

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91119
Folder ID Number: 91119-002

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (November 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Dick Cheney to POTUS Re: My Trip to the USSR (1 pp.)	11/1/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Memorandum for the President Re: My Trip to the Soviet Union, October 16 - 19 (2 pp.)	11/1/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Food Aid/Food Sales to the USSR (2 pp.)	11/9/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Re: Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Soviet Troops in Germany (3 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Soviet Troops in Germany (1 pp.)	11/8/90	(b)(1)	S
04a. Note	Nick Burns to General Scowcroft Re: Note for General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	11/29/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Memo	Condoleezza Rice/Timothy Deal Re: Jackson - Vanik Waiver (1 pp.)	11/29/90	(b)(1)	S
04c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Jackson - Vanik Waiver (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Outline	Re: Jackson - Vanik Options (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (November 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1007
OA/ID Number: 91119-002
Date Closed: 3/2/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with the National Conference on Soviet Jewry: Monday, December 3; 11:30 a.m., (2 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	✓
05b. List	Re: Attendees At National Council on Soviet Jewry Meeting (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (November 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1007
OA/ID Number: 91119-002
Date Closed: 3/2/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102384
RECEIVED: 02 APR 91 08

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: CHENEY, R

DOC DATE: 01 NOV 90
SOURCE REF: X54705

KEYWORDS: USSR
ARMS CONTROL

START
CM

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: CHENEY TRIP RPT TO USSR 16 - 19 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 05 APR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS
DAVIS
GORDON
HEWETT
KANTER
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/2/09

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DISPATCHED BY: _____ DATE: _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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DOC 1 OF 1

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

APNSA Has



01 NOV 1990

2384

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My Trip to the USSR

Attached is a written report on my trip to the USSR. It is a follow-up to the oral briefing I provided you on my return and provides more detail than I was able to give you then.

Dick Cheney

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2011-1592-MR

SCS 3/13/12

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UNCLASSIFIED WHEN DETACHED
FROM ATTACHMENTS

Sec Def Cont Nr. X54705

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

0 1 NOV 1990



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My Trip To The Soviet Union, October 16-19 (U)

(S) My visit to the Soviet Union could not have occurred at a more dramatic time. Upon arrival, I found the Soviet Union in the midst of a full-scale political crisis over implementation of economic reform. The coalition forged by Gorbachev and Yeltsin late this summer is under great stress and in danger of coming unglued. Overall, I was struck by how much had changed since my last visit to the Soviet Union in the spring of 1987 (when I was the ranking minority member on a CODEL led by then-Speaker Wright). My meetings this time were marked by much less posturing and rhetoric than in the past. I believe that it is now possible to make some real progress in our defense-to-defense relations. To that end we were able to propose some specific initiatives to the Soviets. I also want to share with you my impressions of both Gorbachev and the current status of Soviet economic reform efforts.

(S) With regard to expanding defense-to-defense relations, we proposed, and the Soviets agreed, to hold further detailed talks on our respective budgets to enable both sides to have greater confidence about future plans for forces and programs. We also proposed, in keeping with your initiative on technical cooperation at Malta, to make DOD's expertise on defense conversion (which we prefer to call defense economic adjustment) available to the Soviets.

(S) Gorbachev proposed "philosophical" talks on the future of arms control after START and CFE. Shevardnadze suggested that we begin a dialogue on global strategic stability which would include discussions of regional stability. He also proposed an effort to prevent sales of advanced weapons to the Third World. The Soviets also suggested a step-by-step approach to follow-on arms control negotiations with Britain, France and the PRC becoming involved once U.S. and Soviet stockpiles were reduced to 4,000 warheads.

(S) Gorbachev appeared tired but in good spirits. He asked me to convey to you that Soviet Middle East policy would not change, despite the difficulties resulting from the clashes in Jerusalem. He urged continued pressure on Saddam, but stressed the importance of the search for a political solution. U.S.-Soviet cooperation was the key to successful sanctions.

(S) Shevardnadze said Soviet advisers in Iraq were unhappy and wanted to come home, but Iraq was impeding their return. They were defacto hostages. He noted that the advisory presence was more symbol than reality since there were more interpreters than military officers and expressed concern that precipitate withdrawal of military advisers might put Soviet civilians in Iraq at risk. This was clearly an issue of some sensitivity and I sought, in my public statements, not to complicate matters for the Soviets. Yazov's statements on the Gulf were consistent with the Gorbachev/Shevardnadze line, although he indicated Soviet advisers would eventually all come out of Iraq.

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X54700

(S) Winning the Nobel Peace Prize has not bought Gorbachev as much credit domestically as it has in foreign capitals. There was only perfunctory approval when I noted the award in my dinner toast on the first evening and even Gennadiy Gerasimov said in public that the award was not to be confused with the Nobel prize in economics. I had a small, informal lunch meeting on economic reform with Gorbachev's economic point man Abel Aganbegyan and Yeltsin's advisor Oleg Bogomolov who gave me a preview of the next day's debate in the Supreme Soviet. Their differences appeared to revolve around:

- how relations among the republics should be regulated, and
- the absence of timetables or specific guidelines for implementation in the government program.

