

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91138
Folder ID Number: 91138-002

Folder Title:
Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Jose Azcona of Honduras (1 pp.)	7/26/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Honduran President Azcona (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to Honduran President Azcona on the Central American Summit (2 pp.)	7/26/89	(b)(1)	S
01d. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for President's Phone Call to Honduran President Azcona (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica (1 pp.)	7/27/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Costa Rican President Arias (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to Costa Rican President Arias on the Central American Summit (1 pp.)	7/27/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 6

Collection:

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Pinksheet Number: cap1142
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Telephone Call to Honduran President Azcona (1 pp.)	7/31/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Jose Azcona Hoyo of Honduras (3 pp.)	7/27/89	(b)(1)	S
03c. Memo	Everett Ellis Briggs to G. Philip Hughes Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Azcona of Honduras (1 pp.)	7/28/89	(b)(1)	S
04. Memo	Stephen G. Rademaker to Robert M. Gates (4 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala (1 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Call to Guatemalan President Cerezo (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (1 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S
05d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Call to Salvadoran President Cristiani (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05e. Talking Points	Re: El Salvador: Talking Points Bush-Cristiani Telcon (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 6

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05f. Talking Points	Re: Bush/Cerezo Call - Central America Summit (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05g. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Schedule Proposals for Presidential Call to Presidents Cristiani and Cerezo (1 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	Everett Ellis Briggs to Brent Scowcroft Re: Trouble Continues Within the Resistance Military Leadership; Differences Over Demobilization (2 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S
07a. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Background Paper and Points to be Made for the President's Meeting with Nicaraguan Resistance (1 pp.)	8/4/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Outline	Re: Meeting with Nicaraguan Resistance Political - Military Commission (2 pp.)	8/4/89	(b)(1)	S
07c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Military Leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Cheney Memorandum on Noriega's Reported Crossing on to U.S. Base (1 pp.)	8/5/89	(b)(1)	✓
08b. Memo	William T. Pryce to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum from Defense Secretary Cheney Regarding Noriega's Reported Crossing of US Base in Panama (1 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	✓

Page 3 of 6

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08c. Memo	Dick Cheney to POTUS Re: "Noriega Crosses U.S. Base" Incident, 31 July 1989 (2 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	C
08d. Map	Re: Panama (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Robert M. Gates Re: Attendance at the Arias Summit (2 pp.)	9/1/89	(b)(1)	C
10. Memo	Robert M. Gates to Lawrence S. Eagleburger Re: Environmental Initiative fro Eastern Europe (1 pp.)	8/31/89	(b)(1)	C
11a. Memo	William T. Pryce to Brent Scowcroft Re: The Camp David Invitation to Mexican President Salinas (2 pp.)	9/11/89	(b)(1)	C
11b. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Mexican President Salinas Accepts Invitation to Camp David (1 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	C
12a. Outline	Re: Meeting with President Carter (3 pp.)	9/20/89	(b)(1)	C
12b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Carter (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
12c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Carter (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 4 of 6

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12d. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Background Paper and Points to be Made for th President's Meeting with Former President Carter (1 pp.)	9/20/89	(b)(1)	✓
12e. Talking Points	Re: This Administration... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
13. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to Amercian Embassy San Salvador Re: Message from President Bush to President Duarte (2 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	✓
14a. Memo	Everett Ellis Briggs to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum of Conversation with President Jimmy Carter (1 pp.)	9/25/89	(b)(1)	✓
14b. Memo	Philip G. Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Memorandum of Conversation (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
14c. Memcon	Re: President Carter and the Nicaraguan Election (10 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	✓
15a. Outline	Re: Meeting with the Presidential Election Monitoring Commission on Nicaragua (3 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	✓
15b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Senator Richard Lugar and Congressman Anthony Beilenson (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
15c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Senator Richard Lugar and Congressman Anthony Beilenson (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
15d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with The Presidential Election Monitoring Commission on Nicaragua (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
15e. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with The Presidential Election Monitoring Commission on Nicaragua (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
15f. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Ceremony to Announce the Presidential Election Monitoring Commission on Nicaragua (1 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	C
15g. Outline	Re: Meeting with The Presidential Election Monitoring Commission on Nicaragua (1 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	C

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01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Jose Azcona of Honduras (1 pp.)	7/26/89	(b)(1)	S

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AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Honduran President Azcona (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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01c. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to Honduran President Azcona on the Central American Summit (2 pp.)	7/26/89	(b)(1)	S

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financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Talking Points for President's Phone Call to Honduran President Azcona

-- I am pleased that you were able to see Assistant Secretary Aronson last week. Foreign Minister Lopez also had a very productive meeting with Secretary Baker on Thursday.

-- Honduras and the United States have had a very close and productive relationship and our cooperation has extended across a very broad range of economic, military, social and political endeavors.

-- We know that divisions in the United States have often caused complications for our Central American policy and for Honduras.

-- The Bipartisan Accord has the vast majority of Americans and the U.S. Congress behind it. Working together with the Central American democracies, we have succeeded in imposing considerable pressure on Nicaragua to democratize and comply with its other Esquipulas commitments.

-- The upcoming Central American summit next month presents a critical opportunity to maintain this pressure on the Sandinistas.

-- But, the pressure could turn back on you, the Resistance and us if a plan to demobilize the Resistance hastily and without adequate assurances for their safe reintegration is agreed upon.

-- I urge you to hold firm behind a plan which links the reintegration of the Resistance to the creation of safe and democratic conditions inside Nicaragua.

-- I can assure you that the United States and its President will provide the necessary support to take care of this problem in cooperation with Honduras so that Honduras is not left to carry the burden.

-- I think I am a good judge of what is possible in our political system and I am very confident I can get Congress to approve the necessary programs to address the remaining problems.

-- (if raised) I shall take another look at our possibilities to provide Emergency Support Fund disbursement in a timely manner.

--(if raised) I am sorry you weren't able to come to the U.S. for our earlier invitations. I will certainly work for the possibility of a future visit, depending of course on our mutual obligations and schedules.

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02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica (1 pp.)	7/27/89	(b)(1)	S

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Costa Rican President Arias (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Document Partially Declassified

(Copy of Document Follows)

By ES On 7/11/22

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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1085-MR (501.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/21/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

5895

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 27, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS *UB*

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI *DAP*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Costa Rican President Arias on
the Central American Summit

You have requested that we prepare talking points for the President to use in a telephone call to Costa Rican President Arias immediately following the call to Honduran President Azcona at 1 p.m. today. The points to be made at Tab A follow those used for the Azcona call, but slightly altered in view of the President's call to Arias on July 20.

*Call now set
for 3:15 PM.*

Arias told Assistant Secretary Aronson on July 14 that he agreed that the foreign ministers of the democracies should take the lead in formulating a demobilization plan. Foreign Minister Madrigal told the Embassy on July 24, however, that Costa Rica still had not developed a plan of its own.

3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

both Arias and Madrigal believe that demobilization should proceed as soon as possible and that it should not be linked to simultaneous demobilization of the Salvadoran guerrillas. Arias told the Resistance delegation that visited last Friday that demobilization should be accomplished before the Nicaraguan election in February--a position which is unacceptable to us.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Telephone Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Schedule Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1085-MR
E8 12/21/15

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

5927

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1989




ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation of the
President's Telephone Call to Honduran President
Azcona

The memorandum of conversation of the President's telephone call to Honduran President Azcona on July 27, 1989, attached at Tab A should be forwarded to Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson and to the Charge in Tegucigalpa. The transmittal must be handled in NODIS channels.


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/22/2013

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~~SECRET~~

5927

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Jose Azcona Hoyo of Honduras

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jose Azcona Hoyo, President of Honduras
Interpreter: Stephanie Van Reigersberg
Notetaker: Everett Ellis Briggs

DATE, TIME: July 27, 1989, 1:07 - 1:25 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office - Azcona's Office

The President, who initiated the call, began by saying, "Mr. President, how are you, sir?" (U)

President Azcona replied, "How are you, Mr. President?" (U)

The President said, "I'm doing fine. I wanted to call to say a word about the Central American Summit on August 6, if I may." (S)

President Azcona said he would be delighted. (U)

The President said we look at the Summit as presenting a critical opportunity to keep the pressure for democracy on the Sandinistas. He added that he knows that some people in President Azcona's part of the world share his view that the Sandinistas are failing to show progress on democratizing, and are discouraged by the lack of progress on conditions for truly free elections. The President expressed his hope that the democracies will demand that the Sandinistas do more, when they meet with Ortega. (S)

The President said he wished to point out something of direct concern to President Azcona, that the Sandinistas want to adopt a plan to demobilize the Resistance before the February elections, without first taking steps for real democracy. The President said that in his view, that is "clearly unacceptable." (S)

The President said that it was also his view that the plan should link demobilization of the Resistance to the establishment of safe, democratic conditions inside Nicaragua. He said that we still feel that direct talks between the Sandinistas and the Resistance are necessary to take into account the needs of the Resistance. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
8/12/2009 MM

The President said he knows the Resistance has been a "burden" for Honduras, and that he understands this. He assured President Azcona that the U.S. government intends to provide the necessary support so that Honduras does not have to carry the burden alone. He said, "I am absolutely sure Congress will support me in this." He said he hoped we are together on this issue, and that if we can stay together on these points, this will be very important to the eventual democratization of Nicaragua. (S)

