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2009-0275-S

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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91118
Folder ID Number: 91118-006

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Breakfast Meeting with Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, June 13; 8:00 - 9:00 a.m. (1 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made by General Scowcroft on US-Soviet Summit for Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (11 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to William F. Sittmann Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	6/13/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (3 pp.)	5/31/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Soviet Proposal for Joint NATO-Warsaw Pact Declaration: A Preliminary Analysis (3 pp.)	6/18/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Cable	Re: Soviet Proposed NATO-WTO Declaration (4 pp.)	6/15/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Cable	Re: The Other Side of Yel'tsin [redacted] (12 pp.)	6/19/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1001
OA/ID Number: 91118-006
Date Closed: 2/25/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004718
RECEIVED: 12 JUN 90 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BURNS
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 12 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: USSR
ARMS CONTROL
SUMMIT

CONGRESSIONAL
GERMAN UNIFICATION
AFGHANISTAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT BREAKFAST MTG W/ MEMBERS OF SENATE INTELLIGENCE SELECT COM
ON 13 JUN

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
BURNS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/25/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 1 OF 1

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Per Florence,
Tab I was
sent down
earlier

il Security Council
White House

6/13/78

LOG # 4718

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

DOCLOG CM A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other

Should be seen by: (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Scowcroft Breakfast mtg w/ Members of
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence
on June 13 at 8:00pm

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NSC/S —
TAB I came over
earlier today, only (w/o
chit)

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CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

4718

June 12, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

SUBJECT: Your Breakfast Meeting with Members of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, June 13; 8:00-
9:00 a.m.

At Tab 1 are points to be made for your breakfast meeting with
Chairman Boren and other members of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence (SSCI).

The committee has invited you to present an overview of the U.S.-
Soviet summit, including Germany and arms control. Chairman
Boren would like you to focus particularly on summit discussions
on regional issues, and post-summit diplomatic activity on
Afghanistan, Angola and India-Pakistan.

Concurrences: Virginia Lampley, Richard Haass, William Working,
Arnie Kanter, Karl Jackson, William Pryce, John Ordway

*All concurred
in draft.*

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the points at Tab 1 for use in your breakfast
meeting.

Attachments

Tab 1 Points To Be Made

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/13/2002

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POINTS TO BE MADE BY GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ON US-SOVIET SUMMIT FOR
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Overview

- As you know, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev established a broad agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations when they met at Malta in December.
- The Washington summit completed much of that work, and produced some significant and concrete agreements that we think will produce a more mature, and sustainable relationship with the Soviets.
- We had our differences on some issues, notably the Baltics. The President reaffirmed in unmistakable terms our non-recognition policy and our support for Baltic self-determination. He urged Gorbachev to end the economic blockade of Lithuania, and start a fresh dialogue.
- The atmospherics were quite good. The two Presidents had constructive discussions, even on subjects where they disagreed. Camp David provided a day of more informal discussion and activities. And, as you probably know, the two agreed to meet regularly.
- So, we think we produced a good basis to tackle the many unresolved issues in the relationship.
- I'll briefly review the discussions on Germany and the agreements reached in Arms Control and Economics, before giving you some detail on the regional issues talks.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0301-F
SCS 5/13/03

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2

Germany and the Future of Europe

- Let me begin with a subject which made the summit unique- German Unification. This discussion was essentially about the political reorganization of Europe.
- Gorbachev argued that a united Germany in NATO would alter the strategic balance. He proposed that Germany belong to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and thus have two anchors.
- He referred to a long transition period under four-power supervision, and without full sovereignty for Germany.
- The President repeated several times that a united Germany is no threat to anyone, including the USSR. He stressed that Germany's commitment to democracy over the last forty years had earned it a place in the new Europe.
- He emphasized our support for Germany in NATO, including the integrated military structures. He explained that there should be no constraints on German sovereignty at the time of unification, and that there should be no singularization of Germany.
- Significantly, Gorbachev seemed to agree that the Germans have the right under the Helsinki Final Act to choose their alliance membership. Gorbachev did not demur when the President referred to this in the press conference. We'll see how this works out in practice.
- Gorbachev made clear he wanted a continued U.S. military presence in Europe. His positions on many of the other issues may not be fixed. He seems to want reassurance that NATO would change its doctrine and evolve to become a more political alliance.

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- It was not surprising there was no agreement on Germany. We'll continue to work hard, especially at the NATO Summit, to persuade Moscow that a Germany fully in NATO is no threat to Soviet security.

Arms Control

- We made very good progress on arms control issues.
- First, we signed a far-reaching chemical weapons agreement that will result in the destruction of the vast majority of both sides' CW stockpiles.
- We will send this to you as an Executive Agreement for your formal review and approval by both Houses.
- In the Joint Statement on CFE, both sides rededicated themselves to reaching rapid agreement. We agreed a CFE treaty is an indispensable foundation for the future of Europe.
- We agreed on verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. These will provide the on-site verification measures we wanted. The ratification process in the Senate can now proceed.
- on START, we made substantial progress as we noted in our joint statements. But we failed to resolve all the remaining differences.
- Two of the most important outstanding issues are Backfire and heavy missiles (SS-18s). Both have been with us for over fifteen years.

- We made clear to the Soviets how important a political issue Backfire is to us. They agreed to accept a politically binding commitment not to give it an intercontinental capability, but they refused to put a meaningful cap on the total number of Backfires. We'll continue to press in Geneva to impose some kind of limit.
- We also pressed the Soviets hard to go beyond their current agreement to cut their SS-18 force in half from 308 to 154 heavy missiles. They rejected our proposals. We will continue to try for further limits on these missiles in the current START treaty, and will make it a priority issue in the follow-on talks.
- In fact, I think one of our more significant achievements was to get Soviet agreement to follow-on talks which will emphasize dealing with heavies and ICBM MIRVs.
- Don't prejudice the success of those talks by undermining our needed strategic programs during the budget process.
- Finally, we issued a good Joint Statement on Proliferation, and pressed Gorbachev hard on Open Skies.

Economic and Other Agreements

- We were also successful in agreeing to many of the economic initiatives launched at Malta.
- The Commercial Agreement will help our businessmen by improving access to Soviet markets, and making it easier to establish an office in the USSR. It contains strong protections for intellectual property rights.

- The President was very clear that he will not send the agreement to the Hill or waive Jackson-Vanik (the two conditions for granting MFN) until the Soviets pass their legislation guaranteeing the right of emigration.
- We felt it was important to sign the agreement to encourage Gorbachev's efforts toward a market economy.
- We also signed some other important economic agreements, including; Civil Aviation, Long-Term Grains, Maritime Transport, and Customs, which will help in the fight against drug trafficking.
- In other areas, we signed a Maritime Boundary Agreement which will place roughly 70% of the Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction and allow fishing and hydrocarbon resource development to go forward. We also agreed to establish a joint international park in the Bering Sea area.
- Finally, with your help and encouragement, Mr. Chairman, we also agreed to initiate a 1000 to 1000 university student exchange program.

Regional Issues

- The two Presidents discussed regional issues on the third day of the Summit at Camp David.
- The discussions were relaxed and thorough. While there were no dramatic breakthroughs, I think we laid a strong base for future cooperation.

Afghanistan

- The two agreed there was some common ground in our respective positions.

- We agreed on the importance of elections as a mechanism for establishing a permanent government, noting that our support for elections had worked in Nicaragua. We also agreed that a transitional authority should prepare for and conduct elections.
- The critical area of difference remains the role of Najibullah in the transition period. The President expressed our concern about Soviet insistence that Najibullah retain the advantages of incumbency during the transition process--a position that makes it difficult to get such a process started, particularly given the understandable strength of resistance views about Najibullah.
- We plan to follow-up with the Soviets to press these views and convince them to think seriously about the need for a fair transition period.

Middle East

- The President expressed our concern about the recent attempted Palestinian raid against Israel. It is our view that Arafat had to condemn the act, disassociate himself from those who carried it out, and take meaningful steps to discipline those responsible. We had a good exchange on this issue, and the Soviets agreed with our concerns about terrorism in general.
- The two had a candid exchange on the emigration issue and the question of Soviet Jewish emigrants settling in the occupied territories. Gorbachev complained about Israel's practice of settling Soviet Jews in the occupied

territories, and said he had been bombarded by criticism from Arab countries on this issue.

- As you know, Gorbachev said during the press conference that if Soviet concerns are not heeded by Israel, he may have to give further thought to issuing exit permits. Shevardnadze reaffirmed to Secretary Baker a few days later, however, that Soviet emigration policy would not change.
- The President reiterated our support for the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, but made clear we did not agree with their being settled in the occupied territories.
- In our view, however, conditioning the right to leave the USSR on Israeli settlement policy would not be justified.
- The President also pushed for implementation of the Aeroflot-El Al direct flights agreement to assist the process of emigration. This would alleviate hardships posed by the lack of direct air links between Moscow and Tel Aviv. He, of course, raised our concerns in general about refuseniks and anti-semitism in the USSR.

Kashmir

- The Presidents discussed the volatile situation in Kashmir. They agreed to watch the situation carefully and to urge restraint in continuing parallel approaches to India and Pakistan. The Soviets, however, are not prepared to join us in public efforts, no doubt for fear of alienating India.
- Let me give you some background on our approach to Kashmir.
- The President has been deeply concerned about the violence in Kashmir and the escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. He sent Bob Gates there as a special emissary in

late May to meet with leaders of both nations.

