Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91118
Folder ID Number: 91118-009

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Up-Date on Helsinki Meeting Preparations (2 pp.)	9/3/90	(b)(1)	C
02a. Outline	Re: Meeting with President Mauno Koivisto of Finland (2 pp.)	9/7/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Finnish President Koivisto (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02d. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	2/17/88	(b)(1)	C
02e. Report	Biography Re: Harri Hermanni Holkeri [redacted] (2 pp.)	1/16/90	(b)(1); (b)(3)	C
02f. Report	Biography Re: Pertti Paasio [redacted] (2 pp.)	2/5/90	(b)(1); (b)(3)	S
02g. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Meeting with President Koivisto of Finalnd (1 pp.)	9/7/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Your Meeting with Gorbachev in Helsinki (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1004
OA/ID Number: 91118-009
Date Closed: 2/27/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made on Regional Issues and the Gulf Situation (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03c. Report	Re: Briefing (6 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	TS
03d. Report	Re: Moscow's Economic Stake in Iraq (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(3)	C
03e. Table	Re: Soviet Economic Transactions with Iraq (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(3)	C
03f. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made on European Security Issues (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03g. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made on Economic and Technical Cooperation (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03h. Talking Points	Re: Human Rights/Wallenberg Case (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03i. Talking Points	Re: Baltics (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03j. Report	Re: Soviet Economic Reform at a Crossroads (3 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1); (b)(3)	C
03k. Report	Re: Status of the Union Treaty (5 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1); (b)(3)	C
03l. Report	Re: Moscow's Relations with the Baltic Republics (5 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1); (b)(3)	S
03m. Talking Points	Re: START (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03n. Talking Points	Re: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03o. Talking Points	Re: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03p. Talking Points	Re: Chemical Weapons (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03q. Talking Points	Re: Biological Weapons (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03r. Talking Points	Re: INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03s. Talking Points	Re: Nuclear Testing (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03t. Talking Points	Re: NPT Review Conference (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03u. Talking Points	Re: MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03v. Talking Points	Re: Open Skies (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03w. Talking Points	Re: Super Conducting Supercollider (SSC) (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03x. Talking Points	Re: Space Cooperation Initiatives (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03y. Talking Points	Re: Angola (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03z. Talking Points	Re: Asia (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03za. Talking Points	Re: Central America and Cuba (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03zb. Talking Points	Re: South Asia (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03zc. Talking Points	Re: Environment (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03zd. Talking Points	Re: New Office Buildings (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03ze. Talking Points	Re: Kiev/New York Consulates General (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03zf. Talking Points	Re: Malta Student Exchange Initiative (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03zg. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S
03zh. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/9/90	(b)(1)	C
03zi. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	8/17/90	(b)(1)	S
03zj. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	8/2/90	(b)(1)	S
03zk. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/14/90	(b)(1)	C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03zl. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S
03zm. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	C
03zn. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	8/20/90	(b)(1)	C
03zo. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	8/21/90	(b)(1)	S
03zp. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	C
03zq. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/14/90	(b)(1)	S
03zr. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/14/90	(b)(1)	S
03zs. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S
03zt. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1004
OA/ID Number: 91118-009
Date Closed: 2/27/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007017
RECEIVED: 05 SEP 90 09

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BURNS
RICE

DOC DATE: 03 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

1

KEYWORDS: USSR
PERSIAN GULF
AFGHANISTAN
FINLAND
CAMBODIA
CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
KOIVISTO, MAUNO

SUBJECT: UP DATE RE HELSINKI MTG PREPARATIONS 4 - 5 SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 08 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BURNS
		NSC CHRON
		RICE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cal NARA, Date 2/27/09

COMMENTS: _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

September 3, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE NB for

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Up-Date on Helsinki Meeting Preparations

We have worked with White House Advance, State and CIA over the weekend to coordinate preparation for the President's September 9 meeting with Gorbachev in Helsinki. The following summarizes the most important developments.

Advance Preparations

The White House Advance team arrives in Helsinki on September 4 to begin work with the Finns and the Soviet team on September 5. Following Condi's discussions with you, they will work to locate a neutral site for the meetings (probably the Presidential Palace which the Finns have offered). They are fully briefed on your instructions on the number and type of meetings and on participation.

They will seek a bilateral for the President with Koivisto on Saturday. They will also politely turn down Koivisto's offer to host the working lunch on Sunday.

Pre-Departure Briefings for the President

Per your discussion with Condi, we will schedule for Thursday and/or Friday two one-hour briefings. We suggest these be classified, internal USG briefings.

The first will cover Soviet domestic politics focussing on Gorbachev's current engagement in the federation talks, economic reform deliberations, and the consequences of rapid political decentralization for his internal position. CIA will provide two five-minute presentations, followed by discussion.

The second briefing will be on regional issues, including the Gulf crisis, Cambodia and Afghanistan. Richard Haass and Dennis Ross will provide two short presentations, followed by discussion.

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2008-0748-MR
SCS 4/23/12

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Legislative Meeting

We will also work with Ginny Lampley to arrange a Presidential meeting with the Congressional leadership at the end of the week to discuss the President's objectives for the Gorbachev meeting.

Allied Consultations

We are sending to you today draft Presidential letters to key allied leaders via privacy channels. We will also provide a general letter to other allied leaders, letters to selected East European leaders, and talking points for the neutral and non-aligned countries. After you concur with the draft letters and talking points, we plan to send them on Tuesday.

Meeting with Soviet Charge

We met with the Soviet Charge, Chetverikov, today to give him our ideas on the basic structure of the meetings, participation, logistics etc. The Soviets share our views on these matters. We will stay in touch with him this week to make sure we share the same plans for the meeting.

Briefing Materials

We have designed a single, small briefing book for the President's use which we will give to you on Wednesday for review. It will include draft presentations on 1) the Gulf crisis and other regional issues for the morning meeting; 2) The importance of wrapping up the current European agenda including the Two Plus Four talks and CFE so that a CSCE Summit can be held. This will give the President a framework in which he can reiterate the need to wrap up the arms control agenda without requiring him to deal with the details of the negotiations; and 3) Bilateral (mostly economic technical cooperation) issues for the afternoon session. We will also include CIA background papers on each of these issues, and a last section of contingency talking points on major issues.

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		N
NSC Secretariat	3		N LOG FRP

90 SEP 5 A8:28

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

BUSHUM HILL

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007094
RECEIVED: 06 SEP 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HUTCHINGS
RICE

DOC DATE: 06 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
FINLAND
SUMMIT
MEDIA

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON HELSINKI MTG ON 7 SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 10 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF: 9006961 9006969

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HUTCHINGS
		NSC CHRON
		RICE

COMMENTS: _____

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UNCLASSIFIED

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7094



Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

September 6, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE AHB for CR

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: Your September 7 Press Backgrounder on the Helsinki Meeting

Attached are points for your use in backgrounding the press on the President's meeting with Gorbachev in Helsinki. The initial points seek to get the press to begin thinking of these meetings as part of a regular dialogue, without extravagant expectations for new breakthroughs. We recognize this is not an easy task.

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw on the attached points for your backgrounder.

Attachments
Tab I Points to be Made

CHRON FILE

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PRESS BACKGROUNDER

-- As you know, the President will be meeting with President Gorbachev in Helsinki for a full day of discussions on Sunday, September 9.

-- We see this as the continuation of a regular pattern of dialogue and discussion, much as the President has with any number of key foreign leaders.

-- The President wants to address a range of issues about which he and President Gorbachev need to speak personally. The agenda will be broad and open, as was their meeting in Malta and their informal meeting at Camp David during the Washington Summit.

-- The very fact of these kinds of meetings demonstrates how much the relationship has changed for the better.

-- One of the President's objectives at Helsinki will be to encourage continuing Soviet support for the international effort against Saddam Hussein.

-- As we are in the midst of what might be seen as the first post-Cold War crisis, it is important that the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate effectively, setting a tone and pattern for a new kind of U.S.-Soviet relationship. We can also demonstrate that, in this new era, the United Nations can work as it was initially intended to work.

-- But the meeting will not be only about the Gulf. When President Gorbachev was in Washington in early June, he and the President agreed to meet regularly, and there are a number of items springing from the Washington Summit that need discussion.

-- The President will give another push to our arms control agenda -- in CFE, so that we can move forward to a CSCE Summit in Paris in November, as well as at START.

-- The two leaders will also discuss other broad questions involving European security, including the initiatives put forward by NATO in the London Summit Declaration.

-- They will certainly want to discuss regional issues, particularly Afghanistan and Cambodia, as well as a number of bilateral issues.

-- The meeting will also be an opportunity for the President to hear President Gorbachev's views of the domestic political situation, particularly in light of the discussions of the establishment of new federal relations between the Republics and the Union and the continuing economic reform debate.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007041
RECEIVED: 05 SEP 90 18

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 07 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

1

KEYWORDS: FINLAND
AP
PERSIAN GULF
VISIT
USSR

PERSONS: KOIVISTO, MAUNO

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PRES KOIVISTO OF FINLAND

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 08 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CoQ NARA, Date 2/27/09

COMMENTS: _____

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National Security Council
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SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____

Finland Chairs the Sanctions Committee of the UN. Shouldn't we make some reference to the humanitarian food issue? P

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres M NSC/S — 9/7
ORIGINAL GIVEN TO FLO GANTT @ 18:51

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Ltr Sec'd

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National Security Council
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Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	[illegible]	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	2	9/10	_____
NSC Secretariat	3	_____	N/R
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON September 7, 1990

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MAUNO KOIVISTO OF FINLAND

DATE: September 8, 1990
LOCATION: Helsinki, Finland
TIME: 11:55 a.m.-1:25 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To strengthen U.S. - Finnish relations and exchange views on the USSR and the Gulf Crisis.

II. BACKGROUND

Your meeting and lunch with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto, Finland's most prominent and popular politician, gives you an opportunity to cement our relations with a good friend of the U.S. Koivisto is pleased that you and President Gorbachev decided on Helsinki as your meeting site since it burnishes Finland's self-image as a continued bridge between the USSR and the West, even in the post-Cold War world. In addition to the September 8 meeting and lunch, you will also see President and Mrs. Koivisto at the September 9 lunch with Gorbachev.

Your prime objective in the meeting should be to convey to Koivisto your interest in continuing close and good relations between our two countries. Koivisto has not been to the U.S. on official business since 1983 and is planning a private visit next spring. We understand he would be delighted were you to invite him for an official working visit at that time.

Koivisto is an astute observer of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union and considers himself to be somewhat of an expert on Soviet affairs. He would, therefore, appreciate a detailed briefing from you on your objectives for the meeting with Gorbachev. You should also take advantage of the meeting to seek his views on the multiple problems now confronting the Soviet Union. Koivisto knows Gorbachev fairly well and likes him although he is generally cautious in his dealings with the Soviets.

Koivisto may also offer insights on the Baltic situation. The Finns are ethnically related to the Estonians and have been quietly supportive of all three of the Baltic states, but careful not to offend Soviet political sensitivities. Finland's approach, which emphasizes the right of the Balts to self-determination, is compatible with our own policy.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Koivisto will be interested in hearing your view of the Gulf crisis and will probably inquire about possible U.S. actions should sanctions fail to dislodge Saddam from Kuwait. He will be particularly interested in your view of the prospects for continued close U.S.-Soviet coordination in the UN and elsewhere on the Gulf situation.

Koivisto might also want to raise European architecture issues. Finland favors a continued U.S. presence in Europe. As a leading neutral, however, Finland has responded cautiously in determining how to react to the new openings in East-West relations. Koivisto is contemplating the possibility of eventual EC membership, but he is concerned that ongoing talks on expanding the scope of the EC-EFTA free trade area may not succeed, thereby leaving Finland on the periphery of a dynamic EC 92 trading bloc. The Finnish approach to CSCE is close to our own, and Koivisto has no illusions that it can substitute for NATO and other security arrangements. Finland will host the 1992 CSCE Review Conference.

Finally, your meeting provides an opportunity to encourage Finland's purchase of an F-16 or F-18 package worth $500 million, with an option for another $500 million. To date Koivisto has remained above the internal maneuvering on this sale; the French and Swedes are lobbying hard.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open Photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Short meeting with President Koivisto in his office, followed by a working luncheon.

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biographies

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
FINNISH PRESIDENT KOIVISTO

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2009-0954-MR
SCS 4/29/13

OVERVIEW OF U.S.-FINNISH RELATIONS

-- I am delighted to be back in Finland. I have good memories of my visit here in 1983. And it is good to see you again, Mr. President.

-- Our meeting and lunch today and the lunch tomorrow will give us an opportunity to exchange views on a number of important issues.

-- But, before we go any further, I want you to know I was surprised to learn that your last visit to my country was in 1983. So I hope you will be able to accept my invitation to return in 1991 on an official visit.

-- I would be interested in discussing any outstanding questions you would like to raise on our bilateral relations.

-- I am very pleased with the state of our relationship. I think our two countries share many common views on the European security issues and German unification. I really value your advice on a range of issues, as well, and hope we will remain in contact until you visit us in the U.S.

-- I also want you to know how much confidence I have in our very capable Ambassador, John Weinmann, who is enjoying his stay here.

-- If you would permit me, I would just like to raise one last issue--military sales. I know that Finland is considering purchase of an advanced fighter aircraft and that you are considering the F-16 and F-18. Both are superb aircraft, and I hope you would give them every consideration.

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

-- Turning to my meetings tomorrow with Gorbachev, I want you to know first how grateful I am for your willingness to host us both at such short notice.

-- You and your country have a reputation for graciousness which is well deserved, and I very much appreciate the chance to take advantage of your hospitality for this meeting.

-- As I mentioned in our phone conversation last week, I initiated this meeting because I thought it was time for Gorbachev and I to have a chance to meet quietly, as we did at Camp David, to discuss the range of issues affecting our relationship.

-- The Gulf will be at the top of our agenda, but it is by no means the only issue I plan to discuss. I plan to review the situation in Europe with the imminent unification of Germany, and also the arms control issues we want to conclude this year--CFE and START.

