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2009-0275-S

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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91138
Folder ID Number: 91138-011

Folder Title:
Central America (October 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Secretary Baker's Memorandum on a Regional Strategy for Central America (1 pp.)	10/8/90	(b)(1)	✓
01b. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Regional Strategy for Central America (1 pp.)	7/2/90	(b)(1)	✓
01c. Paper	Re: Regional Strategy for Central America (10 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
01d. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Secretary Baker's Memorandum to the President on Central America (1 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	✓
02a. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez Marquez (2 pp.)	10/22/90	(b)(1)	
02b. Letter	President Bush to President Carlos Andres Perez (2 pp.)	10/22/90	(b)(1)	
02c. Letter	President Bush to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (2 pp.)	10/22/90	(b)(1)	
02d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letters on El Salvador to Presidents Salinas and Perez and Prime Minister Gonzalez (1 pp.)	10/19/90	(b)(1)	✓

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Central America (October 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1151
OA/ID Number: 91138-011
Date Closed: 5/13/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02e. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Generating Support for the Negotiations in El Salvador (1 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	✓
02f. Draft Letter	Re: State Department Draft Letter from the President to President Salinas, President Perez, and Prime Minister Gonzalez (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
02g. Message	Presidential Messages on El Salvador (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
02h. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Messages on El Salvador to Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain (1 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	✓
03a. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [English Translation] (2 pp.)	6/10/90	(b)(1)	
03b. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [German] (2 pp.)	6/10/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005333
RECEIVED: 03 JUL 90 09

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 08 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CENTRAL AMERICA
INTL TRADE
CM

FOREIGN INVESTMENT
DEMOCRACY PROGRAM

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SEC BAKER MEMO ON REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL AMER

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 06 JUL 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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MELBY
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CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: PRESIDENT HAS MARKED CERTAIN PARTS OF THE BAKER MEMO

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 3 OF 3

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5333

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 8, 1990

90 OCT 7 8 AM 11:53

GB
read
10-11-90

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*

SUBJECT: Secretary Baker's Memorandum on a Regional Strategy for Central America

Purpose

To inform you of the State Department's ideas for a regional strategy to consolidate democratic gains in Central America.

Background

Secretary Baker has sent you a memorandum (dated July 2, but received last week) outlining political, economic, and military policies designed to contribute to stable, democratic government in Central America. The focus is on the region as a whole -- it does not deal with specific countries. For example, neither the insurgency in El Salvador nor the problems of the Chamorro government are specifically addressed. The strategy document posits three objectives (consolidating democracy, promoting economic development through market-led mechanisms, and encouraging demilitarization and civilian control of the military) and defines elements of a strategy to achieve them.

The strategy proposes a decline in U.S. economic aid, hopefully replaced by growing investment and private sector flows. A five-year multinational fund is proposed to provide grants linked to improvements in investment policies, but that idea may now be folded into your Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.

The paper does not reflect an interagency position. State intends to reach an interagency consensus on the plan and on its operational details. Many of the elements of this plan are already being implemented.

In my view, the paper adopts the correct approach for an integrated policy. The problem is in operationalizing the goals, applying appropriate resources, and dealing with the particular problems that afflict the individual countries.

You may be interested in reading the cover memo and the Executive Summary.

Attachment

Tab I Secretary Baker's Memo to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 2, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III 
SUBJECT: Regional Strategy for Central America

The United States now faces an historic opportunity in Central America. After decades of policies focused on coping with the symptoms of deep societal problems -- the revolutions, the poverty, the extremists of both sides who resorted to terrorism -- we have a rare opening to launch an integrated policy for the entire region directed at root causes. Our goal: a peaceful, stable, democratic Central America moving towards prosperity based on free market economic policies.

With the inauguration of Violeta Chamorro, all Central America has made commitments to democratic principles and market-based economic policies. We can shape our assistance, trade and investment programs to encourage these positive developments, using over time a more regional focus as intraregional cooperation advances. We are working to elicit stronger support for the region through an international coordinating mechanism bringing together the United States, Canada, Europeans, Asians and other Latins.

The region remains fragile both economically and politically. Under the right conditions, however, all Central American countries by the year 2000 can enjoy more democratic government, higher per capita incomes, and closer economic and political integration. To achieve this, we must fulfill the three policy goals set out by the Kissinger and Sanford Commissions: (1) stronger democratic institutions; (2) market-based, outward-oriented economic policies, with the benefits of growth extended with greater social equity; and (3) reduced defense spending by individual countries, with stronger regional security through cooperation. Primary responsibility for achieving these goals rests with the Central American democracies; they must make major structural changes in relations between government and the governed. But external support can play a strong energizing role.

The attached regional strategy outlines specific steps we can take. Recommendations respond to our budget realities, projecting declining aid, with increasing investment and private sector flows as our goals. We will call a meeting to reach interagency consensus on our initiatives and important operational details.

Attachment: Regional Strategy for Central America.

DECLASSIFIED

PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015

By SS NARA, Date 8/28/24

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DECL:OADR

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REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With all the countries of Central America now committed to free elections and market-oriented economies, we see good prospects for achieving regional peace and broad-based economic growth. Primary responsibility will, of course, continue to rest with the Central Americans to overcome deeply-rooted economic, social and political problems; the U.S. and other donor nations, nevertheless, can play an energizing role. Our trade, investment and assistance policies should assume a more regional focus as intraregional cooperation and integration advance. We would seek stronger support from Europe, Canada, Japan and major Latin American countries in all areas outlined below, coordinated through a G-24 mechanism modeled after that in place for Eastern Europe.

Realization of our vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Central America depends critically on three elements:

-- Consolidating democracy: This would involve expanding our own programs (including through the National Endowment for Democracy), as well as those of other donors, to strengthen democratic institutions throughout Central American societies, particularly to promote respect for human rights. We would encourage regional political cooperation (including strengthening the Central American Parliament), as well as improve narcotics control capability.

-- Promoting economic development through market-led strategies: We would continue to encourage macroeconomic and structural reforms through our bilateral assistance programs, with an increased emphasis on viable social investment strategies that effectively reach the poor. A new five-year multinational fund that offers grants linked to improvements in investment policies would finance human resource development and small-scale infrastructure. Greater regional economic cooperation would be stimulated through new consultative mechanisms, as well as initiatives for enhanced trade and investment, and improved regional infrastructure.

-- Promoting regional demilitarization: We would encourage balanced reduction and restructuring of armed forces to reflect changed security needs. Public order, customs and similar functions should be spun off from military into civilian institutions. We would use our aid to promote full civilian control over the military, and ensuring the rule of law over the military when its elements commit abuses.