President Azcona said, "I agree with the views you have expressed. We here in Honduras have been discussing the possibilities regarding demobilization. We believe in the principle that the demobilization and repatriation must be voluntary." President Azcona said he was talking about the repatriation of the Resistance, their families, and refugees. To achieve these ends, he said, Honduras agreed that there must be consultation with the Nicaraguan Resistance. Further, he said that this consultation should be carried out in Nicaragua, based on the principle of national reconciliation and democratization, as provided for in Esquipulas II. He said Honduras also thinks there has to be a judgment made by an international or supranational organization stating that the Nicaraguan government is complying with the principles of Esquipulas II, and certifying that the conditions exist for the demobilization and repatriation of the contras. Then, he said, there would have to be support from an international commission to supervise the repatriation of these people. He added that together with the Nicaraguan government and the Resistance, the conditions would have to be established to guarantee the personal freedom and the economic and political security of the persons being repatriated. President Azcona said that this could in no way be something done in an "overly precipitous" manner. (S)

The President said, "It is good to hear you say that." The President added that we hope all of the democracies will stay united on this, that he agreed with what President Azcona had said, and considered it "very good news." What worried us, he said, was if demobilization took place before the elections and if the conditions had not been established, the Sandinistas would walk away from free elections and also democratization. (S)

President Azcona said Honduras wanted to talk about the various stages in the process and to propose the mechanisms to deal with them. First, he said, there should be an evaluation as to whether Nicaragua is complying with the commitments of Esquipulas II, Alajuela and Costa del Sol; and then, if approved, if Nicaragua is complying, then Central Americans would ask the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Secretaries General of the OAS and the UN to establish the international support and verification commission. This, he said, is going to take time. "We are going to stick to the principle that repatriation must always be voluntary," he said, adding that the Hondurans are very worried that this whole problem will linger in Honduras and continue to cause them difficulty. ~~(S)~~

The President said he could identify with that. He said we want to help on the humane costs involved. He said he thought that if Nicaragua can be held to their timetable of elections, it looks as if the problem is "not forever." ~~(S)~~

President Azcona said, "That is our thought as well." (U)

The President said, "It's nice talking to you." He said he would talk to the other Central American democratic presidents, while trying to not be a burden and recognizing that the key democratic leaders have the major responsibility. He said, "We do not want to impose a burden, but it is also very important to the Resistance that these people not be thrown to the wolves before the conditions are ripe for their return." ~~(S)~~

President Azcona said, "Please rest assured. We would not follow any such line." ~~(C)~~

The President asked President Azcona if he has any vacation plans this summer. (U)

President Azcona said he will visit New York September 2-4, to see his son who has just entered West Point. (U)

The President expressed great pleasure talking to President Azcona, who echoed the sentiment. (U)

The President and President Azcona then each said goodbye and the conversation ended. (U)

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5927

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 28, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS *u*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Azcona of Honduras

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and Honduran President Azcona on July 27, 1989. The memorandum at Tab I transmits the record of the telcon to the State Department.

RECOMMENDATION

That you file the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for record purposes.

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the State Department.

Approve

APB

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Hughes Memo to Roy

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008
By *MM* NARA, Date *7/2/2013*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memo	Stephen G. Rademaker to Robert M. Gates (4 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala (1 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Call to Guatemalan President Cerezo (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
 agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (1 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Date Closed: 5/12/2009	OA/ID Number: 91138-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Call to Salvadoran President Cristiani (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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El Salvador: Talking Points
Bush-Cristiani Telcon

-- El Salvador and the United States have cooperated closely on bilateral issues and on the regional peace process, and we want to continue this cooperation as the Central American summit approaches.

-- The summit will be critical to maintaining momentum on Nicaraguan democratization and ending Sandinista support for subversion throughout the region, particularly in El Salvador.

-- We believe the Sandinistas' support for the FMLN is continuing, and that insistence that subversion end is consistent with the Esquipulas agreement. We have conveyed this view to the other democracies.

-- It is important that the Nicaraguans not be allowed to shift the focus of the summit away from democratization and subversion. We hope that the summit will improve the draft demobilization plan so that it can serve as the basis for eventual Resistance return to Nicaragua and the creation of the conditions for democracy.

-- The key elements of a successful plan will be:

- o Clear linkage between democratization and voluntary demobilization.
- o Establishment of a reliable mechanism within Nicaragua to verify that conditions exist which would allow voluntary demobilization.
- o Direct talks between the Government of Nicaragua and the Resistance.
- o A timetable stretching through the scheduled February 1990 Nicaraguan elections.

-- An agreement which does not include these four basic elements would deny Nicaraguan exiles the right to return to their homeland under universally-accepted minimum conditions.

-- I ask for your assurance that you will work to maintain the focus of the summit on Nicaraguan democratization and an end to Sandinista subversion. Neither El Salvador nor the United States wants results which would drive wedges between U.S. policy and that of our democratic Central American allies.

BUSH/CEREZO CALL - Central America Summit

- o --Guatemala has been and continues to be an important player in the regional peace process. Your personal contribution has been a key element in the results achieved so far.
- o --The upcoming Central American summit is critical to maintaining momentum in democratization in Nicaragua, and to end Sandinista support for subversion in the Region.
- o --It is important that you not allow the Nicaraguans to shift the focus of the summit away from their commitments to democratize and towards demobilization of the Resistance.
- o --We hope you will improve the draft demobilization plan so that it can be a basis for eventual Resistance return to Nicaraguan and lead to the creation of safe and democratic conditions.
- o --We hope that you will support the position of El Salvador that the summit focus on FMLN demobilization, as well as RN demobilization. This position is consistent with the Esquipulas treaty.
- o --The key elements of a successful plan will be:
 - 1. Clear linkage between democratization and voluntary demobilization.
 - 2. Establishment of a reliable mechanism within Nicaragua to verify that conditions exist that would allow voluntary demobilization.
 - 3. Direct talks between the government of Nicaragua and the Resistance.
 - And 4. A timetable that stretches through the February 1990 Nicaraguan elections.
- o --To arrive at an agreement that does not include these four basic elements, would be to deny Nicaraguan exiles the right to return to their homeland under universally-accepted minimum conditions.
- o --I ask you to personally assure that the summit retains the focus on Nicaraguan democratization and does not produce any results which will drive a wedge between the policy of the Central American democracies and U.S. policy.

IF ASKED ONLY: CEREZO LETTER PROPOSING OAS SUMMIT IN GUATEMALA
IN JANUARY 1990

o I would like to thank you for your thoughtful invitation to a summit of heads of state of the Western Hemisphere. As you know I will be going to Costa Rica in October of this year for the celebration of 100 years of Democracy. It will therefore be difficult for me to attend the summit in Guatemala at the time you propose. I believe that your proposal is a timely one and I agree that discussions at the highest levels of the mutual problems facing all nations of the hemisphere are necessary.

DRAFTER: ARA/CEN:BFKnotts/DMcCarthy
CLEARANCE: ARA/CEN:PRomero
SEARAREG 2027 7/31/89

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05g. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Schedule Proposals for Presidential Call to Presidents Cristiani and Cerezo (1 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	Everett Ellis Briggs to Brent Scowcroft Re: Trouble Continues Within the Resistance Military Leadership; Differences Over Demobilization (2 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Date Closed: 5/12/2009	OA/ID Number: 91138-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07a. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Background Paper and Points to be Made for the President's Meeting with Nicaraguan Resistance (1 pp.)	8/4/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
 agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
 information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
 purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07b. Outline	Re: Meeting with Nicaraguan Resistance Political - Military Commission (2 pp.)	8/4/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Latin American Files
Subseries: Central American Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Latin America - Central America (July - September 1989)

Date Closed:	5/12/2009	OA/ID Number:	91138-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
MILITARY LEADERS OF THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE

- Welcome. I am very pleased that you can be here.
- At the outset, I want you to know that you have had my complete support and that my Administration will continue to do all that it can to support you.
- I recognize how difficult it has been for you and the troops; maintaining the cease-fire when the Sandinistas violate it is an example of that.
- But it is essential for maintaining Congressional support for humanitarian aid that you continue the cease-fire.
- We are allies in a common purpose--to bring democracy to Nicaragua.
- I have been very disappointed thus far with Sandinista compliance with the regional peace agreement.
- I have urged the Central American Presidents who are meeting this weekend in Honduras that they must maintain the pressure for democracy.
- I have also told them that any demobilization plan must be voluntary and require the Sandinistas to first establish the conditions that would permit your safe return with full democratic rights.
- I understand that you have visited the Central American Presidents and I would like to hear your views on the meetings.
- Perhaps Commander Bermudez could begin with a few comments on the overall situation and then I would like to hear from the other commanders about the visits to the Presidents.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser
Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Adviser
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs
Cresencio Arcos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs
David Pacelli, NSC (Notetaker)
Rita Boren, Interpreter

Nicaraguan Resistance

Enrique Bermudez, Commanding General
Israel Galeano (Commander "Franklin"), Chief of Staff,
Northern Front
Oscar Sobalvarro (Commander "Ruben"), Chief of Civil Affairs,
Northern Front
Pedro Lara (Commander "Ganso"), Military Commander,
Southern Front
Luis Angel Lopez (Commander "Leonel"), Southern Front
Osorno Coleman (Commander "Blas"), Military Commander,
Atlantic Front
Aristides Sanchez, Director, Nicaraguan Resistance
Donald Castillo, Political Adviser
Xavier Arguello, Political Adviser
Domingo Salinas, Political Adviser

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNKNOWN FILE

6088

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NEEDS THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

August 5, 1989

CB
8-7



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

BS

SUBJECT: Cheney Memorandum on Noriega's Reported Crossing
on to U.S. Base

Dick Cheney's response to your query on Noriega's reported incursion into U.S. controlled territory at Fort Amador is attached at Tab A. It concludes that the incursion, if there was one, was probably not intentional. I agree.