-- I also plan to present some ideas on how we can move forward in our bilateral economic relationship.

-- You know Gorbachev and the Soviets as well as anyone. I would be very interested in your insights into the multiple problems he faces at home.

-- I would also welcome any advice you may have before we meet tomorrow.

-- I would be particularly interested in what you think will develop in the Baltics since you know them so well, probably better than any other European leader.

-- Your willingness to allow Soviet Jews to transit Finland en route to Israel has been very helpful and is much appreciated.

GULF SITUATION

-- On the situation in the Persian Gulf, I very much appreciate the constructive role Finland has played as a member of the UN Security Council in the five key resolutions on the crisis.

-- I applaud your support of the sanctions, and the principled stand you have taken, along with many other countries, of refusing to close your embassy in Kuwait.

-- On sanctions, I am concerned that some countries are weakening by interpreting too liberally the provision on humanitarian food assistance.

-- I know that Finland chairs the UN sanctions committee, and I would appreciate it if you would do everything you can to make sure that the integrity of the sanctions is not violated.

-- I would point out that Saddam Hussein still claims there aren't desperate shortages of food in Iraq. It is thus difficult to make a convincing case for humanitarian food aid at this point.

-- I think it was critically important to have such outstanding international agreement on the resolutions, particularly from the Soviets.

-- Saddam Hussein is trying to make this conflict into the U.S. against Iraq when it is actually, as your know well, the international community against him.

-- My view is that we cannot back down on our agreed objectives

of a complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal, the restoration of the legitimate government and the safe return of all hostages.

-- We're going to have to do the best we possibly can to maintain the sanctions to meet those objectives. I understand from President Ozal and others that the sanctions are already working. The Iraqis are feeling the heat.

EUROPEAN AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- I know you are a keen observer of events in Europe, and I would be interested in your thoughts specifically about security arrangements for the future.

-- As new opportunities open in East-West relations and EC 92 approaches, where do you see areas for us to cooperate more fully?

-- We have a mutual interest in making the EC decision-making process more transparent and accessible to non-members.

-- As you re-examine your own longterm plans vis-a-vis the EC, we hope to keep in close touch on our bilateral trade and economic relations.

-- Our two countries are both trading nations with a common interest in liberalizing the world system.

-- I hope that Finland will play a constructive role in achieving progress on agricultural issues in the GATT Uruguay Round.

(If Koivisto expresses concerns about CFE)

-- I understand your concern that a CFE agreement might make Soviet forces in the North relatively stronger than in Central Europe. We remain committed to a CFE outcome that strengthens security for all states and works against no

one's interests.

(If Koivisto repeats Finnish request to participate in Open Skies)

-- We remain committed to obtaining an effective Open Skies regime, and are pursuing informal contacts to that end.

-- Negotiations are in recess pending completion of the CFE in Vienna.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
John G. Weinmann, U.S. Ambassador to Finland
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Condoleezza Rice, Special Assistant to the President for Soviet Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Finland

Mauno Koivisto, President

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	2/17/88	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Report	Biography Re: Harri Hermanni Holkeri [redacted] (2 pp.)	1/16/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 11/6/2013

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0954-MR (501.04)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/18/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

(b)(1); (b)(3)

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501.04

Harri Hermanni HOLKERI **FINLAND**
(Phonetic: HOLEkairee)



Prime Minister (since April 1987)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

Harri Holkeri, a moderate member of the right-of-center National Coalition Party, heads a historic left-right, four-party coalition. (Finland's second-largest party, the NCP—often called the Conservative Party—is in the government for the first time since 1966.) His government has been known for his party's readiness to minimize differences with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), one of its coalition partners. (b)(1); (b)(3) (b)(1); (b)(3) (b)(1); (b)(3) he has avoided partisan stands and has agreed on many issues with President Mauno Koivisto (who belongs to the SDP). (b)(1); (b)(3) (b)(1); (b)(3) (b)(1); (b)(3) He ran unsuccessfully for president in 1982 and in 1988, losing mostly because people did not perceive a significant difference between him and Koivisto. (b)(1); (b)(3) (b)(1); (b)(3)

Economic Policy

The main goal of Holkeri's government has been to implement a "reform of working life" program intended to cushion the impact of structural economic changes. He has said that Finland has to compete in the world economy and has urged cooperation among business, labor, and government so that the nation can meet its economic challenges. Traditional labor-business antagonisms have not abated, however, and the press has questioned Holkeri's leadership abilities and has criticized him for flip-flopping. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Holkeri says that Finland's neutrality rules out its membership in the EC. He has also said, however, that while Finland will not enter into any arrangements with the EC that would limit its sovereignty, closer cooperation is desirable. He wants to strengthen the European Free Trade Association; he says that improved cooperation between the EFTA and the EC offers Finland the best way to defend its own interests. He notes that Danish membership in the EC is important because Denmark can "smuggle" the Scandinavian lifestyle and high standard of living into the EC, thus avoiding south European domination and lower standards. Holkeri has said that his country must increase exports to reduce its current account deficit, but he realizes that Helsinki cannot expect to find open markets abroad while using subsidies to protect its agriculture. Nonetheless, he thinks Finland will never completely eliminate agricultural subsidies. Instead, Holkeri has introduced a program to reduce public spending; he says that taxes will have to be raised if expenditures are not cut back. (b)(1); (b)(3)

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0954-MR
SCS 5/18/12

(cont.)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Foreign Policy

Although President Koivisto handles foreign relations, Holkeri has been active in promoting Finnish economic interests abroad. He has made several trips to Western Europe to discuss economic integration and to Eastern Europe to talk about expanding economic ties. He does not think that recent events in Eastern Europe will have an immediate effect on the European order or disturb West European integration. Holkeri, who chairs the Fenno-Soviet Economic Commission, has expressed pessimism over the ability of the Soviet Union to institute true reforms; nonetheless, he has said that, if the Soviets open their markets to the West, Finland must be prepared for increased competition in its trade with the East. (b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Holkeri has emphasized the potential for cooperation with the Soviet Union in such areas as the development of natural resources, travel and tourism, and environmental protection. He identifies disarmament as an area in which the West can help Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and favors turning northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone to help alleviate East-West tension. He has called for a step-by-step, realistic approach to disarmament with priority given to each nation's security concerns. He generally supports traditional Finnish positions on confidence-building measures and naval arms control, fearing that tensions will grow in Northern Europe as disarmament in Central Europe progresses. (b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Most observers, including Soviet leaders, view Holkeri as the person most responsible for moving the NCP toward the center. As party chairman during 1971-79, he wanted the NCP to win acceptance as a possible government coalition member and therefore committed the party to backing welfare state legislation and reaffirmed its support for Finland's policy of maintaining neutrality and close relations with the Soviet Union. He also tried to make the party more palatable to Moscow and encouraged its members to have informal contacts with Soviets. Rightwing members of the NCP have regarded Holkeri as being too soft on the Soviet Union, but his handpicked successor as NCP chairman, Ilkka Suominen, has continued his policies. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Career and Personal Data

Holkeri was born on 6 January 1937. He holds a master's degree in political science. During 1961-71 he was a newspaper editor. In 1965 he became secretary general of the NCP. Elected to the Eduskunta (parliament) in 1970, he served on that body's Foreign Affairs Committee. He left the Eduskunta in 1978 to serve in the post of director of the Bank of Finland, where he was regarded as a senior statesman. Holkeri has served on the Helsinki city council since 1969. He was chairman of the council from 1981 until assuming his present position. He is currently on a leave of absence from both the Bank of Finland and the city council. (b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

The press describes Holkeri as a natty dresser. A cross-country skier, he tries to ski 1,000 kilometers every winter. He also enjoys jogging and hiking. He has been to the United States many times and speaks fair English. Married to the former Marja-Liisa Lepisto, he has two children. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02f. Report	Biography Re: Pertti Paasio [redacted] (2 pp.)	2/5/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 11/6/2013

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0954-MR (501.05)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/18/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Pertti PAASIO **FINLAND**
(Phonetic: PAHseeoh)

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501.05



Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs (since January 1989)

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

Social Democratic Party (SDP) Chairman Pertti Paasio has limited foreign policy experience and has taken a cautious approach as Foreign Minister, concerning himself with only major issues. Much of his time is devoted to parliamentary and party activities. Paasio, who describes himself as a leftwinger with an "ear on the center line," is more a labor-oriented Social Democrat [(b)(1); (b)(3)]

[(b)(1); (b)(3)]

[(b)(1); (b)(3)]

Focus on the Environment

Paasio has declared the environment his number-one priority in foreign policy. He is pushing former Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa's proposals for environmental protection of the Arctic, including a conference on the subject, and says that Finland is seeking full membership in the Consultative Committee of the Arctic. Taking a multilateral approach to environmental issues, he has called on the UN to create a permanent and prominent place for the environment on its agenda. He has also urged industrialized countries to offer experience and expertise to Third World countries. In relations with Moscow, he has stressed the importance of the environment, noting that much of the pollution in Finland originates in the Soviet Union. [(b)(1); (b)(3)]

A Bridge Between the Blocs

A strong defender of Finnish neutrality, Paasio stresses the importance of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's recent recognition of Finland's neutrality. He notes that Finland's status enables the country to serve as a bridge between East and West. Paasio points out that Fenno-Soviet relations have become more open and pragmatic and says that dealings with Moscow are increasingly routine. He has called for greater trade between the USSR and Finland. Nonetheless, he has taken a wait-and-see attitude toward Soviet reforms, and during 1989 he reacted cautiously to Gorbachev's Helsinki proposals for increased contacts between the Soviet Union and the Nordic countries. [(b)(1); (b)(3)]

Paasio has generally taken a more optimistic view of recent developments in Eastern Europe than have his counterparts at the Ministry of Defense. Having served as chairman of the parliamentary committee that dealt with relations between the Finnish Social Democratic Party and the East German Socialist Unity Party, he has a special interest in East Germany and has maintained good contacts in the Eastern Bloc. Nevertheless, he has expressed concern about the possibility of German reunification, saying that it could

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(cont.)

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2009-0954 MR
SCS 5/18/12

destabilize Europe. He argues that the changes in Eastern Europe underscore the need for a CSCE summit in 1990. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Although Paasio is apprehensive about the economic situations in Poland and Hungary, he is cautious about providing aid to these countries and has called for the West to coordinate its efforts to avoid antiquated and wasteful projects. He notes that the political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe could change Finland's trade and economic status with Eastern Bloc countries considerably. He has also pointed out that the possibility of applications for membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) from Hungary and other East European countries could complicate talks between the EC and EFTA (of which Finland is a member). Nevertheless, he is optimistic about the prospects for an EC-EFTA agreement on free movement of goods, services, and labor. Paasio is also concerned about the direction of political developments in the Baltic republics, which became economically autonomous in January 1990. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Although Paasio is not an expert on arms control matters, he has emphasized the importance of confidence-building measures in the current conventional force negotiations in Vienna. He has said that it is not sensible to exclude north European countries from talks on conventional arms control in Central Europe and has added that Finland will continue to promote stability and security in the region. Paasio advocates increased attention to the issue of weapons at sea. He was once a member of the Nordic Parliamentary Committee for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone. However, he supports President Mauno Koivisto's approach of discussing the issue only within government channels. (b)(1); (b)(3)

A frequent visitor to Cuba, Paasio is experienced in Latin American affairs. He has a keen interest in Latin America's democratization process and agrees with the United States on the need to push for democratic evolution in Nicaragua. In addition, he has been an active supporter of a Middle East peace settlement, calling for an international conference to resolve the dispute. Describing Israel's refusal to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization as impractical, he has argued that Palestinians have a right to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Career and Personal Data

Paasio was born on 2 April 1939. He is the son of Rafael Paasio, who served as Prime Minister during 1966-68 and again in 1972. The younger Paasio received a degree in political science from the University of Turku in 1968. In 1965 he entered local politics as a Turku City Council member, a position he still holds. He was secretary for tourism in Turku from 1967 until 1973 and director of labor there during 1973-87. He worked as a political secretary for the Finance Minister in 1972 and for the Prime Minister in 1975. Paasio was a member of parliament during 1975-79; he regained his seat in 1982. He has been a member of the SDP Executive Committee since 1978. He chaired the SDP Parliamentary Group from 1984 until 1987, when he became SDP chairman. He is a member of the World Peace Council Presidium. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Paasio has traveled to the United States several times. He speaks English, Swedish, and German. (b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3) Paasio enjoys photography, music, and the theater. Married, he has four children.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

5 February 1990

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7041

September 7, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with President Koivisto of Finland

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting and lunch with President Koivisto of Finland in Helsinki on September 8.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biographies

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/15/2012

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007435
RECEIVED: 19 SEP 90 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MOSBACHER, R

DOC DATE: 07 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

1

KEYWORDS: USSR
SUMMIT
CM
ECONOMICS

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BUSINESS ISSUES FOR THE HELSINKI SUMMIT & LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN PRES BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION TO THE USSR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 22 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 9006961 9006969

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	90091915	NOTED BY PRES

#7435

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

90 SEP 7 A9:09

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT A. MOSBACHER

SUBJECT: BUSINESS ISSUES FOR THE HELSINKI SUMMIT

At the Helsinki Summit, you may wish to raise some issues with President Gorbachev which we believe can improve the opportunities for U.S. business to increase trade and investment with the U.S.S.R.

1. Energy Development. Since oil exports are the largest source of foreign exchange for the U.S.S.R., increasing oil production is a top priority of the Soviet Government. The six energy companies accompanying JAB and me on your trade mission (majors, independents, drillers and suppliers) can help reverse the decline in oil production as investors, joint venture participants, contractors and equipment sellers. There is a need for an ombudsman in the Soviet government to help overcome bureaucratic and regulatory barriers to U.S. involvement. President Gorbachev should consider creating such a position -- this would provide added impetus to energy development from the top levels of U.S.S.R.

2. Property Rights. The U.S.S.R. needs to develop and implement a system to protect property rights, including good and merchantable title. The notion of an open investment policy and other elements of a commercial code will come into place from these efforts.

