

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: China Chronological Files
Subseries: Post-Tiananmen Files

OA/ID Number: 91133
Folder ID Number: 91133-004

Folder Title:
China: Post-Tiananmen (November 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Ambassador to China James R. Lilley (1 pp.)	11/15/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Ambassador to China James R. Lilley (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	From Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft, Re: The President's Meeting with Ambassador to China James Lilley, Thursday, November 15, 3:00 - 3:15 p.m. EST [DOCUMENT DECLASSIFIED; FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	11/14/90	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S
02a. Outline	Re: Meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (1 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made at the Meeting with Foreign Minister Qian (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Report	Re: Qian Qichen [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
02d. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Drop-by During Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen of China (1 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (TBD) (2 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: China Chronological Files
Subseries: Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China: Post-Tiananmen (November 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1112
OA/ID Number: 91133-004
Date Closed: 5/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made at the Meeting with Foreign Minister Qian (4 pp.)		n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: China Chronological Files
Subseries: Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China: Post-Tiananmen (November 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1112
OA/ID Number: 91133-004
Date Closed: 5/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009025
RECEIVED: 14 NOV 90 08

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 15 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

AP

PERSONS: LILLEY, JAMES R

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE / PARTICIPANTS LIST RE PRES MTG W/ AMB LILLEY
15 NOV

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 17 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL

LOGREF: 9008854

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PAAL

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9025

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

WASHINGTON

November 15, 1990

CHRON FILE

MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR TO CHINA JAMES R. LILLEY

DATE: November 15, 1990

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 3:00 - 3:15 p.m. EST

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

RG for

I. PURPOSE

To discuss Ambassador Lilley's plans to depart Beijing, a possible new assignment for him, and a successor as Ambassador to China. To receive an update on the situation in China and on U.S. policy toward China.

II. BACKGROUND

You asked to see Ambassador Lilley during his current consultations. On your appointing him to Beijing, he indicated he would stay for two years.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Brief office meeting.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Participants List

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1148-MR

4/17/2014 MM

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9025

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR TO CHINA JAMES R. LILLEY

- I hear you feel you have served your two years in Beijing and are ready to move on.
- Who do you think would be a good successor?
- How do you think Beijing will behave with respect to a UNSC resolution on the use of force in the Gulf?
- What steps should we be taking bilaterally with Beijing over the next few months?

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2786-MR
10/7/2014 MM

PARTICIPANTS

The President

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs

Douglas H. Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC

Visitor

James R. Lilley, U.S. Ambassador to the PRC

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Memo	From Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft, Re: The President's Meeting with Ambassador to China James Lilley, Thursday, November 15, 3:00 - 3:15 p.m. EST [DOCUMENT DECLASSIFIED; FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	11/14/90	(b)(1), (b)(6)	℄

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: China Chronological Files
Subseries: Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China: Post-Tiananmen (November 1990)

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
 By MM (NLGB) on 3/28/2016

Date Closed:	5/1/2009	OA/ID Number:	91133-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-2786-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/7/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9025

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 14, 1990



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

KARL JACKSON

FROM:

DOUGLAS PAALIN

SUBJECT:

The President's Meeting with Ambassador to China
James Lilley, Thursday, November 15, 3:00 - 3:15
p.m. EST

At Tab I is the meeting memorandum for Jim Lilley's call on the President.

Jim wants to talk about his expected departure, any future position for him, and selection of a successor for the Beijing post. Timing is uncertain. Jim is prepared to recommend a group of senior FSOs as qualified for the nomination, including

(b)(6)

You may want to discuss this subject beforehand with the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft/President Memorandum

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Participants List

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2786-MR

10/7/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009425
RECEIVED: 30 NOV 90 08

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: PAAL
JACKSON

DOC DATE: 30 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

PERSONS: QIAN QICHEN

SUBJECT: PRES DROP BY DURING SCOWCROFT MTG W/ CHINA FOMIN QIAN ON 30 NOV

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 04 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL

LOGREF: 9009432

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JACKSON
NSC CHRON
PAAL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: men LOG # 9425
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Ken Hill</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Brent Scowcroft		<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>W 11/30</u>	<u>A</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other Uhl

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres Drop by 7M P. Chen of China

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Excluded to his Reshette

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH CHINA'S FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN

DATE: November 30, 1990

LOCATION: Brent Scowcroft's Office

TIME: TBD

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To fulfill the minimal requirement for a meeting with Foreign Minister Qian; to express your disappointment that China's leaders failed to heed your call for more positive support on UNSC resolution 678; to make a strong point on the need for human rights progress before the sanctions on China can be lifted.

II. BACKGROUND

The Chinese are trying to portray a return to normal US-China relations without yielding on any issue of concern to the Administration or the Congress. Their abstention on the Gulf vote, for example, was cost-free for Beijing. This disregard of our mutual interests augurs badly for future dealings with the Chinese unless a clear marker is placed before Minister Qian. Moreover, the hardliners in China are strengthening their position against the moderates in the leadership by demonstrating that they can manipulate the US and the West without returning to reform.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press, no White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE

Drop-by at Brent Scowcroft's office.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biographical Information

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1148-MR
4/17/2014 MM

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE AT THE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS MEETING

- I welcome you to the White House. As you know, I attach great importance to our bilateral relations. But as Secretary Baker explained to you Wednesday night, while we will continue to do what we can to move the bilateral relationship forward, the domestic consensus for this would have been strengthened had China voted yes on the most recent UN Security Council resolution.
- Our meeting today clearly shows that I value U.S.-China relations. But we must move forward together. We cannot move the relationship forward unilaterally; we need your help.

COOPERATION OF THE GULF CRISIS

- As I wrote in my recent letter to your leaders, China and the United States, as major powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council, bear special responsibility for deterring aggression and establishing an environment in which the United Nations plays a decisive role in ensuring global peace and security. Our cooperation on the Gulf and Cambodia are critical to ensuring stability in many areas of the world.
- Only by continuing to signal to Saddam Hussein our unity of purpose that his blatant aggression will not be rewarded and that he must withdraw, do we stand a chance of achieving a peaceful resolution to this crisis.

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0110-F11
001 313110

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2

- Only by making credible our resolve to use force if necessary will it be possible to convince Saddam Hussein that a peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait is preferable to the alternative.
- I understand China's concern about the presence of U.S. and other forces in the Gulf. Let me assure you that there is nothing we want more than to bring American troops home as soon as possible.
- Saddam's peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait will permit that process to commence. His continued intransigence will only prolong the confrontation which threatens his nation and other Arab nations with the agonies of war.
- If Saddam should come out of this confrontation "a winner", it would have the most ominous implications, not only for future stability in the Gulf, but also for the credibility of the UN and the Perm Five process. We cannot permit such an outcome to this crisis, which will set the pattern for regional peacekeeping for years to come.
- It is essential that we continue to cooperate as closely as possible on this most important crisis confronting the international community.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

- It has always been our intention to move the bilateral relationship forward. My seeing you today, in the wake of your abstention at the U.N., is proof of this.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- It was true even before your abstention that cooperation on international issues alone will not restore the relationship to normal; it is all the more true following that abstention.
- Executive-Legislative consensus on China policy through five administrations was ripped apart following the Tiananmen Incident. Human rights remains the key area of contention. We must resolve our differences if we are to move the relationship forward.
- I appreciate what China has already done, and I know some of your actions, such as releasing Fang Lizhi, were not easy ones to take.
- We also have taken actions to improve the relationship which have been politically unpopular, such as renewing MFN for China.
- We have been discussing with you over the past year's events mutual steps we could take to improve our relations. There are very few steps remaining. They consist of releasing all prisoners held as a result of the Tiananmen Incident for peacefully expressing their views, giving an accounting of such prisoners, and ceasing the jamming of VOA.
- I must be frank and tell you that recent reports that China will try political dissidents on the charge of sedition, a capital offense, have been very troubling. Such actions can only have harmful effects in the U.S. and may well lead to a setback in the relationship.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- I hope that there will be no such setback, and that further steps on your part in the areas of human rights and non-proliferation will allow Secretary Baker to visit China to signal an end to the major irritants in our relationship. (Along with the Secretary's trip to China, we would be prepared to extend an invitation for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to visit the U.S.)
- I would like nothing better than to see this happen. Good relations between our two countries are important for our people, and for the world. We must work together to make the bilateral relationship prosper so that we can cooperate effectively in a new and challenging international environment.

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Report	Re: Qian Qichen [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: China Chronological Files
Subseries: Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China: Post-Tiananmen (November 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 1/3/14

Date Closed: 5/1/2009	OA/ID Number: 91133-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1148-MR (501.03)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/22/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

QIAN Qichen
 (Phonetic: cheeyen)
 (0629/0366/3819)

CHINA

Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since April 1988)

Addressed as: Mr. Minister



Qian Qichen's influence among senior Chinese leaders does not appear to have been affected by the ongoing power struggle in Beijing. He publicly stated in June 1989 that the students' demands for a crackdown on corruption and for greater press freedoms had been reasonable and in accord with the goals of the Chinese Government. Nevertheless, he added that the government was forced to reestablish public order when radical elements who wanted to overturn socialism had taken advantage of the movement. In subsequent public and private statements, he has stressed that the government exercised restraint toward the demonstrators for two months before taking action. He has also admonished foreign countries, including the United States, for "meddling" in China's internal affairs.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Views on Foreign Affairs

Qian's strongest suit is his experience in Soviet affairs, on which he is widely regarded as China's leading expert. Since serving as vice foreign minister responsible for the Soviet and East European Affairs Department in 1982, he has had final review of Ministry policy recommendations before they were passed to Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, and he has dealt with nearly every Soviet official responsible for Moscow's policies toward Beijing. In December 1988 he became the first Chinese foreign minister to visit Moscow since the break in bilateral relations in the 1960s. Qian handled preparations for the summit between Deng and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in May 1989.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(cont.)