Aganbegyan and Bogomolov agreed that any program would have to include a twenty per cent cut in the military budget. Many Soviets expressed concern that the Government's economic program was too timid and would not work (even Aganbegyan, one of its architects, stressed that in an unconstrained world he would prefer a bolder, more detailed program).

(S) My meetings with Yazov, dramatically different in tone from a year ago, provided a real exchange on a variety of defense and military issues. In my comments I:

- stressed that the U.S. did not represent a threat to the Soviet Union and outlined our new strategy, changing force structure, and defense budget cuts;
- noted U.S. concern about continued Soviet strategic modernization and command and control of nuclear weapons in areas of civil strife;

(S) For his part, Yazov:

- noted the Soviets would cut their military budget by 5 to 6 billion rubles and anticipated a million man reduction in the size of their force (he said that fifty per cent of the units being withdrawn from Europe would be disbanded);
- denied that the Soviets had provided chemical weapons to anyone and argued that Saddam would not dare use CW against the U.S. for fear of retaliation.

(S) In public statements, I noted that although I had been a "skeptic" I was now an "optimistic skeptic." I also offered strong support for the democratic developments taking place in the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that the Soviet military will make the necessary adjustments to the changed political environment. When Yazov was asked directly about coup rumors he said, "the armed forces of the Soviet Union are part and parcel of the people of this country, and they will never raise arms against their people." He also showed greater flexibility on the question of stationing troops in their native republics than he had previously.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008927
RECEIVED: 09 NOV 90 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 09 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOOD AID / FOOD SALES TO USSR

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 13 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/2/90

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Ken Hill</i>	<u>1</u>	<u>has copy</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>has copy</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>OPM 11/16</u>	<u>N</u>
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90 NOV 9 P 5: 04

APNSA Has Seen

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____
 Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8927

November 9, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*
SUBJECT: Food Aid/Food Sales to the USSR

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

This responds to your question about the possibility of providing food aid to the USSR. There are two applicable programs:

1. PL 480. We have authority to provide PL 480 Title I to the USSR, but only on a limited scale. Title I programs are for concessional loans repaid over a period of 10-40 years. To be eligible, a country must have a clear food deficit and a hard currency shortfall, conditions which the USSR presumably meets.

For FY 1991, the USG has \$800 million for PL 480 for Titles I and III (Title III is a grant program; the USSR's per capita income is too high for such grants). While USDA already has allocated most of the funds available, it claims that it could squeeze between \$50-100 million for the USSR if we are willing to operate with virtually no reserve for emergencies throughout the remainder of FY 1991 and if Pakistan, which was due to receive about \$80 million, is found ineligible because of its nuclear program. (Under the new farm bill, to obtain PL 480 Pakistan must provide written assurance that they do not possess nuclear weapons and are not engaged in efforts to develop them. State believes that Pakistan will not provide such assurances.) The USSR could use PL 480 funds received for purchase of any U.S. agricultural commodities or products.

2. Section 416. This program allows for donations of CCC surpluses to needy people. The commodities must go directly to feed such needy people or the receiving government could sell the products so long as the proceeds go to needy people. According to USDA, we could donate large quantities of butter to the USSR under this program.

Beyond food assistance, there are two relevant programs: (a) the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and (b) CCC credit guarantees.

3. EEP. We have sold wheat to the USSR under EEP. But recently the Soviets have not purchased wheat even at subsidized prices because they are obtaining it on credit from both the EC and Canada. USDA believes that the Soviets would be interested, however, in EEP for vegetable oil. We might provide up to 500,000 tons under such a program (approximate market value:

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

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\$162 million). The Trade Policy Review Group, chaired by USTR, rejected an earlier USDA proposal for EEP for vegetable oil. The Group could be asked to reconsider.

4. CCC. Finally, as we have pointed out in previous memoranda, if the President were to waive Jackson-Vanik, USDA could provide CCC credit guarantees for purchase of any U.S. agricultural commodities including wheat, flour, rice, livestock and poultry. He could provide the waiver without submitting the trade agreement to Congress. According to USDA's latest calculations, the U.S. has \$1.25 billion available for credit guarantees to the USSR if the USSR were declared eligible.

Please let me know if you need additional information or want us to convert this into a memorandum for the President.

