The drug issue is now a major regional concern. We have enjoyed excellent cooperation with Brazil in this area -- and look forward to increasing it with you. We are both large consumers of drugs and so should have common objectives.

-- Brazil and the U.S. are active members of the OAS. We will continue to work closely with Brazil's OAS Ambassador and with Secretary General Soares to support OAS efforts to strengthen democracy and promote the observance of human rights.

TRADE POLICY

Background: Brazil's economic development has until recently been based on import substitution. This orientation began to change in 1988, when the Sarney administration announced that Brazil's future development could be best promoted through competitive integration with the world economy. Collor has made a major point of stressing that he favors opening up the Brazilian economy to international competition. However, the myriad trade restrictions and distortions that were created during the half-century of import substitution will not be easy to clear away. More importantly, Collor's trade liberalization policies potentially face strong resistance from entrenched interests who have benefitted from a closed economy.

A principal goal of U.S. trade policy is to improve the multilateral trading system through the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. U.S. objectives include improving discipline in traditional trade practices and expanding GATT rules to new areas such as investment, services and intellectual property. Although Brazil is well-situated to play a useful role in a number of issues, Brazil's Uruguay Round participation has been less than constructive, particularly in the agriculture and intellectual property areas of major importance to the U.S. Collor's support, as reflected in a more forthcoming GATT position, could assist in the achievement of U.S. goals in the Uruguay Round.

TRADE POLICY

Talking Points:

-- We welcome your commitment to trade liberalization in Brazil.

-- A Brazil more open to international trade will be a more efficient and prosperous Brazil. Trade liberalization will also serve to decrease trade tension with the U.S.

-- We look forward to greater cooperation with Brazil in the GATT Uruguay Round. A multilateral trading system with improved discipline and expanded coverage will serve Brazil's interests.

-- Greater Brazilian support for these objectives in the Round would help encourage the improved relations you have called for between Brazil and the OECD countries.

BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES

A brief review of the major bilateral trade issues follows:

ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE U.S.:

Super 301: Brazil was named a priority country. Practices cited involved Brazil's import licensing system, including prohibited imports, de facto quotas, and lack of transparency. Issues are being discussed bilaterally and in the GATT. Brazil has indicated a desire to make progress, but has yet to take specific action.

Special 301: Brazil is on the priority watch list. Intellectual property practices cited were failure to protect pharmaceutical patents and issues involving motion pictures.

Pharmaceuticals 301: This was a case pursued by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association on Brazil's lack of pharmaceutical patents. It resulted in a $39 million per year U.S. retaliation. Case is being discussed in the GATT.

Informatics: Self-initiated 301 case filed in 1985 was concluded in 1989 after progress was made in several areas. U.S. continues to pursue improved access for U.S. software, hardware and investment.

Telecommunications: U.S. pursuing market access as required by 1988 Trade Law. U.S. is also closely following Brazilian procurement of communication satellites and cellular telephone systems.

ISSUES OF CONCERN TO BRAZIL:

U.S. Trade Law: Brazil complains about application of countervailing duty and anti-dumping laws.

Tariffs: Brazil complains that although U.S. tariffs are generally low, they are high on products of particular interest to it such as orange juice and steel.

Export Enhancement Program (EEP): Brazil claims that EEP exports to preempt subsidized EC sales end up hurting Brazil's sales as well. Brazil intends to pursue this issue in the GATT.

BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES

Talking Points:

-- A bilateral trading relationship as large as ours will inevitably include trade conflicts.

-- It is in the interest of both countries to work together pragmatically to solve trade conflicts rather than permit them to affect the entire relationship. The U.S. has worked hard over the past year to improve the trade relationship.

-- The trade liberalization policy suggested in your campaign could facilitate a solution to the problems we identified in our Super 301 case.

-- I urge your government to give early attention to the question of improved intellectual property rights protection in Brazil. Extending patent protection to pharmaceuticals should be a priority. Progress in this area could remove a major irritant in bilateral relations.

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COFFEE

Background: The U.S. and Brazil -- the world's largest coffee consumer and the world's largest coffee producer -- cooperated for more than 20 years in the International Coffee Organization (ICO) in an attempt to stabilize coffee prices. In recent years, however, as serious problems emerged in the operation of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), the U.S. found Brazil increasingly unwilling to cooperate constructively on coffee matters.

