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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91118
Folder ID Number: 91118-004

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Issues (1 pp.)	6/1/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Talking Points	Re: Reminder (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03. Talking Points	Re: Regional Issues (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04. Talking Points	Re: Afghanistan (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05. Talking Points	Re: Kashmir (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06. Talking Points	Re: Central America (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07. Talking Points	Re: Africa (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08. Talking Points	Re: Asia (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09. Talking Points	Re: Middle East (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10. Talking Points	Re: Human Rights (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11. Talking Points	Re: [Emigration Law] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12. Talking Points	Re: Emigration Law (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (June 1990) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap999
OA/ID Number: 91118-004
Date Closed: 2/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
13. Talking Points	Re: Long Term Refuseniks (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
14. Talking Points	Re: Anti-Semitism (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
15. Talking Points	Re: Contingency Points (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
16. Talking Points	Re: Emigrants (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
17. Talking Points	Re: Economic Relations (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
18. Talking Points	Re: Agreements and Negotiations (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
19. Talking Points	Re: Technical Economic Cooperation (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
20. Talking Points	Re: Economy (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
21. Talking Points	Re: Contingency Points (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
22. Talking Points	Re: Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
23. Talking Points	Re: Settlement (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
24. Talking Points	Re: Economic Reform in the Soviet Union (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
25. Talking Points	Re: Conduct of the Press Conference (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
26. Talking Points	Re: Communication (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
27. Talking Points	Re: Correspondence (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
28. Talking Points	Re: Trade Agreement (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
29. Talking Points	Re: [Proliferation] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
30. Talking Points	Re: Contingency Points (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
31. Talking Points	Re: Europe (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
32. Talking Points	Re: NATO (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
33. Talking Points	Re: Two Plus Four (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
34. Talking Points	Re: CFE (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
35. Talking Points	Re: CSCE (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
36. Talking Points	Re: Contingency Points (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
37. Talking Points	Re: Germany's Future (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
38. Talking Points	Re: German Membership in NATO (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
39. Talking Points	Re: Two Plus Four (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
40. Talking Points	Re: Bundeswehr (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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41. Talking Points	Re: [NATO/USSR] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
42. Talking Points	Re: NATO (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
43. Talking Points	Re: CSCE (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
44. Talking Points	Re: USSR (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
45. Talking Points	Re: [Gorbachev] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004475
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: RICE
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 01 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR SUMMIT

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: ISSUES FOR CAMP DAVID

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 07 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF: 9003947 9003968

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAMM CLOSED BY: NSAMM DOC 1 OF 1

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4475
Non-log Item

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 1, 1990

Brent -- If you need anything before you leave for Camp David, give us a call in the office.
BS Blackwill

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: Issues for Camp David

The package for the President's meeting at Camp David contains the following:

Tab I Regional Issues
Human Rights

Tab II Economic Issues
- Economic Reform in the Soviet Union
- Economic Relations

Tab III Issues That Should be Raised

Tab IV Germany (If needed)

Tab V Draft Press Statement

Tab VI Questions and Answers

Tab VII Fact Sheets and Joint Statements

cc: Governor Sununu
Robert Gates

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Declassify on: OADR

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REMINDER OF ISSUES TO RAISE

REGIONAL ISSUES (PARTICULARLY JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES)
HUMAN RIGHTS
    ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE U.S.S.R.
(SENSITIVE ISSUES)
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE PRESIDENT WOULD SUBMIT THE TRADE AGREEMENT TO THE CONGRESS
(CONFIDENCE BUILDERS)
CONDUCT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE
DIRECT PHONE LINK
CORRESPONDENCE

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

REGIONAL ISSUES

-- OUR COOPERATION IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS IS, I THINK, AN IMPORTANT DIMENSION OF OUR IMPROVING RELATIONSHIP.
  - IN NICARAGUA, NAMIBIA, NOW PERHAPS IN ANGOLA, AND SOON, I HOPE, IN AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA AND ELSEWHERE, OUR JOINT EFFORTS CAN SERVE OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.
  - TOGETHER WE CAN HELP END THESE SENSELESS CYCLES OF VIOLENCE AND GIVE ORDINARY PEOPLE -- THE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF THESE CONFLICTS -- A REALISTIC PROSPECT FOR STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH.

-- A KEY TO OUR COOPERATION HAS BEEN OUR ABILITY TO AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF ELECTIONS AS THE

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PRIMARY METHOD FOR RESOLVING MOST OF THESE CONFLICTS:

- TIME AND AGAIN WE'VE SEEN THAT FREE, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS OFFER A VEHICLE FOR GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
- AND WE'VE SEEN THAT ELECTIONS WORK POLITICALLY, BY GIVING ALL SIDES AN EXPLANATION FOR BACKING AWAY, ALLOWING THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TO PROCEED, AND EVEN PERMITTING A BASIS ON WHICH TO GO TO ELECTIONS.

-- CONTINUED PROGRESS HERE IS GOING TO HELP RESHAPE THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. IT WOULD:

- CUT SOME OF THE PRESSURES DRIVING NUCLEAR

AND CHEMICAL PROLIFERATION, THEREBY REDUCING SOME OF THE GENUINE DANGERS TO WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY.

- REMOVE SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN US IN THE PAST, THEREBY STRENGTHENING THE UNDERLYING FOUNDATION OF OUR NEW PARTNERSHIP.
- REINFORCE THE CONCLUSION IN PEOPLE'S MINDS THAT NEW THINKING IS FOR REAL -- THAT THERE MAY REALLY BE A BASIS FOR A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN US.

-- LET ME TURN TO WHAT I SEE AS THE PRIORITIES HERE: AFGHANISTAN, KASHMIR, CENTRAL AMERICA (NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR), AFRICA (ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA), ASIA (INCLUDING CAMBODIA), AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

AFGHANISTAN

-- IT'S TIME FOR US TO WORK FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN THAT WOULD ALLOW US BOTH TO DISENGAGE.

-- I SUGGEST WE CALL ON THE UN, TOGETHER WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC), TO WORK WITH ALL THE AFGHAN PARTIES TO START A TRANSITION PROCESS AIMED AT PRODUCING A NEW, BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT.

-- WE COULD JOINTLY ISSUE AN APPEAL HERE IN WASHINGTON AND, AT THE SAME TIME, SAY THAT ONCE THE TRANSITION IS UNDERWAY, WE WOULD CONSIDER: 1) STOPPING OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE PARTIES; 2) WITHDRAWING MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS ALREADY PROVIDED OR STILL IN THE PIPELINE; AND 3) URGING OTHER STATES TO DO THE

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SAME.

- A STATEMENT BY US WOULD SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL TO EVERYONE THAT IT'S TIME TO WORK SERIOUSLY AT NEGOTIATING AN END TO THIS CONFLICT.

-- BUT WE'RE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO SELL THIS TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, AND IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, WITHOUT SOME RESOLUTION OF NAJIBULLAH'S STATUS DURING THE PROCESS.

- THERE IS NO DOUBT SOME ELEMENTS OF THE RESISTANCE SIMPLY WON'T GO ALONG WITH US.

-- BUT IF WE BOTH COULD AGREE AND STATE OPENLY THAT NO PARTY -- NEITHER THE RESISTANCE NOR THE GOVERNMENT IN KABUL -- SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SUBVERT THE PROCESS, AND THAT AN INDEPENDENT AND NEUTRAL TRANSITION AUTHORITY

SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT "AFGHAN-STYLE" ELECTIONS AND PROVIDE SECURITY, THEN I'M CONFIDENT I COULD GET THE PAKISTANIS AND SAUDIS TO WORK WITH US IN PERSUADING MOST OF THE RESISTANCE TO COOPERATE. AND I THINK I COULD GET OUR CONGRESS TO GO ALONG, TOO.

- THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION TO COMPROMISE. WE WOULD ARGUE FOR NAJIBULLAH'S RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS, BUT NOT AS AN INCUMBENT. WE ARE NOT TRYING TO ANOINT THE AIG OR ANYONE ELSE.
- I'M AFRAID IF WE DON'T WORK OUT A COMMON APPROACH AND A REALISTIC PATHWAY TO A SETTLEMENT, HEKMAKTYAR MAY EVENTUALLY WIN IN AFGHANISTAN. NEITHER OF US WANT THAT.

-- IF YOU AGREE ON THIS GENERAL APPROACH, WE COULD INSTRUCT JIM AND EDUARD TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF A STATEMENT -- AND WITH THAT MOVE TO FINALLY PUT THIS UNFORTUNATE CHAPTER IN OUR RELATIONS BEHIND US.

KASHMIR

-- ANOTHER PLACE WHERE WE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER IS KASHMIR. BOB GATES HAS JUST RETURNED FROM A MISSION TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO URGE RESTRAINT. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME HOPEFUL SIGNS, I REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT. IT'S REAL. AND GIVEN THEIR WEAPONRY AND THE RISK OF ESCALATION, IT'S VERY DANGEROUS.

-- SHEVARDNADZE TOLD JIM BAKER IN MOSCOW THAT YOU WERE ALSO MAKING EFFORTS TO CALM THE SITUATION. FRANKLY, I THINK YOU NEED TO LEAN HARDER ON THE INDIANS TO ADDRESS THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE UNREST, INSTEAD OF GIVING THEM MORE MILITARY SUPPLIES. YOU SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER DISPATCHING A HIGH-LEVEL EMISSARY TO

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PAKISTAN TO URGE THEM TO STOP AIDING THE MILITANTS. WE'VE BEEN VERY FIRM WITH BOTH SIDES. NEITHER SHOULD HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

-- HERE AT THIS SUMMIT I THINK WE WOULD NEED TO ISSUE A JOINT CALL TO DEMONSTRATE OUR CONCERN. IT'S NOT ENOUGH FOR US TO WORK IN PARALLEL. AND I REALLY DON'T UNDERSTAND YOUR RELUCTANCE TO ISSUE A JOINT CALL FOR MODERATION.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

CENTRAL AMERICA

-- THE PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER IN NICARAGUA IS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT ELECTIONS AND U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION CAN PRODUCE. I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORT.

