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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Latin American Files
Subseries:	Central American Chronological Files

OA/ID Number:	91138
Folder ID Number:	91138-003

Folder Title:
Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Phone Call on NED/Nicaragua to Senator Helms (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Timothy Deal and Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: IEPR Breakfast (3 pp.)	10/12/89	(b)(1)	C
02b. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	10/11/89	(b)(1)	C
03a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Republican Leaders (2 pp.)	10/16/89	(b)(1)	C
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Republican Senators on Nicaragua Legislation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03c. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Background Paper and Points to be Made for the President's Meeting with Republican Senators on Nicaragua (1 pp.)	10/16/89	(b)(1)	C
04. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made Anticipated Encounter with President Ortega (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05a. Briefing Paper	Re: Call on President Arias (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1143
OA/ID Number: 91138-003
Date Closed: 5/12/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05c. Talking Points	Re: Potential Pull Aside with Salvadoran President Cristiani Talking Points (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05d. Talking Points	Re: Potential Pull Aside with Prime Minister Manley Talking Points (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05e. Talking Points	Re: Potential Pull Aside with President Barco Talking Points (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05f. Talking Points	Re: Possible Pull Aside with President Borja of Ecuador (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05g. Talking Points	Re: Potential Pull-Aside with Prime Minsiter Mulroney (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05h. Talking Points	Re: Potential Pull-Aside with President Menem (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05i. Talking Points	Re: Potential Pull-Aside with President Paz Zamora of Bolivia Talking Poins (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05j. Briefing Paper	Re: Guyana (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05k. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06a. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Contingency Briefing Papers for Bush-Ortega Meeting (1 pp.)	10/25/89	(b)(1)	C
06b. Talking Points	Re: Possible Encounter with President Ortega (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06c. Talking Points	Re: Arms Shipments and Military Force Levels (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06d. Talking Points	Re: U.S. Assistance to the Opposition (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06e. Talking Points	Re: Humanitarian Aid to the Resistance (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06f. Talking Points	Re: U.S. Economic Embargo (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06g. Talking Points	Re: Improved Bilateral Relations (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06h. Talking Points	Re: Drug Cooperation (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07a. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to G. Philip Hughes Re: Memorandum of Conversation with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minsiter of Spain (1 pp.)	11/4/89	(b)(1)	C
07b. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Memorandum of Conversation with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minsiter of Spain (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07c. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain (6 pp.)	10/19/89	(b)(1)	C
07d. Cable	Re: President's Letter to Hemispheric Leaders (2 pp.)	11/4/89	(b)(1)	C

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FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (1 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	C
08b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
08c. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Telephone Call to Salvadoran President Cristiani (1 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	C
08d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Call to President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
08e. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Additional Information Relating to the President's Telephone Call to Salvadoran President Cristiani (1 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	C
09. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Sandinista - Contra Talks (3 pp.)	11/17/89	(b)(1)	C
10a. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to American Embassy Belize Re: President's Reply to Prime Minister Price (1 pp.)	12/18/89	(b)(1)	C
10b. Letter	Al Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri to President Bush (2 pp.)	9/28/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1143
OA/ID Number: 91138-003
Date Closed: 5/12/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10c. Cable	American Embassy Belize to White House Re: Letter from Belize Prime Minsiter to President Bush on Nicaragua (2 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	C
11a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Your Question Regarding a List of Officers to be Purged from the Armed Forces of El Salvador (1 pp.)	11/22/89	(b)(1)	C
11b. Handwritten Memo	President Bush to Philip Hughes Re: El Salvador (1 pp.)	11/21/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1143
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Date Closed: 5/12/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

For Files
Orig
Pres. Bush
notes 10/6

80606

CHRON FILE

1

TALKING POINTS FOR PHONE CALL
ON NSD/NICARAGUA TO SENATOR HELMS

- I'm calling to ask for your support for the President's package of aid to Violeta Chamorro. [NOTE: We really need his acquiescence to Senate floor debate.]

- The opposition desperately needs our support to defeat the Sandinistas next February.

- The package passed the House last night with overwhelming Republican support. The language coming to the Senate today is virtually identical to the President's original package. The lukewarm support of the Democrats -- 99 votes -- is the best evidence that we refused to negotiate with them.

- We need to get a clean, unamended bill out of the Senate quickly. If this aid is delayed because of amendments requiring a conference, or if we simply can't get a Senate vote, we won't be able to get funds to the opposition before the end of the October registration period.

- The opposition has a good Presidential candidate, and they have the will to win. But they need our help to get the votes to defeat Daniel Ortega. For that, we need you.

- [IF NECESSARY] I'm sorry you can't support the package. I hope you will allow rapid Senate debate and a floor vote. The House leadership -- Republican and Democrat -- worked with us to allow a vote in their chamber. I hope you will allow us the same chance in the Senate.

w/ attachment

✓ even tho unwise
take hold off - proceed
U C.

✓ asked about Mex City -

10/06/89 08:25 ☎202 647 5095 DOS LEGIS AFFAIR ••• NSC LEGISLATIVE ☎002/010

o I know you have some problems with the package:

-- AID TO THE FOURTEEN MEMBER COALITION THAT INCLUDES THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

o Violetta and the other members of the coalition have agreed to run with the Communists to defeat the Sandinistas.

o In putting our package forward, we decided not to second guess Violetta's decision to lead the fourteen member coalition. If Violetta takes office, she, not the Communists, will be running Nicaragua.

-- RUNNING MATE IS VIRGILIO GODOY (VUHHELEO GUDOY) (AND NOT CONSERVATIVE BUSINESSMAN ENRIQUE BOLANOS (ENREKAY BOLANYOS)).

o We might all have preferred a more conservative running mate. In their democratic process, the coalition came up with Godoy as the vice presidential candidate.

o Godoy was, as you know, the Sandinista's labor minister for less than two years. As you also know, he left the regime to run against Ortega in 1984. He even attempted to withdraw his party from the elections, but the Sandinistas refused to take his name off the ballots.

o Whether or not he would be our candidate, he is critical in holding the anti-Sandinista coalition together.

-- PRECEDENT OF NED FUNDING THIS EFFORT.

o We heard that criticism from many on the House side.

o We have, for the moment, exhausted all other efforts to oust the Sandinistas. What we have to decide today is whether to cede the battle to the Marxists in Nicaragua -- to tell them that, after all our efforts, they won -- or whether we will continue the fight against them.

o At the moment, the elections are our means of continuing the fight. NED is our instrument in continuing the battle.

- This is not a precedent for NED. This is the largest effort they have put forth in any country; any program of this magnitude could begin only with our approval -- and after consultation with you.

-- SANDINISTAS MIGHT GET SOME FUNDS

- Our package was designed so that all money into Nicaragua runs through the opposition. That includes the 50% Supreme Electoral Commission tax necessary for an overt program.

- The SEC is starved for cash. They have only 1/3 of the $15 million they need to run a technically correct election.

- The one thing Ortega wants is legitimization by election. For that, he needs the funds to run a technically correct election.

- The opposition believes it can bargain to have our funds go only for legitimate electoral purposes. They also have a member on Council to monitor spending. The opposition will also be able to use the money for further electoral law reforms.

- If any minimal amount were to leak to the Sandinistas, its marginal utility to them will be less than the opposition will get from the program.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	Timothy Deal and Eric Melbey to Brent Scowcroft Re: IEPR Breakfast (3 pp.)	10/12/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91138-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

October 11, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III

1. FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg: GDR at Crossroads. During my meeting with Stoltenberg yesterday, he said the GDR regime was at a turning point; if it did not move toward reform, use of force to suppress unrest could not be ruled out. He said the FRG was tying increased economic assistance to reform, but beyond that its options were limited. I also raised the recently announced FRG aid package for Poland. He said that the key element was over 100 million marks in loan guarantees for immediate relief and that such aid was needed to permit the structural reform that would make larger scale investment attractive. Describing the Wyoming ministerial, I told him the Soviets are still in a hurry for progress in our relations, particularly on arms control, and I reviewed Soviet positions on regional issues, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia. Stoltenberg said the SPD would try to use our stationing practices in the FRG as an election issue, but he did not believe they will succeed. The FRG Government will make clear that it will not reopen the Status of Forces Agreement, but it will consider changing how it is applied. (C)

2. NATO SYG Manfred Woerner: Focus NATO on the East. In our meeting here yesterday, Woerner said we should use NATO for comprehensive discussions of Eastern European developments. He told me all parts of the West German Government see a CFE treaty next year as a real gift for the upcoming campaign elections, but he cautioned that we should time it so as to prevent SNF from reemerging as an issue. Woerner also said the U.S. is pushing the allies too hard on some CFE verification requirements. On Open Skies, I told him NATO should go to Ottawa with an agreed position; he said we will have to press our Allies harder to get one. We will do so. (C)

3. South African Prisoner Release. South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha called me yesterday to inform us of the impending release of eight prominent political prisoners, including Walter Sisulu. (You met with Sisulu's wife, Albertina, in June.) The release of this group will leave Nelson Mandela as the remaining well-known, long-term political prisoner still under detention. The men have not yet actually been freed. The government probably wants to manage their release so as to avoid massive demonstrations which might otherwise take place. The decision is no doubt timed to garner credit in advance of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting starting October 17, and to assist Prime Minister Thatcher as she continues to resist Commonwealth sanctions. The South Africans are reportedly still unsure how to proceed with the Mandela release. (C)

DECLASSIFIED
PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8173

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG CM A/O _____

89 OCT 12 P6:28

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	1	W	I
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates	2	APNSA Has Seen	
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		NAR
NSC Secretariat	4		N

A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS
IEPR Breakfast on Oct. 13 at 7:30a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8288

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

1

MEETING WITH
REPUBLICAN SENATORS
DATE: October 17, 1989
LOCATION: The Cabinet Room
TIME: 9:30 - 10:00 am

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To reinforce Republican support for the Administration's Nicaraguan election aid bill and to underscore your opposition to the Harkin amendment.