During the 1989 renegotiation of the ICA, the U.S. sought improvements to the quota distribution mechanism to recognize consumer preferences and new mechanisms to deal effectively with discounted coffee sales to non-ICO members. Brazil led the opposition to these initiatives. Consequently, ICO members were unable to agree on new economic provisions, and the price of coffee plummeted. This has had a disastrous effect on the economies of coffee-exporting countries, particularly Colombia and the Central American democracies.

Brazil's current strategy appears to be based on a political defense of its historic quota share and a belief that as a low-cost producer it will eventually emerge even more dominant after a period of low coffee prices. Brazil appears to have misjudged U.S. seriousness in this exercise, and apparently expected the U.S. to capitulate in order to save the ICO and aid Central America and Colombia. The inauguration of a new Brazilian administration provides an important opportunity to start a fresh dialogue with Brazil on coffee that might lead to the renewal of negotiations for a new ICA.

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COFFEE

Talking Points:

-- The current stalemate over a new International Coffee Agreement is to no one's benefit. I hope that your government will take a fresh look at Brazil's position.

-- The U.S. is seeking a new agreement that addresses our concerns over the availability of coffee types preferred by our consumers and that deals effectively with the problem of discounted sales to non-members.

-- Stabilizing coffee prices will assist in consolidating democracy in Central America and also provide an economic alternative to illegal drug production in the Andes -- objectives that both of our countries share.

DEBT

Background: Brazil is the largest developing country debtor, owing $112 billion to foreign private and official creditors. Although Brazil rescheduled its commercial debt in 1988, as of September 1989 Brazil had again entered a de facto moratorium. Commercial bank arrears now amount to about $4 billion. Brazil has remained current on its payments to international financial institutions and to most foreign governments -- although not to the U.S.G. Brazil has not implemented either its 1987 or 1988 Paris Club agreements with the U.S.; failure to do so jeopardizes the Export-Import Bank's ability to continue lending to Brazil.

Brazil's foreign debt is popularly seen in Brazil as the country's biggest economic problem. The U.S. view is that, in the correct policy environment, Brazil's foreign debt should be manageable in relation to its economy and trade surplus. The U.S. believes that Brazil's principal economic problem is inflation (1,700 per cent in 1989) brought on by uncontrolled government spending. During his campaign Collor called for the unilateral removal of the sovereign guarantee for Brazil's debt. This is unlikely to be accepted by the creditor banks. The U.S. believes that the appropriate strategy for Brazil is to implement a comprehensive and credible economic reform package that will lead to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. At this point the U.S. Government would be prepared to work to include Brazil in the Brady Plan.

DEBT

Talking Points:

-- The U.S. wishes to be as helpful as possible in assisting Brazil to resolve its debt problem, but the first bold steps must be taken by Brazil.

-- Brazil's first priority should be implementing a credible structural reform package aimed at controlling inflation and balancing government finances. Agreement with the International Monetary Fund will also be necessary.

-- Once these steps are taken, the U.S. will be in a position to see how Brazil could take advantage of the Brady Plan.

-- Little progress has been made in negotiating repayment terms for Brazil's debts to the U.S. Government under either the 1987 or 1988 Paris Club agreements. I hope you will make this a priority of your government. Failure to make progress in this area could jeopardize U.S. Export - Import Bank operations in Brazil.

ENVIRONMENT

Background: In 1988-89, increased burnings in the Amazon, combined with severe droughts in the US and the December 1988 murder of environmentalist/labor leader Chico Mendes, brought the destruction of the Amazon and its effects on the world environment to the forefront. In April 1989, the GOB introduced an environmental program called "Our Nature," designed to reduce the destruction of the rain forest while seeking alternatives to develop the region. However, the GOB lacks the financial resources to implement this ambitious program.

After initial hostility, the GOB has eased its reaction to foreign pressure on the issue. It has signalled greater consent to work with foreigners on the problem -- although still resisting "debt for nature" schemes. Brazil has also become more active in multilateral environmental work; the U.N. General Assembly has voted to accept the Brazilian Government's offer to host the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development.

During his election campaign, President-elect Collor publicly favored foreign help to stem deforestation of the Amazon Basin. However, he opposed debt-for-nature swaps. He also proposed that countries responsible for toxic waste emissions pay an international tax levied by the UN.

