

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91138
Folder ID Number: 91138-013

Folder Title:
Central America (February - May 1991)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Donald C. Johnson/David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Goals for Our Latin America Policy in 1991 (5 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (2 pp.)	3/6/91	(b)(1)	C
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02c. Talking Points	Re: Suggested Points for President's Call from President Chamorro (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02d. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (2 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	C
03. Memo	From American Embassy Managua Re: Presidential Message (3 pp.)	3/18/91	(b)(1)	C
04a. Memo	Donald C. Johnson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Possible Telephone Call to President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (2 pp.)	4/10/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Pinksheet Number: cap1153
OA/ID Number: 91138-013
Date Closed: 5/13/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (1 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	C
04c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call with Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04d. Telecon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (5 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	C
05a. Letter	President Bush to President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (2 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	
05b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply to Letters from the Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro (2 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	S
05c. Letter	President Chamorro to President Bush [English Translation] (1 pp.)	2/1/91	(b)(1)	
05d. Letter	President Chamorro to President Bush [Spanish] (1 pp.)	2/1/91	(b)(1)	
05e. Letter	President Chamorro to President Bush [English Translation] (2 pp.)	3/15/91	(b)(1)	C
05f. Letter	President Chamorro to President Bush [Informal English Translation] (2 pp.)	4/3/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 2 of 4

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05g. Memo	From American Embassy Managua Re: Chamorro Letter to President Bush Concerning April 4 Bush Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister (3 pp.)	4/3/91	(b)(1)	C
06. Cable	Javier Perez de Cuellar to President Bush (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07a. Memo	Meg Lundsager to Brent Scowcroft Re: Mrs. Chamorro's Visit and Debt Forgiveness (2 pp.)	4/15/91	(b)(1)	C
07b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Mrs. Chamorro's Visit and AID Debt Forgiveness (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07c. Memo	John E. Robson to Robert M. Gates Re: Proposed Debt Forgiveness for Nicaragua (3 pp.)	4/13/91	(b)(1)	
07d. Paper	Re: Arugements in Support of Section 572 Debt Forgiveness for Nicaragua (3 pp.)	4/15/91	(b)(1)	C
08a. Letter	President Bush to Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar (2 pp.)	4/17/91	(b)(1)	
08b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply to Letter from the UN Secretary General on the Salvadoran Peace Negotiations (2 pp.)	4/17/91	(b)(1)	C
08c. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Reply to Letter from the UN Secretary General on the Salvadoran Peace Negotiations (2 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 3 of 4

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08d. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to UNSG on El Salvador (1 pp.)	4/4/91	(b)(1)	C
08e. Draft Letter	Re: Department of State Suggested Letter from President Bush to General Secretary Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08f. Cable	From US Mission US United Nations New York Re: GOES/FMLN Talks - UN/SYG Letter to President Bush Request for USG/FMLN Meeting (4 pp.)	3/27/91	(b)(1)	C
08g. Letter	Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to President Bush (2 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	
09a. Outline	Re: Meeting with President Carlos Andres Perez (3 pp.)	5/2/91	(b)(1)	C
09b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Perez of Venezuela (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

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Date Closed: 5/13/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100977
RECEIVED: 07 FEB 91 17

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOHNSON
PACELLI
PRYCE

DOC DATE: 08 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

1/2/3/4

KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA
DRUGS
IAEA

INTL TRADE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: GOALS FOR LATIN AMER POLICY IN 1991

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 11 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JOHNSON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
JOHNSON
NSC CHRON
PACELLI

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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01. Memo	Donald C. Johnson/David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Goals for Our Latin America Policy in 1991 (5 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed:	5/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101625
RECEIVED: 05 MAR 91 13

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

TELCALL
IMF

PERSONS: CHAMORRO, VIOLETA B

BERMUDEZ, ENRIQUE

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL FM PRES CHAMORRO OF NICARAGUA ON 6 MAR / TALKING POINTS

ACTION: STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

DUE DATE: 08 MAR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Telephone Call
National Security Council
The White House

in
Chamorro

PROOFED BY: WEA

LOG # 1625

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG PRM A/O _____

WEA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>3/6 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>OBE/ONR</u>

☒ A = Action
 ☐ I = Information
 ☐ D = Dispatch
 ☐ R = Retain
 ☐ N = No further Action

cc: VP
 ☒ Sununu
 Other PMG BS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1625

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1991

91 MAR -6 AM 7:53

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *Rg for*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua

DATE: March 6, 1991

PURPOSE: To accept President Chamorro's congratulations on resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis and to hear of her economic reform measures of March 4.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: Interpreter required; President Chamorro can speak and understand English, but prefers an interpreter.

PHONE NUMBER: 505 2 411 40 or 410 51

CONTACT PERSON: Craig Kelly, Department of State 647-2205

TIME DIFFERENCE: None

SUGGESTED TIMES: 1:15 p.m. EST March 6, 1991

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Accept congratulations on the Persian Gulf crisis.
2. Hear President Chamorro explain Nicaragua's economic reform measures. These include:
 - an 80 percent devaluation;
 - price and wage increases; and
 - an end to Central Bank financing of the central government and banking sector.These measures will go a long way toward meeting IMF demands, but they will fall short unless Nicaragua also complies with its stated intention to reduce the public sector.
3. Urge end of Sandinista aid to FMLN
4. Urge full investigation of Bermudez

DECLASSIFIED

PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT VIOLETA CHAMORRO OF NICARAGUA

Economic Reforms

- I congratulate you on your economic reform announcement.
They are very sound measures.
- I certainly hope that the Sandinistas reciprocate your cooperative approach. What has been their reaction so far?
- I want you to know that we did follow up on your request to send messages to Japan and Germany urging them to extend as much help as possible so that you can clear arrears to the international financial institutions.
- You can earn the support of the donor community if you hold firm to the measures you announced and if you are successful in your efforts to reduce the public sector through voluntary departures.

Sandinista Aid to the FMLN

- I was pleased with the strong action you took to retrieve the missiles that Sandinista military officers passed to the FMLN, but I am concerned over the latest evidence of continued involvement in clandestine arms shipments.
- The attempted transfer to Honduran terrorists which was discovered by the Honduran Army apparently was carried out with the cooperation of a large number of your military.
- We all want peace in Central America, but that simply will not be possible unless the Sandinista Army stops destabilizing your neighbors.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

Investigation of Bermudez Murder

- I know you have worked so hard for national reconciliation and I sincerely hope that the assassination of Enrique Bermudez does not lead to more violence.
- That is why it is vitally important to solve this murder.
- I wanted to ask you how the police investigation is going and if there might be a role for a nonpartisan commission to carry out an investigation?

State Visit

- I am very much looking forward to your State Visit next month.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Suggested Points for President's Call from
President Chamorro

State Visit

-- I am looking forward to your visit next month.

Economic Reforms

- I congratulate you on your economic reform announcement.
- These are very sound measures. You will have strong international support in carrying them out.
- How is the reaction of the Sandinistas so far?
- You have promoted national reconciliation in the interest of broad acceptance of your economic reform proposals.
- But national reconciliation is a two-way street. Now it is time for the Sandinistas to reciprocate your cooperative approach.
- I encourage you to remain firm in the course you have chosen.

Aid to the FMLN

- I was pleased with the strong action you took to retrieve the missiles that Sandinista military officers passed to the FMLN last year.
- But it appears that the military is bent on aiding regional insurgents. On February 22, the Honduran army intercepted another Sandinista arms transfer -- this one to a Honduran terrorist group that has targetted Americans.
- The Honduras transfer was carried out with the cooperation of a large number of Sandinista military. Clearly this was an organized operation approved by high levels in the Sandinista army.
- We all want to achieve peace in Central America, but we will not be able to do so until the Sandinista army decides once and for all to stop destabilizing its neighbors and violating the Esquipulas accords.

Bermudez Investigation

- I sincerely hope that the assassination of Enrique Bermudez is not a precursor to more violence in Nicaragua.
- That's why it is so important to solve this murder.
- How is the investigation going?
- To ensure that justice is done, is there a role for a non-partisan commission to investigate the assassination?

DECLASSIFIED
PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 1/24/21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1625

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 5, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

Attached at Tab I is a Telephone Call Proposal with talking points for the President to receive a call from President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua at 1:15 p.m. on March 6, 1991.

The points to be made at Tab A cover three topics: Nicaragua's economic reform program, the continuing Sandinista aid to the FMLN, and the lack of vigor in the investigation of former Contra leader Enrique Bermudez. These points were suggested informally by the Department of State (Tab II, cleared by Assistant Secretary Aronson), and we think they are good ones.