These recommendations project declining levels of U.S. assistance in the future, replaced by steadily increasing investment and private sector flows.

(End of Executive Summary)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

INTRODUCTION

With the Nicaraguan inauguration, all seven countries in Central America (Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize) have governments that are both freely elected and market-oriented. This substantially improves prospects for achieving regional peace, strong democratic institutions, civilian control of the military and security forces of the region, and broad-based economic growth. It also gives us the opportunity to address Central American issues through a coordinated regional strategy, while reshaping our bilateral efforts to consolidate these positive trends. Through such a strategy, we should also be able to stimulate greater support from extraregional donors.

Deeply-rooted economic, social and political problems remain. However, with sound economic policies and political stability, all of the countries of the region could achieve, by the year 2000, major increases in real per capita incomes (on a regional average, increasing by as much as 40% to \$1700), and real annual GDP growth rates of 5-7%. Realization of this admittedly optimistic vision depends on the simultaneous fulfillment of the three policy goals set out by the Kissinger and Sanford Commissions:

-- Strengthening of democratic institutions, with more broad-based participation in economic and political systems, as well as regular, monitored elections. We can help this process through bilateral assistance programs, as well as by encouraging heightened activity by nongovernmental groups, international organizations and regional bodies already participating in democratic development project assistance. We should encourage European and Japanese assistance, including activities by the European-based international political party institutes. We should also expand National Endowment for Democracy (NED) activities in the region.

A key focus should be on establishing a strong, impartial judiciary protected from political influence. Police must respect human rights and be above corruption, but not above the law when abuses occur. Public administration in general must be made to function without fear or favor. People must develop faith in democratic institutions, and in the public servants who run them, to address their needs so that they will turn to these institutions - not to violence - to bring about change. A second focus should be the development of professional and rational government bureaucracies and procedures. Inefficiency and corruption erode the confidence of citizens in government. We should develop programs to address these problems.

We should work with the Central American presidents to strengthen political cooperation through such mechanisms as a

Central American Parliament, since recognition of shared political interests helps pave the way for economic cooperation. To prevent narcotics trafficking from undermining budding democratic institutions, greater attention must be directed toward strengthening the region's anti-narcotics capability.

-- Consistent and thorough application by all governments of market-based, outward-oriented economic policies. This would be required not only on the macroeconomic level -- to promote investment and savings, diversify exports and hold down inflation -- but also through sectoral reforms designed to bolster private-sector confidence and attract investment.

All countries of the region are committed to and are in some stage of implementing economic reform programs. Some, such as Costa Rica, Belize and Guatemala, are beginning to see the fruits of their efforts through increased investment, expanding non-traditional exports and significantly lower unemployment. However, reforms must be institutionalized to generate investor confidence and spur domestic savings. Ensuring that the benefits of growth extend throughout the society is also important to reduce instability and violence.

-- Demilitarization and strengthening of regional security cooperation. The U.S. can play a major role in facilitating an objective reappraisal of security needs in each country. As internal conflicts in Central American countries subside and confidence is gained in Nicaragua's efforts to depoliticize and reduce its armed forces, regional security requirements will also diminish. The size of military forces and defense budgets throughout Central America should be reduced. The goal in each country would be a small, more professional and apolitical military force (under the control of the civilian executive) designed for regional cooperation and a professional public security force separate from the armed forces.

To consolidate these policy goals, our strategy must be based on the following factors:

Primary responsibility for economic and political development lies in the hands of the Central Americans. External assistance can play a supporting role. Our success in advancing the vision outlined above depends primarily on the vigor with which Central Americans themselves pursue the process of consolidating peace, democracy and market-based economic growth over the next decade. Political and economic enfranchisement will entail some adjustment in the distribution of wealth and power over time, which must be accepted by entrenched elites as the price for peace and progress. These elites must come to view themselves in word and deed as reformist establishments, concerned about the future of all the

country's citizens, including the poor. Governments must formulate viable social investment strategies that effectively reach the poor.

The growth of region-wide political institutions will be a slow process to start. However, regional political challenges, economic and business opportunities can be the engine for growth of regional cooperation and planning. The Central American Parliament, a provision of Esquipulas and now in its formative stages, could provide a mechanism to address regional and cross-border issues such as demilitarization, anti-drug efforts, environmental cooperation, conflict resolution (including cessation of extra-regional support for insurgencies), customs cooperation, immigration and lowering of trade barriers. The Central American Parliament could be a focus for economic and political cooperation with similar organizations such as ASEAN and the EC. The Parliament could also become a locus for political initiatives such as a Central American Code of Human Rights or a Central American Court.

Each country approaches reducing its level of militarization with a different set of domestic pressures and priorities, and a different view of its national security interests. Progress toward demilitarization in Central America will not be uniform unless there is a willingness among reluctant neighbors to work together to reduce their individual security requirements, and to trust one another. The new U.S. focus on regional cooperation and force reduction would promote a re-examination of their security requirements in a changing threat environment. Two key confidence-building measures are the early resolution of the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, and the Chamorro government's ability to control and reshape the military and security forces in Nicaragua.

To avoid a replay of the events of the last ten years in Central America, civilian executives must exercise full control of the military, and the military must accept the rule of law when its elements commit abuses. While drawing down on size and weaponry is important, if human rights abuses persist and go unpunished, the social effects will be debilitating, regardless of whether the military is significantly smaller in size. Our aid should, therefore, promote "civilianization" of the police and customs functions outside of ministries of defense. In the years ahead, we will have to devote significant resources to training customs, police, investigators and judicial authorities if we are to achieve the goal of civilianized public forces. This will require using some of the Central American "peace dividend" (i.e. reduced military aid) to promote professional police, customs and counternarcotics forces.

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-5-

We will have to engage other donors in this effort and convince our own Congress to take a comprehensive approach to the idea, one in which current restrictions on training under Section 660 of the FAA are abolished or rewritten.

There is scope for greater involvement by the multilateral institutions and other industrialized nations in both political and economic programs. We should establish a new coordinating mechanism with other donors, patterned after the G-24 process in place for Eastern Europe. We should also seek more liberal trade treatment for the Central American region from Canada, the EC and Japan, and formation of a new multinational investment fund for both Central America and the Caribbean. The international financial institutions can play an even more important role than they have to date in encouraging Central American countries to adopt economic reforms needed for development. We should encourage formation of a consultative group for the region chaired by the World Bank, along the lines of that already in place for the Caribbean.