- We have urged India and Pakistan to curb provocative actions and rhetoric, and to open lines of communication. We've also encouraged them to work together on Kashmir in the spirit of the Simla accords, by which they agreed to resolve bilateral disputes peacefully.
- We have long favored a political resolution of the Kashmir dilemma through peaceful negotiations and dialogue. We have reminded India that their concerns about outside intervention in the conflict are overly exaggerated because the root causes are internal. We have urged India to begin a dialogue with the Kashmiris as soon as possible.
- At the same time, we have called upon the people of Kashmir to choose dialogue, and renounce violence.
- We have also warned Pakistan to cease material support to the militants to avoid giving India a pretext for military action.
- We are encouraged that India has proposed some confidence-building measures to Pakistan that the GOP has agreed to consider, and that will provide the basis for talks between the two Foreign Secretaries later this month.
- The critical period lies ahead. Because of the potential nuclear dimension of this problem, we intend to watch the Kashmir problem closely, and to make every effort to prevent further escalation of violence and to encourage a peaceful solution.

Cuba and Central America

- The two Presidents discussed this subject in some detail, as did Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
- Both sides agreed on the need to support the Esquipulas peace process.
- The President and Secretary urged the Soviets to use their influence with Castro to end Cuban arms shipments to the rebels in El Salvador, and to support a negotiated settlement in that country.
- The Soviets urged us to make our concerns known directly to the Cubans, but they promised to probe the Cubans on the arms transfers to the FMLN.
- The Soviets also said they would continue their program of economic aid to the new government in Nicaragua.

Africa

- On Angola, the two Presidents reiterated their strong support for efforts to achieve a political settlement through direct negotiations between the two parties.
- We and the Soviets both support the current Portuguese efforts to broker talks, and we understand that a second round of discussions will take place shortly in Portugal.
- In the last several days, both sides have made positive references to achieving a ceasefire quickly. Based on separate discussions with Savimbi in late May, and the Angolans in June in Havana, we believe they are both serious.

- We will continue to coordinate with the Portuguese, and to urge Savimbi to be flexible.
- We also issued a Joint Statement on Ethiopia calling for a UN-led relief effort that would use Soviet transport to carry our food to Asmara.
- We are in touch with the Soviets to follow up on this both in New York and in Addis. One key unknown is whether the EPLF, which is shelling the airport in Addis, will provide the security guarantees that the Soviets will need to begin these flights. We will be discussing this with the EPLF.
- The summit statement also announced support for an international conference on the Horn of Africa. We are now considering exactly how, when and where such a conference might take place, who would participate, and what its precise objectives would be. We will discuss this further with the Soviets and the governments in the region.

Asia

- The President raised the issue of the Northern Territories, pointing out the U.S. fully supports the Japanese claim to the islands. He urged Gorbachev to resolve this issue with Japan, in order to reduce tensions in the region.
- on Cambodia, the President said it was important to support the efforts of Japan, Thailand and others to resolve differences among the Cambodian parties. The two Presidents took note of progress made so far in the Perm Five meetings on a settlement. Gorbachev was somewhat optimistic that progress would be made because of improvements in the Sino-Vietnamese dialogue.

- The two Presidents also discussed the Korean Peninsula. Gorbachev said the USSR intended to improve its relations with South Korea, as evidenced by his June 4 meeting with President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco.
- The President raised North Korea's failure to sign and implement the IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Agreement. Gorbachev noted the Soviets were also concerned and had discussed the issue with the North Koreans.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4737

CHRON FILE

June 13, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Mulroney
of Canada, May 31, 1990

At Tab I is the memorandum of conversation for the President's
call from Mulroney.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab I be filed
for the record.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/18/2002

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
SCS 8/21/09

4737

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (C)

Participants: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME May 31, 1990, 9:00-9:13 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Good morning, Brian. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'm sorry to interrupt, George, because I know Gorbachev is arriving shortly. (U)

The President: I'm here with John, the Vice President, Brent and Bob Gates. We're having a brief review before we see Gorbachev. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I neglected to mention when we spoke last night two points that I had raised with Gorbachev, probably because I'm so preoccupied with the domestic situation here. (C)

The President: I'll have Brent listen in. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I talked to Henry, Brent. (C)

The President: Did I misunderstand? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: No, I clarified it. Gorbachev misunderstood. (C)

On Cuba, I said to Gorbachev "you must understand that Cuba represents an unacceptable situation for George Bush. You continue to fund this little dictatorial regime with \$6 billion per year. You must understand this creates a problem for George Bush. You must also understand that Cuban-Americans play a big role in the Republican party. You have to understand that this is a fundamental issue for George Bush and Jim Baker". (S)

The President: That's very helpful, Brian. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I reminded Gorbachev he had said that your understanding of his problems on the German question would be a litmus test of the success of the summit. I said I

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assumed he was also talking about his readiness to support you on other questions such as U.S. policy in the Middle East. Gorbachev said he was. I said that I didn't know if there had been an American President in recent memory who was more even-handed on the Middle East than George Bush. I told him that anything he could do to help George Bush break new ground on the Middle East at the summit would help. Gorbachev said he was impressed by that. (S)

The President: Let me make an important point. The PLO attack today is a new level of futility. It was a stupid damn thing. Arafat has to denounce it. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He's undermining your efforts and playing into Shamir's hands. (S)

The President: I appreciate the call and the way you've handled Gorbachev. The fascinating part was that Gorbachev felt the U.S. was leading a NATO-led conspiracy. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He was intense. Just the two of us were in the office. I told him that if he thought a couple of us had produced the events in Germany, he was giving us more credit than we deserved, or that our own publics were giving us. I said that democracy had produced those events in Germany. I brought up Cuba again and said he had to understand. (S)

The President: Listen, Brian, I want you to know that when Mulroney calls, I listen. You suggested I take a look at Article II of the NATO Treaty and the words of Lester Pearson (President read aloud text of Article II). I think this is damn good language that could help convince Gorbachev not to see NATO as a threat. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He appears to see NATO as an institution with long-term survivability. (S)

The President: Brian, we want to support you on EXPO 2000. On the bigger question, just call me if there is something I can do to help. Anything our side can do to strengthen your hand, we'll do. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I appreciate it. (U)

When the question of the Baltics came up in our press conference, I said the creation of Canada's union had been led by Quebec and that there could be no comparing Canada to the Baltics. I said we were moving on domestic constitutional reform. (S)

General Scowcroft: That was a great statement of yours. (S)

The President: What do you make of this military aide thing? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I really don't know. He came to lunch without his military aide. (S)

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3

The President: I told my guys how beneficial your conversations with him were. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Raisa and Mila got along well. She is very influential with him, and there is clearly a lot of mutual respect there. She told Mila that, contrary to some previous visits, she was looking forward to Washington and to spending time with Barbara. There was a clear implication there that Mila didn't touch. Raisa is a key to his moods. (Ø)

The President: Barbara will treat her well and make sure she is comfortable with her. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I would suggest you get together with them casually, be informal and even digress from the program. (Ø)

The President: We'll do two things differently. First, Barbara will take Raisa upstairs after their coffee this morning. We've not done that before. Second, we'll have the Gorbachevs upstairs before the State dinner tonight. And, we'll also spend a day with them at Camp David. I think the mood we'll set should dispel any feelings of hostility. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: On the personal side, let me make a suggestion. You have that lovely daughter in Maine--this guy loves kids and grandchildren; it's genuine. You might bring her down with her kids to loosen things up. (Ø)

The President: Okay. Thanks so much. If you need a shoulder to cry on, let me know. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We'll struggle through, George. (Ø)

The President: I just ache for your problems. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We're proud of what you are doing. Hang in there. (U)

Good luck. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004647
RECEIVED: 08 JUN 90 20

TO: GREEN, S

FROM: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE
DOC DATE: 13 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

BALTIC STATES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT PROCLAMATION RE BALTIC FREEDOM DAY ON 14 JUN

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 12 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
NSC CHRON
RICE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY D. Jenkins DATE 6/13 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

~~Proclamation~~ *res Baltic Freedom*
~~Day - 18 June~~
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: DDP LOG # 4647
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DDP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Bill Sittmann</i>	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>see note</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>6/12 DC</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
<u>CONDI RICE</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>FFA</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Sue 5:00 pm Today

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR SHIRLEY GREEN

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Draft Proclamation Re Baltic Freedom Day on
June 14

The revised text of the Baltic Day Proclamation meets with the approval of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Proclamation

BALTIC FREEDOM DAY, 1990

- - - - -

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION

The struggle for Baltic freedom has entered a new era of great promise and hope. The 50-year-long effort by the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to regain freedom and democracy has begun to bear fruit.

The international community has long decried the dark summer of 1940 when, as a result of a ^{self serving} ~~sinister~~ agreement made earlier by Hitler and Stalin in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Baltic States were denied their independent status. During that fateful summer, Soviet troops invaded and occupied the Baltic States. The rigged elections that followed put an end to Baltic self-determination.

These events, however, did not end the desire of the Baltic peoples for freedom and independence. During the past year, they have taken major steps toward achieving self-determination. Generally free and fair elections based on a vigorous multiparty political system produced popular legislatures ~~that have formed pro-independence governments in all three Baltic States.~~

In decisions reflecting the will of the Baltic peoples, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia have asserted ^{their intention to restore} ~~the restoration~~ of their independence. ~~The representatives of the Baltic~~ ^{Taking a non-violent path, these new} ~~peoples have taken a non-violent path and have consistently appealed for dialogue and negotiations with Moscow to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to~~

For 50 years the United States has refused to recognize the forced incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. As I assured the Prime Minister of Lithuania during her recent visit, the United States will remain faithful to this policy. We support self-determination for the Baltic peoples, and we call upon the Soviet Union to ^{Enter a good-faith dialogue} ~~move to the negotiating table~~ with representatives of the Baltic governments who received popular mandates in free and fair elections.