The economic measures announced on March 4 include:

- an 80 percent devaluation of the gold cordoba;
- price increases for utilities and certain commodities of 200 - 300 percent;
- wage increases for all public sector employees of 160 - 216 percent;
- an end to Central Bank financing of the central government and banking sector; and,
- announcement that regulations will be issued for reviewing illegal property confiscations by the Sandinista government.

These measures will go a long way toward meeting IMF demands. Nevertheless, they will fall short unless Nicaragua also complies with its stated intention to reduce the public sector. Brief mention was made of a previously announced plan to compensate state employees for voluntarily leaving the government, but the government still appears afraid to bite the bullet on that score because of Sandinista opposition.

We have withdrawn a suggested draft Presidential letter to President Chamorro on economic reform (log #0897) because of the phone call. We anticipate resubmitting a revised version that will urge her to stay the course and to intensify the reforms.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Bermudez murder investigation has the potential to become another troublesome issue for the credibility of the Chamorro government. We will submit to you separately a report on the government's lack of progress, as well as a draft Presidential letter of condolence to Commander Bermudez's widow.

Concurrence by: Eric Melby *EM*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab II State Department Suggested Talking Points

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Memo	From American Embassy Managua Re: Presidential Message (3 pp.)	3/18/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed: 5/13/2009	OA/ID Number: 91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101858
RECEIVED: 12 MAR 91 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PACELLI
PRYCE

DOC DATE: 12 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

OAS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESULTS OF US ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION TO EL SALVADOR

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 15 MAR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PACELLI
PRYCE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

Results of U.S. Election Observer
Mission to El Salvador
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WMS

LOG # 1858

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 24 A/O _____

Mr. Hill
Ken Hill

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

K

A

Bill Sittmann

2

V

Bob Gates

3

V

Brent Scowcroft

4

V

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

5

N

NSC Secretariat

6

N

91 MAR 13 AID: 05

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 13, 1991

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI *DAP*

SUBJECT: Results of U.S. Election Observer Mission to
El Salvador

A Presidentially appointed U.S. team led by former South Dakota Governor William J. Janklow observed the legislative and municipal elections in El Salvador on Sunday, March 10, 1991. The group visited 19 polling centers throughout the country, witnessing both the opening of the polls and their closing and counting of ballots. In the opinion of the delegation, the elections were free and fair, despite a number of minor irregularities mostly due to the complexity of El Salvador's election system. The OAS announced similar conclusions, based on the reports of its 160 observers. This should offset claims of fraud by leftist leader Zamora, who is reacting to getting fewer votes than he anticipated.

The U.S. delegation was very much impressed with the cooperation shown by political party representatives of all persuasions at the polling places, as well as by the festive spirit of the day. The election was the first campaign in which an FMLN-affiliated party participated and the first in which the guerrillas agreed to refrain from violence to obstruct the balloting. The guerrillas by and large kept their truce, but their threats to prevent voting in areas they controlled forced the government to move about 15 polling sites.

The delegation met with President Cristiani and the press on March 11 to report on its findings (Tab I).

RECOMMENDATION

That you orally brief the President on the results of the election observer mission.

Approve *DP*

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Janklow Statement

US IS

DECLARACIONES OFICIALES

March 11, 1991

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. JANKLOW
ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL OBSERVER DELEGATION
TO THE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR

Yesterday we split into three groups -- one accompanied me to the eastern part of the country, one went west toward Santa Ana, and the third group stayed in San Salvador. We visited a great variety of polling centers -- nineteen in all, with approximately 1000 individual tables -- throughout the country.

We spoke to voters, to party representatives running the voting tables, to local CCE officials, and to the OAS as well as other international election observers. We were struck by the openness, freedom and enthusiasm with which Salvadorans exercised their right to vote. People felt free, even eager, to approach us and talk about the election, voice their opinions of the process -- both favorable and critical, and to wear the emblems of their parties.

As a result of our observation we have reached the following conclusions:

--At the vast majority of the tables visited, party representatives were working well together.

--A majority of the problems we saw were matters of technical mixups due to the complexity of the system. All of these, with one or two exceptions, were resolved by the party representatives at the tables in a spirit of non-partisan cooperation.

--In our collective experience, the few issues not settled at the tables were passed to representatives of the CCE and resolved quickly.

--We witnessed one polling place that opened late, which created long lines and confusion. This in turn led to allegations of manipulation of issuance of ballots, intimidation by one party's workers of other parties' voters, as well as charges that one party's representatives carried arms into the polling place. An ineffective electoral council representative was unable to solve the problem. I repeat this was the single serious charge of irregularity we saw in the nineteen polling places we visited in nine departments.

--The voting system is complex and cumbersome in the eyes of some observers. While it may have been confusing to some voters, the checks and balances of the process, in our opinion, virtually eliminate the possibility of systematic partisan manipulation.

--Party workers at the tables, CCE representatives, and the voters were serious, knowledgeable of the rules, and patient, contributing to what we saw as a fair and free expression of popular will.

We wish to stress that our observations are based on our personal experiences at a limited number of polling places. The sample we saw was mostly rural. We leave it to other observers to describe their particular experiences and analysis. The Salvadoran people are of course the final judge of the process and of their representatives in a democracy.

In summary, it is the conclusion of the Official U.S. Observer Delegation that we have witnessed a free and fair election.

All the Salvadoran citizens we spoke to expressed their fervent hope for an end to the violence of war. We leave confident that the Salvadoran people's commitment to democracy, illustrated by yesterday's election, will make a major contribution to national reconciliation and peace.

We want to thank the Electoral Council for inviting us, the Government of El Salvador for hosting us, and the people of El Salvador for allowing us to share this day.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102621
RECEIVED: 10 APR 91 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOHNSON
PRYCE

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 10 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR
VENEZUELA

TELCALL

PERSONS: CRISTIANI, ALFREDO

PEREIRA, ARISTIDES

SUBJECT: TELCALL TO PRES CRISTIANI RE TALKS BTW SALVADORIAN GOVT & FMLN

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 13 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JOHNSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JOHNSON

NSC CHRON

O'LEARY

PRYCE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/12/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9102621

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91041017 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
X 91041515 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/13/09

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Possible Telephone Call to _____ of El Salvador

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

WEA

LOG #

2621

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG

WEA

A/O

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DISPOSITION

Ken Hill

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

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4

APNSA Has Seen

5

34.4/15

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6

N/R

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc:

VP

Sununu

Other

Hillman

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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2621

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 10, 1991

not now
B

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

4-15-91

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WP*

FROM: DONALD C. JOHNSON *DJ*

SUBJECT: Possible Telephone Call to President Alfredo
Cristiani of El Salvador

This is a follow-up to your conversation with Bill this morning.

During their April 9 conversation, President Perez of Venezuela told the President that the talks between the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN guerrillas were "paralyzed." CAP also said that Salvadoran President Cristiani would have to give the most in the negotiations, and said that he would be calling Cristiani (as well as the FMLN) to keep up the pressure.

The Department of State report of the status of negotiations is not as gloomy as Perez'. State says that there is real hard bargaining over a solution, and over the constitutional changes that might be required to implement a cease-fire. They think that Cristiani is holding out on making it easier to modify the Constitution until there is an agreement on what articles need to be modified.

If Cristiani can get this, and agreement on a firm timetable for a cease-fire and demilitarization, he would reconsider his opposition to changing the "modification article" (248) of the Salvadoran Constitution before the Legislative Assembly session ends on April 30. (As it stands now, the Constitution can only be modified by two successive legislatures.)

We believe a phone call from the President to President Cristiani at this juncture would be particularly valuable. First, we need to insure that Perez does not take the President's non-committal listening to Perez' briefing on El Salvador and interpret it as a blank check for his activities. Second, with the hard bargaining under way, Cristiani needs to know that he has our strong support. Third, Cristiani also needs to know that we are eager to see a workable solution that will settle the war -- by providing the guerrillas with political space within the Salvadoran democratic system. Finally, we need to reaffirm with Cristiani that U.S. contacts with the FMLN if he wants them would

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-2000-MR
MM 5/8/2015

be a "closer" for the GOES-FMLN talks after all substantive issues have been resolved. The Department of State and the UN Secretary General would like to get us involved at an earlier stage, and we believe there may have been pressures on Cristiani to ask us in before he wants to do so.

We have added a short point on the Jesuit case, just to make sure Cristiani is aware that it is still important to us.