ENVIRONMENT

Talking Points:

-- Over the past year we have become more optimistic about Brazil's efforts to preserve the Amazon region.

-- The United States Government supports Brazil's bid to host the 1992 conference. A developing country as host would build international consensus for the concept that environmentally sound decisions are the basis for sustainable development.

-- The preservation of the global environment is a growing concern to everyone. I hope that Brazil will be prepared to work with others, including the multilateral financial institutions, to design a sound development plan for the Amazon.

-- The U.S. and Brazil already cooperate on some environmental issues -- particularly in multilateral fora and through joint satellite studies with NASA. We hope we can expand our dialogue and cooperation with your government.

-- I am aware of your reservations about sovereignty in debt-for-nature swaps, but I would encourage you to keep an open mind on this issue. Arrangements are normally worked out so that local organizations oversee their implementation. Such swaps have achieved positive results in places like Costa Rica and Ecuador.

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NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Background: Brazil has signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco which seeks to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin America, but it has not brought the Treaty into force. Brazil has unsafeguarded, sensitive nuclear facilities which are under military control. Its constitution prohibits non-peaceful use of nuclear energy, and we have no evidence that the GOB has made a decision to pursue a nuclear weapons program. However, the GOB is committed to developing a nuclear submarine.

Brazil is also determined to develop its own space launch vehicle (SLV). While we support peaceful space cooperation with Brazil, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) constrains us and our G-7 Summit allies from providing Brazil with technology that could be readily adapted to ballistic missile development. Brazilian conventional arms sales to undesirable clients (Libya, Iran) are an added source of concern on the missile front.

Proliferation concerns and law oblige us to review exports of high technology items to Brazil which could be used in developing nuclear weapons or missiles. Supercomputers receive especially close scrutiny. The majority of items are routinely approved. Difficult cases are approved if our assessment of the intended use and security arrangements to prevent diversion to unauthorized uses meets a high standard of confidence. However, U.S. restrictions -- and occasional denials -- are a source of irritation in the GOB and the Brazilian scientific/industrial community. There are indications that some Brazilians are beginning to look elsewhere to purchase high technology.

Brazil is now reviewing bids for new communications satellites. A French offer includes transfer of rocket engine technology that exceeds MTCR guidelines. Our objections to this sale -- still the subject of sharp exchanges with the GOF -- could become a significant irritant in U.S.-Brazilian relations.

Collor has said little about the GOB nuclear program except that he wants to review it (and its costs) and favors continuing the submarine effort. Once in office he may be reluctant to confront the military on nuclear or missile issues.

NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Talking Points:

-- The U.S. has long-standing commitments to halting the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This includes restricting the spread of dual-use technology which can be used in weapons development. Our policy is global; it is not aimed specifically -- or punitively -- at Brazil. Nor is it discriminatory.

-- We believe Brazil's own security as well as the security of other nations would be enhanced if it joined the majority of governments in the region and brought the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force and put all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

-- We look forward to continuing at an early date the positive dialogue on nuclear issues that we have had with Brazil over the past seven years.

-- We have also discussed with your government steps Brazil could take to facilitate access to dual-use technology within the constraints of our weapons proliferation concerns. We hope to continue those discussions at an early, mutually convenient date.

-- We welcome Brazil's modernization and want to be a source of the technology needed to achieve that goal. The technology <u>is</u> available, despite occasional restrictions, and U.S. companies are eager to do business with Brazil.

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NARCOTICS

Background: Because most of the drugs produced in Brazil are intended for domestic consumption, the Government of Brazil has been both interested and cooperative in bilateral and multilateral drug eradication efforts. The $1.9 million U.S. narcotics control program for Brazil is geared to provide the Government of Brazil with increased wherewithal to combat coca and marijuana cultivation. In addition, Brazilians are continuing a modest drug abuse prevention and awareness program aimed at sensitizing the public to the narcotics threat to Brazilian society.

Brazil is South America's major producer of ether and acetone, essential chemicals for processing cocaine. However, Brazilian statistics show only a small percentage of Brazil's legal production of these chemicals being diverted to cocaine production. The Brazilian Government has been successful in its efforts to detect and destroy clandestine cocaine processing labs and there is evidence that fewer cocaine processing chemicals of Brazilian origin are found outside Brazil.