II. BACKGROUND

H.R. 3385 was approved by the House last week by a 256-153 vote. It provides for reallocating funds to help promote a free and fair election in Nicaragua, including up to $5 million to support opposition groups through the National Endowment for Democracy and up to $4 million for non-campaign assistance to the opposition and the Supreme Electoral Council.

The bill comes to the Senate for a floor vote on Tuesday afternoon and we are a few votes short of cloture. We are even further behind on Harkin's amendment, which provides that no funds be expended for the Supreme Electoral Council. This proposal is a transparent effort to kill all aid to the opposition, under the guise of not giving any U.S. funds to a body which is Sandinista dominated. Understandably, this puts the Republican Senators on the spot.

Funneling some aid to the Electoral Council is a price we are willing to pay in order to help the internal opposition. The proposed legislation states that recipient organizations will determine to what extent it is necessary to contribute to the Electoral Council, which will increase the opposition's leverage in bargaining for further campaign reforms. The opposition has representatives on the Council and believes it can ensure that the funds are utilized exclusively for non-partisan activities, such as ballot paper and non-partisan elections ads.

The points to be made at Tab A emphasize that this is a tough vote and that we have to act quickly to get aid to the opposition.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

You may be asked about the outrageous statements the UN Secretary General's representative made to the Contras at their camps in Honduras last Friday in which he said they should put down their arms immediately. The State Department sent Assistant Secretary Bolton and Ambassador Pickering to speak to Perez de Cuellar on Monday and we will be making further representations.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See list at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

After greeting each participant, you will open the meeting with brief remarks followed by discussion.

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
REPUBLICAN SENATORS ON NICARAGUA LEGISLATION

-- As you know, the Nicaraguan opposition is desperately short of funds; it is even unable to adequately equip its Managua headquarters.

-- Mrs. Chamorro has called for our help and time is crucial.

-- I think the Harkin amendment is particularly unfortunate; there are some in Congress who are willing to back democratization programs in countries with rightwing governments, but who refuse to support us in the case of a Marxist regime.

-- Those who opposed the military option have a special obligation to help us with the political/diplomatic effort.

-- We of course prefer that no money go to the Nicaraguan government, but we are willing to permit some funds to go to the Supreme Electoral Council because of the opposition's critical needs.

-- The legislation is written to provide that the minimum necessary go to the Council; the opposition representative will seek to ensure that those funds are used for technical aspects of the election process, like ballot paper.

-- Moreover, every category in the opposition's budget represents a category that NED has funded previously in Chile, Panama, Poland, South Africa, and the Philippines.

-- For these reasons, I ask your help in winning a cloture vote, defeating the amendments, and passing the bill quickly.

-- (IF ASKED) I share your concerns regarding the recent statement by UN officials on Contra demobilization; we will continue to insist that it be voluntary and depend on the prior creation of conditions of safety and democracy, and we are making it abundantly clear to the UN Secretary General.

PARTICIPANTS

President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates,
  Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, NSC (Notetaker)

U. S. Senators

Robert Dole (R-KS)
Bob Kasten (R-WI)
John McCain (R-AZ)
Connie Mack (R-FL)
Richard Lugar (R-IN)
Alan Simpson (R-WY)
Malcolm Wallop (R-WY)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 16, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE WTP

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI DAP

SUBJECT: Background Paper and Points to be Made for the President's Meeting with Republican Senators on Nicaragua

Attached at Tab I is a background paper and talking points for the President's meeting with Republican Senators at 9:30 a.m., October 17, 1989 to discuss our election package for Nicaragua.

Concurrence by: Virginia Before Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B List of Participants

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2127/24

1

POINTS TO BE MADE
ANTICIPATED ENCOUNTER WITH PRESIDENT ORTEGA

Nicaraguan President Ortega may try to confront you during the informal roundtable discussion on a number of issues. What follows are some likely Ortega challenges and suggested responses:

LETS NEGOTIATE

Q: Why don't you and I meet to settle our problems?

A: If you believe in settling problems through dialogue, Mr. Ortega, why don't you meet with the Nicaraguan Resistance as you are supposed to do under the Tela Agreement and guarantee them their freedom and security. Why don't you meet with UNO and arrange to have an independent television station in Nicaragua so your citizens can enjoy a free press. Your problems are with the citizens of your own country -- that is who you ought to be talking with to solve them.

DEMOBILIZE CONTRAS

Q: The Contras are supposed to be demobilized by December 8th under the peace agreement. Why are you trying to keep them from doing so in violation of the Agreement?

A: Maybe you should read the Agreement you signed. Demobilization is voluntary. You are required to guarantee the Contras "basic rights and freedoms". You are required to negotiate with them directly. If you want these people to return why don't you open up your prisons and let their brothers and sons and fathers out of jail? The Salvadoran government did so some time ago, but you haven't.

DEMILITARIZE

Q: The Soviet foreign minister proposed that both superpowers stop sending military supplies to Central America. Will you agree to that?

A: If you would stop sending weapons to the Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador perhaps there would not be as great a need for us to supply military aid to governments to defend themselves. The fact is you have built the largest army in Central American history. The Soviet Union has supplied you three times as much military aid as the U.S. has provided the democracies. Your regime, Cuba, and the Soviet Union have destabilized the region. If you want to demilitarize, why don't you cut your own army back to legitimate defensive needs?

RESPECT ELECTIONS:

Q: If I win the elections are you prepared to respect the results?

A: If the elections are free and fair I have already said I will respect the results. But you are not waging a fair contest. You control both television stations -- they don't broadcast news, they broadcast Sandinista propaganda. Why don't you allow your citizens to establish an independent television station. I get criticized all the time on American television; so do all the other leaders here. That's part of the price for joining the democratic club.

LET'S EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS:

Q: I am prepared right now to exchange Ambassadors and normalize relations.

A: Mr. Ortega: We will normalize relations when Nicaragua has shown by its behavior that the conditions are right. The election campaign will be a key factor. I would point out that this meeting is to discuss a hemispheric agenda, not US-Nicaraguan relations. You want to turn this into a bi-lateral negotiation. That's not why I came to Costa Rica and it's not why these other leaders came to Costa Rica.

(Note: This could be used to respond to virtually any question.)

OTHER REJOINDERS:

-- Mr. Ortega you are the only leader here who will go back to his country and put on a military uniform. You can't have it both ways. You can't claim to be a democrat and be a military dictator at home.

-- Mr. Ortega, you talk about peace, but everyone at this table knows that members of Mr. Christiani's government are being murdered with rifles and bombs supplied by your government.

-- Mr. Ortega, two years ago you pledged to President Duarte of El Salvador at Esquipulas that you would stop sending weapons to the FMLN. In August, you pledged the same thing to President Christiani. But just the other day, they found a truck with secret compartments that came from Nicaragua with rifles and ammunition for the FMLN. When are you going to keep your word?

-- Mr. Ortega, the truth is the United States provided more economic assistance to your government in 1979 and 1980 than any other country. If you had kept your commitments then -- to hold elections, to allow a mixed economy, and to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy -- Nicaragua would be prosperous and peaceful just like Costa Rica.

-- Mr. Ortega, there is no more glaring example of the difference between democracy and communism than Costa Rica and Nicaragua. President Arias hasn't built a huge army; there is no secret police here. Costa Rica isn't trying to destabilize any neighboring government. Democracy in Costa Rica has brought freedom, peace and a growing economy. What has 10 years of your rule brought to Nicaragua? Poverty, misery, dictatorship, and war.

CHRON FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8908607
RECEIVED: 26 OCT 89 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 25 OCT 89
SOURCE REF: 8924808

1

KEYWORDS: COSTA RICA SUMMIT
AP

PERSONS: ARIAS, OSCAR S

SUBJECT: SAN JOSE SUMMIT / PRES CALL ON PRES ARIAS & BRIEFING MATERIALS
FOR PRES 27 - 28 OCT

ACTION: OBE PER PACELLI DUE DATE: 26 OCT 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI LOGREF: 8908338 8908369

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/12/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	PACELLI	Z	89102610	PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
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FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 25 OCT 89
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KEYWORDS: COSTA RICA
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URGENT

SUMMIT

PERSONS: ARIAS, OSCAR S

SUBJECT: SAN JOSE SUMMIT / PRES CALL ON PRES ARIAS & BRIEFING MATERIALS
FOR PRES 27 - 28 OCT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 26 OCT 89 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI LOGREF: 8908338 8908369

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
PACELLI		PILLING
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S/S 8924846

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 25, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

UNCLASSIFIED
(with CONFIDENTIAL attachment)

SUBJECT: San Jose Summit: The President's Call on Costa Rican President Arias

The President is now scheduled to meet privately with Costa Rican President Arias shortly after President Bush's arrival in San Jose, October 27. The attached paper is an updated event paper, with talking points. It should replace the present event paper in the President's briefing book on this subject.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As Stated.

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(with CONFIDENTIAL attachment)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

CALL ON PRESIDENT ARIAS

BACKGROUND:

o As summit host, Arias will meet privately with visiting heads of state for 10-15 minutes each. You will call on President Arias shortly after your arrival at the Cariari Hotel and just before the start of the summit's opening ceremony. This early call on the summit's host can be useful in setting the tone of the proceedings.

-- Nicaragua

Arias has often expressed his admiration for Violeta Chamorro and support for UNO. He has encouraged U.S. support for UNO. Yet he recently warned that U.S. assistance to UNO could be counterproductive.

The respect that Arias enjoys in the region gives him the moral authority to speak out forcefully on the election process in Nicaragua.

Despite commitments to support humanitarian assistance to RN members through February, Arias has not been helpful. Through spokesmen he has opposed humanitarian assistance beyond December. He indicated to Ambassador Hinton that he would make a statement favorable to continued assistance while in New York in October. He made no such statement.

-- Panama

Generally, our views and objectives on Panama are shared by Arias. He agrees that Noriega must be isolated and that the OAS has been ineffective. In the past, he has opposed economic sanctions. He is reluctant to take concrete action against Noriega if not part of a hemispheric effort.

-- Coffee

At a recent London meeting, Costa Rica joined the consensus on the desirability of a new International Coffee Agreement (ICA) and a procedure for negotiations. Arias may be pressured by internal coffee interests to use the summit to support the London meeting's decision and to reluctantly put pressure on Brazil to keep the momentum moving.

-- Investment Disputes

Ten longstanding disputes between U.S. individuals and Costa Rica remain unresolved; two have made some progress toward settlement. The GOCR has pledged good faith efforts to solve all remaining cases before the end of 1989. These cases have received high-level attention and may threaten U.S. aid funds. One investor petitioned to remove favorable Costa Rican trade preferences if his case is not settled.

-- Extradition Treaty

Arias wrote you February 17 to pledge cooperation on anti-narcotics programs. He promised to speed ratification of 1982 extradition treaty. The Legislature has yet to act on treaty.

OBJECTIVES:

- Thank President Arias for invitation to summit.
- Convey U.S. concerns regarding bilateral and regional issues.

TALKING POINTS

PRIVATE MEETING

-- You ought to use your private meeting with Arias to make three points in particular:

- o We are trying to make peace process work, but the Tela Agreement's timetable on demobilization is impossible. Arias promised he would support continued humanitarian assistance after November 30th; try to lock this in.

- o The OAS General Assembly meets in mid November; it needs to take a tough stand on Panama after failing to do so previously.

- o You respect the effort he has made to support negotiations between the Cristiani government and the FMLN. You hope he will continue to emphasize, as he did in New York at the UNGA, the need to end weapons from Cuba and Nicaragua to the FMLN as required by Esquipulas.

-- Additional Points:

- o I congratulate you and the Costa Rican people as you celebrate 100 years of democracy. I truly appreciate your kind invitation to be here in San Jose for this very special occasion.

NICARAGUA:

- o I greatly appreciate your efforts to promote democracy in Nicaragua. We cannot waver in our efforts. Support for the democratic opposition -- moral and otherwise -- is necessary if we are to achieve our common objectives.

- o In Washington, there is strong bipartisan commitment to democratization and peace in Central America. The passage of recent package of support for free and fair elections in Nicaragua is an indication of that commitment.

- o We back fully the efforts of the democratic opposition to gain further electoral reforms, including greater access to the media, the right for exiles to register and vote, and immediate amnesty for all political prisoners.

- o As a key leader and spokesman for democracy in the hemisphere, you can help ensure that the opposition achieves a fair chance in the February elections. Your support for the opposition's request for further electoral reforms would be of enormous value.

- We would also welcome your support for continued humanitarian assistance to the RN until conditions for their voluntary demobilization are in place.

- We consider such aid consistent with Tela Accords, as it provides a way of maintaining stability for the RN until conditions allow for their voluntary repatriation.

PANAMA:

- We welcome your public comments on Panama. The Noriega problem can be resolved only when hemispheric democracies take firm steps to relegate Noriega to the heap of rejected dictators.

- It is important that we sustain the diplomatic, political and economic isolation of the regime.

COFFEE:

- I recognize the importance of coffee to Costa Rica and the problems that the present market situation creates.

- I am pleased at progress achieved at London meeting and support consultations aimed at establishing the framework for a new ICA which avoids problems of the former one.

INVESTMENT DISPUTES:

- We hope that Costa Rica will move rapidly to resolve the remaining investment disputes with U.S. firms and individuals - before end of this year, as agreed. This would end irritant in our relations, and avert possible adverse Congressional or trade policy action.

EXTRADITION TREATY:

- As I wrote you in March, your commitment to speedy ratification of the 1982 extradition treaty is appreciated. When do you expect the legislature to act on the treaty?

S/S 8924808 8607

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 25, 1989

UNCLASSIFIED
(with CONFIDENTIAL attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: San Jose Summit: Briefing Materials For The President

Attached are briefing materials for use by the President in potential "pull asides" with seven selected heads of state, at the San Jose, Costa Rica summit. They should be inserted into his briefing book.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As Stated

UNCLASSIFIED
(with CONFIDENTIAL attachments)

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Potential Pull Aside with Salvadoran President Cristiani

Talking Points

- You have impressed Congressional leaders and the American people as a leader who is both acutely aware of the serious problems in your country and deeply committed to resolving them.

- As the human rights situation in El Salvador continues to improve, your country will benefit from increasing international support. Your recent trip to Europe no doubt also helped in this regard.

- The military and security forces have continued to act with restraint in the face of the most brutal guerrilla attacks on their families. I urge you to reinforce the absolute necessity of not playing into the hands of the guerrillas by retaliating or overreacting.

- Your government's commitment to a peaceful end to the war has been clearly demonstrated by your participation in talks with the guerrillas, despite their refusal to stop the violence against innocent civilians. We are encouraged by the flexibility you have shown. You have our support to continue the dialogue.

- You also have our backing in calling the Nicaraguans to public account for their continuing assistance and arms shipments to the guerrillas. President Ortega in August admitted this support and promised you it would stop. Instead, it has continued.

- The most effective way to address this issue is in the context of the regional peace process. I urge you to take full advantage of the fora offered by the United Nations and the Organization of American States to hold Ortega to his word.

- We commend you for the positive changes you are making to the management of your economy. We look forward to working with the World Bank and other donors to provide you continued assistance to promote the growth essential to your social goals.

- I assure you that you have my continuing support as your government addresses the key issues of human rights, judicial reform, and dialogue with the insurgents.

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DECL:OADR

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

POTENTIAL PULL ASIDE WITH PRIME MINISTER MANLEY

TALKING POINTS

ECONOMY

- I understand the difficulties you face in managing the Jamaican economy. I encourage you to continue working with the IMF. Charting a path for sustainable growth and building business confidence are necessary to attracting new investment.

- For our part, I am working with Congress for extension and enhancement of CBI. We hope to be able to enhance our agricultural trade as a result of the recent agricultural trade and development mission to Jamaica headed by former Secretary of Agriculture John Block.

DRUGS

- I applaud your initiative to involve the UN in the fight against drugs in the region. We think there is merit in the idea of a UN experts group to study your plan in detail.

- Your hosting of the recent ministerial narcotics law enforcement conference in Kingston provided an excellent forum to promote regional anti-narcotics cooperation.

PANAMA

- Your very strong support for the rule of law and democracy in Panama has been welcomed in the U.S. Even the military in Panama, as evidenced by the recent coup attempt, recognize that Noriega must go.

CUBA

- I have learned of your announcement that you intend to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba within the next few months. While I recognize your sovereign right to determine relations with other countries, I hope you are not considering allowing Jamaica to become the first Caribbean island nation to have a resident Cuban embassy.

POTENTIAL PULL-ASIDE FOR PRESIDENT BARCO

Talking Points

-- I was relieved to hear that the reports of the Colombian Supreme Court overturning your extradition decrees were incorrect. Your people have demonstrated great courage in the fight against the cartels, and you have our admiration and respect.

-- I am looking forward to meeting with you and the presidents of Peru and Bolivia to discuss the status of our anti-narcotics programs. Should Venezuela and Ecuador also participate?

    o Do you think Europe should be represented at some level?

    o If so, how? Individually by each country, or by one representative from the European Community?

-- Would sometime in January or February be a good time to hold the summit?

-- (If asked about having the summit in Colombia) I would prefer the summit be held Colombia if the security questions can be resolved.

-- We are in the midst of an inter-agency review of trade and other economic initiatives to help Colombia and other Andean countries sustain the anti-narcotics campaign.

    o I have instructed my people to be creative in devising concrete ways to assist you in this regard.

-- I would like your advice on Peru's criticism of US anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean region.

    o How should this criticism be handled?

    o Is there anything you can do?

-- I am aware of the strain the lack of a coffee agreement is putting on Colombia's economy. I am committed to seeking an International Coffee Agreement that respects market trends and is acceptable to the major producer and consumer countries.

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POSSIBLE PULL-ASIDE WITH PRESIDENT BORJA OF ECUADOR

TALKING POINTS

-- We have been pleased to see the support Ecuador has given the struggle against drugs. We recognize the problem Ecuador faces with drug traffickers using your country as a channel.

-- I understand US helicopters and an airplane are in Ecuador now working for the national police. We are looking at ways to help the Ecuadorian economy through trade and other initiatives.

-- I am impressed with your efforts to deal with Ecuador's economic problems.

-- We think that foreign investment can be a big spur to economic growth and minimize the attractions of illegal activity. I hope Ecuador can provide investors with the necessary confidence.

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By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

POTENTIAL PULL-ASIDE WITH PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY

TALKING POINTS

Organization of American States

- We welcome Canada's entry into the OAS which will contribute to making the OAS more truly representative of the entire hemisphere.

- You have my assurances that the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS will cooperate fully with the Canadian Permanent Representative.

- Canada's enormous prestige in the region, emanating from her representative democracy and highly developed economy, will certainly strengthen the OAS.

Central America

- We attach great importance to effective election monitoring in Nicaragua and effective ONUCA border verification; we welcome Canadian participation.

Acid Rain

- We remain committed to enactment of our Clean Air Proposal and to negotiations with you on an acid rain accord.

Free Trade Agreement (FTA)

- Trade specialists in our countries are pressing ahead to implement the FTA.

  -- Our commitment to the FTA is firm.

Aid to Poland and Hungary

- We commend your $36-million commitment for Poland's economic recovery. Both Poland and Hungary will need our best efforts to open their economies.

CARIBCAN

- Your CARIBCAN and our CBI provide similar economic incentives. It would be greatly helpful to the region if the U.S. and Canada could move to harmonize our two systems of trade preferences for the region.

East-West Relations

- o Change underway in the USSR opens new opportunities to build a more stable and constructive East-West relationship.

- o We thus want perestroyka to succeed. However, that depends foremost on the Soviets themselves.

- o What we can do is work for a stable international environment (through arms control, resolving regional conflicts) so that Gorbachev can focus on his urgent domestic tasks.

  -- West will benefit to extent that the Soviets continue and expand their "new thinking" in foreign policy.

Narcotics

- o We are pleased that Canada is supporting President Barco's efforts against the drug traffickers.

- o Our two countries and the Europeans ought to consider ways to make our overall counter-narcotics efforts more effective.

- o We will be coming to you soon with ideas on how we can better coordinate these efforts.

POTENTIAL PULL-ASIDE WITH PRESIDENT MENEM

Talking Points

- I found our recent meeting in Washington very useful. We want to work closely with you to support democracy in the region, encourage market-oriented economic development, and eliminate the drug scourge.

- I greatly appreciate your support in the fight against drugs in the hemisphere, including your offer of aircraft to Colombia.

- I am encouraged that your economic reform program is showing results and hope you will persevere with your efforts. My administration supports your program.

- Your decision to open up the oil sector to greater competition and investment will be especially important to the Argentine economy.

- The continued improvement in your relations with the UK is very encouraging. Your bold and pragmatic approach is working and I hope diplomatic relations between Argentina and the UK will soon be restored.

- We are ready to discuss with you how to enhance our mutual security relationship. We support your efforts to strengthen civilian control over the military and want to show your military the benefits of abandoning the Condor missile program.

- Ambassador Todman is consulting with your advisors about the added cooperation we could offer in the nuclear area once Argentina agrees to full-scope safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. I hope you will study closely the benefits Argentina would gain from taking this step.

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POTENTIAL PULL-ASIDE WITH PRESIDENT PAZ ZAMORA OF BOLIVIA

TALKING POINTS

- We want to significantly increase our economic assistance if you can help combat international cocaine traffic. This week in Paris and Madrid we also have been urging our allies to increase their assistance to Bolivia.

- A vigorous resumption of your coca eradication program will demonstrate your political will to fight narcotics trafficking and help me to convince Congress to appropriate the additional assistance which I have proposed for Bolivia.

- Both our countries face a well-financed narcotics mafia. Narco-corruption threatens police departments in both our countries. I know that Ambassador Gelbard, who has my fullest confidence, has been in touch with you on this problem.

- Our international drug strategy is a great opportunity for the United States and Bolivia to cooperate in the struggle against cocaine trafficking, and to work together to support more rapid economic development in your country.

- We cannot move ahead in support of your economic development program unless Bolivia plays its part by making an effective eradication and interdiction effort.

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

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GUYANA

BACKGROUND

- Since assuming office in 1985, President Hugh Desmond Hoyte has moved Guyana away from a socialist orientation, toward much better relations with the U.S. and the West.

- Hoyte has taken a number of measures to open the economy, encourage foreign investment and provide greater scope for the private sector. Guyana was admitted to the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in November 1988.

- A Canadian-led "Support Group" (SG) of donors, including the U.S., assembled financing for Guyana's IMF-endorsed, three-year recovery program.

- In response to a request by Canadian foreign minister Joe Clark, Secretary Baker pledged the SG his best effort to provide $10-13 million in budget support assistance by the end of FY90, including $5-8 million this calendar year.

- On April 1 the GOG implemented a stringent IMF-monitored austerity program, including a 70% currency devaluation. This led to a Paris Club in May and signature of a U.S.-Guyana bilateral debt rescheduling in September.

- Under Guyana's program substantial IFI arrears must be cleared before significant IMF and World Bank resources are made available. This is anticipated this year.

- The program has run into difficulty, mainly due to prolonged strikes in the bauxite and sugar industries. A financing gap of $20 million has arisen.

- If this gap cannot be filled, the entire donor package of assistance will be put in jeopardy and the GOG will face activation of the pull-back provision of the Paris Club rescheduling.

- We have been working to identify the amount that Secretary Baker promised to look for, but the budgetary problem is acute. In the meantime, given the increased financing gap, the Canadians are asking us to deliver $10-13 million by the end of 1989. We have said we stand by our original intention, but the budgetary situation may not allow us to meet it.

- Hoyte faces elections next year. He has staked his political future on the success of the economic recovery program. The opposition, led by Marxist Cheddi Jagan, and hardliners within his own party, oppose the program.

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By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

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Talking Points

- o I commend you for your courage in adhering to the tough economic reform program you implemented in April. These difficult measures are the key to future growth and prosperity.

- o As you know, the U.S. has been an active participant in the international "Support Group" for Guyana. Our PL-480 food aid is an integral part of that effort.

- o We are working with the Congress on new CBI legislation which contains useful enhancement provisions and would extend the life of CBI indefinitely.

- o Our Ambassador in Georgetown, Theresa Tull, has my full confidence. She has done much in the interest of strengthened U.S.-Guyanese relations.

- o (IF RAISED) Despite our difficult budget situation, I stand behind Secretary Baker's commitment to undertake our best efforts to provide economic support funds to Guyana this year.

  - We are doing our best, within severe constraints, to identify funds to support your program.

  - Until we have the final FY 1990 appropriation from Congress, we will not know about the availability of funds.

- o (IF RAISED) I am pleased to learn of your willingness to divest your state bauxite and sugar companies. Allowing greater scope to the private sector is essential to achieving restored economic growth.

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

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PERSONS: ORTEGA, DANIEL

SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY BRIEFING PAPERS FOR PRES MTG W/ ORTEGA / OCT 28 - 29 AT SUMMIT

ACTION: OBE PER PACELLI DUE DATE: 30 OCT 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

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PACELLI	RADEMAKER	HILLIARD
	WORKING	PILLING
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S/S 8924852
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 #8598

October 25, 1989

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MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Contingency Briefing Papers for Bush-Ortega Meeting

Attached are contingency briefing papers for a possible meeting between President Bush and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega at the October 28-29 Hemispheric Summit in San Jose, Costa Rica.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

1. Briefing papers

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), July 21, 1997
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

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Possible Encounter with President Ortega

- It is likely Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega will attempt to meet with President Bush and/or Secretary Baker on the margins of the Hemispheric Summit in San Jose, Costa Rica.

- Ortega will probably try to use such a meeting:

  -- as evidence of improving U.S.-Nicaraguan relations;

  -- to improve his international image before Nicaragua's February 1990 elections;

  -- to draw attention away from Nicaragua's National Opposition Union (Ortega has called President Bush the opposition's "chief"); and

  -- to lend credibility to Nicaraguan views on the Central American situation.

- The U.S. should attempt to control any such encounter by:

  -- ensuring it is brief and clearly on the margins of the summit;

  -- avoiding the media, if possible;

  -- limiting any exchange to insistence that Nicaragua fulfill its promises to its neighbors, the internal opposition and the Nicaraguan Resistance, especially:

    -- the commitment to halt support to El Salvador's FMLN guerrillas;

    -- commitments to provide adequate opportunities and guarantees to achieve <u>voluntary</u> Nicaraguan Resistance repatriation; and

    -- commitments to conduct fair, free and honest elections and abide by the results.

- The following papers provide background on various issues Ortega may raise in an informal encounter.

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

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Recognition of a Sandinista Election Victory

Ortega may ask if the U.S. would recognize a Sandinista victory in the upcoming election.

- The U.S. will recognize a Sandinista election victory only if the election is truly democratic. That means, among other things:
  - -- total freedom for the opposition campaign;
  - -- no hindrance of foreign donations to the opposition;
  - -- no restrictions on foreign observers;
  - -- an honest registration and vote count; and
  - -- if defeated, the Sandinistas will give up power, including control of the military and security forces.

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Arms Shipments and Military Force Levels

Ortega promised his Central American counterparts at Tela that Nicaragua's support for subversive groups in their countries would end.

- o A shipment of arms from Nicaragua destined for El Salvador's FMLN was recently captured in Honduras. Continued Nicaraguan aid for subversive groups contradicts Nicaragua's promises to its neighbors to end such aid.

After Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan government stated it had agreed to a temporary suspension of arms deliveries from the Soviet Union and would announce any future deliveries from other countries. Ortega may point to this as evidence of his willingness to address U.S. concerns. He may also raise the Soviet proposal for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to guarantee a regional agreement on arms levels.

- o The Soviets have stated they have stopped direct arms shipments to Nicaragua. Soviet materiel continues to arrive by way of third countries, especially Cuba.

- o We see no reason for Nicaragua to continue to receive military equipment.

  -- Nicaragua's military is already far in excess of any legitimate security need.

  -- The Nicaraguan Resistance has received no military aid since early 1988.

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2127/24

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U.S. Assistance to the Opposition

Ortega may assert that U.S. assistance to the democratic opposition is interference in Nicaraguan internal affairs.

- Foreign assistance to political parties is permitted under Nicaraguan law.
- Political parties of many nations besides the United States have a long history of aiding democratic forces in Latin America.
- The Sandinistas are a party merged with the state. Foreign aid provided to the Nicaraguan Government, including $500 million in Soviet economic aid each year since 1986, has been at the disposal of the Sandinista Party.
- U.S. aid to the opposition is designed to level the electoral playing field. The opposition must have such a level playing field if Nicaragua's elections are to be seen as truly free and fair.

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By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

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Humanitarian Aid to the Resistance

Ortega may charge continued U.S. humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance is not consistent with the Tela agreement on voluntary demobilization, repatriation and relocation or insist that U.S. aid be channeled largely to repatriation and relocation.

- At Tela, the Nicaraguan Government (GON) agreed to engage in a dialogue with the Nicaraguan Resistance aimed at creating guarantees of safe, democratic conditions for their voluntary demobilization and repatriation. The GON has not yet done so.

- All parties to Tela agreed that demobilization must be voluntary; we fully agree with this position.

- We have substantial evidence, including reports cited by the human rights group Americas Watch, that the Sandinista Army and security forces are killing and "disappearing" suspected Resistance supporters in the Nicaraguan countryside. Sandinista forces executed an Indian Resistance leader, Commander "Toro," and seven others in early October.

- If Nicaragua is serious about making voluntary demobilization and repatriation work, it must end these attacks, begin good faith talks with the Resistance, and actively create the conditions necessary to encourage voluntary repatriation.

- The GON continues a propaganda campaign alleging Resistance offensive operations intended to thwart the electoral process. We have no evidence to sustain the Sandinista charges.

- Our legislation provides for continued humanitarian aid to the Resistance through February 1990. This aid must be withdrawn from any Resistance group or individual proved to have conducted offensive operations.

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U.S. Economic Embargo

Ortega may raise the U.S. economic embargo, blaming it for Nicaragua's economic crisis.

- The U.S. embargo was imposed in response to the Nicaraguan government's:
  - -- continuing support for subversion;
  - -- rapid, destabilizing military buildup;
  - -- close security ties to the Soviet bloc; and
  - -- repression of internal opposition.
- The embargo will remain in effect as long as these problems remain.
- The Nicaraguan government's poor economic decisions, especially its dependence on central control of the economy, is the major cause of Nicaragua's economic crisis.

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

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Improved Bilateral Relations

Ortega may ask about prospects for improved U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.

- Any improvement in our relations depends upon the Nicaraguan government taking steps to:
  - -- open and democratize Nicaraguan society;
  - -- begin a genuine national reconciliation;
  - -- end support for subversion;
  - -- end Nicaragua's military buildup and reduce its close ties with the Soviet Bloc.

Ortega may also ask about visas for U.S. trips by high Nicaraguan government officials, including himself and his brother, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega.

- Ortega told President Carter the GON would allow open aid to the opposition in accordance with Nicaraguan law. But National Endowment for Democracy (NED) employees providing such aid have had unnecessary difficulties getting Nicaraguan visas.
- The GON has issued very few visas for U.S. government employees assigned to our Embassy in Managua since last June.
- Ending visa difficulties for U.S. Embassy and NED employees would be a concrete indication of Nicaragua's general interest in improved relations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

Drug Cooperation

Nicaragua promoted a regional agreement on illegal drug trafficking as part of the Tesoro Beach accords. It has ratified the Vienna Convention on Narcotic Drugs and offered unspecified cooperation with the U.S. in apprehending traffickers. Ortega may make other offers along these lines.

- We are willing to cooperate in good faith with any country in combatting the scourge of illegal drugs.
- We are prepared to respond appropriately to clear indications that the GON is serious about fighting drugs; we have no evidence of that to date.
- If the GON is serious, it could begin by halting its support for indicted Panamanian narcotics trafficker Gen. Manuel Noriega.

DECLASSIFIED
PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8908443
RECEIVED: 20 OCT 89 14

CHRON FILE

TO: HUGHES

FROM: BASORA

DOC DATE: 04 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SPAIN

1/2

PERSONS: GONZALEZ, FELIPE

3/4

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PM GONZALEZ OF SPAIN

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES DUE DATE: 24 OCT 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/12/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJRP CLOSED BY: NSDAI DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL 8443

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CARLSON FILE

November 4, 1989

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA AAB

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain

The Transmittal Memorandum to State is at Tab I and the subject Memorandum of Conversation is attached at Tab A.

Robert Blackwill concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A.

2. That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Hughes' Memo to Roy
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b). September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/23/2013

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Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain (U)

Memorandum of Conversation must be distributed via NODIS channels and should not be distributed below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. If the item is to be sent to an Embassy, it should be sent to the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (Ø)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07c. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain (6 pp.)	10/19/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 8/21/2009

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91138-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2000-0429-F(121)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	8/21/2009

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Joseph Zappala, U.S. Ambassador to Spain
Adrian Basora, Director for European Economic Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Foreign Minister
Carlos Solchaga, Finance Minister
Rosa Conde, Minister/Government Spokesperson
Julian Santamaria, Spanish Ambassador to U.S.
Fernando Gomez Aviles-Casco, Secretary General of Commerce
Eudaldo Mirapeix, Foreign Ministry Director General for North America
Juan Antonio Yanez, International Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 19, 1989, 11:00 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: First, I want to wish you a very warm welcome to Washington. We have a wide range of issues to discuss. Let me suggest that you lead off with the issues that are on your mind. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: There have been very positive changes in our bilateral relations. These have to do in part with Spain's own internal political and economic evolution as well as Spain's attempt to define its international role and move away from its previous isolationism. We are ratifying our membership in the WEU; we are fully involved in the construction of the European community, and we are participants in the

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PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

nonproliferation treaty. Our policies are becoming more defined, more open to the rest of the world. Spain is becoming firmly identified as a European, Western nation. (C)

As to relations with the United States, we are looking for points of expanded cooperation. There had been difficulties in recent years, but now these have been overcome. We need to define Spain's relationship with the U.S. within the new East-West context. We Western Europeans are focusing very heavily, sometimes obsessively, on the changes in Eastern Europe. At times we worry about them. The speed of change is almost dizzying. In Poland, there is no alternative to the present government because it represents the alternative. The alternative is already in power and we cannot let it fail. (C)

In Hungary, it is remarkable that the country has even changed its name as part of the reform process. In Poland, remarkably, the Secretary General of the Communist Party told the King that the page in Poland had been definitively turned on the Communist experience.
(C)

In this period of change and stability, it would be frivolous to say that NATO is no longer needed. The Federal German Republic represents a special challenge that we must deal with carefully.
(C)

With regard to bilateral relations, we would like to build up our exchanges based on agreements in the cultural and scientific fields, as well as in areas such as taxation, which can help to encourage investment in both directions. It is a sign of the times that, over the past year, Spanish investment in the U.S. actually exceeded U.S. investment in Spain -- although I am sure this trend will not continue. (C)

The President: As I assess our bilateral relations, I see them as very sound. The very fact that you are here in the midst of an election campaign says something about the relationship. I agree with you regarding the dynamics of change in Eastern Europe. We support that change, and Secretary Brady is working hard to help put together financing to assist in the economic reforms there. (C)

When I was in Poland last July, it was remarkable to see General Jaruzelski and Solidarity leaders all in the same room for lunch at our Ambassador's residence. Even though Jaruzelski had jailed these same leaders only a few years earlier, they were joking together. We have a great affection for Poland here in the U.S.; in fact, it is said that there are more Poles, or Polish-Americans, in Chicago than in Warsaw. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Regarding NATO, Secretary General Woerner visited Washington recently and suggested that NATO play a larger role regarding the changes in Eastern Europe. I am not sure exactly what he had in mind. I would be interested in hearing your views. (C)

Secretary Baker: The Prime Minister and I had an interesting talk last night about the Soviet Union. Regarding NATO, it will definitely have a continuing role, not a diminished role, certainly not in the near term. We will need NATO to help us manage the changes in Eastern Europe. We will need it to help us deal with the consequences of the demise of Communism, even if there is less of a military challenge facing the alliance. Woerner's idea is that NATO can help to formulate the Western response, thus building up the political aspects of the NATO mandate. (C)

The Vice President: Based on my travels to Latin America, I am very impressed by Prime Minister Gonzalez' standing with Latin American leaders. With his prestige, he can help solve the problems that we face in Nicaragua and Panama. (C)

Secretary Brady: Spain has been very helpful in implementing the new debt strategy. We very much appreciate Spain's role. There are two ways of looking at the debt problem: one approach takes account of the problems of our own banking system; the other looks at the debt problems of the countries themselves. On the latter score, I am frequently asked if Spain will provide new money to help alleviate the problem. (C)

I would also like to mention our goal of assuring full financing of the $1 billion structural adjustment fund to support economic reform in Poland. The U.S. has offered to put up $200 million. We need to find the other $800 million, and I hope that Spain will contribute. (C)

The President: I had a group of bankers over the White House for drinks recently and I am now very sympathetic to Nick Brady's problem in getting the bankers to put up new money. I had thought that bringing them to the White House would help soften them up, but then I overhead them talking among themselves off in a corner. They were complaining about the difficult sacrifices we were asking them to make. (C)

I am very impressed with Mexican President Salinas, both with the debt restructuring agreement he has signed on to, and with the steps he has taken since then to implement this agreement. (C)

Secretary Cheney: I had the honor to host a visit from Defense Minister Serra just recently. We had excellent discussions, which made it clear that our relationship has progressed beyond

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the base negotiations to a stage of normal relations within the alliance. We talked about setting up a bilateral consultative group involving our two ministries of defense, which is something I would like to do. I very much agree that NATO's role will be important in providing continuity and stability in Europe over the coming years. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Turning back to Eastern Europe, I think it is important to be aware of the limits and difficulties of the reform process in both the political and economic spheres. When our bankers say they don't want to invest in Poland, it is because Poland does not yet have its new economic system in place. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev does not know how to set up a market-based pricing system. Eastern Europe needs time to make the necessary adjustments -- and yet once the windows are open, one can no longer control the speed at which the winds of freedom blow in. (C)

On the Soviet Union, it is not ethnic problems but rather the explosion of nationalisms that represents the gravest danger, for example, in the Baltic republics. This represents one of the limits of perestroika. One of the very important questions we must face is whether the West is prepared to accept this limit. In my view, we cannot attempt to break up the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev needs to have the military blocs continue in existence. Rationality and tranquility is needed on both sides. (C)

Regarding Latin America, it is important not to focus solely on Central America, which we tend to do too much. The problems of democracy throughout the region are important and countries such as Argentina and Chile have more magnitude and impact than those in Central America. In Nicaragua, I think we are seeing an opportunity for democracy to be won irreversibly. I see this as the outcome, whoever wins the elections, as long as they are clean. I say this despite the suspicions that one may have about the Sandinistas. I share these suspicions, in that the Sandinistas do not have a democratic vocation, but I feel that they believe that they cannot avoid democratic elections. The opposition can win in February, or it can win four years later. The important thing is that the electoral process be a clean one. (C)

On Panama, I have some ideas that we might want to discuss, but not a plan. Perhaps we could talk about this tonight. (C)

Finance Minister Solchaga: On the debt issues, Spanish policy has been very positive and we have pushed for a common EC position. We are concerned about the difficulty of finding new funds. It is important to take a variety of approaches to restructuring. We believe that in view of the international debt situation, the U.S. should agree to the proposed quota increase for the IMF. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Foreign Minister Ordonez: In El Salvador, we are trying to provide strong support to President Cristiani. As to the U.S.-Spanish bilateral relationship, we now have a new framework. The new juridical framework should be implemented, for example, the new cultural agreement. I hope we can move quickly to have a new science and technology agreement by overcoming the problems posed in the light of the U.S. Omnibus Trade Act. Fin Min SOlchaga tells me that with regard to the proposed tax treaty, we can finish off our negotiations within five days. On defense industrial cooperation, we would like to see a memorandum of understanding between the Defense department and our defense ministry which would provide for a better trade balance and defense products. On the commercial side, we hope for increased exchanges. The Spanish bid for the Boston-New York train is an example of such a project on which we would appreciate your help. We should also be able to reach nuclear agreements based on the fact that Spain has signed the MPF treaty. And, of course, our Expo '92 in Seville will be a major event in which we look forward to U.S. participation. (C)

Secretary Baker: We have asked democratic political parties in Europe to support Mrs. Chamorro in her campaign in Nicaragua. This is permitted by Nicaraguan law. We would like to ask that you consider having Spain doing something in this regard. Also, in view of Spain's prestige in the region it would be very valuable to have Spanish observers in the Nicaraguan elections in addition to the EC observers already planned. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: (b) (1) (b) (1) We, too, want to guarantee that this will be a clean election and Spain is already present in Nicaragua towards this end. (C)

The President: Turning back to NATO, we want to push forward on the CFE negotiations. We think your concerns have been met on the paramilitary issue. I have been pleased with the Soviet reaction so far and expect that they will not engage in foot dragging. But it is important that we not have a fractured NATO position. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I agree with you although perhaps the time frame you have set for the CFE negotiations is too short. Although we should try to meet the schedule, there are some real technical problems that need to be sorted out carefully. I agree that alliance cohesion is important. If we can get the Soviets to cut their military spending by as much as 3 or 4 percentage points of GNP, this would be of more assistance to the economy that all of the aid that the NATO allies and Japan could possibly provide. (C)

The President: We don't want the goal of completing the CFE negotiations promptly to slip if it can be avoided, so we should try to meet the goal. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzales: I agree with you completely. I will certainly not say anything in public implying that we should prolong the negotiations. (C)

Secretary Baker: NATO has now gained the initiative in these negotiations and we should be sure to keep it. (C)

Secretary Cheney: I should mention the visit of Soviet Defense Minister Yazov which was an historic first. Our discussions were very interesting indeed. He talked about restructuring in every area except the strategic rocket forces. I asked him a direct question on this, but Yazov ducked it. He is clearly having a difficult time with the transition which is being required of the Soviet military. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The Soviets need to get arms control agreements. (C)

On the Middle East, despite the great difficulties, we need to get a dialogue started. The role of the U.S. is critical. I noticed that Secretary Baker was very skeptical yesterday, but even if the situation is difficult we should use whatever opportunities exist. (C)

The President: If Secretary Baker was "grumpy" yesterday, it was because Prime Minister Shamir had put the wrong spin on what Secretary Baker was trying to do. First Shamir made a public statement misrepresenting the U.S. position, and then he called me one half hour later to talk about it. What we need to do is to get Shamir to implement his own plan. Instead, he is accusing us of pushing for a "Palestinian state," which is false. I agree that we should continue our engagement as long as there is still some chance. The fact that both the Government of Israel and the PLO are critical of the plan may mean that it is a good plan. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: It may be that Shamir feels that he needs to say no to his own plan for domestic political reasons, but that at the same time he wants to be pushed to move ahead on the project so that he can say that he had no choice. (C)

Secretary Baker: The PLO is also very negative. (C)

The President: Let's go out now and make our statements to the press. We'll have more time to talk this evening. (C)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8908970
RECEIVED: 07 NOV 89 11

CHRON FILE

TO: HEMISPHERIC LEADERS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 04 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BRAZIL
COLOMBIA
ARGENTINA
BELIZE
EL SALVADOR
JAMAICA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO HEMISHPERIC LEADERS RE NICARAGUA

1

ACTION: NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW DUE DATE: 10 NOV 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
MERCHANT
PACELLI
PILLING
PRYCE
ROSTOW
WORKING

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 8908970

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	89110711	PRES APPROVED CABLE
001		X	89110711	NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cof NARA, Date 5/12/09

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07d. Cable	Re: President's Letter to Hemispheric Leaders (2 pp.)	11/4/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91138-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909140
RECEIVED: 14 NOV 89 10

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRONTELLE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 14 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

1

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR TELCALL

PERSONS: CRISTIANI, ALFREDO

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PRES TELEPHONE CALL TO SALVADORAN PRES CRISTIANI ON NOV 14

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 17 NOV 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		PACELLI
		PRYCE

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSW CLOSED BY: NSMDC DOC 3 OF 3

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 8909140

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	89111413	FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
002	SCOWCROFT	Z	89111513	ADD-ON / FOR INFORMATION
002		X	89112021	NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
003	PRESIDENT	Z	89111420	FOR INFORMATION
003		X	89111420	NOTED BY PRES

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/12/09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9140

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 14, 1989

89 NOV 14 PM 8 15

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador

DATE: November 14, 1989

PURPOSE: To express your solidarity with the Salvadoran Government over recent FMLN attacks in San Salvador.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open

INTERPRETER: None needed

PHONE NUMBER: 503-24-6380 (Armed Forces Chief of Staff);
503-23-0233 (Ministry of Defense);
503-71-1555 (Government switchboard)

CONTACT PERSON: Kevin Whitaker, Department of State (647-3681)

TIME DIFFERENCE: -1

SUGGESTED TIMES: Afternoon, November 15, 1989

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: U.S. solidarity with the Salvadoran Government in face of FMLN attacks

Date of Submission:

Action:

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
1999-0467-F/2
9/30/2002 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
1999-0467-F/2
9/30/2002 MM

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT ALFREDO CRISTIANI OF EL SALVADOR

-- I am calling to tell you that I have been following the events in El Salvador closely and that the United States stands behind you in the face of these FMLN attacks.

-- We are prepared to help you in what ways we can.

-- The FMLN bears full responsibility for this tragedy; I want to express the solidarity of the American people for the great suffering in San Salvador and elsewhere.

-- We have spoken out strongly in your support and condemned Nicaraguan and Cuban aid to the FMLN. Secretary Baker condemned the attacks at the OAS yesterday and I mentioned it to the OAS Foreign Ministers at their luncheon at the State Department.

-- Your armed forces have acted in a way to protect the civilian population; I commend that. I hope you will continue to emphasize that in your public statements, because the enemies of democracy in El Salvador are looking for any way they can to capitalize on this tragedy.

-- How will these attacks influence peace talks? Before the attacks, I know that the FMLN had suspended participation in the next round; we criticized them for that.

-- Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that in the midst of this crisis, you have reacted in a very measured and calm way; this is a tribute to your leadership, and people here have taken notice.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 14, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call to Salvadoran President Cristiani

Attached at Tab I is a Telephone Call Proposal for the President to call Salvadoran President Cristiani to express our solidarity with the Salvadorans over guerrilla attacks in the capital. The talking points have been informally coordinated with the State Department.

We have included a talking point indicating that we are prepared to help El Salvador to confront this problem. President Cristiani called Ambassador Walker this morning to say that he may approach the MILGROUP with a request for equipment to ferret out the FMLN from urban neighborhoods. He may be referring to tear gas, and could bring this up with the President. The military is drawing from existing ammunition stockpiles and does not appear to be in danger of running out. The Salvadorans probably will be coming to us eventually to help repair or replace helicopters.

The State Department advises that it may be difficult getting through to President Crisitiani since telephone circuits have been jammed.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

Attachment
Tab I Telephone Schedule Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

TELEPHONE CALL TO

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ~~MEETING WITH~~
PRESIDENT ALFREDO CHRISTIANI OF EL SALVADOR

-- I am calling to tell you that I have been following the events in El Salvador closely and that the United States stands behind you in the face of these FMLN attacks.

-- We are prepared to help you in what ways we can.

-- The FMLN bears full responsibility for this tragedy; I want to express the solidarity of the American people for the great suffering in San Salvador and elsewhere.

-- We have spoken out strongly in your support and condemned Nicaraguan and Cuban aid to the FMLN. Secretary Baker condemned the attacks at the OAS yesterday and I mentioned it to the OAS Foreign Ministers at their luncheon at the State Department.

-- Your armed forces have acted in a way to protect the civilian population; I commend that. I hope you will continue to emphasize that in your public statements, because the enemies of democracy in El Salvador are looking for any way they can to capitalize on this tragedy.

-- How will these attacks influence peace talks? Before the attacks, I know that the FMLN had suspended participation in the next round; we criticized them for that.

-- Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that in the midst of this crisis, you have reacted in a very measured and calm way; this is a tribute to your leadership, and people here have taken notice.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
1999-0467-F/2
9/30/2002 MM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 15, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
1999-0467-F/2
9/30/2002 MM

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI

SUBJECT: Additional Information Relating to the President's Telephone Call to Salvadoran President Cristiani

We have checked again with the State Department and Defense for updated information relating to the President's possible telephone call to Salvadoran President Cristiani to express U.S. solidarity over FMLN attacks in the capital:

-- In response to Salvadoran request for help in rooting out guerrilla infiltrators in the city, State and Defense are making arrangements for delivery as fast as possible--about 2 days--of teargas and 3,000 parafin testing kits. The kits will enable the Salvadorans to screen refugee flows from areas affected by the fighting to tell who has recently fired a weapon.

-- We also are processing a request for additional anti-tank weapons (LAWS) on an emergency basis.

-- The Embassy is pressing the Salvadorans to identify additional needs, but no other requests have been made. There are apparently enough helicopter spare parts available in El Salvador to make repairs.

The talking points we provided yesterday emphasize the critical importance of not only continuing Salvadoran efforts to minimize civilian casualties, but public advertisement of that policy. That is where the political battle is going to be fought on this issue.

The OAS adopted in committee a resolution yesterday calling for the fighting to stop and for resumed negotiations. The resolution is not a condemnation of the FMLN, but both points endorse the Salvadoran Government position. Moreover, El Salvador is especially pleased that the resolution specifies that negotiations be held "within the constitutional order"--a rejection of previous guerrilla demands for powersharing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909255
RECEIVED: 16 NOV 89 17

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PACELLI
PRYCE

DOC DATE: 16 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA

1

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SANDINISTA / CONTRA TALKS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 20 NOV 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		PACELLI
		PRYCE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/12/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSAMM DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 17, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
1999-0467-F/2
9/30/2002 MM

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI

SUBJECT: Sandinista-Contra Talks

The following comes from conversations with Bernie Aronson and other State Department officials.

Summary

State has worked to keep the Contras at the negotiating table, fearing that humanitarian aid will be jeopardized if they leave. The Contras, however, must work uphill to contend with a new proposal by the UN/OAS team and appear ill-equipped to manage the public relations aspects of the talks. As a result, we are losing the advantage we had over the Sandinistas of a few weeks back when Ortega suspended the cease-fire. END Summary

Status of the Talks

The talks between the Contras, Sandinistas, and CIAV (the UN/OAS mechanism set up by the Tela peace accord to facilitate demobilization) resumed last night and will continue today. On Wednesday, Aronson convinced the Contras not to leave the talks by arranging for the return of Cardinal Obando, who had left en route to an ordination in El Salvador. Obando still intends to leave tomorrow, but return next week, if necessary.

Aronson's primary objective is to keep the Contras at the table. If they bolt, our humanitarian aid would be at risk.

The CIAV Proposal

In the first days of the talks, the Resistance signed on to a proposal by Obando that was limited to a cease-fire in place and immediate amnesty. This was quickly dismissed by the Sandinistas. CIAV subsequently introduced a proposal that has dominated discussion. Bernie believes that CIAV is acting reasonably as an honest broker. The current CIAV proposal includes:

A. All parties agree the Central American presidents should extend the date for demobilization beyond

December 5, the date set in the Tela document. The most recent draft, however, asks the Central American presidents to extend the date, "in accordance with practical necessities, as determined by CIAV." (Clearly, this formula is dangerous.)

B. An immediate restoration of a cease-fire. ONUCA (the UN border monitoring group established last week) would be asked to implement it, with the cooperation of Obando. (The Contras want Obando to have a co-equal role.)

C. U.S. humanitarian aid to be channeled through CIAV. The Contras apparently believe that State is pressing them to agree to this. State told us they have not, but they have mentioned the possibility of some sort of consultant or advisory role for CIAV.

D. Contras agree not to infiltrate more men; withdrawal of their forces from Nicaragua to Honduras begins upon verification that a cease-fire is in effect. (This provision is ambiguous: the Sandinistas would interpret it to mean that all Contra forces should leave immediately. The Sandinistas have made Contra exfiltration a centerpiece of their efforts, and have told the press that they are willing to drop demands for immediate demobilization for the moment.)

E. CIAV authorized to visit Contra camps to conduct a census of men and equipment. (The Contras don't like this, but lack the ingenuity to devise a counterproposal, like a corresponding census of government troops.)

F. Contra commissions, accompanied by CIAV, will visit Nicaraguan sites to ascertain that conditions are safe.

State Department Activities

Aronson has told the Contras that getting the Tela date for demobilization postponed indefinitely and obtaining a verified cease-fire should be their principal objectives, and that success would be a major accomplishment. To get this, however, the Contras would have to get the Sandinistas to agree to big changes in point A above, and successfully manage the other issues. Moreover, a new Central American summit is planned for December in Managua. The Sandinistas would likely push for a new demobilization date that precedes the February election.

We are told Aronson wants the Contras to agree to exfiltrate men to bring the situation back to the status quo ante because he believes that reinfiltration was a major reason the Sandinistas suspended the cease-fire. He told us, however, that he did not

press the Contras on this point and definitely did not threaten to cut off U.S. payments if they do not exfiltrate.

The Contras do not want to exfiltrate. They say it is far more difficult to do than a cease-fire in place and that to agree to it would be to accept the Sandinista position that their presence in Nicaragua is wrongful. The Sapoa agreement provided for Contra enclaves inside Nicaragua. In our view, an exfiltration agreement of some forces could be negotiated, but the Contras ought to bargain to get something in return, such as corresponding withdrawal of Sandinista forces.

We have also heard that State has urged the Resistance to consider a "symbolic demobilization" of some forces. The details of this are hazy, but we understand the Contras are alarmed by it.

Weak Contra Position

The Contras are in disarray. Their inclination is to postpone the talks and get away from Washington because of all the pressures. With good reason, they view CIAV's "honest broker" role as unfriendly; they must work uphill against its proposal and they sense State's pushing on the exfiltration issue. Despite Ambassador Schlaudeman's advisory role, the Contras appear to have little capability for advancing innovative counterproposals. Moreover, he does not participate in the sessions--unlike Paul Reichler for the Sandinistas.

We and the Contras get regularly beat up in the press on this issue, as the Sandinistas have such good press access (Tab A). The Contras lack an effective English-speaking spokesman and apparently do not meet with the press after every session. The danger here is that we could lose on this negotiations issue what we gained from Ortega's suspension of the cease-fire.

Humanitarian Aid

We have been unsuccessful in learning from State on where humanitarian aid stands with the Congress. Immediately after the San Jose summit, we were riding high, as Congressional figures announced that it would go through. But this should be brought to closure quickly, and we should discourage any thought that the aid decision should be tied to the success of the current talks. As you know, the Bipartisan Accord requires positive action from the bipartisan leadership and relevant committee chairman; we need letters by November 30 and Congress has but a short time before its recess.

Concurrence by: Bret Coulson and Steve Rademaker

Attachment
Tab A November 16, 1989 Press Story

<ORIG> AP
<TOR> 891116070623

<TEXT>R W AP-CONTRA-SANDINISTATALKS 11-16 0529
AP-CONTRA-SANDINISTA TALKS

WASHINGTON (AP) - THE FUTURE OF CEASE-FIRE TALKS BETWEEN NICARAGUA'S RIVAL FACTIONS IS IN QUESTION TODAY AFTER SANDINISTA DELEGATES SAID THE CONTRA REBELS HAD SECOND THOUGHTS JUST WHEN AN AGREEMENT SEEMED WITHIN REACH.

THE KEY ELEMENT OF AN EIGHT-POINT DRAFT PROPOSAL, A COPY OF WHICH WAS OBTAINED BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 2,000 CONTRA FORCES FROM NICARAGUA TO REBEL CAMPS IN HONDURAS AS PART OF A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.

THE PROPOSAL WAS THE PRINCIPAL WORKING DOCUMENT OF THE TWO SIDES AS THEY MET WEDNESDAY FOR THE FIFTH TIME IN SEVEN DAYS IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESTORE THE TRUCE PRESIDENT DANIEL ORTEGA SUSPENDED NOV. 1.

AFTER ABOUT THREE HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS, THE CONTRA DELEGATION STUNNED THE SANDINISTAS IN EARLY EVENING BY ASKING FOR A WEEK-LONG SUSPENSION OF THE TALKS.

''WE HAD MADE A LOT OF PROGRESS TODAY,'' SAID THE CHIEF SANDINISTA NEGOTIATOR, VICTOR HUGO TINOCO. ''IT WAS A TOTAL SURPRISE THAT THEY DECIDED TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS.''

BUT CONTRA SPOKESMAN BOSCO MATAMOROS DENIED THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, ASSERTING THAT STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY ''WERE NOT ACCURATE'' AND THAT THE SANDINISTA NEGOTIATORS SHOWED A LACK OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE DISCUSSIONS.

HE DEFENDED THE CALL FOR A RECESS BY SAYING THAT AFTER MANY HOURS OF TALKS DATING BACK TO LAST THURSDAY, A TIME FOR ''REFLECTION'' WAS APPROPRIATE.

AFTER RETHINKING THEIR EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A SEVEN-DAY RECESS, THE CONTRAS ANNOUNCED AFTER 11 P.M. THAT THEY WOULD RETURN THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS WITH THE SANDINISTAS AND WITH ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND UNITED NATIONS MEDIATORS.

THE SCENE OF THE TALKSWAS AN EIGHT-STORY OAS OFFICE BUILDING THREE BLOCKS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE.

THERE WAS A BIZARRE TWIST WHEN, ACCORDING TO TINOCO, THE CONTRA DELEGATION ASKED FOR A 30-MINUTE RECESS TO TALK THINGS OVER AMONG THEMSELVES ONLY TO DISAPPEAR FOR TWO HOURS.

''WE DON'T KNOW WHERE THEY ARE,'' TINOCO TOLD REPORTERS SHORTLY AFTER 10 P.M. ''THEY ARE SOMEWHERE IN THIS BUILDING.'' HE AND FELLOW DELEGATES THEN LEFT FOR THEIR HOTEL.

THE CONTRA DECISION TO ASK FOR A WEEK'S RECESS JUST WHEN THE TALKS SEEMED ON THE VERGE OF SUCCESS, PROMPTED SANDINISTA SPECULATION THAT A HIDDEN STATE DEPARTMENT HAND HAD NIPPED THE PROPOSAL IN THE BUD.

SANDINISTA PARTISANS PROWLED STAIRWELLS THROUGHOUT THE BUILDING SEARCHING FOR U.S. DIPLOMATS BUT CAME UP EMPTY-HANDED. THE OFFICIAL U.S. POLICY IS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT GIVES ADVICE TO THE CONTRAS BUT IS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE DISCUSSIONS.

RESTORING THE CEASE FIRE IS CONSIDERED AN IMPORTANT GOAL BECAUSE NATIONAL ELECTIONS ARE SET FOR NICARAGUA ON FEB. 25.

AN AMERICAN NEGOTIATOR FOR THE SANDINISTAS, PAUL REICHLER, SOUNDED INCREDULOUS WHEN HE TALKED TO REPORTERS ABOUT THE PERCEIVED CHANGE OF CONTRA ATTITUDES.

''ON THE VERGE OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT, THEY'RE BREAKING OFF THE TALKS,'' HE SAID. ''IT DOES NOT MAKE SENSE UNLESS THE CONTRAS DO NOT WANT AN AGREEMENT OF ANY KIND.''

HE WONDERED WHETHER THE SUDDEN APPEARANCE AT THE TALKS OF CONTRA CHIEF OF STAFF ISRAEL GALEANO, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS COMANDANTE FRANKLIN, WAS RELATED TO THE REBEL RETREAT.

OTHER KEY POINTS IN THE DRAFT PROPOSAL INCLUDED:

-VERIFICATION OF THE CEASE FIRE BY A UNITED NATIONS FORCE SCHEDULED TO TAKE UP PEACEKEEPING DUTIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA SHORTLY.

-A PLEDGE BY THE CONTRAS NOT TO DISPATCH ANY FORCES INTO NICARAGUA FROM BASE CAMPS IN HONDURAS, IN ADDITION TO WITHDRAWING 2,000 OF THEIR ESTIMATED 5,000 TROOPS BASED IN NICARAGUA.

-A REQUEST TO CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS TO EXTEND FROM DEC. 5 THE

DEADLINE SET AUG. 7 FOR CONCLUDING THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE CONTRAS.
"-A CONTRA DELEGATION WOULD TRAVEL TO NICARAGUA IN THE LAST WEEK OF NOVEMBER TO DETERMINE IF POLITICAL CONDITIONS WILL PERMIT THE SAFE RETURN TO NICARAGUA OF REBEL COMBATANTS.

AP-NY-11-16-89 0704EST-

V18691TV--

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909224
RECEIVED: 16 NOV 89 08

TO: PRICE, GEORGE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 30 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BELIZE NICARAGUA
HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES LTR RE SANDINISTA ABROGATION OF CEASEFIRE IN NICARAGUA

ACTION: HANDLED BY DOS CABLE 382682 DUE DATE: 20 NOV 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 8909144 8909242

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
MERCHANT
PACELLI
PRYCE
RADEMAKER

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC CLOSED BY: NSAMM DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8926584

Date December 18, 1989

FOR: Mr. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Bush

From: George Price

Date: November 4, 1989

Subject: Sandinista Abrogation of Ceasefire in Nicaragua

WH Referral Dated: November 16, 1989
NSCS ID# (if any): 8909224

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 5/12/09

ACTION TAKEN:

_____ A draft reply is attached.

_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.

_____ A translation is attached.

_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

_____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.

_____ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.

XX Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: President Bush's response was sent out under State Cable 382682, dated November 30, 1989. A copy is attached.

for Sondra Santos
Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL/OADR~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10a. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to American Embassy Belize Re: President's Reply to Prime Minister Price (1 pp.)	12/18/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91138-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ID 8909224

REFERRAL DATE: 16 NOV 89

EXDIS
ATTACH.

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE 8926584
'89 NOV-16 2:59 PM

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: PRICE, GEORGE

DATE: 04 NOV 89

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM PM PRICE OF BELIZE RE SANDINISTA ABROGATION OF CEASEFIRE IN NICARAGUA

REQUIRED ACTION: RECOMS / DRAFT REPLY

DUEDATE:

COMMENT:

FOR GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

'89 NOV 16 P12:36

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Letter	Al Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri to President Bush (2 pp.)	9/28/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91138-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10c. Cable	American Embassy Belize to White House Re: Letter from Belize Prime Minsiter to President Bush on Nicaragua (2 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (October - November 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91138-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

CHRON FILE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11/25/89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9406

1989 NOV 22 PM 7:51

November 22, 1989

Helpful memo - GB 11-23

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT RG for

SUBJECT: Your Question Regarding a List of Officers to be Purged from the Armed Forces of El Salvador

1.

This is in response to your question (Tab A) concerning whether you had passed a list of officers to be purged from the Salvadoran Armed Forces to the Salvadoran Government during your December 1983 visit to San Salvador. There was a list of Salvadoran Armed Forces personnel to be purged that was passed to President Magana by Ambassador Pickering immediately after your meeting with President Magana, his Vice Presidents, and the Salvadoran Armed Forces Commanders broke up and as you were leaving the Presidential house. In the scenario worked out for your visit, it was left to Ambassador Pickering, and not you, to pass the list to President Magana.

According to the State Department, none of the military personnel on the list presented by Ambassador Pickering are now on active duty inside El Salvador, though it is possible that one or more of them might still be on active duty as military attaches posted outside the country. Similarly, none of the civilians on the list are now in positions of responsibility within the Salvadoran Government.

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/27/24

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9406

November 22, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Reply to President's Question on El Salvador

Attached for your signature is a memorandum for the President answering his question to me about whether he passed a list of Officers to be purged from the Salvadoran Armed Forces to Salvadoran President Magana during his December 1983 visit to El Salvador as Vice President.

Concurrence by: William Pryce D. Paccelli for

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachements

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Note from the President

From the desk of
George Bush

11/21/89

[redacted]

To/
Philip Hughes

Do you remember this?

Re: EL SALVADOR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sen Kerry said in
83 I delivered
a list of people
to be purged
from Army

He says "They're
still there"
What are the
facts - I recall
no such list

[redacted]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 11/21/89

TO: PHILLIP HUGHES

FROM: **JAMES W. CICCONI**
Assistant to the President and
Deputy to the Chief of Staff

☐ **Information**

☒ **Action**

☐ **Let's Discuss**

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9406

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec			
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	GAO 11/25	N
NSC Secretariat	2		R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9406

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 21 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec			
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates	1		
Brent Scowcroft	2	8	A
Philip Hughes	3		I
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

93 MAY 22 A8:35