-- I WOULD LIKE YOUR SUPPORT IN MAKING SURE THE SANDINISTAS DO NOT TRY TO OVERTURN THE ELECTION RESULTS BY DESTABILIZING THE CHAMORRO GOVERNMENT.

-- THERE IS NOW AN OPENING TO FIND A SIMILARLY PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR. BUT CONTINUED CUBAN SUPPORT FOR THE FMLN IS A MAJOR OBSTACLE.

-- YOU HAVE THE MEANS TO INFLUENCE CASTRO, AND TO BUILD ON WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE REGION. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE PREPARED TO

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RECIPROCATE IF CUBAN BEHAVIOR MODERATES. IF IT DOES NOT, THE REALITY IS THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL HOLD THE SOVIET UNION AT LEAST PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR CUBAN TROUBLEMAKING, AND CUBA WILL REMAIN A MAJOR IRRITANT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP.

-- AS JIM BAKER PROPOSED TO SHEVARDNADZE, WE'RE ALSO PREPARED TO PUSH FOR SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE G-24 EFFORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICA IF YOU CONVINCE CUBA TO STOP ARMING THE FMLN AND ACCEPT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND IF YOU CONTINUE YOUR AID TO NICARAGUA. SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH THE CUBANS, AND I'D BE INTERESTED IN HEARING WHETHER YOU'VE MADE ANY HEADWAY.

-- WE'RE READY TO DISCUSS WAYS OF EASING TENSIONS WITH CUBA -- INCLUDING CUBAN CONCERNS ABOUT US MILITARY INTENTIONS -- BUT THAT IS ONLY POSSIBLE IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING CUBAN BEHAVIOR. WE ARE NOT TRYING TO DICTATE INTERNAL CHANGES, BUT WE MUST SEE THEIR EXTERNAL SUBVERSION STOPPED.

AFRICA

-- THE SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA DEMANDS QUICK AND DECISIVE ACTION BY THE TWO OF US. MILLIONS OF PEOPLE FACE STARVATION, AND WE SHOULD LET THE WORLD KNOW WHERE WE STAND.

-- JIM BAKER HAS RAISED THE IDEA OF USING SOVIET AIRCRAFT TO CARRY U.S. FOOD TO ASMARA AND OTHER AFFECTED AREAS. ARE YOU READY TO AGREE? I DON'T KNOW WHY WE CAN'T DO THIS -- AND DO IT IMMEDIATELY.

-- I VERY MUCH WANT TO SEE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA, AND I HOPE WE CAN COOPERATE CONSTRUCTIVELY TO ENSURE THAT BOTH SIDES NEGOTIATE PROMPTLY AND SERIOUSLY. WE'RE PLEASED TO SEE THE UNITA-MPLA TALKS. WE'VE

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PROPOSED TO WORK WITH YOU TO RAISE THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF THEIR TALKS. ULTIMATELY, JUST AS IN THE OTHER CONFLICTS WE SEEK RECONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATIONS, AND ELECTIONS PROVIDE THE REAL PATHWAY.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

ASIA

-- ON JAPAN, YOU KNOW WE FULLY SUPPORT THE JAPANESE CLAIM TO THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES. YOUR TRIP TO TOKYO NEXT YEAR OFFERS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE CREATIVELY AND DECISIVELY, AND OPEN THE WAY TO A BETTER SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP. THAT WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE WHOLE REGION.

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-- ON KOREA, IT'S ESSENTIAL THAT THE NORTH SIGN A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNDER THE IAEA. THEY'VE BEEN STRINGING EVERYONE ALONG ON THIS ISSUE. NOW IT'S TIME FOR PYONGYANG TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS, AND AVERT A DANGEROUS ARMS RACE ON THE PENINSULA.

- I THINK YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ROH TAE WOO IN SAN FRANCISCO IS AN IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE STEP. I WELCOME IT.
- **(IF ASKED TO MAKE A SIMILAR GESTURE TOWARD NORTH KOREA)** THERE IS A GREAT ASYMMETRY BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA'S FORTHCOMING POSTURE TOWARD YOUR COUNTRY AND THE NORTH'S ATTITUDE TOWARD US. PYONGYANG SHOULD START WITH STEPS THAT

ARE IMPORTANT TO US, SUCH AS SIGNING THE IAEA SAFEGUARD AGREEMENT. WE ARE PREPARED TO BE RESPONSIVE, BUT THERE IS A LONG WAY TO GO. WE DO APPRECIATE THE RETURN ON MEMORIAL DAY OF THE U.S. SERVICEMEN'S REMAINS.

-- ON CAMBODIA, WE WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES TO EXPLORE A SETTLEMENT, BASED ON ELECTIONS. WE ENCOURAGE YOU TO ENGAGE THE CHINESE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORATORIUM ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE FACTIONS. WE'LL WORK WITHIN THE PERM FIVE CONSULTATIONS AND WE CONTINUE TO SEE THE UN MECHANISM OFFERING THE BEST WAY TO PREVENT THE KHMER ROUGE FROM RE-EMERGING.

MIDDLE EAST

-- OUR POSITION ON SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION IS VERY CLEAR. WE WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL; WE FIRMLY OPPOSE SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET JEWS IN THE TERRITORIES. THERE'S NO NEED FOR A JOINT STATEMENT ON THIS. BUT WE WOULD CONSIDER A RESPONSIBLE UNSC RESOLUTION ON SETTLEMENTS.

-- THE REAL ISSUE IS WHETHER WE CAN MOVE AHEAD IN THE PEACE PROCESS. WE WERE VERY CLOSE TO LAUNCHING AN HISTORIC ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE, AND ONCE THERE'S AN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WE'LL PUSH FOR THAT DIALOGUE.

-- RAISING ALTERNATIVES, OR TRYING TO GET THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO GANG UP ON ISRAEL,

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WILL IMPEDE PROGRESS, NOT PROMOTE IT.

-- WE WANT TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE IT BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ISRAELIS NOT TO PROCEED.

-- IN THE MEANTIME, WE HOPE YOU'LL RECONSIDER YOUR POSITIONS ON DIRECT FLIGHTS AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. IF YOU HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT WHERE SOVIET JEWS WILL BE SETTLED, WHY DON'T YOU TALK TO THE ISRAELIS DIRECTLY ABOUT THEM?

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

-- WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE PROGRESS THAT YOU HAVE MADE IN HUMAN RIGHTS.
-- RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH, FREEDOM TO PRACTICE RELIGION, FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION, LEGAL DUE PROCESS, AND SO FORTH ARE THE CORNERSTONES OF A DEMOCRATIC AND TOLERANT SOCIETY.
-- IF YOU CAN FIRMLY ANCHOR THESE REFORMS -- IF YOU CAN INSTITUTIONALIZE THEM IN LAWS AND A STRONG JUDICIAL SYSTEM THAT WILL ENFORCE THE LAWS, EVEN IN THE FACE OF OFFICIAL PRESSURE -- NOTHING WILL DO MORE TO BUILD THE FOUNDATION OF A GENUINE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN US.

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, THE NEW EMIGRATION LAW HAS PASSED:)

- YOUR NEW EMIGRATION LAW IS A BIG STEP IN THIS DIRECTION, AND I HOPE WE'LL NOW SEE MOST OF THE "OLD" HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA THAT HAS DIVIDED US IN RECENT YEARS FINALLY DISAPPEAR.

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

IF NEW EMIGRATION LAW HAS NOT/NOT PASSED:

- THAT'S WHY THE NEW EMIGRATION LAW IS SO IMPORTANT: IT REASSURES PEOPLE EVERYWHERE THAT THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE ISN'T JUST GORBACHEV'S POLICY (OR POSSIBLY A PASSING FAD), BUT THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE WHO INTEND TO PRESERVE IT FOR A LONG TIME.

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

LONG-TERM REFUSENIKS

-- IN THIS SAME SPIRIT, I'D LIKE TO APPEAL TO YOU TO PUT THE PROBLEM OF LONG-TERM REFUSENIKS BEHIND US ONCE AND FOR ALL.

- I KNOW YOU TOLD JIM THAT YOU WOULD TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE 12 REMAINING CASES FROM THE LIST I GAVE YOU IN MALTA. HAVE YOU BEEN ABLE TO RESOLVE ANY OF THEM?

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

ANTI-SEMITISM

-- LET ME ALSO RAISE ONE OTHER PROBLEM -- ANTI-SEMITISM.

-- I KNOW YOU DON'T SUPPORT OR CONDONE ANTI-SEMITISM, AND I REALIZE THE PROBLEMS IT CREATES FOR YOU.

- NOT LEAST BEING THE UPSURGE IN JEWISH EMIGRATION THAT FEARS OF POGROMS AND ANTI-JEWISH HARASSMENT HAVE HELPED TO FUEL.

-- I WON'T PRESUME TO TELL YOU HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM.

-- HOWEVER, IT'S BEEN OUR EXPERIENCE IN THIS COUNTRY THAT THE BEST WAY TO STOP ANTI-SEMITISM FROM BECOMING A PROBLEM IS FOR POLITICAL LEADERS TO TAKE A STRONG PUBLIC STAND AGAINST IT.

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

CONTINGENCY POINTS:
(IF HE ASKS WHY WE CAN'T TAKE MORE SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRANTS:

-- WE'RE ALREADY TAKING ABOUT 70,000 THIS YEAR COMPARED TO 20,000 TWO YEARS AGO.

