

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91118
Folder ID Number: 91118-005

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Stephen Rademaker to Brent Scowcroft Re: Formula for Negotiations Between the Baltic States and Moscow (6 pp.)	6/1/90	(b) (1)	
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Kaifu, Japan (1 pp.)	6/4/90	(b) (1)	C
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Call with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b) (1)	C
02c. Memo	Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Kaifu (1 pp.)	6/4/90	(b) (1)	C
03a. Letter	President Bush to President Carter (1 pp.)	6/8/90	(b) (1)	
03b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Carter Letter on MFN to the Soviet Union (1 pp.)	6/7/90	(b) (1)	
03c. Letter	President Carter to President Bush (1 pp.)	5/31/90	(b) (1)	
03d. Fax Coversheet	Re: The Office of Jimmy Carter [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	5/31/90	(b)(6)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Collapse Files

Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1000

OA/ID Number: 91118-005

Date Closed: 2/25/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04a. Memo	Blair Dorminey to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Letter to Former Presidents Reviewing Summit (1 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Letter	President Bush to President Nixon (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Letter	President Bush to President Ford (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Letter	President Bush to President Reagan (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04e. Letter	President Bush to President Carter (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05. Letter	Prime Minister Thatcher to President Bush (2 pp.)	5/10/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Collapse Files

Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1000

OA/ID Number: 91118-005

Date Closed: 2/25/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004421
RECEIVED: 01 JUN 90 18

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RADEMAKER

DOC DATE: 01 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FORMULA FOR NEGOTIATIONS BTW BALTIC STATES & MOSCOW

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 05 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RADEMAKER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
RADEMAKER
ROSTOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9004421

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90060410 FOR INFORMATION
X 90062512 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4421

June 1, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *NR*
FROM: STEPHEN RADEMAKER *SR*
SUBJECT: Formula for Negotiations Between the Baltic States
and Moscow

1/11/90
10
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Both President Gorbachev and leaders of the independence movements in the Baltic states have attempted to define the question of secession by the republics in legal terms. This memorandum analyzes the respective legal positions and suggests a possible face-saving formula that could permit negotiations to begin.

I. Background

The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have long histories as independent cultural and political entities; Lithuania in particular played a significant role in Western history, ruling an empire during the 14th and 15th centuries that at times extended as far south as the Black Sea. The three countries were conquered by Russia in the 18th century, but retained their distinct identities. All three declared their independence from Russia in 1918 and succeeded in maintaining it in the turmoil surrounding the Russian Revolution and the end of World War I. They were recognized by the United States in 1922 and admitted to full membership in the League of Nations.

In June 1940, more or less in accord with the secret protocol to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union. This action violated international law and has never been recognized by the United States. Rather, we have maintained diplomatic relations with representatives of the former governments of the three countries, and, according to the annual State Department publication Treaties in Force, regard "treaties between the United States and those countries as continuing in force."

II. Current Situation in Estonia

With the advent of political reform in the Soviet Union, popular movements within all three Baltic states have acted to restore their nations' independence. Because the situation that has developed in Estonia best illustrates the formula for negotiations proposed here, it will be used as an example. As explained below, the situation in Latvia is similar and could be adapted readily to this formula. Lithuania has followed a slightly different path and would have to make more adjustments in order to use the formula.

The Estonian independence movement has adopted the legal position that Estonia's incorporation into the Soviet Union was illegal and that, accordingly, all Soviet-imposed laws and institutions, including the Estonian Supreme Soviet, are illegitimate. At the same time, however, the independence movement has gained control of the Estonian Supreme Soviet through popular elections and has been willing to use this institution to further its cause. The Estonian Supreme Soviet stopped short of declaring independence, but on March 30 declared Soviet supremacy illegal and proclaimed a transition period leading to the restoration of the state institutions established under the pre-1940 constitution.

A "Congress" has also been installed following elections in which ethnic Estonians -- and those non-Estonians petitioning for Estonian citizenship -- were permitted to vote. The Congress has no basis in either the pre-1940 constitution or current (post-Soviet occupation) law. It does not claim to be the legitimate government of Estonia, but, until constitutional government is restored, does claim to be the sole representative voice of the people. The Estonian Supreme Soviet itself has now recognized the "legal supremacy" of the Congress and follows its lead on most matters, though there have been occasional disagreements. Moscow has refused to recognize the Congress and deals with the independence movement only through the Estonian Supreme Soviet.

Like the Estonian Supreme Soviet, the Congress is committed to the restoration of pre-1940 state institutions, which will be deemed to have happened when the Parliament established under the pre-1940 constitution is elected and installed. Proponents of Estonian independence understand that this event will mean the achievement of constitutional government and independence. At that point, in theory, the Congress and the Estonian Supreme Soviet will no longer serve any purpose and will dissolve.

The movement, nonetheless, has hesitated to take steps toward restoration of the Parliament for fear that Moscow would consider such an event to be a provocation. This fear apparently is based on indications that Moscow will consider a decision to restore the Estonian Parliament as analogous to Lithuania's declaration

of independence and will meet it with a response similar to that used against Lithuania.

A. Soviet Response

Under the Soviet Constitution, all republics explicitly have the right to secede.¹ Confronted by moves toward independence in all three Baltic republics, the Soviet government moved to define this right. In a law on secession adopted on April 3, the Soviet government imposed the following procedural limitations, among others, on any effort by any republic to exercise its right to secede under article 72:

- secession must be requested by popular referendum;
 - o any such referendum will be deemed to have been approved only if 2/3 of those eligible to vote (not those actually voting) voted in favor of secession;
 - o the votes of autonomous minority groups are to be tabulated separately, and the views of such groups are to be taken into account in deciding the ultimate status of territories within the republic inhabited by them;
 - o if a secession referendum is deemed to have failed, another referendum cannot be held for ten years;
- if such a referendum is approved, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies can prescribe a transition period of up to five years;
- a republic that votes to secede must pay all relocation expenses for Soviet citizens who choose to relocate from the republic;
- if requested by ten percent of a republic's residents, another referendum must be held during the last year of the transition period, which must again be approved by 2/3 of those eligible to vote;

¹Article 72 states "Each Union Republic [explicitly including the Baltics] shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR." The constitution is otherwise silent on the question of secession. The Communist Party's monopoly on power prevented this question from arising until recently. As a result, nobody in the Soviet Union formally examined whether the provision was self-executing.

- independence is not final until the Congress of USSR People's Deputies "adopts a decision confirming the completion of the process."

Any application of the law to Lithuania and Estonia would be retroactive, inasmuch as the Supreme Soviets of those states adopted laws challenging Soviet rule before the Soviet law on secession was approved. The Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted its law challenging Soviet rule several days after the secession law was approved and therefore, unlike Lithuania and Estonia, cannot rely on retroactive application as a basis for exemption from the law.