Central Americans must set the pace for greater economic and political regional integration. Democracy and free market economies would be better protected if they were embodied in regional institutions which provide the mutual support and forward momentum needed to prevent backsliding by individual countries. Organizations such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) and the incipient Central American Development Coordinating Committee could positively influence both policy formulation and execution of regional, performance-based programs. We should encourage this evolution, while recognizing that regional integration will succeed only if the Central American countries find it in their self-interest. A new U.S. focus on regional integration would be consistent with the EC agenda for the region and new Japanese thinking.

The policy actions suggested respond to our budget realities. While possible supplemental assistance for Nicaragua and Panama will amplify FY90 and FY91 assistance levels, our recommendations project declining levels of assistance in the future, replaced by steadily increasing investment and private sector flows. U.S. assistance should continue to be conditioned on economic policy reforms and consolidation of democracy, with some incremental changes toward greater emphasis on human capital development.

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ELEMENTS OF U.S. STRATEGY

I. Consolidating Democracy and Regional Political Cooperation

- A. Strengthen democratic institutions, processes and values (notably, respect for human rights).
- o Expand AID programs that help strengthen national governmental institutions - executive, legislative and judicial.
 - o Support the growth of a dynamic, varied nongovernmental sector (trade associations, unions, print and broadcast media, civic groups) with regional and international ties. Primary vehicles include direct assistance through AID, USIA programming, NED, and coordination with nongovernmental, regional and international groups.
 - o Augment administration of justice programs to enhance the effectiveness of the legal system; reinforce the will to carry out justice by underscoring the linkage between U.S. assistance and human rights performance.
 - o Support the professionalization of bureaucracies in order to overcome corruption and inefficiency and to improve service to the public.
 - o Emphasize human rights and democratic values in the design and implementation of cooperative activities (e.g., educational assistance and student exchanges).
 - o Encourage other developed countries, especially the EC and Japan, to increase support for democratization. European-based international political party institutes should be encouraged to help strengthen the political party systems of their Central American counterparts.
- B. Encourage regional political cooperation.
- o Build democratic solidarity through institutionalized high-level meetings of political and military leaders aimed at developing the capacity to act in common on threats to democracy and human rights.
 - o Support the emergence of a regional perspective with greater exchanges and interaction among opinion and policy makers in Central America (through USIA's interactive satellite communications network, regional associations at the professional/technical level, etc.)

- o Encourage development of a Central American Parliament as both a locus for and impetus to regional interaction and cooperation. We could offer training and other support as opportunities develop for CAP initiatives in anti-narcotics, civilian control of the military, trade liberalization etc.

C. Strengthen narcotics control capability both within each country and through regional cooperation.

- o Provide appropriate assistance for improving interdiction and eradication programs, and for increased public awareness.
- o Promote cooperation among enforcement, judicial and demand reduction agencies, through the OAS and regional programs through the United Nations (ILANUD).

II. Promoting Economic Development Through Market-Led Strategies

A. Encourage a sound macroeconomic and institutional framework, including appropriate fiscal policies, positive real interest rates and competitive exchange rates, to underpin business confidence, spur domestic savings, repatriate flight capital and promote private investment.

- o Establish a five-year multinational fund that provides grants to countries, linked to improvements in investment policies. The fund would finance human resource development projects and small-scale business infrastructure needs. We would negotiate operational details of the fund with other donors.
- o Continue to promote economic reform through bilateral assistance programs and through programs and policies of the international financial institutions.
- o Increase emphasis on microeconomic policy changes in areas such as land rights, legal structures, investment codes, and other areas which provide an appropriate enabling environment for the expansion of private investment.
- o Refocus U.S. bilateral Development Assistance to promote sectoral policy reforms, especially in education, agriculture, health, and transportation. Encourage countries to adopt a viable social investment strategy that effectively reaches the poor.

B. Seek to provide improved trade and investment opportunities for the region. Substantial progress has already been made in this area, but existing opportunities should be reinforced by additional actions, such as:

- o Continue to seek legislative expansion of CBI product benefits, as opportunities appear in Congress.
 - o Improve the CBI within existing legislative constraints, by expanding marketing outreach, investment promotion, technical assistance (including USDA assistance for agricultural exports), and improving treatment for textile/apparel exports. Encourage other developed countries to expand their investment-promotion programs.
 - o Encourage Canada to extend special Caribbean trade benefits (CARIBCAN) to Central American countries, and encourage Europe and Japan to move similarly.
 - o Encourage Central American countries to continue to open their economies to world trade, including full GATT membership by El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
- C. Promote greater cooperation in regional economic issues.
- o Promote a World Bank-sponsored regional consultative group on regional economic development strategy, similar to the effort for the Caribbean.
 - o Support Central American efforts to establish the Central American Development Coordinating Committee (CADCC) to foster regional, performance-based coordination of aid policies and programs.
 - o Break down air transport barriers among Central American countries, and between them and the U.S., so as to expand trade and tourism.
 - o Promote regional energy cooperation through bilateral technical assistance and MDB power-sector programs. Approach the Venezuelans and Mexicans to revive oil assistance to the entire region.
 - o Support regional efforts, including through the OAS, to revive a more market-based and outward-looking Central American Common Market and other institutions which promote economically efficient regional economic integration. The latter should include in particular those institutions which have strong influence on policy formulation and execution, e.g., CABEI.
 - o Create U.S. experts groups chaired by Commerce and State to work with Central American governments, the OAS and the private sector to coordinate regional tourism and telecommunications initiatives (including a possible initiative to establish a regional cellular telephone network). Reclassify Central American ports under the Jones Act to encourage tour boat port visits.

- o Support regional environmental efforts, including in the OAS, through increased bilateral and multilateral assistance and policy dialogue.

D. Promote greater involvement by Europe, Canada and Japan in Central American economic development to ease the traditionally high burden on the U.S.

