

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: China Chronological Files
Subseries: Post-Tiananmen Files

OA/ID Number: 91133
Folder ID Number: 91133-003

Folder Title:
China: Post-Tiananmen (October 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Ocotber 19, 4:00 p.m. Meeting with Ambassador Zhu (1 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	C
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Ambassador Zhu Qizhen (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01c. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	1/10/92	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: China Chronological Files
Subseries: Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China: Post-Tiananmen (October 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1111
OA/ID Number: 91133-003
Date Closed: 5/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008028
RECEIVED: 09 OCT 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

COMMON FILE

FROM: NIXON, RICHARD M

DOC DATE: 14 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
KUWAIT
MP

IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM NIXON RE REESTABLISHING HIGH LEVEL CONTACT W/ CHINA

ACTION: NFAR PER SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 12 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JACKSON
NSC CHRON
PAAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008028
RECEIVED: 09 OCT 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: NIXON, RICHARD M

DOC DATE: 14 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
KUWAIT
MP

IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM NIXON RE REESTABLISHING HIGH LEVEL CONTACT W/ CHINA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 12 OCT 90 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
PAAL

FOR CONCURRENCE
CHARLES
HAASS
JACKSON

FOR INFO
HILL
WELCH

COMMENTS:

*No further action, per Gen. Scowcroft's
Please send to his records for filing - J*

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 8028

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>YH 10/10</u>	<u>Staff</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 OCT 9 A 8: 07

[Handwritten signature] Natl Sec Advisor has seen

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)


COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

APNSA Has Seen

RICHARD NIXON

September 14, 1990

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

I find it interesting that while the media pundits are lavishing praise on Gorbachev for making a decision which serves his economic interests in joining us in supporting sanctions against Iraq, they have virtually ignored the fact that China also supported us and did not exercise the veto in the Security Council. As I pointed out in my letter to the President, they don't give China the credit it deserves but even more revealing, they don't give the President and his associates in his Administration credit for not going along with the China-bashers who demanded that we virtually ostracize Beijing because of the tragedy of Tiananmen Square. If he had followed that advice, China might well have exercised the veto, and we would be in a much weaker diplomatic position than is the case presently.

This leads me to make a recommendation which is highly controversial, but I believe in the national interest. This is the time for us to reestablish high level contacts with the Chinese and to relax sanctions to the extent that the Congress has not prohibited such action.

I know the PR types on the White House staff and in the State Department will throw up their hands in horror and urge the President not to take such action because it would give aid and comfort to a the brutal old men in Beijing. How then do they justify Jim Baker's embracing Assad despite the fact that he has been guilty of killing over 10,000 men, women and children in Hama with far less provocation than was the case with the Chinese leaders. Assad is one of the bloodiest butchers of the 20th century and a notorious exporter of terrorism. I nevertheless believe, as I am sure you do, that we are right to try to enlist his full support for our efforts to combat Saddam Hussein.

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
September 14, 1990
Page 2

But the same argument certainly applies to China. The Chinese have indicated that they might consider humanitarian food shipments to Iraq. Han Xu, in a talk I had with him yesterday, assured me that they had taken no actions along this line as yet. But wouldn't it make sense to resume high-level contacts with one of the goals being to convince the Chinese to follow our lead on such humanitarian aid and also to get some assurance, as I understand we have from Gorbachev, that they would not openly oppose our use of force in the event the sanctions don't work?

Clearly apart from the current crisis, I believe it is vitally important that we reestablish a normal relationship with Beijing at the earliest possible time. Gorbachev found he had no choice but to go along with German unification and the independence of the nations of Eastern Europe. But while the Cold War may have ended in Europe, he is still practicing skillful Soviet geopolitics in Asia. When he goes to Japan, he will without question give up the Northern Islands. I can just now see the American media hailing this as one of the most significant, generous actions of all time, ignoring the fact that we gave up Okinawa, a far more important piece of real estate, 18 years ago. His action will undoubtedly lead to economic and other agreements which will join the two countries closer together. Gorbachev is also reaching out his tender loving hands to China. And the Japanese, always looking for a fast buck, have virtually restored full economic relations with China.

Therefore from a long range strategic standpoint, the United States has no choice but to strengthen its relationship with China. Otherwise we have in effect a three-legged stool in Asia -- the Soviet Union, Japan, and China. This is an unstable situation and a dangerous one for us. At a time when we are developing closer relationships with the Soviet Union and continue to nurture a good relationship with Japan, it is vital that we reestablish, at the very least, a cooperative economic relationship with China. A four-legged stool is far more stable than a three-legged stool!

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
September 14, 1990
Page 3

With all of the other problems on your desk, I am sure you will consider this issue somewhat peripheral and even premature. But in the event the issue ever reaches the President's desk for decision, I would appreciate it if you would pass along some of my thoughts to him for his consideration.