To date, Moscow essentially has taken the position that it will not even talk to the Baltic states about independence until their Supreme Soviets repeal the laws they have passed challenging Soviet rule and agree to proceed within the framework of Soviet law. The Baltic states might consider suspending the implementing legislation they have passed, but they have refused to repeal their laws challenging Soviet rule on the ground that such a step would amount to accepting reimposition of Soviet rule. In the absence of agreement on this issue, there has been no real movement toward negotiations.

B. Analysis With Respect to Estonia

Both sides have taken political positions that are inconsistent with their legal positions. The Estonian independence movement claims that it does not recognize the legitimacy of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, yet refuses to let that body repeal its law declaring Soviet supremacy illegal. Moscow claims it does not recognize the Estonian Congress, yet apparently indicated that a decision by the Congress to hold elections for a Parliament under the pre-1940 constitution will be tantamount to a declaration of independence.

If the parties desire negotiations, their inconsistent legal positions might provide a face-saving device for bringing both sides to the table. The Estonians could agree to repeal by the Estonian Supreme Soviet of the March 30 declaration and similar laws offensive to Moscow, because in Estonia's view actions by that body are illegitimate in any event. At the same time, the Congress could declare independence and proceed with elections for the pre-1940 Parliament. Moscow need not object to such actions, because in its view only actions by the Estonian Supreme Soviet are of any legal consequence. The Estonians would have to modify their current position that the Estonian Supreme Soviet must be dissolved when their Parliament is restored, but, since they regard the Supreme Soviet as legally irrelevant anyway, this would not be a major concession.

This state of affairs could persist for as long as required by the negotiations, provided there was a mutual understanding to

that effect. The Estonian Supreme Soviet would continue serving as the communications channel between the independence movement and Moscow, just as it does today. It would be permitted, however, to say and do those things necessary to satisfy Moscow's need to have its laws respected. The Congress, and later the restored pre-1940 Parliament, would increasingly wield real power in Estonia. In this, they would be aided by the Estonian Supreme Soviet, which could turn over to the Parliament control of governmental institutions to the extent that doing so did not call into question the supremacy of Soviet law.

This formula would also work in Latvia, which has followed a cautious course similar to that of Estonia. Latvia has a Citizens Committee corresponding to the Estonian Congress, as well as a Supreme Soviet, and like Estonia has declared restoration of its pre-1940 parliament to be its goal.

The Lithuanian independence movement has adopted a more radical course and would have to make more adjustments in order to use this formula. Lithuania has no institution corresponding to the Estonian Congress and the Latvian Citizens Committee. Rather, the independence movement seemingly has accepted the legitimacy of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet now that it is in control of that body. The movement used the Supreme Soviet to declare the restoration of Lithuanian independence and has changed the institution's name to the Supreme Council. In order to avail itself of this formula, Lithuania would have to decide to establish a parallel or shadow government based on pre-1940 institutions and to eventually abolish the Supreme Council.

C. U.S. Position

Having steadfastly (and correctly) refused to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, the United States would need to be careful in responding to any development that did not result in Baltic independence so as not to grant legitimacy to what would be "fruit of a poisonous tree." Compromise on Baltic independence, even for a transitional period, would not reflect legitimate self-determination because, since 1940, the Baltics have had no say in how or by whom they were governed. Provided such a transitional period led promptly to genuine independence, however, we could probably find a way to support the transition without abandoning our policy virtue on recognition. With this caution, the legal inconsistencies of all sides in the Baltic affair may provide the beginning of an out.

III. Additional Points

The following points are set forth to be helpful to respond to arguments that have been advanced in support of Moscow's current position with respect to the Baltic states.

While some may argue that President Gorbachev's objections to secession are not unlike Abraham Lincoln's, significant differences should be kept in mind. First and foremost, the U.S. government, unlike the Soviet government, is based on the principle of consent of the governed. Our Constitution is silent on secession because it says the people form the union -- and therefore the people (not the states or other governments) may dissolve it. And, of course, the Baltic states can hardly be said to have voluntarily sought membership in the USSR.

Some also may argue that permitting the Baltic states to secede will lead to similar demands by other republics. There are sufficient differences between the Baltic states and the other republics to warrant different treatment. No other republic shares the Baltic states' history of centuries of cultural and political cohesion, independence until recent times, membership in the League of Nations, and forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union that we refused to recognize. Further, Lithuania and Estonia can be distinguished from the other republics by the fact that they challenged Soviet rule prior to approval of the Soviet law on secession.

Concurrences by: Peter  Rodman, Robert  Brackwill, Condoleezza 
Rice

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004423
RECEIVED: 01 JUN 90 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RODMAN

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 01 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SPEECHES
CENTRAL AMERICA
USSR

CHINA P R
SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES SPEECH ON FORN POLICY COVERING RECENT SUMMIT / CHINA / CENTRAL
AMERICA

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 05 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RODMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
RODMAN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9004423

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001 RODMAN
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90060119 FOR INFORMATION
Z 90060710 FOR FURTHER ACTION
X 90061111 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 1, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Secure it
RD

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *mm*
SUBJECT: President's Speech on Foreign Policy

At Tab I is the skeleton of a speech on foreign policy for next week. Per Bob's instructions, it covers the Summit but also China and Central America.

The Summit material will have to be supplied. The China and Central America portions are included, with the help of Karl Jackson, Doug Paal, and Dave Pacelli.

The unifying themes I have tried to stress are:

- the crucial American role of leadership;
- the power of our democratic values;
- our continuing responsibility.

Concurrence by: *R&J* Karl Jackson, Doug Paal, Dave Pacelli *DAP* *mb*

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the above.

Attachment
Tab I Draft Presidential Speech
on Foreign Policy

America and the World, 1990

My fellow Americans:

I would like to report to you tonight on how America is helping build a new world of peace.

Events are moving rapidly -- exciting, sometimes turbulent, and sometimes full of surprises. But I have sought, with your support and the bipartisan support of Congress, to help shape these events.

Americans have a vision of the kind of world we want to see. As the Cold War and its military confrontation fade, a new world is being born. There are many uncertainties and many dangers; history teaches us that such times can be times of new instability. Our job is to build for the long term -- to shape a stable structure of international relations that will last, far into the next century, based on our values of democracy, freedom, progress, and a secure peace. To make the world safe for democracy, as Woodrow Wilson so wisely said.

For in this world of turmoil and change, there is a central theme that stands out -- a trend of freedom, the power of that very idea of

democracy. This trend has already transformed the Communist world and our relations with it. It has spread around the globe -- from Central America to South Africa to Eastern Europe to East Asia.

We know that freedom is the surest foundation of stability, of progress, and of peace.

The Washington Summit

This theme was very much in my mind during my meetings with President Gorbachev last week. He has unleashed a powerful trend of change inside the Soviet system, in the direction of greater openness and greater democracy. He has shown the wisdom and, yes, courage to permit Eastern Europe to choose its own path.

Whatever happens inside the Soviet Union, we will deal openly and constructively with a Soviet leader who shows a willingness to work with us to help solve world problems, in the interest of freedom and peace.