The right to liberty and self-determination; free and fair elections; a better life for themselves and for their children -- these are the just aspirations of the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. On this Baltic Freedom Day, we reaffirm our support for them.

The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 251, has designated June 14, 1990, as "Baltic Freedom Day" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim June 14, 1990, as Baltic Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the United States of America to observe this day with appropriate remembrances and ceremonies to reaffirm their commitment to principles of freedom and liberty for all oppressed people.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
day of , in the year of our
Lord nineteen hundred and ninety, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred and fourteenth.

Whereas 1990 marks the 50th anniversary of the invasion, seizure, and illegal incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union against the national will and the desire for independence and freedom of the Baltic people;

Whereas 1990 also marks the 50th anniversary of the continued policy of the United States of not recognizing the illegal forcible occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union;

Whereas, due to Soviet and Nazi collusion, the Baltic States suffered a loss of one-third of their population by the end of World War II;

Whereas, under Soviet occupation, the native Baltic peoples have been deported from their homelands to forced labor and concentration camps in Siberia and elsewhere;

Whereas the people of the Baltic States have unique indigenous cultures, national traditions, and languages, which have been threatened by decades of russification;

Whereas the Soviet Union has introduced into the Baltic States ecologically unsound industries without proper safeguards, and the presence of those industries has critically endangered the environment and well-being of the Baltic people;

Whereas, as part of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign of openness, restructuring, and democratization, the Soviet leaders have officially acknowledged the illegality of the secret protocols to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which led to the Soviet military invasion of the Baltic States in 1940;

Whereas, in the spirit of openness and democratization, the Baltic peoples are affirming their right, upheld both by international law and by the Soviet Constitution, to restore full independence through parliamentary and peaceful means; and

Whereas the United States, as a member of the United Nations,
has repeatedly upheld the right of nations to self-determina-
tion: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of*
2 *the United States of America in Congress assembled, That—*

3 (1) the Congress recognizes the continuing desire
4 and right of the people of the Baltic States for freedom
5 and independence;

6 (2) the Congress, in keeping with the policy of the
7 United States to deny recognition of the Soviet occupa-
8 tion of the Baltic States, urges the Soviet Union to
9 recognize the sovereignty of the Baltic States and to
10 yield to the rightful demands of the Baltic peoples for
11 independence from foreign domination and oppression,
12 as guaranteed by Principle Eight of the Helsinki Ac-
13 cords, to which the Soviet Union is a signatory;

14 (3) June 14, 1990, the anniversary of the first
15 mass deportation of the Baltic peoples from their
16 homelands in 1941, is designated as "Baltic Freedom
17 Day", as a symbol of the solidarity of the people of the
18 United States with the aspirations of the captive Baltic
19 people; and

20 (4) the President is authorized and requested to
21 issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the
22 United States to observe Baltic Freedom Day with ap-
23 propriate ceremonies and activities, and to submit to

1 the Congress within 60 days a statement articulating
2 specific actions the United States Government is
3 taking, in fulfillment of the intent of the nonrecognition
4 principle to—

5 (A) support the peaceful restoration of the in-
6 dependence of the Baltic States; and

7 (B) to encourage Soviet support for a peace-
8 ful transition to independence and democracy in
9 the Baltic States.

○

101ST CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. J. RES. 251

Designating "Baltic Freedom Day".

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 7 (legislative day, JANUARY 23), 1990

Mr. RIEGLE (for himself, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. SIMON, Mr. DIXON, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. WILSON, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. SASSER, Mr. WARNER, Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DOLE, Mr. GARN, Mr. INOUE, Mr. KOHL, Mr. EXON, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. DODD, Mr. MCCLURE, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. BRYAN, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. GORTON, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. SYMMS, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. WALLOP, Mr. NUNN, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. PELL, Mr. COATS, Mr. ROTH, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. GLENN, Mr. BOREN, Mr. SPECTER, and Mr. HELMS) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Designating "Baltic Freedom Day".

Whereas the people of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have cherished the principles of religious and political freedom and have recently held mass demonstrations calling for freedom and independence;

Whereas from 1918 to 1940, the Baltic States existed as independent, sovereign nations and as fully recognized members of the League of Nations;

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 11, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Draft Proclamation Re Baltic Freedom Day on
June 14

Attached at Tab A is a revised Baltic Freedom Day Proclamation text. Your memorandum to Shirley Green forwarding the revised text is at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Green
Tab A Revised Draft Proclamation

*Condi -
Brent's enthusiasm
for this ranges between
slim + none.
- What is origin?
- Relationship to Captive Nations
- Done in past?
- Why on flag day?
- Any other background?
- Why!*

7647

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1990



MEMORANDUM FOR:

C. BOYDEN GRAY
EDE HOLIDAY
FREDERICK D. McCLURE
ROGER B. PORTER
DAVID DEMAREST
SIG ROGICH
JOSEPH W. HAGIN II (FYI)
BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

Paul McNeill for
SHIRLEY GREEN
93 OEOB

SUBJECT:

(Draft Proclamation)
Baltic Freedom Day, 1990

Attached for your review is the above-mentioned proclamation designating June 14, 1990, as "Baltic Freedom Day."

It was submitted by the Department of State, reviewed and approved by the National Security Council, and edited/revised by this office.

IMMEDIATE ATTENTION REQUIRED. Written or oral response required by no later than 5:00 p.m. Monday, June 11, 1990.

For questions, discussion or routine clearance, contact Paul McNeill, via phone or interoffice mail, in room 93/extension 2276. Thank you.

cc: Ron Geisler

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004892
RECEIVED: 18 JUN 90 14

TO: MCCLURE, F

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 18 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
CONGRESSIONAL

MIDDLE EAST
AP

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POINTS TO MAKE ON LITHUANIA & MIDDLE EAST AT SENATE GOP LEADERSHIP
MTG / JUN 19

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 21 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LAMPLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LAMPLEY
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4892

June 18, 1990

CLERK FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK D. MCCLURE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Points to be Made on Lithuania and the Middle East
at Senate GOP Leadership Meeting, June 19, 1990

Attached are Points to be Made on Lithuania and the Middle East
for the President's meeting with the Senate GOP leadership on
June 19, 1990, at 10:00 a.m.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made on Lithuania
Tab B Points to be Made on the Middle East

POINTS TO BE MADE ON LITHUANIA

- As you know, I made it very clear to Gorbachev at the Summit, and before, that the U.S. supports self-determination for the Baltic republics. We have encouraged the Soviets and the Baltic governments to find a peaceful solution toward that end.
- I also told him directly how important this issue was to the Congress.
- I was encouraged by Gorbachev's June 12 meeting with the three Presidents of the Baltic republics in which he indicated that he could begin a dialogue if they suspended their declarations of independence, rather than annulled them.
- Prime Minister Ryzhkov met on June 13 with Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene and promised that, as a gesture of good will, the Soviets would increase the supply of natural gas to Lithuania. And we do have indications that the Soviets have, in recent days, begun to make good on that promise.
- So, at least for now, the signs are positive. We are letting all sides know that we hope these meetings will lead to a sustained dialogue and the lifting of the Soviet blockade.

POINTS TO BE MADE ON LITHUANIA

- AS YOU KNOW, I MADE IT VERY CLEAR TO GORBACHEV AT THE SUMMIT, AND BEFORE, THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE BALTIC REPUBLICS. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED THE SOVIETS AND THE BALTIC GOVERNMENTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TOWARD THAT END.
- I ALSO TOLD HIM DIRECTLY HOW IMPORTANT THIS ISSUE WAS TO THE CONGRESS.
- I WAS ENCOURAGED BY GORBACHEV'S JUNE 12 MEETING WITH THE THREE PRESIDENTS OF THE BALTIC REPUBLICS IN WHICH HE INDICATED THAT HE COULD BEGIN A DIALOGUE IF THEY SUSPENDED THEIR DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, RATHER THAN ANNULLED THEM.
- PRIME MINISTER RYZHKOV MET ON JUNE 13 WITH

- LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER PRUNSKIENE AND PROMISED THAT, AS A GESTURE OF GOOD WILL, THE SOVIETS WOULD INCREASE THE SUPPLY OF NATURAL GAS TO LITHUANIA. AND WE DO HAVE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE, IN RECENT DAYS, BEGUN TO MAKE GOOD ON THAT PROMISE.
- SO, AT LEAST FOR NOW, THE SIGNS ARE POSITIVE. WE ARE LETTING ALL SIDES KNOW THAT WE HOPE THESE MEETINGS WILL LEAD TO A SUSTAINED DIALOGUE AND THE LIFTING OF THE SOVIET BLOCKADE.

POINTS TO BE MADE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

- I am concerned about trends in the Middle East. Things tend to get worse when they don't get better. I don't see war on the horizon, but I do worry about increased violence and the future of moderates on all sides.
- We are pushing the new Israeli government for a quick and we hope positive response on the peace process. We want to get an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue started. This will require flexibility from them on the composition of the Palestinian side.
- We do not want to see this drawn out any longer than need be. If we can't make this work, we will go back to the drawing board.
- We also want to see Israel back off settlement activity, which really does work against peace prospects. Until we can reach some understanding with them, I won't release the \$400 million in housing investment guarantees.
- As for the PLO, we have told them we need a clear condemnation and some disciplinary action against Abu Abbas. If we don't get more than we have, we will have no choice but to suspend our dialogue. No one should kid themselves, though--if we do break off talks with the PLO, the political situation (as well as the situation on the ground) is almost certain to deteriorate.