- o Create a G-24-like mechanism (similar to that established for Eastern Europe, but co-chaired by the U.S., Japan, the EC and possibly Venezuela) to bring together international donor efforts to assist the region economically and commercially and at the same time to provide a means to strengthen political objectives shared by donors and recipients. Working groups would be established on a wide range of issues (aid, trade, investment, the environment, narcotics control and democratization).
- o Involve other developed countries in all aspects of the strategy outlined above, to the maximum extent possible.
- o Building on Panama and Nicaragua aid initiatives, approach the Europeans, Canadians, Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese to focus additional assistance resources for regional Central American initiatives, including co-financing MDB projects.
- o Increase the diplomatic presence of other donors in the region, with the EC playing a special role in promoting regional integration

III. Promoting Regional Demilitarization

- o Work with the UN, OAS, the Central American presidents and other important parties to bring peace to the region, resolve internal conflicts and end the disruptive extraregional interventionist influence.
- o Encourage each civilian executive to exercise full control over the military after redefining its role within a democratic society and its relationship with the legislature. Each president will need to divest the military of missions that it cannot efficiently perform, such as public order, customs and immigration, and ensure that the military is effectively under the rule of law. He must create a positive environment for this change by enforcing administrative improvements and anti-corruption efforts across the entire bureaucracy.
- o Press for more active presidential involvement in internal military decision-making, particularly on such issues as senior promotions, material acquisition strategies and stationing plans. These steps will need to be balanced by presidential support for military programs (such as force modernization and facility upgrade) and military benefits (such as retirement and

- o Press each government to reassess its national security interests and revise its military strategy to reflect the improving security environment of the region. The U.S. could offer to help the Inter-American Defense Board organize a civilian-military team familiar with the region to provide sustained technical advice.
- o Encourage Central American countries to ensure that police, customs, immigration and justice functions are under civilian control outside defense ministries. The creation of such civilian organizations will require identifying the appropriate resources and satisfying legal concerns.
- o Expand professional contacts between U.S. military and Central American counterparts to foster a better understanding of a military's role in a democracy. At a minimum, this will require a major increase in IMET funding, which currently is quite low.
- o Support development of Central American legislative oversight of the militaries.
- o Work with the Central American presidents, perhaps through the Inter-American Defense Board, to revitalize efforts to set standards for force size and equipment levels and to implement these cost-saving measures.
- o Promote regional cooperation to reduce each country's defense spending by fostering regional defense industries in such areas as ammunition, equipment, clothing and field rations. These should be cost-effective and consistent with our other economic initiatives. A similar regional approach can be used for public order forces and other justice functions. Training, for example, could be conducted at a regional center; criminal information could be shared; and material co-produced.
- o Tailor U.S. assistance, and condition it as necessary to accomplish several objectives. To reinforce the civilian executive's control over the military, assistance should be provided through the president or civilian minister of defense (or both). Materially, it should support "civilian" forces and reward progress toward regional cooperation and force reduction.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 30, 1990

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/28/24

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI *DAP*

SUBJECT: Secretary Baker's Memorandum to the President on
Central America

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President from Secretary Baker outlining a regional strategy for Central America. The memorandum arrived here in early July but was returned to State because some of the pages were in draft format. State resubmitted the memo last week without changing the date on the cover page.

The paper was drafted by State alone, without consulting other agencies. Although it says that an interagency meeting will be called to reach consensus on the initiative and operational details, none has been called. This may well be because most of the elements of the initiative are already in place or are not controversial policy issues. We will attempt to focus State's attention on this document, as its overall approach seems quite reasonable.

We do not believe the President needs to read the Secretary's entire memorandum, as he can get the essential gist of it from your memorandum and perhaps the Executive Summary. At the least, the President should be aware the Secretary has sent the memorandum.

Concurrence by: Eric Melby *SM*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to the President
Tab A Baker Memorandum to the President

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Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008204
RECEIVED: 15 OCT 90 18

TO: GONZALEZ, FELIPE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 22 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR
SPAIN
UNGA

MEXICO
VENEZUELA
CM

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: SALINAS, CARLOS
PEREZ, CARLOS A

GONZALEZ, FELIPE
CRISTIANI, ALFREDO

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES GONZALEZ RE SUPPORT FOR UN PEACE EFFORTS IN
EL SALVADOR

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 18 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
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FOR INFO
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY WEA/MEN DATE 10/23 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 6 OF 6

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9008204

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 PACELLI
002 SCOWCROFT
003 PRESIDENT
004
005
006
006 STATE

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90101518 PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
Z 90101815 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
Z 90101918 FOR SIGNATURE
X 90102216 PRES SGD LTR
X 90102216 PRES SGD LTR
Z 90102216 PRES SGD LTRS
X 90102216 FOR DISPATCH

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/13/09

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008204
RECEIVED: 15 OCT 90 18

TO: GONZALEZ, FELIPE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 22 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR
SPAIN
UNGA

MEXICO
VENEZUELA
CM

PERSONS: SALINAS, CARLOS
PEREZ, CARLOS A

GONZALEZ, FELIPE
CRISTIANI, ALFREDO

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES GONZALEZ RE SUPPORT FOR UN PEACE EFFORTS IN
EL SALVADOR

ACTION: PRES SGD LTRS

DUE DATE: 18 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA
DYKE
NSC CHRON
PACELLI

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 6 OF 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9008204

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	PACELLI	Z	90101518	PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
002	SCOWCROFT	Z	90101815	FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
003	PRESIDENT	Z	90101918	FOR SIGNATURE
004		X	90102216	PRES SGD LTR
005		X	90102216	PRES SGD LTR
006		X	90102216	PRES SGD LTRS

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/13/09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008204
RECEIVED: 15 OCT 90 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BAKER, J

DOC DATE: 15 OCT 90
SOURCE REF: 9021759

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR
SPAIN
UNGA

MEXICO
VENEZUELA
CM

PERSONS: SALINAS, CARLOS
PEREZ, CARLOS A

GONZALEZ, FELIPE
CRISTIANI, ALFREDO

SUBJECT: GENERATING SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN EL SALVADOR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 18 OCT 90

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PRYCE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

~~PRYCE~~

David Pacelli

FOR CONCURRENCE

BASORA

JOHNSON

Bill Pryce

FOR INFO

GOMPERT

HILL

SITTMANN

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 9008204
DATE 22 OCT 90

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES GONZALEZ RE SUPPORT FOR UN PEACE EFFORTS IN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 3 ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/13/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9008204

REFERRAL

DATE: 22 OCT 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GONZALEZ, FELIPE

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 22 OCT 90

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO PRES GONZALEZ RE SUPPORT FOR UN PEACE EFFORTS IN
EL SALVADOR

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

*** PLEASE DISPATCH THE 3 LTRS ENCLOSED

DUE DATE: 22 OCT 90

COMMENT:

FOR

Walter E. Ains

GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/13/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 6
FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN (NAME) _____ (EXTENSION) _____ (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LETTERS TO EL SALVADOR TO PRES SALINAS, PEREZ
AND PM GONZALEZ

LOG # 8204

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>J. STAPLETON ROY</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING, SIGNED ORIGINALS TO FOLLOW.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/13/09

