

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):  
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:  
2009-0275-S

# FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an  
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential  
Library Staff.**

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** China Chronological Files  
**Subseries:** Tiananmen Files

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**OA/ID Number:** 91132  
**Folder ID Number:** 91132-001

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**Folder Title:**  
China: Tiananmen (August - October 1989)

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| Stack:   | Row:      | Section: | Shelf:   | Position: |
|----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| <b>G</b> | <b>34</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>4</b> | <b>4</b>  |

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type     | Subject/Title                                                                               | Date    | Restriction       | Classification |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------------|----------------|
| 01a. Memo           | Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: China -- Outlook Even Bleaker Than It Seems (3 pp.)  | 8/4/89  | (b)(1)            | S              |
| 01b. Cable          | To Distribution List<br>Re: Discussion Topics... (7 pp.)                                    | 8/3/89  | (b)(1)            | S              |
| 02. Memo            | Douglas H. Paal to Robert M. Gates<br>Re: China - Lifting Travel Advisory (1 pp.)           | 8/4/89  | <del>(b)(1)</del> | <del>S</del>   |
| 03a. Letter         | Brent Scowcroft to Zbigniew Brzezinski (1 pp.)                                              | 8/4/89  | <del>(b)(1)</del> |                |
| 03b. Memo           | Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Reply to Zbigniew Brzezinski re China (1 pp.)        | 7/31/89 | <del>(b)(1)</del> |                |
| 03c. Memo           | Zbigniew Brzezinski to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Lunch with Ambassador Han Xu (1 pp.)          | 7/21/89 | <del>(b)(1)</del> |                |
| 04a. Memo           | Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Your Meeting with Ambassador Han Xu of China (1 pp.) | 8/7/89  | (b)(1)            | S              |
| 04b. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Ambassador Han Xu of China (1 pp.)                   | n.d.    | <del>(b)(1)</del> |                |
| 04c. Report         | Re: HAN Xu [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)                                             | 1/30/89 | (b)(1), (b)(3)    | S              |

Page 1 of 3

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** China Chronological Files  
**Subseries:** Tiananmen Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** China: Tiananmen (August - October 1989)

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1107  
**OA/ID Number:** 91132-001  
**Date Closed:** 5/1/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title                                                                                                                                                   | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 05a. Memo       | G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Meeting with Secretaries Cheney and Baker,<br>Wednesday, September 6, 7:15 a.m. (1 pp.)                    | 9/5/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>TS</del>  |
| 05b. Memo       | Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Item (1 pp.)                                                                                                     | 9/5/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05c. Memo       | Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Item on Japanese Responsibility Sharing (1 pp.)                                                             | 9/5/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 05d. Memo       | Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Item - China/Peace Pearl - Next Steps (1 pp.)                                                                  | 9/5/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05e. Memo       | William T. Pryce to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Panama Item for September 6 Scowcroft/Baker/Cheney<br>Breakfast - Selecting a Panamanian Canal Administrator (2 pp.) | 9/5/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 05f. Memo       | Barry F. Lowenkron/Nancy Beard Dyke to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: September 6 Breakfast Item: Aid for Bulgarian Turks (1 pp.)                                       | 9/5/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 06a. Memo       | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: China: Implications of the Peace Pearl Agreement (1 pp.)                                                                        | 9/18/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 06b. Memo       | Douglas H. Paal to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Brief Update for the President on Implications of the Peace<br>Pearl Agreement (1 pp.)                                | 9/17/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

Page 2 of 3

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|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 07a. Memo       | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: China - United States: More on Deng Xiaoping's Meeting with Professor T.D. Lee (2 pp.) | 9/21/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 07b. Report     | Re: International Affairs (2 pp.)                                                                                      | 9/18/89 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 07c. Report     | Re: International Affairs (3 pp.)                                                                                      | 9/18/89 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 07d. Memo       | Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: More Information on Deng's Meeting with T.D. Lee (1 pp.)                        | 9/19/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08a. Memo       | Robert Blackwill to G. Philip Hughes<br>Re: Memorandum of Conversation with John Major, UK Foreign Secretary (1 pp.)   | 9/21/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08b. Memcon     | Re: Meeting with John Major of the United Kingdom (4 pp.)                                                              | 9/11/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

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**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**



~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8906140  
RECEIVED: 04 AUG 89 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: PAAL  
JACKSON

DOC DATE: 04 AUG 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CHINA OUTLOOK EVEN BLEAKER THAN IT SEEMS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 08 AUG 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/1/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS

CLOSED BY: NSBTM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 8906140

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT  
001  
001

Z 89080420 FOR INFORMATION  
X 89102617 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN  
X 89121211 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: TAS

LOG # 6140

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM RRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN   | DISPOSITION   |
|-----------------|-------------|------------|---------------|
| Dep Exec        |             |            | <del>MM</del> |
| Philip Hughes   | <u>1</u>    | <u>APB</u> | <u>H</u>      |
| Bob Gates       | <u>2</u>    | <u>8</u>   |               |
| Brent Scowcroft | <u>3</u>    |            |               |
| Philip Hughes   |             |            |               |
| Situation Room  |             |            |               |
| West Wing Desk  |             |            |               |
| NSC Secretariat |             |            |               |
|                 |             |            |               |
|                 |             |            |               |

89 AUG 4 P 8:19

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS    Fy I — Thank you — C. L. —  
by Doug Paal

Brent — A very good,  
but troubling, memo by  
Doug Paal.  
8.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                  | Date   | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| 01a. Memo                | Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: China -- Outlook Even Bleaker Than It Seems (3 pp.) | 8/4/89 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

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**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files

**Series:** China Chronological Files

**Subseries:** Tiananmen Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** China: Tiananmen (August - October 1989)

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
By SCS (NLGB) on 2/21/12

|                               |                        |                             |                    |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 5/1/2009               | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91132-001          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S            | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |                    |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |                        | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |                    |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |                        | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |                    |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             | 2000-0116-F/1 (207.01) | <b>MR Case #:</b>           | 2010-2789-MR (500) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        | Released in Part       | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      | Released in Part   |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   | 3/31/2010              | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> | 3/31/2010          |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ w/SECRET SPECAT  
NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON  
WNINTEL ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

6140

August 4, 1989



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL JACKSON *KJS*  
FROM: DOUGLAS PAAD *DP*  
SUBJECT: China -- Outlook Even Bleaker Than It Seems

You have seen intelligence reports and analysis that say the domestic political situation in China is "unstable," "fragile," and hard to predict. The purpose of this memorandum is to point out that the situation is more volatile and dangerous than even these characterizations suggest.

Having suppressed the uprising in Beijing, Deng got a grip on his temper and moved to stem the political damage to himself, trying to restore a balance of reformers and conservatives in the Politburo. In doing so, Deng foiled the expectations of Li Peng and others to be rewarded with higher positions. Their resentment, including that of Yang Shangkun, who has not moved up either, is the source of the danger.

For these men, and for those close to them who are viewed within China's elites as having the blood of Tiananmen on their hands, perpetuation of the status quo amounts to continued risk of their political demise. What they have done in the last 8-10 weeks has made them perpetually vulnerable to charges of "blood crimes." They must achieve dominance in the leadership in order to protect themselves.

That is why these leaders are pressing now to round up all of Zhao's supporters and to charge him with crimes that will put Zhao out of action permanently. By extension, they are also undermining Deng. So far, however, Deng and a substantial portion of the Central Committee have stood in their way. The fourth plenum, in June, fell short of their demands in denouncing Zhao. Deng, moreover, ordered a two-year suspension of further recriminations within the leadership.

~~SECRET~~ w/SECRET SPECAT NOFORN  
NOCONTRACT ORCON WNINTEL ATTACHMENT  
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED  
2000-0116-F12  
@ 313110

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ w/SECRET SPECAT NOFORN 2  
~~NOCONTRACT ORCON WNINTEL~~  
~~ATTACHMENT~~


This past week, however, we have seen efforts by Li Peng and his allies to circumvent Deng and appeal to the retired leaders who emerged from the shadows to remove Hu Yaobang in 1987 and to oust Zhao this year. A fierce attack on one of Zhao's followers in People's Daily this week is a good example of this approach.