3. Privatization. Foreign investors, especially U.S. business, need the Soviet government to clarify plans for privatization. The proposed joint venture law has serious flaws which might inhibit rather than encourage foreign participation in privatization. President Gorbachev's advisors should consider amendments to these proposals. Additionally ambiguities about the decision making process and the nature of contingent liabilities in the purchase of state owned assets need to be cleared up.

If President Gorbachev were to ask his senior advisors to address these issues directly it would greatly enhance the prospects for increased U.S. business participation in the Soviet economy.

4. Presidential Mission to U.S.S.R. You are aware that the Presidential Business Mission departs on Saturday. Your meeting will give the mission your personal sense of what is happening in the U.S.S.R. Our group includes 15 CEOs from four industrial sectors: energy, food/food processing, housing and transportation. Our itinerary includes Moscow and Leningrad and visits with President Gorbachev and key Soviet government officials. I have attached a list of participants.

Attachment

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Office of the Secretary
Washington, D.C. 20230

PARTICIPANTS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION TO
THE U.S.S.R.

Mr. Dwayne O. Andreas
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company
4666 Faries Parkway
Decatur, Illinois 62525

Mr. Lodwrick Cook
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Atlantic Richfield Company
515 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90071

Mr. Kenneth T. Derr
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Chevron Corporation
225 Bush Street
San Francisco, California 94104-4289

Mr. John J. Murphy
Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
Dresser Industries
1600 Pacific Building
Dallas, Texas 75201

Mr. James Hayes
Publisher
Fortune Magazine
Time & Life Building
Rockefeller Center
New York, New York 10020

Mr. James Jameson
Chairman
Glenair International
P.O. Box 2028
Del Mar, California 92014

Mr. H. Leighton Steward
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
The Louisiana Land and Exploration Company
909 Poydras Street, Suite 3600
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

Mr. Donald B. Marron
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
PaineWebber Group Inc.
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019

Mr. Donald M. Kendall
Chairman of the Executive Committee
Pepsico, Inc.
Anderson Hill Road
Purchase, New York 10577

Mr. Chesley Pruet
President
Pruet Oil Company
P.O. Box 31
El Dorado, Arkansas 71731

Mr. Alex J. Mandl
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Sea-Land Service, Inc.
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Edison, New Jersey 08837

Mr. Leonard Sylk
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Shelter Systems Group
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Hainesport, New Jersey 08036

Mr. James W. Kinnear
President and Chief Executive Officer
Texaco Inc.
2000 Westchester Avenue
White Plains, New York 10650

Mr. Mark C. Hungerford
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Transcisco Industries, Inc.
555 California Street
San Francisco, California 94104

Mr. William Esrey
Chairman
United Telecom, Inc.
2330 Shawnee Mission Parkway
Westwood, Kansas 66205

* THIS LIST IS NOT FOR PUBLICATION. THIS IS NOT A FINAL DRAFT.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007404
RECEIVED: 18 SEP 90 14

TO: NAGLE, DAVID R

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 08 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

1

KEYWORDS: USSR
MIDDLE EAST
FINLAND
CO

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: RESPONES TO REP NAGLE RE SUPPORT OF PRES SUMMIT MTG W/ GORBACHEV IN HELSINKI

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR DUE DATE: 21 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BENKO
		LAMPLEY
		LUNDSAGER
		NSC CHRON
		RICE
		ROSTOW

COMMENTS: _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 8, 1990

Dear Congressman Nagle:

Thank you for your letter to the President concerning a waiver for the USSR of the Jackson-Vanik restrictions.

The President signed a Trade Agreement with President Gorbachev in June, but has indicated that he will not send it to Congress until the Supreme Soviet adopts an emigration law. We understand that the Soviets will begin the second reading of the bill in October. The Administration believes that codification of Soviet emigration practices is necessary before waiving Jackson-Vanik and granting MFN.

We do want to normalize our economic relationship with the Soviets and to help integrate them into the world economy. We have undertaken a number of initiatives to that end, including a recent Presidential Business Development and Trade Mission and technical assistance programs. In addition, we initiated with our G-7 allies at the Houston Summit an IMF-led study of the economic problems in the Soviet Union. We agreed to invite the Soviets to observe the annual IMF/World Bank meetings this month and agreed earlier in the year to their observer status in the GATT. We are also currently negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty as well as agreements on tax and Soviet debt to the U.S.

We hope that all of these initiatives will be useful in improving our economic relationship with the USSR, realizing that the ultimate success of our efforts will be very much dependent on the internal reform process in the USSR.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable David R. Nagle
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 1, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

FROM: STEPHEN E. BENKO SEB

SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Nagle Re Presidential Meeting with Gorbachev in Helsinki

At Tab I is a response from you to Congressman Nagle, who wrote the President before the Helsinki meeting urging that he grant MFN to the Soviet Union both to encourage further political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union and to reward the Soviets for their stance on Iraq. The response explains our policy on MFN and on assistance to the USSR.

Nicholas Burns, NB Meg Lundsager ML and Virginia Lampley VL concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Letter to Nagle
Tab II Incoming

DAVE NAGLE
3D DISTRICT, IOWA

214 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-3301

AT LARGE DEMOCRATIC WHIP

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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7404

September 7, 1990

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President;

I am writing to express my support for the upcoming Helsinki summit with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and to applaud your initiative as an important step in unifying a world effort to resolve the crisis in the Gulf.

As you are aware, Soviet cooperation in the Gulf region has significantly contributed to the unity of the international response. To date, the Soviets have cooperated with the United States position in the Gulf region and have become an important ally in the effort to halt Iraq's aggression in the Middle East.

I strongly believe that the summit presents an historic opportunity to recognize and encourage these efforts while at the same time, to seize the opportunity to forge a new U.S. - Soviet alliance by lifting Cold War generated trade barriers.

I urge you to lift Jackson-Vanik restrictions by providing a three year waiver renewable for an additional five years for Jackson-Vanik restrictions on most-favored-nation tariff treatment for credits for the Soviet Union. There is no better time, no better place, and no better way to formally recognize that the old antagonisms are falling by the wayside and that the world's superpowers are poised on the brink of an era of friendship and cooperation.

With one bold stroke, you can encourage further political and economic reforms within the Soviet Union and also recognize and reward the Soviet contribution to the international peace-keeping effort within the United Nations and in the Middle East.

The Soviet economy is continuing to deteriorate and could soon reach dangerous levels of instability. Currently, we have the opportunity to help stabilize the Soviet economy, assistance the Soviets so desperately need, and at the same time open vast potential new markets for American business and industry.

The upcoming summit presents an opportunity to re-evaluate Cold War policies and remove those which have become outdated to meet our changing alliances. The Soviet Union has made real strides in democratic and economic reforms and their cooperation in the Gulf has proved invaluable in reaching an international consensus of cooperation. Lifting Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions against the Soviet Union could not only help avert an economic calamity in the Soviet Union, but will also allow the Soviets to continue to play a stabilizing role in the Middle East crisis.

I respectfully request that you consider this historic opportunity as you meet with Mr. Gorbachev this weekend in Helsinki.

Sincerely,

Dave Nagle

Dave Nagle
Member of Congress

September 11, 1990

Dear Congressman Nagle:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding the President's summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Helsinki, Finland.

Although your letter was not received at the White House until after the President had already left for Helsinki, your comments regarding the Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions are appreciated. Please know that I have shared your comments with several of the President's foreign affairs and trade advisors so that they, too, are aware of your view that the Jackson-Vanik restrictions should be lifted.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable David R. Nagle
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to USTR - FYI

ID# 172879

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THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 10, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DAVE NAGLE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION DURING UPCOMING SUMMIT WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN HELSINKI
SUPPORT FOR LEADERSHIP DURING MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	ACTION DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	DISPOSITION C D	DISPOSITION COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE	ORG	90/09/10	FM	A	90/09/11
REFERRAL NOTE: NSCSITT	R	90/09/18			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: 99DOS	I	90/09/18		C	90/09/18
REFERRAL NOTE: 99USTR	I	90/09/18		C	90/09/18
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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

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KEYWORDS: USSR
PERSIAN GULF
FINLAND
SUMMIT

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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES BRIEFING BOOK FOR MTG W/ PRES GORBACHEV / SEP 9

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STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 9006961 9006969

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THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING

WITH

SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

September 9, 1990

HELSINKI, FINLAND

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By Cap NARA, Date 2/27/09

BRENT SCOWCROFT

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PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, SEPT 9, 1990, HELSINKI, FINLAND

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THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

September 9, 1990
HELSINKI, FINLAND

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b. Presentation on bilateral issues: decentralization, economics, human rights and the Baltics

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-- Background paper on status of Union Treaty
-- Background paper on the Baltic Republics

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TAB A

SCOPE PAPER

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Gorbachev in Helsinki

Gorbachev comes to Helsinki at a critical juncture in his five-year tenure as leader of the USSR, facing a daunting and unprecedented number of challenges to his power and authority this autumn. The forces he unleashed at the beginning of his rule through his policies of perestroika and glasnost have come to a head and have produced a time of uncertainty and instability in the Soviet Union that will require all his energies and political skills in the months ahead.

At first glance, Gorbachev's establishment of the Executive Presidency in March, his triumph over conservative forces at the July party congress, and his successful meetings with you and Kohl earlier in the summer, appear to have given him wide breadth of maneuverability in Soviet politics. But his freedom to chart his own course is partly illusory. His actual power to make fundamental reform decisions appears to be slipping as aggressive Republic leaders like Boris Yeltsin, and radical reformist mayors such as Gavril Popov of Moscow and Anatoly Sobchak of Leningrad have embarked on entirely new and independent paths to change without consulting the Kremlin.

Gorbachev must face several critical problems simultaneously this autumn. The most serious is structuring a coherent and workable economic reform program which can successfully lead the country through the transition from a command economy to one based on free market principles. He must also quiet ethnic tensions and manage critically important Union negotiations which could redefine the relationship between the center and republics.

He confronts these dilemmas at a time when his own authority, popularity and power are in precipitous decline. No longer able to impose solutions on the country as he and his predecessors once did, he must now compromise and form coalitions with new leaders and institutions in Moscow and beyond. And since the Communist party has been irreparably weakened, Gorbachev must try to invigorate his new power base, the Presidency and the Presidential Council, to steer through these crises.

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Gorbachev returned from his summer vacation in the Crimea seemingly intent on regaining the initiative he had lost on economic reform and the union question since you met in June. On economics, he sought a compromise with his rivals by making a quick, tactical alliance with Yeltsin on the latter's 500-day economic reform plan, in opposition to Prime Minister Ryzhkov's more conservative program. But he has waffled in recent days, angering Yeltsin and confusing everyone else. He will have to announce a new economic reform plan soon--probably a day or two after you meet--which will signal whether he is indeed committed to deep and speedy reforms advocated by Yeltsin and many of his personal advisors, or the more gradualist approach of Ryzhkov which the Supreme Soviet rejected last spring. If he cannot reverse the now pervasive sense the he is indecisive, he risks irrelevancy as bolder leaders emerge.

As these domestic issues preoccupy him, Gorbachev is likely to continue to seek accommodation with us on foreign policy issues, as he has in the Gulf crisis and on German unification. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have redefined some of the basic principles underlying Soviet foreign policy. Rejecting the old thinking that embraced revolutionary client states, thereby alienating the West, they seem to have opted to tend first their most important relationships abroad--with the U.S., Japan, China and Germany, to promote stability. This sharp break with the past may or may not persist, but it has been brought into sharp focus by the Gulf crisis. There is now an intense policy debate in Moscow, especially within Shevardnadze's Foreign Ministry, where Middle East specialists are reportedly furious with the USSR's tough stance against Iraq.

Since the coming months are critical to his efforts to stem chaos we should use this period to wrap up ongoing negotiations on arms control and regional issues and invigorate our economic relationship. You may see Gorbachev more than once this autumn, and so your meeting in Helsinki will be important in shaping the prospects for progress across a broad range of issues.

Your first priority at Helsinki should be to give Gorbachev a detailed view of events in the Gulf, and to encourage the continued, close cooperation between us so that international pressure is kept on Saddam Hussein. You might also suggest we come to an agreement on other, contentious regional issues, such as Afghanistan by proposing a mutual cutoff of arms to the warring parties and elections.

It will also be important to review European security issues at Helsinki. On German Unification, you might stress that all Four Power rights should be suspended so that Germany will be fully sovereign from the date of unification (expected October 3).

Following up on your September 6 telephone conversation with Kohl, you could also express your concern that there should be no further limitations placed on Germany's full participation in NATO.

You should also seek his agreement to say publicly that both sides commit themselves to sign a START treaty in December, and to push for more rapid progress at CFE so that we can move forward to a CSCE Summit in Paris in November. You could review with him our goals, and NATO's for the future of CSCE.

Finally, Helsinki gives you the chance to open a new chapter in our increasingly important economic relationship with the Soviets. While you will want to put off for the time being, as you did at the Washington Summit, another request for outright financial assistance, there is much you can suggest to put our economic relations on a new and higher plane.

You could propose focusing our technical assistance efforts on some of these problems, by offering our public and private sector help in food processing, energy, housing and other areas that he deems useful. You could also point to the Mosbacher-Baker Presidential Mission, which begins the day following the Helsinki meeting, as a demonstration of your interest in expanding trade and investment.

We have told the Soviets many times that we want to help them accelerate the integration of their economy into the world market system and normalize our bilateral relationship. But access to our private capital markets and to government-backed credit depends on Soviet good faith at the negotiating table. And attracting western investment depends ultimately on Soviet willingness to allow repatriation of profits and national treatment.

The message on economics he may really need to hear yet again at Helsinki is that our ability to assist him in any meaningful way depends very much on the scope and pace of his own reforms in the months ahead.

TAB B

TALKING POINTS

TAB 1

First Session

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2009-0954-MR
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POINTS TO BE MADE ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND THE GULF SITUATION

-- I AM GLAD THAT THIS FIRST SESSION IS ON REGIONAL ISSUES. AS YOU YOURSELF HAVE NOTED, HISTORY SUGGESTS THAT REGIONAL CONFLICTS HOLD THE GREATEST POTENTIAL TO AFFECT OUR LARGER RELATIONSHIP AND PEACE ITSELF.

-- THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT I BELIEVE THE TWO OF US CAN EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS. I HAVE IN MIND HERE AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, AND OF COURSE THE PERSIAN GULF. IF IT IS ALL RIGHT WITH YOU, I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN WITH THE GULF.

-- LET ME JUST SAY AT THE OUTSET, HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE WHAT THE SOVIET UNION IS DOING. IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT OUR COOPERATION HAS REINVIGORATED THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE PROCESS ALLOWING THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO FUNCTION MUCH AS IT WAS INTENDED WHEN THE UN WAS FOUNDED. YOU SHOULD FEEL A SPECIAL SENSE OF SATISFACTION GIVEN YOUR DECEMBER 1988 ADDRESS TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

-- I KNOW CRITICISM OF IRAQ IS NOT EASY FOR YOU GIVEN THE ECONOMIC LOSSES YOU WILL INCUR FROM LOST CONTRACTS, THE THOUSANDS OF SOVIET PEOPLE STILL IN IRAQ, AND THE MANY YEARS OF CLOSE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRIES. BUT I HONESTLY BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHARES A MAJOR INTEREST IN SEEING THAT THIS NAKED AGGRESSION DOES NOT STAND.

-- YOUR WILLINGNESS TO VOTE FOR FIVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS HAS SENT A POWERFUL SIGNAL TO BAGHDAD THAT WHAT THEY HAVE DONE IS TRULY UNACCEPTABLE. SO TOO DID THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY OUR TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WHEN THEY MET

IN EARLY AUGUST.

-- WHAT WE ARE DOING HERE WILL HAVE MAJOR CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND THE RULE OF LAW. THE STAKES ARE ENORMOUS, AND INCLUDE THE POTENTIAL DOMINATION BY IRAQ OF ENERGY RESOURCES CRITICAL TO THE WORLD ECONOMY.

-- BUT THE STAKES ARE ABOUT SOMETHING MORE, ABOUT THE KIND OF WORLD THAT WE WISH TO SEE. YOU HAVE PERSONALLY DONE MUCH TO END THE COLD WAR. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF WE SUCCEEDED IN ENDING ONE ERA OF TENSION ONLY TO ENTER A NEW ONE.

-- WHAT THIS WILL REQUIRE IS NOT SIMPLY THAT WE AVOID COMPETITION AND CONFRONTATION, BUT THAT WE MOVE AHEAD INTO COOPERATION AND WHERE POSSIBLE PARTNERSHIP.

-- I BELIEVE WE ARE MAKING REAL PROGRESS. VISIBLE SIGNS OF SOVIET CRITICISM OF AND DISTANCING FROM IRAQ SEND POWERFUL SIGNALS TO SADDAM AND THOSE AROUND HIM THAT THIS IS NOT BUSINESS AS USUAL. JUST AS IMPORTANT, YOU ARE IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO PRIVATELY URGE SADDAM TO REVERSE COURSE. I ASK YOU TO USE ANY INFLUENCE AVAILABLE TO YOU.

-- THERE ARE OTHER STEPS THAT WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE. THE DEPARTURE OF YOUR REMAINING MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ADVISORS WOULD BE A BIG HELP. WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANYTHING YOU COULD DO TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY COUNTRIES WITH WHOM YOU HAVE INFLUENCE, INCLUDING CUBA AND VIETNAM.

-- THE SOVIET UNION CAN HELP BY REDUCING THE BURDEN THAT HIGHER OIL PRICES PLACE ON EASTERN EUROPE. SOME DEGREE OF INSULATION OF THESE ECONOMIES FROM THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHER OIL PRICES WOULD HELP, SPECIFICALLY IN ENSURING THE DELIVERIES OF CONTRACTED LEVELS OF SOVIET OIL. SO TOO WOULD

INCREASED SOVIET ENERGY PRODUCTION, AND IN THIS WE MAY BE ABLE TO HELP.

-- I WOULD LIKE NOW TO EXPLAIN WHAT WE ARE DOING. YOU KNOW OUR SHARED OBJECTIVES: THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQ'S FORCES FROM KUWAIT; THE RESTORATION OF KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT; PERSIAN GULF STABILITY; AND THE PROTECTION OF OUR CITIZENS.

-- I ALSO WANT YOU TO HEAR FROM ME WHAT OUR OBJECTIVES ARE NOT. WE ARE NOT SEEKING ANY SPECIAL ADVANTAGE FOR OURSELVES IN THE REGION AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE NOT LOOKING TO RE-CREATE A NATO-LIKE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT IN THE GULF. NOR DO WE WANT CONFLICT.

-- WE HAVE RESPONDED TO A REQUEST FROM KING FAHD TO DETER AND IF NECESSARY HELP SAUDI ARABIA DEFEND AGAINST AN ATTACK BY IRAQ. AND I HAVE SENT OUR NAVAL FORCES TO HELP ENFORCE SANCTIONS AT THE REQUEST OF THE AMIR OF KUWAIT AND PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS.

-- WE HOPE THAT OUR FORCES, TOGETHER WITH THOSE OF MANY COUNTRIES, WILL DETER FURTHER IRAQI AGGRESSION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HOPE COMPLIANCE WITH SANCTIONS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES WILL HURT THE IRAQI ECONOMY AND PERSUADE SADDAM TO WITHDRAW.

-- AS WE MOVE AHEAD, WE WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO ACCEPT HALF-WAY OR FALSE SOLUTIONS SURE TO BE SUGGESTED BY VARIOUS MEDIATORS. SADDAM MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO BENEFIT FROM AGGRESSION.

-- I WANT TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT FOOD. SEVERAL NATIONS ARE MISINTERPRETING THE "HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES" EXCEPTION. IT DOES NOT APPLY YET, AND WHEN IT DOES, THE UN WILL HAVE TO

CAREFULLY MONITOR SHIPMENTS TO ENSURE THEY DO NOT GO TO IRAQI SOLDIERS. ALLOWING FOOD INTO IRAQ AND KUWAIT NOW WOULD ONLY INCREASE THE CHANCES SANCTIONS WON'T WORK.

-- EVEN IF WE SUCCEED AND SADDAM WITHDRAWS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE CHALLENGE POSED BY IRAQ WILL NOT BE OVER. WE WILL WANT TO CONSULT AND WORK TOGETHER TO HELP CREATE A NEW SITUATION IN THE GULF IN WHICH IRAQ CANNOT IMPOSE ITS WILL ON ITS NEIGHBORS OR THREATEN THE FREE FLOW OF OIL.

-- ONE KEY ASPECT OF THIS WILL SURELY BE NEW EFFORTS BY OUR COUNTRIES AND OTHERS TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT THAT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO IRAQ'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES. IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TOGETHER TO LIMIT IRAQ'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, BALLISTIC MISSILE, AND ABOVE ALL NUCLEAR CAPACITY. JUST IMAGINE WHAT THE CURRENT SITUATION WOULD BE LIKE IF IRAQ THREATENED TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- IF, HOWEVER, IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT SANCTIONS ARE FAILING TO CONVINCE SADDAM TO LEAVE, WE WILL HAVE TO RECONSIDER OUR OPTIONS. I WANT TO STRESS THAT WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT PERMIT SADDAM TO SUCCEED HERE AND HOLD ON TO KUWAIT. TOO MUCH IS AT STAKE, NOT SIMPLY FOR THE UNITED STATES, BUT FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.

-- IF SANCTIONS FAIL, I WOULD HOPE THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO AGREE ON THE APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION. LET ME REASSURE YOU: WE ARE NOT LOOKING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO USE MILITARY FORCE. WE MUCH PREFER DIPLOMACY. BUT WE SHOULD NOT AND WILL NOT RULE OUT <u>ANY</u> OPTION IF THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO

REVERSING WHAT SADDAM HAS DONE.

-- MR. PRESIDENT, YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED THAT I AM HESITANT TO SPEAK OF THE COLD WAR AS A THING OF THE PAST. BUT I CAN THINK OF NO BETTER OPPORTUNITY THAN THE CURRENT PERSIAN GULF SITUATION TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE HAVE TRULY MOVED TO THE POST-COLD WAR ERA.

-- I WOULD VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WE COULD SIGNAL THE BROAD AREA OF AGREEMENT THAT I BELIEVE EXISTS BETWEEN US IN WHAT WE SAY TO THE PRESS LATER TODAY.

-- AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET, THERE ARE TWO OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES I WANT TO HIGHLIGHT.

-- THE FIRST IS AFGHANISTAN. I TRULY THINK OF THIS AS AN ANACHRONISM, AN EXAMPLE OF "OLD THINKING" ON BOTH OUR PARTS. IT WOULD BE BEST IF WE PUT THIS CONFLICT BEHIND US, IF WE STOPPED PROVIDING ARMS TO OUR RESPECTIVE SIDES AND INSTEAD HELPED THEM REACH A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION.

-- OUR EXPERTS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING PRINCIPLES THAT INVOLVE A TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY DURING A TRANSITION PERIOD LEADING TO ELECTIONS. NAJIBULLAH COULD CONTEST THESE ELECTIONS. I CAN ACCEPT THIS. I CAN ALSO SUPPORT A MUTUAL CESSATION OF OUR MILITARY SUPPORT IN THIS CONTEXT.

-- I HOPE YOU AGREE. WHAT I PROPOSE IS THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AND SECRETARY BAKER TAKE THIS UP IN DETAIL. I WOULD ALSO HOPE THAT WE WOULD MAKE SOME PUBLIC REFERENCE TO THIS WHEN WE MEET WITH THE PRESS LATER.

-- I FEEL SIMILARLY ABOUT CAMBODIA. THIS IS ANOTHER CONFLICT THAT WE SHOULD PUT BEHIND US, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT WE HAVE A FRAMEWORK ENDORSED BY ALL FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE

SECURITY COUNCIL.

-- AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE TAKEN THE DECISION TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH VIETNAM AND THE PRK. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL DO WHAT YOU CAN TO URGE VIETNAM AND PHNOM PENH TO FORMALLY ACCEPT THE UN FRAMEWORK AND MOVE TO CREATE A SUPREME NATIONAL COUNCIL. HAVING HANOI BEGIN REMOVING ITS REMAINING MILITARY UNITS FROM CAMBODIA WOULD ALSO BE A BIG HELP.

-- THERE ARE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE, JUST AS THERE ARE OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES, SUCH AS ANGOLA, WORTHY OF OUR ATTENTION. AGAIN, I SUGGEST THAT JIM AND EDUARD TAKE THIS UP.

(IF GORBACHEV RAISES THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE):

-- WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO GROUP THE PERSIAN GULF AND ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES TOGETHER AT THIS TIME. WE SHOULD FOCUS ON GETTING IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT; IF WE SUCCEED, WE MAY WELL CREATE A CONTEXT IN WHICH PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD BECOME MORE LIKELY.

(IF GORBACHEV RAISES THE UN AND THE USE OF FORCE):

-- WHILE NOT RULING OUT ADDITIONAL UN INVOLVEMENT, WE BELIEVE ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, THE FIVE UNSC RESOLUTIONS, AND THE REQUEST FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT FOR AID PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE LEGAL BASIS FOR DOING WHATEVER MAY BE NECESSARY TO SEE THAT UNSC RESOLUTION 660 IS IMPLEMENTED AND KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY IS RESTORED.

-- WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU BEFORE WE APPROACHED THE UNITED NATIONS FOR ANY ADDITIONAL PURPOSE.

-- I AM NOT SURE THAT A FORMAL UN COMMAND WOULD REALLY BE HELPFUL. WITH THE FORCES OF SO MANY NATIONS ALREADY INVOLVED, IT COULD PROVE TO BE UNWORKABLE IN THE FIELD. BUT WE REMAIN OPEN TO USING THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE FOR ITS INTENDED CONSULTATIVE FUNCTION.

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File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
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AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Report	Re: Moscow's Economic Stake in Iraq (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
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(b)(1), (b)(3)

Moscow's Economic Stake in Iraq (b)(1), (b)(3)

Iraq has been one of Moscow's most important Third World partners since bilateral economic and military relations began at the end of the 1950s. As of mid-1990:

-- Baghdad had become Moscow's largest Third World military customer with purchases over the years of nearly $30 billion worth of arms.

-- Iraq also had received nearly $4 billion in Soviet economic aid largely devoted to power development and establishing Iraq's national oil industry.

-- Some 6,000 to 7,000 civilian technicians were providing support to about 20 oil and power production projects under aid and commercial contracts.

-- Iraq's debt to the USSR stood at an estimated $6 billion, with Iraq making payments of about $1.5 billion largely in oil that Moscow reexported.
(b)(1), (b)(3)

A protracted embargo would cause Moscow damage on several fronts by:

-- Cutting repayments in oil and currency under revised payments agreements that could reach $2 billion a year in the early 1990s;

-- Forcing Moscow to find alternative oil cargos for India and other Soviet customers who receive Iraqi oil under Soviet supply contracts;

-- Relinquishing the Soviet hold on the Iraqi oil industry by withdrawing the technicians that are now able to influence timely oil repayments because of their operational responsibilities;

-- Terminating the profitable hard currency trade in Soviet technical services that probably earns Moscow in the neighborhood of $150 million a year in peacetime;

-- Foreclosing Soviet plans to sell several billion dollars worth of equipment to Iraq for a nuclear powerplant, and several steel industry projects; and

-- Severely damaging the market for Soviet arms in Iraq, where Moscow is the dominant supplier.
(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

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03e. Table	Re: Soviet Economic Transactions with Iraq (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(3)	C

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
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Soviet Economic Transactions with Iraq

(Million US $)

Year	Credit Deliveries	Civilian Trade Exports to Iraq	Civilian Trade Imports from Iraq*
1980	30	730	395
1981	70	1,255	5
1982	45	1,345	25
1983	40	500	515
1984	60	335	825
1985	50	320	670
1986	50	415	490
1987	80	500	1,220
1988	150	510	1,585
1989	60	405	1,550

*Imports are mostly Iraqi oil received as payment for past debts and reexported by the Soviets.

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(b)(1), (b)(3)

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TAB 2a

Second Session

TAB 2b
Second Session

POINTS TO BE MADE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES

-- IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD WHAT I CONSIDERED A VERY USEFUL REVIEW OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES. YOU OUTLINED FOR ME HOW YOU SEE THE NEW FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE SOVIET UNION'S PLACE IN IT.

-- I LISTENED VERY CAREFULLY TO WHAT YOU SAID. TOGETHER WITH OUR WESTERN PARTNERS, WE HAVE TRIED TO ADDRESS THE SECURITY CONCERNS YOU EXPRESSED.

-- MAY I SUGGEST THAT WE RESUME THE DISCUSSION WE HAD IN WASHINGTON, REVIEW THE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WE LAST MET, AND LOOK AHEAD TO THE AGENDA BEFORE US.

LONDON SUMMIT

-- AS I EXPLAINED IN MY LETTER TO YOU AFTER THE LONDON SUMMIT MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, WE AND OUR ALLIES WERE DETERMINED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NATO IS CHANGING AND WILL CONTINUE TO CHANGE IN FUNDAMENTAL WAYS.

-- WHILE NATO'S SECURITY FUNCTIONS REMAIN ESSENTIAL, WE ALSO WANT TO STRENGTHEN AND EMPHASIZE THE ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL CHARACTER. WE WANT THE ALLIANCE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE.

  -- BOTH THROUGH THE PROPOSAL FOR A NON-AGGRESSION DECLARATION AND THROUGH SUCH MEASURES AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LIAISON MISSIONS AT NATO, WE WANT THE ALLIANCE TO REACH OUT TO THE EAST.

-- I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR RESPONSE TO THOSE INITIATIVES. ALREADY WE HAVE PUT TO GOOD USE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR

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CONSULTATION AT NATO WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES THERE.

-- WE ARE ALSO ENCOURAGED BY THE REACTIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY FIND A STRONG VOICE IN THE NEW EUROPE.

-- WE CAN NOW BUILD ON THIS SOLID FOUNDATION OF COOPERATION. I SEE THE LONDON SUMMIT AS THE BEGINNING, NOT THE END, OF NATO'S TRANSFORMATION.

-- WHAT WE DO NOT HAVE IN MIND, OF COURSE, IS TRANSFORMING NATO OUT OF EXISTENCE. YOU UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION -- THAT NATO IS THE MECHANISM THAT KEEPS THE U.S. IN EUROPE, AND IS AN ESSENTIAL GUARANTOR OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND STABILITY.

GERMAN UNIFICATION

-- YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF GERMANY'S CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP IN NATO PAVES THE WAY FOR BUILDING A STABLE AND SECURE NEW EUROPE. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THIS IS IN THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST AS WELL.

-- I FULLY SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT YOU AND CHANCELLOR KOHL REACHED AT STAVROPOL.

-- I BELIEVE IT DEMONSTRATES A RESPONSIVENESS TO SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS.

-- WE ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR INTEREST IN COMPLETING THE WORK NEEDED FOR AGREEMENT ON A FINAL SETTLEMENT DOCUMENT AT THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL SEPTEMBER 12.

-- IN THE PROCESS OF COMPLETING THIS AGREEMENT, WE CANNOT SUPPORT, HOWEVER, ANY FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON GERMANY'S FULL PARTICIPATION IN NATO BEYOND THOSE ALREADY AGREED TO.

-- THE CREATION OF A SEMI-SOVEREIGN GERMANY WOULD BE A MISTAKE OF HISTORIC PROPORTIONS.

-- YOUR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A UNITED GERMANY, LIKE OURS, DEPEND ON ITS ENJOYING FULL SOVEREIGNTY, WITHOUT BEING SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL STATUS.

-- FINALLY, I HOPE WE CAN ENSURE THAT FOUR POWER RIGHTS ARE SUSPENDED FROM THE MOMENT OF UNIFICATION -- NOW EXPECTED ON OCTOBER 3 -- SO THAT THE UNITED GERMANY WILL BE FULLY SOVEREIGN FROM THE BEGINNING.

-- IN THAT REGARD, HAVE YOU BEEN APPROACHED REGARDING A CEREMONY IN BERLIN ON OCTOBER 3? WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS? I THINK IT IS A GOOD IDEA, BUT I HAVE SCHEDULING PROBLEMS THAT WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ME TO ATTEND.

ARMS CONTROL

-- YOU AND I AGREED THAT WE WOULD COMPLETE START THIS YEAR. BUT THIS WILL REQUIRE A STRONG PUSH FROM BOTH OF US. ONE STEP WE CAN TAKE WOULD BE TO ANNOUNCE TODAY THAT WE PLAN TO SIGN START IN DECEMBER. SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD HELP GALVANIZE BOTH OUR BUREAUCRACIES INTO ACTION.

-- WE CONTINUE TO MAKE SOME LIMITED PROGRESS IN THE START AND CFE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THEIR LAST MEETING, SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE EACH PRESENTED SOME NEW IDEAS. OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE WORKING HARD AS WELL.

-- I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE NOT ON A TRACK THAT WILL ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE OF SIGNING BOTH TREATIES BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. WE MUST CHANGE THE WAY WE ARE DOING BUSINESS IF WE ARE TO REACH THAT GOAL.

-- MY NEGOTIATORS TELL ME THAT IN SOME AREAS THEIR COUNTERPARTS APPEAR TO BE UNINSTRUCTED. IN OTHER AREAS, THEY APPEAR UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO PUT INTO THE DRAFT TREATY ISSUES THAT WERE RESOLVED AT A POLITICAL LEVEL. AT TIMES THE SOVIET SIDE SEEMS TO BE REOPENING ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN SETTLED, AND HARDENING POSITIONS ON OTHER ISSUES THAT SEEMED CLOSE TO AGREEMENT.

-- THERE ARE SEVERAL IMPORTANT MEETINGS AHEAD COMING UP, INCLUDING A NEW WORKING GROUP THAT BEGINS TODAY IN MOSCOW IN ADVANCE OF THE NEXT BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING LATER THIS WEEK.

-- I AM PREPARED TO GIVE SECRETARY BAKER NEW FLEXIBILITY TO MOVE AHEAD ON KEY ISSUES PROVIDED FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAS THE SAME AUTHORITY.

CSCE SUMMIT

-- I WANT TO CONCLUDE CFE SO THAT WE CAN HAVE A CSCE SUMMIT IN LATE NOVEMBER. MINISTERS WILL BE MEETING IN NEW YORK ON OCTOBER 1-2 TO SET A DATE FOR THE CSCE SUMMIT. BUT YOU AND I AGREED IN JUNE WE COULD NOT HOLD A CSCE SUMMIT UNTIL CFE WAS READY TO SIGN. SETTING THE DATE WILL REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS OVER THE NEXT FOUR WEEKS.

-- WE HAVE GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE ROLES CSCE CAN PLAY IN THE NEW EUROPE, AND HOW THE PARIS SUMMIT CAN SET AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CSCE.

-- AS YOU KNOW, MANY OF THESE IDEAS FOUND EXPRESSION IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LONDON DECLARATION ON HOW THE CSCE CAN BE INSTITUTIONALIZED TO STRENGTHEN ITS ROLE.

  -- WE PROPOSED MORE REGULAR CONSULTATIONS AMONG HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AND AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND A MORE REGULAR SCHEDULE OF REVIEW CONFERENCES.

  -- WE ALSO SUGGESTED A CSCE SECRETARIAT, A MECHANISM FOR MONITORING ELECTIONS, A CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT, AND A CSCE PARLIAMENTARY BODY.

-- WHEREVER POSSIBLE, WE WANT TO SEE THESE NEW INSTITUTIONS LOCATED IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.

  -- ONE WAY OF ENSURING THAT THERE IS A STABLE SITUATION ON YOUR WESTERN BORDERS IS TO HELP THESE NEW AND FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES FIND A SECURE PLACE IN THE NEW EUROPE. THE CSCE CAN PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN THAT REGARD.

-- I KNOW YOU ALSO WANT TO SEE A GREATER SOVIET ROLE IN A STRENGTHENED CSCE. WE WELCOME THAT. CSCE OFFERS UNIQUE POSSIBILITIES FOR BRINGING OUR TWO COUNTRIES TOGETHER WITH

ALL OF EUROPE IN SHAPING ITS FUTURE.

-- WE CONTINUE TO RESIST THE IDEA THAT THE CSCE CAN OR SHOULD BECOME A COLLECTIVE SECURITY ORGANIZATION. PHRASES LIKE "ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES" AND "PAN-EUROPEAN PEACE ORDER" HAVE SOME PUBLIC APPEAL, BUT IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT CSCE IS TOO BIG AND DIVERSE TO PLAY THIS KIND OF ROLE.

-- I WOULD OF COURSE WELCOME YOUR IDEAS ON HOW WE CAN STRENGTHEN THE CSCE.

(IF GORBACHEV ACCEPTS THE OFFER OF ADDRESSING THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL):

-- I AM DELIGHTED THAT YOU ACCEPT OUR OFFER. I KNOW THAT OUR OTHER ALLIES FEEL THE SAME WAY.

-- WE WILL NEED TO CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES ON THE TIMING OF YOUR ADDRESS, BUT WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE YOUR PREFERENCES.

(IF GORBACHEV SAYS THAT FOUR POWER RIGHTS IN GERMANY SHOULD BE "TERMINATED" RATHER THAN "SUSPENDED"):

-- WE CERTAINLY AGREE THAT FOUR POWER RIGHTS SHOULD BE TERMINATED, BUT THIS REQUIRES RATIFICATION BY AT LEAST SOME PARLIAMENTS BEFORE IT WOULD HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW. MEANWHILE, A UNITED GERMANY WOULD STILL BE SUBJECT TO THOSE FOUR POWER RIGHTS.

-- FOR THAT REASON, WE WANT FOUR POWER RIGHTS TO BE SUSPENDED PENDING THEIR TERMINATION SO THAT GERMANY CAN ENJOY FULL SOVEREIGNTY FROM THE MOMENT OF UNIFICATION.

(IF GORBACHEV ASKS WHAT IS MEANT BY CONCERN ABOUT FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO):

-- GERMANY HAS ALREADY AGREED TO KEEP ANY NON-GERMAN NATO FORCES FROM BEING STATIONED IN THE FORMER GDR. NOW YOUR SIDE WANTS TO EXPAND THIS BAN TO KEEP THESE SOLDIERS FROM EVEN SETTING FOOT IN THIS PART OF GERMANY -- FOREVER.

-- WE THINK IT SHOULD BE UP TO GERMANY TO DECIDE HOW TO WORK WITH THE FOREIGN FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY IN YEARS TO COME. AND, AS I SAID, WE AGREE WITH THE PROHIBITION ON STATIONING NON-GERMAN NATO FORCES IN THE EAST BUT BELIEVE ADDITIONAL LIMITS ARE INAPPROPRIATE.

(IF GORBACHEV RAISES CFE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS):

-- WE'VE SUPPORTED CONTINUING THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS, WITH THE SAME PARTICIPANTS AND MANDATE, TO BUILD ON THE CURRENT AGREEMENT.

-- WE ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE MANPOWER LIMITS IN THOSE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS.

(IF GORBACHEV SUGGESTS STARTING NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW MANDATE IN PARALLEL WITH THE CFE FOLLOW-ON TALKS):

-- WE'LL NEED TO LOOK AT THAT IDEA IN CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES. BUT I WOULDN'T WANT NEW MANDATE TALKS TO INTERFERE WITH THE SUBSTANTIVE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS OR PRE-JUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE 1992 HELSINKI CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE.

(IF GORBACHEV SUGGESTS NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AS PART OF ANY FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS):

-- OF COURSE, THE CURRENT MANDATE EXPLICITLY EXCLUDES NAVAL FORCES.

-- AS FAR AS NEW MANDATE TALKS THAT MIGHT COVER NAVAL FORCES ARE CONCERNED, IT IS FAR TOO EARLY TO PREJUDGE HERE WHAT A NEW MANDATE MIGHT COVER. BUT YOU KNOW MY VIEWS ON NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AND I DON'T NEED TO REPEAT THEM HERE.

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE ON ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

-- I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS HOW WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FOCUS OUR PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO ASSIST YOUR ECONOMIC REFORM PROCESS MORE DIRECTLY AND MORE QUICKLY.

-- I AM INTERESTED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT YOUR PLANS FOR TRANSITION TO A MARKET SYSTEM -- INCLUDING PRIVATIZATION, CLEAR PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION AMONG ENTERPRISES.

-- I THINK THAT AS YOUR REFORMS PROGRESS, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FOCUS OUR TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM ON A FEW AREAS THAT WOULD HAVE HIGH PAY-OFF FOR IMPORTANT SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY.

-- LET ME MAKE ONE SUCH SUGGESTION.

-- I HAVE READ THAT ONE OF YOUR MAJOR PROBLEMS IS GETTING FOOD FROM THE PRODUCER TO THE CONSUMER -- I AM TOLD THAT YOU HAVE PROBLEMS OF STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION.

-- ((FYI: AT LEAST 40% OF THE SOVIET HARVEST SPOILS BEFORE IT CAN REACH THE CONSUMER))

-- I THINK WE CAN HELP BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS A LOT OF EXPERTISE -- PARTICULARLY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR -- IN THE AREAS OF FOOD PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION.

-- YOU ARE ALREADY WORKING WITH SOME AMERICAN FIRMS. SOME KEY BUSINESSMEN IN THIS AREA ARE ACCOMPANYING JIM BAKER AND BOB MOSBACHER TO THE SOVIET UNION NEXT WEEK.

-- IF YOU ARE INTERESTED, WE SHOULD ASK OUR EXPERTS TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR A MAJOR PUSH IN THIS AREA.

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-- IN ORDER TO PRODUCE A MORE RAPID PAY-OFF, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO FOCUS ON A FEW KEY CITIES -- LIKE PERHAPS MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD -- WHERE AN INCREASE IN THE SUPPLY OF FOOD TO CONSUMERS WOULD PRODUCE A DEMONSTRATION EFFECT FOR THE WHOLE COUNTRY.

-- I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF LOCAL OFFICIALS IN SUCH A PROGRAM.

-- I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT I HAVE IN MIND A PROGRAM THAT WOULD IMPROVE THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF <u>YOUR</u> FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

-- THIS WILL HAVE FAR GREATER PAY-OFF BOTH NOW AND IN THE LONG-TERM THAN SIMPLY INCREASING THE SUPPLY TO THE CONSUMER BY IMPORTING GOODS.

<u>ENERGY</u>

-- ANOTHER AREA THAT WE COULD USEFULLY FOCUS ON IS COOPERATION IN THE ENERGY SECTOR, INCLUDING NOT JUST OIL BUT ALSO NATURAL GAS, COAL AND NUCLEAR.

-- THIS WOULD GIVE US BOTH SHORT AND LONG-TERM BENEFITS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE UNCERTAIN SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THE WORLD NEEDS YOUR OIL AND NATURAL GAS EXPORTS AND WE CAN HELP YOU INCREASE ENERGY PRODUCTION AND EFFICIENCY.

-- THERE HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGHS IN TECHNOLOGIES TO MAXIMIZE OUTPUT FROM OLDER OIL FIELDS AND IN EXPLORATION OF COLD-WEATHER OIL FIELDS.

-- I KNOW THAT YOU ARE DOING A LOT WITH AMERICAN COMPANIES BUT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DO MORE. THERE ARE SOME TECHNOLOGIES THAT WE COULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO YOU TO IMPROVE PRODUCTION

AND I WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE AMERICAN COMPANIES TO BECOME INVOLVED HERE.

-- I DON'T MEAN TO EXCLUDE OTHER FRUITFUL AREAS BY FOCUSING ON FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT. WE MAY BE ABLE TO COOPERATE EFFECTIVELY TO ASSIST YOUR HOUSING AND FINANCIAL SECTORS.

-- I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE AN INTEREST IN A BROAD PROGRAM OF ECONOMICS EDUCATION AS WELL.

-- BUT I WANTED TO ASK YOU WHETHER COOPERATION IN FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND ENERGY WOULD BE OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST TO YOU.

-- I BELIEVE IT COULD HAVE HIGH PAY-OFF FOR YOUR ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM.

-- IF WE PUT OUR MINISTERS TO WORK ON THIS, PERHAPS WE CAN HAVE A DOCUMENT OUTLINING AN ACTION PLAN READY FOR SIGNATURE BY OUR NEXT SUMMIT.

~~SECRET~~

HUMAN RIGHTS/WALLENBERG CASE

-- We have made great progress on human rights.

-- The changes you have put in place during the last five years have been breathtaking, and we now look forward to new laws that will formalize individual freedoms.

-- At Malta, I gave you a list of 20 people who had been denied exit permission for more than 10 years. Many of the cases have been resolved.

-- I would like your agreement that we ask our Foreign Ministers to resolve the remaining cases by the end of this year.

-- Finally, I would like to raise just one more issue with you -- the case of an honorary American citizen, Raoul Wallenberg.

-- You know the story of his heroism, and of his incarceration by Soviet authorities just before the war ended.

-- Your government recently promised to provide more information about what happened to him. I applaud this initiative and hope very much you will allow international investigators full access to the complete KGB and GRU archives on this case.

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BALTICS

-- Events in the Baltics have unfolded pretty much the way you said they would when we met in Washington.

-- We are encouraged by your dialogue with the Baltic states, and hope this positive momentum can be maintained.

-- In that sense, I would be most interested in your view of how the talks will develop this autumn.

-- As you know, I've met with a some of the Baltic leaders in the past few months. They have impressed me as serious people, and certainly aware of Soviet economic and security interests.

-- I have told them what we have said consistently in public -- that we support their right to self-determination and believe the best way forward is through direct dialogue.

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4 September 1990

Soviet Economic Reform at a Crossroads

Summary

A new Soviet economic reform program will be the main item on the agenda of the Supreme Soviet, which convenes on 10 September. As the time to present that program draws near, however, differences between the backers of two alternative approaches have become increasingly bitter and personal, casting doubt on Gorbachev's ability to produce a plan that has unified leadership support. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Origins of the Dispute

Debate over the pace and sequence of the planned reforms began last May when Premier Ryzhkov presented the government's new reform program to the Supreme Soviet. Ryzhkov's program called for a five-year transition to a "regulated market" economy and emphasized the need for price revisions as a first step toward deregulation. Legislators rejected the increase in bread prices he proposed for July, questioned the wisdom of other price hikes scheduled for January 1991, and remanded the program for further work. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Meanwhile, Boris Yel'tsin, who heads the Russian Republic's legislature, began promoting an alternative program that would give first priority to supplanting state control of assets with private ownership and shorten the transition period from five years to "500 days." Given his weakening political position, Gorbachev agreed to cosponsor with Yel'tsin a working group tasked with "synthesizing" the Yel'tsin and Ryzhkov programs. Ryzhkov and other members of his government generally refused to cooperate with this group, however, and its final proposal reportedly bears a close resemblance to the original Yel'tsin program. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

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A Forced Marriage

With supporters of each plan insisting that theirs was the only one worthy of submission to the legislature, Gorbachev convened a two-day meeting of the Presidential and Federation Councils last week to hear both sides of the argument. At its conclusion, he ordered a single draft to be produced from the two programs, which he said would then be coordinated with the republic legislatures before presentation to the Supreme Soviet. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Combining those two programs will be a difficult task that Yel'tsin has compared to "mating a hedgehog with a snake." As presented in May, the Ryzhkov program called for, in rough order, price reform, monetary and fiscal reforms, and the creation of markets for commodities, housing, and capital--all to be accomplished during a five-year time frame. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Instead of price increases, the 500-day program Yel'tsin supports would give first priority to reducing the budget deficit and supplanting state control of assets with diverse forms of private ownership. According to Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, the Russian Republic's deputy premier and reputed author of the program, it would decontrol prices gradually and only after significant progress toward demonopolization and reduction of purchasing power. Other features praised by Yel'tsin and other supporters of the plan include its "concreteness" and detailed timetable of necessary steps. The plan, as amended by the working group, also is reported to give the republics more economic autonomy than even the revised version of the Ryzhkov program would allow. This is an important feature of the program that, according to Yel'tsin, could serve as the foundation of the new union treaty that will redefine center-republic relations. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Common Elements

These key differences aside, the two programs are in agreement on a number of elements that almost certainly will remain in any compromise plan:

-- Market creation. Under both programs, markets would be created by reducing centrally mandated state orders, encouraging direct ties between buyers and sellers, and denationalizing state-run industries, which would be leased or turned into joint-stock companies, cooperatives, or partnerships.

-- Banking and Financial Reform. A new two-level banking system--modeled after the US Federal Reserve--would consist of independent commercial banks and a central bank that would regulate the money supply through manipulation of a discount rate and reserve

requirements. Interest rates would be increased to encourage saving and dampen inflation, and taxes would assume more importance in controlling economic behavior.

-- The Social Safety Net. The Ryzhkov program calls for price increases to be compensated first by income supplements, then by wage increases linked to a consumer price index. Although details vary, virtually all reform proposals, including Yel'tsin's, have similar provisions. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Prospects

Until recently, this common ground left open the possibility of a compromise that preserved the best of both programs. For example, the Yel'tsin-backed plan appears to correct some major flaws of the Ryzhkov program--notably its failure to appreciate the importance of private property or to speed up the dismantling of the government bureaucracy. Yel'tsin's program gives first priority to supplanting state assets with private ownership, and his republic recently streamlined its bureaucracy by eliminating half its ministries. On the other hand, Yel'tsin, concerned that front-loading the program with its least appealing elements will make it difficult to sell, is less forthright than Ryzhkov in facing up to the price increases that would accompany the end of state subsidies. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Prospects for such compromise dimmed significantly this week, however, as Yel'tsin presented his own reform plan to the Russian legislature and continued to call for Ryzhkov's resignation. Gorbachev still appears to be trying to maintain a centrist position on reform, but political realities now suggest that any announced "compromise" will heavily favor Yel'tsin, whose popularity and position as head of the USSR's largest republic make his support essential for the effective implementation of any union-wide reform program. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03k. Report	Re: Status of the Union Treaty (5 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1) (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

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FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
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AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	6/7/2010

RESTRICTION CODES

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Status of the Union Treaty

Summary

Moscow's authority over the country continues to dissipate rapidly in the face of increasingly assertive republic governments that are demanding greater control over their own affairs. Negotiations underway between the center and the republics on the future nature of the union are complex, but Moscow probably has little choice other than to cede to the republics most of the powers they are demanding in order to hold some semblance of the country together, restore stability, and retain primacy at least in foreign affairs and defense. Even in those areas Moscow will face strong challenges. The role of Russia and its leader Boris Yel'tsin will be critical. To the extent that Gorbachev and Yel'tsin can work out an agreement between them, most other republics will probably fall into line. It is almost certain, however, that the current negotiations will lead to a much weaker central government. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The Sovereignty of the Republics

To date, 13 of the USSR's 15 republics have passed sovereignty declarations. The other two republics--Kazakhstan and Kirghizia--are currently considering them. All 13 declarations assert the primacy of republic laws over union laws, and 10 of them assert the right of the republic government to control resources within the republic. But the challenge that individual republics present to Moscow varies widely:

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-- The three Baltic republics have opted for complete independence and separation from the USSR. They are declining to participate in negotiations on the new union treaty, but they recognize that in the future their economies will be closely linked with that of the Soviet Union and are therefore taking part in talks on economic reform.

-- The Ukraine, second largest republic after Russia, has passed the most radical sovereignty declaration and apparently envisions a severely limited form of central government.

-- In Moldavia and the Caucasian republics--Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia--secessionist sentiment is strong. These republics will demand a high degree of autonomy if they indeed do remain in the union.

-- Belorussia and the Central Asian Republics--Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan--are the least assertive but are nevertheless likely to follow the lead established by the Russian republic. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Russia's Role Crucial

The role of Boris Yel'tsin and the Russian Republic will be critical. The republic legislature is calling for primacy of its own laws over union laws, for control of its land and resources, fiscal policy, police and internal security forces, most economic enterprises, and foreign trade and customs, as well as some role in foreign and monetary policy. For now, at least, Yel'tsin has been willing to cede some meaningful powers to the center, such as defense. Because Russia so dominates the union, any agreement it makes with Moscow will go far to establish a pattern for other republics that remain within the union, although there almost certainly will be variations in that pattern. Negotiations could be complicated by some minority regions within Russia seeking secession from that republic and separate status in the union. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The Negotiation Process

Gorbachev appears to recognize that he cannot stop the dissipation of central power to the periphery. His strategy of late has been to try to persuade the republics that there are important advantages to remaining in the union and it is to their interest that the central government retain control over sectors such as foreign policy, energy, foreign trade and customs, border control, defense and state security, transportation and human rights. Key republics, however--including Russia and the Ukraine--object to Gorbachev's concept of the proper parameters of the central government's role. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

USSR: Soviet Republic Sovereignty Declarations[a]

● Yes
□ No
⁄ Unknown

Republic (in order of declaration)	Estonian SSR	Lithuanian SSR	Latvian SSR	Azerbaijan SSR	Georgian SSR	RSFSR	Uzbek SSR	Moldavian SSR	Ukrainian SSR	Belorussian SSR	Turkmen SSR (c)	Armenian SSR	Tadjik SSR (c)
Seeks independence	●	●	●	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
Supremacy of republic laws	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Right to republic military troops	●	●	●	□	□	□	□	□	●	●	⁄	●	□
Independent economic policy	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	⁄
Republic banking, tax, currency	●	●	●	□	□	●	□	□	●	●	⁄	●	⁄
Independent foreign relations	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	⁄	●	⁄
Control over natural resources	●	●	●	●	●	●	⁄	●	●	●	⁄	●	⁄
Republic citizenship	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Military neutrality	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	b	●	●	⁄	□	⁄
Nuclear-free state	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	●	●	●	□	⁄
Favors continued participation in union	□	□	□	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

a Kazakh SSR, and Kirghiz SSR currently have draft sovereignty declarations under consideration.

b Moldavian SSR has declared itself to be a demilitarized zone.

c Full text of sovereignty declarations not yet published.

The negotiations are being conducted in working groups under the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, with the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation assuming overall responsibility. The Baltic republics are not officially participating but have sent unofficial observers. An economic working group, which was created on 4 August in accordance with an agreement between Gorbachev and Yel'tsin, is meeting separately and is supervised by the Presidential Council. A committee from the working groups was formed last week and is to begin drafting a new union treaty this month. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

A timetable was adopted in July that said the working groups would try to reach an agreement on general principles by September. At that time, the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council were to review the progress of the negotiations. A draft treaty based on general principles was to be due by October or November and a final treaty early in 1991. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

These deadlines have already slipped. Each of the republics participating in the negotiations has apparently submitted its own draft treaty, as has Moscow. In addition, other participants, such as members of the Institute of State and Law, have submitted proposals. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g] (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g] the drafts vary widely. Yel'tsin said last week the draft proposals had so little in common that it would be impossible to combine them into a single entity, and the working groups would probably have to start with an entirely new draft. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

In theory, once the working groups finished the union treaty draft, it would have to be ratified by the different republic legislatures before final approval by the national legislature. In practice, however, the formal negotiation process may be overtaken by events. Yel'tsin plans to submit a new constitution to the Russian legislature this month which, if adopted, would define the powers of the Russian republic even before the union treaty is completed and voted upon. Other republics have constitutional commissions at work and might also present Moscow with a fait accompli. In addition, several of the republics have begun making bilateral agreements among themselves, bypassing Moscow completely. The initial impact of these new constitutions and inter-republic agreements will probably be limited, and most enterprises will probably continue to take their orders from Moscow for a while, although Moscow's control has already begun to deteriorate in some areas. As the republics develop practical incentives to influence local managerial behavior, however, they will loosen Moscow's grip over their regions even more. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Outlook

Ultimately, Moscow almost certainly will have to accede to most of the demands of Russia and the other republics in order to recreate a new stability. Some republics likely will secede from the union. Others may remain in the union as largely sovereign entities with extensive control over their own affairs, including responsibility for their own foreign affairs. The remaining republics may delegate significant powers to the union, including foreign affairs and defense, while retaining control over their own resources. The relationships that are finally worked out between the center and the republics, however, are unlikely to emerge clearly within the next few months, particularly if the formal negotiations stall and the republics turn more to a series of bilateral agreements among themselves and bypass Moscow.