I am a realist. I know that the Cold War legacy of suspicion and military confrontation will not easily be put behind us. It requires patient work -- and hard bargaining. Many significant differences remain, and America will not bargain away basic principles. Mr. Gorbachev and I spoke candidly and sometimes bluntly about many problems. Nor can we settle key issues with the Soviets alone when our allies have vital interests at stake and a major voice in the process.

Nevertheless, I can report to you and to our allies that we made progress, on several fronts:

[Summit Insert]

- arms control
- Europe and Germany
- Lithuania
- bilateral relations

China and Asia

My fellow Americans:

The world is that much safer, if the United States and Soviet Union can work constructively together. Safer for democracy.

At this time of the year, we also think back on events a year ago, in quite another part of the globe: China.

Last June was the crackdown in Tiananmen Square, and the great disaster it represented for China's once-hopeful process of reform. Ten years of political and economic reform were replaced in an instant by repression and stagnation.

China's citizens had been expressing, peacefully and with great dignity, the same yearnings and aspirations we have seen in so many other places around the world. When people demonstrate peacefully for democracy, the phrases on the placards may be in different languages, but their meaning is universal.

And we, in the United States of America, who cherish our heritage of liberty that has contributed so much to freedom in this world, could only be deeply shocked by this catastrophe.

The tide of democracy we see building elsewhere in the world gives us hope -- that these aspirations cannot long be denied, that the great and heroic people of China will someday soon achieve their dream.

America's policy must be to build toward that future. We must keep open the links and contacts and access that can be a lifeline to the Chinese people. It cannot be our wish, or our interest, to deepen their isolation. On the contrary, China is a proud and ancient civilization, and a humane civilization, and for that very reason it cannot be immune to universal human aspirations if we keep those lines open and use our influence positively.

That's why I've tried to maintain trade, educational, professional, and other contacts.

The security of Asia too, depends on China's recovery from this tragedy. Meanwhile, we will continue to deepen our ties with our most important Asian ally, Japan, as well as with our allies spanning the breadth of the Pacific from Korea, to the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia.

I can't predict when change will come in China. But we must encourage that change, positively.

Central America

Finally, a word about the course of democracy nearer to home -- in Central America. We've witnessed historic changes in Central America, and a new dawn for peace and freedom.

The peoples of Nicaragua and Panama suffered for long years under repressive rulers. Today, they live under democracy.

The Fund for Democracy, which we created with bipartisan support in Congress, is critical to those countries' chances for success. I am pleased to say our aid has now begun to flow. But they face daunting

tasks -- to rebuild, to demilitarize, to strengthen democratic institutions. In El Salvador, of course, a democratically elected government still defends against the assault of Communist guerrillas. We strongly endorse the negotiating process that has begun with the good offices of the United Nations. And I will work with Congress on a bipartisan approach for continued assistance to the Salvadoran Government in pursuit of peace.

We will do our utmost to help these struggling democracies, and I call upon other freedom-loving peoples to do what they can, as well.

Conclusion

There is a lesson for us in all of this -- is that where America is united -- bipartisan and working in harmony -- we succeed. We are a force for good. That's how I want this country to be.

Our role is vital in the world. Amid all the changes taking place, world leaders keep telling me that America's role is more crucial than ever. We are a rock of stability, a bulwark of security, a source of

reassurance and a beacon of freedom in a world that still looks to us as a leader.

We must -- and will -- stay engaged. Our steadfastness and that of our allies has helped bring about this moment of hope. Let's finish the job.

Thank you.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004452
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 90 10

TO: ARMSTRONG, WILLIAM L

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 03 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

CO

PERSONS: LANDSBERGIS, VYTAUTAS

SUBJECT: LTR TO ARMSTRONG RE LITHUANIA

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 07 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLACKWILL

BURNS

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

Lisa Saloth

DATE

7/3

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

BS Ltr to Sen Armstrong
National Security Council
The White House

Condoleezza

PROOFED BY: WEA

LOG # 4452

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG JRP A/O _____

W Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

SEQUENCE TO

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DISPOSITION

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JRP 7/3

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LNS 7/3

D

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 3, 1990

Bill

Dear Senator Armstrong:

Thank you for your recent letter forwarding the letter sent to you by Lithuanian President Landsbergis.

We remain very concerned about the situation in Lithuania and are watching events there carefully. As you know, President Bush emphasized his concern to President Gorbachev at the Summit meeting and urged him to open a dialogue with the Lithuanian leadership, and to end the economic blockade. We believe that some progress has been made in the weeks following the summit. As you know, President Gorbachev recently met with all three Baltic leaders. We are encouraged by the most recent developments especially with respect to Lithuania, and hope for continued progress in the period ahead.

Sincerely,

Brent
Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable William L. Armstrong
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

0091

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 24, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES A COPY OF A LETTER HE RECEIVED FROM
PRESIDENT VYTAUTAS LANDSBERGIS OF LITHUANIA
REGARDING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO
PREVENT THEIR MOVEMENT TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

ACTION

DISPOSITION

ROUTE TO:	ACT	DATE	TYPE	C	COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D	YY/MM/DD

FREDERICK MCCLURE

ORG 90/05/24

FM A9005130

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220

MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                        *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *OF SIGNER         *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED         *CODE = A           *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED         *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                        *OUTGOING           *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                        *                     *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                        *                     *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                        *                     *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

May 30, 1990

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President sharing your views regarding the present situation in Lithuania and providing us with a copy of the letter you received from President Landsbergis.

We certainly appreciate being advised of your concerns regarding the Soviet Union's policy toward the Baltic states. Please know that I have shared your comments with the Presidential advisors charged with assisting President Bush to prepare for the summit so that they will be fully aware of your perspective on this important issue.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable William L. Armstrong
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI

145680

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 16, 1990

The Honorable George H. W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I just received the enclosed letter from President Landsbergis of Lithuania.

Recent events have clarified the intent of the Soviet government to delay, obstruct and prevent further movement toward independence by any of the Baltic republics. No matter what route each republic has chosen, the Soviets have refused to negotiate in any form with their duly elected leadership. The Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians -- showing themselves to be truly courageous -- have refrained from violence, even though their Soviet oppressors have freely used force and intimidation to occupy buildings and herd young men into the military.

Yesterday's attacks on the Parliament buildings in Latvia and Estonia suggest the immediacy of the current situation, and the need for the United States to send a clear signal of support for independence for the Baltic republics.

I urge you to take positive steps to put the Soviet government clearly on notice that America will not stand by silently while other freedom-loving peoples are slowly strangled or violently suppressed.

Best regards.

Sincerely,



William L. Armstrong

WLA:cp
Enclosure

LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS AUKŠČIAUSIOJI TARYBA

THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

232008, Vilnius, Gedimino pr. 53, Lithuania

The Honorable William Armstrong
U.S. Senate

May 15, 1990

Honorable Senator William Armstrong

I felt it best to inform you that the international situation in Estonia and Latvia is being dangerously destabilized by the actions of dislocated military forces, the Kremlin's decrees and anti-reformist groups in those Baltic states. Today the Parliaments in Riga and Tallinn were attacked. Destabilization is possible in Lithuania as well, where incidents are once again being provoked by the continuation of the USSR's brutal economic blockade and slanderous propaganda against the Government of Lithuania. Today a soldier shot a civilian in Kaunas.