CARD 1 OF 2

POINTS TO BE MADE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

- I AM CONCERNED ABOUT TRENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THINGS TEND TO GET WORSE WHEN THEY DON'T GET BETTER. I DON'T SEE WAR ON THE HORIZON, BUT I DO WORRY ABOUT INCREASED VIOLENCE AND THE FUTURE OF MODERATES ON ALL SIDES.
- WE ARE PUSHING THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FOR A QUICK AND WE HOPE POSITIVE RESPONSE ON THE PEACE PROCESS. WE WANT TO GET AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE STARTED. THIS WILL REQUIRE FLEXIBILITY FROM THEM ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN SIDE.
- WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS DRAWN OUT ANY LONGER THAN NEED BE. IF WE CAN'T MAKE THIS WORK, WE WILL GO BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD.
- WE ALSO WANT TO SEE ISRAEL BACK OFF SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY, WHICH REALLY DOES WORK AGAINST PEACE

CARD 2 OF 2

- PROSPECTS. UNTIL WE CAN REACH SOME UNDERSTANDING WITH THEM, I WON'T RELEASE THE \$400 MILLION IN HOUSING INVESTMENT GUARANTEES.
- AS FOR THE PLO, WE HAVE TOLD THEM WE NEED A CLEAR CONDEMNATION AND SOME DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ABU ABBAS. IF WE DON'T GET MORE THAN WE HAVE, WE WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO SUSPEND OUR DIALOGUE. NO ONE SHOULD KID THEMSELVES, THOUGH--IF WE DO BREAK OFF TALKS WITH THE PLO, THE POLITICAL SITUATION (AS WELL AS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND) IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO DETERIORATE.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

4892

June 18, 1990

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: VIRGINIA A. LAMPLEY *W*

SUBJECT: Points to Be Made on Lithuania and the Middle
East at Senate GOP Leadership Meeting, June 19,
1990

Attached is a memorandum to Fred McClure containing Points to be Made on Lithuania and the Middle East for the President at the Senate GOP Leadership Meeting tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. The points have been provided by Nick Burns and Richard Haass.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Fred McClure
Tab A Points to be Made on Lithuania
Tab B Points to be Made on the Middle East

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: <u>WEA</u>	LOG # <u>4892</u>
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>		
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>6/18 WEG</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
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RECORD ID: 9004872
RECEIVED: 18 JUN 90 08

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 18 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

FROM: ZELIKOW
BLACKWILL
KANTER

KEYWORDS: USSR
CSCE
EUROPE

NATO
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
GERMANY D R

PERSONS: SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR JOINT NATO - WARSAW PACT DECLARATION /
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 21 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
KANTER
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/25/09

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DOC 1 OF 1

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JOINT IDHCO-
Warsaw Pact
Declaration

LOG # 4872

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N = No further Action

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4872

June 18, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: Soviet Proposal for Joint NATO-Warsaw Pact
Declaration: A Preliminary Analysis

Shevardnadze has now detailed his views, in a June 14 letter to Secretary Baker, on the content of a joint NATO-Warsaw Pact declaration. A copy of the letter is attached at Tab I. Although some earlier references to such a declaration tended to assume it could be a benign repetition of CSCE principles, it is now clear that this is not the Soviet view. Shevardnadze's proposal is comprehensive, elaborate, and highly substantive, with the aim of using the declaration to create a full-bodied pan-European collective security system, based on long-standing Soviet ideas for European security.

The problems with the Soviet proposal are so pervasive, and so tied to the basic approach of the document, that we believe it is not a useful basis for further discussion. Moreover, this Soviet approach indicates that even attempting to negotiate such a joint declaration is likely not only to be fruitless but perhaps even a source of new acrimony in East-West relations, rather than a way to solve current disputes.

There are at least a dozen major ideas in the Soviet proposal which we consider so unacceptable as to be nonnegotiable. The list which follows does not even bother with minor irritants, such as calls for naval CSBMs and the like.

1. Creation of a political obligation for joint NATO-WP collective security.

"-- In the event of a conflict or a threatening situation WTO and NATO countries immediately enter into consultations with a view to dealing with the situation and restoring the previously existing situation."

"-- The agreement between WTO and NATO should be open for accession to it by any CSCE member state."

2. Creation of direct ties between NATO and Warsaw Pact political and military institutions, thus propping up Pact structures.

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0950-MR
SCS 12/31/12

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"... setting up joint organs between political and military structures of the two blocs, establishing of associate relations."

3. Creation of an all-European multinational force to keep the peace.

"-- Institution of multilateral forces, including troops of neutral states, for maintaining peace within the WTO and NATO zone of operation."

4. Abrogation of the collective obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty, by eliminating the mandatory requirement to aid Allies against aggression.

"There should no longer be automatic application of obligations under the NATO Pact and the Warsaw Treaty."

5. Abrogation of the collective obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty, by conditioning the obligation to aid another ally on that ally's non-use of force in a conflict. (No distinction is drawn between first and second use of force.)

"-- A reciprocal obligation by the WTO and NATO countries not to provide military, economic or other assistance to any country which has used force within the zone covered by the WTO and NATO treaties, and to strongly condemn its actions up to and including moral and political boycott."

6. Agreement to no first use of nuclear weapons.

"Of extreme importance would be a provision calling for mutual renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons."

7. Commitment to the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons out of Europe.

"-- Negotiations and an agreement on a sizable reduction and subsequently complete elimination of all short-range (0-500 km) systems of any basing mode in Europe."

8. Demilitarization of Central Europe (but not affecting the USSR).

"... establishing the 'disengagement' or 'arms-rarefied' zone along the line of contact between the Alliances."

9. Withdrawal of naval and air forces from Europe that might be used for surprise or large-scale offensive actions.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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"All the systems intended for surprise offensive actions and large-scale operations, including naval and air forces, should be withdrawn from the zone."

10. Creation of Baltic and Mediterranean nuclear-free zones.

"Such a zone that would include the Baltic and the Mediterranean should be rid of nuclear weapons."

11. Exclusion of former GDR territory from protection under the North Atlantic Treaty.

"An agreement on a special status of the GDR territory, which will not be part of the NATO zone."

12. Requirement that US (and other foreign troops) leave the FRG as Soviet troops leave the GDR.

"Reduction of foreign troops in the FRG territory parallel with the Soviet troop reductions in the GDR."

We will be working with State and DoD to get a cable to NATO posts informing them of this Soviet initiative and providing guidance for use with host governments.

Heather ~~W~~ilson concurs.

Attachment

Tab I State 193792 (NODIS), "Soviet Proposed NATO-WTO Declaration"

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

<DIST>SIT: BENKO BLACKWILL BURNS RICE VAX BRANSCUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUEHC<DTG> 150109Z JUN 90
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SOVIET PROPOSED NATO-WTO DECLARATION

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ STATE 193792

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, NATO

SUBJECT: SOVIET PROPOSED NATO-WTO DECLARATION

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR BESSMERTNYKH DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SHEVARDNADZE TO SECRETARY BAKER ON JUNE 14.
3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

IT IS MY FEELING THAT IN COPENHAGEN WE HAD AN INTERESTING AND USEFUL CONVERSATION ABOUT THE IDEA OF PROVIDING A TREATY FOUNDATION FOR THE NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THEIR MEMBERS. BOTH OF US APPEAR TO AGREE THAT THIS IS A PROMISING OBJECTIVE WHOSE ACCOMPLISHMENT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AT THE SAME TIME MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS UNDOING A NUMBER OF TANGLES RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OF UNIFICATION OF GERMANY.

THE WTO AND NATO MILITARY-POLITICAL ALLIANCES BEARING THE IMPRINT OF THE TIMES WHEN THEY WERE ESTABLISHED SHOULD NOT REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES OF THE PROCESS OF FORMING NEW SECURITY AND STABILITY STRUCTURES, PRESENTLY UNDERWAY IN EUROPE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE CONCERTED EFFORTS TO ALTER THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOSE ALLIANCES SO THAT NOT ONLY SHOULD THEY CEASE TO BE AN OBSTACLE TOWARD REACHING NEW FRONTIERS OF CONFIDENCE AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BUT SERVE AS AN ENGINE THAT WOULD ADD ADDITIONAL MOMENTUM TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW EUROPEAN PEACEFUL ORDER.

IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH AN ORDER CAN ONLY BE CREATED ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES AND AGREEMENTS RECORDED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND OTHER CSCE INSTRUMENTS. THIS IS WHAT ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE GUIDED BY TODAY.

BUT IT ALSO SEEMS USEFUL TO US THAT WTO AND NATO AS MILITARY-POLITICAL ALLIANCES DECLARE THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE CSCE AGREEMENTS AND CALL UPON ALL THE STATES PARTIES TO THOSE AGREEMENTS TO ACTIVELY COOPERATE IN THE MATTERS OF DEEPENING THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND CREATING NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES.