Attachment

Tab A Cheney Memorandum

cc Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1347-MR
SCS 8/15/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6088

August 3, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS

FROM: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum From Defense Secretary Cheney Regarding
Noriega's Reported Crossing of US Base in Panama

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from Defense Secretary Cheney responding to the President's inquiry about General Noriega's possible incursion into U.S.-controlled territory at Fort Amador.

We agree with the memorandum's comment that the incursion, if indeed there was one, was probably not intentional. Your memorandum to the President at Tab I simply records our agreement with Cheney's comment.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to the President

Tab A Cheney Memorandum to the President

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-1347-MR

SCS 8/15/13

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

6088

August 2, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1084-MR
1/27/2014 MM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: "Noriega Crosses U.S. Base" Incident, 31 July 1989

(S)(NOFORN) In response to your inquiry regarding the incursion into US controlled territory in Panama by General Manuel Noriega during the eighth observance of the death of General Omar Torrijos as reported in the Washington Times (Enclosure 1), we have developed the following information.

(S)(NOFORN) Noriega did cross part of a US controlled area at Ft. Amador, Panama, where he shares the base with US Forces. Whether this was an "act of defiance" on his part, and whether he "led a parade" is questionable.

(S)(NOFORN) July 31st was the eighth anniversary of the death of Omar Torrijos and was a holiday in Panama. His mausoleum is located at Ft. Amador. In the morning, Noriega led a large group of Panamanians onto the post from the western side--walking. Several hundred people were with him. Initially, Noriega and his followers walked on the Panamanian side of the boundary. They came to an area where the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) had stationed dog teams to control the crowd. Apparently to avoid the dogs, Noriega cut to the left at this point, walking behind the dog handlers, and onto US controlled territory. There is not a road there; it is the middle of a field as enclosure (2) (a chart of the area) indicates. The exact line is not marked on the ground. Noriega was probably 50 feet or less inside the US area while walking a distance of about 200 yards.


(S)(NOFORN) US service members and PDF members regularly violate that particular boundary line. The Panamanians hit baseballs onto the golf course, the Americans hit golf balls onto the ball fields. Retrievals are accomplished without incident.

(S)(NOFORN) The PDF made a conscientious and effective effort to control the large crowd that day, which eventually numbered as many as 10,000. We are aware of no other incursions during the day.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C)(NOFORN) It is possible that Noriega's incursion was intentional. In light of the fact that he has a headquarters at Ft. Amador, and because of the various other more blatant provocations for which he is responsible, it is more likely that he simply veered a short distance to the north spontaneously. To the best of our knowledge, he has made no attempt to capitalize on this technical violation.

(C)(NOFORN) Finally, as you might imagine, there are conflicting reports on the incident. Since the boundary is not marked there are questions about whether Noriega actually did cross the line, by how far, and for how long. The Provost Marshal for US Southern Command, who was present at the incident, has reported that Noriega did not cross the boundary.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. L. Cherry". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "D" and a stylized "L".

Enclosures

1. "Noriega Crosses U.S. Base," Washington Times, August 1, 1989
2. Chart of Fort Amador, Panama with annotations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TUESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1989

WASHINGTON TIMES

AUGUST 1, 1989

Pg. 9

Noriega crosses U.S. base

By Adrian Croft
REUTERS NEWS AGENCY

PANAMA CITY, Panama — Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, in an apparent act of defiance toward the United States, yesterday led a parade through part of a military base reserved for American servicemen.

The incident at Fort Amador, a Panama City military base jointly administered by the United States and Panama, occurred during events marking the eighth anniversary of the death of Panamanian leader Gen. Omar Torrijos.

Gen. Noriega, leading a proces-

sion of several hundred army officers to Gen. Torrijos' tomb on the base, suddenly veered off the road and marched across a golf course in the U.S.-administered part of the base.

The parade passed in front of houses occupied by senior U.S. officers.

About 20 Panamanian police motorcyclists leading the marchers were left stranded and rode over a lawn to get back ahead of the parade.

"This wasn't planned," one army officer said.

Gen. Noriega was asked about the incident but refused to answer questions from reporters, putting his finger to his lips, gesturing silence.

A military spokesman for the U.S. Southern Command declined comment on the incident.

Gen. Torrijos, a revered nationalist who died in a plane crash in 1981, signed treaties with President Carter in 1977 under which Washington agreed to gradually hand over control of the Panama Canal and U.S. military areas to Panama.

The United States and Panama each administer half of Fort Amador. Their soldiers stare stonily at each other across a demarcation line.


The United States has been trying to oust Gen. Noriega with financial sanctions and other measures since he was indicted on drug-trafficking charges in Florida in February 1988.

U.S. forces here, reinforced after elections were voided in May, have staged a series of exercises that the Noriega-backed Panamanian government labels provocative.

Later, thousands of people marched from the city center to the tomb for a separate commemoration of Gen. Torrijos' death. The march was also billed as a protest against the U.S. military presence in Panama.

Marchers, chanting "Noriega hit hard at the Yankee" and "Not a single step backwards," were filmed by U.S. military cameramen and a video crew.

NORIEGA'S
ROUTE →



~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~

6892

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 1, 1989

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI *DAP*

SUBJECT: Attendance at the Arias Summit

In response to your question, Ortega will be invited to the summit and Castro definitely will not be invited. We have every reason to believe that a Noriega representative will not be invited. Arias does not want to invite Haiti and Chile, but we are pressing him to do so if he invites Ortega. The evidence is as follows:

Castro: We made clear in our original demarche that Castro should not be invited to a confab of the democracies. Arias reconfirmed in a conversation with the Ambassador on June 21 that Castro will not come (Embassy San Jose 07953).

Ortega: We did not question Ortega's presence in our original demarche and it has always been our expectation that he would come. It would be difficult for Arias to justify excluding his neighbor--given his overriding commitment to not jeopardizing the peace process--despite billing the event as a celebration of democracy.

Panama: We told Arias in our original demarche that excluding a representative of Noriega's regime was a sine qua non for our attendance. The President also alluded to this in his phone call accepting the invitation. The last word we have on paper is the June 21 conversation with Hinton: "After considerable discussion of Panama, Arias said he would withhold an invitation at least until September." Arias has taken a tough line on Panama, and we do not believe he will invite Rodriguez.

Pinochet/Chile and Avril/Haiti: Arias told us early on that he would not invite Chile and Haiti, but we recently decided to press for them anyway. State cabled the following instructions to Hinton on August 29:

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1084-MR

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

"It would be hard to justify President Bush's attendance at a hemispheric summit which included Ortega but excluded Pinochet and Avril, the current leaders of two countries which are making more progress toward democracy than Nicaragua. Please ask Arias to reconsider his refusal to invite Chile and Haiti." (State 276234)

Arias interpreted this to mean that we were threatening to back out if Avril and Pinochet were not invited. He reacted strongly, saying he did not believe that the President knew of, or agreed with, the suggestion that if Pinochet and Avril were not invited that the President might not attend. Arias maintained that however much progress they had made in returning to democracy, they had come to power through military coups. Arias said that although Ortega is not the world's greatest democrat, at least he had been elected.

We do not expect Arias to give on this point.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

31 August 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
The Acting Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Environmental Initiative for Eastern Europe

There remains one important loose end in putting together for submission to the Congress next Tuesday the legislative and budgetary package needed to implement the President's initiatives in Poland and Hungary: where do we find the \$20 million for environmental programs?

We have found half of the solution in the Energy Department, which appears willing to reprogram \$10 million to cover all of its portion of the environmental initiative for Poland. This leaves us with the need to identify a source for \$5 million for Poland (air quality monitoring system in Krakow) and \$5 million for Hungary. EPA is prepared to program \$500,000 in FY 90 and the same in FY 91.

Recognizing that State and the 150 account already are absorbing \$125 million for the Enterprise Funds, we are forced to ask that you also cover the remaining \$9 million in the environmental initiative. This could be spread over two fiscal years, FY 90 and FY 91. With the "no new money" rule, at this point we have not been able to identify any other options.

Urgent action is required to enable us to submit the legislative package on September 5th.



Robert M. Gates
Assistant to the President and Deputy
for National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1084-MR
EJ 4/6/15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6871

August 31, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR STAPE ROY

FROM: MIKE DONLEY **MD**

SUBJECT: Environmental Initiative
for Eastern Europe

Attached please find a memo from Bob Gates to Larry Eagleburger on the Environmental Initiative for Eastern Europe. The original is being hand carried to Eagleburger by one of our staff members this afternoon. This copy is for your information.

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

DEPARTMENTAL MAIL

89 AUG 31 AM 1:30

B

NO. 2115

CLASSIFICATION

PAGES

2

MIKE DONLEY

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

DESCRIPTION

ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVE FOR EASTERN EUROPE

LOG 8

AGENCY	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
F	J. STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	

IS FOR URGENT DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEE

URGENT

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM MIKE DONLEY _____
(NAME) _____

(EXTENSION) _____ (ROOM NUMBER) _____

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVE FOR EASTERN EUROPE

LOG # _____

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

STATE

J. STAPLETON ROY

EXEC SEC

REMARKS FOR URGENT DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEE

URGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7074

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

September 11, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS

FROM: WILLIAM T. PRYCE

SUBJECT: The Camp David Invitation to Mexican President Salinas

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

The attached memo from Stapleton Roy on the Salinas Camp David (Tab I) visit is somewhat OBE'd, but it shows what the Mexicans thought was in the offering and may give us a chance to go back to the President on the subject.