-- WE FACE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND, OF COURSE, THERE ARE PEOPLE FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD WHO WANT TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES AS REFUGEES AND AS IMMIGRANTS, MANY TO UNITE WITH THEIR FAMILIES HERE, AND WHO HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AS WELL. WE NEED TO HAVE A BALANCED POLICY, THOUGH THE SOVIET PART OF OUR REFUGEE PROGRAM IS 40 PERCENT OF THE WORLDWIDE TOTAL.

- BUT I UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS TO YOU, AND I WILL SEE IF SOMETHING MORE CAN'T BE DONE FROM OUR SIDE.)

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(IF HE ASKS WHY WE STILL CLASSIFY MOST SOVIET EMIGRANTS AS "REFUGEES"

-- FRANKLY, I THINK YOU AND I BOTH UNDERSTAND THAT MOST SOVIET JEWS AND MANY OTHER SOVIET MINORITIES STILL SUFFER FROM A "WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF PERSECUTION" -- THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (UNCHR) STANDARD.)

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

-- WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP SINCE MALTA, FOLLOWING UP ON OUR INITIATIVES THERE.

-- THIS AGENDA IS AN INDICATION OF THE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO THE SUCCESS OF PERESTROYKA.

- OUR INITIATIVES AND PERESTROYKA ARE MUTUALLY REINFORCING. OUR INITIATIVES HELP PERESTROYKA SUCCEED; AND ITS SUCCESS MAKES THESE INITIATIVES AND VARIOUS COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS MORE ATTRACTIVE TO U.S. BUSINESS, FOSTERING GREATER ECONOMIC INTERACTION.

-- WE HOPE TO CONTINUE TO EXPAND AND DEEPEN THIS INTERACTION, AS PERMITTED BY THE BROADER POLITICAL CONTEXT.

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS

-- WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO CONCLUDING A COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT AND I AM PLEASED WITH THE TEXT OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE PUT TOGETHER; BUT EVENTS IN THE BALTICS AND THE FAILURE TO PASS AN EMIGRATION BILL WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS POINT TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT.

-- SO LONG AS YOU MAINTAIN YOUR ECONOMIC BLOCKADE IN LITHUANIA AND FAIL TO ENGAGE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD AS RAPIDLY AS WE ENVISAGED AT MALTA TOWARD NORMAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

-- I AM ALSO UNABLE TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL ASSENT TO REMOVING THE RESTRICTIONS ON USG CREDITS AND CREDIT GUARANTEES TO THE USSR. TO DO THAT, I MUST FIRST WAIVE JACKSON-VANIK, WHICH REQUIRES YOUR PASSAGE OF AN EMIGRATION

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BILL.

-- OUR COUNTRIES DO HAVE A FULL PLATE OF AGREEMENTS TO SIGN AT THIS SUMMIT.
  - THESE INCLUDE THE LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT AND ACCORDS ON MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, CUSTOMS COOPERATION AND AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT.

-- SIGNATURE OF THESE AGREEMENTS AT THE SUMMIT WILL LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP HAS DEEPENED.

-- NEGOTIATIONS ARE ALSO UNDERWAY ON A TAX TREATY, WHICH SHOULD BE COMPLETED LATER THIS YEAR, AND A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, WHICH BEGAN PURSUANT TO OUR INSTRUCTIONS.

-- THESE AGREEMENTS SHOULD ALSO HELP CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR EXPANDED U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE USSR.

-- HOWEVER, I WANT TO REITERATE THAT OUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP AND CONTINUED REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE AN ENORMOUS IMPACT ON OUR ABILITY TO EXPAND THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

-- I AM ALSO PLEASED WITH THE PROJECTS UNDERWAY ON OUR TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGENDA.
-- WE HOPE TO DEEPEN THIS COOPERATION OVER THE COMING YEAR. IT EXPRESSES OUR SUPPORT FOR PERESTROYKA.
-- WE HAVE DISCUSSED IDEAS FOR EXPANDING TECHNICAL COOPERATION, ESTABLISHING TRAINING PROJECTS AND EXPERT CONSULTATIONS, AND A HIGH-LEVEL ECONOMIC DIALOGUE.
-- WE WOULD BE READY TO MOVE FORWARD AND DEVELOP THESE IDEAS IF YOU ARE INTERESTED.

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

SOVIET INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY

-- I AM DELIGHTED BY THE STEPS THAT YOU AND WE HAVE TAKEN TO FACILITATE SOVIET INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY.
  - SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT OF GATT OBSERVERSHIP, WHICH WE SUPPORTED, IS ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS.
  - SO TOO IS THE GROWING SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THE OECD, SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE EBRD, AND SIGNATURE OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE BONN CSCE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE.

-- WE HOPE YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THESE ORGANIZATIONS WILL FURTHER ACQUAINT YOU WITH MARKET PRINCIPLES.

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

CONTINGENCY POINTS
(IF GORBACHEV COMPLAINS ABOUT U.S. OPPOSITION TO FULL SOVIET BORROWING RIGHTS IN THE EBRD.)

-- FOR THE FIRST THREE YEARS, OF COURSE, YOUR BORROWING WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE LEVEL OF YOUR PAID-IN CAPITAL. WE COULD REVIEW THE SITUATION THEREAFTER IN ACCORDANCE WITH BANK RULES, AND AS YOUR REFORMS PROGRESS.
-- FRANKLY, IT CONCERNED US THAT AN ECONOMY OF YOUR SIZE MIGHT HAVE ABSORBED MOST OF THE BANK'S RESOURCES AT THE EXPENSE OF EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE MADE A COMMITMENT TO MARKET REFORM.
-- FURTHER, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HARD TO DEFEND ANYTHING MORE, AS LONG AS THE USSR CONTINUES TO SPEND BILLIONS ABROAD TO SUPPORT COUNTRIES LIKE CUBA, AFGHANISTAN AND NORTH KOREA THAT

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ARE ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES THREATENING TO WESTERN INTERESTS.

-- STILL YOU ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE EBRD AND WE WOULD HOPE AS YOUR REFORMS PROCEED TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT GREATER PARTICIPATION.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV SEEKS FOOD AID OR CREDITS.)

-- AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF LEGISLATIVE BARRIERS THAT PREVENT US FROM OFFERING OR GUARANTEEING CREDITS TO THE USSR. I HAVE PLEDGED TO WORK WITH CONGRESS TO BEGIN TO REMOVE THESE BARRIERS AS SOON AS WE ARE ABLE TO WAIVE JACKSON-VANIK.

-- THE LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO PROVIDE MORE FOOD EXPORTS TO THE USSR.

-- IN ORDER FOR THE USSR TO QUALIFY FOR OUR AGRICULTURAL EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAMS, A JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER WOULD BE REQUIRED.

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV COMPLAINS THAT WE ARE SEEKING TOO HIGH A SETTLEMENT IN OUR FINANCIAL CLAIMS NEGOTIATIONS OF DEFAULTS ON PRE-1933 OBLIGATIONS TO THE USG AND TO U.S. CITIZENS.

NOTE: THE SETTLEMENT IS NEEDED TO REMOVE THE USSR FROM JOHNSON ACT RESTRICTIONS, WHICH MAKE IT A CRIME FOR PERSONS OR ENTITIES IN U.S. TO MAKE LOANS NOT TIED TO EXPORTS, OR TO BUY OR SELL SOVIET DEBT INSTRUMENTS AS LONG AS USSR IS IN DEFAULT ON OFFICIAL OBLIGATIONS TO USG; IN THE TALKS THE SOVIETS ARE OFFERING $100 MILLION TO SETTLE, AND ARE READY TO OFFER $200 MILLION; WE ARE PROPOSING $972 MILLION, BUT CAN SETTLE FOR LESS.)

-- WE HAVE MADE THE ASSURANCES YOU REQUESTED REGARDING THE JOHNSON ACT; THE BENEFITS YOU WILL GAIN WHEN THIS MATTER IS SETTLED ARE SIGNIFICANT: ACCESS TO OUR CREDIT MARKETS.

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

-- I HOPE OUR NEGOTIATORS CAN RESOLVE THE CLAIMS ISSUE SOON.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF 5

ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION

-- I HAVE FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED MY SUPPORT FOR PERESTROYKA AND FOR THE IMMENSE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES YOU ARE UNDERTAKING.
-- I BELIEVE THAT MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND A MARKET SYSTEM IS THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE A BETTER LIFE FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE.
-- I RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THE ROAD TO MARKETS IS NOT AN EASY ONE AND I WOULD NOT PRESUME TO GIVE YOU ADVICE ON HOW TO TRAVEL THIS PATH.
-- BUT I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER A FEW COMMENTS ON HOW I SEE THE REFORM PROCESS DEVELOPING AND THE ROLE THE U.S. COULD PLAY.
-- THE LONGER YOU REMAIN POISED BETWEEN TWO SYSTEMS, THE GREATER YOUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WILL BECOME.

~~SECRET~~

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-- I KNOW THAT YOUR ADVISERS AND MINE -- INCLUDING JIM BAKER, NICK BRADY AND MIKE BOSKIN -- HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONS ABOUT YOUR ECONOMIC REFORM PROCESS.
-- I HOPE THAT THOSE DISCUSSIONS ARE HELPFUL AND CAN CONTINUE.
-- MY STRONG SUPPORT FOR YOUR ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM WAS EVIDENT IN THE INITIATIVES I ADVANCED AT MALTA.
-- AS THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP IMPROVES, WE CAN CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR EXPANDED U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE USSR.
-- REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, TRADE AND INVESTMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES -- AND THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS -- WILL REMAIN MARGINAL UNTIL <u>YOU</u> TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO OPEN THE SOVIET ECONOMY TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

-- PERHAPS YOU COULD EXPLAIN HOW YOU EXPECT YOUR LATEST REFORM PACKAGE WILL ACHIEVE YOUR OBJECTIVES.
  - WILL IT RECEIVE PUBLIC SUPPORT?
  - HOW DO YOU INTEND TO OVERCOME THE OPPOSITION OF ENTRENCHED MINISTRIES?
  - IS THERE WORKER OPPOSITION?