AS YOU KNOW, THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES HELD ON JUNE 7 IN MOSCOW ADOPTED A DECLARATION ON THE NEW NATURE OF OUR ALLIANCE. WE CONSIDER THE NATO COUNCIL SESSION HELD IN SCOTLAND AT THE LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AND ITS DECISIONS AS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD OUR POSITION. AS A FOLLOW-UP ON THE EXCHANGES HELD IN THE DANISH CAPITAL I WOULD LIKE TO SET FORTH AT THIS TIME A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING SOME PRINCIPLES WHICH WE BELIEVE COULD PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT.

-- WTO AND NATO AND THEIR MEMBERS NO LONGER CONSIDER EACH OTHER AS ADVERSARIES. THEY ARE PREPARED TO MOVE TO COOPERATIVE AND INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPRA-BLOC SECURITY AND STABILITY STRUCTURES.

-- WTO AND NATO DECLARE THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO MAKE

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THEIR ACTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS IN EVERY AREA, INCLUDING THE MILITARY ONE.

-- THE RIGHT OF EACH WTO AND NATO MEMBER STATE AND OF OTHERS, I.E. THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES IN EUROPE, TO BE OR NOT TO BE PARTY TO BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL TREATIES, INCLUDING ALLIANCE TREATIES, OR TO BE NEUTRAL, WHICH IS PROVIDED FOR IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WOULD BE REAFFIRMED. MEMBERSHIP IN ONE ALLIANCE SHOULD NO LONGER BE AN OBSTACLE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN ANOTHER ALLIANCE.

-- WTO AND NATO COUNTRIES DECLARE THEIR FULL RENUNCIATION OF ANY TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND REITERATE THE INVIOABILITY OF THE EXISTING FRONTIERS IN EUROPE.

-- THEY UNDERTAKE NOT TO USE FORCE IN WHATEVER FORM AND NOT TO THREATEN THE USE OF FORCE EITHER AGAINST EACH OTHER OR ANY STATE OR AN ALLIANCE OF STATES. THEY CAN ONLY USE FORCE IN THOSE INSTANCES WHEN THIS IS NECESSARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RIGHT TO LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE AS PROVIDED IN THE UN CHARTER.

OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE WOULD BE A PROVISION CALLING FOR MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE SHOULD NO LONGER BE AUTOMATIC APPLICATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NATO PACT AND THE WARSAW TREATY.

-- A RECIPROCAL OBLIGATION BY THE WTO AND NATO COUNTRIES NOT TO PROVIDE MILITARY. ECONOMIC OR OTHER ASSISTANCE TO ANY COUNTRY WHICH HAS USED FORCE WITHIN THE ZONE COVERED BY THE WTO AND NATO TREATIES, AND TO STRONGLY CONDEMN ITS ACTIONS UP TO AND INCLUDING MORAL AND POLITICAL BOYCOTT.

-- IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT OR A THREATENING SITUATION WTO AND NATO COUNTRIES IMMEDIATELY ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH A VIEW TO DEALING WITH THE SITUATION AND RESTORING THE PREVIOUSLY EXISTING SITUATION.

A WTO AND NATO OBLIGATION TO TAKE VIGOROUS AND AGREED-UPON MEASURES TO FURTHER REDUCE ARMS AND AFFIRM THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFENSIVE SUFFICIENCY THROUGH ARMED FORCES REDUCTIONS AND CHANGES IN THEIR STRUCTURES.

-- NEGOTIATIONS AND AN AGREEMENT ON A SIZABLE REDUCTION AND SUBSEQUENTLY COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ALL SHORT-RANGE (0-500 KM) SYSTEMS OF ANY BASING MODE IN EUROPE.

-- IN THE CONTEXT OF ARMED FORCES REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE FOR CHANGING THEIR LOCATIONS, AND ESTABLISHING THE "DISENGAGEMENT" OR "ARMS-RAREFIED" ZONE ALONG THE LINE OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES. ALL THE SYSTEMS INTENDED FOR SURPRISE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AND LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS, INCLUDING NAVAL AND AIR FORCES, SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE ZONE. SUCH A ZONE THAT WOULD INCLUDE THE BALTIC AND THE MEDITERRANEAN SHOULD BE RID OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MECHANISM OF REGULAR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN BOTH ALLIANCES. AS A RESULT, SETTING UP JOINT ORGANS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUCTURES OF THE TWO BLOCS, ESTABLISHING OF ASSOCIATE RELATIONS. THE OTHER CSCE MEMBER STATES CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THOSE ORGANS AS OBSERVERS, OR THEY WOULD HAVE THE OPTION OF JOINING THEM. THE JOINT WTO AND NATO ORGANS WOULD OPERATE IN CONTACT WITH CENTERS (ORGANS) ON MILITARY RISK REDUCTION, ON VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH DISARMAMENT AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AGREEMENTS, AND ON PREVENTION AND SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS; THEY WOULD BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

-- AN AGREEMENT ON DEVELOPING AND IMPROVING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND SECURITY MEASURES, IN PARTICULAR IN MATTERS OF LIMITING MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EXTENDING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO NAVAL AND AIR FORCES. MUTUAL INFORMATION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES. MORE

DETAILED INFORMATION OF BOTH ALLIANCES' TROOPS EXERCISES. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE DANGER OF DEVELOPING FUNDAMENTALLY NEW KINDS OF WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD AND, AS NECESSARY, CONSULTATIONS ON THIS PROBLEM.

-- INSTITUTION OF MULTILATERAL FORCES, INCLUDING TROOPS OF NEUTRAL STATES, FOR MAINTAINING PEACE WITHIN THE WTO AND NATO ZONE OF OPERATION. THIS CONTINGENT COULD BE USED IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICTS (NATURALLY, AT THE PARTIES' REQUEST), AND ALSO FOR COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND PROVIDING ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF NATURAL OR TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS.

-- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "HOT LINE" BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE WTO AND NATO CENTERS.

-- DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION IN CIVILIAN SECTORS (ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, EDUCATION, CULTURE). ELIMINATION OF EXISTING BARRIERS AND RESTRICTIONS. DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE-SCOPE AND EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS AND FUNDS DESIGNED TO STIMULATE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND LEVEL OFF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE SCALE OF ENTIRE EUROPE, INCLUDING THROUGH REDUCTION OF MILITARY SPENDING AND CONVERSION OF MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL SECTORS.

-- ENHANCEMENT OF THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS AND TIES AMONG THEM IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN WTO AND NATO AND THEIR MEMBER STATES. ESTABLISHMENT OF A PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF BOTH ALLIANCES WHICH WOULD MONITOR AND CONTRIBUTE TOWARD COMPLIANCE OF AGREED PRINCIPLES OF THE WTO-NATO AGREEMENT.

-- THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN WTO AND NATO SHOULD BE OPEN FOR ACCESSION TO IT BY ANY CSCE MEMBER STATE.

AS FOR THE ISSUES RELATING TO THE GERMAN UNIFICATION. BOTH SIDES, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, PROCEED FROM THE RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR SYNCHRONIZING THE PROCESSES OF SHAPING THE GERMAN UNITY AND DEVELOPING THE ALL-EUROPEAN STABILITY AND SECURITY STRUCTURES. THEREFORE, THERE IS POLITICAL AND LOGICAL INNER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WHAT WAS STATED ABOVE AND THAT WHICH OUGHT TO FIND ITS DENOUMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE "TWO-PLUS-FOUR" MECHANISM, POSSIBLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH AGREEMENTS AT OTHER FORUMS. THIS HAS TO DO WITH SUCH ISSUES AS SETTING THE "CEILING" FOR GERMANY'S ARMED FORCES; GERMANY'S OBLIGATION NOT TO POSSESS NUCLEAR AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; AN AGREEMENT ON A SPECIAL STATUS OF THE GDR TERRITORY, WHICH WILL NOT BE PART OF THE NATO ZONE; ISSUES RELATING TO CONTINUED STATIONING OF THE SOVIET TROOPS CONTINGENT IN THIS TERRITORY AND ITS GRADUAL REDUCTION; REDUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN THE FRG TERRITORY PARALLEL WITH THE SOVIET TROOPS REDUCTIONS IN THE GDR.

I BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO STRESS THAT WE DO NOT REGARD THESE CONSIDERATIONS AS AN ULTIMATE TRUTH. I THINK THEY COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR STARTING THE WORK AND SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS AN INVITATION TO DISCUSSION.

I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT I ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS TOPIC WITH GENSCHER IN THE COURSE OF OUR RECENT MEETING IN BREST AND I CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HE RECEIVED OUR IDEAS ALONG THESE LINES WITH INTEREST.

I FEEL I MUST PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT IN PRESENTING OUR CONSIDERATIONS WE HAVE SOUGHT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A BROAD SPECTRUM OF PROPOSALS AND APPROACHES WHICH HAVE BEEN ADVANCED RECENTLY BY MANY STATES AND DISCUSSED AT VARIOUS FORUMS, INCLUDING AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON. NOW WE CAN SPEAK OF AN EMERGING CONSENSUS WITH RESPECT TO THE NEED FOR

TRANSFORMING NOT ONLY THE ALLIANCES THEMSELVES BUT THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM.

WE SHALL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE U.S. SIDE'S IDEAS.
WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL GO IN A DIRECTION THAT WOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO SHAPING COMMON APPROACHES TOWARD THIS
COMPLEX AND CRITICAL AREA.

I FEEL THAT ALREADY AT THIS POINT WE COULD, WITHOUT
WASTING TIME, THINK OF ESTABLISHING AN ORGANIZATIONAL
FRAMEWORK (A GROUP OF EXPERTS OR A COMMISSION) FOR
PURSUING FURTHER THE EMERGING UNDERSTANDING AND FOR
THOROUGHLY LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITIES OF ARRIVING AT
TANGIBLE AGREEMENTS.