When the State Department passed the message to the Mexican Embassy on Friday, September 8 that President and Mrs. Bush were . inviting President and Mrs. Salinas and one aide for an intimate informal lunch at Camp David, leaving Washington around 11:00 a.m. and returning mid-afternoon, the response was positive but reflected politely veiled disappointment.

Ambassador Astie, the number two at the Mexican Embassy, called me directly late Friday afternoon to say that he was sure President Salinas would be delighted with the invitation, but that leaving for Camp David at eleven in the morning would mean that Salinas would have to get up at 4 in the morning, because of the two hour time difference between the U.S. and Mexico in addition to the 4 hour flight. He wondered whether the suggested hour had come from the President himself. I said I believed it did, but that the time difference between the U.S. and Mexico might not have been taken into account.

Astie then said that in imagining what the Camp David invitation might entail, the Mexicans had envisioned a mid-afternoon arrival and perhaps an informal dinner. The memo from Roy makes clear that Salinas had expected to stay overnight.

Confining the invitation to Camp David to what is essentially a long lunch will be a big disappointment to the Mexicans, and may well not achieve our purpose of attempting to demonstrate the special importance the President gives to U.S./Mexican relations and his relationship with Salinas. We don't know what is on the President's schedule for Sunday evening October 1, but if there could be a dinner at Camp David with Salinas, U.S./Mexican relations will be well served. An overnight stay would be ideal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1084-MR
E8 4/10/15

RECOMMENDATION

That you seek informally to have the President's invitation to Mexican President Salinas to visit Camp David on October 1 changed from "lunch" to "afternoon and supper," with an overnight if at all possible.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Roy to Scowcroft Memorandum



Washington, D.C. 20520 7074

September 8, 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Mexican President Salinas Accepts Invitation
to Camp David

Mexican Ambassador Gustavo Petricioli informed the Department on August 25 that President Salinas has accepted President Bush's kind invitation to visit Camp David on Sunday, October 1.

According to Petricioli, Salinas expects to remain overnight at Camp David and come to Washington the morning of Monday, October 2, for a day of private activities prior to the official beginning of the State Visit on Tuesday, October 3.

The Department believes that President Salinas' acceptance of President Bush's invitation will get the visit off to an excellent start and demonstrate the special nature of our relationship with our neighbor Mexico.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

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2009-1084-MR
E& 4/6/15

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7417
PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1989

CHRON FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1084-MR
SS 4/6/15

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER

DATE: September 21, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:30 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*



I. PURPOSE

To underscore to President Carter that he must use his observer mission to demand full compliance by the Sandinistas with their commitment to a free and fair election.

II. BACKGROUND

President Carter has requested this meeting to report to you on his trip to Nicaragua on September 15-17 on behalf of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, his Atlanta-based organization of some 15 present and former leaders. Mrs. Carter and former Argentine President Alfonsin also went on the trip. The group was warmly welcomed in its meetings with government, opposition, and electoral council officials.

President Carter clearly wants to duplicate his successful observer mission to Panama in May, which was co-led by President Ford. He plans several trips to Nicaragua, and hopes to have small teams of mission members visit every two weeks. Staff aides claim that the group (which has not been named) will be bipartisan. Carter told the press that he would propose independent sampling--probably exit polls--on election day to ensure an honest vote, but details have not been worked out. You should congratulate him for his success in brokering a deal which eased the conditions for return of former Miskito Indian fighters.

Yet, based on his statements in Managua and his record in Panama, we believe that he will be constrained in continuing to act as a broker by a fear that activism would compromise his "neutrality" and possibly jeopardize the whole process. Carter is eternally optimistic, telling the press that after reading the electoral laws and the government-opposition accord, "I believe it will be possible to avoid what happened in Panama."

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Opposition spokesmen presented him a letter demanding new talks with the government, saying that Ortega had not fully lived up to his promises in the agreement of August 4. The opposition, for example, complained that the military draft was continuing, that television time was restricted, and that a full amnesty should be granted. Carter publicly noted "problems" and said he had raised them with Ortega, but told the press that it was not his role to demand changes in the laws.

You should emphasize that our sole interest is in a free choice for the Nicaraguan people through a completely fair election, but that we are concerned that the playing field be level for the opposition. Clearly, this is not the case now, when the Sandinistas have not yet delivered on their promises and the unity of the party-army-police looms over the process. Carter can help, without appearing to be pro-opposition. The Sandinistas should be pressed for further changes beyond the August 4 accord, such as polling up until election day, exile voting, and a more balanced electoral council. An extension of the registration period beyond October might be outside the accord, for example, but necessary for a more just electoral process.

It is particularly important that you urge President Carter to state publicly that the Sandinistas should show they have nothing to hide by being open to all electoral observers. Last week, the Sandinistas refused visas for members of the group headed by Curtin Winsor and Gaylord Nelson, and earlier they prevented a Congressional delegation headed by David Dreier from observing an opposition rally.

President Carter may ask that you demonstrate support for the electoral process in visible ways. (In Panama, you recall, he asked us to drop our economic sanctions.) He could echo Sandinista pleas that the electoral machinery requires external funding. Nevertheless, at the same time the government is pleading poverty, our Embassy has noted dramatic increases in public works projects and new trucks for public transportation.

Carter has not said much about the Contras. Carter's aide, Bob Pastor, explored with my staff the idea of U.S. incentives for the Contras to demobilize, such as advance payments of resettlement money. Our position is that the obligation should not be upon us to lure the Contras back, but on the Sandinistas to create the conditions for their voluntary return. We stand ready, of course, to aid repatriation. Continued humanitarian aid to the Resistance through the election aids the electoral process; a cutoff would probably lead to renewed fighting.

Carter's Role in Ethiopia Carter also may want to brief you on his mediation role between Mengistu and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front. (You will recall that it was

Carter who broke with Ethiopia and persuaded Somalia to shift its alignment to the West in 1977.) After Carter made several trips to Africa over the past year, the two sides finally agreed to talks, which were held two weeks ago in Atlanta. Nyerere or Mubarak have been mentioned as co-mediators; Nyerere is skeptical, but Mubarak is eager and would like to host further sessions in Cairo.

We support the peace talks, but have not otherwise involved ourselves. They have been inconclusive thus far and the two sides are far apart. The Eritrean and Tigrean rebels have virtually cut Addis Ababa off from the sea and are slowly gaining ground. Mengistu barely survived a military coup three months ago and reacted by decimating the leadership of his army. We believe he is on the ropes and will use any outside support to prop himself up. The Soviets have said they will not renew their military supply agreement and an Ethiopian shopping mission to Pyongyang yielded no significant aid. Mengistu would like better relations with the United States, but there is no reason to help him.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Participants List

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Photo-op; welcoming remarks; followed by discussion

Prepared by:
David Pacelli

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List

A

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT CARTER

- My Administration's fundamental interest is that the Nicaraguan people have a free choice to decide their own destiny through fair and honest elections.
- We want a democratic opening as there has been in the other countries of the hemisphere; and we don't believe in a separate standard for Nicaragua that is less demanding.
- At the same time, for a free election there must be a level playing field for the opposition, and we are not convinced that exists right now.
- I congratulate you on arranging for the Sandinistas to drop some of their demands concerning the Miskito opposition leaders; that is an example of leveling the playing field.
- The Sandinistas control the army, police, courts, and state machinery; it will require careful monitoring to ensure that they do not use state resources for partisan purposes.
- The agreement with the opposition is a big step in the right direction, but many provisions have not been implemented yet; if I were a Contra, I would want to see much more before I decided that I could return in safety and live a normal existence.
- I know that the opposition presented you a letter saying that they wanted to talk to the government about items that were not addressed in the August 4 accord; it seems to me

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2009-1084-MR
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that what they want is reasonable, and necessary for a free and fair election: reform of the Electoral Council and the regional councils, provisions for exile voting, an immediate general amnesty, and end to confiscations, and privately-owned radio and television stations.

- I am very concerned that the Sandinistas have welcomed some observers but barred others from visiting Nicaragua, and hope that you will publicly insist that they refrain from this tactic.
- Even Ortega was forced to admit that the Sandinista arms buildup is continuing; there is absolutely no excuse for this when the Contras have respected the cease-fire and have not received arms aid for a year and a half.

Ethiopia

- I applaud your willingness to try to bring peace to a part of the world where there has been so much suffering.
- Do you believe the two sides are prepared to compromise on their major differences? Eritrea is demanding independence; can Mengistu afford to give them enough to end the fighting?
- When Mengistu is weakening and the Soviets and others are abandoning him, is there any reason for us to change our policy of ostracism? Wouldn't a change just prop him up?
- Do you see any signs of Mengistu's willingness to change his internal policies of repression, "villagization," and absolute state control?

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CARD 1 OF 5

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT CARTER

- MY ADMINISTRATION'S FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IS THAT THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE HAVE A FREE CHOICE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY THROUGH FAIR AND HONEST ELECTIONS.
- WE WANT A DEMOCRATIC OPENING AS THERE HAS BEEN IN THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE HEMISPHERE; AND WE DON'T BELIEVE IN A SEPARATE STANDARD FOR NICARAGUA THAT IS LESS DEMANDING.
- AT THE SAME TIME, FOR A FREE ELECTION THERE MUST BE A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD FOR THE OPPOSITION, AND WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT EXISTS RIGHT NOW.

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CARD 2 OF 5

- I CONGRATULATE YOU ON ARRANGING FOR THE SANDINISTAS TO DROP SOME OF THEIR DEMANDS CONCERNING THE MISKITO OPPOSITION LEADERS; THAT IS AN EXAMPLE OF LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD.
- THE SANDINISTAS CONTROL THE ARMY, POLICE, COURTS, AND STATE MACHINERY; IT WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL MONITORING TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO NOT USE STATE RESOURCES FOR PARTISAN PURPOSES.
- THE AGREEMENT WITH THE OPPOSITION IS A BIG STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT MANY PROVISIONS HAVE NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED YET; IF I WERE A CONTRA, I WOULD WANT TO SEE MUCH MORE BEFORE I DECIDED THAT I COULD RETURN IN SAFETY AND LIVE A NORMAL EXISTENCE.

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CARD 3 OF 5

- I KNOW THAT THE OPPOSITION PRESENTED YOU A LETTER SAYING THAT THEY WANTED TO TALK TO THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT ITEMS THAT WERE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE AUGUST 4 ACCORD; IT SEEMS TO THAT WHAT THEY WANT IS REASONABLE, AND NECESSARY FOR A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION: REFORM OF THE ELECTORAL COUNCIL AND THE REGIONAL COUNCILS, PROVISIONS FOR EXILE VOTING, AN IMMEDIATE GENERAL AMNESTY, AND END TO CONFISCATIONS, AND PRIVATELY-OWNED RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS.
- I AM VERY CONCERNED THAT THE SANDINISTAS HAVE WELCOMED SOME OBSERVERS BUT BARRED OTHERS FROM VISITING NICARAGUA, AND HOPE THAT YOU WILL PUBLICLY INSIST THAT THEY REFRAIN FROM THIS TACTIC.

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CARD 4 OF 5

- EVEN ORTEGA WAS FORCED TO ADMIT THAT THE SANDINISTA ARMS BUILDUP IS CONTINUING; THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EXCUSE FOR THIS WHEN THE CONTRAS HAVE RESPECTED THE CEASE-FIRE AND HAVE NOT RECEIVED ARMS AID FOR A YEAR AND A HALF.

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CARD 5 OF 5

ETHIOPIA

- I APPLAUD YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRY TO BRING PEACE TO A PART OF THE WORLD WHERE THERE HAS BEEN SO MUCH SUFFERING.
- DO YOU BELIEVE THE TWO SIDES ARE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE ON THEIR MAJOR DIFFERENCES? ERITREA IS DEMANDING INDEPENDENCE; CAN MENGISTU AFFORD TO GIVE THEM ENOUGH TO END THE FIGHTING?
- WHEN MENGISTU IS WEAKENING AND THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS ARE ABANDONING HIM, IS THERE ANY REASON FOR US TO CHANGE OUR POLICY OF OSTRACISM? WOULDN'T A CHANGE JUST PROP HIM UP?
- DO YOU SEE ANY SIGNS OF MENGISTU'S WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE HIS INTERNAL POLICIES OF REPRESSION, "VILLAGIZATION," AND ABSOLUTE STATE CONTROL?

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B

PARTICIPANTS LIST

United States

The President

James A. Baker, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft,

Assistant to the President and National Security Adviser

Robert M. Gates,

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser

Bernard W. Aronson,

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Everett Ellis Briggs, NSC (Notetaker)

President Jimmy Carter

Robert Pastor

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7417

September 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS *EEB*
FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI *DAP*
SUBJECT: Background Paper and Points to be Made for the
President's Meeting with Former President Carter

Attached at Tab I is a background paper for the President's meeting with former President Carter to discuss his recent trip to Nicaragua. Per your instructions, we have identified specific things the Sandinistas must do to guarantee a free and fair election. The points to be made draw from an informal State Department draft (Tab II).

We also have included some information and talking points on Ethiopia provided by David Passage so that the President may be prepared if the subject comes up.

Concurrence by: David Passage *DAP*

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab II State Department Draft Talking Points

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- o This Administration wants to see free, fair and honest elections in Nicaragua in February 1990. We want a democratic opening in Nicaragua, as there has been in other countries of the hemisphere. There is no hidden agenda.
 - o I hope the agreement you arranged for the return of exiled Indian opposition leaders to Nicaragua's Atlantic coast will contribute to truly free elections.
 - o The August 4 agreement between the Nicaraguan Government and the opposition could reduce the likelihood of electoral fraud, however, many of these provisions have yet to be formally implemented.
 - o Other opposition concerns, such as reform of the Sandinista-dominated Supreme Electoral Council and provisions for exile voting, were not addressed in the August 4 agreement.
 - o The Sandinistas control the army, police, courts and state machinery, and can use these and other government resources in their electoral campaign.
 - o The opposition has asked for implementation of the August 4 agreement and further talks on election reform. A statement from you supporting the opposition's request would be welcome.
 - o The Sandinistas have shown a consistent pattern of breaking their promises:
 - The Sandinistas have promised to allow foreign funding for opposition parties. You can help in ensuring NED is allowed to function freely.
 - Ortega promised at Tela to end support for the Salvadoran FMLN and other Central American subversives, admitting the Sandinistas supported subversion in the past. But we have seen no evidence to suggest such support has ended.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907589
RECEIVED: 26 SEP 89 09

CHRON FILE

TO: DUARTE, JOSE N

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 22 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES TO DUARTE RE HIS LEADERSHIP & COMMITMENT TO PEACE

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 29 SEP 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BRIGGS
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PACELLI
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WORKING

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/12/09

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8907589

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By Co NARA, Date 5/12/09

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, ES, US

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT DUARTE

REF: (A) AMB WALKER-WHITAKER TELCON, 9/22

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSE NAPLEON DUARTE.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. PRESIDENT:

I WOULD LIKE TO ADD MY VOICE, AND THOSE OF THE ENTIRE
AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PEOPLE, TO THE CHORUS OF PRAISE FOR
YOUR ABLE LEADERSHIP AND YOUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE.

MR. PRESIDENT, YOU ARE THE FATHER OF SALVADORAN
DEMOCRACY. THE COURAGE AND WISDOM YOU DEMONSTRATED IN
LEADING YOUR COUNTRY THROUGH A TIME OF GREAT HARDSHIP MADE
THE DIFFERENCE FOR EL SALVADOR. THE UNITED STATES IS
HONORED TO HAVE SUPPORTED YOU AND EL SALVADOR IN THOSE
EFFORTS. THE MANY SUCCESSES OF THE PAST YEARS WOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT YOUR COURAGE, LEADERSHIP, AND
FORESIGHT.

BARBARA AND I HAVE HAD YOU IN OUR THOUGHTS AND PRAYERS
OFTEN IN RECENT DAYS. YOU ARE A TRUE LEADER AND PATRIOT.
THE FRUITS OF YOUR COURAGE WILL LIVE ON FOR GENERATIONS.

END TEXT

PLEASE PREPARE HARD COPY AND DELIVER TO PRESIDENT DUARTE
ASAP. NO RELEASE INTENDED BY WHITE HOUSE, AND NO SIGNED

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By MM NARA, Date 7/22/2013

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW. NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY RECIPIENT.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 25, 1989

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with President
Jimmy Carter

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum of Conversation between the President and former President Jimmy Carter in the Oval office on September 21, 1989. A copy of the Memorandum of Conversation should be sent to the Department of State for their information (Tab I).

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record, ~~and a copy sent to the Department of State.~~

Approve ✓APX

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Hughes Memo to Roy

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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AS AMENDED

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and former President Jimmy Carter which took place on September 21 at the Oval Office.

Philip G. Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008
By MM NARA, Date 7/22/2013

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President Carter and the Nicaraguan Election

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
Everett Ellis Briggs, Special Assistant to
the President and Senior Director for
Latin America and the Caribbean

Jimmy Carter, Former President
Robert Pastor, Advisor to Former President
Carter

DATE, TIME September 21, 1989, 10:30-11:10 a.m.
PLACE: The Oval Office

The President and former President Jimmy Carter met in the Oval Office at 10:30 a.m. to hear President Carter's views of the upcoming Nicaraguan election. (U)

The President: I'm anxious to hear what you have to say about Nicaragua. (U)

President Carter: I was invited by UNO and the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) to monitor the election. Mine is the only group that was invited by everyone. Elliot Richardson was asked by UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to represent him, and the OAS is also monitoring the election. Our group consists of a "fifteen person" council made up of present or former democratically elected leaders, including Manley and Alfonsin. We will see if the election is free and fair; we will carefully observe the process, to make sure it takes place in accordance with the Nicaraguan constitution and the laws of Nicaragua, the August 4 agreement between the government and the opposition, and also the Esquipulas II and Tela agreements. (U)

The President: What do you mean, Esquipulas and Tela? (U)