(b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
031. Report	Re: Moscow's Relations with the Baltic Republics (5 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

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Moscow's Relations With the Baltic Republics

Summary

Since lifting its economic blockade of Lithuania in early July, Moscow has moved from confrontation toward dialogue with each of the Baltic republics, but the sides are approaching negotiations with fundamentally different objectives that are likely to make for continued tensions and slow progress. Pressures on Moscow will probably push it toward further compromise over time, paving the way for the Baltic republics' gradual transition to independence. Nonetheless, tensions between Moscow and one or more of the republics may flare, derailing talks and perhaps leading to new pressures by Moscow or even violence. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Movement Toward Talks

After insisting for months that it only negotiates with foreign states, Moscow has moved to meet Baltic leaders' longstanding call for formal talks to resolve their differences in return for only minimal concessions by Lithuania and apparently none by Estonia and Latvia.

-- A continued hard line by Gorbachev would have risked confrontation with Russian Republic chairman Boris Yel'tsin who is negotiating his own political and economic agreements with Baltic leaders and whose cooperation is essential to Moscow's efforts to hold the union together.

-- Gorbachev's advisors may have concluded by early summer that they would have to moderate their tactics toward the Baltic republics to get Western economic

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(b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Negotiations with Tallinn began in late August. Talks with the Lithuanians are still preliminary but both sides have appointed formal negotiating teams. Moscow and the Latvians are also making progress toward beginning formal discussions. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The sides are far apart, however, on the objectives of the talks. While President Gorbachev still apparently hopes to persuade the maverick republics to remain in a reconfigured union, the Balts are determined to achieve complete independence before considering even limited cooperation with Moscow in certain areas, such as trade. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Moscow's Strategy

Gorbachev intends to offer the republics "confederal" status guaranteeing them substantial autonomy within the union. Although the extent of autonomy Moscow is prepared to allow is unclear, (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g] it is prepared to give the Balts full freedom in foreign relations, including United Nations membership, and an independent currency. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

At the same time, Moscow hopes to deter a push for independence by insisting on stiff preconditions, including:

-- Adherence to the Secession Law. The law approved in April requires republics seeking independence to achieve a two-thirds majority favoring secession in a republic referendum. Given the large ethnic minority presence in Estonia and Latvia, referenda would be risky.

-- Settling Financial Claims. Moscow has said it will demand huge hard currency payments from the Lithuanians, totaling $33 billion at official exchange rates, for its economic and military investment in the republic and to compensate families who decide to resettle in the Soviet Union. Moscow has not yet provided estimates of financial claims against Estonia and Latvia but they would almost certainly approach the Lithuanian totals.

-- Settling Territorial Claims. Moscow has indicated it will raise the status of Klaipeda, Lithuania's only major port, and of Vilnius and surrounding areas that had been part of Poland between the wars but were returned to Lithuania by the Soviet Union in 1939. Moscow does not appear to be preparing territorial claims against Estonia or Latvia, probably because they would be substantially more difficult to justify on the basis of the historical record.

-- Satisfying Security Concerns. Gorbachev and other senior Soviet officials have underscored the importance of the Baltic region to Soviet security, particularly air defense. Moscow almost certainly sees its theater forces in the Baltic republic as a component of the USSR's first line of defense.

In addition, Moscow is moving in other ways to persuade the Balts to reconsider. Gorbachev and other senior Soviet officials have repeatedly reminded Baltic leaders that if their republics become independent they will be required to pay world market prices in hard currency for imports from the Soviet Union. Moscow is also impeding Baltic efforts to establish control over their economies and develop ties with the West.

(b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Baltic Response

Despite Moscow's blandishments of confederal status and continued pressure tactics, the Baltic leaders are holding firm for independence. In late July the three Baltic Presidents jointly rejected participation in negotiations for a new union treaty intended to establish new power sharing relations between the center and republics. Although senior officials in all three republics have expressed a willingness to allow a continued Soviet military presence in their republics for a number of years, they have said they will reject Moscow's territorial demands and most of its financial demands and raise ones of their own.

-- Before beginning formal talks, Lithuanian officials insist that Moscow sign a protocol acknowledging the republic's independence as the goal of talks and asserting that Soviet law has no force in Lithuania--an admission that would exempt them from the secession law.

-- Estonian and Latvian leaders appear more concerned with getting official talks underway than with getting prior guarantees from Moscow. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

To increase pressure on central authorities, the Balts have eagerly sought to develop ties with Yel'tsin and the Russian Republic as well with other republics. Each republic has begun negotiating political treaties with Yel'tsin for signing by October in which Baltic leaders hope the Russian republic will recognize their independence. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Prospects

Despite predictions by some in Moscow and the Baltic republics that negotiations will be completed by October, the fundamental difference over the republics' future status will probably make for difficult and prolonged talks. It is possible that the Lithuanians and Moscow will continue to wrangle for several more weeks before even begining formal talks. In late August following only their second official meeting with their Moscow counterparts, the Estonian delegation raised the spectre of a stalemate if Moscow failed to acknowledge the illegality of the republic's entry into the union in 1940. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

During the period of negotiations with each of the republics Moscow will probably continue to apply pressure and offer incentives to convince them to back off. Even now, some leaders in each of the republics appear willing to settle for confederal status, but they are likely to lack both legislative and public support needed to win the day. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Pressures on Moscow will probably push Gorbachev toward further compromise over time, increasing the possibility of a negotiated settlement providing for the Balts' gradual transition to independence.

-- A further strengthening of relations between Yel'tsin and Baltic leaders would increase the risk that a tough approach by Moscow toward the Baltics would lead to confrontation with the Russian Republic and Moscow's being further superceded.

-- A further deterioration of the Soviet Union's economic situation would probably sharpen Moscow's desire for Western economic assistance.

-- Worsening unrest in other republics or difficulties in negotiations with other republics over a new union treaty may increase Moscow's willingness to get the Baltic problem off its plate. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

There is a risk, however, that either Moscow or Baltic leaders will pursue tactics that derail negotiations and greatly sharpen tensions. Moscow, for example, could reinstitute an economic blockade against Lithuania or impose similar measures against Estonia or Latvia. It may try to cut a deal with Lithuania in order to increase its leverage over Estonia and Latvia--perhaps dropping territorial and financial compensation demands and offering independence contingent on

the holding of a public referendum. The Baltic governments could move to form their own armies or take physical control of their borders in order to facilitate trade with other republics. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

It is unlikely that Moscow will be able to convince one or more of the Baltic republics to settle for continued membership in a renewed union. To have a chance, the center would probably have to offer de facto independence, and interethnic tensions in the republics would probably have to worsen enough to increase concern of republic leaders about potential violence and instability following independence. (b)(1), (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

TAB C

OTHER TALKING PTS

TAB 1

Arms Control

~~SECRET~~

START

Non-circumvention

Key Points

-- We have gone a long way to meet your concerns in this area, including a ban on the transfer of strategic offensive arms to other countries, except for existing patterns of cooperation.

-- As we have stated, ~~the U.S. has only one such existing pattern of cooperation.~~ We have a longstanding program of cooperation with the U.K. to help keep modern its independent nuclear deterrent. This program goes back decades and was not an impediment to earlier arms control agreements such as SALT I and SALT II.

-- This should not be a problem. You know that our cooperation will not make the U.K. a nuclear superpower. Nevertheless, you want us to say that the Trident II program will be the end of cooperation that goes back more than 40 years. This we cannot do. Assurances by the U.K. on the size of their deterrent should satisfy your concerns.

START-ABM Linkage

Key Points

-- Our ministers agreed a year ago that START will not be linked to new agreements in Defense and Space. That was a positive step.

-- Since then, however, the Soviet side in Geneva continues to propose linkages.

-- We cannot accept back door linkages that have the purpose of interfering with legitimate testing for the SDI program. The issue of such testing has no place in the START Treaty.

-- We agreed at the Washington Summit to a mandate for the Defense and Space Talks to reach an agreement implementing a proper balance between strategic offenses and defenses.

-- The U.S. is ready to pursue that mandate now in Geneva and we have a draft treaty on the table.

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CFE

German Manpower

Key Points

-- The Germans have publicly committed themselves to cut their armed forces in half, fulfilling Chancellor Kohl's commitment to you. As political leaders, we know there can be no doubt about the binding nature of that commitment.

-- To singularize Germany by insisting that they make a legally binding commitment in a CFE treaty would be discriminatory and very harmful in the long run.

U.S. and Soviet Manpower

Key Points

-- Jim Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed in Irkutsk that the limits on our manpower discussed in Ottawa have been overtaken by events, and this issue is off the table.

-- The level of U.S. forces in Europe will emerge in the course of the NATO strategy review which we launched in London in July. We don't know what the exact level will be, but it will be substantially below the level I proposed in January in my State of the Union speech. (FYI: 195,000 in Central Europe and 225,000 in all of Europe.)

Aircraft

Key Points

-- We're still interested in finding a mutually acceptable solution on aircraft in a CFE treaty. Our team meeting over the next few days in Moscow has instructions to try to find common ground.

Withdrawal of Equipment from Europe

Key Points

-- A small number of U.S. units from Europe have gone to the Gulf. We do not expect this to affect our obligations under a CFE treaty.

-- The withdrawal of large amounts of Soviet military equipment from Europe to storage depots east of the Urals does raise concerns. It seems to be inconsistent with your statement that equipment that was reduced unilaterally would be converted to peaceful uses or destroyed. It also raises

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questions about reductions mandated by the CFE treaty. Secretary Baker will be discussing this further with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Contingency Points

(If Gorbachev raises CFE Follow-on Negotiations):

-- We've supported continuing the CFE negotiations, with the same participants and mandate, to build on the current agreement.

-- We are ready to negotiate manpower limits in those follow-on negotiations.

(If Gorbachev suggests starting negotiations on a new mandate in parallel with the CFE follow-on talks):

-- We'll need to look at that idea in consultation with our Allies. But I wouldn't want new mandate talks to interfere with the substantive follow-on negotiations or prejudge the outcome of the 1992 Helsinki CSCE review conference.

(If Gorbachev suggests naval arms control as part of any follow-on negotiations):

-- Of course, the current mandate explicitly excludes naval forces.

-- As far as new mandate talks that might cover naval forces are concerned, it is far too early to prejudge here what a new mandate might cover. But you know my views on naval arms control and I don't need to repeat them here.

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SNF

Key Points

-- We are developing an SNF arms control framework with our allies which takes into account the requirement for far fewer nuclear weapons because of the positive changes in Europe.

-- We will be prepared to begin to address U.S. and Soviet SNF in Europe shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. It would be premature and self-defeating to take on SNF before CFE is settled.

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Chemical Weapons

Contingency Points

(If he raises the Geneva negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention and says that we must push harder and conclude an agreement soon):

-- We want an comprehensive ban on CW, but if it is to be ratifiable and effective the Convention must reflect realistic, well thought out positions and the sincere commitment of all parties.

-- We appreciate the close U.S.-Soviet cooperation in Geneva. We believe it has been responsible for getting many of the countries to address tough issues squarely.

(If he says that other countries oppose the idea of a conference at the eighth year of the Convention to decide whether to proceed to destroy the last 500 tons of CW):

-- The purpose of such a conference is to get all states to join. They will see there is no advantage in not joining because the U.S. and the USSR will not completely eliminate their stocks until all do.

-- The Convention will not achieve its purpose if states with CW capability do not join.

-- We appreciate your unstinting support for this proposal in Geneva.

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Biological Weapons

Key Points

-- As I said to you at Camp David, we must solve this issue completely or risk putting not only our arms control agenda, but the entire relationship in jeopardy.

-- We believe the proposals provided by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretary Baker at Irkutsk are constructive. If you and I follow through fully and on a sustained basis, they can provide the basis for a program that will address our concerns over time.

-- Let me reiterate, those proposals are a constructive step. Everything now depends on developing and implementing those proposals fully.

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INF

Key Points

-- We remain concerned about the Soviet-produced SS-23 missiles in Eastern Europe, and about the fact that your side has not yet provided the information that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said we should have been given.

-- This is not helpful to the arms control process. We need to put this matter behind us so that it does not become an obstacle to future agreements.

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Nuclear Testing

Key Points

-- The Treaties and the new Protocols are with the Senate. I expect the Senate will take action on them yet this fall.

-- Our priority should be to get the Treaties ratified and into force. Both of our countries will gain valuable experience with the new, powerful verification techniques.

-- As the new verification methods are put into practice, the U.S. will be ready to consider negotiations on possible further limitations -- we will consider limitations that enhance security and stability, and still guarantee a safe, reliable, and effective deterrent.

-- So long as we both depend on nuclear weapons for deterrence, it would be irresponsible to consider limitations that would result in uncertainty in the reliability or safety of these weapons, or prevent our making improvements in these features.

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NPT Review Conference

Key Points

-- Our cooperation in preventing nuclear proliferation is longstanding. I want to see that cooperation continue.

-- Our adoption of a requirement for full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear cooperation or sale would greatly strengthen our non-proliferation efforts.

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MTCR

Key Points

-- We appreciate your interest in preventing missile proliferation. Adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime would be a positive step.