Concurrence by: Condi *CR* Rice

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TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 13 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

GERMANY



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOVIET TROOPS IN GERMANY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 12 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

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RICE
SCOWCROFT

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/2/90

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 2 OF 2

**National Security Council
The White House**

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LOG # 8893

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>FOR INFO</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>12/11</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>12/11</u>	<u>N/R</u>
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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8893

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Soviet Troops in Germany

Germany and the Soviet Union have agreed to the withdrawal of 380,000 Soviet troops based on the territory of the former GDR by 1994. I wanted to make you aware, however, that this leisurely timetable belies a festering and potentially explosive problem in Soviet-German relations that could complicate the position of our own forces there.

Incidents between Soviet troops and the German population are up sharply due to the deteriorating economic circumstances of Soviet soldiers and officers; desertions of Soviet personnel who do not want to return to potentially even worse economic conditions at home; and hostility of the East German population toward Soviet soldiers.

The Soviet military, which enjoyed favorable procurement arrangements for food and housing in the GDR, is now forced to buy food and supplies at market prices. In a time of declining defense budgets, authorities simply cannot afford to do so. Thus, supplies are very low in the Western Group of Soviet Forces and food rationing has been instituted in many units. The meager rations exacerbate the fact that Soviet soldiers live on about \$20 a week in an economy where prices have risen dramatically since monetary union. At the same time, the eighteen year old Soviet enlisted man or the twenty-two year old junior officer is stationed in a modern capitalist country with German consumer goods all around. These young men know that goods purchased in Germany can bring ten or more times their value on the blackmarket back home.

Needless to say, temptation is winning out. Soviet soldiers are selling their weapons -- including AK-47 assault rifles, surface-to-air missiles, mines, and anti-tank weapons -- to anyone who will pay hard currency. German authorities are concerned that the Soviet military has become an easy source of weaponry for terrorist groups throughout the country. Asked about the incidents, the Soviet military procurator said simply, "What Soviet soldier can stand firm at the sight of a Western car?"

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

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201-1475-MR
ES 3/28/13

APR 13 1991

NOV 13 1990

*Brent - Kohl meeting
re: P3 - Just removed the
a.I-11 raise
subject
GFB*

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And common crime against the population is up too. Soviet soldiers -- often in search of food as well as possessions -- are accused almost daily of burglary in near-by villages.

All of this, coupled with no longer latent hostility for Soviet "occupiers" among the East German population has created a very tense environment in and around Soviet bases. At least two Soviet officers have been found dead in the last two months. A Soviet school bus was fired upon by Germans in Techentin on October 3 -- the day of German unity. Soviet soldiers are demanding to keep their sidearms and sufficient ammunition at home to defend their families.

Yet, hated as they are, many Soviet soldiers want to stay in Germany. Desertions number about two per day. A Soviet human rights lawyer claims that 700 Soviet soldiers have gone AWOL this fall and are roaming German forests, stealing food to stay alive. Germans across the political spectrum are concerned about the possibility of numerous refugees from the Soviet army -- particularly if conditions deteriorate further in the Soviet Union itself.

The Germans are doing what they can to address these problems. Most importantly, they have pledged massive credits to Moscow and promised to build housing in the Soviet Union for returning military personnel. There are now many in Germany who think that 1994 is an unrealistic departure date for Soviet forces but the Soviet military -- whose pride is already badly bruised -- seems determined to avoid the perception of hasty withdrawal.

The troublesome Soviet troop presence in Germany will almost certainly affect our interests. Obviously, large-scale refugee flows or uncontained violence would be destabilizing for Central Europe. It is more likely, however, that the situation will simmer rather than boil, exacerbating already tender German sensibilities about foreign troops. Soviet military leaders have suggested to the German leadership that a campaign be devised to portray Soviet forces in a better light -- perhaps explaining that the Soviet troop presence in the East is no different than that of the NATO partners in the West. That approach would, of course, be unacceptable to us and harmful to the Alliance. Polls show that much of the population of Eastern Germany harbors negative feelings toward NATO and does not distinguish Soviet troops from other foreign presences. Linkage of the Soviet and Allied presence must be avoided at all cost and we may have to campaign actively in the Eastern part of Germany to dispel this notion. The German government has assured us that they reject any such linkage and will stress to the German people that there is no parallel between Soviet and U.S. troops.

The Soviet troop problem will also make Bonn hypersensitive to instability and economic difficulties in the Soviet Union itself. Soviet economy recovery, the Germans reason, will give Soviet forces a reason to go home: Chaos will give them every reason to

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stay. Thus, Bonn is lobbying harder for economic assistance from its Western partners to share the burden of stabilizing (or at least propping up) the Soviet economy.