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President Carter: Esquipulas II and Tela are binding on the Sandinistas. We aren't trying to change the laws governing the election, just make sure they are observed. We got there Saturday. Alfonsin joined me. Carlos Andres Perez sent a representative. Oretaga met us at the airport. Our first meeting was with SEC chairman Fiallos. We also saw UNO -- presidential candidate Violeta Chamorro and her running mate Godoy -- and met with President Ortega and Vice President Ramirez. The opposition complained that the Sandinistas are continuing to draft recruits into their army, to expropriate property, and to refuse to release political prisoners. In all we had very extensive meetings, including three separate times with Ortega. (U)

President Carter: I found the Sandinistas committed to free and fair elections. Regarding expropriations, they promised they would suspend further actions under the land reform program, and authorized me to tell the press the expropriations were suspended - not abandoned, suspended. And I did so. (U)

President Carter: They said they were not conscripting into the active forces, just into the reserves. I recommended that they stop this. Ortega took it under advisement. (U)

President Carter: I took up the question of the Miskito leaders, who had been excluded from their country for seven years. I told Ortega he had to allow the Miskitos back in. Tomas Borge (the toughest of them all) went to Puerto Cabezas with us. En route from Managua he said he would never back down. But on Monday I presented the Indians' conditions, and Borge accepted them. I announced this in Managua. Since then, Brooklyn Rivera has signed the agreement (I drafted), and he will go back. (U)

President Carter: About the registration of voters, I expect 1.5 million people will be registered, and probably around 900,000 will actually vote. The registration will take place on the first four Sundays in October. We will cooperate with the UN and OAS on this. The UN and OAS already have observer teams on the scene. This will ensure the honesty of the election. Those with complaints will be able to submit them to the UN, OAS, and/or to me. Of course, the international organization representatives will not pass the complaints directly to the Nicaraguan government, since they will have to go through their own channels, to their headquarters in New York and Washington, to their superiors, and eventually to the respective councils. (U)

President Carter: There will be poll watchers at every table, and the results will be certified by eleven people. I obtained authorization to have an independent vote count. We plan to monitor selected tables, and think we can predict the outcome with a margin of error of no more than 2 percent. (U)

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Secretary Baker: Will there be exit polls? (U)

President Carter: No, that was not approved. I suggested, however, that we withhold publicizing our results until after the official count had been announced, and that was accepted. (U)

Dr. Pastor: The Sandinistas will not allow exit polls. President Carter did not ask for this. The experts tell us that in the Nicaraguan context they wouldn't be any good, anyway. (U)

President Carter: I will have to work out how to coordinate our activities with Baena Soares and Elliot Richardson. I hope the official vote count will be announced by noon on Monday, the day after the election. (U)

President Carter: I think the registration of voters will be an orderly process. The UN and OAS will start off with about 100 people at the beginning. By election day they will have around 120 people each. My group will be increased by 20 "distinguished" individuals, in addition to our 15 members, and I hope I can find a prominent Republican to serve with me as co-chairman. The Sandinistas won't know in advance which of the 400 tables we will have selected to monitor. Both sides are confident of victory. What I want to do is make the consequences of fraud so great that no one will be tempted. (U)

The President: What about access to the media for the opposition? (U)

President Carter: I believe the system they have is basically fair. The Sandinistas obviously control the system, but there is equal access to the media for anyone willing to pay, in addition to three minutes of air time, free, per day. If UNO wants to buy additional time, it can. (U)

The President: Who pays for the Sandinistas? (U)

President Carter: They claim that their expenses are being kept separate from the government's. On August 4, under the agreement with the opposition, each party was entitled to three minutes free broadcast time per day. There were 14 parties. Now that they are united in UNO, together they are only entitled to three minutes. But they knew what they were doing. If Mrs. Chamorro can get financial help, she can buy the time she needs. If there are any complaints about media access they can be passed to the SEC, to me, or to the OAS or UN. (U)

The President: What if a U.S. private individual wants to contribute to the opposition? (U)

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President Carter: There's no bar to financial assistance from foreigners. Everyone has agreed that any assistance from abroad should be split 50/50 between the recipient party and the SEC. There are no restrictions on how it is used. Ortega told me if the U.S. gives aid, it can monitor how it is used and determine what it is used for. (U)

The President: Is the SEC constituted so as to enjoy UNO's confidence now? (U)

President Carter: No, but they agreed to it. Fiallos, the chairman, is loyal to the government. The Sandinistas have two official representatives. The opposition has two representatives, but UNO considers one of them -- Sandino -- to be an enemy. When I spoke to Virgilio Godoy about this, he said Sandino is an honest man of the old school, who will maintain his independence rather than be under the opposition's control. (U)

Secretary Baker: So at best the split in the SEC is 3:2 in favor of the Sandinistas? (U)

President Carter: Yes, but we will be watching closely how the SEC performs. The OAS and UN are unlikely to issue any public statements, since they have to send their reports up through their system; but my group will be able to speak out. (U)

Governor Sununu: Is there a chance that since a lot of foreign countries condemned the Panamanian election, they may feel impelled to accept this one, just to keep the appearance of balance? (U)

President Carter: I don't know, but for me, my own integrity is involved, so you can be sure I will speak out. (U)

Secretary Baker: Is there any reason to believe the Sandinistas will not allow congressional delegations to go to Nicaragua? (U)

President Carter: Yes, but we need some flexibility here. I met with Ortega. What he really wants is for the contras to desire to come home. He insists that the process approved at Tela be observed. I asked him about humanitarian aid, and he said he had no objection. I suggested that 75 percent of the aid be used to underwrite the rehabilitation of the contras inside Nicaragua. Ortega said that was all right, if it were routed through the UN. He said the government would provide the contras with land. We could monitor that, too. I am a farmer, and I know the difference between good and bad land. The other 25 percent could be used to feed the contras, so as not to "starve them back" home. (U)

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President Carter: I raised the question of arms to the FMLN, and Ortega said he was ready to give a commitment on this. I raised the question of exchanging ambassadors, and asked him if he would be willing to name an ambassador acceptable to the U.S., and if we could reciprocate, and augment the size of our embassy in Managua. He answered yes, but he didn't want to propose someone as ambassador and then be rejected; and he didn't want us to give the idea that diplomatic relations would only be normalized if UNO won the election. He is ready to name someone right away, if it can be worked out. (Ø)

The President: I have some problems with that. I would want to know more about how the election works. I do not want to give away anything, or to give the sense that all is well out there, until I have a clearer idea of how this election is going to work. I am troubled by it. But it is interesting that he talks like this. (Ø)

President Carter: Ortega would be happy to call on you and give you his personal assurances about the election. He said you meet with the contras, and the opposition, so why not with him? (U)

The President: No. (U)

Secretary Baker: The Sandinistas promised to cut off aid to the FMLN two years ago! (U)

President Carter: He doesn't admit he is doing it. He did not say he would stop. He said he would ensure the UN observer force would have full freedom to carry out its duties on the borders. (U)

Secretary Baker: My question had to do with the election. I am not sure of your answer about congressional delegations. (U)

President Carter: Ortega has some objections. He would like some indication of improved relations. He wants to be sure there is no CIA help to UNO. I think he trusts me. If I could give him an assurance that there was no covert aid to UNO... I tried to convince him of the derogatory effect of such an accusation. I offered him a deal: I would get him an assurance that there would be no covert aid to UNO, and he would stop accusing us of interfering. Ortega said yes, and if that happened, I do not see any problem getting approval for congressional delegations to go to Nicaragua. Ortega wants to see tension with the U.S. relieved. I am convinced the Sandinistas are committed to a free election. (U)

General Scowcroft: What really motivates them? Would they really agree to give up power? (U)

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President Carter: The Army will remain a part of the FSLN Party - as stipulated by the constitution. (U)

Secretary Baker: Does that mean that the newly elected government, if the opposition wins, will not have authority over the Army? (U)

Dr. Pastor: The Sandinistas do not want to address the question of whether they would give up power any more than we want to say in advance of the election whether we would recognize the Sandinistas if they should win. (U)

General Scowcroft: So they think they can win? (U)

President Carter: Yes. I do not know what would happen with the Army. The number two man in the Army did say he would not continue to serve under a UNO president. (U)

Dr. Pastor: If President Carter could give an assurance of no covert action, then Ortega would not accuse us of trying to destabilize the election. (U)

Mr. Aronson: Yesterday the Sandinistas denied a visa to the Republican representative on NED. That raises the question of whether the Sandinistas would allow funding through NED. (U)

President Carter: Once I can assure Ortega that any funds provided will be given under Nicaraguan law and that there is no covert funding, Ortega's response will be immediate. There will be an immediate change on the issuance of visas and monitoring. I believe it would be a mistake, anyway, to deluge the country with 18 to 20 delegations. If all the visitors insisted on seeing Ortega, he would not have time for anything else. That would be "abusive." (U)

The President: We do not want to be abusive, but we do want balanced delegations. We are encouraging Congress to get involved. (U)

General Scowcroft: That is our standard practice. (U)

President Carter: Ortega will allow it if I can assure him that what we are doing is in accordance with the law. And UNO agrees with this. I would be embarrassed if after giving such an assurance I found out the U.S. had been giving covert aid. (U)

The President: What worries me is that, meanwhile, the Soviets are providing more military aid than ever. We may find out more about this today [when we talk to Scheverdnadze]. This is serious business. We are at an interesting crossroads. (Ø)

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Mr. Aronson: If the Sandinistas want to legitimize the election they have nothing to hide. The more people see what is happening, the better. (U)

President Carter: If you are not willing to give an assurance that any dollars provided are in accordance with Nicaragua law... (U)