There is possibility of increased mutinous activity and post-factum policy.

Sincerely,



Vytautas Landsbergis
President of the Supreme Council
of the Republic of Lithuania

VL:rdd

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 25, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Armstrong Regarding Lithuania

At Tab I is a letter to Senator Armstrong, who has forwarded a letter sent to him from Lithuanian President Landsbergis warning of destabilization in Lithuania. The response repeats our policy or urging negotiation and notes that some progress seems to have been made recently.

Ginny Lampley *1* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Sen. Armstrong
Tab II Incoming

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004471
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 90 15

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

PERSONS: KAIFU, TOSHIKI

SUBJECT: TELCALL FM PM KAIFU RE US - SOVIET SUMMIT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 07 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JACKSON LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
JACKSON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By GP NARA, Date 2/25/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FI

4471

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTED

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Kaifu, Japan

DATE: Monday, June 4, 1990

PURPOSE: To brief Prime Minister Kaifu on the U.S.-Soviet Summit

SECURE OR OPEN: Open

INTERPRETER: Frances Seeds. Prime Minister Kaifu does not speak English. He understands some English.

PHONE NUMBER: 011-813-581-2361

CONTACT PERSON:

TIME DIFFERENCE: +13

SUGGESTED TIMES: 7:00 p.m., Monday, June 4, 1990

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: Prime Minister Kaifu will be concerned to hear: your general impressions of the summit and, in particular, any discussion you had regarding the Northern Territories.

President Roh has just visited Japan, and Kaifu will be concerned to learn about any summit discussion about Korea.

Today the Japanese government has been hosting a conference among the leaders of the four Cambodian factions. At this hour the media are saying that the Tokyo meeting has failed because the Khmer Rouge representative has absented himself from the meetings, probably to avoid any agreement until after the talks between China and Vietnam next week in Hanoi.

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0949-MR
5/9/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER TOSHIKI KAIFU

- I sent you a letter yesterday on my meetings with Gorbachev; I wanted to report back to you personally on my meetings here in Washington.
- The meetings with Gorbachev went well. The atmosphere was positive; our discussions were animated and candid, but not confrontational.
- Although there were no breakthroughs on the most difficult issues, such as German unification and Lithuania, I think we made significant progress on narrowing our differences.
- On arms control we made good progress, with joint statements on CFE and on strategic arms reduction, in addition to our bilateral agreement on chemical weapons.

Asia Issues

- With President Roh meeting President Gorbachev in San Francisco today -- and the important meetings you are hosting among the Cambodian factions -- it has been a busy week for international relations in Asia.
- I raised the Northern Territories issue with Gorbachev. Unfortunately, Gorbachev did not show positive movement on the issue. Perhaps the Soviets will be more forthcoming when their officials visit Tokyo in preparation for

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Declassify on: OADR

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2009-0949-MR
5/9/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Gorbachev's visit. In any case, we will continue to support your position that the Northern Territories should be returned to Japan.

-- On Korea, Gorbachev shares our mutual concern about the lack of North Korean agreement on the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Gorbachev described the meeting with President Roh as simply getting acquainted. A brief report from my staff on the West Coast indicates that the Roh-Gorbachev meeting went over familiar issues, but I will know more when I have talked to President Roh later this week in Washington.

-- On Cambodia, Gorbachev saw some hope for a settlement and described himself as slightly optimistic. It was his impression that China is acting more positively on the Cambodia issue as part of a normalization process between China and Vietnam.

SII

- Before closing, let me raise one bilateral matter, the Final SII report, which is scheduled for July.
- We together achieved a break through to a new spirit of cooperation in the six weeks after Palm Springs. I know that you, personally, deserve the largest share of the credit for this forward movement in U.S.-Japan relations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

- Our respective SII teams have met again, and I have heard that concern exists on both sides about the Final Report. Both our countries must strengthen our commitments in at least a few areas in order to insure a good reception for the Final Report prior to our meeting in Houston.
- I would appreciate your continuing assistance in this very important matter.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4771 4471

June 4, 1990

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Kaifu

Attached you will find the schedule proposal for this evening's call to Kaifu along with a suggested set of talking points for the President.

The important thing to remember is that President Roh has just visited in Japan and, therefore, today's meeting between Roh and Gorbachev may be on Kaifu's mind.

Likewise, the Tokyo meeting on Cambodia taking place today will make Kaifu interested in anything that Gorbachev has said on the subject.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0949-MR
5/9/2014 MM

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RECORD ID: 9004473
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 90 15

CHRON FILE

TO: MCCLURE, F

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 05 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CONGRESSIONAL
SUMMIT

USSR
AP

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON 5 JUN RE US - USSR SUMMIT

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 07 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
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ZELIKOW

COMMENTS: _____

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CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 2 OF 2

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UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9004473

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT
001
002

Z 90060420 FOR DECISION
X 90060509 SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
X 90060509 SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO

UNCLASSIFIED


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK D. McCLURE

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT:

The President's Meeting with Congressional Leaders
on June 5, at 9:00 a.m.

Suggested talking points for the President for this meeting, providing an overview of his meetings with President Gorbachev, are attached at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made on US-Soviet Summit

POINTS TO BE MADE ON US-SOVIET SUMMIT
FOR MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

- At my press conference on Sunday I said I thought my meetings with President had been very productive, building on our good discussions in Malta. We are trying to build a fundamentally different US-Soviet relationship, one that would move beyond containment to an era of enduring cooperation.
- I think all of you could tell that the atmosphere of the Summit was very positive. Our private discussions were vigorous, at times, but not confrontational. I felt we were able to talk with candor and openness.
- There were no breakthroughs on the toughest issues, but I felt we made important progress toward narrowing our differences.
- President Gorbachev sat back and told me, at one point in our talks, that he thought it was remarkable that we are passing through a time of great change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in such a peaceful way. That's one of the ways in which I think our good relationship is paying off.
- All in all, I found Gorbachev still confident. But he is obviously weighed down with all he faces at home. He spoke to me about these problems in a direct way, and I think he is still committed to the path of reform -- political and economic.
- I laid out my position on Lithuania and the other Baltic states and explained why we do not see this as an internal Soviet problem. We have not recognized the incorporation of

the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. I support the right of these nations to self-determination. President Gorbachev knows my views, and knows that Soviet action in the Baltics can be a thorn in the side of our overall relationship.

- On the Soviet international position, Gorbachev seemed to me to be groping his way through the implications of all the changes of the past year.
- To his credit, he is open-minded and prepared to be reassured by steps the Western allies might take to show that the changes can be managed in ways that do not threaten Soviet security. In that regard, I believe the Summit helped give him some of those assurances.
- Our agreement to hold regular Summit meetings will also strengthen the sense of predictability in US-Soviet relations.
- I would now like to ask Brent to talk to you for a few minutes about the substantive accomplishments of the Summit.