-- THE FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF SOME OF OUR EXPERTS IS THAT THIS PACKAGE WILL FALL SHORT OF WHAT IS NECESSARY. THEY ARE CONCERNED IT WILL COST YOU PUBLIC SUPPORT WITHOUT PRODUCING THE BENEFITS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN THE REFORM EFFORT.
  - IF YOU THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, WE COULD INTENSIFY OUR EXPERT DISCUSSIONS, FOCUSING ON YOUR LATEST PROPOSALS.

-- WHILE I RECOGNIZE OUR ECONOMIES ARE VERY

DIFFERENT, LET ME HIGHLIGHT A FEW PROBLEMS THAT HAVE STRUCK US.

- FIRST, THE VALUE OF THE RUBLE NEEDS TO BE RESTORED. OTHERWISE, PEOPLE WON'T WANT TO RECEIVE OR HOLD THEM.
- SECOND, YOU NEED TO ENCOURAGE MORE COMPETITION. MONOPOLIES -- WHETHER GOVERNMENTAL OR PRIVATE -- WON'T ACCOMPLISH WHAT'S NECESSARY. A STRONG COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT COULD HELP WITH THIS.
- THIRD, I HOPE YOU CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INCENTIVES. UNCERTAINTY CAN IMPOSE A HEAVY BURDEN ON ECONOMIES. PEOPLE NEED TO KNOW THEY CAN KEEP THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR.
- FOURTH, WE SUGGEST THAT YOUR SAFETY NET PROTECTIONS FIT WITH MARKET PRINCIPLES --

FOR EXAMPLE, BY STEERING INCOME PAYMENTS TO THE MOST NEEDY AS OPPOSED TO PRICE CONTROLS.

- FINALLY, IT'S IMPORTANT THAT THESE REFORMS BE INTEGRATED WITH ONE ANOTHER AND SEQUENCED PROPERLY. IT'S THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY TO MOVE TOWARD A MARKET SYSTEM. HALFWAY STEPS JUST WON'T WORK.
- OUR EXPERTS CAN DISCUSS THESE IDEAS, TOO, IF YOU THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL.

~~SECRET~~

CONDUCT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE

-- WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT A LOT OF SENSITIVE AND DIFFICULT ISSUES DURING THIS SUMMIT AND MADE GOOD PROGRESS ON MANY OF THEM. THE PRESS WILL HAVE QUESTIONS ON ALL OF OUR WORK AND I WANT OUR PRESS CONFERENCE TO BE A REAL SUCCESS.

-- I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST TO YOU THAT WE SPEND A FEW MOMENTS TALKING ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THE PRESS ON SEVERAL OF THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUES: GERMANY, LITHUANIA, THE TRADE AGREEMENT.

-- HERE IS THE STATEMENT THAT I PLAN TO USE AT THE OPENING OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE.

-- I WOULD LIKE YOU TO TAKE A LOOK AT IT BECAUSE I DO NOT WANT TO SURPRISE YOU.

-- I PARTICULARLY WANT YOU TO LOOK AT THE LANGUAGE ON GERMANY TO SEE IF IT REFLECTS YOUR VIEW.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

DIRECT PHONE LINK

-- I BELIEVE THAT MUCH MORE FREQUENT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN US IS VERY IMPORTANT.
-- I HOPE YOU WILL CALL ME WHEN YOU WANT TO GET A DIRECT FEEL FOR HOW I AM THINKING ABOUT AN ISSUE.
-- WE WILL HAVE A DIRECT PHONE LINK BY THE FALL. BUT IT WILL NOT BE A SECURE LINE.
-- MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT IN ABOUT A YEAR, WE WILL HAVE A DIRECT AND SECURE LINE.
-- THIS WILL BE A VERY GOOD THING.
-- GENERAL SCOWCROFT CAN ALWAYS PASS A MESSAGE TO ME THAT YOU WANT TO TALK WITH ME. PERHAPS YOU COULD DESIGNATE AN AIDE IN MOSCOW WITH WHOM WE COULD CONTACT WHEN I WANT TO CALL YOU.
-- BUT WE NEED TO TALK MORE OFTEN. PLEASE CALL IF SOMETHING IN OUR POSITION ON AN ISSUE IS BOTHERING YOU.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

CORRESPONDENCE

-- I ALSO HOPE THAT WE CAN IMPROVE THE NATURE OF OUR WRITTEN COMMUNICATION.
-- TO BE HONEST, I'M AFRAID THAT WE ARE STILL EXCHANGING LETTERS IN THE STYLE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO AND FROM BREZHNEV AND NIXON.
-- THE QUALITY OF OUR CORRESPONDENCE SHOULD REFLECT THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP.
-- THE LAST LETTER THAT I WROTE TO YOU WAS ONE THAT I PREPARED PERSONALLY.
-- I CAN'T PROMISE TO ALWAYS DO THAT BUT I WILL TRY TO DO SO WHEN POSSIBLE.
-- PERHAPS YOU COULD TRY TO DO THE SAME BECAUSE I THINK WE ARE AT THE STAGE WHEN WE WANT TO GET BEYOND RESPONSES THAT ARE STILTED AND BUREAUCRATIC.

~~SECRET~~

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CONDITIONS FOR YOUR AGREEMENT TO SIGN THE TRADE AGREEMENT

-- I JUST WANT TO GO OVER OUR UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE TIMING OF MY SUBMISSIONS OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT TO CONGRESS.
-- AT MALTA, WE AGREED TO TAKE STEPS TO NORMALIZE U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
-- THE TRADE AGREEMENT IS THE FIRST STEP.
-- THE NEXT TWO STEPS MUST BE TAKEN BY YOU AFTER WHICH I WILL SUBMIT THE TRADE AGREEMENT TO CONGRESS AND SEEK WAIVER OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT LEADING TO MFN.
-- YOU WILL MOVE PROMPTLY TO PASS EMIGRATION LEGISLATION.
-- THE SOVIET UNION WILL LIFT ALL SANCTIONS AND BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH LITHUANIA SHORTLY AFTER PASSAGE OF THE EMIGRATION LEGISLATION.

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~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE CARD OF 3

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

-- WE'RE FINALLY MAKING REAL PROGRESS ON PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILES.
-- AT THIS TIME, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO LET THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON GENIE OUT OF THE BOTTLE. IT WILL BECOME A TIME BOMB THAT COULD ENDANGER ALL OF HUMANITY.
-- I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DOING ABSOLUTELY NOTHING IN THIS AREA. AND WE WILL DO NOTHING. THAT IS A PROMISE.
-- WE HAVE, HOWEVER, CLEAR-CUT, AUTHORITATIVE EVIDENCE THAT YOU HAVE A LARGE, COVERT BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

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- WE KNOW QUITE A BIT ABOUT THIS PROGRAM.
- WE KNOW YOU HAVE BEEN PRODUCING AND FIELD TESTING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR OVER A DECADE.
- JIM BAKER HAS PROVIDED DETAILS TO MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE.

-- I NEED TO KNOW THAT THIS PROGRAM WILL BE ENDED AND DISMANTLED.

- YOUR PROGRAM IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

-- IF THIS CONTINUES, IT WILL BECOME A MAJOR CONSTRAINT ON OUR RELATIONS, NOT JUST ON ARMS CONTROL BUT ACROSS THE BOARD.

CONTINGENCY POINTS
(IF GORBACHEV PRESSES ON VERIFICATION OR PROPOSES RECIPROCAL VISITS TO LABORATORIES:

-- WE ARE INTERESTED IN YOUR SUGGESTION. BUT, AS YOU KNOW, THERE IS NO MEANS TO LEGALLY VERIFY WHETHER BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE BEING PRODUCED. YOU MUST SIMPLY STOP YOUR PROGRAM.)

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE:
GERMANY, NATO, CFE, AND CSCE

-- **GERMANY**: I'M PLEASED THAT WE'VE BEEN ABLE TO HAVE AN OPEN DIALOGUE ON GERMANY, DESPITE OUR DIFFERENCES. WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION HERE AND IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.

-- I UNDERSTAND YOUR STRONG INTEREST IN INSURING THAT YOUR COUNTRY'S SECURITY IS NOT THREATENED BY THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT ARE OCCURRING IN EUROPE. WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN THAT.
- WE THINK WE'VE BEEN SENSITIVE TO YOUR GENUINE SECURITY CONCERNS, BUT WE ALSO EXPECT YOU TO BE SENSITIVE TO OURS.

-- JIM BAKER LAID OUT THE NINE POINTS REGARDING WHAT WE ARE ALREADY PREPARED TO DO TO ADDRESS YOUR SECURITY CONCERNS.
- 1) FOLLOW-ON CFE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COULD COVER A RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE

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QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN A CENTRAL REGION.

- 2) ADVANCING THE TIMING OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS.
- 3) GERMAN REAFFIRMATION OF ITS NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL COMMITMENTS.
- 4) NON-EXTENSION OF NATO FORCES TO THE GDR.
- 5) I UNDERSTAND THAT HELMUT KOHL WOULD CONSIDER A TRANSITION PERIOD FOR SOVIET FORCES IN THE GDR.
- 6) THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A TRANSFORMED NATO AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN LONDON IN EARLY JULY.
- 7) FIRM RESOLUTION OF GERMANY'S BORDERS, COMPRISING ONLY THE FRG, GDR AND BERLIN.
- 8) CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING CSCE.
- 9) ENHANCED GERMAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC TIES.