Congratulations on the brilliant work all of you have done so far in the Gulf crisis. I am increasingly skeptical that a diplomatic settlement is in the cards. Just as soon as the necessary military forces are in place, the President's only choice will be to resort to military action after giving Saddam Hussein an ultimatum. This action, risky as it would be, will assure the President's place in history as a courageous and decisive leader. Even more important, such action would be a warning shot across the bow to other potential aggressors around the world. By using force now in this crisis would mean that our threat of the use of force in a similar crisis somewhere else will be so credible that any potential aggressor would conclude that his only option was to pursue his goals by diplomatic rather than military means.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Brent' or 'BS', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
The White House
Washington, DC. 20500

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008340
RECEIVED: 18 OCT 90 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: JACKSON

DOC DATE: 18 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

ANSA

PERSONS: ZHU QIZHEN

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT MTG W/ AMB ZHU ON 19 OCT RE US / CHINA RELATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 22 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JACKSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JACKSON
CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Ocotber 19, 4:00 p.m. Meeting with Ambassador Zhu (1 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: China Chronological Files
Subseries: Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China: Post-Tiananmen (October 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS (NLGB) on 2/21/12

Date Closed: 5/1/2009	OA/ID Number: 91133-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2635-MR (68)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 3/31/2010

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8340

October 18, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*

SUBJECT: October 19, 4:00 p.m. Meeting with Ambassador Zhu

Ambassador Zhu is returning to China for consultations on October 25. He requested this meeting to ascertain your view of U.S.-China relations. (b) (1)

(b) (1) and to indicate to us that China has done its part and is now waiting for the U.S. to do more.

From our vantage point we should indicate, in no uncertain terms, that the President has invested an extra-ordinary amount of political capital in maintaining the China relationship. Unless and until China makes some sign, the relationship will remain at its present level. State, of course, wants to go ahead with its plans for Bob Kimmitt to visit China in late November as a precursor to a visit by the Secretary of State next year. The Chinese already seem aware of both prospects.

Your job is to convince Zhu that a Kimmitt visit will be possible only if and when further domestic steps have been undertaken.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the attached talking points.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biographical Info

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED


2000-0116-F/1

SCS 3/31/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR ZHU QIZHEN

- We must continue to work together to resolve the Gulf crisis peacefully and follow through on a rapid solution of the Cambodian issue.
- The lopsided (384-30) vote on MFN in the House on Thursday indicates that cooperation, in the international arena alone, is not sufficient to restore the U.S.-China relationship.
- China has taken several difficult steps related to its internal affairs and we have matched these with steps of our own. What remains on China's side of the "package" is:
 - release of those under detention or arrest for peaceful activities associated with the events of 1989,
 - evidence that the releases have been full and comprehensive, and
 - cessation of the jamming of VOA.
- Attempts to apply political pressure on Chinese students in the U.S., in violation of U.S. law, and the extremely unhelpful steps restricting travel by foreign students in China, have further complicated our relations.
- We would like to re-engage in the regular strategic dialogue that we held before Tiananmen. At the same time we must be sure that a trip to China by a high ranking official will not cause a further political firestorm in the United States.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0116-F/I
SCS 3/31/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- We strongly urge China to act on domestic issues now to facilitate a trip to China that I know Under Secretary Kimmitt would like to undertake. The vital interests of both the U.S. and China require the resumption of our dialogue, but the dialogue can only be reinstitutionalized once further progress on Chinese domestic matters has become apparent.
- The key message I want to leave with you is that we must both continue to take steps to make this happen. By standing up to Congress on MFN and by adjusting our World Bank policy, the President has taken the initiative. He expects China to respond vigorously with its own initiatives to advance our relations. The future is in your hands.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	1/10/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: China Chronological Files
Subseries: Post-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China: Post-Tiananmen (October 1990)

Date Closed: 5/1/2009	OA/ID Number: 91133-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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10/6/8

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

October 26, 1990

John
Dear Senator Heinz:

I am writing in response to your letter to the President in which you urged attaching additional conditions to MFN status for China.

We have given your proposals careful thought, and it is clear that you and we have virtually identical objectives with respect to human rights in China. Where we differ is in how to realize those goals.

This Administration's position remains that additional, explicit conditionality risks doing more harm than good in achieving progress on human rights. It is also clear that prolonged uncertainty about MFN will disadvantage U.S. economic interests, especially in light of the fact that none of our competitors will impose similar conditionality.

Finally, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Chinese government has behaved responsibly both in its bilateral relations with Iraq and neighboring states and in the United Nations Security Council. This is also true of Chinese cooperation in settling the Cambodian conflict. We believe that imposing new conditionality on MFN is unlikely to bring about the internal actions we seek or to encourage responsible international behavior.

Sincerely,

Brent
Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable John Heinz
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 16, 1990

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL JACKSON *KJ*
FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*
SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence -- Reply to
Senator Heinz on China/MFN

At Tab I is a brief reply from you to Senator Heinz's letter to the President urging additional conditionality to MFN for China.