POINTS TO BE MADE BY GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ON US-SOVIET SUMMIT FOR
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

Germany and the Future of Europe

- We had lengthy discussions with the Soviets, as you might imagine, about German unification.
- Gorbachev began by arguing that a united Germany in NATO would alter the strategic balance. He proposed that Germany belong to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- have 'two anchors,' as he put it -- and referred to a long transition period, seemingly under Four Power supervision. He came back to this idea of a transition period several times.
- The President said, very clearly, that a united Germany is no threat to anyone, including the Soviet Union, and stressed that Germany had earned its place in the new Europe. He pointed out that Germany wanted good and constructive relations with the Soviet Union.
- The President stressed that he supported Chancellor Kohl's position that a united Germany should remain a full member of NATO, including participation in its integrated military structures. He added that a united, democratic Germany must be free to choose its Alliance arrangements.
- The President explained our view that German unification must be complete at the time of unification, with no new discriminatory constraints on German sovereignty and no 'singularization' of Germany for special status.
- President Gorbachev seemed to agree with the President that,

while we differ about Germany's full membership in NATO, the Germans have the right -- under the Helsinki Final Act -- to choose their Alliance membership. The President referred to this agreement in his press statement opening the Sunday press conference. We'll see how this works out in practice.

- Gorbachev left the impression that he was still feeling his way and that his position may not yet be fixed. For example, in arguing against a united Germany in NATO, he seemed to be concerned as much with NATO itself as with Germany's membership in it.
- It seemed that Gorbachev was looking for reassurance that NATO would change its doctrine and evolve to become a more political alliance, and trying to get a better sense of what the Soviet position in Europe would be after unification.
- So there was no agreement on Germany. We will have to work hard in NATO, and in the Two Plus Four, to persuade Moscow that a united Germany fully in NATO is no threat to Soviet security.
- It will be particularly important to demonstrate, at the NATO Summit which will be in London early next month, that the Alliance is changing and will play a different role in Europe after German unification, and after Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe.

- We made good progress on arms control, which has the added virtue of demonstrating to the Soviet Union that military tensions in the new Europe can be substantially reduced.
- The joint US-Soviet statement on CFE was important. The Soviets agreed to rededicate themselves to reaching rapid agreement, and agreed that a CFE treaty is an indispensable foundation for the future of European security.
- On chemical weapons, we signed a far-reaching agreement that will result in the destruction of the vast majority of the CW stockpiles that the two sides declared under the terms of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding.
- We will be sending this agreement to the Hill for the formal review and approval of both houses.
- We will be consulting with you about when would be the best time to send it up.
- We also agreed on the verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaty, both of which were originally concluded in the 1970s. We now have the on-site verification measures we wanted, and the ratification process in the Senate can now go forward.
- We also will be nuclear testing protocols so that the ratification process can go forward.
- On START, we were able to record the substantial areas of agreement we have reached, but we failed to resolve all of the remaining differences.
- Two of these outstanding issues are Backfire and heavy

missiles (the SS-18s).

- Even though Backfire has only very limited capabilities in a strategic nuclear context, we made clear to the Soviets the long history and political importance of the Backfire issue to us.
- They did agree at the summit to accept a politically binding commitment not to give Backfire an intercontinental capability through in-flight refueling or by any other means. They refused, however, to put a meaningful cap on the total number of Backfires they will have.
- They argue that it is not and will not be a strategic nuclear bomber and therefore should not be subject to any numerical limits in the START context. We nevertheless will continue in Geneva to try to get them to accept some kind of limit.
- We also pressed the Soviets hard to go beyond their current agreement to cut their SS-18 force in half from 308 to 154 heavy missiles. They flatly rejected all of our proposals and arguments, including the idea of a limit on the number of SS-18 flight tests that would be permitted each year.
- While we will continue to try for further limits on these heavy missiles in the current START treaty, we are committed in any event to making the SS-18 a priority issue in the follow-on talks.
- With our agreement on the broad objectives for these follow-on talks, the need to pursue the key elements of our strategic modernization programs is all the more compelling.

- I hope you won't let our progress on START become an excuse for undermining these programs during the budget process.
- The President pressed Gorbachev hard on Open Skies, said he was keenly interested in it, and said an Open Skies treaty would really underscore both countries' commitment to openness.
- Gorbachev said he supported the concept of Open Skies, and that he thought more progress was possible. So the President, at his press conference, said he was hopeful that those negotiations would go forward.
- We also issued a good joint statement against proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and missile technology.

Bilateral Agreements

- There were a number of agreements signed during the Summit, including a commercial agreement, and joint statements were issued on a variety of subjects.
- The announcement of these agreements, on June 1, helped turn the atmosphere of the Summit toward a more upbeat tone, which may be helpful to Gorbachev back home.
- Our commercial agreement breaks much new ground in commercial relations with the Soviets and will make it easier for US businesses to operate in the USSR.
- The agreement specifically provides improved access to Soviet markets, sets up easier procedures for operation of commercial offices, and contains strong protections for intellectual

property rights. .

- This commercial agreement, along with waiver of Jackson-Vanik, are prerequisites for granting the Soviets most-favored-nation status.
- The President and Gorbachev agreed, however, that we cannot grant MFN until the Soviets pass their revised emigration laws. As the President said on Sunday, we will not send the commercial agreement up to you until the Soviet Union has completed action on the legislation guaranteeing the right of emigration.
- We also signed agreements on student exchanges, the peaceful use of atomic energy, ocean studies, civil air transport, a long-term grains accord, and an agreement on maritime transportation.
- The maritime boundary agreement we signed with the Soviets puts about 70% of the Bering Sea under US jurisdiction and will allow fishing and hydrocarbon resource development to go forward in previously disputed areas.
- We also issued joint statements on a Beringian region park, and other matters.
- I would note, just as signs of the new relationship between our countries, that we got a good customs agreement to get Soviet help in the drug war, as well as an agreement setting up a US cultural center in Moscow for the very first time.
- On the humanitarian side, we were pleased that we could get the Soviets to agree to help fly our food to starving people

in Ethiopia.

Regional Affairs

- The two presidents discussed regional issues for much of their day of talks out at Camp David.
- The discussions were very relaxed. Again, although there were no breakthroughs, a stronger basis for cooperation has been established.
- On Afghanistan, for example, we agreed on the importance of elections -- which were so helpful in easing the Nicaraguan problem between us. We still disagree, though, about the role of Najibullah.
- On the Middle East, the President raised our concerns about the recent attempted Palestinian terrorist raid against Israel, and said we thought Arafat had to condemn that act.
- The Soviets agreed with our concerns about terrorism and we had a good exchange on this issue.
- The President also pushed for implementation of the Soviet direct flights agreement. President Gorbachev complained about the attitude of Israel about settlements in the occupied territories.
- The President also urged the Soviets to use their influence with Castro to stop arms shipments to the rebels in El Salvador. Secretary Baker also raised this Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The Soviets agreed on the need to support the Esquipulas peace process.

- Other areas were also discussed, such as Cambodia, Korea, and South Africa.
- That's all I have. As you can see, this was a very productive Summit, where we had a real chance to explore all aspects of US-Soviet relations in depth.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4473

June 4, 1990

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/VIRGINIA LAMBEY

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Congressional Leaders
on June 5, 1990 at 9:00 a.m.

Following up on your discussion today with Ginny, attached at Tab I is your memorandum to Fred McClure with talking points for the President to use in providing an overview of his meetings with President Gorbachev. Talking points for your use in reviewing the details of the Summit accomplishments are at Tab II.

Arnold Kanter and Tim Deal concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum at Tab I to Fred McClure, forwarding talking points (Tab A) for the President.

That you draw upon the talking points provided at Tab II in briefing Congressional leaders.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Fred McClure

Tab A Points to be Made (The President)

Tab II Points to be Made (General Scowcroft)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004350
RECEIVED: 31 MAY 90 11

TO: CARTER, JIMMY

UNION FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 08 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
MFN

CHINA P R

PERSONS: CARTER, JIMMY

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO CARTER RE MFN RECOMMENDATION

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 31 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS:

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DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

REF ID: A66043
ID 9004350

REFERRAL

DATE: 11 JUN 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: CARTER, JIMMY

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 08 JUN 90

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO CARTER RE MFN RECOMMENDATION

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:

FOR



GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1990

Dear Jimmy:

Thank you for your letter regarding MFN for the Soviet Union.

I agree with much of what you say in support of an MFN recommendation. There is one key condition on emigration that the Soviets have not yet met, however: codification. Although Gorbachev's emigration policies over the past year have been very positive, I believe it is important to lock these in to the fullest extent possible through emigration legislation.

My meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev may clarify his intentions on this score, and on a second issue which inevitably affects the timing of any positive action -- his policy toward the Baltic Republics. As you know, MFN for the USSR would involve not only a Jackson-Vanik waiver but also getting a trade agreement through Congress.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "G. H. W. Bush", with a long, sweeping underline that extends towards the bottom right of the page.

The Honorable
Jimmy Carter
The Carter Center
One Copenhill
Atlanta, Georgia 30307

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 7, 1990

SIGNED

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Carter Letter on MFN to the Soviet Union

Purpose

To reply to former President Carter's letter urging that you recommend MFN status for the USSR.

Background

Carter argues that granting MFN would be widely acceptable in the U.S. in view of Gorbachev's Jewish immigration policy, his withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and other actions. He reasons that Jackson-Vanik was a mistake from the beginning, and that improved trade would help encourage democratization and other reforms.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Carter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Carter
Tab B Carter incoming

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4350

May 31, 1990

Redo
BO

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AAB*

SUBJECT: Carter Letter on MFN for the Soviet Union

Attached is a memo for the President conveying a suggested response to former President Carter's letter urging that you recommend MFN.

CR
Condi Rice concurs.

Timothy Desh

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	Letter to Carter
Tab B	Carter incoming

★
★
★
★

JIMMY CARTER

May 31, 1990

To President George Bush

Some gratuitous advice:

I suggest strongly that you recommend Most Favored Nation status to the Soviet Union.

In my opinion, the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the trade bill in the 1970s was a mistake from the beginning. When I decided to normalize diplomatic relations with China, I planned to grant MFN status to both the PRC and the Soviet Union. At that time, in 1979, Brezhnev was permitting almost 5,000 refuseniks to emigrate each month. This could clearly have met the Jackson-Vanik test. However, any generous move toward the Soviets would have been impossible after the invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, so I just recommended MFN for the Chinese.

With Gorbachev's decisions to remove Soviet troops from Afghanistan, encourage Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea, and to permit practically unrestricted Jewish emigration, granting most favored nation status would now be politically acceptable to almost all elements of our society, including Jewish groups and the U.S. business community. Furthermore, the moves by Gorbachev toward democracy and other reforms could be helped in some degree by improving trade ties between our two countries.

If needed, I would be glad to help convince any reluctant Democrats in the Congress of the wisdom of such a recommendation by you.

Please give President Gorbachev my best wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jimmy", written in dark ink.

TIME STAMP

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 4350

ACTION OFFICER: RICE

DUE: IMMEDIATELY, 31 MAY

☒ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates☐ Appropriate Action☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes☐ Prepare Memo _____

to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 3912

FYI

☐ Basora
☐ Beers
☒ Blackwill
☐ Charles
☐ Coulson
☐ Davis
☐ Deal
☐ Dorminey
☐ Dyke
☐ Gordon
☐ Grimes
☐ Haass
☐ Hayden
☐ Hutchings
☐ Jackson
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☐ Lampley
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☐ Merchant
☐ Miller
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☐ Paal
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☐ Passage
☐ Pilling
☐ Popadiuk
☐ Pryce
☐ Rademaker
☐ Rice
☐ Rodman

FYI

☐ Rostow
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INFORMATION ☐ Hughes☒ Scowcroft (advance)☒ Sittmann☒ Gates (advance)☐ Exec. Sec. Desk☒ Secretariat

COMMENTS

Logged By SL

Return to Secretariat

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Fax Coversheet	Re: The Office of Jimmy Carter [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	5/31/90	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	2/25/2009	OA/ID Number:	91118-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



The Office of Jimmy Carter
The Carter Center
One Copenhill
Atlanta, Georgia 30307

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Please deliver the following document

TO: President George Bush
Attn: Patricia Prosoch

Addressee's Phone # Closed According to Donor
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FROM: Jimmy Carter

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET: 2 pages

COMMENTS: Contact: Range Dill

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TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: DORMINEY
RODMAN

DOC DATE: 12 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA
USSR

CHINA P R
EUROPE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO FORMER PRES REVIEWING SUMMIT

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 23 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RODMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DORMINEY
NSC CHRON
RODMAN

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/25/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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DOC 2 OF 2

National Security Council
The White House

revised
re - Summit

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 4123

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Bill Sittmann

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90 JUN 12 P 3. 50

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A = Action

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D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*This is ready to
go - Soonest.*

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

4123

June 12, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

PETER W. RODMAN *PMR*

FROM:

BLAIR DORMINEY *ABD*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Letter to Former Presidents
Reviewing Summit

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

I have prepared draft Presidential letters to former Presidents reviewing the Summit. Precisely the same letter has been drafted for Presidents Nixon, Ford and Reagan; a shorter letter has been prepared for President Carter, per Peter's instruction. These letters are composed of lightly edited excerpts from two State cables reporting the Summit and talking points the President used in his meeting on June 5 with congressional leaders. Before preparing the final letters on green stationery, it would be useful to have any changes you wish to make.

A set of texts of key joint statements, Presidential remarks, and fact sheets will accompany each letter.