-- OUR INTEREST IN WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU ON UNIFICATION IN TWO PLUS FOUR AND THESE

CONCRETE STEPS WE'RE PREPARED TO TAKE LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT WE WANT YOU INTEGRATED INTO THE PROCESS AND INTO THE NEW EUROPE.

-- BUT EVENTS IN EUROPE WILL NOT STAND STILL, AND YOU RISK LEAVING YOURSELF OUT WITH YOUR CURRENT POSITIONS ON THE POLITICAL-MILITARY ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION.

- OTHER EUROPEANS, EAST AND WEST, DO NOT SHARE YOUR CONVICTIONS THAT A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO IS A DANGER.
- QUITE THE REVERSE, THEY SEE MEMBERSHIP AS STABILIZING. INDEED, GERMANY'S NEIGHBORS ALL EMBRACE THIS REALITY.
- WHAT WILL IT MEAN FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN THE LONG-RUN TO BE SO OUT OF STEP WITH THE REST OF EUROPE? IS IT IN YOUR LONG-TERM INTEREST TO INSIST THAT GERMANY BE TREATED ANY DIFFERENTLY FROM OTHER NEIGHBORS? THAT WAS EUROPE'S MISTAKE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

WAR; WE SHOULDN'T REPEAT IT NOW.

- IF YOU TRY TO HOLD UP GERMAN UNIFICATION, USING CONDITIONS THAT WOULD SINGULARIZE A UNITED GERMANY, YOU ARE PREPARING THE WAY FOR FUTURE GERMAN GENERATIONS TO QUESTION AN UNEQUAL SETTLEMENT AND TO TRY TO OVERTURN IT. SINGULARIZING THEM WOULD GIVE THEM AN INCENTIVE TO DO SO, AND THAT'S IN NO ONE'S INTEREST.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

-- **NATO**: YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT NATO IS MORE THAN JUST A SYMBOL FOR US. IT IS AMERICA'S ANCHOR IN EUROPE. UNLIKE YOUR COUNTRY WHICH SITS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, WE SIT THERE BY VIRTUE OF OUR ALLIANCE TIES. WE'RE NOT PREPARED TO CUT THAT BOND TO EUROPE AND TO GERMANY, NOR ARE WE BEING ASKED TO BY ANYONE BUT YOURSELF.

-- NATO'S PROVEN TO BE A TREMENDOUS STABILIZING FORCE IN EUROPE. IT HAS NEVER BEEN SOLELY FOCUSED ON THE THREAT FROM THE EAST. IT ALWAYS HAS HAD A WESTERN DIMENSION. NATO HAS BEEN A FACTOR FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, FOR EXAMPLE, BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. IT HAS PROVIDED PREDICTABILITY AND STABILITY IN WESTERN MILITARY RELATIONS.

- BY COMBINING WITH OTHER WESTERN STATES, GERMANY IS CONFIDENT THAT IT NEEDS FAR FEWER MILITARY FORCES THAN IT MIGHT SEEK

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OTHERWISE. THIS SHOULD BE REASSURING TO YOU AS WELL.

- BY RELYING ON NATO, IT HAS ALSO AVOIDED ANY SEARCH FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ITS OWN, ANOTHER CONCERN OF YOURS.
- THESE REASONS SUGGEST THAT GERMAN INTEREST IN REMAINING IN NATO ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO SOVIET INTERESTS.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

-- **TWO PLUS FOUR**: I ALSO WANT TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS.

-- WE BELIEVE TWO PLUS FOUR'S PRIMARY TASK IS TO TAKE THOSE DECISIONS THAT NEED TO BE TAKEN IN ORDER TO RETURN FULL SOVEREIGNTY TO A UNITED AND DEMOCRATIC GERMANY. IT'S REAL COMPETENCE LIES IN MATTERS OF FOUR POWER RIGHTS OVER GERMANY AND BERLIN.

-- BUT WE ALSO SEE IT AS AN IMPORTANT STEERING GROUP; A STEERING MECHANISM WHERE MANY ISSUES CAN BE RAISED AND RE-DIRECTED TO THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR DECISION.

- EVERYTHING WILL NOT MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT BY CHANNELLING BUNDESWEHR LIMITS, ALONG WITH LIMITS ON OTHER FORCES, TO CFE II, NUCLEAR FORCE ISSUES TO SNF, BY STRENGTHENING CSCE, WE CAN HELP TO BUILD THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE WE BOTH SEEK.

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-- THIS IS A PRACTICAL WAY TO APPROACH TWO-PLUS-FOUR. POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES CAN BE RAISED, DISCUSSED, AND THEN CHANNELLED ELSEWHERE TO FORA THAT CAN ACTUALLY MAKE DECISIONS.

-- I THINK THERE'S A DANGER IF YOU WANT TO MAKE TWO PLUS FOUR AN ALL POWERFUL DECISION FORUM WHERE ALL EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION CAN BE DECIDED FINALLY AND FULLY. SUCH AN APPROACH WILL GUARANTEE SINGULARIZATION -- A PRESCRIPTION FOR INSTABILITY.
   - IT WILL ALSO ALIENATE ALL THE OTHER NATIONS OF EUROPE, WHICH FEEL THEY SHOULD HAVE THEIR SAY ON THESE TOPICS IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA.

-- THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS SHOULD FOCUS ON BRINGING TO AN END THE SPECIAL FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE. A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD

HAVE FULL CONTROL OVER ALL OF ITS TERRITORY WITHOUT ANY NEW DISCRIMINATORY CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY. WE BELIEVE FOUR POWER RIGHTS SHOULD END WHEN GERMANY IS UNIFIED.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

-- **CFE**: LET ME TURN NOW TO CFE. WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF YOUR UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE. THEY HAVE HELPED PAVE THE WAY TO ENDING THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION THERE.

-- THE END OF THAT CONFRONTATION, HOWEVER, MUST BE CODIFIED IN A CFE AGREEMENT.

- UNTIL CFE LOCKS-IN NEW FORCE LEVELS, OUR MILITARY PLANNERS CANNOT REALISTICALLY RESHAPE THEIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS OR MILITARY STRATEGY.
- THIS AFFECTS NOT ONLY OUR CONVENTIONAL STRATEGY BUT OUR NUCLEAR STRATEGY, TOO.
- YOU OUGHT ALSO TO TAKE NOTE THAT WE HAVE CALLED ON NATO AND THE WEU TO DEVELOP SOLID POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIALOGUES WITH YOU AND THE EASTERN EUROPEANS.
- NATO WILL REACH OUT AND BE MORE POLITICAL, BUT THIS WILL BE EASIER ONCE A MORE STABLE MILITARY SITUATION IS LOCKED-IN BY A CFE

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TREATY.

-- CFE IS REALLY THE GATEWAY TO DEVELOPING A NEW POLITICAL AND SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE. HOLD THAT UP, YOU HOLD UP THE VERY PROCESSES THAT YOU WANT TO SEE EVOLVE.
  - WE'VE MADE A CSCE SUMMIT CONDITIONAL UPON SIGNING OF A CFE TREATY. THAT'S BECAUSE WE WANT MILITARY CHANGES TO CATCH UP WITH THE NEW POLITICAL REALITIES IN EUROPE.
  - IF WE'RE TO TALK ABOUT THE FUTURE SECURITY STRUCTURE, WE'VE GOT TO ALTER, AS YOU PUT IT, THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE FIRST.

-- WITH CFE IN PLACE, WE WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE GREAT STRIDES IN STRENGTHENING CSCE.

-- I HOPE YOU'LL GIVE YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION TO SEEING THAT CFE GETS BACK ON TRACK.
  - JIM BAKER BROUGHT A PACKAGE OF IDEAS TO MOSCOW THAT WENT A LONG WAY TOWARD MEETING

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

YOUR CONCERNS; THE RESPONSES YOUR SIDE GAVE HERE EARLIER THIS WEEK WERE ENCOURAGING, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE STILL SOME POINTS OF DIFFERENCE.

- WE'RE READY TO PUSH AHEAD ON CFE; I THINK WE SHOULD SEND OUR AMBASSADORS BACK TO VIENNA TO WORK THESE NEW IDEAS AND FIND SOLUTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO EVERYONE. LET'S REINVIGORATE THESE TALKS.

-- **CSCE**: CSCE SHOULD BECOME THE "CONSCIENCE OF THE CONTINENT." IT CAN BEST SERVE AS A FORUM WHERE EVERYONE CAN VOICE THEIR CONCERNS.
  - IT HAS THE STRENGTH OF INCLUDING THE 35.
  - BUT IT HAS THE WEAKNESS OF BEING UNWIELDY.
  - IT CANNOT SERVE AS A COLLECTIVE SECURITY ORGANIZATION; THAT WOULD BE REPEATING THE PROBLEMS WITH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

-- WE WANT TO INSTITUTIONALIZE IT AS A PROCESS FOR FOSTERING EUROPEAN RECONCILIATION. BUT THIS WON'T HAPPEN OVERNIGHT. WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL, HOWEVER, HAVE MUCH MORE TO SAY ABOUT THIS AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN LONDON IN EARLY JULY.
  - WE'VE MADE SOME PROPOSALS TO BROADEN ITS POLITICAL BASKET TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION.
  - WE'RE ALSO LOOKING INTO HOW IT MIGHT SUPPORT SOME SORT OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION OR

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CONFLICT PREVENTION MECHANISM, WHICH I UNDERSTAND IS OF INTEREST TO YOU.

- BUT ABOVE ALL, WE NEED TO TAKE STEPS TO STRENGTHEN CSCE'S ABILITY TO OPERATE. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS MUST BE TO REGULARIZE MEETINGS.

-- WE SEE NATO AND THE CSCE, ALONG WITH THE EC, AS THE CORNERSTONES OF A NEW, INCLUSIVE EUROPE.