-- Jim Baker's people will be in touch on next steps. Your continued shipment of SCUDs to Afghanistan is at odds with the objectives of the Regime, and should cease prior to your joining.

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OPEN SKIES

Key Themes

-- With negotiations on your Open Skies initiative at a standstill due to lack of Soviet movement on key outstanding issues (use of aircraft of the observed or observing country, territorial coverage, number of overflights, and types of sensors), we want to urge Moscow to reengage bilaterally in preparation for the resumption of the negotiations after a CFE Treaty is signed.

-- The ideas Shevardnadze presented at Irkutsk could help break the impasse on aircraft and territory covered. If we can resolve these and other issues bilaterally, a new round of negotiations can begin -- most likely this winter if a CFE Treaty is signed in 1990.

Key Points

-- We remain committed to concluding an Open Skies regime which permits greater transparency and openness.

-- At our last meeting in Washington, you expressed your support in principle for the Open Skies concept and said your side was prepared for constructive negotiations.

-- Unfortunately, although some progress was made during the second round on technical issues, there was no sign of Soviet compromise on the major substantive issues.

-- The ideas Shevardnadze put forward in Irkutsk had some interesting features; we are currently studying them. It is a good idea for Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to continue their dialogue so we can remove the obstacles to resume negotiations after we finish CFE.

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SUPER CONDUCTING SUPERCOLLIDER (SSC) (IF RAISED)

Key Themes

-- Construction of the super conducting supercollider (SSC) will facilitate promising high-energy physics research.

-- The Congressional plan for the SSC calls for one-third of total construction costs coming from foreign sources. Base cost estimates currently are around $8 billion.

-- We are at an early stage of our plan to seek international participation in the SSC; we have asked Japan and Korea to consider how they might contribute to the effort and plan to ask European governments this fall.

-- We intend to ask others, including the USSR, in the near future, when technical, financial and planning issues have been resolved.

Key Points

-- We are evaluating the contributions foreign countries can make to the SSC, one of the most important scientific undertakings of this decade.

-- We recognize the great scientific achievements of the USSR and are considering ways in which Soviet participation can enhance the project.

-- We will be in a position to discuss this in the near future.

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SPACE COOPERATION INITIATIVES (IF RAISED)

Key Themes

-- Over the past year, the USSR has made several formal and informal proposals for expanded cooperation under the 1987 bilateral space cooperation agreement.

-- We are preparing a package of proposals for additional US-USSR space cooperation.

  -- The proposals relate to environmental monitoring from space, annual consultations on civilian space activities, and exchange of flight opportunities on one "MIR" mission and one space shuttle mission.

Key Points

-- We expect to address further space cooperation in the near future.

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TAB 2

Regional

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ANGOLA

Key Points

-- I remain very worried about the situation in Angola. We both need to do our utmost to ensure that the Government in Luanda, and UNITA, negotiate seriously to resolve this conflict.

-- I know Dr. Savimbi is committed to a negotiated settlement, and UNITA has made major concessions in recognizing the State of Angola, dos Santos as President, and allowing the MPLA to remain in power until elections.

-- Luanda needs to reciprocate by agreeing to recognize UNITA and commit to multiparty democracy, steps it refused to take in the latest negotiations.

-- We will continue to urge UNITA to take a constructive and flexible approach in the talks with the MPLA and to work for rapid agreement, first on principles and then on a ceasefire.

-- I am optimistic that through our mutual efforts and cooperation we can arrive at a negotiated resolution of the Angolan conflict. The Portuguese have suggested that the U.S. and USSR become more actively involved. We are prepared to respond to such a request, if the parties agree.

-- We are encouraged by Luanda's agreement to ask the UN to develop a plan to provide humanitarian relief to both sides of the Angolan conflict.

-- We think that time is of the essence and urge you to press Luanda for quick assent to a set of UN guidelines which would permit cross-border deliveries and necessary operational contacts between the UN and UNITA.

Contingency Points

(If Gorbachev raises a cutoff of assistance):

-- We are willing to accept an agreement by the parties not to accept lethal assistance from any source, as long as it:

  -- is agreed to by all parties;

  -- cuts off arms from all sources;

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-- allows for the continued supply of non-lethal aid;

-- is subject to international verification; and

-- includes the withdrawal of all foreign military advisors.

ASIA

Korea

Key Points

-- I was very pleased that you met with South Korean President Roh in San Francisco. This improved dialogue, and eventually normalized relations between South Korea and the USSR, can only strengthen the prospects for peaceful, stable development on the Korean Peninsula.

-- We also hope that the unprecedented dialogue between the Prime Ministers of North and South Korea will bear fruit.

-- We very much appreciate the efforts you have made with the North Koreans to urge them to conclude the nuclear non-proliferation treaty IAEA safeguards agreement and to negotiate seriously with South Korea.

-- Nevertheless, we seem to be at an impasse. We must continue every effort in the international community to pressure North Korea to comply with its treaty obligations. We would welcome your thoughts as to any additional steps we might take.

-- We were particularly disturbed by North Korea's assertion at the Review Conference that it had no unsafeguarded nuclear activities. This is simply not true, and raises concerns about the true purpose of North Korea's nuclear development.

Contingency Points

(If the Soviets raise North Korean proposals for a reduced U.S. military presence in South Korea):

-- The U.S. military presence in Korea is designed to help ensure South Korean security. Both ROK and U.S. forces are defensive; the North Korean forces are offensively structured. We are committed to South Korea's defense as long as the North Korean posture requires it.

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Japan

Key Points

-- The continuing dispute over the Northern Territories is a source of concern to us. We would very much like to see that chapter of history closed to everyone's satisfaction, and permit Soviet-Japanese relations to assume their rightful level.

-- I would welcome a readout on Mr. Shevardnadze's trip to Tokyo earlier this week.

Contingency Points

(If Gorbachev raises Soviet proposals for confidence - and security-building measures in Asia, involving Japan):

-- We believe reaching concrete agreement on outstanding regional conflicts and territorial disputes -- such as the Northern territories -- would be the most effective way to reduce tensions, and build confidence, in Asia.

Asian CBMs (if raised)

Key Points

-- While we find CBMs are generally useful measures to undertake in the proper context, we cannot agree to many of the specific proposals for Asian CBMs that have been presented to us so far.

-- Although I am not ready to provide a definitive response, our preliminary reaction is that there is good potential for CBM's and ultimately arms reductions in the Korean peninsula.

-- The ROK is already considering CBMs designed to increase the transparency of the forces stationed in Korea.

-- DPRK conclusion of an IAEA safeguards agreement and subsequent implementation would be the best possible CBM for Korea.

-- However, in other areas we have already reviewed -- the Northern Territories, Cambodia -- we believe reaching concrete agreement on specific issues would be the most effective way to reduce tensions, and build confidence, in Asia.

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CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA

Key Points

-- We have both learned that free and fair elections are the best way to resolve both the domestic and external aspects of regional conflicts. In Nicaragua, elections have helped bring peace to that country on terms that we can both take pride in.

-- We appreciate your efforts to work with the Sandinistas to help ensure that they work constructively with the government of Mrs. Chamorro and refrain from sponsoring destabilizing strikes.

-- We also welcome Soviet efforts to support the ongoing negotiations on El Salvador, and appreciate your decision to send a Soviet envoy to San Salvador. This can only help the peace process.

-- I am particularly troubled by the unhelpful role that Cuba is playing. The leadership of the FMLN should be receiving a clear message that they must negotiate, not fight a war.

-- The continuing logistical support, training and arms that Castro provides to the FMLN send a very different message, reinforce FMLN intransigence and complicate the negotiating process.

-- Frankly, continued Soviet military support to Cuba allows Castro to continue this very unhelpful assistance to the FMLN.

-- The United States has made its support to the Government of El Salvador conditional on human rights and other reforms.

-- I would welcome a decision by the Soviet Union to follow suit with Cuba, conditioning further aid on Cuba's willingness to halt its support for the FMLN and to pressure the FMLN to negotiate seriously with the Government of El Salvador.

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SOUTH ASIA

Kashmir

-- Even though the world's attention is focused on the Gulf, the risk that India and Pakistan may come to blows cannot be overlooked.

-- The nuclear dimension makes any conflict over Kashmir doubly dangerous.

-- Our cooperation on the crisis in the Persian Gulf shows that we can work together constructively.

-- We should redouble our efforts with India and Pakistan to avert a crisis over Kashmir, which remains a critical source of regional tension.

-- A key to reducing tension is encouraging confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan, both on the military front and on nuclear non-proliferation. We hope you will use your influence with India on both issues.

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TAB 3

Bilateral

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ENVIRONMENT (IF RAISED)

Key Themes

-- We want to encourage cooperation on the environment, which has been conducted without interruption since 1972 under the U.S.-USSR Environmental Agreement.

-- In late 1989, the U.S. began probing for ways to engage the Soviets in expanded environmental cooperation, preferably in long-term environmental and pollution monitoring. Prospects for linking Soviet research to the U.S. Global Change Research Program are promising but loosely defined.

-- Our pending space cooperation initiative (see Space talking points) includes environmental monitoring from space, and could be linked to the Global Change Research Program.

Key Points

-- We are following closely the USSR's efforts through the State Committee for Nature to cope with pressing environmental issues.

-- I know you face a formidable task in drafting fundamental legislation, publishing formerly confidential data, and developing a strategy for dealing with serious environmental problems.

-- The U.S.-USSR Environmental Agreement has been a model of cooperation in many ways, and surely can be further strengthened.

-- I would be pleased to have our experts explore more ways to gather essential basic data through cooperation in long-term environmental and pollution monitoring. These efforts would have international significance.

-- We should press our experts to follow up on the joint statement we made at the May 1990 summit, with commitment to the study of global change, full and open exchange of data, and cooperation in environmental monitoring and research.

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NEW OFFICE BUILDINGS

Key Points

-- Ambassador Salgo and Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov have been working on a formula to resolve Embassy property issues since June 1989.

-- At stake are not only the claims we have arising out of defective construction of our new chancery, but also the desire of both sides to expand their Embassy compounds.

-- Our inability to use our new building is one of the shrinking number of issues between us which continue to embitter Congressional and U.S. public attitudes.

-- Our negotiators are close to agreement; we need to urge that they resolve outstanding issues by our next summit.

-- As our relations improve and cooperation expands, we both will badly need additional chancery space.

Contingency Points

(If asked whether the U.S. still plans to tear down its new chancery building and whether Congress will agree):

-- We stand by our decision to tear down and rebuild on the existing foundation our new Embassy chancery.

-- Most Congressmen feel quite strongly that the new Embassy building has been so compromised as to be unusable.

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KIEV/NEW YORK CONSULATES GENERAL

Key Points

-- We both need to improve our ability to reach out to each other's citizens.

-- You and President Reagan recognized this fact as far back as the Geneva Summit and decided to move forward with an exchange of Consulates General in Kiev and New York.

-- We had some legislative restrictions which blocked progress; they are now manageable though there are certain steps we will have to take with our Congress before the agreements come fully into force.

-- We look forward to opening the posts perhaps as early as late this month.

Contingency Points

(In the event Gorbachev complains that the Soviets will not immediately be able to put their Consulate in buildings they own in New York):

-- Congress has long been concerned that our missions in the USSR are not treated as favorably as Soviet missions here.

-- While removing some restrictions on an exchange of Consulates General, the Congress did insert a legal requirement that the posts enjoy reciprocal conditions.

-- You own buildings in New York. We have agreed that you can occupy them when we are able to buy suitable buildings for our mission in Kiev.

-- In the meantime, both sides have agreed to operate out of leased facilities.

-- We intend to move quickly to find permanent quarters in Kiev; your efforts on our behalf with Kiev authorities would be useful and appreciated.

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MALTA STUDENT EXCHANGE INITIATIVE

Key Themes

-- At the December 1989 Malta meeting, you proposed that both countries expand undergraduate university exchanges by 1000 students in each direction.

-- At the June 1990 summit, you and President Gorbachev signed a general agreement for a phased increase in university exchanges beginning Academic Year 1991-92.

-- Our goal is to negotiate and sign the protocol in September so that we can proceed with student placement by Fall 1991.

-- We want to encourage direct affiliations between U.S. and Soviet institutions, and to direct the Soviet government towards facilitating exchanges, not controlling them.

Key Points

-- The increase in university student exchanges that we pledged at Malta and signed at the Washington summit is moving toward implementation.

-- It is apparent that numerous U.S. and Soviet universities have interpreted the Malta pledge and the summit agreement as an open door to private exchange arrangements.

-- I welcome this kind of "proliferation"; I see in it a need and a mutual opportunity to normalize relations between Soviet republics and the U.S. academic and private entrepreneurial sector.

-- To be effective in these circumstances, central government needs to see itself as facilitating, not "controlling," such contacts.

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TAB D

BIOGRAPHIES

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zg. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zk. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/14/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zl. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zm. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zn. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	8/20/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zo. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	8/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed: 2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:** 91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #:	**Appeal Disposition:**
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	**Disposition Date:**
AR Case #:	**MR Case #:**
AR Disposition:	**MR Disposition:**
AR Disposition Date:	**MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zp. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zq. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/14/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed: 2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:** 91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #:	**Appeal Disposition:**
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	**Disposition Date:**
AR Case #:	**MR Case #:**
AR Disposition:	**MR Disposition:**
AR Disposition Date:	**MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zr. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/14/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed: 2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:** 91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #:	**Appeal Disposition:**
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AR Disposition:	**MR Disposition:**
AR Disposition Date:	**MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zs. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed: 2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:** 91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #:	**Appeal Disposition:**
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	**Disposition Date:**
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AR Disposition:	**MR Disposition:**
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RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03zt. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1990) [1]

Date Closed: 2/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:** 91118-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S **Re-review Case #:** **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**	**Appeal Case #:** **Appeal Disposition:** **Disposition Date:**
AR Case #: **AR Disposition:** **AR Disposition Date:**	**MR Case #:** **MR Disposition:** **MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TABLE

VISIT SCHEDULE