LDA M 90-12350

(b)(1); (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 PER E.O. 13526
 2009-1148-MR
 SC5 2/22/13

Although the foreign minister traditionally has implemented, not formulated, Beijing foreign policies, Qian—relying on his expertise and experience—is seeking to break that mold.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Early Life and Career

Qian was born on 5 January 1928. His early career closely paralleled those of many senior Chinese leaders. (b)(1); (b)(3) he attended an American high school in Shanghai. When the Japanese occupied that city in 1937, all high schools were required to teach Japanese. Qian learned a few words of Japanese and then joined the anti-Japanese underground movement; just after liberation he served in the Communist Youth League. Sent to study in the Soviet Union in 1954, he subsequently served two tours at the Embassy in Moscow before being recalled to China in 1964. Qian was purged from the Communist party at the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and did not reappear until 1972, when he was reassigned to Moscow as a counselor. He subsequently attended a CCP higher cadre school in which promising young officials are groomed for promotion.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Personal Data

Qian speaks fluent English, Russian, and French. (b)(1); (b)(3) he has displayed a keen interest in American culture. During his trips to the United States he has enjoyed popular music concerts at Wolf Trap Farm Park's Filene Center and musicals at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and he reportedly developed a love for country and western music in the Great Smoky Mountains in Tennessee. (b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3) in his limited free time he tries to find opportunities to read about this country. (b)(1); (b)(3)

3 April 1990

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs

Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs

James R. Lilley, U.S. Ambassador to the PRC

Douglas Paal, Director, Asian Affairs, NSC Staff

James Brown, Interpreter

PRC

Qian Qichen, Foreign Minister

Zhu Qizhen, Ambassador to the U.S.

Zhang Yijun, MFA, Director, Americas Division

Shen Guofang, Secretary to FM

Lu Shumin, MFA

Tian Junting, MFA

Gao Shumao, MFA

Ma Xuesong, Interpreter

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

9425

November 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*
FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*
SUBJECT: Presidential Drop-by During Your Meeting with
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen of China

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President's drop-by during Qian's meeting with you. On balance, a short encounter with the President, with no photos and the President dominating the conversation, will meet the minimum requirements and do the least damage. More public criticism will only gladden Saddam Hussein.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biographical Information

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2786-MR
10/7/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009432
RECEIVED: 30 NOV 90 09

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: PAAL
JACKSON

DOC DATE: 30 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

4

PERSONS: QIAN QICHEN

SUBJECT: TALKING PTS FOR SCOWCROFT MTG W/ CHINA FOMIN QIAN ON 30 NOV

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 04 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL

LOGREF: 9009425

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
JACKSON
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 9432
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 24 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Ken Hill</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>		
Brent Scowcroft	<u>APNSA</u>	<u>Has Seen</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>11/30</u>	<u>K</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>11/30</u>	<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*General Scowcroft
Meeting w/ FM Qichen*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

9432

November 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*
FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
(TBD)

*Met Sec Advisor
has seen*

Meeting with Qian will draw fire from Congressional and other human rights activists who will accuse the Administration of putting geopolitics ahead of human rights, only to be rewarded by China's breaking ranks with the Perm Five consensus on a critical UN Security Council resolution. The Chinese may pocket the White House meeting and demand further steps from Washington in return for their abstention (e.g. a Presidential visit or re-establishing military contacts.)

We have made important steps over the past year to improve the relationship in the wake of Tiananmen, most notably taking on fights with Congress over the Pelosi Bill and MFN. While the Chinese too have moved to improve the relationship, as indicated by their release of Fang Lizhi and almost 900 political prisoners, their moves have usually been grudging half-steps, taken in response to major threats such as the loss of MFN.

The leadership, feeling confident of its domestic and international position, has miscalculated that the need for China's cooperation on the Gulf Crisis presents a windfall opportunity for China to convince the U.S. and other Western countries to drop post-Tiananmen sanctions, reflecting a misreading of continuing concern about China's human rights practices.

Beijing's recent decision to put leading dissidents on trial further complicates our attempts to improve the relationship.

You should use this meeting to:

- Reaffirm your resolve to seek major improvement in the bilateral relationship, and the need for continued cooperation in such global and regional issues as the Gulf and Cambodia.