Not surprisingly, the Germans do not want to offend Soviet sensibilities by trumpeting the problem and they are sensitive about discussing it with others. Nevertheless, given the potential effect on our interests, you may want to raise the issue with Chancellor Kohl when you see him this month -- focusing on German efforts to resolve the problem. They have advised us privately that they are concerned but do not expect it to become unmanageable.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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November 8, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: Soviet Troops in Germany

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President regarding Soviet troops in Germany.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President

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Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *DA* NARA, Date *11/3/11*

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009416
RECEIVED: 29 NOV 90 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: RICE
DEAL

DOC DATE: 29 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
EMIGRATION

INTL TRADE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: JACKSON - VANIK WAIVER

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 03 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF: 9009505

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/2/90

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DOC 2 OF 2

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National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 9416

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Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>Σ 4.12/27</u>	<u>\$N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>W/K</u>

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Summary Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

See General's
- NOTED By Scowcroft
- Close Out

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 29, 1990

Note for General Scowcroft

Please find attached the Jackson-Vanik Options memo you requested.

I wanted to bring to your attention an important point on the first page of your memo to the President under Option One: Bob Zoellick has not yet cleared with Secretary Baker the sentence in parentheses "State is willing to consider a possible waiver near the Moscow Summit depending on conditions in the Baltics". He will check with Secretary Baker at OOB and we will let you know if this sentence does not reflect Secretary Baker's views.

Condi will call you at 7:00 a.m. to discuss any questions you may have.

Nick Burns NB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 29, 1990

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE/TIMOTHY DEAL /NB for


SUBJECT: Jackson-Vanik Waiver

Your memorandum to the President on a possible waiver of Jackson-Vanik is at Tab I. Bob Zoellick has cleared for the State Department. Other agencies reviewed and cleared an earlier version.

The memorandum lays out four options. Should the President decide on either a partial or total waiver of Jackson-Vanik, we must allow time for consultations with Congress and with the relevant domestic constituencies. Though we anticipate minimal resistance from the mainstream Jewish community, Baltic Americans and other conservative groups will probably oppose the waiver. The most important thing is to consult in advance of a public announcement and to give ourselves an opportunity to put the right spin on the decision to waive in advance of an emigration law.

You may also want to raise the issue of timing of the announcement with the President. Though there is considerable political pressure now (the House Agriculture Committee will hold hearings on grain sales to the USSR on December 5), the President might wish to grant the waiver at the time of his summit meeting with Gorbachev. This would also give us time to assess the internal political situation in the Soviet Union, particularly Soviet policy toward the Baltic states which appears to be hardening. The President could, in the meantime, go ahead with a package of medical assistance for the Soviet Union in December. This would allow him to be forthcoming with Gorbachev, and would help to dispel the charge that the Administration has not responded in Gorbachev's time of need.

Finally, Cabinet Affairs believes it would be very helpful to Clayton Kutter if he could participate in briefing the Farm Lobby should the President decide to waive Jackson-Vanik.

Concurrence by: David Gompert. 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Options Paper

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-1202-F/1
SCS 7/6/11

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9416

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Jackson-Vanik Waiver

Purpose

Whether to waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment before the USSR Supreme Soviet passes an emigration bill to permit the extension of USG credits and guarantees to the USSR.

Background

As you are aware, Clayton Yeutter, Bob Mosbacher, John Macomber and many influential members of Congress are concerned that the U.S. is in danger of losing sales of agricultural and other exports in the USSR market due to legislative restrictions, such as Jackson-Vanik, that prevent us from offering official credits and guarantees. NSC staff informally canvassed the interagency community on whether or not you should waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment before the Soviets pass an emigration bill in order to boost our export sales (a condition you established in May 1989).

A Jackson-Vanik waiver (without sending the trade agreement to Congress and seeking the repeal of other legislative restrictions) would allow the USG to extend credits and guarantees for agricultural exports to the USSR under the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). It would also permit EXIM to guarantee U.S. exports up to \$300 million.

A more detailed paper is attached at Tab A. The following options have been developed for your consideration.

As expected, the agencies were split in their recommendations to you. The agencies are divided on the first two options. Two additional options have no formal support.

Option One: Hold to Current Policy

Supported by State, Treasury and OMB (State is willing to consider a possible waiver near the Moscow Summit depending on conditions in the Baltics).

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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They believe that holding to the Administration's policy would maintain pressure on the Soviets to pass an emigration bill and preserve the credibility of our human rights policies. They would argue that while Soviet emigration practices are acceptable, a free emigration law that finally codifies the right to travel freely, and specifies the requirements of the "secrecy clause" is important.

It is worth noting, however, that mainstream Jewish groups have dropped their opposition to a waiver of Jackson-Vanik. You could, however, expect resistance from a vocal minority in the Jewish community; from Baltic Americans who will point to Moscow's hardening position there; and from conservatives in the Congress. This option would also avoid the risk of guaranteeing the Soviet Union's creditworthiness when it is highly likely that Moscow will default on any loans.

These agencies also argue that we have already met the Soviets halfway in June, and rather than have you take another hit at home with domestic groups, we ought to make it clear to Gorbachev that it is now his turn to bite the bullet. Passage of the emigration bill would unlock the trade agreement, extend MFN and give the Soviet access to USG credits and guarantees.