- THEY CAN COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER, REINFORCING A LEGITIMATE AND STABLE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM.

-- IN THE NEW EUROPE, BOTH THE US AND THE USSR WILL HAVE THEIR RIGHTFUL PLACE. BUT OUR PLACE WILL DEPEND UPON HOW WE WORK TOWARD THE COMMON INTEREST.

- THAT'S WHY I'VE GONE OUT OF MY WAY TO STRESS THE NEED NOT TO OBSTRUCT GERMAN UNIFICATION OR A CFE TREATY.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

CONTINGENCY POINTS
(IF GORBACHEV SAYS THE US WANTS GERMANY IN NATO BECAUSE WE DON'T TRUST THE GERMANS:

-- WE WANT GERMANY IN NATO -- AND THE GERMANS WANT TO BE THERE -- BECAUSE THE ALLIANCE IS PREDICATED ON TRUST. IT IS TRUST BUILT OVER YEARS OF SHARED VALUES AND COMMON INTERESTS.

-- WHY SHOULD WEST GERMANS, AFTER 40 YEARS OF DEMOCRACY AND RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP, BE FORCED TO LEAVE AN ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES THAT HAS AIDED ITS RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT? WE WOULD BE PUNISHING GERMANY FOR UNIFYING.

-- WE ALSO SAY WE SHOULD LET THE GERMANS MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS ON ALLIANCES, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT SAYS THEY SHOULD.)

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2009-0948-MR
9/22/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV SAYS WE'RE NOT COPING ADEQUATELY WITH GERMANY'S FUTURE ALLIANCE ALIGNMENT:

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST GUARANTEE FOR FUTURE GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE (WHICH YOU QUESTION) IS THE FACT THAT THE ALLIANCE RESTS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RIGHTS, ALLOWING STATES TO OPENLY EXPRESS DIFFERENCES AND PREVENTING THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY BEING FORCED ON THE MINORITY.

- THE CONSENSUS PRINCIPLE INSURES THAT ALL WILL BE HEARD, AND ALL WILL WANT TO BE HEARD BY PARTICIPATING.)

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0049-MR
1/31/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

((IF GORBACHEV RAISES THE FRENCH MODEL FOR GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO))

-- THE NATURE OF GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN AN ALLIANCE SHOULD BE A MATTER, OF COURSE, FOR THE GERMAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE.

-- HOWEVER, WE DO NOT THINK THE FRENCH MODEL IS A GOOD ONE FOR GERMANY. WE AGREE WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL THAT IT IS WISE FOR A UNITED GERMANY, AND THE ARMED FORCES OF A UNITED GERMANY, TO BE INTEGRATED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE INTO WESTERN STRUCTURES.

-- ONE REASON FRANCE CHOSE A DIFFERENT APPROACH WAS TO PRESERVE THE INDEPENDENCE OF ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENT. BY CHOOSING A DIFFERENT PATH THE GERMANS HAVE NO NEED TO HAVE THESE WEAPONS.

-- INDEED, IF NEITHER GERMANY NOR FRANCE HAS ITS FORCES WITHIN NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE, THAT STRUCTURE WOULD PROBABLY

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1/31/2011 MM

COLLAPSE, AND THEN THERE WOULD BE NO PLAUSIBLE RATIONALE FOR THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE.

-- SO YOU WILL UNDERSTAND WHY I COULD NOT SUPPORT A "FRENCH SOLUTION" FOR A UNITED GERMANY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO.

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV SAYS THE TWO PLUS FOUR SHOULD DECIDE BUNDESWEHR LIMITS:

-- SEEKING BUNDESWEHR LIMITS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR IS A NON-STARTER FOR US AND THE GERMANS BECAUSE IT SINGLES OUT GERMANY FOR SPECIAL LIMITS THAT NO OTHER STATE IS BEING ASKED TO ASSUME.

-- THE FORMULA FOR BUNDESWEHR LIMITS HAS TO INCLUDE PARALLEL, RECIPROCAL LIMITS ON THE MILITARY FORCES OF OTHER PARTIES.

- WE THINK PARALLEL, RECIPROCAL LIMITS ARE BEST REACHED IN CFE FOLLOW-ON TALKS, SO LET'S WORK ON THAT. WE'RE PREPARED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO GET THERE.)

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1/31/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV PUSHES A LIMIT ON THE BUNDESWEHR:

-- WE BELIEVED OTTAWA CLOSED OUT THE MANPOWER QUESTION.
-- WE WILL NOT SINGULARIZE GERMANY.
-- IF YOU WANT TO REOPEN OTTAWA, BY GOING BACK TO YOUR ORIGINAL COUNTERPROPOSAL, WE CAN LOOK AT THAT -- PROVIDED WE WOULD THEN BE CLOSING ON CFE.)

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1/31/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV SAYS NATO IS A THREAT TO THE USSR;

-- DESCRIBING NATO AS A THREAT TO SOVIET SECURITY IGNORES THE DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE. TRUE, WE WANT TO RETAIN THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE AS A "DETERRENT" TO HOSTILE INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES; BUT THIS IS NOT A THREAT TO SOVIET TERRITORY.

-- MOREOVER, NATO'S POSTURE IN CONVENTIONAL -- IN MILITARY TERMS -- WILL BE VERY DIFFERENT. I AM CERTAIN YOU WILL BE ABLE TO POINT TO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN NATO TO EXPLAIN THE NEW CONTEXT TO YOUR PEOPLE. YOUR POLICIES CAN BE CREDITED WITH PRODUCING THE CHANGE.

-- CODIFYING THEM IN CFE WILL ALLOW EVEN GREATER CHANGES IN OUR FORCE POSTURE AND MILITARY STRATEGY.)

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV ASKS TO JOIN NATO:

-- NATO IS FAR MORE THAN A SECURITY ALLIANCE. DEMOCRATIC VALUES ARE THE TIES THAT BIND THE ALLIES TOGETHER.
  - LOOK BACK AT THE ATLANTIC CHARTER: "THEY ARE DETERMINED TO SAFEGUARD THE FREEDOM, COMMON HERITAGE AND CIVILIZATION OF THEIR PEOPLES, FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW."
  - THAT'S WHY GERMANY -- THE FORMER ENEMY OF SO MANY OF THE ALLIES -- CAN BE A MEMBER. THE GERMAN PEOPLE HAVE PROVEN THEIR COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES.
-- NEW STATES HAVE JOINED THE ALLIANCE -- SPAIN FOR EXAMPLE.
-- BUT IT IS CRITICAL THAT ANY NEW MEMBER HAS PROVEN ITS COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY.
-- YOU'VE MADE GREAT STRIDES, AND IN THE LONG

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RUN, ALL SORTS OF THINGS ARE POSSIBLE.

-- BUT YOUR UNWAVERING COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES HAS TO BE PROVEN BEFORE ANYONE WOULD WANT TO ADMIT YOU TO NATO.

- YOUR FORCE STRUCTURE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE RADICALLY RESHAPED SO THAT YOU DID NOT POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

-- SO, RIGHT NOW, IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE TO TALK ABOUT NATO MEMBERSHIP.)

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV PRESSES ON CSCE:

-- WE SEE THE CSCE SERVING AS AN ALL-INCLUSIVE EUROPEAN FORUM.

-- BUT CSCE CANNOT INSURE THE PEACE.

-- WE SEE A POLITICALLY-ENHANCED NATO AND A STRENGTHENED CSCE AS COMPLEMENTS TO ONE ANOTHER.

-- I'D BE INTERESTED IN HEARING YOUR IDEAS ON HOW CSCE MIGHT BE STRENGTHENED.

- I'D ALSO LIKE TO KNOW HOW YOU BELIEVE NATO MIGHT BE INCONSISTENT WITH CSCE. WE DON'T SEE ANY REASON WHY THE TWO CANNOT COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER.)

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~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV ARGUES THAT THE USSR IS BEING EXCLUDED:

-- NO ONE IS TRYING TO EXCLUDE YOU FROM EUROPE.
-- IN FACT, WE'RE ALL TRYING TO STRENGTHEN CSCE TO GUARANTEE YOU A VOICE IN EUROPE'S FUTURE.
-- BUT YOUR ROLE IN EUROPE WILL DEPEND ULTIMATELY ON WHAT YOU DO INTERNALLY.
-- LOOK AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LAST YEAR, IT WAS AN OUTCAST; NOW, IT'S SEEN AS THE CENTER OF EUROPE.
-- THE MORE YOUR REFORMS PROGRESS, THE MORE YOU'LL FEEL AND CLEARLY BE PART OF EUROPE.
-- ALSO, YOUR OWN POSITIONS ON ISSUES WILL PRODUCE AN EXCLUSION IF YOU PERSIST. YOU ARE THE ONLY NATION -- EAST, WEST, OR NEUTRAL -- THAT DOESN'T WANT GERMANY IN NATO.)

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2011-0049-MR
1/31/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ CARD OF

(IF GORBACHEV PUSHES THE POINT THAT EVERYTHING'S FINE IN THE SHORT-RUN, BUT THERE ARE NO GUARANTEES AGAINST LONG-TERM INSTABILITY:

-- AS A PHILOSOPHICAL POINT, YOU'RE RIGHT: THERE IS NO IRON-CLAD GUARANTEE TO A LEGITIMATE AND STABLE EUROPE OVER THE LONG-RUN.

-- BUT FROM A PRACTICAL POINT, WE CAN DO ONE THING: WE CAN SO SHAPE THE SHORT-RUN THAT THE LONG-RUN TAKES CARE OF ITSELF.)