I SEE A REASON FOR OPTIMISM IN THE FACT THAT OUR
DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IS MOVING FROM THE
STAGE OF COMPARING CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO A JOINT WORK.
SINCERELY,

EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE

END TEXT. BAKER

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 3792<STOR> 900615111048 MSG000266757048
<TOR>900615112251

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008409
RECEIVED: 22 OCT 90 19

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 22 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:



FROM: GATES

KEYWORDS: USSR

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: CABLE FM MATLOCK IN MOSCOW TO GATES RE RPT ON YELTSIN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 25 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GATES

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 2/25/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 2 OF 2

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P - return to
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Bob Gates

22 June 1990

Bob

very, very interesting

Mr. President --

mostly "down" for
Boris but

The attached cable from Jack Matlock
in Moscow is a good report on Boris
Yeltsin, including both his strengths
and weaknesses. If you get a spare
moment this weekend I think you would
find it interesting reading.

conventional wisdom

Bob gave him

Robert Gates

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

a few "p"s

APNSA Has Seen

GB

6-23

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # _____

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SYSTEM PR3 NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	1	Σ 4. 10/22	N
NSC Secretariat	2	JPH 10/22	PR3 R
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 OCT 22 AM 1:19

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Cable	Re: The Other Side of Yel'tsin [redacted] (12 pp.)	6/19/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 11/6/2013

Date Closed: 2/25/2009	OA/ID Number: 91118-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-0950-MR (503)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/31/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



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PRT GATES SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN SUNUNU
SIT: BENKO BLACKWILL BURNS FILE RICE SIT SUM VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 190833Z JUN 90

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2829
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0436

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 20097

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, UR

SUBJECT: THE OTHER SIDE OF YEL'TSIN

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

>BEGIN SUMMARY>

SUMMARY

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2. TO THE PUBLIC, YEL'TSIN IS A CORRUPTION BUSTER AND RADICAL REFORMER DEFENDING THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE SYSTEM. HIS SEVEREST CRITICS, HOWEVER, ARGUE THAT HE IS A DANGEROUS DEMAGOGUE, AND A VARIETY OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL SOURCES CHARACTERIZE HIM AS AN UNIMAGINATIVE, SHALLOW POLITICIAN THRUST INTO THE SPOTLIGHT OF LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF SKILLED ADVISORS. THOSE WHO HAVE WORKED WITH HIM OBSERVE THAT HE READILY DELEGATES AUTHORITY AND DEPENDS HEAVILY ON A LOYAL AND DEVOTED STAFF OF TOUGH-MINDED, AGGRESSIVE STRATEGISTS. OTHERS CRITICIZE HIM FOR SHIRKING RESPONSIBILITY AND PROTECTING HIMSELF WITH SYCOPHANTS. DESPITE THE CRITICISM AND HIS REPUTATION AS A SELF-INDULGENT WOMANIZER, YEL'TSIN CONTINUES TO BOUNCE BACK FROM CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH FOR ANY OTHER SOVIET POLITICIAN WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY MEANT DISGRACE AND ALIENATION. HOWEVER FLAWED IN INTELLECT AND CHARACTER, YEL'TSIN MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. HE PERSONIFIES A

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2009-0950-MR
SCS 12/31/12

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PROFOUND PUBLIC DISGUST WITH THE SYSTEM AND ITS LEADERS. A GROUNDSWELL OF SENTIMENT THAT UNDER THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES HE COULD RIDE TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS COUNTRY.

END SUMMARY

>END SUMMARY<

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3. SINCE GORBACHEV BROUGHT HIM TO MOSCOW IN 1985, BORIS YEL'TSIN HAS EMERGED AS THE COUNTRY'S LEADING FOLK HERO. WHILE HE WAS MOSCOW PARTY BOSS, HE GATHERED A BROAD PUBLIC FOLLOWING FOR HIS ROUGH HANDLING OF LOCAL APPARATCHIKI, ATTACKS ON OFFICIAL PRIVILEGE, AND ENTHUSIASM FOR MIXING WITH THE PEOPLE. HIS FALL FROM GRACE IN NOVEMBER 1987 AND DISMISSAL FROM THE POLITBURO QUICKLY BOOSTED HIS POPULARITY ACROSS THE COUNTRY. SINCE THEN, A FASCINATED PUBLIC HAS CHEERED HIS EVERY STEP ALONG WHAT IS SURELY A UNIQUE OCCURRENCE IN SOVIET HISTORY, A POLITICAL COMEBACK THAT WAS NOT POSTHUMOUS (A LA BUKHARIN). YEL'TSIN'S ELECTION AS RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN WAS A MAJOR MILESTONE, BUT PERHAPS NOT THE LAST ON HIS RETURN TO THE CENTER OF POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION.

4. FOR THE BROAD PUBLIC, YEL'TSIN IS A SWORN ENEMY OF OFFICIAL PRIVILEGE, AN INTREPID CORRUPTION BUSTER, A RADICAL REFORMER WILLING TO TAKE ON THE SYSTEM TO RIGHT THE WRONGS IT HAS PERPETRATED AGAINST THE PEOPLE. HOWEVER, COMMENTS FROM SOVIETS, BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL, WHO HAVE WORKED WITH YEL'TSIN, AS WELL AS EMBOFFS' ENCOUNTERS WITH HIM, PAINT ANOTHER PICTURE -- THAT OF A DEPUTY BORED BY THE MUNDANE WORK OF LEGISLATION, OF A CAUTIOUS POLITICIAN WHO REAPS THE BENEFITS OF OTHERS' BATTLES, AND OF A SHALLOW EXTROVERT WHO MAKES UP WITH OLD-FASHIONED POLITICKING WHAT HE LACKS IN INTELLECT AND IMAGINATION.

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UNINSPIRING RECORD IN THE SUPREME SOVIET
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5. ALTHOUGH YEL'TSIN WAS ELECTED TO THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET WITH MUCH FANFARE AND NO LESS POLITICAL INTRIGUE, HE TURNED OUT TO BE AN ALOOF LEGISLATOR. UNLIKE SUCH POPULAR AND RESPECTED DEPUTIES AS ANATOLIY SOBCHAK, KONSTANTIN LUBENCHENKO, AND FEDOR BURLATSKIY, YEL'TSIN RARELY TOOK THE FLOOR AT THE SUPREME SOVIET. WHILE A RECORD OF HIS ATTENDANCE HAS NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC, EMBOFFS RECKON THAT YEL'TSIN ATTENDED FEWER THAN HALF OF LAST FALL'S SESSIONS AND PROBABLY FEWER THAN TEN THIS SPRING. THE FEW TIMES HE DID TAKE THE FLOOR, HE DELIVERED ONLY SOME APPARENTLY CAREFULLY CHOSEN WORDS ON A HIGH PROFILE ISSUE. IN ALMOST ALL CASES, HE DECLINED TO TAKE SIDES DEFINITELY BUT, INSTEAD, USUALLY PROPOSED AN UNWORKABLE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH. ON THE FEW OCCASIONS WHEN HE DID DECLARE HIS POSITION, HE WAS SUPPORTED BY A COMFORTABLE VOCAL MAJORITY.

JFK?
↓

6. EMBOFFS WHO OBSERVED YEL'TSIN FROM THE BALCONY OF THE SUPREME SOVIET NOTED THAT YEL'TSIN RARELY DEVOTED MUCH ATTENTION TO THE PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENTLY PREFERRING INSTEAD TO PAGE THROUGH NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES. ONE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 20097

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, UR

SUBJECT: THE OTHER SIDE OF YEL'TSIN

DEPUTY, ALSO A MEMBER OF THE INTERREGIONAL PARLIAMENTARY GROUP (IPG), SAID THAT YEL'TSIN'S BEHAVIOR DURING THE SESSION WAS SOMETIMES MORE LIKE THAT OF AN UNDISCIPLINED TEEN-AGER PREOCCUPIED WITH HIS OWN IMPORTANCE, THAN OF A RESPECTED LAW-MAKER. HE NOTED THAT YEL'TSIN OFTEN CIRCULATED WESTERN PRESS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ITEMS ON HIMSELF AMONG NEARBY DEPUTIES.

AND IN THE IPG AS WELL

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7. DESPITE YEL'TSIN'S HIGH PROFILE AS A FOUNDING FATHER OF THE INTERREGIONAL PARLIAMENTARY GROUP (IPG), HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE GROUP HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTING. EMBOFFS WHO ATTENDED IPG MEETINGS NOTED THAT YEL'TSIN NEVER TOOK A STRONG STAND ON ANY ISSUE AND AVOIDED MAKING ANY COMMITMENTS TO CONTROVERSIAL POSITIONS RECOMMENDED BY OTHER IPG CO-CHAIRMEN. MOREOVER, ON THE FLOOR OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OR DURING THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES, YEL'TSIN WOULD INVARIABLY SOFTEN THE

AGREED LANGUAGE OF ANY PROPOSITION PUT FORTH BY THE IPG.

8. WHILE YEL'TSIN REMAINS A POPULAR POLITICAL FIGURE, HIS PERFORMANCE IN THE SUPREME SOVIET AND AS AN IPG LEADER HAS NOT ESCAPED THE NOTICE OF CRITICS, NOR DO SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE SUPREME SOVIET AND THE IPG APPEAR EAGER TO RUSH TO CHEER FOR HIS SUCCESS:

-- IN PRIVATE, SEVERAL IPG DEPUTIES WERE SHARPLY CRITICAL OF YEL'TSIN AT THE DECEMBER 1989 SECOND CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES, DURING WHICH YEL'TSIN BACKED AWAY FROM DELIVERING THE IPG'S STRONGLY-WORDED CALL FOR THE FORMATION OF AN OPPOSITION PARTY. YEL'TSIN CONVENIENTLY AVOIDED BEING PUT INTO THE SAME BIND BY FALLING ILL ON THE OPENING DAY OF THE THIRD CONGRESS.

-- ONE REGULAR IPG PARTICIPANT, (b)(1) (b)(1) (PROTECT) TOLD EMBOFF THAT YEL'TSIN'S ATTITUDE HAD DISAPPOINTED MOST OF HIS SUPPORTERS IN THE IPG.

(b)(1) NOTED THAT EVEN AFTER THE UNEXPECTED DEATH OF ANDREY SAKHAROV, YEL'TSIN FAILED TO EXERCISE RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP OF THE IPG TO PREVENT IT FROM SLIPPING FURTHER INTO DISARRAY.

-- ACCORDING TO ANOTHER IPG MEMBER, WHEN THE IPG, IN REPLY TO RYZHKOV'S NEW ECONOMIC PLAN IN MAY, AGREED TO

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CALL FOR A VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE IN THE RYZHKOV GOVERNMENT. YEL'TSIN REPORTEDLY DECLINED TO BE THE ONE TO PROPOSE SUCH A MOTION ON THE FLOOR OF THE SUPREME SOVIET. ARGUING INSTEAD THAT THE FIRST IPG MEMBER CALLED SHOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY. →

-- AFTER YEL'TSIN'S ELECTION AS RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN. (b)(1) (PROTECT), AN IPG MEMBER, SAID THAT THE IPG COULD TAKE LITTLE CREDIT FOR YEL'TSIN'S SUCCESS. MOREOVER, HE SAID THE IPG MAY BENEFIT FROM YEL'TSIN'S VICTORY SINCE HE MAY NOW DISTANCE HIMSELF EVEN MORE FROM THE GROUP.

-- (b)(1) (PROTECT), ALSO AN IPG MEMBER, SAID THAT YEL'TSIN WOULD ONLY BE AS GOOD AS THE GOVERNMENT HE FORMS AND ADVADZE SPECULATED THAT YEL'TSIN'S "HONEYMOON" WOULD BE SHORT-LIVED AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO DELIVER TANGIBLE PROOF OF HIS CREDIBILITY SOON. ↘

-- (b)(1) (PROTECT) SAID THAT YEL'TSIN WAS NOT TO BE TRUSTED. HE STEADFASTLY MAINTAINED THAT YEL'TSIN IS A "DANGEROUS OLD THINKER" WHO IS WITHOUT SCRUPLES AND MORAL INTEGRITY. HE ADDED THAT YEL'TSIN HAS NO PLAN TO SAVE RUSSIA; RATHER, HIS IS AN EMPTY, HALF-BAKED PLAN ALREADY DUBBED "YEL'TSINOMICS." ↓

-- (b)(1) (PROTECT), A CONSERVATIVE RUSSIAN NATIONALIST (b)(1) SAYS THAT YEL'TSIN HAS "NO LOVE FOR RUSSIA." SHE NOTES THAT HE SUPPORTED BALTIC NATIONAL FRONTS AND ECONOMIC AUTONOMY FOR THE BALTS; HELPED FORM A GROUP FOR THE DEFENSE OF JEWS WHILE IGNORING THE NEEDS OF RUSSIANS; AND, IN THE PAST, DECLINED TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC AUTONOMY FOR RUSSIA BECAUSE HE THOUGHT RUSSIAN WAS NOT DEVELOPED SUFFICIENTLY. ↘

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 20097

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV. PREL. PINR. UR
SUBJECT: THE OTHER SIDE OF YEL'TSIN

SOME NICE THINGS TO SAY TOO ...

9. AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECTURE, YEL'TSIN WAS EXPECTED TO MEET REGULARLY WITH 43 MEMBERS ON ISSUES RELATED PRINCIPALLY TO THE GOVERNMENT'S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY RESOURCES AND PROGRAMS. THE COMMITTEE ALSO CONSIDERED NEW LEGISLATION THAT HAD A BEARING ON THESE ISSUES (SUCH AS THE NEW LEGISLATION ON LAND, PROPERTY, ENTERPRISES, ETC.). DESPITE HEAVY LEGISLATIVE OBLIGATIONS, YEL'TSIN CALLED FEW MEETINGS.

10. NEVERTHELESS, A MEMBER OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECTURE COMMITTEE OFFERED EMBOFF HIS THOUGHTS ON THE MANAGEMENT STYLE YEL'TSIN DISPLAYED DURING THE FEW MEETINGS HE DID CHAIR. (b)(1) (PROTECT), A USSR DEPUTY (b)(1) WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING YEL'TSIN'S NUMEROUS LIMITATIONS, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS THE SAME WEEK THAT YEL'TSIN WAS ELECTED RSFSR LEADER:

- AS THE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, YEL'TSIN SHOWED HIMSELF TO BE A FAIRLY GOOD ORGANIZER AND QUICKLY AND EASILY WAS ABLE TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY AS NECESSARY.
- YEL'TSIN CHAIRED MEETINGS SIMPLY AND UNPRETENTIOUSLY AND EXPECTED MEMBERS TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS OPENLY AND DIRECTLY.
- HE REGULARLY GAVE THE FLOOR TO MEMBERS WHO CRITICIZED OR CHALLENGED HIS RECOMMENDATIONS AS LONG AS THEY WERE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE VALUE OF THEIR VIEWS AND DEFEND THEM SUCCESSFULLY.
- YEL'TSIN CAME TO RELY ON AND EARN THE RESPECT AND LOYALTY OF THOSE MEMBERS WHO INITIALLY WERE THE MOST

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CRITICAL OF HIM.

-- YEL'TSIN RARELY CALLED FOR A CONSENSUS OF OPINION; RATHER, HE EXPECTED THE VIEW OF THE PERSON WITH THE STRONGEST CASE TO PREVAIL.

11. (b)(1) NOTED; FROM HIS OWN OBSERVATION OF YEL'TSIN, THAT HE USUALLY TRIED TO SURROUND HIMSELF WITH STRONG-WILLED PROBLEM-SOLVERS; DISLIKED WEAK "YES-MEN;" AND KNEW AND SOMEWHAT FEARED HIS OWN LIMITATIONS. HE CONCLUDED THAT YEL'TSIN DEPENDED HEAVILY ON AN AGGRESSIVE, INTELLIGENT STAFF -- WHETHER A COMMITTEE STAFF OR A PERSONAL STAFF -- TO INSURE HIS SUCCESS. ADDITIONALLY, (b)(1)

(b)(1) (PROTECT), WHILE NOTING THAT YEL'TSIN IS NOT ON THE SAME INTELLECTUAL LEVEL AS GORBACHEV, GIVES YEL'TSIN HIGH MARKS FOR SURROUNDING HIMSELF WITH YOUNGER AND MORE COMPETENT ADVISORS THAN HAS GORBACHEV. WHERE WAS BORIS?

12. DESPITE HIS REPUTATION AS AN OUTSPOKEN CRITIC OF THE POWERS THAT BE, YEL'TSIN HAS IN FACT BEEN CIRCUMSPECT IN HIS OPPOSITION TO GORBACHEV. OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, HE HAS ALLOWED OTHERS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN CHALLENGING GORBACHEV AND AVOIDED RISKY UNDERTAKINGS.

-- YEL'TSIN WAS ABSENT FROM THE "DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM" FOUNDING CONFERENCE IN JANUARY 1990 -- HE WAS TRAVELING

IN JAPAN. LIKEWISE, YEL'TSIN MISSED THE FEBRUARY 25 MOSCOW DEMOCRATIC RALLY WHICH GORBACHEV CONDEMNED, THOUGH HE DID ATTEND THE FEBRUARY 4 RALLY WHICH GORBACHEV REPORTEDLY BLESSED.

-- YEL'TSIN CONVENIENTLY FELL ILL ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE MARCH 1990 EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES, CALLED TO CONSIDER THE CREATION OF THE USSR PRESIDENCY AND ACTION AGAINST LITHUANIA.

-- YEL'TSIN'S ILLNESS CONTINUED TO KEEP HIM OUT OF

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ACTION THROUGH THE SUPREME SOVIET HEARINGS ON THE
CONTROVERSIAL GDLYAN-IVANOV INVESTIGATIONS OF ELITE
CORRUPTION. YET HE WAS WELL ENOUGH TO ATTEND A WEDDING
RECEPTION SHORTLY THEREAFTER WHERE NUMEROUS WITNESSES
REPORTED ON HIS EXCESSIVE DRINKING AND EXPENSIVE TAN.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 20097

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, UR

SUBJECT: THE OTHER SIDE OF YEL'TSIN

-- CURIOUSLY, YEL'TSIN APPEARS TO HAVE ADOPTED THIS
MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH ONLY SINCE THE SO-CALLED "RIVER
INCIDENT" LAST FALL. ACCORDING TO SOME SOVIET
OBSERVERS, YEL'TSIN HAS STILL NOT COMPLETELY RECOVERED
FROM THE DISGRACE HE SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF THE
INCIDENT, WHICH WAS APPARENTLY INDUCED BY OVERAMBITIOUS
DRINKING AND WOMANIZING. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF INDEED
THE INCIDENT WAS EVEN A MINOR TURNING POINT IN HIS
CAREER, THE MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH HE HAS SINCE
DISPLAYED COULD BE THE RESULT OF INTENSIVE COACHING BY
HIS ADVISORS.