A Telephone Call Proposal with suggested talking points are attached.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Memorandum of Phone Conversation with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez on April 9

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2621

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Alfredo
Cristiani of El Salvador (U)

DATE: April 11 or 12, 1991

PURPOSE: To express support for Cristiani's
efforts to conclude a cease-fire
with the FMLN, and get Cristiani's
assessment of prospects.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open line call

INTERPRETER: None required. President Cristiani
speaks fluent English.

PHONE NUMBER: To be provided

CONTACT PERSON: None

TIME DIFFERENCE: - 2

SUGGESTED TIMES: To Be Determined

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Brief him on your April 9
phone conversation with
President Perez.
2. Express support for his
efforts to negotiate a cease-
fire with the FMLN.
3. Get his assessment of
prospects for the
negotiations.
4. Reaffirm our position on
direct contacts with the FMLN
5. Remind him of our interest in
the Jesuit Case.

Date of Submission:

Action:

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Memorandum of Phone Call to President Perez

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-2000-MR
MM 5/8/2015

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call with Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 8/1/2022

Date Closed: 5/13/2009	OA/ID Number: 91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-2000-MR(502)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/8/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions


C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL WITH
SALVADORAN PRESIDENT ALFREDO CRISTIANI

Phone Conversation with CAP

- I spoke with CAP on April 9. He told me that he thought the negotiations in Mexico City were in trouble. He also said that he would be calling you to press you for more flexibility in the Mexico City talks with the FMLN.

Status of Mexico City Negotiations

- First, I want you to know that you have our strong support, both moral and political. I hope the Mexico City meeting will produce results. I understand you had a good discussion on this with General Powell on April 8.
- We are troubled by ^{3.3(b)(1)} [REDACTED] Cuban shipments of SA-16's and other upgraded military equipment to the FMLN. Bob Gates of the NSC mentioned our concern to Venezuelan Foreign Minister Figueredo on Monday.
- We want to see a successful conclusion to the negotiations, one that brings the conflict to an end by giving the guerrillas political space within an open Salvadoran system.
- How do you see the current situation in Mexico City? And how do you assess the prospects for reaching a solid agreement on a cease-fire before the end of April?

Contacts with the FMLN

- I want you to know that our position on contacts with the FMLN remains unchanged. We will have contact only if and when you agree that it would be useful. We are not at the negotiating table. The responsibility for reaching a satisfactory conclusion belongs to the Salvadorans, not us.

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2011-2000-M/6
MM 5/8/2015

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- If, however, you think that direct contacts with the FMLN, with GOES presence, would serve as a "closer" for the talks after all substantive issues have been resolved, we are willing to do so.
- But I want you to be clear that I don't want to push you on this, and that we will look to you to tell us when the time is exactly right.

Jesuit Case

- I know that you have made some progress on the Jesuit Case. It is very important for us, especially our Congress, that your government keep pressing on this.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Pérez
Interpreter: Stephanie Van Reigersberg
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME April 9, 1991, 4:12 - 4:49 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: How are you, my friend? (U)

President Perez: What a great pleasure to talk to you, Mr.
President. (U)

The President: It's a great pleasure for me, too. Nice to hear
your voice again. (U)

President Perez: I've been wanting for some time, since the end
of the war in the Middle East, to call and talk to you. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

President Perez: I wanted to express my deepest pleasure for the
way you handled this conflict. You handled all the important
decisions with great intelligence. (U)

The President: Thank you very much for the kind words. We are
very concerned about the human suffering there. But I have no
intention of using U.S. forces to solve that problem. (U)

President Perez: Unfortunately, that's true. It's irritating
and difficult to feel powerless when dealing with such a
situation. I think you've done the best thing possible, and you
could not have done otherwise. It's important that the United
Nations be involved to help in this matter. (U)

The President: Thank you for those words of support. (U)

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President Perez: As usual, the people who criticized you for intervening in the Gulf are the same ones who are now criticizing you for not intervening. But that is the fate of those of us who have to make the difficult decisions. (Ø)

The President: True. (U)

President Perez: I called to talk about the situations in El Salvador and in Haiti. (Ø)

The President: Please go ahead. (U)

President Perez: As you know, the conversations in Mexico City are paralyzed. There is a lack of flexibility by the FMLN as well as by the Salvadoran Government. I understand that President Cristiani is being pressured a great deal by people in the right of his party linked to Roberto D'Aubisson. (Ø)

The President: Uh-huh. (U)

President Perez: It would be a tremendous mistake to waste this opportunity to solve the problem. If we can get to a cease-fire, that would mark the end of the guerrillas. (Ø)

It is necessary to pressure Cristiani to give as much as possible, so he'll be as flexible as possible, but to support him publicly very strongly so he'll gain respect at home, and this will help him with the parties of the left. (Ø)

The President: Uh-huh. (U)

President Perez: What they're doing now is arguing about constitutional niceties, but what they need is real constitutional reforms. The FMLN needs constitutional guarantees, because the people in charge of the Assembly are ARENA and the Christian Democrats. (Ø)

I've called Cristiani and will call him again today. There is a Salvadoran commission presently in Caracas, and I spoke to them, praising him (Cristiani) very much, so it will get wide play in the press in El Salvador. (Ø)

The President: I see. (U)

President Perez: I've also been talking on the phone to the FMLN, asking them to be flexible. But I think the one who will have to give more is Cristiani. That is the important thing. (Ø)

They need to get to the point of a cease-fire. (Ø)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Perez: Now, on Haiti. I was extremely concerned when I heard of the arrest of Mrs. Trouillot. But she got out, however, and the incident came out all right. I think Aristide is increasingly sound (sensato). Unfortunately, he's got some people who are confused and extremists, and they are trying to drive him to adopt ever more negative positions. We need to help him. (Ø)

The tragedy is that the poor man has no money at all. Venezuela is making a great effort to help. We have been doing even more than we can do. We cannot let Haiti sink (naufragar). (Ø)

The President: Well, I think that's very important. We've put together a project that Beatrice Rangel discussed with General Scowcroft -- maybe not. It's \$83 million and we've already started disbursement. (Ø)

President Perez: I'm going to tell Beatrice to call General Scowcroft because this is a very important thing. (Ø)

The President: He'll be looking forward to talking to her. (Ø)

President Perez: I want to raise the Middle East with you again. Shimon Peres is coming to Caracas later this week. I'm going to have a breakfast for him on Friday. We can't waste any opportunity to try to resolve this conflict. This is the most dangerous issue that you will face during your Presidency. If you have anything you'd like me to raise or anything you want me to do, I'll be delighted to do so. I'd like also to ask if you have any advice or counsel for me on this issue. (Ø)

The President: One, please pay my personal respects to Shimon Peres. We have not settled on one specific plan. But Jim Baker is back in the Middle East as you know, and he's trying to make headway with Israel on two points: One, they're going to have to give up some land, and second, that there must be some talking, some discussion going on. (Ø)

As you know, Peres supported rather strongly the concept of an international conference. The Europeans are still talking about an international conference. And our position is that we don't oppose the concept, but after all these visits by Baker we want a conference that will work. (Ø)

We want people to come together and talk to each other. But too broad a conference at this juncture would only guarantee that the Shamir Government would not attend. (Ø)

We do feel the Arabs are a little more flexible now than they were. We would like them to eliminate the anti-Israel boycott and agree to talk to the Israelis. We'll know a little more about that when Baker gets back from the trip. But we were a

little more optimistic after his first visit, that there was a chance to put an end to hostilities and begin a dialogue. (C)

The last point relates to Jordan. I'm interested in knowing what Shimon Peres thinks on this point. We think Jordan will eventually have a very important part to play in any final solution. Jordan is still in the bad graces of the Saudis, of the other Gulf states, and Egypt. But we've re-established contact at the Foreign Minister level, and Baker will meet their Foreign Minister in Geneva. (C)

We will handle the Jordanian situation, which is a delicate situation, properly. We were upset with King Hussein. At the same time, we knew the pressures he was under. It will take a little time, but we don't want to destabilize Jordan. (C)

These are the main themes, and we'll be glad to bring you up to date when the trip is finished. (C)

If you pick up anything of importance from Shimon Peres, I'd be happy to hear about it, but I worry that he no longer has the political clout he once had. (C)

President Perez: I'm very much in agreement with all you said. Hussein behaved in an extremely clumsy manner in this crisis. It's as we say "A crown without a head under it" (una corona sin cabeza). We share your view on an international conference. Too broad a conference would be a negative thing. However, the basic countries need to participate. We need to keep pressuring Israel to start talking to the Arabs. And the Arabs need to be more flexible. (C)