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2011-0049-MR
1/31/2014 MA

When President Gorbachev and I were at Malta, we agreed that we would try to build a fundamentally different U.S.-Soviet relationship -- one that would move beyond containment to an era of enduring cooperation. At the time, we did not know the momentous events that would unfold in Europe -- in Central America -- in South Africa. Our task is -- if anything -- more urgent and the case for a new U.S.-Soviet relationship more compelling -- because the opportunities before us are so great.

During this summit, President Gorbachev and I have not shied away from discussing issues about which we disagree. There were some tough ones before us -- particularly the aspirations of the Baltic peoples to determine their own future -- a cause which the United States fully supports. I think it is a mark of how far the U.S.-Soviet relationship has come that in all of our exchanges -- whether about issues on which we agreed or those about which we did not -- the spirit of candor and openness -- as well as a desire not only to understand but to build bridges -- shone through.

President Gorbachev and I had intensive discussions on the transforming events in Europe -- events that have put before us our best chance in four decades to see Europe whole and free. We both agree that the long held aspirations of the German people to be one nation again should be met without delay. On the matter of Germany's external alliances -- I believe -- as does Chancellor Kohl and the members of the Alliance -- that the

united Germany should be a full member of NATO. President Gorbachev does not hold that view. But we are in full agreement -- that the matter of alliance membership is -- in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act -- a matter for the Germans to decide.

Over the last six months and in Washington this week, we made great progress on the arms control agenda that we laid out at Malta. I am especially pleased that we were able to sign an accord pointing toward the eventual elimination globally of the scourge of chemical weapons.

I believe that we were able to give an important political push to the START negotiations in the joint statement of agreement on major outstanding issues -- and to CFE -- by making known our mutual commitment to signing a CFE treaty this year. The CFE treaty -- which will transform the military balance and reduce the risk of war in Europe -- is even more urgent in today's circumstances. With the treaty completed we will be able to have a CSCE Summit.

I am hopeful that the good discussion President Gorbachev and I had about "Open Skies" will revive the negotiations. We agreed that an "Open Skies" regime should demonstrate our genuine commitment to openness. I want to see us complete the work on this important treaty by the end of this year.

While affirming our commitment to finish the unfinished business before us -- we took decisions to tackle new problems. President Gorbachev and I have agreed to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces specifically devoted to achieving a more stable strategic balance after the current treaty is completed. Reductions alone will not suffice and so we will try to reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles -- including on heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs.

President Gorbachev and I had a full exchange on the range of regional issues and noted that in many circumstances -- free elections are an important element in finding a political solution to the conflicts that plague so many peoples. We reaffirmed our commitment in Afghanistan to the establishment of a non-aligned and sovereign Afghanistan -- at peace with its neighbors. President Gorbachev and I have agreed to devote special attention to the plight of the Ethiopian people.

Finally, we made progress in the economic sphere -- which is improving in accordance with our maturing political relationship. At Malta, we agreed to work toward the normalization of economic relations. We took the first step by signing a commercial agreement. Now we look forward to the next step -- passage of a Soviet emigration law -- a prerequisite for a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendement.

I am also pleased that we were able to sign the Long-Term Grains Agreement -- which will enable American farmers to supply the Soviet people with at least 10 million metric tons of grain per year.

In closing let me say how productive I think the last few days have been. We are now at a stage -- in the U.S.-Soviet relationship and in world history -- where we must redouble our efforts to complete the extraordinary tasks before us. Toward that end -- President Gorbachev and I have agreed to hold annual summit meetings.

Q's and A's on Summit

TRADE AGREEMENT AND OTHER ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS

Q: Is the Trade Agreement in force now that you have signed it with President Gorbachev?

A: No. The Trade Agreement will not enter into force until 1) I decide to send it to Congress and 2) I waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

Q: Then, why did you decide to sign the agreement without waiving Jackson-Vanik?

A: I made clear to the Soviets over a year ago, and I reaffirmed to President Gorbachev at Malta, that I would not waive Jackson-Vanik until the Supreme Soviet had passed emigration legislation consistent with international standards. Since the emigration bill has not yet passed, I have not waived Jackson-Vanik, which is a fundamental step before granting Most Favored Nations Status (MFN).

Q: Did Gorbachev provide any assurances that he would pass an emigration bill quickly in return for your signing the bill?

A: The timing of the passage of the emigration bill is up to the Soviets to decide. At that point, we can proceed with the Trade Agreement.

Q: Aren't the Soviets really after Most Favored Nation Status in signing the agreement?

A: MFN would be beneficial to the Soviets but it cannot be granted without both Congressional approval of the Trade Agreement and a Jackson-Vanik waiver.

Q: Hadn't you linked Soviet policy in Lithuania to signing the Trade Agreement? Did the Soviets give you any assurances on Lithuania that led you to sign the Trade Agreement?

A: We have never formally linked the Trade Agreement with Soviet policy in Lithuania. But President Gorbachev is fully aware of my position that the U.S. does not recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR. We continue to urge the Soviet Union to establish a peaceful and productive dialogue with the Lithuanians and the other Baltic peoples in order to provide for their self-determination.

Q: Isn't signing the agreement then a political victory for Gorbachev with little to show for the U.S.?

A: I signed the Trade Agreement because it is in the best interest of the United States. First, it provides many advantages and opportunities for American businesses. It is also a forward-looking agreement, designed to contribute to economic reform in the USSR. But, equally important, I believe that signing it will encourage the Soviets to finally pass an emigration bill. This would represent one

more step toward the rule of law in the USSR. And, it would provide the protection of a law for the continuance of the very favorable emigration policies of the USSR during the past few years. Last year, almost one hundred times as many people were allowed to leave the USSR than in 1985, the year Gorbachev came to power. That is the kind of progress the authors of Jackson-Vanik had in mind when they wrote the amendment.

Q: Did the Soviets link signature of the Trade Agreement with their signature of the Long-Term Grains Agreement?

A: There was no formal linkage. Both agreements are mutually beneficial. We hope they will lead to an improvement in our bilateral economic relationship.

Q: You signed several economic agreements with the Soviets. Do these agreements encompass the Baltics and thereby symbolize U.S. acceptance of Soviet sovereignty there?

A: Nothing in these agreements, as in our prior agreements with the Soviets since 1940, alters our firm policy of not recognizing the forcible incorporation of the three Baltic states into the USSR. Our signing the agreements does not in any way imply support for current or past Soviet policy there.

Q: Is it true that the Maritime Transport Agreement, and the Civil Aviation Agreement make specific mention of Baltic

cities and ports? How can you justify this when the Baltic Foreign Ministers announced that Gorbachev could not undertake obligations on their behalf at the Summit?

A: It is true that those two agreements specifically refer to cities and ports in the Baltics. But the United States wants to expand its contacts with the Baltic peoples, and expanded air routes and increased possibility for maritime trade are an important step toward their goal. We have always believed that our policy of not recognizing the Soviet incorporation of the Baltics should not mean that we end up discriminating against Baltic citizens.

GERMANY IN NATO

Q: Was there any breakthrough on the issue of a united Germany in NATO?

A: I would not call it a breakthrough, but we achieved a much better understanding of each other's positions. As I said in my statement:

I agree with Chancellor Kohl that a united Germany should be a full member of NATO, including its military structures.

President Gorbachev continues to oppose the integration of a united Germany into NATO.

But both President Gorbachev and I agree that Germany has the right to decide for itself which, if any, alliance it should join. We both agree that right is guaranteed by the Helsinki Final Act, which both of our countries signed in 1975.

Q: What will happen if Germany is unified and the NATO issue is still not settled, the Two Plus Four have not reached agreement?

A: When Germany is unified we expect, as Chancellor Kohl has said, that the Federal Republic of Germany will keep all of its existing treaty obligations, including its adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The purpose of the Two Plus Four talks, in our view, is to restore full sovereignty to a free, democratic, united Germany over all of its territory. The old Four Power rights and responsibilities should come to an end when Germany is unified.

Q: What is wrong with the idea of a compromise, such as Germany following the French example and staying out of NATO's military structure?

A: The nature of German membership in an Alliance should be a matter, of course, for the German people to decide.

However, we do not think the French model is a good one for

Germany. We agree with Chancellor Kohl that it is wise for a united Germany, and the armed forces of a united Germany, to be integrated as much as possible into Western structures.

Indeed, if neither Germany nor France has its forces within NATO's integrated military structure, that structure would probably collapse, and then there would be no plausible rationale for the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe.

So you can see why I cannot support a "French solution" for a united Germany's relationship with NATO.

Q: Why couldn't Germany be a member of <u>both</u> NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

A: We think that if you're a member of both alliances, you're not really a member of either of them.

Q: Doesn't US insistence on a united Germany being in NATO put Gorbachev in danger, by making him accept a 'victor's peace,' like the Treaty of Versailles?

A: I don't look at it that way. If the Soviet Union respects the wishes of the people of Eastern Europe, or the people of Germany, that is not like a terrible military defeat. It is a triumph for far-seeing statesmanship, because the most

durable relationships are built on cooperation, not coercion.

If the Soviet goal in 1945 was to build a new Germany that would be dedicated to peace, I don't think they could do much better than the united Germany which is in prospect. That's a measure of the victory all the allies achieved together in the last war.

Q: Did you promise to negotiate limits on the German army in the future in order to get the Soviets to accept German unity?

A: No, I did not. Now, as a practical matter, every country's forces would be limited under the current CFE agreement because we would all have to keep our equipment within the new limits. As for the future, our view, and Helmut Kohl agrees with this, is that the follow-on conventional arms control talks can deal with a range of issues, including the question of further limitations on a central region. But Germany would not be singled out for any special limits.

Q: Can new moves on CSCE help meet Soviet concerns about Germany?

A: President Gorbachev told me that the development of CSCE, pan-European, institutions could be an important part of any solution. I think this is a matter worth pursuing since, as

you know, we very strongly support strengthening the CSCE as an institution to help build a Europe whole and free. As I said in Oklahoma last month, the Alliance should announce new goals for the future of CSCE at the NATO Summit, which will be in London in early July.