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8204
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AC A/O _____

LOG # 8204

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

DOCLOG AC A/O _____

90 UC122 A10.27

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Bill: Date 10/22/90

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

P Ltrs to PS of Mexico
National Security Council
The White House *Venezuela*
Spain

PROOFED BY: WEA LOG # 8204
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LMS A/O _____

WEB
Ken Hill

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Ken Hill 1 J A

Bill Sittmann 2 W _____

Bob Gates 3 8 _____

Brent Scowcroft 4 APNSA Has Seen _____

Bill Sittmann _____

Situation Room _____

West Wing Desk 5 MM 10/19 D

NSC Secretariat _____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's office has deslotted

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1990

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was very gratified to hear from you during our meeting in New York at the UN General Assembly that you have accepted the Secretary General's request to become directly engaged in support of the UN's efforts to mediate a successful political settlement to the war in El Salvador. I very much welcome your efforts, and I am confident that you can make a decisive difference in helping to bring both peace and the consolidation of democracy to El Salvador.

Since you will be playing such an important, direct, and personal role, I want to share my own assessment of the situation with you and offer my personal support for your efforts, and those of the other leaders who have enlisted in this effort with you.

You and I spoke about our joint concerns for the situation in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua. I believe that ending the war in El Salvador is crucial to realizing the long-term hopes of the leaders and peoples of Central America for democracy, demilitarization, and development.

President Cristiani, I believe, is seriously committed to finding a negotiated solution to the war that takes into account the legitimate security concerns of FMLN combatants. I am also impressed with the consensus which appears to have developed among the political parties in the Inter-Party Commission for electoral and judicial reform. We support and endorse these efforts.

Clearly, the issue of the armed forces is the most difficult and sensitive one; my information is that President Cristiani has put

meaningful and far-reaching offers on the table. Nevertheless, as he grows more flexible, the FMLN appears to be hardening its demands.


If the current logjam is not broken, I fear the process could collapse and be replaced with renewed violence. It is crucial that all of us set as our goal a breakthrough in the next round of negotiations leading as quickly as possible to a UN-supervised cease-fire, as called for by the Central American Presidents.

I will do my part, both by supporting President Cristiani and by pressing for flexibility and greater respect for human rights. Unfortunately, I do not believe there is much pressure for serious bargaining on either the FMLN or on Cuba, which continues to arm and train FMLN combatants. Here I hope you will use your influence. If both Cuba and the FMLN know they will pay a political price for intransigence, they may be more reasonable.

I believe we must also give maximum support to the Secretary General in the next round by raising the level of international concern about the slow pace of progress in the peace talks. The FMLN has blocked the efforts of the Secretary General's representative to offer compromise proposals or to speed up the pace of negotiations. We need to ensure the Secretary General has these tools at his disposal.

Your efforts during the Nicaraguan elections helped bring both peace and democracy to that troubled country. I deeply appreciate your commitment to make a similar effort towards El Salvador. Please keep me informed of your efforts and know that you can count on my support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Felipe Gonzalez', written in a cursive style.

His Excellency
Felipe Gonzalez Marquez
President of the Government of Spain
Madrid

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

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
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Your efforts during the Nicaraguan elections helped bring both peace and democracy to that troubled country. I deeply appreciate your commitment to make a similar effort towards El Salvador. Please keep me informed of your efforts and know that you can count on my support.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Carlos Andres Perez
President of the Republic of Venezuela
Caracas

I am looking forward to my trip.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

I was very gratified to learn in New York at the UN General Assembly that you have accepted the Secretary General's request to become directly engaged in support of the UN's efforts to mediate a successful political settlement to the war in El Salvador. I very much welcome your efforts, and I am confident that you can make a decisive difference in helping to bring both peace and the consolidation of democracy to El Salvador.

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
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I will do my part, both by supporting President Cristiani and by pressing for flexibility and greater respect for human rights. Unfortunately, I do not believe there is much pressure for serious bargaining on either the FMLN or on Cuba, which continues to arm and train FMLN combatants. Here I hope you will use your influence. If both Cuba and the FMLN know they will pay a political price for intransigence, they may be more reasonable. I know there is a sizable FMLN political presence in Mexico; I hope you will use your influence with them directly to make it clear that Mexico expects serious bargaining in the next round, not a new offensive.

I believe we must also give maximum support to the Secretary General in the next round by raising the level of international concern about the slow pace of progress in the peace talks. The FMLN has blocked the efforts of the Secretary General's representative to offer compromise proposals or to speed up the pace of negotiations. We need to ensure the Secretary General has these tools at his disposal.

Your efforts during the Nicaraguan elections helped bring both peace and democracy to that troubled country. I deeply appreciate your commitment to make a similar effort towards El Salvador. Please keep me informed of your efforts and know that you can count on my support.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Carlos Salinas de Gortari
President of the United Mexican States
Mexico, D.F.

P.S. I'm looking forward to our visit
George

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS ⁸²⁰⁴SEEN
10-22-90

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

90 OCT 19 PM

October 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Letters on El Salvador to Presidents Salinas and
Perez and Prime Minister Gonzalez

Purpose

To generate the support of three key leaders to use their influence with the FMLN guerrillas and Cuba for a negotiated settlement in El Salvador.

Background

Secretary of State Baker recommends that you send personal messages to President Salinas of Mexico, President Perez of Venezuela, and Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain to urge them to exert pressure on the FMLN and Cuba for a breakthrough in the Salvadoran peace negotiations (Tab B). Each has agreed to the request of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to act individually to facilitate the talks. President Cristiani also has given his qualified endorsement to the idea.

You previously wrote each leader on September 5, 1990, to urge them to use their influence with the FMLN to negotiate seriously and not to conduct another military offensive. These additional messages at Tabs A, B, and C underscore the importance of quickly achieving a cease-fire, and they closely follow the State Department's suggested text.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to Presidents Salinas and Perez, and Prime Minister Gonzalez, at Tabs A - C.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Salinas
Tab B Letter to President Perez
Tab C Letter to Prime Minister Gonzalez
Tab D Secretary Baker's Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0467 F12
21 3/6/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1990

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: Generating Support for the Negotiations in El Salvador

The U.N.-mediated negotiations between the Cristiani government and the FMLN face a logjam. If a breakthrough does not occur in the upcoming round, scheduled tentatively for November 4, the whole process may break down. Moreover, it is crucial that some kind of cease-fire agreement be reached before the March 1991 Salvadoran elections to allow for an expanded electoral process, including in the conflictive zones, and expanded international observation -- the U.N. says it will not monitor the elections absent a cease-fire.

As you remember, President Salinas of Mexico, President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, and Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain all volunteered to you in your UNGA bilaterals that the Secretary General had asked them to provide assistance. Each also pledged to exert pressure on the FMLN and Cuba to achieve a negotiated breakthrough.

Each of these leaders was very helpful, at your request, in pressing the Sandinistas to hold elections in Nicaragua. I believe that if they knew how important this issue was to you, they would be similarly energized, and could make a crucial difference. The FMLN is headquartered in Mexico; thus Salinas retains considerable leverage over them. Cuba, which remains the principal political and military support for the FMLN, does not want to alienate Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela at a time when its economy is in crisis and it is politically isolated.

I believe it would make an enormous difference if each of these leaders received a personal letter from you in the next several days outlining your views and concerns about El Salvador and encouraging their active involvement. Enclosed is a draft letter for your consideration.

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DECL: OADR

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AS AMENDED
1999-0407-F12
② 1/2/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

State Department
Draft Letter from the President
to President Salinas, President Perez,
and Prime Minister Gonzalez

Dear:

I was very gratified to hear from you during our meeting in New York at the UNGA that you have accepted the Secretary General's request to become directly engaged in support of the U.N.'s efforts to mediate a successful political settlement to the war in El Salvador. I very much welcome your efforts, and I am confident that you can make a decisive difference in helping to bring both peace and the consolidation of democracy to El Salvador.

Since you will be playing such an important, direct, and personal role, I want to share my own assessment of the situation with you and offer my personal support for your efforts, and those of the other leaders who have enlisted in this effort with you.

You and I spoke about our joint concerns for the situation in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua. I believe that ending the war in El Salvador is crucial to realizing the long-term hopes of the leaders and peoples of Central America for democracy, demilitarization, and development.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0467F/1
DU 3/6/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

President Cristiani, I believe, is seriously committed to finding a negotiated solution to the war that takes into account the legitimate security concerns of FMLN combatants. I am also impressed with the consensus which appears to have developed among the political parties in the Inter-Party Commission for electoral and judicial reform. We support and endorse these efforts.

Clearly, the issue of the armed forces is the most difficult and sensitive one; my information is that Cristiani has put meaningful and far-reaching offers on the table. Nevertheless, as Cristiani grows more flexible, the FMLN appears to be hardening its demands.

If the current logjam is not broken, I fear the process could collapse and be replaced with renewed violence. It is crucial that all of us set as our goal a breakthrough in the next round of negotiations leading as quickly as possible to a U.N.-supervised cease-fire.

I will do my part, both by supporting Cristiani and by pressing for flexibility and greater respect for human rights. Unfortunately, I do not believe there is much pressure for serious bargaining on either the FMLN or on Cuba, which continues to arm and train FMLN combatants. Here I hope you will use your influence. If both Cuba and the FMLN know they

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

will pay a political price for intransigence, they may be more reasonable. (For Salinas: I know there is a sizable FMLN political presence in Mexico; I hope you will use your influence with them directly, Carlos, to make it clear that Mexico expects serious bargaining in the next round, not a new offensive.)

I believe we must also give maximum support to the Secretary General in the next round by raising the level of international concern about the slow pace of progress in the peace talks. The FMLN has blocked the efforts of the Secretary General's representative to offer compromise proposals or to speed up the pace of negotiations. We need to ensure the Secretary General has these tools at his disposal.

Your efforts during the Nicaraguan elections helped bring both peace and democracy to that troubled country. I deeply appreciate your commitment to make a similar effort towards El Salvador. Please keep me informed of your efforts and know that you can count on my support.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Presidential Messages on El Salvador

The following messages should be delivered to President Perez of Venezuela, President Salinas of Mexico concurrently with messages from Acting Secretary Eagleburger to Foreign Minister Figueredo and Foreign Secretary Solana:


Dear Mr. President:

I have asked (Chargé Skoug/Ambassador Negroponte) to deliver a message from Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to (Foreign Minister Figueredo/Foreign Secretary Solana) on the situation in El Salvador and also want to let you know personally of my concern. I am troubled that the FMLN appears to be seeking to undermine the peace negotiations with unreasonable demands and violent actions such as the recent attack on the Presidential Palace.

We have been satisfied that the Salvadoran government has taken a constructive and flexible posture in these negotiations so far, and we are urging them to continue to do so. I believe it would be very helpful for you to use your influence to convince the FMLN to approach the next round of negotiations, now scheduled for September 13th, with a good faith effort to achieve a cease fire in the shortest time possible. More particularly, I hope you will communicate to the FMLN that the launching of a military offensive would be denounced by you in the strongest possible terms.

I deeply appreciate your efforts on behalf of a peaceful solution to the war in El Salvador.

Sincerely,



George Bush

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0467 P12
21 3/6/03

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8204

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 18, 1990

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*
FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI *DAP*
SUBJECT: Presidential Messages on El Salvador to Mexico,
Venezuela, and Spain

The Secretary of State has sent a memorandum to the President recommending that he send a personal message to Presidents Salinas and Perez, and Prime Minister Gonzalez, urging them to become actively involved in working for peace in El Salvador (Tab D). The President sent a previous message to these leaders on September 5, 1990, which asked them to use their influence with the FMLN guerrillas for flexibility in the negotiations, as well as to warn the FMLN against launching a military offensive (Tab II).

While these letters will probably not have a significant effect on either President Salinas or Prime Minister Gonzalez, they are worth a try. Although President Cristiani has agreed to the group, he has reservations. He believes -- correctly, in our view -- that these countries will pressure him as well as the FMLN.

The letters at Tabs A - C closely follow the version suggested by the Secretary.

Concurrences by: *NBD* Nancy Bearg Dyke and *AAB* Adrian Basora

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to President Salinas
Tab B Letter to President Perez
Tab C Letter to Prime Minister Gonzalez
Tab D Secretary Baker's Memorandum
Tab II Presidential Message, September 5, 1990

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AS AMENDED
1999-0467 F/1
20 3/6/03

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005475
RECEIVED: 09 JUL 90 13

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 24 OCT 90
SOURCE REF: 9015432

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
IMF

NICARAGUA
EC
HS

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM CHANCELLOR KOHL RE ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE DUE DATE: 12 JUL 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON
PACELLI
RICE
SALVETTI, L

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 5/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9015432

Date October 24, 1990

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President BushFrom: Helmut KohlDate: 6/20/90

Subject: Kohl informs President of Germany assistance to Nicaragua
as agreed in Rome at Nicaragua pledging conference

WH Referral Dated: July 9, 1990NSCS ID# (if any): 9005475

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- _____ A draft reply is attached.
- _____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- _____ A translation is attached.
- _____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- X _____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- _____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- _____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: Kohl's letter is in response to a letter from President Bush and
does not need a reply, besides, any response would be too late at
this point. We recommend this letter be declared OBE.

[Signature]
Director
Secretariat Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9005475

REFERRAL

DATE: 09 JUL 90

S/S 9015432

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: KOHL, HELMUT

DATE: 20 JUN 90

SUBJ: KOHL INFORMS PRES OF GERMAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA AS
AGREED IN ROME AT NICARAGUA PLEDGING CONF

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 13 JUL 90

COMMENT:

FOR

Walter E. Avis

GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

Walter E. Avis
JUL 11 1990
11:34

Translation

S/S 9015432

The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, 10 June 1990

His Excellency
Mr George Bush,
President of the
United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

Dear George,

Thank you very much for your kind letter, conveyed to me by Ambassador Walters, informing me on the eve of the Nicaragua pledging conference in Rome of your Government's proposed financial contributions and its firm commitment to the success of the conference.

My Government, too, made careful preparations for the conference in Rome, which was important not only for Nicaragua but also for developments throughout Central America.

In the view of the Federal Government as well as the other participants and Nicaragua itself, the result of the conference can on the whole be regarded as satisfactory. Your Government's generous contribution played a decisive part in this.

The Federal Republic of Germany was able to contribute US \$ 31 million, including US \$ 15 million in the form of emergency aid. To this must be added our share of the EC contribution of US \$ 60 million, which included US \$ 49 million in emergency aid.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3
GB-2009-1103-MR / NW 80021
By SAC, NARA, Date 2/24/2006

No less important than the volume of the contributions and emergency aid pledged in Rome is, in the Federal Government's view, the World Bank's compliance with requests by Nicaragua and its donors to head an advisory group on Nicaragua, in close cooperation with the IMF and the IDB. An IMF stabilizing programme as well as comprehensive international debt rescheduling arrangements must now be developed as soon as possible.

You may rest assured that the Federal Government will continue to make every effort to support Nicaragua both bilaterally and within the framework of the European Community. The Federal Government entirely shares the view widely expressed at the pledging conference in Rome that a settlement to the Nicaragua problem, whose significance extends far beyond Central America, must be found.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) Helmut Kohl

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
DER BUNDESKANZLER

Bonn, den 20. Juni 1990

Seiner Exzellenz
dem Präsidenten der Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika
Herrn George Bush

Washington, D.C.

Lieber George,

für Ihr freundliches, durch Herrn Botschafter Walters übermitteltes Schreiben, mit dem Sie mich am Vorabend der Nicaragua-Geberkonferenz in Rom über die beabsichtigten Zusagen und das große Interesse Ihrer Regierung an einem erfolgreichen Verlauf unterrichten, danke ich Ihnen sehr.

Auch meine Regierung hatte sich auf diese sowohl für Nicaragua wie auch darüber hinaus für die Entwicklung in ganz Zentralamerika wichtige Konferenz in Rom sorgfältig vorbereitet.

Nach Einschätzung der Bundesregierung und wohl auch in Übereinstimmung mit den übrigen Teilnehmern und Nicaragua selbst kann das Konferenzergebnis insgesamt als Erfolg bewertet werden. Die großzügige Zusage Ihrer Regierung hat hieran einen ganz entscheidenden Anteil.

Für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland konnten 31 Mio US \$, davon 15 Mio \$ in Form dringend benötigter Soforthilfe zugesagt werden. Hinzuzurechnen wäre der deutsche Anteil an der Zusage der Europäischen Gemeinschaft von 60 Mio US \$, davon 49 Mio \$ Soforthilfe.

Ebenso wichtig wie der volumenmäßige Umfang der in Rom erreichten Zusagen bzw. Soforthilfen ist aus Sicht der Bundesregierung die Tatsache, daß sich die Weltbank auf Bitten Nicaraguas und der Geber bereiterklärt hat, die Führung einer Beratergruppe für Nicaragua unter enger Einbindung von IWF und IDB zu übernehmen. Es wird jetzt darauf ankommen, möglichst rasch ein IWF-Stabilisierungsprogramm und international abgestimmte umfassende Umschuldungsregelungen zustandezubringen.

Ich darf Ihnen versichern, daß die Bundesregierung Nicaragua bilateral und im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft weiter nach Kräften unterstützen wird. Die Bundesregierung teilt voll die beim Gebertreffen in Rom allgemein zum Ausdruck gekommene Überzeugung, daß der "Fall Nicaragua" mit seiner weit über Zentralamerika hinausreichenden Signalwirkung nicht scheitern darf.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'H' followed by a large, sweeping 'J' and a smaller 'm'.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008211
RECEIVED: 15 OCT 90 20

TO: ROCKEFELLER, DAVID

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 25 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

PERSONS: ROCKEFELLER, DAVID

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT RESPONSE TO LTR FM ROCKEFELLER ON 1 OCT RE ENTERPRISE FOR AMERICAS

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 18 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JOHNSON

LOGREF: 9007970

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JOHNSON

MELBY

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 6 OF 6

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9008211

REFERRAL

DATE: 25 OCT 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: ROCKEFELLER, DAVID

SOURCE: SCOWCROFT

DATE: 25 OCT 90

SUBJ: SCOWCROFT RESPONSE TO LTR FM ROCKEFELLER ON 1 OCT RE ENTERPRISE FOR
AMERICAS

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:

FOR


GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 24, 1990

Dear David:

Thanks for your recent letter reporting your conversations with Latin American Presidents concerning the Enterprise for the Americas initiative. When I launched the initiative on June 27, I was hoping for a positive response, and the widespread enthusiasm with which it has been received is very gratifying. I am personally committed to making all aspects of this initiative work, and the support of the Americas Society, both domestically and in the hemisphere will help insure success.

I, too, am a little troubled by the fact that the Enterprise initiative has not received more attention at home. The Americas Society and the private sector can play a major role in publicizing the advantages that an open trade and investment environment can give to all countries in this hemisphere, including our own.

We are working hard to achieve passage of the Enterprise legislation, which was sent to Congress on September 14. I plan to use my trips to Mexico in November and to South America in early December to give our policy greater recognition at home.