Mr. President, I don't want you to forget what I told you in Caracas last December on Iran. My energy minister is going to Iran next week. I'm sending a letter to Rafsanjani with him. (C)

The President: That's very interesting. We've told Iranian representatives, through the appropriate channels, that we're willing to help on the refugee problem that they have. Maybe this will help. (C)

Tell your minister to say the one word that I keep repeating over and over again -- "Hostages." Please help us with the hostages. (C)

President Perez: Of course, Mr. President. I agree, and have already sent a message to Rafsanjani on the subject of the hostages. It would also be good to start dealing with Iranian claims for compensation. (C)

The President: Exactly. That's the one they're interested in, and talks are going on right now with their representatives. But we can't buy out our hostages with some deal. That would lead to more hostages down the road. (C)

President Perez: It's clear that something has to be done so it doesn't appear that the two things are linked to each other. (C)

The President: Well, I've enjoyed this call, and it's wonderful to hear from you. (U)

President Perez: I feel very satisfied to be able to talk to you. It is always such a great pleasure. I send you an abrazo. (U)

The President: If you have any news on the meeting with Peres, please pass it to me. (C)

President Perez: Thank you, and good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102032
RECEIVED: 19 MAR 91 12

TO: CHAMORRO, VIOLETA B

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 12 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
IMF

HS
JAPAN

PERSONS: KAIFU, TOSHIKI

CHAMORRO, VIOLETA B

SUBJECT: REPLY TO LTR FM NICARAGUAN PRES CHAMORRO

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR	DUE DATE: 14 APR 91	STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI	LOGREF: 9100502	9100724
FILES: WH	NSCP:	CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSLMS DOC 5 OF 5

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: gjh

LOG # 2032

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>gjh</u> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>gjh 4/11</u>	<u>LDK/D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____
Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Date 4/11/91 ?

Given to SDO
TO FAX. Bypassed
STATE. Given to
SDO at 1443 4/11/91.
Ralph approved.

DISPATCH INSTR

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

WWD

Please have this
Cabled out ASAP
so that Pres Chamorro
receives it before she
meets with the
President on 4/17

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Letter	President Bush to President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (2 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed:	5/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply to Letters from the Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro (2 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed:	5/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Letter	President Chamorro to President Bush [English Translation] (1 pp.)	2/1/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed:	5/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Letter	President Chamorro to President Bush [Spanish] (1 pp.)	2/1/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed:	5/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05e. Letter	President Chamorro to President Bush [English Translation] (2 pp.)	3/15/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed: 5/13/2009	OA/ID Number: 91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05f. Letter	President Chamorro to President Bush [Informal English Translation] (2 pp.)	4/3/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed:	5/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05g. Memo	From American Embassy Managua Re: Chamorro Letter to President Bush Concerning April 4 Bush Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister (3 pp.)	4/3/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed:	5/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Cable	Javier Perez de Cuellar to President Bush (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed: 5/13/2009	OA/ID Number: 91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102750
RECEIVED: 15 APR 91 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: LUNDSAGER
PRYCE
MELBY

DOC DATE: 15 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA
ENTERPRISE FOR AMERICAS

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

PERSONS: CHAMORRO, VIOLETA B

SUBJECT: CHAMORRO VISIT & DEBT FORGIVENESS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 15 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LUNDSAGER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
LUNDSAGER
MELBY
NSC CHRON
PRYCE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 2 OF 2

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Chambers Unit
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JB
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 2750
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
DOCLOG MM AIO _____

WBB

Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

<u>1</u>		<u>A</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
<u>4</u>	<u>SEA 4/17</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>5</u>		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

01 APR 12 10:50 TSS Approved Person

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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DECLASSIFIED

PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

April 15, 1991

*President has
been briefed
but has not
declassified, BO*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM PRYCE/ERIC MELBY

FROM: MEG LUNDSAGER

SUBJECT: Mrs. Chamorro's Visit and Debt Forgiveness

Treasury and State disagree on what we should tell Mrs. Chamorro regarding our willingness to forgive some of the debt that Nicaragua owes the U.S. Government. State would like us to indicate that we will forgive AID debt under existing foreign assistance legislation (section 572), once Nicaragua meets the criteria set by that legislation, namely that Nicaragua have an IMF program. Treasury is arguing that we should add agreement on arrears clearance and investment reform requirements to this conditionality, in order to fit Nicaragua into the EAI mold (our draft EAI legislation is now before Congress). John Robson (Tab II) and Bob Zoellick (Tab III) have sent us notes laying out these positions.

Treasury position: Treasury's main concerns center on two issues.

1. Japan, a key player in providing funds to clear Nicaragua's arrears to the World Bank and IDB, will not forgive the official debt of developing countries and was very difficult on Poland. Treasury fears that if we are seen as relaxing our conditions for debt relief, then Japan will not provide the new loans that Nicaragua needs to clear its arrears to the World Bank and IDB, which is necessary to get an IMF agreement.

2. EAI legislation is now being marked up in various Congressional committees where pressure is mounting to weaken the multifaceted conditionality of the EAI. Treasury fears that if we give Nicaragua debt forgiveness under section 572, with its more limited conditionality, it will undermine our efforts to get EAI passed with its carefully crafted requirements for economic reform intact. Treasury would have us avoid giving Mrs. Chamorro a debt relief commitment and, as a fallback, to condition such a commitment on clearing debt arrears to the international institutions and meeting investment regime reforms "contemplated" but not yet defined under EAI.

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Declassify on: OADR

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State position: State believes that Treasury is moving the goalposts and that it is important to give Mrs. Chamorro political support by not demanding more conditionality than required by the Congress. Nicaragua has become such a poor country that it now qualifies for section 572 debt forgiveness which was originally intended for the poorest countries of Africa. Only Bolivia, Haiti and Guyana in the western hemisphere share similar dire straits. The only conditionality required under 572 is an IMF agreement and State believes this is all we should ask of Nicaragua.

We believe that, as a practical matter, Mrs. Chamorro will have to get agreement on clearing her arrears in order to get her IMF program. That will take several more months. The President therefore need not say to Mrs. Chamorro what form our debt forgiveness will take, only that we will do so when Nicaragua gets an IMF agreement. But since Treasury decided to push the issue at this time, we recommend that you agree to the State position, that we provide debt forgiveness under section 572 once Nicaragua meets conditions in the law.

We have attached a contingency memo to the President.

Concurrence by: David Pearce, Virginia Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you seek the President's oral concurrence that Nicaragua will be eligible for AID debt reduction under section 572 once it has an IMF agreement.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab II Memo from John Robson
Tab III Memo from Bob Zoellick

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Mrs. Chamorro's Visit and AID Debt Forgiveness

Purpose

To secure your approval of our AID debt forgiveness policy regarding Nicaragua.

Background

Nicaragua has become eligible for USG debt forgiveness of AID loans under legislation that was primarily aimed at helping low income sub-Saharan Africa (section 572), because its per capita income dropped significantly during the Sandinista years. State would like you to tell Mrs. Chamorro that we will grant her this kind of debt forgiveness, once she has an IMF program, which is a legislative requirement.

Treasury is not opposed to debt forgiveness, but wants to require in addition that Nicaragua have in place an arrears clearing agreement and an investment reform program, along the lines of what we are contemplating under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which is before Congress. State argues, correctly, that this would delay debt relief for Nicaragua considerably and that adding these requirements is tantamount to moving the goalposts for a country that already is facing a difficult enough task ahead.

The issue of requiring arrears clearance is not critical since as a practical matter she will have to do so before she can get an IMF program. For that reason, in your meeting with her you need only indicate that we will provide debt forgiveness once she has an IMF agreement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you reaffirm that Nicaragua is eligible for reduction of its AID debt once it has an IMF agreement in place and that investment reform conditionality is not required.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM TO: ROBERT M. GATES
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: JOHN E. ROBSON *JER*
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TREASURY

SUBJECT: Proposed Debt Forgiveness for Nicaragua

We have an unresolved interagency disagreement on the conditions and timing of a commitment to Nicaragua to forgive AID debt under Section 572. Treasury's view is that a firm commitment should not be made at this time for the following reasons:

- Section 572 forgiveness will result in no cash or other immediate financial benefit to Nicaragua, since the country is paying nothing now on its AID loans.
- A pledge to forgive Nicaragua's debt will divert Nicaragua's attention from the urgent actions needed to clear existing arrears to the World Bank and IDB, actions needed to put in place a program to start substantial cash flows to Nicaragua from the IFI's.
- A commitment now may provoke Japan into refusing to make any new money available for Nicaragua -- a position that will thwart the critical arrears clearing process.
- Section 572 forgiveness will undermine the President's Enterprise for America's Initiative at a critical point in the legislative process when we are trying to defeat efforts by some in Congress to eliminate key reform conditions for EAI eligibility, particularly on investment reform.
- If a firm commitment to Section 572 forgiveness is made now and the conditions for action under Section 572 are not met in FY 1991, it could result in pushing the Section 572 forgiveness into FY 1992 with potential adverse budgetary impact on the 150 account or AID's budget.