So long as Deng remains active and retains the loyalty of the military, and so long as there is no sudden development that releases these forces all at once, Deng and his allies may postpone the cataclysm. In the time remaining to him, Deng may work to divide and conquer this group. He is strong when he wants to be, and with luck and cunning he might dispose of Li Peng in time. But we need to remind ourselves that, for the people at the center in Beijing today, the stakes are extremely high. Release of these pent-up pressures will not come through political compromise and accommodation, and may be triggered in a scramble for military support after Deng's passing.

#### Implications for Foreign Policy

The broad course of Chinese foreign policy is set by objective circumstances. We have seen evidence of this since the beginning of Sino-US relations. Nevertheless, things could get very much worse for our relationship within that broad course. Already the Soviets appear to enjoy a better day-to-day relationship than we do, and this is not healthy.

(b) (1)



Li Peng and many conservative leaders have also set themselves apart from Deng in the harshness of their rhetoric against the United States and in their willingness to lean toward the Soviet Union. Yang Shangkun has not joined them in this, and in the long run reliance on the USSR is not a viable option. But in the short term, increased xenophobia and self-reliance, coupled with feints toward Moscow, are a real possibility should this group gain the upper hand. It is instructive to think back to Senator Hugh Scott's unpleasant encounter with the Gang of Four after Deng fell in 1976, to imagine what it might be like.

There is little we can do to shape the outcome of the continuing succession struggle in China. The President's prudent course

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~~NOCONTRACT ORCON WNINTEL ATTACHMENT~~

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NOCONTRACT ORCON WNINTEL ATTACHMENT

should be followed, lest we get ourselves deeper into Chinese politics. There is reason for optimism over the very long term; near-term, however, a great many things have to go very well for stability and openness to prevail. Only one or two things need go wrong for the opposite to occur. As we factor China into regional and strategic calculations, it is important to recall that we may not have seen the worst yet in China.

Attachment

(b) (1)

~~SECRET~~ w/SECRET SPECAT NOFORN  
NOCONTRACT WNINTEL ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                | Date   | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| 01b. Cable               | To Distribution List<br>Re: Discussion Topics... (7 pp.) | 8/3/89 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

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**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** China Chronological Files  
**Subseries:** Tiananmen Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** China: Tiananmen (August - October 1989)

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/1/2009        | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91132-001 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

CHRON FILE

RECORD ID: 8906164  
RECEIVED: 07 AUG 89 11

TO: GATES

FROM: PAAL

DOC DATE: 04 AUG 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

FOREIGN TRAVEL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LIFTING TRAVEL ADVISORY IN CHINA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 10 AUG 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JACKSON

PAAL

SITTMANN

WILSON, M

WORKING

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8906164

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 89080711 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By Cap NARA, Date 9/1/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4-Aug-1989 12:13 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Gates

*Agree. D*  
( GATES )

FROM:

Douglas H. Paal  
(PAAL)

SUBJECT:

China - Lifting Travel Advisory

I have learned from State sources (who need to be protected) that Sec Baker will call the President to ask him about lifting the travel advisory for China and permitting the return of dependents to our missions.

This had been pre-cooked for August 5, once Congress adjourns, and the dependents are all set to go aback, tickets in hand. A press leak of the planned action, however, spooked Baker and he is thinking of delaying further.

I recommend lifting the advisory, with due qualifications regarding the risks of travelling at night within Beijing, etc. I also strongly recommend returning the dependents. China now is physically safer than DC, NYC and lots of other places. If we impose advisories for purely political reasons, we damage the integrity of the warnings. Our officers are going squirrely without their families, Jim Lilley included. There may well be more damaging stories if the advisory is extended for purely political reasons than the one that upset Baker.

CC: Diane L. Edwards  
CC: Karl Jackson  
CC: Wilma G. Hall

( EDWARDS )  
( JACKSON )  
( HALL )

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED

CNP 2000.0116.F/1  
3/31/10

# CHRON FILE

5827

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3

August 4, 1989

Dear Zbig:

Thank you for your memorandum on your lunch with Ambassador Han Xu. It is important that the Chinese hear a consistent line from people such as yourself on what needs to be done in U.S.-China relations.

Our hands will be tied if Beijing does not begin taking measures that improve public attitudes in this country toward China. An amnesty would be a constructive step toward stabilizing and rebuilding U.S.-China relations. I have made similar representations and, while I doubt the Chinese will do anything so forthcoming, I hope the basic message is received.

Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Center for Strategic &  
International Studies  
1800 K Street, N.W.  
Suite 400  
Washington, D.C. 20006



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1989

**SIGNED**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

DOUGLAS PAAL 

SUBJECT:

Reply to Zbigniew Brzezinski re China

Zbig Brzezinski sent you a memorandum (Tab II) on a lunch he had with Han Xu in which Brzezinski urged the PRC to proclaim an amnesty for "transgressors" as a first step toward improving U.S.-China ties. He suggested that you reinforce his proposal.

Your draft reply endorses Brzezinski's proposal and says you will mention the need for an amnesty to Han Xu.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the reply to Zbigniew Brzezinski at Tab **I**.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft/Brzezinski Letter

Tab II Brzezinski/Scowcroft Letter dated 7/21/89



5827

staff  
for  
BS  
reply

Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Washington, DC

July 21, 1989

MEMORANDUM

TO: Brent Scowcroft  
FROM: Zbigniew Brzezinski   
RE: Lunch with Ambassador Han Xu

At Ambassador Han Xu's request, I had a one-on-one lunch with him on July 19. The burden of his message was that it is essential to preserve the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and he particularly appealed to me to try to influence Congressman Solarz not to press with the punitive legislation.

Han also spoke very highly of the President's attitude on the question of China and expressed the hope that the President will prevail.

I expressed to him my general sympathy with the President's approach, but I also stressed to him that what happens in China will affect American public and therefore Congressional attitudes. I specifically told him that in my judgment one should discriminate between what happened on Tiananmen Square (regarding which we can disagree but which is an event in the past) and what is continuing to happen in China (notably the continuing repression, trials, and enforced political indoctrination). Han assured me categorically that no students will be executed. I indicated to him that in my judgment that was insufficient. I urged him strongly to recommend to his superiors that they issue a general amnesty for any "transgressors," especially given the fact that the regime does not appear to be politically threatened. I stressed that an amnesty would help to improve the climate of American-Chinese relations.

Although Han Xu seemed skeptical regarding his government's willingness to proclaim an amnesty, I got the distinct impression that the thought registered with him. It might, therefore, be useful to reemphasize that idea with him at some appropriate point -- provided it does not become part of a public campaign, to which the Chinese government is instinctively unwilling to bow.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------|--------|
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**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** China Chronological Files  
**Subseries:** Tiananmen Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** China: Tiananmen (August - October 1989)

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By SCS (NLGB) on 2/21/12

|                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/1/2009        | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91132-001          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>              |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>                |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-2789-MR (502)    |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 3/31/2010   |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



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SECRET ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~


*Paal*

6167

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 7, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL JACKSON *KJ*

FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *Paal*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Han Xu of China --  
August 9, 1989, 4:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

Ambassador Han will make his farewell office call on you. We do not know precisely what his next position will be, but it is likely to be in the "second echelon" dealing with foreign affairs through one of China's people-to-people organizations. This has been the pattern for China's previous Ambassadors.

Ambassador Han's successor will be Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen, whom you know. (b) (1)

(b) (1)

Han's call will be another opportunity to express the Administration's desire to put relations back in order, provided China takes steps to make that politically possible.

Han will be accompanied by Chen Mingming, interpreter and Embassy First Secretary.