The President: They will blame the CIA anyway. (U)

President Carter: Do you really believe it is in our best interest to send covert assistance? (U)

The President: I want to make a realistic decision, as President of the United States, in accordance with U.S. law. (U)

President Carter: Yes, of course... (U)

Secretary Baker: If we used NED, as was done in Chile and in Poland, and the money went to support the electoral process, not to the parties, would that be acceptable? Would part of that have to go to the SEC? (U)

President Carter: Yes, according to my understanding of what UNO and SEC told me. (U)

Secretary Baker: So if we use the NED we have to assume some dollars will have to go to the SEC? (U)

President Carter: Any dollars spent in Nicaragua have to be in accordance with Nicaraguan law. UNO supports this. The SEC should be aware of all money being spent in connection with the election. (U)

Mr. Aronson: I understand NED can directly fund certain activities of a non-partisan nature, but that if it helps UNO, then 50 percent has to go to the SEC. (U)

President Carter: All I want is an assurance that any moneys spent are in accordance with Nicaraguan law. (U)

Dr. Pastor: It is clear that covert aid will be a major issue. If we are not providing covert assistance anyway, but won't say so, aren't we getting the worst of both worlds? (U)

The President: Would Ortega guarantee that there is no covert aid coming in to the FSLN? (U)

President Carter: If the opposition can provide evidence of this, I would denounce it. And if Ortega can demonstrate to me that the U.S. is providing covert aid to the opposition, I will denounce that. (U)

Secretary Baker: There is a constitutional issue here. Our policy is that we have no intention of asking for covert aid. But, if the Sandinistas start undermining the election two months from now, the President cannot be asked to foreswear actions that might then be justified. (S)

Mr. Aronson: It would be nice if Ortega refrained from accusing CIA of interfering, but what is important is that the Sandinistas let overt assistance be given. (U)

President Carter: I will try to get Ortega to approve an observer commission from Congress. (U)

President Carter: If I understand our purpose, we want the contras to be able to return and participate freely in the democratic process, and to respect the dignity of those who decide not to. Ortega told me he would provide them with land, and I would like to ensure it is good land. (U)

The President: What we want is free and fair elections, and the return to a free and fair society. We want a regime not beholden or ideologically tied to the declining star of Marxism. You have seen what has happened. Who stands with Panama? Nicaragua, Cuba and Libya. I don't want this to end with one election. If it is certified as having been free, that is fine, but if the Sandinistas win, or if they continue supplying arms to El Salvador, then you cannot expect we will have relations with them such as what we have with Costa Rica. The whole trend in the region is toward democracy. One election isn't enough. What I am concerned with is what is in the best interest of the U.S. If Nicaragua continues supporting Noriega, trafficking in arms, or whatever... (U)

President Carter: Oh, I agree. We have to ensure the election is free. I hope to be able to work closely with the UN and the OAS. (U)

Mr. Aronson: You can help a lot with monitoring the election process. The Sandinista Party is merged with the State. They have pledged not to use the resources of the State - trucks, people, etc. If you could help to keep them clean on that, it would be very positive. (U)

President Carter: That is part of my responsibility. The allegation [of misdeeds] must first be made to the SEC. (U)

Dr. Pastor: Ortega assured us of his total compliance with Tela. He would respond very well to a U.S. statement of its commitment to demobilization of the contras, and of encouragement to the contras to repatriate. (U)

Secretary Baker: I am not sure I understood you. What would Ortega do about the FMLN, if he denies he is helping them now?
(U)

President Carter: The international observers will be allowed to travel at will. (U)

Mr. Aronson: They would not be able to find anything. We are the only ones with the capability to know what the FMLN is doing.
(S)

Secretary Baker: It seems to me it is easier to find areas of agreement on fair and free elections than to get into more difficult areas. If we link the election, the contras and the FMLN, it will be more difficult to resolve the issues. (U)

President Carter: I am going to meet today with the leadership in Congress. What shall I tell them? What do you want me to say? How are we going to spend our money? The contras are involved. Vice President Ramirez told me they have brought back some 500 contras from both north and south, and are getting them settled. The role of the Reconciliation Commission headed by Cardinal Obando y Bravo can be increased. (U)

Secretary Baker: If we try to address demobilization and repatriation, the FMLN, or the exchange of ambassadors, we get ourselves wrapped up in a debate that could become contentious and get us nowhere. Right now we are interested in reprogramming \$9 million to fund NED's efforts to promote a democratic election. If we go off on a tangent we will move away from concentrating on getting a free and fair election. Those other issues are just too divisive. We should concentrate on the election. That is our position. Yes, the other issues should be addressed, after the election. We respect Tela. Congress appropriated \$49 million in humanitarian assistance for the Resistance. I have reason to believe the Congressional leadership won't "pull the chain" on continuing to provide this aid to the Resistance beyond November 30. We are committed to use some of this aid to help those who volunteer to repatriate -- those who are satisfied that conditions in Nicaragua are all right now. There will be serious complications if we get into those other issues. (U)

President Carter: I do not disagree with that. I want to make sure what I say is compatible with what you are doing. (U)

Secretary Baker: We have no present intention of seeking covert aid for use in Nicaragua, but if in December the Sandinistas are not allowing observers in, or letting NED operate as it did in Poland, then we may want to revisit this question. (S)

President Carter: If it is our government's intention to furnish funds in accordance with Nicaraguan law, I will urge Ortega to let congressional delegations visit Nicaragua. My responsibilities do include the contras, to check up on what happens to them when they go back home. That is my purview. (U)

Secretary Baker: We cannot guarantee abiding by Nicaraguan law, if it says that all funding has to pass through the SEC. (U)

Dr. Pastor: There is a distinction between funds given by governments, and by private individuals. (U)

Secretary Baker: Our bipartisan approach encourages private sector contributions to the Nicaraguan election. (U)

The President: How did Ortega explain Nicaragua's support to Panama? How is this consistent with his commitment to a free election? (U)

President Carter: I did not raise it with him. (U)

Dr. Pastor: It is not that Nicaragua condoned what Noriega did about the election, it was a question of Nicaragua's condemning U.S. intervention in the election. To invite President Carter to be an official observer of the Nicaraguan election after he had spoken out about what happened in Panama was an indication of Sandinista confidence in their ability to hold and win a free election. (U)

The President: How have you been doing on resolving the Ethiopian problem? (U)

President Carter: There is agreement on everything except who the mediator will be. The Ethiopians would prefer Nyerere, and I would too. We have to bring the Eritreans around. They will be meeting next in Nairobi, on November 18. (U)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907616

RECEIVED 21 SEP 89

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 13 NOV 89

SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA

AP

PERSONS: LUGAR, RICHARD

BEILENSON, ANTHONY

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR PRES CEREMONY ANNOUNCING PRES ELECTION MONITORING COMMIS
ON NICARAGUA - 27 SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 17 NOV 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
PACELLI

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/12/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSBTM

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8907616

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001 PACELLI
002 PRESIDENT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 89092619 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
Z 89092813 FOR FURTHER ACTION
Z 89111408 FOR DECISION
X 89111710 NOTED BY PRES

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cep NARA, Date 5/12/07

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

11/16/89

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2009-1084-MR

8/4/15

November 13, 1989

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
MONITORING COMMISSION ON NICARAGUA

DATE: November 14, 1989

LOCATION: Oval Office and Cabinet Room

TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To announce formation of a Presidential Election Monitoring Commission on Nicaragua to help us track the extent to which the Sandinistas are complying with their commitment to hold a free and fair election.

II. BACKGROUND

As part of our Bipartisan Accord on Central America, we support the broadest possible spectrum of foreign observers of the Nicaraguan electoral process and involvement of Congressional leaders. The appointment of this commission will assist us to scrutinize Sandinista behavior and to help maintain the maximum amount of leeway for opposition political activity.

The Commission has been carefully balanced between Republicans and Democrats, Senate and the House, and supporters and opponents of our policy. Congressman Beilenson, for example -- co-chairman along with Senator Lugar -- has been an opponent of our Nicaragua policy. Although you are announcing the appointment of the Congressional members today, we also plan to propose a group of distinguished citizens to supplement the 20 legislators as Commission members at a later date.

Commission members will lead Congressional visits to Nicaragua by delegations which will include at least one member who opposes the Administration's policy. We will provide logistical support for these visits. Within ten days after each visit, Commission members, as delegation leaders, will submit to you a report which represents a delegation consensus. We plan to have the entire Commission present in Nicaragua on election day.

A number of Congressional delegations have visited Nicaragua recently, and the Sandinistas have said that they will permit additional visits. Nevertheless, the Nicaraguan Government has announced that it will require accreditation

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

for foreign electoral observers, a tactic which we believe is designed to maintain control over this process insofar as possible. The recent Nicaraguan decision to impose visa restrictions on American visitors is part of this effort. The Sandinistas also refused to let in the conservative group headed by Curtin Winsor and Gaylord Nelson, which you met with several months ago, claiming that it had CIA ties.

We expect that as the election campaign progresses, there will be greater numbers of foreign observers, but only a small number are present now. The recently enacted law providing U.S. funds for the Nicaraguan opposition earmarked funds for President Carter's group (\$400,000), the Center for Democracy (\$250,000), and the San Jose-based Center for Training and Electoral Promotion (\$400,000). Moreover, some 17 members from the UN and OAS have arrived in Nicaragua as part of a group formed under the Esquipulas accord, and it eventually will grow to 160 observers.