The situation is as follows:

1. Nicaragua owes the U.S. \$257 million in AID debt. Section 572 permits forgiveness for "least developed countries", a qualification that Nicaragua meets. Section 572 forgiveness, originally intended for the poorest Sub-Saharan African countries, can be provided only when a country has an IMF or World Bank adjustment program, neither of which Nicaragua now has. It is possible, but by no means certain, that such an agreement could be put in place during FY 1991. A prerequisite for adjustment program approval is a financial commitment from donor countries and an agreed disbursement procedure for arrears clearing. Treasury has been working with the IFI's and potential donor countries to pull together the arrears clearing package, but at present the commitments fall short of the \$390 million needed to clear Nicaragua's arrears.
2. What Nicaragua needs is money. Forgiveness under Section 572 will not put a penny at Nicaragua's disposal since they have made no payments on our AID debt since 1989. The best contribution that we can now make is for the U.S. to focus its effort on assisting in the arrears clearing process.
3. Japan is a major factor in gathering sufficient resources to clear Nicaragua's IFI arrears and will be crucial in other arrears clearing efforts, such as Peru. The Government of Japan has objected to providing new loans to countries which are receiving debt reduction on official credits, and therefore will resist participating in the arrears clearing effort.
4. EAI legislation is at a critical stage in Congress. We are trying to preserve EAI's essential conditions of eligibility -- most importantly the liberalization of investment regimes. If we pledge to forgive debt for Nicaragua without referencing the need for investment reform, it could seriously undermine these efforts and strengthen the hand of those in Congress who seek to eliminate or water down EAI conditions for eligibility. This will effectively

eviscerate the economic reform conditions of EAI, which are vital to sustained growth in Latin America. Moreover, other Latin countries will also strongly resist such conditions when they seek debt relief.

5. Although OMB projects no budget cost to forgiveness of Nicaraguan AID debt, even if it occurs in FY 92, there is a risk that the Congressional Budget Office could disagree and insist on some cost. OMB's projections reflect zero expected payments on this debt through the maturity of the outstanding loans. Prior to the recent economic deterioration, for FY 1987-89, actual payments on these debts averaged almost \$200,000 annually. We would expect that any cost to the 150 Function would be borne by State and AID.

6. We would suggest the following approach:

- The USG would commit to a full court press to get Nicaragua's IFI arrears clearing and IFI agreements in place as soon as possible.
- We would say that once Nicaragua had its IMF program in place and an agreement is reached on clearing arrears, we would look at the possibility and conditions for debt relief for Nicaragua. No commitment for debt relief would be made now.
- Alternatively, if a firm commitment on debt relief is made now, we would insist on conditions that Nicaragua have an IMF program, agreement on clearing arrears and meet investment regime reform requirements contemplated under EAI.

Treasury wants to make clear that we do not oppose the ultimate objective of granting Section 572 debt relief to Nicaragua. Our concerns are with the timing and criteria for getting there.

In light of Mrs. Chamorro's visit next week, I suggest that we try to pull together the appropriate agency representatives at a senior level to make a decision on this matter.

cc: Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger
Under Secretary Robert Kimmitt
Counsellor Robert Zoellick

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III



United States Department of State
The Counselor

April 15, 1991

NOTE FOR BOB GATES

SUBJECT: Section 572 Debt Relief for
Nicaragua

Attached is the paper you requested on
Section 572 debt forgiveness for Nicaragua.
I'm also sending a copy to John Robson.

Attachment

Bob Zoellick

April 15, 1991

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF SECTION 572
DEBT FORGIVENESS FOR NICARAGUA

- One of the major successes of the Administration's foreign policy has been the emergence of democracy in Nicaragua with the election of President Chamorro.
 - The Administration devoted a great deal of effort during its first year to develop a bipartisan approach to Nicaragua and to attempt to put behind us a decade of bitter American military and diplomatic struggle to uproot the Sandinista revolution.
- As President Bush has stated, we simply cannot afford to see democracy fail in Nicaragua.
- One of the most important signals of support that the U.S. government can now offer to President Chamorro personally and to her Administration's well-conceived economic stabilization plan is early debt relief.
 - Nicaragua owes the U.S. Agency for International Development \$205 million in principal plus \$51.9 million in arrears, for a total of \$256.9 million in official economic debt.
- FAA Section 572 permits debt forgiveness for a "relatively least developed country" if the country has an IMF program.
 - AID has determined that Nicaragua is a "relatively least developed country" and would be eligible for Section 572 debt forgiveness once it reaches an IMF agreement.
 - An IMF agreement would provide strong conditionality for economic reform by Nicaragua.
- The President should have the choice whether to provide such debt relief to Nicaragua under the current circumstances. Indeed, the President may wish to use debt relief to help resolve other political irritants in our relationship with Nicaragua, such as the pending ICJ case.
- Nonetheless, the Treasury Department opposes Section 572 debt relief for Nicaragua at this time, because Nicaragua cannot meet the additional criteria for debt forgiveness in the proposed but not yet passed E.A.I. legislation. Treasury makes several points in support of its position, which we would answer as follows.

DECLASSIFIED

PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015

By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

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DECL:OADR

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- 2 -

- First, Treasury argues that Nicaragua will not receive any immediate cash benefit from debt forgiveness, because it is not currently making any debt payments. However, the primary reason for the debt forgiveness is to send a strong signal of political support to the Nicaraguan regime at this critical time and to help it begin to get its economic house in order -- not to provide an immediate cash benefit. In addition, debt forgiveness now for Nicaragua may very well have a direct financial benefit for it in the near future.
 - Reduction in Nicaragua's debt overhang may lead other donors, and even the IFIs, to increase their aid.
 - Nicaraguans with money abroad may be encouraged to bring it home if they see less debt overhang.
 - The other debt relief efforts that Treasury has promoted, including E.A.I., also do not provide an immediate cash benefit.
- Second, Treasury argues that forgiving Nicaragua's debt will divert Nicaragua's attention from other urgent actions, such as clearing existing arrears to the World Bank and the IDB. Exactly the opposite is the case.
 - Nicaragua has multiple economic problems. Forgiving Nicaragua's debt does not divert Nicaragua's attention; it relieves Nicaragua of one of its problems so that it can focus its attention elsewhere.
 - Specifically, Nicaragua will be able to give even more attention to arrears clearing, which is an integral part of an IMF program.
- Third, Treasury argues that Section 572 forgiveness will undermine the E.A.I. at a critical point in the legislative process. That does not need to be the case. Indeed, it would be ironic if the proposed E.A.I. legislation undermined a similarly critical U.S. foreign policy objective -- promoting democracy and stability in Nicaragua.
 - Section 572 already imposes on Nicaragua the substantial condition of reaching an IMF agreement.
 - The E.A.I. legislation would impose a second level of conditionality for investment reform which Nicaragua probably would not be able to meet for at least two more years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