Concurrence by: V. *V*ampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the reply to Senator Heinz at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft/Heinz Letter
Tab II Heinz/Scowcroft Letter dated 8/15/90

6 / 61

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

TA 005

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 17, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JOHN HEINZ

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING RECOMMENDATION THAT MOST
FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THE PEOPLE 'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA BE CONTINUED FOR ANOTHER
YEAR

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE		ORG	90/08/17	Fm	A9008/21 W
NSS/ITN	REFERRAL NOTE: _____	R	90/08/13	W	T /
99005	REFERRAL NOTE: _____	E	90/08/24	W	C /
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220 _____

MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		*OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

August 21, 1990

Dear John:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President regarding the granting of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to the People's Republic of China.

We appreciate both being apprised of your view that MFN status should be contingent upon Beijing's future behavior and receiving your recommendations on specific unilateral actions the U.S. could take to further press China toward democratic change. In addition to sharing your comments with the President, I have taken the liberty of providing his foreign policy advisors with your remarks so that they, too, are aware of your views on this important issue.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable John Heinz
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI

SPARK M. MATSUNAGA, HAWAII
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, NEW YORK
MAX BAUCUS, MONTANA
DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY
GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAINE
DAVID PRYOR, ARKANSAS
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., MICHIGAN
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA
TOM DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA

BOB PACKWOOD, OREGON
BOB DOLE, KANSAS
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE
JOHN C. DANFORTH, MISSOURI
JOHN H. CHAFEE, RHODE ISLAND
JOHN HEINZ, PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID DURENBERGER, MINNESOTA
WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, COLORADO
STEVE SYMMS, IDAHO

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

VANDA B. McMURTRY, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL
ED MIHALSKI, MINORITY CHIEF OF STAFF

August 15, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing with respect to your recommendation of May 24 that Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for the People's Republic of China (PRC) be continued for another year.

While I would like to support your decision, I cannot do so unconditionally. Granting MFN status through a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment is an action laden with symbolism and substantive economic impact for both Americans and Chinese. An unconditional renewal of MFN misses a proper and timely opportunity to send a strong message of disapproval to Beijing over its continued unacceptable abuses of human and civil rights.

It is true that many of "the people in China who trade with us are the engine of reform," and, if reform is to continue, we must maintain and expand our contacts with these forces, not isolate them. Continuing MFN encourages these reformers. Nevertheless, a simple and unconditional extension of MFN status send a message of approval to Chinese hardliners as well.

The situation in the PRC is indeed complex and fluid, but I believe firm actions must be taken by both Washington and Beijing if MFN status is to be maintained. The United States must put some teeth in its condemnations of the hardliners in order to further bolster the strength of those pushing for change, and in China the central government must abandon its repressive measures and allow an open airing of views without retaliation.

With regard to U.S. actions, aligning this country more firmly with the progressive forces in China can best be achieved if renewal of MFN status is embedded in a larger package. While supporting those in the peaceful reform movement, it is also imperative that we send a signal to Beijing that its actions are offensive to the principles of freedom and democracy and that subsequent renewal of MFN will hinge on its future behavior.

In addition to reaffirming and maintaining our current sanctions of halting all high-level official exchanges, suspending all military sales programs, and freezing any World Bank or Asian Development Bank loans, the U.S. needs to take unilateral actions to:

1. Increase Voice of America funding to overcome the jamming of programs by the PRC government.
2. Combine renewal of MFN status with Administration support for Taiwan's accession to GATT.
3. Refuse to agree to further tariff cuts in the Uruguay Round on products where the PRC would be the major beneficiary.
4. Combine renewal of MFN status with the PRC's prompt codification of its emigration law.

For its part, the PRC must discontinue any harassment of the press and members of the peaceful reform movement. As in 1979, the Beijing leadership is confident that China will not pay a severe economic price for its repressive policies, and its actions over the past year manifest this.

For example, there have been rearrests and over 40 public executions of protesters (as recent as May 31), and thousands remain jailed without charge. Restrictive emigration procedures have been introduced to snare pro-democracy activists, and Chinese students in the U.S. continued to be harassed. New laws have been codified to extend indefinitely provisions of martial law, including stronger government controls over demonstrations and foreign journalists. This particular step has led to the swift and brutal suppression of any act resembling dissidence such as the beating and arrest of a man who tried to display a banner to a Canadian television cameraman on the anniversary of the massacre.


In order to retain preferential trade status, China itself must act to eliminate these policies. The U.S. should forcefully indicate that MFN will not be extended again unless the central government takes such action.

The release of pro-democracy protesters, the lifting of martial law in Tibet, and the decision to allow Feng Lizhi and his wife to leave the country are welcome gestures from the Chinese government, but they are far from adequate. I share the view of many analysts that China's normal response to concessions is to interpret them as a sign of weakness. From that point of view, your decision not to suspend MFN or attach conditions to its renewal will likewise be seen in Beijing as wilting in the face of our commitment to democracy and human rights.

As you are well aware, there are no absolutes in the arena of world affairs -- no absolute amity, no absolute harmony. The process in which we are now engaged must be undertaken with this premise in mind. I urge you to work with Congress in developing a means of renewing the PRC's MFN status in a way that places the U.S. solidly on the side of the economic and political reformers.

In the long-run, democracy, in both China and America, will be the better for it.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Heinz", with a large, stylized loop at the end.

John Heinz
United States Senator