A further reason to hold to current policy is that you may wish to reserve judgment until we have a clearer view of Soviet policy toward the Baltic states (another crackdown/blockade is not out of the question). It would not be wise to take this action directly following the Security Council vote on Iraq. This might appear as a payoff. You may also wish to wait until your next meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow before announcing a change in Administration policy in order to derive the maximum benefit. In addition, we could then possibly seek some action from the Soviets like a Presidential decree on emigration that gives some justification for a policy reversal.

Option Two: Immediate Presidential waiver of Jackson-Vanik with the primary objective of promoting agricultural sales, but with no action on the Trade Agreement or MFN until the emigration bill is passed.

Supported by USDA and EXIM, and in principle by Commerce and USTR (Secretary Mosbacher is supportive of the need to boost agricultural sales to the Soviets but is also sensitive to the possible domestic reaction of a shift in policy before an emigration bill is passed).

These agencies argue waiving Jackson-Vanik now would permit U.S. farm exports in a period of declining sales worldwide and preserve our place in the Soviet market. Availability

of EXIM facilities, even on a limited scale, would also promote exports of manufactured goods and enable U.S. firms to participate in several major construction projects. They believe the waiver could be justified by Soviet emigration practices which, though not codified, have been acceptable.

USDA is particularly concerned that the U.S. could lose the lucrative Soviet market (currently the largest such market for the U.S.). The Soviets have warned in recent days that they will not purchase grains from the U.S. this year without accompanying credit guarantees.

Congressional attitudes on this issue are mixed. Holding to the current Administration position is sustainable in Congress, but there is also important farm belt support for a waiver of Jackson-Vanik to allow agricultural sales. For example, Congressman Pat Roberts (R-Kansas) has criticized the White House for holding U.S. farmers hostage to a "de facto embargo."

One crucial aspect of this issue is whether the Supreme Soviet is likely to pass an emigration bill anytime soon. As you know, the Soviets have been assuring us for more than a year and a half that passage is imminent. The Supreme Soviet does not have the bill on its current legislative calendar, and there appears to be new and significant opposition among many deputies (fear of brain drain and massive emigration -- a fear shared by many European leaders and many in our own government that the West will not be able to cope with a potential flood of Soviet emigrants.) We believe prospects for the bill's passage before you meet Gorbachev are not good. Ambassador Matlock shares this pessimistic assessment.

This issue should not be confused with the question of food aid to the Soviets. Should the Soviets request food aid from us, we could provide a limited amount of food under other programs which are not subject to Jackson-Vanik restrictions. Substantial food assistance, however, would probably require a Jackson-Vanik waiver.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you choose to maintain current Administration policy of denying a Jackson-Vanik waiver until the USSR Supreme Soviet passes an emigration bill (supported by State, Treasury and OMB).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you agree to waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment to permit CCC and EXIM credits and guarantees, but take no action on the Trade Agreement, MFN or other legislative restrictions until an emigration bill is passed (supported by USDA and Exim, and in principle by Commerce and USTR).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you agree to waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment for the sole purpose of extending CCC credits to permit agricultural grains

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sales. You would not authorize EXIM credits and guarantees under this option (no agency supports this option).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that you waive Jackson-Vanik, seek Congressional approval for the Trade Agreement, MFN and removal of other legislative restrictions (no agency supports this option).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Options Paper

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JACKSON-VANIK OPTIONS

I. ISSUE

Whether to provide a Jackson-Vanik waiver to permit the extension of USG credits and guarantees to the USSR.

II. BACKGROUND

Demand for Export Financing

Secretaries Yeutter and Mosbacher, EXIM Chairman Macomber, and many senior Congressional leaders are concerned the U.S. is losing commercial opportunities in the Soviet market due to legislative restrictions that prohibit official credits and guarantees for grain and other U.S. exports.

Once a cash customer for most foreign goods, the Soviet Union now relies heavily on credit. Soviet negotiators told us in late November, in fact, that the USSR could now only purchase American grains with credit and would choose to purchase from other countries should the USG be unable to provide the necessary credit guarantees. Given the Soviet Union's dismal economic situation and questions about its creditworthiness, government guarantees are needed to reassure nervous commercial bankers to provide financing. Other governments, including Germany, France, Italy and Canada, provide this coverage to promote exports to the USSR. France, for example, has offered official credit guarantees for 3 million tons of wheat conditioned on the cash purchase of an additional 1 million tons of wheat from EC stocks. The Soviets have also recently requested from the U.S. \$2.5 billion in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credit guarantees for grain, vegetable oil and livestock purchases.

Soviet creditworthiness is marginal and declining. Until the outlook improves, there is substantial risk that the Soviet Union may seek debt relief on any official credits extended by the USG for the following reasons:

- The Soviet Union's balance of payments will be under considerable strain over the next several years because of disruption of normal export channels in the transition from central planning to free enterprise and continued strong import demand.
- Soviet external debt is rising and reserves are falling at a rapid rate.
- The Soviets have delayed meeting scheduled external payments, an early sign of diminished creditworthiness.