Concurrence:

~~Robert Blackwill~~ *PMR for* Condoleezza Rice, Nick Burns

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the draft Presidential letters to former Presidents.

Approve *ABD* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Draft Presidential letter to former Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan
Tab II	Draft Presidential letter to former President Carter
Tab III	Background

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2009-0949-MR
5/9/2014 MM

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The issues we addressed lie at the very root of the Cold War: the division of Germany and of Europe, significant reductions in the Soviet military threat, and the transformation of the Soviet system itself.

Although no breakthroughs were made on the toughest issues, I felt we made important progress toward narrowing our differences. At one point in our talks, Gorbachev sat back and told me that he thought it was remarkable that we are passing through a time of great change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in such a peaceful way. That is one of the ways in which I think our good relationship is paying off.

All in all, I found Gorbachev still confident. But he is obviously weighed down by all he faces at home. He spoke to me about these problems in a direct way, and I think he is still committed to the path of reform -- political and economic.

I laid out my position on Lithuania and the other Baltic states and explained why we do not see this as an internal Soviet matter. President Gorbachev knows my views, and knows that Soviet action in the Baltics can be a thorn in the side of our overall relationship.

As for the Soviet international position, Gorbachev seemed to me to be groping his way through the implications of all the changes of the past year. To his credit, he is open-minded and prepared to be reassured by steps the Western allies might take to show that changes can be managed in ways that do not threaten Soviet security. In that regard, I believe

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Germany and Europe

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All in all, although many important differences remain, I believe the Summit moved us forward toward a more durable East-West relationship.

Sincerely,

Enclosures

The Honorable Richard Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675

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As for the Soviet international position, Gorbachev seemed to me to be groping his way through the implications of all the changes of the past year. To his credit, he is open-minded and prepared to be reassured by steps the Western allies might take to show that changes can be managed in ways that do not threaten Soviet security. In that regard, I believe

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Sincerely,

Enclosures

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P.O. Box 927
Rancho Mirage, California 92270

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2121 Avenue of the Stars
34th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067

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Dear President Carter:

I would like to give you a prompt review of my discussions with Gorbachev. Also enclosed for your information are some of the key joint statements, remarks, and fact sheets.

The atmosphere of the Summit was very positive, as you will have noted from the press coverage. Our private discussions were animated at times, but not confrontational. I felt we were able to talk with candor and openness.

The issues we addressed lie at the very root of the Cold War: the division of Germany and of Europe, significant reductions in the Soviet military threat, and the transformation of the Soviet system itself.

Although no breakthroughs were made on the toughest issues, I felt we made important progress toward narrowing our differences.

I laid out my position on Lithuania and the other Baltic states and explained why we do not see this as an internal Soviet matter. President Gorbachev knows my views, and knows that Soviet action in the Baltics can be a thorn in the side of our overall relationship.

As for the Soviet international position, Gorbachev seemed to me to be groping his way through the implications of all the changes of the past year. I believe the Summit helped reassure him that changes can be managed in ways that do not threaten Soviet security. Our agreement to hold regular summit meetings will also strengthen the sense of predictability in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Germany and Europe

Gorbachev began our discussions by arguing that a united Germany in NATO would alter the strategic balance. He proposed that Germany belong to both Nato and the Warsaw Pact -- have "two anchors," as he put it -- and referred to a long transition period, seemingly under Four-Power supervision, an idea he came back to several times.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0949-MR
5/9/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

2

I responded clearly that Germany is no threat to anyone, including the Soviet Union, and stressed that Germany has earned its place in the new Europe and would have good and constructive relations with the Soviet Union. I emphasized that I support Chancellor Kohl's position that a united Germany should remain a full member of NATO, including participation in its integrated military structures. I also added that a united, democratic Germany must be free to choose its alliance and security arrangements. German sovereignty must be complete at the time of unification, with no new discriminatory constraints on German sovereignty. Forty-five years after the war, there is no reason for a united, democratic Germany to be singled out for special status.

Gorbachev seemed to agree that, while we differ about Germany's full membership in NATO, the Germans have a right -- under the Helsinki Final Act -- to choose their Alliance membership. We'll see how this works out in practice.

I reaffirmed to Gorbachev my readiness, and that of the Atlantic Alliance, to address legitimate Soviet security concerns and I shared with him my vision of a transformed Alliance.

Arms Control

We reached several important arms control agreements. These serve our interests, as well as demonstrating to the Soviets that military tensions in the new Europe can be substantially reduced.

The joint statement on CFE was important. The Soviets agreed to re-dedicate themselves to reaching rapid agreement, and agreed that a CFE treaty is an indispensable foundation for the future of European security.

On chemical weapons, we signed a far-reaching agreement that will result in the destruction of the vast majority of the CW stockpiles that the two sides declared under the terms of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding. My hope is that this agreement will lead quickly to a global ban on chemical weapons.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

We also agreed on the verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. We now have the on-site verification measures we wanted.

On START, we were able to record the substantial areas of agreement we reached, but we failed to resolve all the remaining differences.

On Open Skies, I emphasized that a treaty would underscore our countries' commitment to openness. Gorbachev replied that he supported the concept, and thought more progress was possible.

In our press conference, we also issued a good joint statement against proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and missile technology.

Bilateral Agreements

A number of other agreements were signed during the Summit, including a commercial agreement, and joint statements were issued on a variety of subjects. The announcement of these agreements, on June 1, helped turn the atmosphere of the Summit toward a more upbeat tone.

Our commercial agreement breaks much new ground, and will make it easier for U.S. businesses to operate in the U.S.S.R. The agreement specifically provides improved access to Soviet markets, sets up easier procedures for operation of commercial offices, and contains strong protections for intellectual property rights. This agreement and waiver of Jackson-Vanik are prerequisites for granting the Soviets MFN status. Gorbachev and I agreed, however, that we cannot grant MFN until the Soviets pass their revised emigration laws.

We also signed agreements on student exchanges, the peaceful use of atomic energy, ocean studies, civil air transport, a long-term grains accord, and an agreement on maritime transportation. The maritime boundary agreement we signed puts about 70 percent of the Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction and will allow fishing and hydrocarbon resource development to go forward in previously disputed areas. We also issued joint statements on a Beringian region park, and other matters.

~~SECRET~~

As a further indication of the new relationship between our countries, we reached a good customs agreement to get Soviet help in the drug war, and agreement on setting up a U.S. cultural center in Moscow for the first time. On the humanitarian front, we were pleased to issue a joint statement declaring our intention to cooperate in using Soviet planes to fly American food to starving Ethiopians.

Regional Affairs

During much of the day we spent at Camp David, Gorbachev and I discussed regional issues. Our discussions were very relaxed. Again, although we achieved no breakthroughs, a stronger basis for cooperation was laid.

On Afghanistan, for example, we agreed on the fundamental importance of elections -- which were so helpful in easing the Nicaraguan problem between us. We still disagree, however, about the role of Najibullah, during the transition period before elections.