- Excepting Nicaragua from the proposed E.A.I. conditionality would not open a major loophole in the E.A.I. program, as only one other Latin American country -- Haiti -- currently qualifies under Section 572 as a "relatively least developed country" yet does not meet E.A.I. conditions.
- Not to except Nicaragua from the yet-to-be-enacted E.A.I. conditionality could risk substantially the political future of the Chamorro government. Moreover, it would be a self-inflicted risk by the Administration, not one imposed on us by the Congress.
- We are offering Section 572 relief to Bangladesh; why should we be adding additional hurdles for Nicaragua?
- Fourth, Treasury argues that Section 572 debt forgiveness may somehow antagonize Japan and provoke it into refusing to participate in the arrears clearing effort for Nicaragua. This sort of supposition is not what should drive U.S. foreign policy.
 - This concern has not stopped Treasury from urging debt relief for many other countries, including some others that we are pressing Japan to help.
 - In the event Japan were to resist participating in the arrears clearing effort because of our debt forgiveness, we should resolve that issue at the time with Japan, rather than penalize Nicaragua now.
- Fifth, Treasury argues that if the conditions for action under Section 572 are not met in FY 1991, it could result in an adverse budgetary impact on Function 150 in FY 1992. Treasury, however, acknowledges the weakness of this argument.
 - OMB itself projects insignificant budget costs to forgiveness of this Nicaraguan debt, even if it occurs in FY 1992, because of the negligible amount of previous payments.
 - And moving now in FY 1991 to forgive the debt, rather than waiting at least two years until Nicaragua can meet the proposed E.A.I. conditions, would ensure that there would be no budget scoring against Function 150.
- In sum, the Chamorro regime has just embarked on a major economic reform program and needs our support. The State Department strongly believes that early debt relief is the strongest signal of support that the U.S. government can now offer. The President should not be constrained by the proposed E.A.I. legislation to consider this policy option

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: PEREZ DE CUELLAR, JA

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 17 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UN
HS

EL SALVADOR

PERSONS: CRISTIANI, ALFREDO

SUBJECT: LTR TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR FM PRES RE SALVADORAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 08 APR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF: 9101870 9102204

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PACELLI
PRYCE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 6 OF 6

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2250

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG WFA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WFA 4/17</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>WFA 4/17</u>	<u>D</u>

91 APR 17 P 6:43

RECEIVED

☐ A = Action
 ☒ I = Information
 ☐ D = Dispatch
 ☐ R = Retain
 ☐ N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Date: 4/17/91 ?

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Pres Reply to UNSYG
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA LOG # 2250
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>W</i> Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	APNSA Has Seen	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>4/17 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
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91 APR 5 P 2.43

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP ✓ Sununu ✓ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

91 APR 5 15:00

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS

Env Secs Office has despatched

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 17, 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for your letter of March 25, 1991, sharing your analysis of the prospects for a successful negotiation to end the war in El Salvador. I am very encouraged by your statement that we are at the threshold of a major breakthrough in the UN's efforts to mediate an end to this longstanding conflict. I strongly share your view that a concerted effort must be made to achieve political agreements and a cease-fire by the end of April.

The United States wholeheartedly and firmly supports the political negotiations which the UN under your auspices is mediating. I hope that you will give this effort your personal attention and engagement to ensure the maximum possible chance for success. I am encouraged also by the efforts of Mexico, Colombia, Spain and Venezuela to play an active role, at your request, in support of a negotiated settlement.

I am confident that President Cristiani will continue to display the same good faith and flexibility that his government has demonstrated over the past year. President Cristiani is deeply committed to this negotiation process and will spare no effort to see it succeed. I hope that those with influence with the FMLN will urge them to refrain from any further military actions and to negotiate in good faith on the remaining issues. The United States will do everything possible to ensure the full implementation of any agreements reached by the parties at the bargaining table.

As to the issue you raised about direct contact by the U.S. Government with the FMLN, as I have told

you in the past, this is a difficult question for the United States, particularly in light of the heinous execution of two U.S. servicemen by FMLN combatants in January. Nevertheless, I take seriously your view that direct contacts are now of critical importance to the success of the peace effort. We will consult with President Cristiani on this issue and assess his views. After this consultation, my administration will weigh carefully whether and how a direct contact such as you suggest might contribute to an early cease-fire agreement.

In closing, let me reiterate my strong personal appreciation for the role that you have played in supporting these negotiations through many difficult months. An end to the conflict in El Salvador under UN mediation would be a great milestone in your distinguished career as Secretary General and would, I believe, put Central America permanently on the path to stability and democracy in the coming years. The United States will make every effort to support these critical negotiations to achieve your goal of a cease-fire by the end of April.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Bush", with a stylized flourish at the end.

His Excellency
Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar
Secretary General of the
United Nations
New York

~~SECRET~~

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2250

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1116-MR
Eg 4/2/15

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91 APR 17 PM 2:37

April 17, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from the UN Secretary General on
the Salvadoran Peace Negotiations

Purpose

To assure the UN Secretary General that we will make every effort to support the negotiations, but to reserve our position on direct contacts with the FMLN.

Background

UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar wrote you on March 25, 1991, to inform you that the Salvadoran peace talks have entered into an intensive round of negotiation to complete work on constitutional reforms, armed forces reform, and cease-fire arrangements by April 30. This deadline arises because the Salvadoran constitution specifies that amendments must be approved in successive legislatures. The current term of the Legislative Assembly ends on April 30, and if constitutional changes are not approved now there is the prospect of a three year delay.

Perez de Cuellar wants your support for this intensified phase of the peace talks. In particular, he has asked again that you authorize direct contact by the U.S. Government with the FMLN, saying that they are of critical importance to the success of the peace effort. He asserts that this would dissipate misunderstandings and allow the U.S. to clarify what guarantees it is willing to make for implementation of the peace accords.

I believe we should be extremely wary about talking to the FMLN before all substantive issues are resolved, for otherwise the contacts will serve only to increase the FMLN's stature and involve us in a process of seeking concessions from the Salvadoran government. Nevertheless, if the parties are on the verge of agreement, we should be willing to talk to the FMLN to spell out what we are willing to do to make a settlement work, including using our influence to ensure Salvadoran government compliance.

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

2

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Your reply to the UN Secretary General (Tab A) states your wholehearted support for his efforts to mediate an end to the conflict. On the issue of contacts with the FMLN, your reply indicates that we will consult with President Cristiani and then decide whether and how a direct contact might contribute to an early cease-fire agreement. The reply is based upon a Department of State draft.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to the UN Secretary General at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to the UN Secretary General
Tab B	Letter from the UN Secretary General

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

2250

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 9, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

FROM:

DAVID A. PACELLI *DP*

SUBJECT:

Reply to Letter from the UN Secretary General on
the Salvadoran Peace Negotiations

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President covering his response to a letter from UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on the Salvadoran peace negotiations.

The central purpose of the Secretary General's letter is to persuade the President to authorize direct contacts with the FMLN. Perez de Cuellar conceives of these contacts as a series of meetings. We believe he views these contacts as a way to: (1) actively press the parties to resolve outstanding issues; (2) convey U.S. assurances to honor the accord if reached (for example, by cutting our military aid); (3) guarantee that the U.S. will use its influence to ensure that the Salvadoran government will comply with the peace agreement; and (4) outline U.S. assistance for resettlement.

As you know, we oppose the first objective, for it undoubtedly aims to involve the U.S. in pressuring the Salvadoran government to make concessions on substantive issues in the peace talks. The second, third, and fourth objectives are acceptable, but our position is that U.S. involvement should be on a one-time basis in the presence of Salvadoran government representatives, and as a "closer" for the talks after all substantive issues have been resolved. While we have communicated this view repeatedly to the Department of State, we believe it would be useful if you would mention to Secretary Baker that you do not want to see us get dragged into an active role in the negotiations.

The President's reply (Tab A) says only that we will consult President Cristiani and then decide whether and how a direct contact with the FMLN might contribute to a cease-fire accord. The reply is a shortened version of a State Department draft.

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You should be aware that consulting with President Cristiani is not necessarily a firebreak in this process, as recent intelligence reporting indicates that he is feeling pressured to ask us to talk to the FMLN to get the monkey off his back.

Concurrence by: Nancy Bearg Dyke ^{NBD}

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to the President
 Tab A Letter to the UN Secretary General
 Tab B Letter from the UN Secretary General
Tab II Roy Memorandum to Scowcroft

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Washington, D.C. 20520 2250


April 4, 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to UNSYG on El Salvador

Attached is a draft letter for the President in response to a letter from United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar recommending that the U.S. Government enter into direct discussions with the Salvadoran FMLN guerrilla group. The response indicates that we will consult with President Cristiani and keep Perez de Cuellar's concerns in mind.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- (A) Proposed Response to UNSYG
- (B) Letter from UNSYG

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 1, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Bush
from UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar.
which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources
Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on April 1, 1991
A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

CA Holmes

Director, S/S-IRM
Information Resources Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-2991

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED LETTER

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for your letter of March 25, 1991, sharing your analysis of the prospects for a successful negotiation to end the war in El Salvador. I am very encouraged by your statement that we are at the threshold of a major breakthrough in the U.N.'s efforts to mediate an end to this longstanding conflict. I strongly share your view that a concerted effort must be made to achieve political agreements and a cease-fire by the end of April. I also agree that we must use the deadline of April 30 when the current legislative assembly dissolves in order to press the parties to make a maximum effort to reach agreement on the major issues, especially a cease-fire.