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- Uncertainties about the division of political power between the central government and the Republics have caused additional concern among potential lenders.

Deciding whether or not to loosen these restrictions presents the Administration with a difficult choice with significant foreign and economic policy implications.

- On the economic side, the most immediate concerns come from the agricultural community and its supporters on Capitol Hill who fear the loss of a formerly lucrative market in the USSR. U.S. agricultural exports to the USSR totaled nearly \$3.5 billion in the 1990 crop year, but may fall substantially in 1991. The Soviets have made no agricultural purchases from the U.S. for four months and did not meet their FY-90 commitments under the bilateral grains agreements. They are threatening now to not meet their FY-91 obligations unless we provide the necessary credits. USDA contends that authority to provide \$1 billion in guarantees would ensure continual annual sales of around \$2-3 billion.
- Wheat prices are down roughly a third from year ago levels, a situation brought about by increased production and falling exports. We are now six months into the 1990 wheat marketing year and U.S. export sales worldwide are 24% below last year. Our failure to sell wheat to the Soviets would exacerbate this problem.
- Many major U.S. corporations are also pressing us to relax the restrictions. Exim receives 15 to 20 calls per week concerning its possible support for U.S. exports to the USSR. Asea-Brown-Bovari of Connecticut, for example, recently requested a \$1 billion Exim guarantee for construction of a petrochemical plant in the USSR. This transaction would be the first of several of a similar magnitude. Upjohn, Inc. is also interested in a \$1.2 billion Exim loan guarantee for construction of a Soviet pharmaceutical plant. IBM has a major computer project for the USSR, the first tranche of which totals \$65 million. IBM will provide the computers either from the U.S. or from its European subsidiaries depending on the availability of official export credits and/or guarantees. Nevertheless, until the legislative restrictions which limit Exim credit guarantees to \$300 million are lifted, it will not be possible for the USG to guarantee many major projects.
- Use of U.S. credit guarantees also involves substantial financial risk for the USG. The USG would be insuring sales because American firms and financiers do not want to offer credit.
- Politically, any USG decision to provide credits or guarantees could be controversial and politically risky for the President. Baltic-Americans, conservative Republican members of Congress and other human rights organizations

would oppose such a decision. They want the Administration to maintain its policy of insisting on Soviet passage of an emigration bill before taking steps to normalize the economic relationship, such as providing export credits.

- On the other hand, an increasingly vocal group of farm state congressmen, business groups and the mainline American Jewish groups contend that the President ought to waive Jackson-Vanik in order to stimulate American exports to the USSR, and to help Gorbachev cope with his difficult economic problems.

Legislative Restrictions

Jackson-Vanik, included in Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, prohibits granting government export credits/guarantees or MFN status to any nation with a non-market economy that restricts emigration. It was specifically written to deal with the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration. Jackson-Vanik has prohibited all CCC, Eximbank and other official financing programs from operating in the USSR since 1974.

In addition, three additional legislative prohibitions restrict Eximbank activities in the USSR:

- The Stevenson Amendment to the Exim Act, imposes a \$300 million ceiling on all Exim lending and credit guarantees for the USSR, and places a separate limit of \$40 million for financing of any exports related to fossil fuel production.
- The Byrd Amendment, included in the Trade Act of 1974, also prohibits any agency of the USG, except CCC, to provide export financing in excess of \$300 million without Congressional approval.
- The Marxist-Leninist Amendment to the Exim Act denies Exim financing to the USSR and other Marxist-Leninist countries unless the President declares such support to be in the national interest. Presidential determination is required for loans above \$50 million.

Administration Policy

The President announced in a May 1989 speech at Texas A+M University that he would waive Jackson-Vanik only after the Supreme Soviet had passed a bill giving Soviet citizens the legal right to emigrate. He reiterated this position several times privately to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials. Even after the President and Gorbachev signed the Trade Agreement at the Washington Summit, we cautioned that the President would not waive Jackson-Vanik and send the Trade Agreement to Congress, thereby enabling MFN, and would not seek the repeal of the other legislative restrictions until passage of an emigration bill. This is a self-imposed condition which the President could lift on his own.

The Soviets have told us consistently during the past year and a half that passage of an emigration bill is imminent. While the bill has completed its first reading in the Supreme Soviet, it has not yet been considered for final approval. With only a month left in the current session of the Supreme Soviet, it appears increasingly unlikely that it will be considered and voted on in this calendar year. During the past several months, we have seen increasing opposition to the bill from a cross-section of Soviet officials who contend that the bill's passage would stimulate a brain drain to the West, and possible mass emigration. Our best guess is that the bill will not be considered in the foreseeable future absent a major push from the U.S. (i.e. a personal request from the President to Gorbachev).