In the Middle East, I raised our concerns about the recent attempted Palestinian terrorist raid against Israel, and said Arafat must condemn that act. The Soviets agreed with our concerns about terrorism and we had a good exchange on this issue. I also pressed Gorbachev for implementation of the Soviet direct flights agreement. He complained about the attitude of Israel toward settlements in the occupied territories.

As to Central America, I urged Gorbachev to use Soviet influence with Castro to stop arms shipments to the Communist rebels in El Salvador. The Soviets agreed on the need to support the Esquipulas peace process.

Cambodia, Korea, Kashmir, and South Africa were also discussed.

~~SECRET~~

5

All in all, although many important differences remain, I believe the Summit moved us forward toward a more durable East-West relationship.

Sincerely,

Enclosures

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
The Carter Presidential Center
1 Copenhill
Atlanta, Georgia 30307

~~SECRET~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

RECEIVED

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 4123

90 MAY 23 1962

ACTION OFFICER: RODMAN

DUE: IMMEDIATELY, 23 MAY

- ☒ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi
☐ Prepare Memo _____

- ☐ Appropriate Action
☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes
to _____

URGENT

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 6907

- FYI**
- ☐ Basora
☐ Beers
☐ Blackwill
☐ Charles
☐ Coulson
☐ Davis
☐ Deal
☐ Dorminey
☐ Dyke
☐ Gordon
☐ Grimes
☐ Haass
☐ Hayden
☐ Hutchings
☐ Jackson
☐ Kanter
☐ Kitchen
☐ LaMagna

- FYI**
- ☐ Lampley
☐ Levin
☐ Mahley
☐ Mandel
☐ Melby
☐ Menan
☐ Merchant
☐ Miller
☐ Needels
☐ Paal
☐ Pacelli
☐ Passage
☐ Pilling
☐ Popadiuk
☐ Pryce
☐ Rademaker
☐ Rice
☐ Rodman

- FYI**
- ☐ Rostow
☐ Salvetti
☐ Tilley
☐ Tobey
☐ Van Eron
☐ Watson
☐ Welch
☐ Whitley
☐ Wilson
☐ Working
☐ Zelikow
☐ _____
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☐ _____
☐ _____
☐ _____
☐ _____
☐ _____

INFORMATION ☐ Hughes
☐ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ ~~Sittmann~~
☐ Gates (advance)

☐ Exec. Sec. Desk
☒ ~~Secretariat~~

COMMENTS

Logged By AC

Return to Secretariat

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-May-1990 09:12 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Dona F. Proctor

(PROCTOR)

FROM:

Peter Rodman
(RODMAN)

SUBJECT:

Update for Former Presidents

In response to the General's query about when the last one went out:

The last update for former Presidents was sent on April 3, signed by General Scowcroft as has been the usual practice after the first one.

The question now is whether to try to rush one out before the Summit, and also whether the President wants to sign it himself (as his May 1 memo suggested). My recommendation is that we do it shortly after the Summit and have the President sign it. Is this OK?

CC: Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

CC: Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

CC: Robert M. Gates

(GATES)

CC: Diane L. Edwards

(EDWARDS)

General:

OK

[Signature]

Other

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4123

Peter Rodino

*Di-
pls assign
Action Brent
and Eric
jr*

DATE: May 1, 1990

FROM THE PRESIDENT

To: Brent Scowcroft

Let's send a foreign policy update
to all former Presidents regarding
Latin America, China, Soviet Union/
Europe.

Just how we see things as of now,
what we are trying to do. Have
your staff draft.

I'll sign next week.

cc: John Sununu

→ Redman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/24

Peter
when was last time
one of the foreign
policy updates
went out. Gen said
he gave you instructions
that he wanted one
to go out every six
weeks. He hasn't
seen one in some.

Donna

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4123

DATE: May 1, 1990

FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO: Brent Scowcroft

Let's send a foreign policy update
to all former Presidents regarding
Latin America, China, Soviet Union/
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I'll sign next week.

cc: John Sununu

Peter R...

*Di-
pls assign
Action Brent
and Fnk
jr*

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

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to _____

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☐ Jackson
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☐ Levin
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☐ Mandel
☐ Melby
☐ Menan
☐ Merchant
☐ Miller
☐ Needels
☐ Paal
☐ Pacelli
☐ Passage
☐ Pilling
☐ Popadiuk
☐ Pryce
☐ Rademaker
☐ Rice
☐ Rodman

- FYI
- ☐ Rostow
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☐ Tobey
☐ Van Eron
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☐ Welch
☐ Whitley
☐ Wilson
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☐ Zelikow
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☐ _____

INFORMATION ☐ Hughes
☐ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Sittmann
☐ Gates (advance)

☐ Exec. Sec. Desk
☒ Secretariat

COMMENTS

Logged By AC

Return to Secretariat

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003789
RECEIVED: 11 MAY 90 17

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 11 JUL 90
SOURCE REF: 9010798

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
HS

USSR

PERSONS: PRUNSKIENE, KAZIMIERA

THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM THATCHER RE LITHUANIA

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE DUE DATE: 15 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9003791 9003859

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
BURNS
CLARK
NSC CHRON
RICE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/25/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORD ID: 9003789

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STATE
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90051118 FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY
X 90052220 PRES NOTED SUMMARY OF LTR
X 90071208 NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/25/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003789
RECEIVED: 11 MAY 90 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: THATCHER, MARGARET

DOC DATE: 10 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
HS

USSR

PERSONS: PRUNSKIENE, KAZIMIERA

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM THATCHER RE MTG W/ PRUNSKIENE ON LITHUANIA

ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY DUE DATE: 15 MAY 90 STATUS: D

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
BURNS
CLARK
RICE
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 2/25/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY hms DATE 5/11 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9010798

Date July 11, 1990

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/25/09

REFERENCE:

To: President Bush

From: Prime Minister Thatcher

Date: May 10, 1990

Subject: Meeting with Prunskiene on Lithuania

WH Referral Dated: May 11, 1990
NSCS ID# (if any): 9003789

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

 A draft reply is attached.

 A draft reply will be forwarded.

 A translation is attached.


 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

XX We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.

 Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: Prime Minister Thatcher is giving President Bush a
read out on her meeting with Mrs. Prunskiene. No
further action is required.


Director
Secretariat Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9003789

REFERRAL

DATE: 11 MAY 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

9010798

90 MAY-11 11:15 PM

SOURCE: THATCHER, MARGARET


DATE: 10 MAY 90

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM PM THATCHER RE MTG W/ PRUNSKIENE ON LITHUANIA

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 15 MAY 90

COMMENT:


FOR GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

1990 MAY 11 P 11:14
RECEIVED NSC SECRETARIAT

CWA

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Letter	Prime Minister Thatcher to President Bush (2 pp.)	5/10/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed: 2/25/2009	OA/ID Number: 91118-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Room 1/WW
The White House
Washington DC 20500

10 May 1990

Dear Brent,

I should be grateful for your assistance in passing to
/ the President the enclosed letter from the Prime Minister
The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP FRS.

*Sincerely**Antony*
Antony Acland