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- Make the Chinese aware of our dissatisfaction and disappointment over China's abstention at the U.N., and of the connection that Congressional and other critics of the bilateral relationship will make between China's breaking ranks with us on a critical issue involving the lives of American servicemen just as we are taking steps to improve the relationship.
- Impress upon Qian that cooperation on the Gulf, Cambodia and other vital global issues is necessary, but is not a sufficient basis for rebuilding a strong relationship. Our efforts to advance bilateral relations will remain seriously constrained without significant Chinese steps on human rights issues.
- Indicate that we hope China will take bold steps to improve relations so that our two countries can get on with the important business of forging new international cooperation on a range of key transnational issues in the cause of global peace, security and prosperity.

Attachment

Tab I Points to be Made

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POINTS TO BE MADE AT THE MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS MEETING

- I welcome you to the White House. As you know, I attach great importance to our bilateral relations. But as Secretary Baker explained to you Wednesday night, while we will continue to do what we can to move the bilateral relationship forward, the domestic consensus for this would have been strengthened had China voted yes on the most recent UN Security Council resolution.
- Our meeting today clearly shows that I value U.S.-China relations. But we must move forward together. We cannot move the relationship forward unilaterally; we need your help.

COOPERATION OF THE GULF CRISIS

- As I wrote in my recent letter to your leaders, China and the United States, as major powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council, bear special responsibility for deterring aggression and establishing an environment in which the United Nations plays a decisive role in ensuring global peace and security. Our cooperation on the Gulf and Cambodia are critical to ensuring stability in many areas of the world.
- Only by continuing to signal to Saddam Hussein our unity of purpose that his blatant aggression will not be rewarded and that he must withdraw, do we stand a chance of achieving a peaceful resolution to this crisis.

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- Only by making credible our resolve to use force if necessary will it be possible to convince Saddam Hussein that a peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait is preferable to the alternative.
- I understand China's concern about the presence of U.S. and other forces in the Gulf. Let me assure you that there is nothing we want more than to bring American troops home as soon as possible.
- Saddam's peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait will permit that process to commence. His continued intransigence will only prolong the confrontation which threatens his nation and other Arab nations with the agonies of war.
- If Saddam should come out of this confrontation "a winner", it would have the most ominous implications, not only for future stability in the Gulf, but also for the credibility of the UN and the Perm Five process. We cannot permit such an outcome to this crisis, which will set the pattern for regional peacekeeping for years to come.
- It is essential that we continue to cooperate as closely as possible on this most important crisis confronting the international community.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

- It has always been our intention to move the bilateral relationship forward. My seeing you today, in the wake of your abstention at the U.N., is proof of this.

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- It was true even before your abstention that cooperation on international issues alone will not restore the relationship to normal; it is all the more true following that abstention.
- Executive-Legislative consensus on China policy through five administrations was ripped apart following the Tiananmen Incident. Human rights remains the key area of contention. We must resolve our differences if we are to move the relationship forward.
- I appreciate what China has already done, and I know some of your actions, such as releasing Fang Lizhi, were not easy ones to take.
- We also have taken actions to improve the relationship which have been politically unpopular, such as renewing MFN for China.
- We have been discussing with you over the past year's events mutual steps we could take to improve our relations. There are very few steps remaining. They consist of releasing all prisoners held as a result of the Tiananmen Incident for peacefully expressing their views, giving an accounting of such prisoners, and ceasing the jamming of VOA.
- I must be frank and tell you that recent reports that China will try political dissidents on the charge of sedition, a capital offense, have been very troubling. Such actions can only have harmful effects in the U.S. and may well lead to a setback in the relationship.

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- I hope that there will be no such setback, and that further steps on your part in the areas of human rights and non-proliferation will allow Secretary Baker to visit China to signal an end to the major irritants in our relationship. (Along with the Secretary's trip to China, we would be prepared to extend an invitation for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to visit the U.S.)
- I would like nothing better than to see this happen. Good relations between our two countries are important for our people, and for the world. We must work together to make the bilateral relationship prosper so that we can cooperate effectively in a new and challenging international environment.

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Tentative
List

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. U.P.

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

James A. Baker III, Secretary of State

Robert Kimmitt, State Department

Robert Gates

Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State

James R. Lilley, U.S. Ambassador to the PRC

Douglas Paal, Director, Asian Affairs, NSC Staff

James Brown, Interpreter

PRC

Qian Qichen, Foreign Minister

Zhu Qizhen, Ambassador to the U.S.

Zhang Yijun, MFA, Director, Americas Division

Shen Guofang, Secretary to FM

Ma Zhengang, Counsellor, Chinese Embassy

Lu Shumin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Tian Junting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ma Xuesong (interpreter)