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw on the points to be made at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made  
Tab B Biography

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED  
2000-0116-F11

② 3/31/10



POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH  
AMBASSADOR HAN XU OF CHINA

- Your departure from Washington is the end of another chapter in what has been a long and successful association with relations between the United States and China. I know that you have more chapters to write before you finish your work.
- After almost ten years in the United States, you are well-informed about us and our system. I hope you will use your knowledge when you return to help put our relationship back in order and help get us out of the current situation.
- It will be very helpful if you will urge China's leaders to take steps, such as the lifting of martial law and an amnesty for protestors, that will ease the pressure on our relationship.
- Our nations have important parallel interests that need to be promoted. But they cannot be promoted in isolation from our political process.
- We do not wish China any ill. We have no intention to meddle in your internal affairs. We will continue to abide by the three communiques and our other undertakings. I hope China will do the same.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                       | Date    | Restriction    | Class. |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------|----------------|--------|
| 04c. Report              | Re: HAN Xu [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.) | 1/30/89 | (b)(1), (b)(3) | S      |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** China Chronological Files  
**Subseries:** Tiananmen Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** China: Tiananmen (August - October 1989)

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By mm on 8/4/2023

|                               |             |                             |                      |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 5/1/2009    | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91132-001            |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |                      |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |                      |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |                      |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           | 2013-1604-MR(500.03) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      | Released in Part     |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> | 7/15/2016            |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information  
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

#### Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information  
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information  
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]  
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



**HAN Xu**

(Phonetic: hahn)

(7281/0650)

**CHINA****Ambassador to the United States**  
(since May 1985)Han Xu, <sup>3.3(b)(1)</sup>has been an effective spokesman  
for Beijing's interests. <sup>3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)</sup>

He places a high priority on developing economic relations and continues to lobby strenuously for relaxed controls over technology transfer to China, a new bilateral textile agreement, and a reduction in trade barriers. We believe that this may be Han's last year in Washington; the typical tour for the Ambassador to the United States has been three years.

(b)(3)

The son of a noted attorney, Han was born on 26 May 1924. During the Sino-Japanese war, he operated a ham radio for the Chinese forces and changed his name to protect his family. He has studied economics and political science at Yenching University. <sup>3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)</sup>

During World War II, he served as an interpreter for US pilots rescued by the Chinese from behind enemy lines. He joined the Foreign Affairs Department of the Beijing city government in the early 1940s. Han was assigned to the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry in 1949, and later that year he delivered China's request for recognition to the US Embassy. He served as a political counselor in Moscow during 1964-65. Recalled to China in 1966, he made no public appearances during the subsequent Cultural Revolution. By 1971 he was director of protocol; in that capacity he played a major role in the visit of President Richard Nixon in February 1972. Han then served as Deputy Chief of the Liaison Office (now the Embassy) in Washington from 1973 until 1979. As director of the American and Oceanian Affairs Department, during 1979-82, he had a central role in negotiations between Beijing and Washington over a variety of issues. In September 1982 he was elected an alternate member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. He was appointed Vice Foreign Minister in 1982. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

Han has traveled throughout Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. He speaks excellent colloquial English. Han enjoys calisthenics and swimming. He is married to Ge Qiyun, a Foreign Ministry official who specializes in disarmament. She speaks English and French. The couple has a daughter and two sons. <sup>6.2(d)</sup>

6.2(d)

LDA M 89-10531  
30 January 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET~~

6957

**DOWNGRADED FROM  
TOP SECRET TO SECRET**

② 4/28/11

September 5, 1989

**CHRON FILE**

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

G. PHILIP HUGHES *Philip*

SUBJECT:

Breakfast Meeting with Secretaries Cheney and Baker,  
Wednesday, September 6, 7:15 a.m.

The following items have been submitted for your breakfast meeting  
tomorrow with Secretaries Cheney and Baker:

|                                                                     |           |       |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Strategy on Defense Authori-<br>zation Bills/Relocation of<br>401st | State/DOD | Tab A |
| Japan Responsibility Sharing                                        | State     | Tab B |
| China FMS                                                           | State     | Tab C |
| Panama                                                              | State     | Tab D |
| Afghanistan                                                         | State     | Tab E |
| Aid for Bulgaria Turks                                              | State     | Tab F |

Attachments  
As stated

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2789-MR  
10/6/2014 MM



~~SECRET~~

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Non-Log

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 5, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL *AK RB*  
FROM: DON MAHLEY *DM*  
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item - Relocation of 401st Tactical  
Fighter Wing

Defense has placed this item on the agenda, to allow Secretary Cheney to brief you and Secretary Baker on the status of Congressional action on funding for the 401st transfer to Italy. Time is short, since the HASC and SASC have completed their work and will go to conference either next week or the following Monday, and the SAC will mark the appropriations bill next week.

Secretary Cheney believes the move is in trouble - he is probably right - and wants to generate high-level interventions to correct the situation. He will likely propose a series of phone calls by you, by Secretary Baker, and by himself. We do not believe he will propose using the President yet, but Presidential intervention is not far off.

The issue is still the same: Congress is balking at allocating US funds for what they perceive as a NATO project. However, the US historically has always demanded higher standards, especially for housing and support facilities, than NATO standards. NATO infrastructure will only pay for NATO standards - we have to provide the supplemental funds. The SASC provided enough funds, but the HASC authorized a much lower total (250 million overall) and the appropriations committees are both below what Defense believes is the minimum needed. If funds are not restored, the wing will likely be unable to move.

State wants to combine the 401st appeal with an appeal against a separate amendment (sponsored primarily by Schroeder) that would block all O&M funds for NATO installations where US use of the facility is restricted. We believe we should not combine the two and diffuse our efforts on the 401st.

Concurrences: Virginia Lampley, Eugene Ebner, and Phil Zelikow. *BL 8 PZ*

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1032-MR  
MM 8/18/2015

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

September 5, 1989

INFORMATION

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1032-MR  
MM 11/16/2015

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item on Japanese Responsibility Sharing

Background

Japan provides us with the most generous host nation support program in the world, \$2 billion in direct costs plus \$.8 billion for indirect costs. For instance, by 1991 Japan will pay all non-salaried costs and more than 50 percent of total labor costs of Japanese workers at American bases. In addition Japan pays most of our construction costs.

President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu discussed burden sharing as an example of a sensitive topic that should be discussed but kept out of the news headlines because news coverage hurts the prospects for increased responsibility sharing. Japanese leaders are torn two ways here: they use U.S. pressure to increase defense and burden sharing outlays but they do not want to depict Kaifu as an "Am-boy" during the crucial run up to the elections.

CINCPAC has submitted the following priorities to be phased in over 5 years raising annual expenditures in these categories from \$1 billion to \$2.7 billion. If Kaifu and the LDP survive the elections, these are areas which we should stress.

- Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) increases, \$150 m per year;
- salaries, as opposed to benefits, of Japanese workers on American bases, increase of \$500 m per year;
- telecommunication improvements, \$40m;
- utilities expenditures for U.S. Forces Japan, \$200 million per year;
- maintenance of US bases, \$220 million per year;
- U.S. costs in exercises with Japan, \$20 m per year;
- O & M costs (10% of present U.S. total= \$150 m per year);
- war reserve materials, \$50 m per year;
- currency fluctuation account, \$125m per year, and transportation costs, \$29 million per year.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 5, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL JACKSON *KJ*  
FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*  
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item - China/Peace Pearl - Next Steps

There are basically two issues related to the Peace Pearl project with China on the breakfast agenda: What to do if China does not pay the required \$50 million by September 15, and what should be the approach toward briefing Congress?

State believes there is a good chance the Chinese will balk at paying the full \$50 million due before September 15. Beijing may believe the Administration's forthcoming attitude up to now leaves China still more latitude on payment for the F-8 avionics upgrade. This is not the case; if the full payment is not paid, Air Force will shut the project down because it cannot assume the legal obligation to pay out of its own funds. State and Defense will seek reassurance that the Administration will stand firm on the requirement for payment.

On the questions of whether and how to brief the Congress on Peace Pearl, there are differences within State, and perhaps within Defense. Bob Kimmitt is said to believe no briefing is necessary, because pointing out the issue would be like waving a red flag before the leadership, inviting questions as to why they were not briefed before China signed the agreed minute last week. Others in State think SFRC, HFAC, and key leaders must be briefed before stories about a "shift" in Administration policy break in the media, as they will.

My recommendation is to conduct limited briefings of Congressional leaders once we are sure China will pay or has paid the \$50 million. After that, we should outline the issue to the COCOM partners on a bilateral basis so as to dampen their suspicions.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1032-MR  
7/11/2014 MM



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REVISED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS

FROM: WILLIAM T. PRYCE

SUBJECT: Panama Item For September 6 Scowcroft/Baker/Cheney  
Breakfast - Selecting a Panamanian Canal  
Administrator

Background

In the paper considered at the August 30 NSC Deputies Meeting on Panama, the Panama PCC recommended approval of agreement in principle that if Noriega is still in power at the end of the year, Fernando Manfredo, the current Deputy Administrator of the Panama Canal, be appointed Acting Administrator on January 1, 1990.