And while the practice of Soviet emigration policy has been liberalized, there are still problems (i.e., refuseniks).

III. OPTIONS

- 1) Hold To Current U.S. Policy:
State, Treasury and OMB support this option.

Pros:

- Would maintain pressure on the Soviets to pass an emigration bill, especially since they assert they will act soon.
- Would protect the President's credibility.
- Would protect the President from the charge by Baltic-Americans and others that he is not committed to human rights.
- Would probably be sustainable in the Congress. The President received letters from three Republicans and seventeen Democrats (both liberals and conservatives) in the late summer/early autumn supporting a delay until the emigration bill is passed. Most of these members belong to the Congressional Human Rights caucus.
- Avoid USG financial risk of guaranteeing a weak credit recipient.

Cons:

- Opens the President to the charge that he has failed to respond to the deteriorating economic situation in the USSR, or to help Gorbachev.
- Might appear inconsistent with Presidential pledges to normalize economic relations with the USSR.

- Appears to ignore substantial improvement in Soviet emigration practices.
- Could result in an annual loss of \$1-2 billion in agricultural sales and lessen prospects for participation by U.S. firms in several major construction and industrial projects.

2) Waive Jackson-Vanik but do not send Trade Agreement to Congress or seek MFN until the Emigration Bill is passed.

USDA and Exim support this option. USTR and Commerce are sympathetic to this option but have not taken an official position.

Should the President decide to permit Exim (up to \$300 million) and CCC credits and guarantees, he could argue that the USSR is no longer denying to its citizens the basic right to emigrate.

A Jackson-Vanik waiver would be good until July 3, 1991, after which time it could be renewed for additional 12 month periods. The initial waiver could be disapproved at any time by a majority vote in both Houses. Such a bill would not be entitled to "fast track" (no amendment - limited period). The renewal would be subject to disapproval within 60 days of July 3 by a joint resolution under "fast track" procedures.

Pros:

- Provides legal authority for Soviet access to CCC credits and limited EXIM guarantees (up to \$300 million).
- Would maintain or possibly boost U.S. farm exports to the Soviets in a period of declining sales worldwide.
- Would reward the Soviets for their human rights practices, but provide the President with leverage to continue pushing for an emigration bill. 1990 Soviet emigration is expected to be 350,000 of which 55,000 Soviets will come to the U.S.
- ~~Has~~ support in Congress. 10 Senators primarily from farm districts and including Dole, Mitchell, Packwood and Pell have written the President to support this option, along with 8 House members. The Republicans primarily represent districts and states that would gain from agricultural exports to the USSR.

Cons:

- Would reverse the President's long-held position on the necessity of Supreme Soviet passage of an emigration bill just as the Soviets assert they are going to meet it and open him to charges of insensitivity to human rights concerns.

- Would have only a limited impact since such action would not provide for MFN or removal of other legislative restrictions.
- Could decrease pressure on Soviets to pass an emigration bill quickly.
- Could strengthen those in Congress now seeking to impose additional restrictions on continuation of MFN for China.
- Puts USG in position of guaranteeing a weak credit recipient. Could expose CCC to potential losses if the Soviet economy worsens dramatically.

- 3) Waive Jackson-Vanik for extension of CCC credits only, but do not permit EXIM to operate, and do not send the Trade Agreement to the Hill, or seek MFN until Soviet passage of an emigration law.

This is a new option which has not yet been fully vetted with the agencies. The President could waive Jackson-Vanik for the sole purpose of permitting the extension of CCC credits to the USSR to secure sales of American grain during the next few months. The President would not permit a corresponding extension of EXIM credits.

Pros:

- Would maintain or possibly boost sales of U.S. grain at a time of declining sales worldwide, thereby pleasing an important constituency in the U.S.
- Would also demonstrate the President's willingness to respond to shortages of food in the Soviet Union.
- Would be viewed positively by Gorbachev.
- Would also provide the President with leverage to continue pushing for an emigration bill.

Cons:


- Would open the President to the charge that he compromised on principle for economic gain.
- Would disappoint business groups since it would not provide for EXIM, MFN or removal of other legislative restrictions.
- Puts USG in position of guaranteeing a weak credit recipient. Could expose CCC to potential losses if the Soviet economy worsened dramatically.

- 4) Waive Jackson-Vanik, send the Trade Agreement to Congress, (to provide MFN) and seek removal of legislative restrictions. Justify these steps as warranted by Soviet emigration practices.

Pros:

- Would allow short-term credits/guarantees to support agricultural and other sales to USSR.
- Assuming Trade Agreement and repeal of Byrd and Stevenson pass, it would also provide vastly increased long-term opportunities for American businesses by clearing away the most significant barriers to normal trade and investment.
- Has support in Congress. 9 Democratic Senators and 29 House members (including 5 Republicans) have urged the President to take this course to reward the USSR for its improved human rights record.