Sincerely,



Mr. David Rockefeller
Chairman
Americas Society, Incorporated
660 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10021

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 24, 1990

Dear David:

The President has shared with me the letter you sent him on the Enterprise for the Americas initiative. As always, I appreciate your assistance and your wise counsel. As the Administration continues to work for passage of the Enterprise implementing legislation, we will want to call on your help and that of the Americas Society. We want to see this legislation passed soon in 1991, to keep up the positive momentum in our relations with the hemisphere.

Your point on more publicity is well taken -- we are going to do our best to use the President's planned November 26-27 trip to Mexico and his December 2-8 trip to South America to focus domestic attention on relations with our hemisphere. Work on the visits is now under way; the South America trip will take the President to Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela. Maybe by the end of the year, the change in our relations with the hemisphere will begin to come into focus here at home.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Brent", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Brent Scowcroft

David Rockefeller
Room 5600
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10012

10-25-90

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 OCT 24 PM 9:52

October 24, 1990

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter from David Rockefeller

Purpose

To reply to a letter from David Rockefeller on your Enterprise for the Americas initiative

Background

David Rockefeller wrote you October 1 reporting that in his recent meetings in New York, Latin American leaders' reaction to your Enterprise for the Americas initiative was "uniformly enthusiastic." He adds that "no President of the United States in recent decades has enjoyed the popularity you have or has been perceived to have your personal interest and concern for the affairs of this Hemisphere." However, he expressed concern that your initiative has received little public recognition here at home, and reiterates an offer by the Americas Society to help.

The letter at Tab A thanks him for the letter, tells him that you share his concern about the Enterprise initiative's lack of visibility here at home, tells him that you welcome the Americas Society's help, and adds that you hope your trips to Mexico and South America in November and December will focus domestic attention on the positive developments in our relations with the Hemisphere.

David has also written to me on the same subject, and I plan to reply along the same lines.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to David Rockefeller at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A President's Letter to David Rockefeller
Tab B Letter from David Rockefeller to the President

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 19, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

FROM: DONALD C. JOHNSON *MS*

SUBJECT: Letters from David Rockefeller to the President
And to You

SIGNED
[Signature]

David Rockefeller has written letters to the President and you reporting recent Latin American reactions to the Enterprise for the Americas initiative and expressing concern about the lack of domestic publicity for it. The letters at Tabs A and C respond to him, thanking him for support, saying that the President will seek additional help from the Americas Society in getting the Enterprise legislation passed and agreeing that we need to be more active in promoting this initiative at home.

The Rockefeller letter was originally assigned to Cabinet Affairs for reply, but given the foreign policy aspects of the letter, and the companion letter to you, action was transferred to the NSC.

Concurrence by: *Tim Deal*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab A.

That you sign the Letter to David Rockefeller at Tab C.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	President's Letter to David Rockefeller
Tab B	Letter from David Rockefeller to the President
Tab C	Scowcroft Letter to David Rockefeller
Tab D	Letter from David Rockefeller to Scowcroft
Tab II	Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 16, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*

FROM: ERIC MELBY *EM*

SUBJECT: Comments on Proposed Reply to David Rockefeller

John Gardner has asked for our comments on the attached proposed reply (Tab A) to David Rockefeller's letter to the President on the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Gardner indicating that the NSC staff concurs with the proposed reply.

Concurrence by: William Pryce *WP*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Gardner at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Gardner
Tab A Proposed Reply
Tab B Letter from Rockefeller

10/16
Bell - By the time
this reaches Rockefeller,
it will probably be
clear that the ONI
legislation won't pass
this session. g

82 11
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10112

ROOM 5600

(212) 649-5600

October 8, 1990

Dear Brent:

As you know, I have been most encouraged about the Administration's new "Enterprise for the Hemisphere Initiative", announced by President Bush over the summer. The Americas Society and others in the private sector are eager to be helpful as this Initiative makes its way through Congress and in developing further private sector support.

In this regard, I recently wrote to President Bush telling him of the enthusiasm I have found for the Initiative in Latin America. I enclose a copy of my letter for your information.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



David Rockefeller

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
National Security Council
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

20 Oct 1990



AMERICAS SOCIETY INC

680 PARK AVENUE NEW YORK NEW YORK 10021 212 249 8950

DAVID ROCKEFELLER
President

October 1, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

As you know better than anyone, the recent meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations have brought a great many Heads of State to New York. I am happy to say that the Americas Society has been able to take advantage of this fact by entertaining at lunches and dinners eight of the leading Latin American Presidents including Presidents Collor, Gaviria and Salinas, who, in my judgment, are three outstanding leaders of the Hemisphere. The functions we gave provided them with opportunities to meet with opinion leaders from the private sector at public events coupled with smaller private meetings with senior businessmen doing business in their respective countries.

I am taking the liberty of writing you at this time because I thought you would be interested and encouraged to hear that the reaction of the Latin American leaders we have talked with has been uniformly enthusiastic with respect to your "Enterprise for the Americas" initiative. They agree with you that the time is propitious to emphasize investment and trade and that the private sector will need to play a major role even though there are important ways in which Government can stimulate and encourage these private activities. American businessmen with existing interests in Latin American share the enthusiasm of their Latin American counterparts. Many, including myself, are also convinced that the debt for nature proposal embedded in your initiative could be very important in encouraging more aggressive programs to protect the environment in Latin America.

My one concern is that, unlike in Latin America, the initiative has thus far received very little public recognition in this country. Organizations like the Americas Society and the Council of the Americas are fully on board and hopefully are being helpful in selling it both here and in Latin America. But, with developments in the Soviet Union and Central Europe,

not to mention the Gulf, it would appear that even within the Administration there are relatively few people who are actively promoting the initiative. This is a pity since your leadership and the message you are conveying to the newly-elected leaders of Latin America are widely and enthusiastically recognized. Indeed, I have heard it said by many that no President of the United States in recent decades has enjoyed the popularity you have or has been perceived to have your personal interest and concern for the affairs of this Hemisphere.

We in the Americas Society are keeping in close touch with Nick Brady and David Mulford in the Treasury, with Bob Mosbacher in Commerce and with Roger Porter and Steve Farrar in the White House. Please be sure that we believe in what you are doing and would like to help in other ways if you see the opportunity. Please let us know.

Sincerely,



David Rockefeller

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN S. GARDNER

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

SUBJECT: Comments on Proposed Reply to David Rockefeller

The NSC staff concurs with the attached proposed reply (Tab A) to David Rockefeller's letter to the President (Tab B).

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Reply

Tab B Letter from Rockefeller