The Chairman, with the agreement of the Committee, decided that the NSD to be prepared that day should not include any treaty issues, but that the question of Manfredo's ascendancy should be treated at a Scowcroft/Baker/Cheney breakfast. It was agreed that it would be best to hold off announcing a decision on Manfredo for as long as possible, to keep Noriega off guard. It was also decided to recommend that if, as expected, the breakfast principals agreed to the naming of Manfredo, they would authorize that he be informed in confidence of the decision. He would understand that there is no long term commitment and that we would accept the nominee of a future Panamanian Government which we recognized. (With luck such a government might nominate Manfredo who was chosen as deputy administrator by Torrijos and has done an outstanding job.) Secretary Baker plans to raise the issue.

We learned late this afternoon that Secretary Cheney may raise DOD's plans to nominate a Senior U.S. Career Canal Commission employee as the acting Deputy Administrator at the time Manfredo is nominated acting Administrator. We see no problem with this. There is not yet agreement on whether the permanent U.S. Deputy Administrator should be a career employee or someone appointed from outside. We tend to favor the selection of a career person.

Cheney may also raise Defense's desire to fire the two remaining Panamanian members of the Canal Commission board, Carlos Ozores who is now Noriega's Vice President, and Oyden Ortega who has some sort of policy position in the Panamanian government. All

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1032-MR  
MM 11/16/2015

the member of the Panama PCC agreed that this is a good idea. We recommend that you agree in principle if the subject comes up. We have told Defense that we need to see the specific language of the implementing letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve in principle the appointment of Manfredo as Acting Administrator and authorize Panama Canal Commission Chairman Pace to inform him of our intentions.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you approve in principle firing Ozores and Ortega from the Panama Canal Commission Board of Directors.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Non-log item

September 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/DAVID C. MINER  
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON/NANCY BEARD DYKE  
SUBJECT: September 6 Breakfast Item: Aid for Bulgarian  
Turks

State has placed this item on the agenda to convey the urgent need for a Presidential decision authorizing State officials to consult with the Congress on reprogramming \$10 million in statutory earmarked funds from Somalia to Turkey.

State is concerned that we may not be able to reprogram the funds because of the September 30 end of the fiscal year. The game plan involves the following: Presidential approval of State consultations with the Congress, a formal notification by the President, a fifteen day notification period during which the Congress can formally register its opinion, and consultations with the Turks on allocating the funds.

Background:

Bob Gates signed off on a package we prepared for the President on August 30 asking approval for State consultations with the Congress. The Executive Clerk asked that we redraft the package to ask the President to approve the consultations and to sign the determination which can be dated and released once State informs us that these consultations were successful. By asking the President to dispose of both issues at the same time we will gain some breathing space for the reprogramming process.

We will be forwarding this revised package to your office tomorrow.

*CR*  
Condi Rice concurs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1032-MR  
9/19/2014 MJ



CHRON FILE

6932

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

September 5, 1989



MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES *Philip*  
SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Congressional Leaders

Attached are talking points, approved by Brent Scowcroft, on aid to Poland for the President's meeting with Congressional leaders scheduled for today.

Attachment  
Talking Points

POINTS TO BE MADE TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON AID TO POLAND

- The political reform process in Poland has continued very much on the track that I had hoped when I made my speech at Hamtramck last April; I believe that the clear US support for economic and political reform has helped strengthen the reformers' hands.
- I don't want to claim too much, but I feel that my meeting in Poland had more than a little to do with the way the compromise has been working out. I believe my trip was a major confidence and cooperation building exercise for all parties.
- The reform process has accelerated over the two months since my visit, yet the Hamtramck strategy of increasing US support step by step as the Poles themselves move ahead is the right one.
- Poland's relationship with Moscow is a sensitive matter; we don't want to disturb the delicate balance that Mazowiecki is working to achieve with the Soviet Union.
- The US will increase its economic support to Poland as the Mazowiecki government sets out its reform program, but it is important that we do this in a way that does not decrease the incentive for the Poles to undertake all the necessary economic changes that they alone can make.
- As you know, the US has its own severe budget constraints, but within these we will find the necessary resources. I hope we can work cooperatively together for maximum effectiveness to achieve the ends we all seek. We will also be working with the Europeans and Japan to be sure that these are multiplied and used for maximum impact.
- Our approach is deliberately multilateral; we must stay in step with our major allies -- the US is not Poland's major creditor. The Concerted Action effort which we launched at the Paris Economic Summit and which is chaired by the EC Commission is off to a good start. This 24-nation group has had one meeting already and two more are planned very soon. (FYI: a September 6 meeting for food donors and a September 26 plenary meeting.)
- It is important that the Congress move forward promptly on the \$119 million package for Poland (and a proportionate package for Hungary) which I am forwarding to Congress this week.

*I hope we can work cooperatively together for maximum effectiveness to achieve the ends we all seek.*

POINTS TO BE MADE TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON AID TO POLAND

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- *I don't want to claim too much, but I feel* The reform process has ~~in fact~~ accelerated over the two months since ~~I visited~~ *my visit* Poland, yet the Hamtramck strategy of increasing US support step by step as the Poles themselves move ahead is the right one.
- Poland's relationship with Moscow is a sensitive matter; we don't want to disturb the delicate balance that Mazowiecki is working to achieve with the Soviet Union.
- The US will increase its economic support to Poland as the Mazowiecki government sets out its reform program, but it is important that we do this in a way that does not decrease the incentive for the Poles to undertake all the necessary economic changes that they alone can make.
- As you know, the US has its own severe budget constraints, but within these we will find the necessary resources, ~~and we~~ *also be* will work <sup>very</sup> with the Europeans and Japan to be sure that these are multiplied and used for maximum impact.
- Our approach is deliberately multilateral; we must stay in step with our major allies -- the US is not Poland's major creditor. The Concerted Action effort which we launched at the Paris Economic Summit and which is chaired by the EC Commission is off to a good start. This 24-nation group has had one meeting already and two more are planned very soon. (FYI: a September 6 meeting for food donors and a September 26 plenary meeting.)
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*that my meetings in Poland had more than a little to do with the way the compromise has been working out. I believe my trip was a major confidence and cooperation building exercise for all parties.*



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1488  
**CHRON FILE**

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1032-MR

MM 1/6/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

The President has seen

JK  
9/18/89

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *Bgf*  
SUBJECT: China: Implications of the Peace Pearl Agreement

Over the weekend, Beijing not only agreed to our terms for keeping the Peace Pearl project (upgrade of China's F-8 avionics) alive, but wired on time all but a trifling \$7,000 of the \$55.9 million we required.

Surrounding this event were developments that give us a good look at the bitter debate in China over the relationship with the U.S. In the weeks leading up to the Chinese decision on Peace Pearl, there was an increasing stress in China's media -- albeit never authoritative -- on self-reliance and the dangers of involvement with the United States. Late in our talks, as a probable sign of opposition to Peace Pearl, the Li Peng camp ballyhooed American-trained rocket scientist Qian Xuesen, who is a living symbol of self-reliance in defense and the sciences. (Qian hates the U.S., where as a professor at the California Institute of Technology he received rough treatment from the F.B.I. in the early 1950s.)

Now that Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun have Peace Pearl in hand as proof of U.S. intentions, those who favor a long term relationship with the U.S. are pressing their case publicly. On Saturday, Xinhua published an article on continuing defense cooperation with the U.S. despite the sanctions. Then, in a highly symbolic gesture, Deng ended his long absence from public view at a banquet for Professor T.D. Lee, Nobel prize physicist from Columbia University and a living emblem of the benefits of cooperation in the sciences with the United States.

The battle lines in a major Chinese policy debate are seldom more clearly drawn. Deng and Yang appear to continue to have the upper hand in foreign and defense policy, but they still face a strong challenge from the hardliners nominally led by Li Peng.