HIS POLITICAL STYLE -- NO GIFT FOR GAB

/-----

13. SINCE HIS ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW IN 1985 FROM RELATIVE
OBSCURITY IN PROVINCIAL SVERDLOVSK, YEL'TSIN TO MANY
FOLLOWERS HAS BECOME A FOLK HERO WHO CHALLENGES AND
DEFEATS THE INJUSTICES OF THE SYSTEM. SOME WHO KNOW
HIM, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT YEL'TSIN IS ANYTHING BUT THE
AGGRESSIVE, POPULAR HERO-POLITICIAN HE IS MADE OUT TO BE.

14. EMBOFFS WHO HAVE OBSERVED YEL'TSIN IN ACTION AT
THE SUPREME SOVIET HAVE NOTED THAT HE IS THE ULTIMATE
"GLADHANDER," ALWAYS READY TO SHAKE HANDS. ON THE
OTHER HAND, YEL'TSIN HAS NOT BEEN AN ENGAGING
CONVERSATIONALIST AND SOMETIMES COULD NOT EVEN REPLY --

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WAS LITERALLY SPEECHLESS -- TO EMBOFF QUESTIONS RELATED TO FLOOR PROCEEDINGS. SEVERAL DEPUTIES HAVE COMMENTED ON THIS LACK OF SPONTANEITY AS BEING HIS GREATEST WEAKNESS AS A POLITICIAN. EMBOFFS REPEATEDLY OBSERVED THAT YEL'TSIN HAD DIFFICULTY THINKING ON HIS FEET AND IMPROVISING REPLIES TO PROBING QUESTIONS WITHOUT APPEARING HOSTILE OR RUDE. NEVERTHELESS, BEFORE THE PRESS, HE OFTEN TOOK ON A MORE HEROIC APPEARANCE AND SEEMED TO STICK CLOSELY TO PREPARED TALKING POINTS.

15. AMONG OTHER SIMILAR OBSERVATIONS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

-- ACCORDING TO A SOURCE WHO WORKED (b)(1) FOR YEL'TSIN AT THE MOSCOW GORKOM, YEL'TSIN WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO WORK FOR AND HAD NO SKILL IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS. HE REPORTEDLY POISONED THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE GORKOM.

-- DURING HIS TENURE AS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AT THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR CONSTRUCTION (GOSSTROY), ACCORDING TO GOSSTROY STAFFERS, YEL'TSIN WAS NOT ON SPEAKING TERMS WITH EITHER THE CHAIRMAN OR ANY OF THE OTHER DEPUTY CHAIRMEN.

-- ON WHY YELT'SIN APPEARED TO SPEND SO MUCH TIME DURING BREAKS ALONE, ONE DEPUTY SAID THAT "COMRADE YEL'TSIN IS ALWAYS GOOD FOR A HANDSHAKE BUT HE IS SIMPLY NOT A VERY PERSONABLE FELLOW."

-- MANY DEPUTIES WHO HAVE ENCOUNTERED YEL'TSIN DURING THE SESSIONS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET HAVE REMARKED - TO THEIR OWN SURPRISE -- THAT YEL'TSIN DOES NOT SEEM TO BE VERY BRIGHT. HOWEVER, NONE SEEMED TO REGARD THIS AS A HANDICAP.

CORRIDOR GOSSIP

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16. WHILE THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN RUMORS ABOUT YEL'TSIN'S AMOROUS ADVENTURES AND ALCOHOLIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS, SOME OF THE STORIES RETOLD IN THE CORRIDORS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET DON'T CIRCULATE TOO

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WIDELY. HERE ARE A FEW:

-- YEL'TSIN'S RECENT BACK INJURY, FOR WHICH HE REQUIRED EMERGENCY HOSPITALIZATION IN SPAIN, WAS THE RESULT OF OVEREXERTION WITH A SPANISH BARMAID (THIS THEORY MAY SOMEWHAT CONTRADICT THE VIEW THAT YEL'TSIN LACKS SPONTANEITY).

-- A RUMOR CIRCULATED LAST FALL THAT YEL'TSIN HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF A LONG-TIME MISTRESS IN AN AUTO ACCIDENT ATTRIBUTED TO ONE OF HIS DRINKING EXTRAVAGANZAS.

-- MANY DEPUTIES CONSIDER YEL'TSIN TO BE WITHOUT MORAL SENSIBILITIES; NOT NECESSARILY IMMORAL, BUT WITHOUT HIGH MORAL VALUES. OTHERS BELIEVE THAT YEL'TSIN'S

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, UR

SUBJECT: THE OTHER SIDE OF YEL'TSIN

A LOOFNESS REFLECTS HIS INABILITY TO EXPRESS EMOTIONS EASILY EXCEPT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL.

-- AN AMERICAN CLOSELY INVOLVED IN YEL'TSIN'S SEPTEMBER 1989 VISIT TO THE U.S., WHERE HIS DRINKING HABITS WERE WIDELY PUBLICIZED, TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE BELIEVED THAT YEL'TSIN WAS AN ALCOHOLIC. HE SAID YEL'TSIN SEEMED TO DEPEND ON LIQUOR TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO BE MORE COMFORTABLE AROUND PEOPLE.

17. WHILE WITNESSES TO YEL'TSIN'S DRINKING HABITS ABOUND, EMBOFFS HAVE ENCOUNTERED NO SOURCES THAT KNOW FIRST HAND ABOUT YEL'TSIN'S REPUTED WOMANIZING. SEVERAL DEPUTIES HAVE TOLD EMBOFF THAT YEL'TSIN SEEMS TO ENJOY HIS REPUTATION AS A WOMANIZER AND MANLY DRINKER. IN ANY EVENT, SEVERAL SOVIET SOURCES HAVE NOTED PARTICULAR ASPECTS ABOUT YEL'TSIN'S BEHAVIOR THAT APPEARS TO FIT A RATHER CONSISTENT PATTERN OF

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INDISCRETION:

-- ONE DEPUTY REMARKED THAT THE FICTION OF YEL'TSIN BEING PROUD OF HIS REPUTATION AS A HEAVY DRINKER AND WOMANIZER ONLY COVERED THE FACT THAT YELT'SIN IS AN

EMOTIONALLY FRUSTRATED ALCOHOLIC WHO HAS NEVER HAD A SATISFYING RELATIONSHIP WITH ANYONE.

-- A MOSCOW GORKOM SOURCE WHO WORKED FOR YEL'TSIN SAID THAT AT THE SAME TIME YEL'TSIN WAS BLASTING PARTY PRIVILEGES. ONE OF HIS FIRST STEPS AS MOSCOW PARTY BOSS WAS TO BRING IN HIS OWN PRIVATE WAITER AND A "PERSONAL" SECRETARY -- REPORTEDLY A BEAUTIFUL YOUNG WOMAN WHO WAS BELIEVED TO BE PROVIDING YEL'TSIN MORE THAN SECRETARIAL SERVICES.

-- ~~GOSSTROY~~ STAFFERS HAVE SAID THAT YEL'TSIN ACTUALLY PERFORMED NO REAL DUTIES THERE AND RARELY WENT TO HIS OFFICE. NEVERTHELESS, HE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF EVERY TRAVEL AND ENTERTAINMENT PRIVILEGE HIS POSITION PROVIDED HIM. TO THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF AT GOSSTROY, YEL'TSIN WAS AN EMBARRASSMENT AND A FRAUD. WHERE DOES HE GO FROM HERE?

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18. WHATEVER PERSONAL LIMITATIONS HE MAY HAVE, YEL'TSIN HAS COME TO BE SEEN BY LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET CITIZENS AS THEIR BEST HOPE AGAINST A CORRUPT AND DESPOTIC SYSTEM THAT HAS IMPOVERISHED THEM BOTH MORALLY AND MATERIALLY. THEY ARE MORE THAN READY TO FORGIVE HIS FAILINGS. RESPONDING TO A COMMENT THAT YEL'TSIN SEEMED OVERLY FOND OF ALCOHOL AND WOMEN, ~~A FEMALE~~ SOVIET ATTORNEY SIMPLY ASKED WHAT POLITICIAN DID NOT LIKE ALCOHOL AND WOMEN.

19. MANY PROGRESSIVES BELIEVE THAT GORBACHEV'S DENUNCIATION OF YEL'TSIN AT THE RSFSR CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES DID MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE TO ENSURE YEL'TSIN'S ELECTION TO THE CHAIRMANSHIP BY RENEWING HIS CREDENTIALS AS THE BETE NOIRE OF THE SYSTEM. UNDER THE

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RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES. THOSE CREDENTIALS COULD CARRY HIM TO THE PRESIDENCY ON A WAVE OF VOTES FROM SIMPLE SOVIETS WHO SEE NO OTHER WAY TO STICK IT IN THE EAR OF A SYSTEM THEY DESPISE. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT YEL'TSIN WOULD DISAPPOINT THEM IN THE END BY SHOWING HIMSELF TO BE AN AUTOCRATIC, ERRATIC AND SELF-INDULGENT PRODUCT OF THE SYSTEM RATHER THAN A COMMITTED REFORMER. HE MAY NOT BE A SERIOUS PERSON. BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE SHOULD NOT TAKE HIM SERIOUSLY.

20. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MATLOCK

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