Brazil's role as a transit country for narcotics originating in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru is increasing. Brazilian customs officials have recently seized substantial amounts of cocaine in Rio de Janeiro and Manaus. With increased pressure on narcotics traffickers in neighboring countries, narcotics cultivation and transit problems in Brazil are expected to grow worse as the Andean drug lords seek other places to conduct their business.

During the election campaign, President-elect Collor stated he would wage an "all-out war" against drugs in Brazil and would intensify enforcement activities to combat drug trafficking. However, narcotics were not a major campaign issue and he has not yet proposed a specific anti-narcotics program.

NARCOTICS

Talking Points:

-- We appreciate the Brazilian Government's cooperation and support in anti-narcotics matters. I hope that cooperation continues under your administration.

-- Our anti-narcotics program is broadening. Brazil, given its size and geographic location, will likely become more involved. What role would you like to see your government play in the anti-narcotics effort?

-- The United States and Brazil have a great deal in common. Domestic drug consumption is a major problem in both countries. I hope we can work together to combat this.

-- Have you outlined what your administration's narcotics program will be? What are your specific objectives?

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DECL:OADR

PROPOSED LIST OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND BRAZILIAN ATTENDEES

<u>Department of State</u>

Secretary Baker
Ambassador to Brazil Richard H. Melton
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson
Interpreter

<u>Brazilian</u>

President-Elect Fernando COLLOR (<u>KO</u>-Lor) de Mello
Ambassador to the U.S. Marcilio Marques MOREIRA
Ambassador Marcos Antonio de Salvo COIMBRA (KO-<u>IM</u>-BRA)
Interpreter

BRAZIL

Economic Data Table

Population: 147 million (est.)
Rate of Population Growth: 2.1%
Life Expectancy: 65
Literacy Rate (1984): 78%
Infant Mortality: 67 per 1000

1989 GDP: $US 353 billion(e)
GDP per Capita: $2,405
Composition of GDP: Agric. 13%, Ind. 33%, Serv. 54%
U.S. Investment: $US 9.2 billion

	1987	1988	1989	
1. ECONOMIC INDICATORS:				
1a. Real GDP (% ch)	3.6	-0.3	1.0	
1b. Real GDP Per Capita (% ch)	1.5	-2.4	-1.1	
1c. Consumer Price Index (% ch)	366	934	1,765	
1d. Gross Invest as % of GDP	19.0	NA	NA	
1e. Unemployment Rate (%)	3.6	3.7	4.0	(1)
2.FISCAL INDICATORS				
2a. Operational Public Sector Balance as % of GDP	-5.4	-4.3	-6.5	(e)
3.BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ($US Bill)				
3a. Exports to US	7.6	9.1	6.5	(2)
3b. Imports from US	-4.0	-4.2	3.4	(2)
3c. Trade Balance with US	3.6	4.9	3.1	(2)
3d. Total Exports FOB	26.2	33.8	31.0	
3e. Total Imports CIF	-15.1	-14.7	-17.0	
3f. Merchandise Trade Balance	11.2	19.1	16.5	
3g. Current Account Balance	-0.8	4.8	3.4	(e)
4.EXTERNAL FINANCE				
4a. Gross External Debt ($US Bill)	121	115	112	
4b. Gross Debt as % GDP	37.4	32.8	30.2	
4c. Debt Service Paid as % of exp	35.3	52.7	56.4	(3)
4d. Exchange Rate (end of year)	71.3	753.0	11.3	(4)
4e. Total Reserves minus gold ($USB)	5.6	7.0	7.0	(e)

Notes:
(e) = Estimated
(1) = Open Urban Unemployment; understates true rate
(2) = Jan - Sept 1989
(3) = Debt moratorium in effect at various times over this period
(4) = In 1987 and 1988, monetary unit was Cruzado; in 1989 New Cruzado equal to 1,000 Cruzados was introduced

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	Meg Lundsager to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting on Latin American Debt: May 8, 5:30 p.m. (2 pp.)	5/7/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
Office:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Latin American Files
Subseries:	Economic Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:	
File Location:	Latin America - Economics (January - May 1990)

Date Closed:	5/14/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91139-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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National Security Council
The White House

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Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		~~NFA~~
NSC Secretariat	4		N

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cc: VP Sununu Other

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COMMENTS

Meeting on Tuesday May 8
~~5:30~~ PM
5:15