An officer at the Chinese Embassy last week said the hardliners are making headway by arguing that the U.S. is out to subvert socialism, and that the U.S. is a greater threat to China than the U.S.S.R. It would be helpful if you could find an opportunity before long to repeat our long term goals of a strong, secure and modernizing China and avoid specific references to China when commenting on how democracy is gaining on socialism.

cc. Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

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7288

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 17, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

KARL JACKSON *KJS*

FROM:

DOUGLAS H. PAAL *DP*

SUBJECT:

Brief Update for the President on Implications of  
the Peace Pearl Agreement

At Tab I is the brief memorandum you asked me to prepare for the President for early Monday morning, September 18, 1989. It repeats the account I gave you on Saturday of events in China and suggests that the President find an opportunity to say something positive about U.S. intentions toward China over the long run.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Scowcroft memo to President

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED  
CAF 2000-0116-F/1  
3/31/10

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907400  
RECEIVED: 19 SEP 89 18

**CHRON FILE**

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 21 SEP 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

PERSONS: LEE, T D

DENG XIAOPING

SUBJECT: CHINA / US / MORE ON DENG XIAOPING MTG W/ PROFESSOR LEE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 22 SEP 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
JACKSON  
PAAL

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
APNSA Has Seen 10

September 21, 1989

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Fang Li Jini  
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SEP 21 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *Rg for*

SUBJECT: China - United States: More on Deng Xiaoping's  
Meeting with Professor T.D. Lee

You asked for more information on Deng's very significant meeting with Professor Lee on September 16, 1989. At Tab A I have attached official Chinese accounts of the meeting as published and broadcast, in translations from FBIS.

Jim Lilley has not received any additional unpublicized information to report on the meeting. Professor Lee has not sought in the past to have a close relationship with our mission. We are attempting to establish contact and obtain any further insights we can.

Since the Deng - Lee meeting, a Japanese parliamentary delegation headed by former Foreign Minister Ito Masayoshi has met with Deng, Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Wu Xueqian. Deng did not single out the U.S. or any other Western country for criticism as he complained about the Paris economic summit's resolution on China and noted that Japan had voiced reservations concerning the resolution. Deng praised Nixon, Kissinger, and former Prime Ministers Tanaka and Ohira, and said the U.S. may seek to expand trade relations with China.

In a contrasting performance, Premier Li Peng sounded hardliner themes as he sharply criticized the United States. Li said the U.S. took the lead in urging sanctions on China. Washington, Li said, has had one single objective since the time of Secretary Dulles: to turn China from a socialist into a capitalist country. Li flattered the Japanese and urged an end to the economic blockade of China. But in one concession to Deng's dominance, Li admitted that despite U.S. sanctions Washington had recently sent a "signal of friendship."

Deng's symbolic meeting with Professor Lee has drawn a line between himself and other hardliners less friendly to the U.S. In a sense this makes it easier for the West to rehabilitate Deng's reputation in contrast with that of Li Peng and his associates. But the hardliners have not given up the fight. Their views, exemplified in the article at Tab B, have resonance in China, and we need to avoid playing into their hands.

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DECL: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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Attachments:

Tab A      FBIS report Deng/Lee meeting  
Tab B      FBIS report Zhao article

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DECL: OADR

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**Spokesman Condemns Murder of SWAPO Leader***OW1509133889 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1225 GMT 15 Sep 89*

[Text] Beijing, September 15 (XINHUA)—China today condemns the murder of Anton Lubowski, member of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), in Windhoek Tuesday.

In response to a correspondent's question a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "We denounce the base terrorist act of assassinating the SWAPO leader. We strongly demand that the parties concerned make a thorough investigation of the case and punish the assassin severely so as to ensure that the Namibian people participate in a free and fair general election in a peaceful and safe atmosphere."

**United States & Canada****Deng, Jiang Zemin Meet With Visiting Professor****Deng Reaffirms Policies***HK1809074089 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese  
17 Sep 89 p 1*

["Deng Xiaoping Meets With Professor T.D. Lee" by reporter Yu Jiafu (5713 1367 1788)—RENMIN RIBAO headline]

[Text] Beijing, 16 Sep (XINHUA)—While meeting with T.D. Lee, professor at Columbia University in the United States, and his wife at the Great Hall of the People this morning, Chairman Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed that China's various policies worked out during the 10 years of reform and opening up would remain unchanged, and that China will do better in its four modernizations program and the policy of reform and opening up.

He added: The recent turmoil gave us a major lesson. For many years some of our comrades were engrossed in specific matters and failed to show concern for ideological and political trends. They failed to guard sufficiently against serious corrupt phenomena or failed to take forceful measures to correct them. The current turmoil has sobered them up.

Deng Xiaoping continued: It will not work if China fails to pursue or uphold socialism. Without the leadership of the Communist Party, there would be no socialism or present-day China.

He stressed: The current situation in China is stable. After the turmoil, the new leading body will persist in the policy of reform and opening up of the previous 10 years, and maintain the situation of stability and unity. It will uphold one center and two basic points. Of course, there might be setbacks or defects. However, we believe that those who persist in this guiding principle and policy will ultimately win.

Deng Xiaoping said: One point is certain: China has to be developed, and its productivity has to be developed, with an appropriate speed. To conclude, after the turmoil, we must be skillful in summing up experience, in opposing the phenomenon of corruption, and in running a clean government. By doing this, China's advancing steps will be more stable, sturdy, and fast.

When the meeting started, T.D. Lee said: I am very happy to see that your health is this good. Deng Xiaoping pointed to the suntanned skin on his hand and said: I go swimming in the sea. He said: I do not like indoor swimming pools, I like natural swimming.

After talking for 70 minutes, Deng Xiaoping gave a luncheon in honor of T.D. Lee and his wife, Chin Hui-chun.

Zhou Guangzhao, head of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, took part in the meeting and luncheon.

**Beijing TV Report***OW1609121289 Beijing Television Service in Mandarin  
1000 GMT 16 Sep 89*

[By reporters Zhou Jianguo [0719 1696 0948], Yan Pingzhou [7051 1627 5297], Li Dongsheng [2621 2639 0581]; from the "National News Hookup" program]

[Text] [Announcer] At a meeting with Mr T.D. Lee, professor of Columbia University of the United States, and his wife at the Great Hall of the People this morning, Chairman Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed that the policies we have worked out during the past 10 years of reform and opening to the outside world will not change.

[Video shows a closeup shot of Deng Xiaoping walking toward Columbia University Professor T. D. Lee. They are shown holding and shaking each other's hands. Deng is smiling. He then raises his left hand—shaking slightly—over Lee's right hand, his right hand still holding Lee's right hand. Video then shows Deng turning to shake hands with Mrs Lee. Video then cuts to shows Deng and Lee, walking side by side toward their seats in a room while holding hands; Lee is on Deng's right. As they walk, the following conversation is heard]

[Lee] You are very healthy. When you are in good health, everyone is very happy.

[Deng] Oh.

[Video shows Deng's female aid stepping forward from the left rear of Deng]

[Deng's female aid] When you are in good health, everyone is very happy.

[Video then cuts to closeup of Deng seated]

[Deng's female aid] He swims more than an hour each day.



[Deng] One hour. Under the water. [zai shui xia] I do not like indoor swimming pools. They are too small for me to move around.

[Lee] You seem to prefer nature.

[Deng] Yes. I like nature. It is freer, and you can [word indistinct]. [laughs]

[Video then alternates between closeup shots of Deng and Lee, who is seated to the left of Deng, during the remainder of the report: Zhou Guangzhao is seen seated at the left of Lee]

[Announcer] Deng Xiaoping said: After this turmoil, China will do better in accomplishing the four modernizations and opening to the outside world. He said that the recent turmoil has taught us a big lesson. For many years, some of our comrades were engrossed in specific matters and paid little attention to ideological and political trends. They failed to guard sufficiently against serious corruption and their remedial measures were ineffective. The turmoil has sobered them up.

Deng Xiaoping said: China must pursue and uphold socialism. Without the leadership of the Communist Party, there would be no socialism nor modern China.

Deng Xiaoping said: The current situation in China is stable. After the turmoil the new leadership will continue to uphold the reform and open policy of the past 10 years to maintain stability and unity. It will continue to uphold the principle of one center and two basic points. This does not mean there will not be twists and turns, or defects. We believe, however, that victory will eventually belong to those who uphold this principle and policy.

Deng Xiaoping said: But one thing is certain; that is, China must continue to develop, its productivity must develop, and the pace must be appropriate. In short, after the turmoil, we must be good at summing up experiences and combating corruption so as to bring about a clean government. By doing this, the pace of progress in China will be steadier, firmer, and faster.

Zhou Guangzhao, president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was present at the meeting.