Cons:

- Would open the President to the charge that he compromised on principle for economic gain.
 - Would anger some domestic interest groups including Baltic-Americans and the Jewish Community. Jewish members of Congress and conservatives like Jesse Helms would likely oppose.
 - Would reduce incentive for Supreme Soviet passage of an emigration bill, and thus possibly reduce chance for Soviet citizens to have emigration rights embedded in law.
 - Not certain that Congress would agree to the prompt removal of legislative restrictions.
 - Puts USG in position of guaranteeing a weak credit recipient.
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RECORD ID: 9009461
RECEIVED 30 NOV 90 17
CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BURNS

DOC DATE: 30 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

ISRAEL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR SCOWCROFT MTG W/ NATL CONF ON SOVIET JEWRY ON 3 DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 04 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS
NSC CHRON
RICE

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 3/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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By SS NARA, Date 2/26/24

November 30, 1990



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the National Conference on
Soviet Jewry: Monday, December 3; 11:30 a.m.,
Room 180 OEOB

BACKGROUND

The National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) asked to meet with you to discuss the Jackson-Vanik restrictions pertaining to the USSR. The NCSJ Board will likely decide shortly after your meeting to make a high-profile public call this week for an early Presidential waiver of Jackson-Vanik before Supreme Soviet passage of an emigration law. The NCSJ, unlike some other Jewish-American groups, has never agreed with the Administration's position that an emigration law must precede a Jackson-Vanik waiver. The NCSJ believes Jewish emigration from the USSR will be better assured in the future if there is no emigration law (since that might create such a great demand that some Jews could conceivably be crowded out by other groups).

We were told by NCSJ Executive Director Martin Wenick that the NCSJ, and the Jewish community as a whole, believe the Administration has not consulted adequately on Soviet issues. He said NCSJ President Shoshana Cardin and other Jewish leaders (a list of participants is attached at Tab A) will want to focus on the Administration's policy toward the USSR, including the status of long-term refuseniks, and the problem of anti-semitism, but will most likely not try to engage you in a discussion of Middle East issues.

Suggested Points to Make

We recommend that you invite Mrs. Cardin and other members to present their views on the Jackson-Vanik restrictions and other Soviet Jewry issues. We suggest you then brief them on the Administration's current review of the Jackson-Vanik issue, and on our policy on other Soviet Jewry issues. You will want to assure the NCSJ group that we value these consultations and their unique perspective on Soviet issues.

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You may want to draw on the following points:

- I am very glad that you were able to visit today. Our last meeting just before the Washington Summit in June was most helpful, and I value your unique perspective and your long and productive work on human rights issues.
- On Jackson-Vanik, you heard the President say on Friday that we are reviewing the Administration's position. We have consulted with key Congressional leaders, and members of the business community.
- We consider this meeting to be particularly important, owing to your long and central involvement with this issue.
- I can assure you that we will let you know in advance before announcing any change in the Administration's position.
- This is a difficult issue for us. We are concerned about food shortages in the USSR and about the need to assure the continuation of American grain sales.
- But as you know, we are also committed to doing what we can to encourage the passage of a law that would give all Soviet citizens the legal right to emigrate. That is a fundamental human right which the USSR ought to provide its citizens.
- We are generally pleased with Soviet emigration practices over the past two years. The numbers alone indicate a dramatic change from the past:
 - Through September, nearly 233,000 Soviets have been permitted to emigrate in 1990 alone.
 - Roughly 106,000 of those were Jews, most of whom went to Israel.
- Despite this progress, we continue to be concerned by the problem of long-term refuseniks--there are still seven cases pending on the list of 20 that the President presented to Gorbachev at Malta.
- We have raised with the Soviets our concern on this issue and on the general problem of anti-semitism in the USSR.
- These are core issues that we will keep firmly in mind in all of our encounters with Soviet officials.

Concurrence by: David Gompert^{N3} *for*

Attachment
Tab I List of Attendees

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ATTENDEES AT NATIONAL COUNCIL ON SOVIET JEWRY MEETING

Shoshana S. Cardin
Chairman
The National Conference on Soviet Jewry

Martin Wenick
Executive Director
National Conference on Soviet Jewry

Mark Levin
Associate Executive Director
National Conference on Soviet Jewry

Seymour Reich
Chairman
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations

Malcolm Hoenlein
Executive Director
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organization

Arden Shenker
Chairman,
National Jewish Community Relations
Advisory Council

Jess Hordes
Washington Representative of the
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

Thomas Neuman
Executive Vice President
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

Alfred Moses
Chairman of the Board of American Jewish Committees

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>WEA</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft		Nat Sec Advisor	
Bill Sittmann		has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

☐ A = Action
 ☒ Information
 ☐ D = Dispatch
 ☐ R = Retain
 ☐ N = No further Action

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: