

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91119
Folder ID Number: 91119-001

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (October 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	10/3/90	(b)(1)	
02a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar and Foreign Minister Lennart Meri of Estonia (2 pp.)	10/11/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Estonian Prime Minister Savisaar and Foreign Minister Meri (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Estonian Prime Minister Savisaar and Foreign Minister Meri (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02d. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02e. Report	Re: Lennart Meri (1 pp.)	7/13/90	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)	C
02f. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Meeting with Estonian Prime Minister and Foreign (1 pp.)	10/11/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	George Van Eron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary as of October 17 (1 pp.)	10/17/90	(b)(1)	TS
03b. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
03c. Letter	Prime Minister Yatzhak Samir to President Bush (3 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	TS

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

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Series: USSR Collapse Files

Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (October 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1006

OA/ID Number: 91119-001

Date Closed: 3/2/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03d. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush (2 pp.)	10/90	(b)(1)	
03e. Cable	Re: Arms Control Letter from Prime Minister to President Bush (4 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	S
03f. Letter	Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Yevgeniy Primakov (3 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Yevgeniy Primakov (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S
04d. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	10/90	(b)(1)	
04e. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	10/90	(b)(1)	
04f. Letter	E.A. Shevardnadze to James Baker [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04g. Memo	Condoleezza Rice/Richard Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Meeting with Yevgeniy Primakov on October 19, 1990 (1 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Jackson - Vanik Options (3 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 3

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05b. Outline	Re: Jackson - Vanik Options (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Anatoliy Sobchak: Tuesday, October 30, 10:00 am (2 pp.)	10/29/90	(b)(1)	C
07a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Anatoliy Sobchak (1 pp.)	10/29/90	(b)(1)	C
07b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Anatoliy, Sobchak, Chairman of Leningrad City Council (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07d. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Anatoliy Sobchak: Tuesday, October 29, 10:00 am (2 pp.)	10/29/90	(b)(1)	C

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Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007908
RECEIVED: 04 OCT 90 10

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 03 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

PERSONS: MOISEYER

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRE GORBACHEV RE UPDATE FM NEW YORK

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 08 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS
NSC CHRON
RICE
SALVETTI, L

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7908



THE PRESIDENT

Oct. 3, 1990

Dear Mikhail -

Yesterday I had a nice visit here with Gen Moiseyev a most impressive officer.

Today I had a short visit with Vitale whom I asking to pass this note to you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

President Gorbachev

personal
country of Vitali Ignatenko

Also Monday I had a
very good visit at the
Waldorf in N.York with
Edouard Shennadze. So it
has been 3 days of good
contacts with your team.

With this note comes
my warm personal best wishes
for you. I know these times are not
easy. Good luck — George/

THE WHITE HOUSE

President Gorbachev

personal
country of Vitali Ignatenko

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 7908

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>ET-10/3</u>	<u>R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>FRP</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

900013 P4:05

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Was in OP's joint
box. Bill*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS

Ken

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008093
RECEIVED: 11 OCT 90 09

TO: PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 11 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

PERSONS: SAVISAAR, EDGAR E

LENNART, MERI

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES MTG W/ PM SAVISAAR & FOMIN MERI OF ESTONIA
ON 12 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 15 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS
NSC CHRON
RICE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 3/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: *KL*

LOG # 8093

URGENT NOT PROOFED:

SYSTEM *PRS* NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK:

DOCLOG *KL* A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
<i>Bill Sittmann</i>	<u> 1 </u>	<u> <i>W</i> </u>	<u> <i>A</i> </u>
Bob Gates	<u> 2 </u>	<u> <i>8</i> </u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u> 3 </u>	<u> <i>WEA 10/11</i> </u>	<u> <i>D</i> </u>
NSC Secretariat	<u> 4 </u>		<u> <i>N</i> </u>

90 OCT 11 P 2: 53

 A = Action *I* = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other

Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS
*Vpres meeting w/ PM & Foreign
Minister Meric 10/12*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
Spec Sec 0 for Mrs. Bush

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

8093

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

90 OCT 11 PM 10:02

2011-0769-MR

October 11, 1990

SCS 11/18/11

MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER EDGAR SAVISAAR AND
FOREIGN MINISTER LENNART MERI OF ESTONIA

DATE: October 12, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:00-10:10 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

Rg fr

I. PURPOSE

To demonstrate your support for self-determination for Estonia and the other Baltic states.

II. BACKGROUND

This will be your third meeting with Baltic leaders in the last six months (you met with Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene in May and Latvian Prime Minister Godmanis in July). You should use this brief, ten-minute meeting with Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar and Foreign Minister Lennart Meri to underscore the Administration's continued support for Baltic self-determination, and peaceful and constructive negotiations with Moscow.

Savisaar and Meri may mention several issues that Meri raised with Secretary Baker last week in New York. First, like the other two Baltic states, the Estonian government wants our support in achieving full membership in the CSCE at the Paris Summit next month. We have told the Balts that while we would support their observer status in CSCE, it is likely Moscow would use the CSCE rules of consensus to block any such bid. As for full membership, we would be glad to support it after the Balts have achieved their effective independence from Moscow.

This is a controversial issue. The Balts have orchestrated a public campaign to press their CSCE case, including a letter from a score of Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. The Estonians will listen carefully to how you describe the U.S. position.

Second, the Estonians and the other Balts fear that the international community sees the Two Plus Four talks and

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

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German unification as marking the definitive end of the Second World War, including acceptance of Soviet control of Baltic borders. We have told them repeatedly that German unification will have no adverse bearing on them or on our own position on the Baltics.

Third, Meri mentioned to Secretary Baker that an eventual U.S.-Soviet agreement on MFN would contradict the pre-1940 MFN between Estonia and the U.S. We have also told them that until they achieve their effective independence, we will not be in a position to conclude agreements like MFN with them. As we have in the past, we will continue to conclude such agreements with the Soviet Union that cover the Baltics.

The Estonian leadership is generally more moderate and flexible than either the Lithuanians or the Latvians. Estonia opened discussions with Moscow in August, for example, without prior insistence that the talks lead to independence. The Estonians broke off the talks in early September. Though there continue to be informal talks, Gorbachev appears to be delaying serious negotiations with Estonia and the other Baltic states until he can work out a new union treaty with all of the republics.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The Participants List is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by a brief, ten-minute meeting in the Oval Office

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European and Soviet Affairs, NSC (notetaker)

Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Tiina Ets, Interpreter

Estonia

Edgar Savisaar, Prime Minister

Lennart Meri, Foreign Minister

Mikhail Mutt, Assistant to the President

Arvo Jurviste, Interpreter

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CARD 1 OF 6

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
ESTONIAN PRIME MINISTER SAVISAAR
AND FOREIGN MINISTER MERI

- IT IS A PLEASURE TO WELCOME BOTH OF YOU TO THE WHITE HOUSE.
- AS YOU KNOW, I MET HERE IN MAY WITH LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER PRUNSKIENE AND IN JULY WITH LATVIAN PRIME MINISTER GODMANIS.
- THE BALTIC STATES HAVE INSPIRED US ALL, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS PAST YEAR HAS BEEN A HOPEFUL BUT CHALLENGING ONE FOR YOU.
- LET ME BEGIN OUR TALK TODAY BY REAFFIRMING TO YOU CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY MY ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON THE BALTIC STATES.
- FIRST, WE SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF ESTONIA, AS WELL AS LITHUANIA AND LATVIA, TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND A REESTABLISHMENT OF YOUR

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CARD 2 OF 6

- SOVEREIGNTY.
- SECOND, THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER RECOGNIZED THE FORCIBLE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES INTO THE USSR. I MADE THIS POINT CLEARLY AND FIRMLY TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AT THE JUNE SUMMIT MEETING.
- YOU CAN BE ASSURED THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT ALTER THIS POLICY WHILE I AM PRESIDENT.
- AS YOU KNOW, WE SUPPORT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AND WANT TO ENCOURAGE YOU TO MAINTAIN A GOOD DIALOGUE WITH MOSCOW.
- I BELIEVE THE BEST WAY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO HELP IS BY A CAREFUL POLICY OF QUIET DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT.
- WE DON'T HAVE A LOT OF TIME TODAY, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN ESTONIA, AND ALSO ABOUT YOUR NEGOTIATIONS

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AS AMENDED
2000-1197-F
03/06/2008 MM

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CARD 3 OF 6

WITH MOSCOW.

(IF THEY ASK FOR U.S. SUPPORT OF BALTIC MEMBERSHIP IN CSCE):

- WE SUPPORT YOUR PARTICIPATION AS OBSERVERS TO THE CSCE MEETINGS, BUT WE ALL UNDERSTAND THIS MAY NOT BE A PRACTICAL PROPOSITION SINCE THE CSCE OPERATES ON A CONSENSUS BASIS.
- IN ADDITION, THE U.S. SUPPORTS SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE BALTIC STATES AND THUS YOUR RIGHT, AFTER YOU HAVE RESTORED YOUR EFFECTIVE INDEPENDENCE, TO CHOOSE AND BE GRANTED FULL CSCE MEMBERSHIP.
- WE BELIEVE RESTORING YOUR INDEPENDENCE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION WITH MOSCOW.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CARD 4 OF 6

(IF THEY ASSERT THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR AGREEMENT IS HARMFUL TO THE BALTIC STATES SINCE IT MAY LEAD TO INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE BALTIC STATES AND BALTIC BORDERS WITH THE USSR):

- WE BELIEVE THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR AGREEMENT HAS NO EFFECT ON OUR NON-RECOGNITION POLICY AND NO EFFECT ON SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE BALTIC STATES.
- OUR POSITION WILL NOT CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING GERMAN UNITY. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE THE FORCIBLE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES INTO THE USSR AND WILL NOT RECOGNIZE SOVIET SOVEREIGNTY THERE.

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CARD 5 OF 6

(IF THEY ARGUE THAT A U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON MFN AND OTHER AGREEMENTS SHOULD CONTAIN A CLAUSE INDICATING THEY DO NOT PERTAIN TO THE BALTIC STATES) :

- NEITHER WE NOR YOU WANT TO DELAY THE CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENTS IMPORTANT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY SUCH AS START AND CFE.
- FURTHERMORE, MANY OF THESE AGREEMENTS WILL ACTUALLY HELP YOU IN A PRACTICAL WAY SUCH AS AN EVENTUAL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY OR MFN. BOTH WOULD HELP YOU TO ENHANCE YOUR ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE U.S.
- THE U.S. HAD AN MFN AGREEMENT WITH ESTONIA BEFORE 1940. WE SUSPENDED THE AGREEMENT AFTER WORLD WAR II IN COORDINATION WITH THE ESTONIAN LEGATION IN WASHINGTON TO PREVENT SOVIET

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CARD 6 OF 6

- AUTHORITIES FROM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF IT. SINCE WE DO NOT NOW HAVE FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT, WE CANNOT CONCLUDE A NEW MFN AGREEMENT. ONCE YOU SUCCESSFULLY RESTORE YOUR INDEPENDENCE, WE CAN DISCUSS THIS ISSUE.
- AS I HAVE SAID MANY TIMES, THE U.S. HAS STOOD UP FOR THE BALTIC PEOPLES FOR FIFTY YEARS AND WE WILL NOT DIMINISH THAT SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
ESTONIAN PRIME MINISTER SAVISAAR AND FOREIGN MINISTER MERI

- It is a pleasure to welcome both of you to the White House.
- As you know, I met here in May with Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene and in July with Latvian Prime Minister Godmanis.
- The Baltic states have inspired us all, and we understand that this past year has been a hopeful but challenging one for you.
- Let me begin our talk today by reaffirming to you clearly and unequivocally my Administration's policy on the Baltic states.
- First, we support the right of Estonia, as well as Lithuania and Latvia, to self-determination and a reestablishment of your sovereignty.
- Second, the United States has never recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR. I made this point clearly and firmly to President Gorbachev at the June summit meeting.
- You can be assured that the U.S. will not alter this policy while I am President.
- As you know, we support a peaceful solution to the problem and want to encourage you to maintain a good dialogue with Moscow.
- I believe the best way for the United States to help is by a careful policy of quiet diplomacy and public support.

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2000-1197-F

03/06/2008 MM

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- We don't have a lot of time today, but I would like to hear your assessment of the situation in Estonia, and also about your negotiations with Moscow.

(If they ask for U.S. support of Baltic membership in CSCE):

- We support your participation as observers to the CSCE meetings, but we all understand this may not be a practical proposition since the CSCE operates on a consensus basis.
- In addition, the U.S. supports self-determination for the Baltic states and thus your right, after you have restored your effective independence, to choose and be granted full CSCE membership.
- We believe restoring your independence can only be achieved through dialogue and negotiation with Moscow.

(If they assert that the Two Plus Four Agreement is harmful to the Baltic states since it may lead to international acceptance of Soviet control over the Baltic states and Baltic borders with the USSR):

- We believe that the Two Plus Four Agreement has no effect on our non-recognition policy and no effect on self-determination for the Baltic states.
- Our position will not change as a result of the negotiations preceding German unity. The U.S. will continue to oppose the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR and will not recognize Soviet sovereignty there.

(If they argue that a U.S.-Soviet agreement on MFN and other agreements should contain a clause indicating they do not pertain to the Baltic states):

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- Neither we nor you want to delay the conclusion of agreements important to international peace and security such as START and CFE.
- Furthermore, many of these agreements will actually help you in a practical way such as an eventual Bilateral Investment Treaty or MFN. Both would help you to enhance your economic links with the U.S.
- The U.S. had an MFN agreement with Estonia before 1940. We suspended the agreement after World War II in coordination with the Estonian legation in Washington to prevent Soviet authorities from taking advantage of it.
- Since we do not now have formal diplomatic relations with your government, we cannot conclude a new MFN agreement. Once you successfully restore your independence, we can discuss this issue.
- As I have said many times, the U.S. has stood up for the Baltic peoples for fifty years and we will not diminish that support in the future.

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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (October 1990)

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 10/20/2015

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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0769-MR(500.04)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/12/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information


(b)(1); (b)(3); (b)(6)

Lennart MERI
(Phonetic: mairEE)

*Foreign Minister of the Republic
of Estonia (since April 1990)*

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

USSR



A prominent writer and filmmaker—now Estonia's Foreign Minister—Lennart Meri faces a difficult balancing act. Meri, who has repeatedly praised postwar Finnish foreign policy, apparently envisions a similarly neutral and independent Estonia that will develop a policy allowing for close ties to both the Soviet Union and Europe. Meri maintains that Moscow, for its part, must recognize Estonia's restoration of independence and negotiate to resolve differences during an unspecified period of transition. He views the Baltic crisis as a test case for the Soviet Union: if the Soviets try to forcibly keep their empire together, the result will be a return to East-West confrontation. Bitterly disappointed by the lack of positive response from the the United States and Europe to the Baltic republics' moves toward sovereignty, Meri will come to Washington to convince US officials that restoring Baltic independence is in their interest. (b)(1); (b)(3); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(3); (b)(6)

Meri has stated that his top foreign policy objective is to obtain some type of official status in the CSCE process, having been refused observer status at the June CSCE in Copenhagen. In early July, Meri was sent to Vienna representing the Baltic states, in an effort to persuade the CSCE preparatory conference to grant them observer status at the November CSCE summit in Paris. (b)(1); (b)(3); (b)(6)

Meri was born around 1930. The Estonian Supreme Soviet chose him as Foreign Minister (b)(1); (b)(3); (b)(6) He speaks several languages, has a good rapport with Finnish officials, and his father was a diplomat in independent prewar Estonia. During World War II, his family was deported to Siberia but later was allowed to return to Estonia. Meri is the former director of the Estonian Institute, an organization interested in expanding Estonian cultural contacts with other nations. He was elected to the Estonian Citizens Congress and has contacts with the Estonian Popular Front. (b)(1); (b)(3); (b)(6)

(b)(1); (b)(3); (b)(6)

LDA M 90-14338
13 July 1990

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0769-MR
6/12/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8093

October 11, 1990

Brent,

*You may want to call
The President's attention
to the points on Baltic part. again
in the CSCE because the U.S.
position is very delicately
balanced. The Estonians will
pay close attention to what The Preside
says.*

CR

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Estonian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister *Says.*

Attached at Tab I is the briefing memo to the President for his October 12 meeting with Estonian Prime Minister Savisaar and Foreign Minister Meri. Contrary to what we had been told earlier in the week, Estonian President Rutell decided not to travel from Estonia to attend the meeting.

David Gompert *MG* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-1197-F
03/06/2008 MM

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SITTMANN
VAN ERON

DOC DATE: 12 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
USSR
ITALY

ISRAEL
HUNGARY
SRI LANKA

PERSONS: SHAMIR, YITZHAK
ANTALL, JOZSEF

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
ANDREOTTI, GIULIO

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY FOR 12 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 16 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON LOGREF: 9008115 9008147

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

*Shamir
Gorbachev
Antall
Andreotti* } *only*

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 3/2/90

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 1 OF 1

Head of State Comm.

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: LMS LOG # 8145
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG W/A A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill <u>File</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>File</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>File 10/22</u>	<u>2</u>
NSC Secretariat			

90 OCT 17 P 7: 39

APNSA Has Seen

20 File 10/19

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action
cc: VP Sununu Other _____
Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Per Sec Of As diskette

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG #

8145

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	5	OK M19	N
NSC Secretariat	6	9/10/22	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

See note from Pres at
Tab D (send copy
to action ofc)

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH TOP~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8145

October 17, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN *WFS*
FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON *GEV*
SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence Summary
as of October 17

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence received by the Secretariat since Wednesday, October 10.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/17/2012

Attachments

Tab I	Summary for the President	
Tab A	PM Shamir	- Israel
Tab B	President Gorbachev	- Soviet Union
Tab C	PM Antall	- Hungary
Tab D	PM Andreotti	- Italy
Tab E	President Premadasa	- Sri Lanka
Tab F	President Gaviria	- Colombia
Tab G	President Hassan	- Djibouti
Tab H	Secretary General Perez de Cuellar	- UN

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH TOP~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

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**DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET**

8145

SCS 2/25/13

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

**Prime Minister Shamir of Israel - October 15, 1990
(Received October 16)**

PM Shamir is "appalled and offended" by the recent UN Security Council Resolution regarding Jerusalem and is hurt by the U.S. position. He feels that the Council ignored the fact that Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall "were subjected to an unprovoked attack by an unprovoked Arab mob on a Jewish festival day." He is also offended that the Council referred to Israel's holiest shrine, the Temple Mount, by its Muslim-Arab name. Israel regrets the loss of life resulting from the riot and has appointed an independent inquiry committee to investigate the incident. Israel decided not to receive a UN Investigating Commission because it would mean a "surrender" of their sovereignty in Jerusalem.

PM Shamir supports your actions in the Gulf. Yet, he cannot be expected to permit the Arabs "to exploit this sensitive circumstance in order to harm Israel's vital interests." He agrees with Secretary Baker on the need to put this incident behind us "so as to focus on the real issues confronting us."

**President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union - October 12, 1990
(Received October 15)**

President Gorbachev reports on a meeting between his personal envoy, Ye.M.Primakov, and Saddam Hussein. Primakov presented an objective view of the consequences of war to Iraq and the entire region, however, Saddam Hussein countered with an attempt to justify the annexation of Kuwait with regard to Iraq's national security. Nevertheless, after all of the rhetoric, Hussein indicated that there is the possibility of "a political settlement of the Gulf crisis involving the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait." Primakov believes that the most important thing for Saddam Hussein is to "save face." Shevardnadze has also sent Secretary Baker a more detailed account.

**Prime Minister Antall of Hungary - October 10, 1990
(Received October 15)**

PM Antall praises the agreements reached by Secretary Baker and Shevardnadze regarding crucial issues of the CFE Treaty. He is convinced that the CFE Treaty can be prepared for signing at the CSCE Summit in Paris. He is also ready to keep the momentum going after the signing of the Treaty to continue CFE/CSBM talks without any recess.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2009-0958-MR
SCS 2/25/13

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

Hungary, as well as other Warsaw Pact states, continues to review the Warsaw Treaty since its "strategic objectives, political essence, and legal obligations" have been surpassed by history. In the changing European situation, Hungary hopes to establish friendly relations with its neighbors and join European institutions. Early in November, the European Council is expected to accept Hungary's membership. NATO Secretary General Worner and WEU Secretary General Van Eekelen are also meeting with Hungarian officials in the next few weeks.

History has shown to Antall that the participation of the U.S. in European affairs is "indispensable for preserving stability." Therefore, he is confident that the CSCE Summit in November will "not only declare the end of the division of Europe, but will also lead to the establishment of a new security system." Finally, he looks forward to meeting you on October 18.

Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy - October 9, 1990
(Received October 15)

PM Andreotti believes that the UN Security Council will pass a resolution condemning Israel for the recent incident in Temple Mount. He also fears that a U.S. veto would create confusion in the Arab world and ruin your efforts to defend an Arab country against aggression. President Mitterrand also shares his concerns.

President Premadasa of Sri Lanka - October 5, 1990
(Received October 16)

President Premadasa seeks support in the form of development assistance. In the past year, Sri Lanka has suppressed terrorism and restored peace in the South. He believes that this peace will continue only if there is economic growth which the World Bank and the IMF have helped in the past year. However, the Gulf crisis is having a serious effect on their economy.

President Gaviria of Colombia - September 21, 1990
(Received October 12)

President Gaviria appreciates the photos of his visit on July 13.

President Hassan of Djibouti - September 23, 1990
(Received October 17)

President Hassan seeks aid for Djibouti's economy which is being ruined by the Gulf Crisis. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have cancelled several projects which had been guaranteed financing. He continues to support the UN resolution, but warns that Djibouti "cannot survive indefinitely without aid."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Letter	Prime Minister Yatzhak Samir to President Bush (3 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (October 1990)

Date Closed:	3/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	91119-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush (2 pp.)	10/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (October 1990)

Date Closed:	3/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	91119-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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8186

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PRT: GOMPERT SITTMANN VANERON

SIT: HUTCHINGS PRES-MSGS RICE FILE VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 121639Z OCT 90

FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1165

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 12620

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM. HU

SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER
- TO PRESIDENT BUSH.

1. (X) ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON OCTOBER 12, MFA PRESENTED EMBASSY WITH A
LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER ANTALL TO PRESIDENT BUSH.
MFA'S UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FOLLOWS IN PARA 3.
SIGNED ORIGINAL, IN HUNGARIAN, HAS BEEN POUCHED
TO DEPARTMENT (REGISTRY 5693005).

3. BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONORABLE
GEORGE H. W. BUSH,
PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
BUDAPEST, OCTOBER 10, 1990

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

WHILE I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR FORTHCOMING MEETING,
ALLOW ME TO TAKE THE VALUABLE POSSIBILITY AGAIN AND
CONTINUE OUR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING
SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ISSUES.

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE CONGRATULATION
FOR THE AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN SECRETARY BAKER AND HIS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0958-MR
SCS 9/23/13

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

SOVIET COLLEAGUE ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUES OF THE CFE TREATY. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE CFE TREATY CAN BE PREPARED FOR SIGNING AT THE PARIS CSCE SUMMIT AS A RESULT OF THE SUCCESSFUL TALKS IN NEW YORK AND AT THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE CSCE COUNTRIES. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO LIMIT ALL THE FIVE CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS UNDER THIS TREATY IN ORDER TO FULLY MEET ALL EXPECTATIONS. DUE TO THE SHORT TIME AHEAD, VERY INTENSIVE WORK IS REQUIRED IN VIENNA. I INSTRUCTED THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION TO MAKE GREAT EFFORT TO FACILITATE THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE TALKS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF ITS POSSIBILITIES.

IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE IMPETUS OF THE TALKS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE CFE TREATY, WE ARE READY TO CONTINUE THE CFE/CSBM TALKS WITHOUT ANY RECESS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT MANDATE AND WITH THE PRESENT PARTIES INVOLVED. IN PARALLEL TO THIS, THE ELABORATION OF THE MANDATE OF THE NEW ROUND OF TALKS PLANNED TO START IN 1992, COULD ALSO COMMENCE. I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY, WE INTENSIVELY CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING THE WARSAW TREATY, WHICH WAS INITIATED

BY HUNGARY WITH THE PERSPECTIVE OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ORGANIZATION. HUNGARY PROCEEDS FROM THE FACT, THE HISTORY HAD SURPASSED THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, POLITICAL ESSENCE AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS INCLUDED IN THE TREATY. IT IS INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO HARMONIZE THESE OBLIGATIONS WITH OUR INTERNATIONAL ENDEAVOURS AND ORIENTATION. MY GOVERNMENT WISHES TO PURSUE A CONSEQUENT AND PRECAUTIOUS "REALPOLITIC" IN THIS ABOVE ISSUE. THIS ALSO INCLUDES THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE JUSTIFIED SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE, AND WE WOULD BE READY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

TO OFFER GUARANTEES IN THE FIELD OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS NOT TO ALLOW THE EMERGENCE ON HUNGARIAN TERRITORY OF ANY DANGER THREATENING THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

IN THE RAPIDLY CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROPE, HUNGARY ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH STABLE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, INTENDS TO JOIN THE EFFECTIVELY FUNCTIONING EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, AND SEEKS THE OPPORTUNITIES OF COOPERATION WITH THEM.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE IS EXPECTED TO MAKE A POSITIVE DECISION ON HUNGARY'S ACCEPTANCE IN EARLY NOVEMBER. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NEW ORIENTATION OF OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS, HUNGARY INITIATED TO ACHIEVE ASSOCIATED MEMBERSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES WITH THE PERSPECTIVE OF BECOMING A FULL MEMBER. SUBSTANTIVE TALKS TO THIS EFFECT HAS ALREADY STARTED. IN THIS CONTEXT, I PROPOSED TO ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI DURING OUR RECENT MEETING TO DEVELOP FOREIGN POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNITIES AND HUNGARY.

BT

#2620

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUDAPEST 12620

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, HU

SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER
WE ARE EXPECTING NATO SECURITY GENERAL MR. WORNER AND
WEU SECRETARY GENERAL MR. VAN EEKELEN TO BUDAPEST IN
THE FOLLOWING WEEKS. WE WISH TO TAKE BOTH
OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE AND REGULARIZE COOPERATION
BETWEEN THESE ORGANIZATIONS AND HUNGARY.

THE FUTURE OF HUNGARY LIES IN OUR INTEGRATION TO
EUROPE, WHICH DOES NOT REDUCE TO ANY EXTENT THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE MANIFOLD AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HUNGARY.

I BELIEVE THAT SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS AGREEMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS EMERGING FROM THE PROCESS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE SHALL CREATE THE PILLARS OF THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. MY STUDIES OF HISTORY LED ME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IS INDISPENSABLE FOR PRESERVING THE STABILITY IN EUROPE. THAT IS THE REASON WHY I ATTACH PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO NATO AND CSCE PROCESS AMONG THE EXISTING AND NEWLY

EMERGING INSTITUTIONS AS THEY INCLUDE THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA IN FORMULATING THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE. THE FORA OF HELSINKI PROCESS ALSO PROVIDES POSSIBILITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO ESTABLISH COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP AND RELATIONS WITH THE UNIFYING EUROPE.

THEREFORE I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE CSCE SUMMIT OF THE 34 PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES IN PARIS THIS NOVEMBER WILL NOT ONLY DECLARE THE END OF THE DIVISION OF EUROPE, BUT WILL ALSO LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM.

I HOPE THAT OUR FORTHCOMING MEETING WILL PROVIDE US THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES AS WELL. LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR MEETING, ALLOW ME TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEND YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, MY BEST REGARDS AND PLEASE ACCEPT THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

YOURS SINCERELY,

(S) (JOZSEF ANTALL).

END TEXT.

THOMAS

BT

#2620

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

FROM PRIME MINISTER GIULIO ANDREOTTI
TO PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

*Brent
Be sure he
gets a good
response*

Dear Mr. President,

The extremely serious incident in Jerusalem occurred just as all of us are working to see to it that a definitive solution to the Kuwaiti problem is achieved by the peaceful means which were so clearly re-emphasized both in your speech to the UN on Monday and in our subsequent meeting at the Waldorf Astoria. The risk of complications which would precipitate the situation is grave and I do believe that the Security Council will adopt a resolution which will not rupture the unity which so far has been the solid foundation on the basis of which it has been possible to react effectively to the arrogant Iraqi initiative. A US veto would retrigger exceedingly dangerous polemics which would cause confusion regarding the attitude of the United States toward the Arabs, just when you are making such costly efforts to defend an Arab country victim of aggression and to prevent another Arab country from suffering the same violence. Moreover, I consider what you said to be more valid than ever, namely, that it is not possible to think in terms of simultaneous solutions for Kuwait, Palestine, and Lebanon, but that the commitment not to forget the existence of the latter two problems must be reaffirmed, notwithstanding the urgency and priority of the restoration of the rule of law in Kuwait.

Last evening I was in Paris with President Mitterand who shares these concerns and hopes.

With warmest greetings and best wishes,

Giulio Andreotti

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008292
RECEIVED: 17 OCT 90 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 18 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
KUWAIT

PERSIAN GULF
MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS: PRIMAKOV, YEVGENIY
HUSSEIN, SADDAM

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PRIMAKOV ON 19 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 20 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT

HAASS

NSC CHRON

RICE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/2/99

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
8292

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 OCT 18 PM 11:27

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

October 18, 1990

2009-0958-MR

SLC 9/23/13

MEETING WITH YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV

DATE: October 19, 1990

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the crisis in the Gulf; hear first hand Primakov's account of his meetings in Baghdad; and underscore the importance that you attach to Soviet support for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Primakov must understand that you are not interested in a partial solution to this crisis.

II. BACKGROUND

Yevgeniy Primakov has just returned from Baghdad where he met with Saddam Hussayn as a special envoy from Gorbachev. According to the Soviets, the purpose of Primakov's visit was two-fold: to deliver a very strong message to Saddam that he must withdraw from Kuwait in order to avoid his own destruction and that of his country; and to try and obtain the release of Soviet citizens who are being held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait. Primakov succeeded in obtaining the release of 1500 of the roughly 5000 Soviet citizens in Iraq. It is not clear, however, whether he delivered the kind of tough message to Saddam that we might have hoped. Rather, there is some evidence that he might have gone to Baghdad as a first step in producing a political deal that would allow Saddam to "save face."

Shevardnadze's chief assistant, Sergei Tarasenko, has told us confidentially that Primakov will float a peace proposal with you. According to Tarasenko, **Shevardnadze objected strongly to Primakov's trip to the United States and to the proposal that he allegedly intends to make. Shevardnadze was overruled by Gorbachev.** We do not know the details but the proposal is probably a package deal which links Iraqi withdrawal from most of Kuwait (perhaps with the exception of the Bubiyan and Warbah islands and/or the Rumailah oilfield) with a broader solution to the problems of the Middle East. If Sergei Tarasenko's tip is accurate, it confirms our suspicions of a significant

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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difference of opinion between Shevardnadze and Primakov on Soviet Gulf policy. You will remember the discernible difference between Gorbachev's presentation to you at Helsinki (probably written by Primakov) and the one that Shevardnadze was making simultaneously to Jim Baker.

Since Helsinki, Shevardnadze has repeatedly cast Soviet policy in a way that is directly supportive of the U.S. approach. His suggestion last month at the U.N. that military force might be legitimately used against Saddam provoked a fire storm in Moscow and he has had to "clarify" his position. Primakov, on the other hand, is an old-style Arabist who is seeking, at a minimum, to preserve Soviet equities with Iraq and the Palestinians. He has a great deal at stake personally in the outcome of the Gulf crisis since he is widely rumored to be a candidate to succeed Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister.

Gorbachev has been very supportive of our policy to now, but there are strong cross-pressures operating on him. The differences between Shevardnadze and Primakov, his two principal advisors, are playing out against a backdrop of deep concern in Moscow that war with Iraq would undoubtedly spread, engendering instability throughout an already unstable region. The Soviet periphery is, after all, less than 400 miles from Baghdad and Iran borders the turbulent Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Soviet military is worried that Moscow's current course -- so supportive of the U.S. position -- will disadvantage the Soviet Union in the long-term, particularly if the United States uses military force, establishes a presence in the region and develops strong new security relationships with Syria and other states in the region. Finally, some in Moscow have come to the conclusion that -- without diplomatic intervention of some kind -- U.S. policy will inevitably lead to war.

The Soviets (or at least some of them) are thus starting to temporize and search for solutions -- often exaggerating the likelihood of a diplomatic outcome. Primakov returned from Baghdad and announced publicly that he believed a diplomatic solution was available. In his letter to you, Gorbachev said that Saddam is ready for a negotiated solution but needs only to find a way to "save face." If Gorbachev is looking for a way out of this crisis, he could begin to lean toward a compromise.

It is thus very important that you reiterate our view that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait must be absolutely unconditional and that we should not reward Hussayn for his aggressive act. Primakov must leave knowing beyond a shadow of a doubt that a partial solution or linkage of the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to a broader Middle East settlement is unacceptable to you. Even the slightest hint of interest

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in his "package deal," should he present one, would strengthen Primakov's hand and risks undermining the solid support that we have enjoyed from Moscow. That in turn would only reinforce Saddam's intransigence. Worse, it might start to endanger the wider acceptance of our objectives by our European and Arab allies.

You may also wish to use this opportunity to reiterate to Primakov that we consider the Soviet Union a full partner in our Gulf policy. There has been some grumbling in Moscow that the Soviet Union is showing weakness and is in Washington's "hip-pocket" in the Gulf. (You will recall Gorbachev's unhappiness at not being told in advance of our deploying forces to Saudi Arabia.) Reciprocity and equality are important to the Soviets at this time of grave domestic difficulty and the attendant crisis of legitimacy that they are experiencing. You may thus want to ask for Primakov's views of the upcoming resolutions in the U.N. on reprovisioning embassies still open in Kuwait and on reparations stemming from what Iraq is doing in Kuwait.

III. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

IV. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by meeting in the Oval Office.

Attachments

Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Primakov Biography
Tab D	Gorbachev letter to you re Gulf crisis
Tab E	Shevardnadze letter to Secretary Baker

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2009-0958-MR
SCS 9/23/13

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV

- I very much look forward to hearing your personal impressions of the Iraqi leadership, the situation there, and diplomatic prospects.
- Let me say that we very much appreciated hearing directly from President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze about your trip.
- Before you give us your views, it might be useful if I stated a few things about our thinking.
- We believe it essential that Saddam not be rewarded in any way for his aggression. We absolutely are not interested in partial solutions which in reality are no solution at all. Saddam must withdraw unconditionally and the legitimate government of Kuwait must be returned to power.
- Compromising at all on any of this will strengthen Saddam's hand, and in the long run threaten not only Gulf security but also the prospects for peace between Israel and the Arab states.
- Similarly, we believe that there must be no linkage of the Palestinian question to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
- Any of this would only make Saddam a figure of gigantic proportions in the region and strengthen him greatly, thereby putting the entire region at even greater risk.
- We want to accomplish the withdrawal of Kuwait peacefully, using sanctions and diplomacy. But we are prepared to consider the alternatives if sanctions are clearly not

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working or if Saddam further provokes us. We would hope that in so doing we could continue to work successfully with your government and the Security Council.

- Our two governments have worked closely since this crisis began. This cooperation has been important as a signal to Saddam that he is truly isolated. And this cooperation has been an important demonstration that US-Soviet relations are truly changed. Helsinki was an important milestone.
- We are looking at a number of additional resolutions in the Security Council that might add further to Iraq's isolation. In particular, we are interested in getting new supplies to embassies still open in Kuwait City; failing this, we want to get our people out. We also need to call attention to what Iraq is doing in Kuwait. Reparations and placing Iraq's leaders on notice that they may be tried for war crimes seem to us to be appropriate responses.
- We remain interested in diplomacy. I think the UN Secretary General may be best positioned to do this, so long as it is understood that diplomatic efforts are consistent with Resolution 660 and its successors and does not simply become a cover for prolonged Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
- Let me just stop here. I would only add that I am pleased you could visit and that I look forward to hearing your impressions of the situation in Baghdad and in the Gulf.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the President for Near East Affairs, NSC Staff
Condoleezza Rice, Special Assistant to the President for Soviet Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Dennis Ross, Director for Policy Planning, Department of State
Dmitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

USSR

Yevgeni Primakov, Member of the USSR Presidential Council
Alexander Bessmertnykh, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Robert Markarian, Special Assistant to Primakov (Notetaker)
Georgiy Markosov, Counselor
Yevgeniy Zolotov, Interpreter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (October 1990)

Date Closed:	3/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	91119-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	10/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (October 1990)

Date Closed:	3/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	91119-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04e. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	10/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (October 1990)

Date Closed:	3/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	91119-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

James,

As a follow-up on our telephone conversation of October 7, I wish to inform you in more detail on the substance of the discussions of Presidential Council member E.M.Primakov with Iraqi leaders and with the PLO Executive Committee Chairman Y.Arafat.

As I told you before, E.Primakov was sent to Bagdad as a special representative of the USSR President in order to resolve the matter of bringing back to the Soviet Union those our specialists who thus far have not been able to leave Iraq because of the virtually open opposition on the part of that country's authorities. This is causing a lot of problems to us, since of the five thousand people who remain in Iraq about two thousand insist that their return to the home country be arranged as soon as possible. The issue disturbs our country's public opinion as well.

The discussion of this matter with President Hussein and other members of the Iraqi leadership proved rather difficult, because the Iraqi side, using formal pretexts, kept saying that a departure of such a large number of Soviet specialists would only be possible if they could be replaced by those from among local residents, which would, allegedly, take some time. As a result of an intense argument, we succeeded in reaching agreement with Saddam Hussein that 1,500 of our people would leave within one month.

We were also quite emphatic in insisting before the Iraqi leaders on the inadmissibility of keeping citizens from other, first of all, Western countries, as a "human shield". It was emphasized that such actions by Bagdad are being extremely strongly condemned all over the world, that they discredit Iraqi leaders in the eyes of the world public opinion and will not prevent a large-scale military action against Iraq, if things come to that. From the remarks by Foreign Minister T.Aziz one

could form the impression that on this matter there are certain differences of opinion in Bagdad.

Another objective of E.M.Primakov's trip to Iraq, no less important, was to explore, and even to strongly press for, the possibility of S.Hussein fundamentally changing his position, above all on the issue of Iraqis' withdrawal from Kuwait.

During his meeting with the Iraqi President, E.M.Primakov, pursuing an energetic and convincing line of reasoning, strongly urged him to display a sense of realism, emphasizing that the Soviet Union and the international community as a whole would never accept the annexation of Kuwait.

Although to justify his Kuwaiti adventure S.Hussein advanced the largely well-known set of arguments, our representative still had the impression that there emerged some new nuances in the Iraqi position. S.Hussein was no longer saying that the annexation of Kuwait's was "final and irrevocable", and in the course of the conversation several times stated his readiness to look for a political solution to the crisis, and did not reject, in principle, the possibility of pulling out the Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

In a one-on-one meeting S.Hussein finally conceded that withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait would be possible - but not in conditions of the ultimatum: either a withdrawal, or a military strike on Iraq. In this case, said the Iraqi President, Bagdad refuses to change anything in its current position, and a military action against it would entail large-scale actions by Iraq that would be devastating for many countries. E.M.Primakov understood the Iraqi President to primarily imply a simultaneous destruction of all oil fields on the Arabian peninsula.

At the same time, S.Hussein was quite clear and unambiguous in saying that a political solution of the Kuwaiti crisis must be a "package" one, that is, must include not only Iraqi "concessions", but such "meet-you-half-way" elements that would

enable the Iraqi leader to save face before his own people and in the Arab world at large. From S.Hussein's remarks one could conclude that, in specific terms, he was referring to real progress in achieving the settlement of the Palestinian problem and giving Iraq secure access to the Persian Gulf.

As the discussions suggested, S.Hussein fears that even after getting out of Kuwait Iraq will remain blockaded in some way, while the Iraqi President himself will never again be an acceptable figure in Western eyes. This definitely makes the choice in favor of a political solution more difficult for him.

The subject of terrorism was raised before the Iraqis, and particularly before Y.Arafat, with utmost frankness. The Soviet representative stressed that carrying out terrorist actions against the United States and other countries would spell disaster for Iraq and the Palestinian cause. The PLO Executive Committee Chairman showed full understanding of our arguments and gave relevant assurances.

By and large, from a preliminary analysis of E.M.Primakov's discussions in Bagdad the impression is that the clear and unequivocal refusal of the international community to accept the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, the adoption of energetic Security Council resolutions to this effect are resulting in an appreciable, if slow, sobering of S.Hussein. Our representative even had the impression that people in the immediate entourage of the Iraqi President are afraid to report to him the true situation obtaining around Iraq. Observations suggest that the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council's decisions against Iraq are beginning to have their effect as well.

Those are our general impressions from E.M.Primakov's discussions in Bagdad. We intend to discuss the results of his trip in detail, and if we have some additional considerations with respect to the future course of action about the situation in the Persian Gulf, I shall be ready to share them with you.

Sincerely,

E.A.SHEVARDNADZE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 18, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE/RICHARD HAASS (RH)

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Yevgeniy Primakov on
October 19, 1990

Attached at Tab I is the briefing memo to the President for his meeting with Yevgeniy Primakov.

David Gompert concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Biography
Tab D	Gorbachev letter to the President re Gulf crisis
Tab E	Shevardnadze letter to Secretary Baker

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/17/2012

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008313
RECEIVED: 18 OCT 90 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BURNS
RICE
DEAL

DOC DATE: 18 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
EXPORT CONTROLS

INTL TRADE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: JACKSON - VANIK OPTIONS RE POLICY TWDS USSR

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 22 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 18, 1990

8313

CHRON FILE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA *Rice* / TIM *Deal*

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

SUBJECT: Jackson-Vanik Options

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen



I. Issue

Per your instructions, we followed up on your recent conversation with Secretary Yeutter by informally canvassing the interagency community on whether or not the President should waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment before the Soviets pass an emigration bill in order to boost agricultural sales and other U.S. exports to the USSR.

We wrote a paper (attached at Tab I) to focus the issue and the debate, and presented it, containing the following options, to the agencies:

- 1) Hold to Current Policy
- 2) Immediate Presidential waiver of Jackson-Vanik with the primary objective of promoting agricultural sales, but no action on the Trade Agreement or MFN until the emigration bill is passed
- 3) Immediate Jackson-Vanik waiver, Congressional action on Trade Agreement, MFN and removal of other legislative restrictions to allow unimpeded U.S.-Soviet trade

II. Agency Positions

As expected, the agencies were split in their recommendations to the President. While there was no support for Option three, the agencies divided on the first two options, as follows:

Option One: Supported by State, Treasury and OMB because they believe that holding to the Administration's policy would preserve the President's credibility with conservative Republicans and human rights groups, maintain pressure on the Soviets to pass an emigration bill, and avoid the risk of guaranteeing a weak credit recipient.

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Option Two: Supported by USDA and EXIM, and in principle by Commerce and USTR (Secretary Mosbacher is supportive of the need to boost agricultural sales to the Soviets but wanted an opportunity to discuss with you and others the implications for the President of shifting policy before an emigration bill is passed). These agencies argue waiving Jackson-Vanik now would permit U.S. farm exports in a period of declining sales worldwide and preserve our place in the Soviet market. Availability of Exim facilities, even on a limited scale, would also promote exports of manufactured goods and enable U.S. firms to participate in several major construction projects. They believe the waiver could be justified by Soviet emigration practices.

Congressional reaction on this issue is mixed. Holding to the current Administration position is sustainable in Congress, but there is also important Farm belt support for a waiver of Jackson-Vanik to allow agricultural sales.

III. NSC Staff Recommendation

NSC staff is unanimous in its strong support of Option One-maintaining the current policy of waiting for the Supreme Soviet to pass an emigration bill before going ahead with credits/guarantees and other USG programs to normalize the economic relationship.

We are concerned that a waiver of Jackson-Vanik before the emigration bill passes would hurt the President's credibility with human rights organizations such as Baltic-Americans and members of the Jewish community. The President's record on human rights is not seen by these groups as particularly solid. An early waiver would confirm those attitudes.

We also think that an early waiver would send the wrong signal to the Soviets. The President and Gorbachev have discussed this issue several times, and they reached an understanding on it at the Washington Summit when the President agreed to sign the trade agreement. While it is in our interest to normalize the economic relationship, it is of even greater importance for Gorbachev. The President already met him halfway in June. Rather than ask the President to take another hit at home with domestic opponents, we ought to make it clear to Gorbachev that it is now his turn to bite the bullet. Passage of the emigration bill would unlock the trade agreement, MFN and give him access to USG credits and guarantees. We believe that maintaining pressure on the emigration bill will eventually convince him that he has to act if he wants our economic relationship to go forward in a meaningful way.

These factors, we believe, outweigh potential losses in agricultural sales which are difficult to quantify in any case. Furthermore, given the Soviet Union's presently poor credit rating the Administration could come under fire if the Soviets default on these annual credits, which is certainly a real possibility.

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This issue should also not be confused with the question of food aid to the Soviets. They have not asked us for food aid but are interested in normal agricultural purchases so long as we provide credit for a substantial portion of their needs. Should a genuine emergency arise, we could provide a limited amount of food under other programs which are not subject to Jackson-Vanik restrictions. We do not underestimate the importance of the Soviet market to our agricultural producers. But we believe we should continue to give precedence to broader interests, namely, policy consistency, the maintenance of the President's credibility both with the Soviets and certain domestic groups, and the codification of present emigration practices.

David Gompert and Ginny Nampley concur.

Attachment

Tab I Options Paper

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JACKSON-VANIK OPTIONS

I. ISSUE

Whether to provide a Jackson-Vanik waiver to permit the extension of USG credits and guarantees to the USSR.

II. BACKGROUND

Demand for Export Financing

Secretaries Yeutter and Mosbacher, EXIM Chairman Macomber, and other senior Administration officials are concerned the U.S. is losing commercial opportunities in the Soviet market due to legislative restrictions that prohibit official credits and guarantees for grain and other U.S. exports.

Once a cash customer for most foreign goods, the Soviet Union now relies heavily on credit. Given the Soviet Union's dismal economic situation and questions about its creditworthiness, government guarantees are needed to reassure nervous commercial bankers to provide financing. Other governments, including Germany, France, Italy and Canada, provide this coverage to promote exports to the USSR. France, for example, has offered official credit guarantees for 3 million tons of wheat conditioned on the cash purchase of an additional 1 million tons of wheat from EC stocks. The Soviets have, also recently, requested from the U.S. \$2.5 billion in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credit guarantees for grain, vegetable oil and livestock purchases.

Soviet creditworthiness is marginal and declining. Until the outlook improves, there is substantial risk that the Soviet Union may seek debt relief on any official credits extended by the USG for the following reasons:

- The Soviet Union's balance of payments will be under considerable strain over the next several years because of disruption of normal export channels in the transition from central planning to free enterprise and continued strong import demand.
- Soviet external debt is rising and reserves are falling at a rapid rate.
- The Soviets have delayed meeting scheduled external payments, an early sign of diminished creditworthiness.
- Uncertainties about the division of political power between the central government and the Republics have caused additional concern among potential lenders.

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Deciding whether or not to loosen these restrictions presents the Administration with a difficult choice with significant foreign and economic policy implications.

- On the economic side, the most immediate concerns come from the agricultural community and its supporters on Capitol Hill who fear the loss of a formerly lucrative market in the USSR. U.S. agricultural exports to the USSR totaled nearly \$3.5 billion in the 1990 crop year, but may fall substantially in 1991. The Soviets have made no agricultural purchases from the U.S. for four months and did not meet their FY-90 commitments under the bilateral grains agreements. USDA contends that authority to provide \$1 billion in guarantees would ensure continual annual sales of around \$2-3 billion.
- Wheat prices are down roughly a third from year ago levels, a situation brought about by increased production and falling exports. We are now five months into the 1990 wheat marketing year and U.S. export sales worldwide are 24% below last year. Our failure to sell wheat to Soviets would exacerbate this problem.
- Many major U.S. corporations are also pressing us to relax the restrictions. Exim receives 15 to 20 calls per week concerning its possible support for U.S. exports to the USSR. Asea-Brown-Bovari of Connecticut, for example, recently requested a \$1 billion Exim guarantee for construction of a petrochemical plant in the USSR. This transaction would be the first of several of a similar magnitude. Upjohn, Inc. is also interested in a \$1.2 billion Exim loan guarantee for construction of a Soviet pharmaceutical plant. IBM has a major computer project for the USSR, the first tranche of which totals \$65 million. IBM will provide the computers either from the U.S. or from its European subsidiaries depending on the availability of official export credits and/or guarantees. Nevertheless, until the legislative restrictions which limit Exim credit guarantees to \$300 million are lifted, it will not be possible for the USG to guarantee many major projects.
- Use of U.S. credit guarantees also involves substantial financial risk for the USG. The USG would be insuring sales because American firms and financiers do not want to offer credit.
- Politically, any USG decision to provide credits or guarantees would be controversial and politically risky for the President. Baltic-Americans, Jewish groups, conservative Republican members of Congress and other human rights organizations would oppose such a decision. They want the Administration to maintain its policy of insisting on Soviet passage of an emigration bill before taking steps to normalize the economic relationship, such as providing export credits.

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Legislative Restrictions

Jackson-Vanik, included in Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, prohibits granting government export credits/guarantees or MFN status to any nation with a non-market economy that restricts emigration. It was specifically written to deal with the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration. Jackson-Vanik has prohibited all CCC, Eximbank and other official financing programs from operating in the USSR since 1974.

In addition, three additional legislative prohibitions restrict Eximbank activities in the USSR:

- The Stevenson Amendment to the Exim Act, imposes a \$300 million ceiling on all Exim lending and credit guarantees for the USSR, and places a separate limit of \$40 million for financing of any exports related to fossil fuel production.
- The Byrd Amendment, included in the Trade Act of 1974, also prohibits any agency of the USG, except CCC, to provide export financing in excess of \$300 million without Congressional approval.
- The Marxist-Leninist Amendment to the Exim Act denies Exim financing to the USSR and other Marxist-Leninist countries unless the President declares such support to be in the national interest. Presidential determination is required for loans above \$50 million.

Administration Policy

The President announced in a May 1989 speech at Texas A+M University that he would waive Jackson-Vanik only after the Supreme Soviet had passed a bill giving Soviet citizens the legal right to emigrate. He reiterated this position several times privately to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials. Even after the President and Gorbachev signed the Trade Agreement at the Washington Summit, we cautioned that the President would not waive Jackson-Vanik and send the Trade Agreement to Congress, thereby enabling MFN, and would not seek the repeal of the other legislative restrictions until passage of an emigration bill. This is a self-imposed condition which the President could lift on his own.

The Soviets have told us consistently during the past year and a half that passage of an emigration bill is imminent. The bill has completed its first reading in the Supreme Soviet but has not yet been considered for final approval. In mid-September, Prime Minister Ryzhkov told Secretary Mosbacher that the Supreme Soviet would consider and pass the bill by the second half of October. We now understand, however, that the Supreme Soviet will not consider the bill this month and may not get to it until November or December at the earliest. And the practice of Soviet emigration policy has been liberalized, there are still problems (i.e., refuseniks).

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III. OPTIONS

State, Treasury and OMB support this option.

1) Hold To Current U.S. Policy:Pros:

- Would maintain pressure on the Soviets to pass an emigration bill, especially since they assert they will act soon.
- Would protect the President's credibility.
- Would protect the President from the charge by Baltic-Americans and others that he is not committed to human rights.
- Would be sustainable in the Congress. The President has received letters from three Republicans and seventeen Democrats (both liberals and conservatives) supporting a delay until the emigration bill is passed. Most of these members belong to the Congressional Human Rights caucus.
- Avoid USG financial risk of guaranteeing a weak credit recipient.

Cons:

- Might appear inconsistent with Presidential pledges to normalize economic relations with the USSR.
- Appears to ignore substantial improvement in Soviet emigration practices.
- Could result in an annual loss of \$1-2 billion in agricultural sales and lessen prospects for participation by U.S. firms in several major construction and industrial projects.

2) Waive Jackson-Vanik but do not send Trade Agreement to Congress or seek MFN until the Emigration Bill is passed.

USDA and Exim support this option. USTR and Commerce are sympathetic to this option but have not taken an official position.

Should the President decide to permit Exim (up to \$300 million) and CCC credits and guarantees, he could argue that the USSR is no longer denying to its citizens the basic right to emigrate.

A Jackson-Vanik waiver would be good until July 3, 1991, after which time it could be renewed for additional 12 month periods. The initial waiver could be disapproved at any time by a majority vote in both Houses. Such a bill would not be entitled to "fast

track" (no amendment - limited period). The renewal would be subject to disapproval within 60 days of July 3 by a joint resolution under "fast track" procedures.

One potential obstacle to using a Jackson-Vanik waiver to permit Exim credit guarantees to the USSR is the proposed Leahy amendment to the Senate Foreign Operations bill currently under consideration. The amendment would effectively prohibit the USSR's access to Exim programs until it had been accorded MFN.

Pros:

- Provides legal authority for Soviet access to CCC credits and limited EXIM guarantees (up to \$300 million).
- Would maintain or possibly boost U.S. farm exports to the Soviets in a period of declining sales worldwide.
- Would reward the Soviets for their human rights practices, but provide the President with leverage to continue pushing for an emigration bill. 1990 Soviet emigration is expected to be 350,000, of which 55,000 Soviets will come to the U.S.
- Has support in Congress. 10 Senators primarily from farm districts and including Dole, Mitchell, Packwood and Pell have written the President to support this option, along with 8 House members. The Republicans primarily represent districts and states that would gain from agricultural exports to the USSR.

Cons:

- Would reverse the President's long-held position just as the Soviets assert they are going to meet it and open him to charges of insensitivity to human rights concerns.
- Would have only a limited impact since such action would not provide for MFN or removal of other legislative restrictions.
- Could decrease pressure on Soviets to pass an emigration bill quickly.
- Could strengthen those in Congress now seeking to impose additional restrictions on continuation of MFN for China.
- Puts USG in position of guaranteeing a weak credit recipient. Could expose CCC to potential losses if the Soviet economy worsens dramatically.

- 3) Waive Jackson-Vanik, send the Trade Agreement to Congress, (to provide MFN) and seek removal of legislative restrictions. Justify these steps as warranted by Soviet emigration practices.

Pros:

- Would allow short-term credits/guarantees to support agricultural and other sales to USSR.
- Assuming Trade Agreement and repeal of Byrd and Stevenson pass, it would also provide vastly increased long-term opportunities for American businesses by clearing away the most significant barriers to normal trade and investment.
- Has support in Congress. 9 Democratic Senators and 29 House members (including 5 Republicans) have urged the President to take this course to reward the USSR for its improved human rights record.

Cons:

- Would open the President to the charge that he compromised on principle for economic gain.
- Would anger some domestic interest groups including Baltic-Americans and the Jewish Community. Jewish members of Congress and conservatives like Jesse Helms would likely oppose.
- Would reduce incentive for Supreme Soviet passage of an emigration bill, and thus possibly reduce chance for Soviet citizens to have emigration rights embedded in law.
- Not certain that Congress would agree to the prompt removal of legislative restrictions.
- Puts USG in position of guaranteeing a weak credit recipient.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008564
RECEIVED: 29 OCT 90 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BURNS
RICE

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 29 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

ANSA

PERSONS: SOBCHAK, ANATOLIY

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT MTG W/ SOBCHAK / OCT 29

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 01 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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RICE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 2

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8564

October 29, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *COL*
FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Anatoliy Sobchak: Tuesday,
October ~~30~~, 10:00am

Setting

Sobchak will be in Washington for three days as part of a week-long visit to the U.S. In addition to your meeting, he will see Governor Sununu, Secretaries Baker and Mosbacher and Ambassador Hills. He asked for an appointment with the President, but we told his office it would not be possible to confirm one. He does not know that the President may drop by your meeting. We will have a White House photographer available. A participants list for the meeting is at Tab B.

Points to Raise

We have attached at Tab A suggested points for the President's use in his drop-by.

Our principal objective is to demonstrate our support for the reform process by meeting with one of its principal proponents. We would suggest that you focus your meeting on a few, broad issues:

- Stress our interest in broadening our contacts with key figures in Republic and city governments, without taking sides in the USSR's internal political debate;
- Ask for his views on recent internal developments, including:
 - The economic reform debate and economic conditions;
 - The union talks and prospects for continued center/periphery disagreement on constitutional issues;
 - Emergence of a multi-party system.
- You might also discuss Sobchak's plans to pursue radical measures to reform the Leningrad economy.

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Biography

A biography on Sobchak is attached at Tab C. Some highlights:

- Sobchak is one of three leading Soviet opposition figures, along with Yeltsin and Moscow Mayor Popov. He is rumored to be a possible Prime Minister in any future coalition government of national unity.
- Was elected Chairman of the Leningrad City Council (equivalent to Mayor) in Spring elections.
- He is also a Supreme Soviet Deputy and is a leader of the radical Interregional Group.
- Sobchak resigned from the Communist Party after this past summer's party congress.

David Gompert  concurs.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be made (for the President)
Tab B Participants
Tab C Biography

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008564
RECEIVED: 29 OCT 90 10

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 29 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

ANSA

PERSONS: SOBCHAK, ANATOLIY

SUBJECT: MTG W/ SOBCHAK ON 30 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 01 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS

NSC CHRON

RICE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 3/2/90

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 2 OF 2

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 8564

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG R A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	<u>10/30</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

WWD - Replaced
cover memo. VP, Co S,
our copies, BS+RMG have
been replaced

Wey

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8564

90 OCT 29 PM 10:13

October 29, 1990

MEETING WITH ANATOLIY SOBCHAK

DATE: October 30, 1990

LOCATION: My Office

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To meet Anatoliy Sobchak, one of the Soviet Union's bright young progressive politicians.

II. BACKGROUND

You are scheduled to drop by my meeting with Anatoliy Sobchak the progressive and popular young Mayor of Leningrad. Sobchak is one of three leading Soviet opposition figures, along with Yeltsin and Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov. He is rumored to be a possible Prime Minister in any future coalition. He left the Communist Party after this past summer's party congress and has been critical of Gorbachev for the slow pace of economic reform.

III. PARTICIPANTS

At Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Sobchak will meet with me and you will join when it is convenient for you.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography of Sobchak

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0959-MR
SCS 12/2/13

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
ANATOLIY SOBCHAK, CHAIRMAN OF LENINGRAD CITY COUNCIL

- I am very pleased to meet you and want to welcome you to the United States and to the White House.
- I apologize for not having been able to confirm a meeting in advance. While my schedule did not permit a longer session, I am very pleased to have the chance to talk for a few minutes.
- First, I want to thank you for your hospitality to our Presidential Business Development Mission led by Secretary Mosbacher last month. Our business leaders were all most impressed by your commitment to free market economics and political pluralism.
- We are serious about expanding trade and investment between our two countries and we hope to work with the central government, as well as republic and city governments to promote a much deeper economic relationship.
- I understand you have made economic development one of your top priorities in Leningrad. How can we promote trade and investment in your city?
- I also want you to know that we support the process of reform in the USSR, which includes political pluralism, the development of a multi-party system, and the rule of law. I would be interested in your views on how you see these issues unfolding in the coming months.
- I know from my conversations with President Gorbachev, whom I respect very much, that this is a crucial period for your

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country, specifically because you are considering
fundamental shifts in the economy and in center-republic
relations. I would appreciate your thoughts on the outcome
of the economic reform debate and the union talks.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President (will drop-by)

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Condoleezza Rice, Special Assistant to the President for Soviet Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Dmitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

USSR

Anatoliy Sobchak, Chairman of the Leningrad City Council

Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Ambassador to the U.S.

Nikolai Yegorov, Aide to Sobchak

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (October 1990)

Date Closed:	3/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	91119-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8564

October 29, 1990

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 - Emergence of a multi-party system.
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Declassify on: OADR

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Tab B Participants
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