It remains to be seen whether these groups will disperse throughout the country and whether they will take the Sandinistas to task when violations occur. I am concerned by President Carter's apparent concern with preserving the perceived neutrality of his group, which will prevent sharp denunciations of the regime. His recent public statements, for example, held the Contras responsible for Ortega's breaking the cease-fire accusing them of intending to disrupt the registration process.

The points to be made in both your private meeting with the co-chairmen and the Commission as a whole (Tabs A and B) emphasize that the Commission is one more step in our bipartisan efforts to ensure a free and fair election. Your introductory remarks to the Commission at Tab B also include statements on the recent violence in El Salvador which we hope gain publicity.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Participants List at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Oval Office: White House photographer; Cabinet Room: open photo and writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Commission Co-Chairmen Lugar and Beilenson will meet with you first in the Oval Office for five minutes, together with the Vice President, Secretary Baker, John Sununu, myself, and Bob Gates. You will then proceed to the Cabinet Room to meet with the entire Commission for twenty-five minutes. After greeting the members, you will make introductory remarks which will be covered by the press.

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Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made, Oval Office
Tab B	Points to be Made, Cabinet Room
Tab C	List of Participants

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CARD 1 OF 2

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR AND CONGRESSMAN ANTHONY BEILENSEN

- I AM DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU AS THE CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MONITORING COMMISSION ON NICARAGUA.
- I HAVE BEEN SERIOUS ABOUT OUR COMMITMENT TO BIPARTISANSHIP IN OUR CENTRAL AMERICA POLICY; I AM GLAD TO SEE SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP INCLUDING MEMBERS OF BOTH PARTIES AND DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS TOWARD NICARAGUA POLICY.
- WHAT UNITES US IS OUR COMMITMENT TO A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION IN NICARAGUA, AND TO EVERYTHING WE CAN DO FOR A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD SO THAT THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE MAY FREELY DECIDE.

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CARD 2 OF 2

- AS YOU KNOW, WE ENCOURAGING AS MANY FOREIGN OBSERVERS AS POSSIBLE; MRS. CHAMORRO SHARES THIS VIEW.
- I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SANDINISTAS SAY THEY WILL NOT INTERFERE; WE DID HAVE ONE INCIDENT A FEW MONTHS BACK WHEN THEY WOULD NOT LET DAVE DREIER OBSERVE AN OPPOSITION RALLY, BUT I SHOULD HOPE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH THAT WITH YOUR GROUP.
- I UNDERSTAND THAT EACH DELEGATION GOING DOWN IS TO FILE A REPORT UPON ITS RETURN; I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THEM.
- THE ONLY THING WHICH WILL FORCE THE SANDINISTAS TO CONDUCT AN HONEST CAMPAIGN IS INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND PUBLICITY.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR AND CONGRESSMAN ANTHONY BEILENSON

- I am delighted to have you as the Co-Chairmen of the Presidential Election Monitoring Commission on Nicaragua.
- I have been serious about our commitment to bipartisanship in our Central America policy; I am glad to see such a representative group including members of both parties and differing viewpoints toward Nicaragua policy.
- What unites us is our commitment to a free and fair election in Nicaragua, and to everything we can do for a level playing field so that the Nicaraguan people may freely decide.
- As you know, we encouraging as many foreign observers as possible; Mrs. Chamorro shares this view.
- I understand that the Sandinistas say they will not interfere; we did have one incident a few months back when they would not let Dave Dreier observe an opposition rally, but I should hope that they will not be able to get away with that with your group.
- I understand that each delegation going down is to file a report upon its return; I look forward to receiving them.
- The only thing which will force the Sandinistas to conduct an honest campaign is international pressure and publicity.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CARD 1 OF 4

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MONITORING
COMMISSION ON NICARAGUA

- IN THE NINE MONTHS SINCE THE BIPARTISAN ACCORD, WE HAVE SEEN SOME HOPEFUL SIGNS IN NICARAGUA BECAUSE WE HAVE WATCHED SO CLOSELY AND INSISTED ON REAL POLITICAL CHANGE.
- THE FEBRUARY 1990 ELECTION IS A CRUCIAL MOMENT, AND FOR US A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY TO ASSIST DEMOCRATIC FORCES, JUST AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PHILIPPINES, PANAMA, AND CHILE.
- THE ISSUE IS NOT JUST AN HONEST COUNT ON ELECTION DAY, BUT A FAIR CAMPAIGN. THE SANDINISTAS MUST PERMIT A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD, STARTING NOW.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CARD 2 OF 4

- THAT IS WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED AND THE CONGRESS APPROVED NON-CAMPAIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION THROUGH THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, TO HELP BUILD THE INFRASTRUCTURE TO ORGANIZE AND COMPETE.
- THAT IS WHY TODAY I AM FORMING A BIPARTISAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MONITORING COMMISSION ON NICARAGUA.
- I THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING. I AM PLEASED TO SEE SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP FORM BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE AND REFLECTING A BROAD RANGE OF VIEWS; I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR REPORTS ON ELECTORAL CONDITIONS.
- YOUR JOB IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT IN VIEW OF THE SANDINISTA DECISION TO SUSPEND THE CEASE-FIRE. IT IS VITAL FOR THE CEASE-FIRE TO BE

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2009-1084-MR
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MONITORING COMMISSION ON NICARAGUA

- In the nine months since the Bipartisan Accord, we have seen some hopeful signs in Nicaragua because we have watched so closely and insisted on real political change.
- The February 1990 election is a crucial moment, and for us a crucial opportunity to assist democratic forces, just as we have done in the Philippines, Panama, and Chile.
- The issue is not just an honest count on election day, but a fair campaign. The Sandinistas must permit a level playing field, starting now.
- That is why we have proposed and the Congress approved non-campaign assistance to the democratic opposition through the National Endowment for Democracy, to help build the infrastructure to organize and compete.
- That is why today I am forming a bipartisan Presidential Election Monitoring Commission on Nicaragua.
- I thank you for participating. I am pleased to see such a representative group form both sides of the aisle and reflecting a broad range of views; I am looking forward to your reports on electoral conditions.
- Your job is all the more important in view of the Sandinista decision to suspend the cease-fire. It is vital for the cease-fire to be restored to permit an open political process in rural areas, and I again call on the Nicaraguan Government to take steps in its talks with the Resistance to create a permanent and effective cease-fire.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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November 13, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

FROM:

DAVID A. PACELLI *DAS*

SUBJECT:

Ceremony to Announce the Presidential Election
Monitoring Commission on Nicaragua

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President giving background information and talking points for his meeting tomorrow, November 14 with Congressional members of the Presidential commission to observe the Nicaraguan elections. The points to be made draw from information informally provided by the State Department. We will forward a separate package with a draft press statement to be released following the meeting.

At Tab II, we have included information supplied by the State Department on Congressional visits to Nicaragua that have already taken place this year.

The Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Resistance are continuing their talks begun in New York last week in Washington on the margins of the OAS meeting. We will get you an update tomorrow morning.

BC
Concurrence by: Bret Coulson

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made, Oval Office
Tab B Points to be Made, Cabinet Room
Tab C List of Participants
Tab II Congressional Visits to Nicaragua

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Oval Office and
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
MONITORING COMMISSION ON NICARAGUA

DATE: November 14, 1989
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

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The Commission has been carefully balanced between Republicans and Democrats, Senate and the House, and supporters and opponents of our policy. Congressman Beilenson, for example -- co-chairman along with Senator Lugar -- has been an opponent of our Nicaragua policy. Although you are announcing the appointment of the Congressional members today, we also plan to propose a group of distinguished citizens to supplement the 20 legislators as Commission members at a later date.

Commission members will lead Congressional visits to Nicaragua by delegations which will include at least one member who opposes the Administration's policy. We will provide logistical support for these visits. Within ten days after each visit, Commission members, as delegation leaders, will submit to you a report which represents a delegation consensus. We plan to have the entire Commission present in Nicaragua on election day.

A number of Congressional delegations have visited Nicaragua recently, and the Sandinistas have said that they will permit additional visits. Nevertheless, the Nicaraguan Government has announced that it will require accreditation

PARTICIPANTS LIST

United States

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates,
 Assistant to the President and Deputy for National
 Security Affairs
Fred McClure, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs
Boyd Hollingsworth, Deputy Assistant to the President for
Indent → Legislative Affairs
Robert Portman, Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative
 Affairs
Nancy Dorn, Special Assistant to the President for Legislative
 Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for
 Inter-American Affairs
Janet Mullins, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional
 Relations
William Kristol, Chief of Staff to the Vice President
Bret Coulson, NSC, Legislative Affairs
David Pacelli, NSC (Notetaker)

Presidential Commission

Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), Co-Chairman
Senator David Boren (D-OK)
Senator Dave Durenberger (R-MN)
Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS)
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
Senator John McCain (R-AZ)
Senator Connie Mack (R-FL)
Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI)
Senator Terry Sanford (D-NC)
(one additional Democrat to follow)

Congressman Anthony Beilenson (D-CA), Co-Chairman
Congressman David Bonior (D-MI)
Congressman William Broomfield (R-PA)
Congressman Rod Chandler (R-WA)
Congressman Mickey Edwards (R-LA)
Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL)
Congressman G.V. Montgomery (D-MS)
Congressman John Murtha (D-PA)
Congressman Jim Slattery (D-KS)
Congressman Tom Tauke (R-IA)