The United States wholeheartedly and firmly supports the political negotiations which the U.N. under your auspices is mediating. As my administration has stated on many occasions, the United States believes that the only humane and appropriate solution to this conflict is a negotiated political settlement which allows for the peaceful reintegration of former combatants on both sides into democratic political life with full guarantees for security and human rights.

His Excellency

Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar,
Secretary General of the United Nations,
New York.

I know that some progress has been made in the past, but I share your view that the next four weeks are the decisive moment in this negotiation. I hope that you will give this effort your personal attention and engagement to ensure the maximum possible chance for success. I am encouraged also by the efforts of Mexico, Colombia, Spain and Venezuela to play an active role, at your request, in support of a negotiated settlement and hope they will do so at the opening round of negotiations.

I am confident that President Cristiani will continue to display the same good faith and flexibility that his government has demonstrated over the past year. I know that President Cristiani is deeply committed to this negotiation process and will spare no effort to see it succeed. I hope that those with influence with the FMLN will urge them to refrain from any further military actions and to negotiate in good faith on the remaining issues. The United States will do everything possible to ensure the full implementation of any agreements reached by the parties at the bargaining table.

As to the issue you raised about direct contact by the U.S. Government with the FMLN, as I have told you in the past, this is a difficult question for the United States, particularly in light of the heinous execution of two U.S. servicemen by FMLN combatants in January. Nevertheless, I take seriously your views that "such direct contacts are now of critical importance to the success of

the peace effort." The State Department will consult with President Cristiani on this issue and assess his views about the matter you recommend. Our primary goal is to see a negotiated solution to this war as quickly as possible. After consulting with President Cristiani, my administration will weigh carefully whether and how a direct contact such as you suggest might contribute to an early cease-fire agreement.

In closing, let me reiterate my strong personal appreciation for the role that you have played in supporting these negotiations through many difficult months. The U.N. under your leadership played a decisive role in ending the conflict in Nicaragua and holding that nation's first free and fair presidential elections. An end to the conflict in El Salvador under U.N. mediation would be a great milestone in your distinguished career as Secretary General and would, I believe, put Central America permanently on the path to stability and democracy in the coming years. The United States will make every effort to support these critical negotiations and to achieve your goal of a cease-fire by the end of April.

Warmest personal wishes,

George Bush

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT. GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN VANERON
SIT. FILE OCONNELL PACELLI PRES_MSGS SIT SUM VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY CLAS. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 270156Z MAR 91

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4438
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0688
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3577
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2630
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 2119
RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 4228
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 2414
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3671
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 2544
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 1647

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 00961

EXDIS DOVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UN, ES, XK

SUBJECT: GOES/FMLN TALKS - UN/SYG LETTER TO PRES. BUSH,
- REQUEST FOR USG/FMLN MEETING

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. USUN RECEIVED MARCH 26 FROM THE UN SECRETARIAT A
LETTER FROM UN/SYG JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO PRESIDENT
BUSH (COPY FAXED TO IO/UNP AND ARA/CEN AND ORIGINAL
POUCHED TO IO/UNP 3/26, TEXT REPORTED BELOW). IN THE
LETTER, THE SYG URGES, INTER ALIA, THAT THE USG MEET
WITH THE FMLN "TO ASCERTAIN WITH ABSOLUTE CLARITY THE
ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY THE U.S. IN GUARANTEEING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNDERTAKINGS WHICH ARE OF FUNDAMENTAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE NEGOTIATION..."

3. BEGIN TEXT.

25 MARCH 1991

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1116 MR
28 5/20/15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT.

--FOLLOWING AN IMPORTANT SHIFT IN THE POSITION OF THE
FRENTE FARABUNDO MARTI PARA LA LIBERACION NACIONAL
(FMLN), EFFORTS TO END THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR COULD
WELL BE AT THE THRESHOLD OF A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH.

--UNTIL RECENTLY, THE FMLN INSISTED ON STRICT ADHERENCE
TO THE AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH THE GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO
WHICH POLITICAL AGREEMENTS ON A HOST OF SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES HAD TO BE CONCLUDED BEFORE ANY DISCUSSION OF
CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS. THE FMLN HAS NOW PROPOSED THAT
A CONCERTED EFFORT BE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENTS BY THE
END OF APRIL ON THE ARMED FORCES, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
AND CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS, LEAVING FOR A LATTER STAGE,
AFTER A CEASE-FIRE IS IN PLACE, THE DETAILS OF OTHER
DEMANDS REGARDING JUDICIAL AND ELECTORAL REFORM AND
CERTAIN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS.

--CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS MUST BE APPROVED BY THE
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY BY 30 APRIL IN ORDER TO ENSURE
EARLY RATIFICATION BY THE NEW LEGISLATURE WHICH TAKES
OVER ON 1 MAY. THERE IS THUS A BUILT-IN DEADLINE FOR
THIS INTENSIFIED EFFORT, WHICH IS PREDICATED ON THE
PREMISE THAT THERE EXISTS A MILITARY STALEMATE AND THE
IMPLICIT COROLLARY THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD RENOUNCE THE
GOAL OF MILITARY VICTORY.

--THE ISSUES WHICH STILL NEED TO BE OVERCOME IN THIS NEW
NEGOTIATING EFFORT, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FMLN
HAVE AGREED TO INITIATE EARLY NEXT MONTH, ARE EXTREMELY
COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE, BUT DURING RECENT
MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT CRISTIANI AND THE LEADERSHIP OF
THE FMLN MY REPRESENTATIVE HAS DETECTED SIGNS OF
MOVEMENT WHICH, IF TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE ADVANCES AND

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

MUTUAL CONCESSIONS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. COULD BEAR EARLY FRUIT.

--BOTH SIDES WILL, HOWEVER, NEED TO KNOW OF THE INTEREST AND THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATION. AND OF THE WILLINGNESS OF ITS MEMBERS TO FULLY BACK THIS EFFORT AND TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGING AGREEMENTS. THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE WARRING PARTIES MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO FLAG.

--I AM THEREFORE URGING THE PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND TO BE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE IN CERTAIN SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE IN MY JUDGMENT FLEXIBILITY WILL BE NEEDED SO THAT AGREEMENTS CAN BE REACHED. I AM BRIEFING YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE SUBJECT.

BT

#0961

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 00961

EXDIS DOVE

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UN, ES, XK

SUBJECT: GOES/FMLN TALKS - UN/SYG LETTER TO PRES. BUSH,
--COOPERATION OF GOVERNMENTS IN A POSITION TO BE OF ASSISTANCE IS VERY MUCH IN NEED AT THIS TIME, AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR IS CRITICAL. I NEED HARDLY SAY THAT, IN THIS CRUCIAL PERIOD, THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATION COULD BE JEOPARDIZED IF ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE PARTIES WERE TO GATHER FROM ACTIONS OR DECISIONS BY OUTSIDE POWERS THE IMPRESSION THAT ANYTHING BUT A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SOLUTION WERE ACCEPTABLE.

--YOU WILL RECALL, FURTHERMORE, THAT I HAVE IN THE PAST RAISED WITH YOU THE QUESTION OF DIRECT CONTACT BY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT WITH THE FMLN. WHEN WE LAST MET IN JANUARY, I TOOK NOTE OF YOUR POSITION THAT WHILE YOU HAD BEEN MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION, SUCH CONTACT HAD BEEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

RENDERED DIFFICULT IN LIGHT OF THE EXECUTION OF TWO U.S. SERVICEMEN BY MEMBERS OF THE FMLN EARLIER THAT MONTH. I CANNOT BUT SYMPATHISE WITH YOUR FEELINGS REGARDING THE UNCONSCIONABLE ACT COMMITTED BY THOSE FMLN COMBATANTS. I UNDERSTAND FROM YOUR REPRESENTATIVES, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE THAT ACT, YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE SUCH A POSSIBILITY IF IT WERE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO SUCCEED.

-- IN MY VIEW, SUCH DIRECT CONTACTS ARE NOW OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACE EFFORT. QUITE APART FROM THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD SERVE THE BROAD PURPOSE OF DISSIPATING MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND CLARIFYING POSITIONS AND GOALS, THERE MAY WELL BE A NEED TO ASCERTAIN WITH ABSOLUTE CLARITY THE ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY THE U.S. IN GUARANTEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNDERTAKINGS WHICH ARE OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO THE NEGOTIATION AND TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN EL SALVADOR. I WOULD THEREFORE URGE YOU TO GIVE URGENT CONSIDERATION TO THIS MATTER AT THIS TIME.

-- I REMAIN, YOURS SINCERELY,
JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR

END TEXT.

PICKERING

BT

#0961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25 March 1991

Dear Mr. President,

Following an important shift in the position of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), efforts to end the conflict in El Salvador could well be at the threshold of a major breakthrough.

Until recently, the FMLN insisted on strict adherence to the agreement signed with the Government according to which political agreements on a host of substantive issues had to be concluded before any discussion of cease-fire arrangements. The FMLN has now proposed that a concerted effort be made to reach agreements by the end of April on the armed forces, constitutional reforms and cease-fire arrangements, leaving for a later stage, after a cease-fire is in place, the details of other demands regarding judicial and electoral reform and certain economic and social questions.

Constitutional reforms must be approved by the Legislative Assembly by 30 April in order to ensure early ratification by the new legislature which takes over on 1 May. There is thus a built-in deadline for this intensified effort, which is predicated on the premise that there exists a military stalemate and the implicit corollary that both sides should renounce the goal of military victory.

The issues which still need to be overcome in this new negotiating effort, which the Government and the FMLN have agreed to initiate early next month, are extremely complex and difficult to resolve, but during recent meetings with President Cristiani and the leadership of the FMLN my representative has detected signs of movement which, if translated into concrete advances and mutual concessions at the negotiating table, could bear early fruit.

Both sides will, however, need to know of the interest and the support of the international community for the success of the negotiation, and of the willingness of its members to fully back this effort and to ensure the implementation of emerging agreements. The political will of the warring parties must not be allowed to flag.

His Excellency
Mr. George Bush
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

I am therefore urging the parties to exercise restraint and to be prepared to compromise in certain specific areas where in my judgment flexibility will be needed so that agreements can be reached. I am briefing your Permanent Representative to the United Nations on the subject.

Cooperation of Governments in a position to be of assistance is very much in need at this time, and the role of the United States in particular is critical. I need hardly say that, in this crucial period, the prospects for success of the negotiation could be jeopardized if one or the other of the parties were to gather from actions or decisions by outside powers the impression that anything but a negotiated political solution were acceptable.

You will recall, furthermore, that I have in the past raised with you the question of direct contact by the U.S. Government with the FMLN. When we last met in January, I took note of your position that while you had been moving in that direction, such contact had been rendered difficult in light of the execution of two U.S. servicemen by members of the FMLN earlier that month. I cannot but sympathise with your feelings regarding the unconscionable act committed by those FMLN combatants. I understand from your representatives, however, that despite that act, your Government would be prepared to contemplate such a possibility if it were essential to ensure that negotiations were to succeed.

In my view, such direct contacts are now of critical importance to the success of the peace effort. Quite apart from the fact that they would serve the broad purpose of dissipating misunderstandings and clarifying positions and goals, there may well be a need to ascertain with absolute clarity the role to be played by the U.S. in guaranteeing the implementation of undertakings which are of fundamental importance to the negotiation and to the achievement of peace and democratization in El Salvador. I would therefore urge you to give urgent consideration to this matter at this time.

I remain, yours sincerely,



Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9103197
RECEIVED: 30 APR 91 09

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 02 MAY 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: VENEZUELA
AP

VISIT
EL SALVADOR

PERSONS: PEREZ, CARLOS A

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR PRES MTG W/ PRES PEREZ OF VENEZUELA ON 3 MAYRE CENTRAL
AMER ISSUES & PEACE IN EL SALVADOR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 03 MAY 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JOHNSON

LOGREF: 9102758

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GANTT
JOHNSON
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PRYCE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

Pres Mtg w/ Pres Perez on May 3

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JEB

LOG # 3197

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
<u>WBJ</u> Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>4.5/3</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>MR</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has dispatch

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09a. Outline	Re: Meeting with President Carlos Andres Perez (3 pp.)	5/2/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (February - May 1991)

Date Closed:	5/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

TAB A

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B
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT PEREZ OF VENEZUELA

COURTESY POINTS

- I understand you're going on to Houston, Tulsa, and Palo Alto, California. Congratulations on the honor you will be receiving Saturday from the University of Tulsa.
- Congratulations also to Foreign Minister Duran and Beatrice Rangel on their new promotions.

EL SALVADOR

- I'm proud that our efforts on behalf of peace have shown some fruit. I think that Cristiani has shown great courage, skill, and flexibility in working for peace.
- We need to insure that the political agreements are matched quickly by a cease-fire. We will be working hard to bring this about.
- I remain ready to send a high-level U.S. representative to talk to the FMLN in the presence of the Government of El Salvador, on what we can do to guarantee an agreement -- if President Cristiani wants it and it seems likely to help finalize an accord.
- We nevertheless remain concerned about FMLN weapons acquisitions and intentions. The supply of SA-16's by Cuba to the FMLN is a case in point. Our information is reliable. I urge you to tell the FMLN in no uncertain terms that this is the time for peace, not war.

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

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Declassify on: OADR

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NICARAGUA

- I welcome your efforts to help Latin American countries, particularly Nicaragua, to clear their arrears to the IFI's.
- As I told you on the phone on April 20, we want to help Dona Violeta solve the arrears-clearing problem. She needs a total of \$360 million. Spain is offering \$70 million and Mexico is prepared to offer \$75 million.
- We are prepared to give Nicaragua \$75 million for this effort. We need you to follow through on your \$65 million commitment. That would bring us close to a deal.
- We also hope you will continue to help in the reconciliation process there, particularly in depoliticizing the Sandinista-dominated police force, which is causing a great deal of tension in the countryside.

HAITI

- We appreciate your efforts on behalf of Haiti's democracy.
- We are giving approximately \$82 million in economic aid to Haiti in FY91 and are requesting \$88.5 million for FY92.
- (IF RAISED) Your idea of providing oil to Haiti at the domestic Venezuelan price (\$32 million in oil at world prices for \$5 million, paid for with U.S. assistance funds) is one we are interested in learning more about, but await further details.
- (IF RAISED) We were looking at possible dates for an Aristide visit, but the arrest of Mrs. Trouillot caused us to pause. We want to see how things develop.

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SURINAME

- The elections on May 25 will be a key test of Bouterse's intentions. Given his track record, we are very skeptical.
- We need to be prepared to take a firm position against Bouterse if the May 25 elections turn out to be a farce, or if he tries to intimidate the winners. Bouterse is a thug, and the international community needs to recognize this.
- The Dutch are extremely concerned, and increasingly willing to take strong measures. We are consulting with them. I hope you will urge the Brazilians to take a more activist position in support of Suriname's democracy.

OIL PRODUCER-CONSUMER DIALOGUE

- (IF RAISED) As I told you in my letter of March 21, we believe initiatives aimed at managing or manipulating the oil market are not workable, and we will not support them.
- We are strong supporters of bilateral consultations between producers and consumers that do not attempt to set production or price levels. We just finished holding such bilateral talks with you in Caracas on April 23-24, which I understand went well.
- We are concerned that the French are now pushing this idea. The IEA does not support it, and the Saudis have told us they do not favor the idea.

PDVSA, CITGO, AND ELF AQUITAIN

- We keep hearing rumors that Venezuela is going to sell a portion of its interest in CITGO to Elf Aquitaine. We see

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no business reason for a sale, and we wonder what is driving this. What's the true story?

- PDVSA's ownership of CITGO is not a domestic political issue here. We welcome Venezuelan investment in the U.S.; it is a good example of producer/consumer cooperation. We would like to see U.S. companies have equally free access to the Venezuelan market.

FAST TRACK AND NAFTA

- (IF RAISED) We face a tough battle on fast track, but I am hopeful that we will succeed. I understand how important this vote is to our credibility in our hemisphere.
- If Congress gives us the fast track authority, we plan to begin negotiations this summer.
- We are also continuing to work on Enterprise for the Americas (EAI) legislation in Congress.

PERU

- Peru is facing a very difficult situation. They are making ambitious efforts on the economic side, and need the support of the international community. We want to help them. They will of course need to make real progress on drugs and human rights. Do you have any thoughts on how the situation there will develop?

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TAB B

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs
Michael Skol, U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin American and
Caribbean Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Stephanie van Reigersberg, Interpreter

Venezuela

Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Armando Duran, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Beatrice Rangel, Minister of the Secretary of the Presidency
Simon Alberto Consalvi, Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.S.
Danute Rosales, Interpreter