[Video ends with a long shot of Deng and Lee seated, facing each other, as well as Zhou Guangzhao, Mrs Lee, and others seated]

### Jiang Discusses Education

HK1609085889 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE  
in Chinese 0815 GMT 16 Sep 89

[Report by Reporter Li Wei (2621 0251): "Jiang Zemin Meets With T.D. Lee and His Wife"—ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE Headline]

[Text] Beijing, 16 Sep (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, met with T.D. Lee, an American of Chinese origin and professor at Columbia University, and his

wife Chin Hui-jun in Zhongnanhai yesterday afternoon, and had a cordial and friendly conversation with them. While talking about the problem of education for youths, Jiang Zemin said: Youths are the future and hope of our country. Regarding those young students who took part in the demonstrations, sit-ins, or hunger strike in general, we have always taken an enthusiastic attitude toward them, and set high demands on them to help them sum up experience and lessons, enhance their understanding, and distinguish between right and wrong. We also hope that they will study hard in order to turn themselves into qualified personnel for the socialist modernization.

Jiang Zemin explained again: Apart from repeatedly mourning the death of the commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army [PLA], officers and men of the Armed Police Force, and cadres and policemen of the public security force who sacrificed their lives in the course of quelling the rebellion, we also show concern for the masses who died because of accidental injury. In the meantime, we have instructed the relevant units to deal conscientiously with the aftermath after the accident.

Zhou Guangzhao, president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was present at the meeting.

T.D. Lee and his wife came to China at the invitation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and arrived in Beijing on 11 September. It has been learned that his purpose in making the current visit is to guide the work of the Chinese High Scientific and Technological Center.

### Article Analyzes 'Peaceful Evolution' Policy

OW1609161789 Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO  
in Chinese 4 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by Zhao Guoliang (6392 0948 5328): "An Analysis of 'Peaceful Evolution' Approach of the U.S. Monopoly Capitalist Class"]

[Text] In order to "win over" a socialist country led by the communist party to the "big family of democracy" based on the U.S. style, leading political figures of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class believe that they should "manipulate all kinds of means" to stimulate "some changes" in the socialist countries so as to enable them to "accept once again the pluralistic world" through gradual "peaceful evolution." Their so-called "all kinds of means" for stimulating a gradual "peaceful evolution" in the socialist countries can be generalized under the following four methods:

First, it is by nurturing and spreading the "seeds of freedom." Leading political figures of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class believe that to destroy the impenetrable fortress of socialism, they should first "spread the seeds of democracy" and train some so-called fighters for democracy. Then, they can use these "seeds" and "fighters" to recruit and expand the forces of "democratic liberation." Even if it is rather difficult to "expand" such forces, they should train, at all costs, "democratic





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forces" which "emerge in any crack in the iron curtain." These "seeds of freedom" and "democratic forces" will be able to play an important role for the U.S. Government's strategy of "peaceful evolution" on various occasions. However, the U.S. monopoly capitalists' wishful thinking has met with repeated setbacks in practice. During the recent counterrevolutionary rebellion in Beijing, China, their so-called "seeds of freedom," such as Fang Lizhi and Yan Jiaqi, fully revealed their true countenance. Unable to get away with the powerful legal networks of the people's democratic dictatorship, they encountered a sad ending similar to "the rat running across the street where everyone cries, 'kill it'." Since then, the people have renewed their vigilance against "peaceful evolution."

**Second,** it is by infiltrating bourgeois ideas through political, economic, and cultural exchanges. Leading political figures of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class believe that in order to conquer the soul and mind of the people and effect "peaceful evolution" in the socialist countries, instead of using force, it is more effective to infiltrate the bourgeois ideas and way of life through trade, tourism, diplomatic personnel, books, academic and cultural exchanges, as well as through such channels as holding international conferences. This is why former U.S. President Nixon once remarked: "They (referring to the socialist countries) need our technology and want to do business with us. They have no way of blocking our radio broadcasts. They cannot completely isolate themselves from the world. When they open the door to get what they need, we should try to deliver as much 'truth' as possible to them." Nixon's remark has thoroughly exposed the true intention of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class. They want to inject, through various channels, their decadent ideas into the organism of socialist countries so as to gradually effect the "peaceful evolution" and make the socialist countries their vassal states or colonies.

**Third,** it is to stir up "resistance sentiments" inside the socialist countries through media propaganda. Leading political figures of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class deem it feasible to subvert the socialist system through media propaganda in order to confuse people's minds and weaken their ideological conviction in communism. To this end, Nixon's book "Genuine Peace" clamored that the socialist countries "have no way of blocking our satellite television broadcasts," and that "we should try our utmost to push as much 'truth' as possible" through the door of socialist countries. His so-called "truth" actually refers to the hodgepodge of decadent bourgeois ideas and the political and economic system guided by such ideas. On this basis, the U.S. Government has appropriated the huge sum of \$1 billion since 1983 to cover expenditures "for beefing up such radio broadcasts" and media propaganda. The current U.S. President Bush pointed this out even more explicitly during the annual meeting of the Association of U.S. Newspaper Editors on 15 April 1988, saying that "we should provide ideological support to the democratic forces" inside the

socialist countries." Acting on the instruction of their master, the U.S. mass media have grasped every opportunity to vigorously spread their "truth" to the socialist countries. When political turmoil and the counterrevolutionary rebellion took place in Beijing last year they thought that the time had come for "effecting" a U.S. style "democratic country." Hence, beginning 17 April, the "Voice of America [VOA]" used more than 10 hours daily to report events in Beijing on three different programs. They fabricated all kinds of rumors and lies to confuse listeners. Such an ignominious performance by the "VOA" did deceive some ordinary people. However, they cannot wrap fire in paper. Rumors are, after all, lies, and rumormongering cannot last. After the counterrevolutionary rebellion was quelled, public order in Beijing soon returned to normal, and friendly exchanges with foreign countries have been carried on as usual ever since. This reality is the most powerful rebuttal to the "VOA's" ignominious act. Meanwhile, we should soberly realize that the U.S. monopoly capitalist class and its propaganda apparatus will not change its "strategic" ideology. Therefore, we must maintain our vigilance and be ready to retaliate at anytime.

**Fourth,** it is through the method of providing material support to those so-called "democratic forces" in socialist countries. Leading political figures of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class believe that "verbal support" through mass media alone is not enough to topple the socialist system. It is also necessary to provide economic aid to those "democratic forces" and "independent political organizations." As early as in October 1983, the U.S. State Department held a meeting on the "democratization in the communist countries," during which a "government plan on federal and private aid" was formulated at the suggestion of some U.S. officials. In the spring of 1989, the U.S. "FOREIGN AFFAIRS" quarterly published a lengthy article, which, based on the political climate in China, suggested that the U.S. Government grasp this "historic opportunity" to "exploit Western economic powers in order to achieve political results," while the "VOA" threatened to "provide material assistance" to opposition parties inside the socialist countries. The U.S. Government accepted the suggestion. Hence, the British "GUARDIAN" noted: "The objective of Western assistance is to stimulate and encourage the process of political pluralism and free market economy," and to bring "sanctions and 'penalties' against those countries adhering to the socialist road. This is the current 'Bush Doctrine' of the United States.

In short, the U.S. monopoly capitalist class wants to exploit all kinds of means to grasp every opportunity to subvert the socialist system at any cost. These means can be summarized, in Nixon's words, as two "ingenious" cards, that is, economic and ideological cards. Through these two cards, the U.S. monopoly capitalist class wants to inject the U.S. political, economic, and cultural systems into the socialist countries so as to make them become members of the Western capitalist family.



through gradual "peaceful evolution." However, the U.S. Monopoly capitalists are wrong in their wishful thinking. The course of history can only lead to the inevitable destruction of capitalism and victory for socialism!

## Soviet Union

### Further on Lukyanov Delegation Visit

#### Demilitarized Border Zone Talks

HK1609003089 Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA  
MORNING POST in English 16 Sep 89 p 1

[By David Chen]

[excerpts] China and the Soviet Union are negotiating about the setting up of a demilitarised zone [DMZ] along the entire length of their common borders.

If the talks are successful, the pull-back of troops could start within six months "or possibly earlier", said sources yesterday.

The sources added that Chinese would be first to withdraw their troops and tanks.

The concept of a DMZ was raised in February during a visit to Beijing by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Eduard Shevardnadze, and was "finalised" in May when President Mikhail Gorbachev visited the Chinese capital.

A senior Soviet military official is in Beijing to start the first round of discussions, Chinese military sources confirmed yesterday.

The officer is among a six-member delegation led by the First Vice-President of the Soviet Presidium, Mr Anatoliy Lukyanov, on an official visit to China, the first since the Tiananmen Square massacre.

Analysts say the establishment of the zone would not necessarily change the military balance in the border region—with today's modern military technology, a dozen kilometres from any border line would hardly figure in the overall military consideration.

However, the political implications would be colossal from a global strategic point of view.

Such a zone, which could not have been dreamt of a decade ago, would point to such an improvement in bilateral relations that it could prompt other countries to re-examine their alliances and strategies.

One source described the talks as almost the last step in resuming full relationships between the two communist countries, which officially patched up their ties only on May 16, when China's senior leader, Mr Deng Xiaoping, declared the resumption of party-to-party contact in the first few minutes of his meeting with Mr Gorbachev.

Sources say that during the negotiations the Soviet Union will also take on the role of acting as proxy for a third country.

While not naming the country, they said if the negotiations were making headway, the People's Liberation Army might take the initiative of pulling back troops "along the whole north and western border".

This could mean that troops may also be pulled back from the Tibetan border with Nepal and India.

Analysts noted that a few days ago, before Mr Lukyanov arrived in Beijing, the Prime Minister, Mr Li Peng, told a Nepalese delegation that an improvement of Sino-Indian relations would not jeopardise Sino-Nepalese relations.

And they believe that a gesture in the military area would underline China's desire for friendly ties with India, whose Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, visited Beijing at the end of last year.

The Indians are, however, sceptical. While aware of the current negotiations in Beijing, they are not convinced of the Chinese gesture.

### Meets Ye Gongqi in Shanghai

OW1709170689 Shanghai City Service in Mandarin  
2300 GMT 16 Sep 89

[Text] According to a report by our station, the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation, led by its First Vice President Lukyanov, arrived in Shanghai via a special plane on the night of 16 September to continue their tour of China following a visit to Beijing, Wuhan, and other localities. Ye Gongqi, chairman of the municipal people's congress standing committee, and others greeted the delegation at the airport.

### Feted by Ye Gongqi

OW1809103489 Shanghai City Service in Mandarin  
2300 GMT 17 Sep 89

[Report by station correspondent (Yao Shougong) in the "Morning News" program]

[Text] The Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress hosted a banquet in the Hongqiao Guesthouse to warmly welcome the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by Comrade Lukyanov, that body's first deputy chairman, in the evening of 17 September.

This delegation, which is currently on a visit to China, is one of the highest level delegations sent by the USSR Supreme Soviet to China since parliamentary contacts between China and the Soviet Union were resumed in 1985.

Ye Gongqi was the first to propose a toast in the course of the banquet, which was held in a very friendly atmosphere. On behalf of the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress and all of the

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7400

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*

SUBJECT:

More Information on Deng's Meeting with T.D. Lee

At Tab I is additional information requested by the President on Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's meeting with Columbia University Professor T.D. Lee on September 16, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments:

Tab I Scowcroft memo for the President  
Tab A FBIS report Deng/Lee meeting  
Tab B FBIS report Zhao article

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DECL: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2009-1032-MR  
7/11/2014 MM

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907018  
RECEIVED: 07 SEP 89 13

TO: HUGHES

CHRON FILE

FROM: BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 21 SEP 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
MEMCON

AP

PERSONS: MAJOR, JOHN

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ MAJOR ON 11 SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES

DUE DATE: 11 SEP 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF: 8905955 8907037

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By Cep NARA, Date 5/1/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSGAD

CLOSED BY: NSAMM

DOC 3 OF 3

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7018 add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 21, 1989

CHRON FILE  
NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with John Major, UK  
Foreign Secretary

A memorandum of conversation for the subject meeting, on September 11, is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By CAP NARA, Date 7/1/02

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7018 add-on

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1032-MR  
7/11/2014 MM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with John Major of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

The President  
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State  
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President  
and Press Secretary  
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President  
and Deputy for National Security Affairs  
Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Director,  
European and Soviet Affairs, NSC Staff  
(Notetaker)  
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State

United Kingdom

John Major, Foreign Secretary  
Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to the U.S.  
Sir Patrick Wright, Permanent Undersecretary  
Stephen Wall, Private Secretary  
Andrew Burns, Press Secretary

DATE, TIME September 11, 1989, 10:00 a.m. - 10:35 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President welcomed the Foreign Secretary and hoped that he would have a good discussion later in the day with Secretary Baker. The President felt the U.S. and the U.K. were together on most issues. He had talked to Prime Minister Thatcher and they were in agreement on Poland, the anti-drug effort, and what the G-7 might do regarding Columbia. The only difficulty was in the Alliance's failure to meet its September 7 deadline for tabling the remainder of its new proposal in the CFE negotiations. That had caused the President some grief. The Allies need to move this matter forward. NATO must keep momentum and not signal a loss of interest. (S)

The Foreign Secretary thought the obstacles within the Alliance on CFE could be overcome and that he and Secretary Baker could make progress later in the day. He hoped there would be no undue

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delay. The Foreign Secretary felt the President understood London's concerns about non-circumvention; the new U.S. language was very helpful. (S)

The Foreign Secretary added that, as the President knew, the Prime Minister hoped to come to the United States as soon after the opening of Parliament on November 14 as could be arranged. (S)

The President said he hoped for an informal session with the Prime Minister on a wide array of issues. (S)

The Prime Minister would like that, the Foreign Secretary replied. She has Gorbachev on her mind, he said, in quite a big way. On drugs, the President's initiative is going down very well in the United Kingdom. The U.K. had its own team in Bogota last week and London wanted to help. The British government would also be pushing its European partners for more involvement. (S)

The President asked if the British sensed that Barco was going to last the course. (S)

The Foreign Secretary said yes. Barco has made clear his determination to stand up to a bunch of hoodlums. (S)

On Poland, the Foreign Secretary said the U.S. and the U.K. shared the same objectives. The Poles need a proper IMF agreement. The West should not smother them with so much help that they do not take the necessary steps. The British government was also wondering what Gorbachev's real goals are in Eastern Europe. The Foreign Secretary said he did not know. (S)

The President said that Prime Thatcher would have a chance to look into this question when she was in Moscow on September 23rd. Congress had discovered Poland and pressure was building on the Hill. The U.S. might be able to do more on food aid, but the West should be sure it was not throwing money at the problem without the needed structural reforms in Poland. (S)

Secretary Baker asked if the British government was on board for Paris Club rescheduling before an IMF agreement. (S)

The Foreign Secretary said his Treasury Department would prefer an IMF agreement first. (S)

The President asked if Boris Yeltsin would be visiting the U.K. (S)

Not yet, the Foreign Secretary said. Continuing, he noted that there were a couple of problems of special concern to the Prime Minister. First among these was Hong Kong and the Vietnamese boat people. This issue had taken an immense amount of the Foreign Secretary's time. On Hong Kong, London knew where it wanted to go,

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but was not sure about how to get there. There were no signs of panic in Hong Kong, but much less confidence than before June. The Chinese leadership was now being uncooperative about Hong Kong and the modalities that still need to be negotiated. (S)

The President asked about what had happened in the Hong Kong market. (S)

The Foreign Secretary said the market had survived remarkably well. This was a mixed blessing, because the Chinese asked how the British could cite a loss of confidence when the stock market was doing so well. Still, it would be quite a job to restore the confidence of the population of Hong Kong. (S)

The President asked if the Foreign Secretary was under pressure to be tougher on the Chinese. (S)

The Foreign Secretary said the British government was happy to stay where it was for the time being. (S)

The President noted that there could be further surprises in China; the West needed to be prudent. U.S. domestic pressure was manageable now, but could increase from both the left and the right, and the Chinese were increasingly blaming the U.S. for their problems. (S)

Secretary Baker asked what sort of contacts the British had through their Embassy in Beijing. (S)

Low level, the Foreign Secretary replied. The situation was pretty much a standoff at the moment. Continuing, the Foreign Secretary noted that when the President saw the Prime Minister he had touched on the problem of intelligence, cooperation, and the need to improve it. London had a package which would be given to Judge Webster in October. (S)

The President asked if the Foreign Secretary had any brilliant ideas on how to solve the Lebanon problem. (S)

The Foreign Secretary said that some people were concerned about the U.S. taking its diplomats out because the Syrians might be further emboldened and increase their military effort, and because some might conclude the U.S. had given up. The U.K. was grateful for the U.S. offer to take out British diplomats at the time of the American evacuation, but the British officials were under no unusual threat. The Western nations should try to reduce the degree of shelling, even if they could not stop it entirely. (S)

The President said the U.S. took its people out because this crazy, Aoun, was threatening them. (S)

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The Foreign Secretary commented that moderates in Amal would want the U.S. to return its Embassy as soon as possible. (S)

The President said he hoped to do that. The situation was so complicated, and so sad. Did the U.K. have any representation in Syria? (S)

Permanent Undersecretary Wright said it was only an interest section, a very small operation. (S)

The Foreign Secretary wondered how much longer the Palestinian problem could remain static. (S)

The President remarked that the only game in town is elections in the occupied territories, but he was pessimistic. (S)

The Foreign Secretary asked if Shamir was willing to make concessions. (S)

Secretary Baker said that would only be known when there are face to face negotiations. Shamir's willingness could not be tested before that point. (S)

The President said the situation was discouraging. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 10, 1989

*Steve*

Dear Congressman Solarz:

Thank you for your letter and article on Henry Kissinger and human rights in China. I know that you and Henry have exchanged your views on China frankly on the MacNeil/Lehrer program. That debate illuminates an important issue for the American people.

On the issue of conducting "business as usual" with the Chinese, I believe that this Administration has clearly expressed its abhorrence of the events of Tiananmen Square. In fact, the Chinese accuse us of leading the rest of the world in calls for sanctions. Bearing this in mind, I hope you will consider preserving maximum flexibility for the President as he continues to manage this delicate matter.

Sincerely,

*Brent*

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Steven J. Solarz  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515



**National Security Council  
The White House**

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| Philip Hughes   | <u>2</u>    | <u>APB</u>      |             |
| Bob Gates       | <u>3</u>    | <u>8</u>        |             |
| Brent Scowcroft | <u>4</u>    | <u>under</u>    |             |
| Philip Hughes   |             |                 |             |
| Situation Room  |             |                 |             |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>5</u>    | <u>10/10 PL</u> |             |
| NSC Secretariat |             |                 |             |
| <u>Paul</u>     | <u>6</u>    |                 | <u>FPL</u>  |

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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Reply to Cong Salary on China (Kessington)*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 4, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL JACKSON *KJS*  
FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*  
SUBJECT: Reply to Congressman Solarz re China

Steve Solarz sent you a letter and a copy of an op-ed piece he did criticizing Henry Kissinger's stand on human rights in China. Your draft reply (Tab I) asks Solarz to preserve the President's flexibility on China policy.

Concurrence by: *RLM* Lamprey, *MR* Rodman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Congressman Solarz at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft/Solarz Letter  
Tab II Solarz/Scowcroft Letter dated 8/25/89





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Solarz:

Thank you for your letter and article on Henry Kissinger and human rights in China.

I know that you and Henry have exchanged your views on China frankly on the MacNeil/Lehrer program, and I will leave *illuminate* that debate to you two. *That debate is an*

*important issue for the American people.*

On the issue of conducting "business as usual" with the Chinese, I believe that this Administration has clearly expressed its abhorrence of <sup>the</sup> events surrounding the Tiananmen Square ~~massacre~~. In fact, the Chinese accuse us of leading the rest of the world in calls for sanctions. Bearing this in mind, I hope you will consider preserving maximum flexibility for the President as he continues to manage this delicate matter.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Steven J. Solarz  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515



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## Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC

August 25, 1989

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

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Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcraft  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
NSC The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

The Washington Post recently ran an article by Henry Kissinger that criticized the U.S. Congress for the actions it took in the wake of the brutal massacre of the pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square last June. Dr. Kissinger appears to believe that the Chinese leadership was justified in crushing the democracy movement and that America's strategic interests require that we simply ignore human rights concerns in our dealings with China.

Dr. Kissinger apparently does not understand that neither the Congress nor the American people are prepared to conduct business as usual with a government that relies on indiscriminate violence and sweeping repression of the sort we have witnessed in China in recent weeks.

Several days after Dr. Kissinger's article appeared, the Washington Post published a rejoinder that I wrote, in which I tried to explain why China will continue to suffer international opprobrium until it demonstrates a genuine respect for the human rights of the Chinese people.

Because I suspect that you share my concerns about the situation in China, I thought you might like to see a copy of my Post article.

It goes without say, of course, that I would welcome your thoughts on this or any other subject.

Sincerely,

  
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ  
Member of Congress

SJS:rm/bh



# The Washington Post

SUNDAY, AUGUST 6, 1989

*Stephen J. Solarz*

## Kissinger's Kowtow

In the days when China still had emperors, anyone who approached the Dragon Throne was required to abase himself and kowtow before the sovereign. Now Henry Kissinger, even before his forthcoming visit to the Middle Kingdom, has kowtowed to China's latter-day emperor through the op-ed page of *The Washington Post*.

Kissinger, whose article argued that "no government in the world would have tolerated having the main square of its capital occupied for eight weeks" and that "a crackdown was therefore inevitable," appears to believe that China's leaders were justified in crushing the democracy movement and that our strategic interests with Beijing are far too important to make an issue of human rights. True to form, he appeals for a policy of amoral *Realpolitik* by erecting the straw man of a hysterical Congress that, according to him, went way overboard in its response to the Tiananmen Massacre.

### Taking Exception

Yet what did Congress really do? It did not impose a comprehensive trade embargo, revoke China's most-favored nation tariff status, suspend its textile quota, eliminate its eligibility for Export-Import Bank financing or reduce the sophistication of the American dual-use technology China is privileged to receive.

Congress did codify the suspension that President George Bush had al-

ready imposed on the transfer of military items and on the multilateral liberalization of China's access to dual-use technology. It also prohibited the sale of crime-control equipment such as cattle prods and suspended U.S. government-funded risk insurance and feasibility studies. Furthermore, contrary to Kissinger's patently false statement that Congress "established no criteria for eventually lifting the China sanctions," the legislation provided for presidential waivers on human rights or national security grounds.

Kissinger, who now defends the president's policy as a way of criticizing Congress, neglects to mention that he opposed a suspension of military cooperation with China before the president's decision to freeze all arms sales. Unlike the president and Congress (who approved the legislation he condemns by a vote of 418 to 0), he apparently saw nothing wrong with continuing to sell arms to a "People's Liberation Army" that engaged in the brutal slaughter of people it was supposed to protect.

The actions of Congress did not reflect a mere spasm of emotion. Indeed, its motivation was precisely the same as the president's: to demonstrate that the United States cannot do business as usual with a government that relies on indiscriminate violence and sweeping repression. Obviously, Kissinger still fails to understand that America's relations with other countries—particularly a Communist country like China—must rest on a solid foundation of public opinion. When the Chinese government resorts to the wanton violation of human rights, it will inevitably pay a price with the American public and its elected representatives.

Kissinger grudgingly acknowledges that "most of the grievances of the protesters were real." Would that he had asserted that Beijing's citizens were justified in voicing those grievances, and that a significant segment

of Chinese officialdom agreed on the urgent necessity of political reform. Would that he had admitted that the party could have solved the crisis by accepting the people's reasonable demands. Would that he had recognized that the demonstrations had almost ended by June 3, and that the army's resort to violence was a deliberate effort to intimidate the populace into submission. By evoking all the paranoid reasons why Deng Xiaoping and his henchmen believed repression was necessary, however, Kissinger justifies their actions.

There is no question that the United States' relationship with China is geopolitically important. Yet most American policy-makers have come to realize, particularly in the context of Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking," that Beijing is no longer quite the counterweight against Moscow that Kissinger thought it was in the early 1970s. True, China has played a constructive role in Asia in recent years. But it does so in pursuit of its own national interest, not for the purpose of pleasing the United States, and it will continue to do so on that basis.

Instead of offering an apologia for repression, thereby confirming the prejudices of his Chinese interlocutors, Kissinger could better use his time in Beijing explaining to Deng and his colleagues why China will continue to suffer international opprobrium until they demonstrate a genuine respect for the human rights of their own people. It would also be helpful if, after reaffirming America's recognition of China's continued geopolitical significance, he called on them to end martial law, release political prisoners, end the executions and get on with a serious program of political reform.

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*The writer, a Democratic representative from New York, chairs the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs.*