Q: Do you think Germany should be unified this year?

A: I think that is a matter for the democratically elected German leaders to decide. For our part, this is something we have supported for forty years, and the sooner it happens, the better. I welcome it.

ARMS CONTROL

START

Q: Wasn't there a last minute rush to conclude the agreed statement on START? Why are we negotiating against a deadline?

A: We have been negotiating strategic arms reductions for almost a decade (since June, 1982). That is hardly negotiating against a deadline. We have made substantial progress and I wanted to record that progress. President Gorbachev and I have committed ourselves to resolve the remaining issues and be in a position to sign the START Treaty by the end of the year.

Q: Haven't you given the Soviets all of their key objectives in START while compromising on U.S. objectives?

A: No. We are in a negotiation, but one in which I am so far satisfied with the results. We are within reach of a START agreement that achieves our major objectives -- improving stability and reducing the risk of war by reducing the most destabilizing kinds of strategic weapons.

From the outset, the U.S. has focused on reducing ballistic missiles because they pose the greatest threat to stability. START will reduce the number of Soviet ballistic missile warheads by 50%. START will reduce the number of Soviet heavy ICBM warheads by 50%. START will reduce Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight by 50%. Those aren't reductions for their own sake. Those are reductions that strengthen stability.

Q: Why are there such complicated counting rules in START? Why don't all the weapons count the same?

START will count bomber weapons more leniently than weapons on ballistic missiles, thereby encouraging both sides to rely more on bombers for their future deterrent forces. This was a key U.S. objective in START because bombers would take hours to reach targets and therefore would not be capable of a surprise first strike.

Q. Why are the Soviets allowed 40 percent more ALCM-carrying bombers than the U.S.?

A. The short answer is that this so-called 40 percent allowance partially offsets the U.S. right to carry 2/3 more ALCMs on

each of its bombers. By that arithmetic, we got a good deal.

Q. Why did the U.S. yield to the Soviet insistence on a 600 km range threshold for ALCMs?

A. Any negotiation requires making compromises to conclude a deal. We got what was most important to us by being willing to make compromises on things that were less important. In this connection, we could agree to the 600 km range threshold because it does not impose any practical limits on the U.S.

The 600 km ALCM range threshold does not affect any U.S. nuclear cruise missile programs, either current or planned.

Our major concern was that <u>conventional</u> cruise missiles--which have no business being limited by a treaty that constrains <u>nuclear</u> weapons--not be inadvertently swept up by ALCM limits. We achieved that objective by getting the Soviets to agree that conventional cruise missiles which are "distinguishable" from nuclear cruise missiles will not be limited by START.

Q. Why did Secretary Baker give Shevardnadze a side letter that accepted several constraints on Tacit Rainbow?

A. Secretary Baker did not offer nor accept anything that imposed constraints on the Tacit Rainbow conventional ALCM.

He did confirm to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze what are some well-known facts about this missile, e.g., it is a conventionally-armed cruise missile that has an operational

range of about 800 km.

Q. Why did we agree to a binding agreement on SLCMs?

A. We got what we wanted from the Soviets on SLCMs. They wanted a legally binding SLCM limit in the START treaty. We said we could not accept that because there is no effective and workable way of verifying such limits. In the end, they agreed to our proposal for a political declaration on SLCMs outside the START treaty.

The Soviets wanted to include all SLCMs, both conventional and nuclear. We insisted that the declaration refer only to nuclear SLCMs, and that was the result.

Q. Why did the U.S. agree to a limit on the number of nuclear SLCMs we can deploy?

A. The Soviets wanted some kind of predictability about the size of the nuclear SLCM force. We benefit from the same information about their plans.

So we agreed a maximum number of nuclear SLCMs we would declare at any one time. We picked a number that is comfortably above not only the number of nuclear SLCMs we have today, but also the number we expect to have at any time during the next 15 or 20 years.

Q. Why did we abandon our efforts to get at the SS-18 heavy ICBM?

A. Let's look at what has been achieved. The Soviets already

have agreed to cut their SS-18 force in half, from 308 missiles to 154 missiles. That has to be counted as a major achievement in START. That said, the question of additional limits on heavy ICBMs such as the SS-18 remains open. We have not abandoned our efforts to get even tighter limits than those that the Soviets already have agreed to.

Q. The Administration said it would not sign a START Treaty until the Krasnoyarsk ABM Treaty violation had been corrected. Have you changed your mind?

A. The Krasnoyarsk radar violates the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze admitted that publicly to his own Supreme Soviet. The Soviets have agreed to tear this illegal radar down to the ground. We will hold them to that agreement.

Q: Was there progress on the issue of non-circumvention of the START Treaty? Backfire? Additional limits on heavy missiles?

A: These are issues that are still under discussion.

Defense and Space

Q: What's the status of the Defense & Space Talks? What's the prognosis for the future?

A: In Washington the two sides agreed that the Defense & Space Talks would continue without interruption. We agreed the objective for those talks should be an agreement implementing an appropriate balance between strategic offenses and defenses, taking into account new technologies.

Although the Soviets have a different view, they have agreed to work to achieve an early outcome to the Defense & Space

talks.

Nuclear Testing Protocols

Q: What is the next step in nuclear testing? Will you live up to the Reagan Administration's commitment to proceed immediately to further talks on nuclear testing limitations?

A: We have a step-by-step approach to further limits on nuclear testing. We believe it is necessary to proceed with ratification of the treaties and their protocols and, as a practical matter, to observe their implementation. This will give both sides valuable experience with the new and complex verification methods.

After a period of observation, we will be better able to assess the verification lessons learned and to determine the additional moves that make sense from a national security standpoint.

Q: Does the U.S. continue to favor a comprehensive test ban?

A: A comprehensive test ban is a long-term objective. However, a test ban must be viewed in the context of a time when the U.S. no longer needs to depend on nuclear deterrence.

Q: Why weren't the Threshold Test Ban Treaty TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) ever ratified?

A: The TTBT and PNET were not ratified because neither could be effectively verified. The new verification protocols signed at the Summit correct this shortcoming.

Q: Have the U.S. and USSR been complying with the PNET and TTBT, even though they were never ratified?

A: Both sides have stated they observe the Treaties' 150 kt limit. Questions about Soviet compliance could not be definitively answered because of the inadequacy of verification. It is likely the Soviets exceeded the 150 kt threshold on some tests in the past, but I emphasize again the verification uncertainties we have had until now.

Q: Why does the U.S. need to conduct <u>any</u> nuclear tests?

A: Nuclear weapons continue to play a critical role in U.S. national security strategy. So long as this is the case, underground nuclear testing is necessary to maintain the credibility of the U.S. deterrent and to ensure the safety, reliability and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Testing permits improvements in safety and helps detect deterioration or other serious problems that may develop in the stockpile. Testing also enables the U.S. to modernize weapons as needed to respond to improvements in Soviet capabilities. It also allows the U.S. to ensure that military command and control equipment can survive nuclear effects.

<u>CFE</u>

Q: Hasn't CFE taken a back seat to START at this Summit?

A: No, not at all. We had very constructive discussions. We reaffirmed that we want to sign a treaty this year, and that CFE is an essential part of the new security system in Europe we're building. We agreed that a CSCE Summit only made sense when a CFE Treaty is complete and ready to sign.

This is a multilateral negotiation -- now we have to consult with our Allies and go back to Vienna where we have agreed to intensify the pace.

Q: Would we be willing to agree to Bundeswehr limits in order to achieve a CFE agreement as the Soviets have proposed?

A: We cannot accept the singularization of Germany. All 23 nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are covered by CFE limits. It is not appropriate that one particular country's military forces be dealt with outside of CFE.

We support a follow-on negotiation with the same membership and mandate as the current talks and believe we should address a range of issues, including the question of further limitations on conventional forces in a central zone. It should be possible to address Soviet concerns in this context.

Q: Isn't CFE obsolete, given the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?

A: The changes in Europe have made a CFE agreement all the more important. CFE will codify the Eastern reductions, and the treaty's destruction and verification provisions will make them difficult to reverse. Moreover, the treaty will also require the reduction of Soviet forces in the USSR.

<u>SDI</u>

Q: Where does SDI stand after the Summit?

A: Exactly where it did before summit. Mr. Gorbachev knows I

am committed to a strong SDI and that we seek to discuss a cooperative transition to increased reliance on strategic defense. As I have said before, in the 1990s, strategic defense make more sense than ever before. I am hopeful that we can narrow our differences on this issue as the Defense & Space Talks continue.

Bilateral Agreement on CW Destruction

Q: What is the relationship between the bilateral Agreement on CW Destruction and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)?

A: The Agreement should help to accelerate the negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. By taking this bilateral step to destroy the vast bulk of our declared stockpiles, we can set an example for other countries.

Q. What arrangements are there in the bilateral Agreement pertaining to technical cooperation?

A. The agreement calls for the development of a program of cooperation on CW destruction. We are willing to help the Soviets to find safe and environmentally sound ways to destroy chemical weapons.

Q. When will the two parties cease production of chemical weapons?

A. The production of chemical weapons will cease upon entry into force of the Bilateral Agreement.

Q. When will the Agreement on CW destruction enter into force?

A. The Agreement will enter into force with an exchange of instruments stating acceptance of the Agreement by each party. In the case of the United States, this will be after Congressional action has been completed.

Non-Proliferation

Q: Why is the USSR only "supporting the objectives of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) rather than adhering to the guidelines?

A: The Soviet Union has indicated it too is concerned about missile proliferation. The modalities for Soviet adherence would have to be agreed upon among all the MTCR partners. We will be meeting with the partners this summer, and will discuss Soviet adherence then.

Q: How can the U.S. cooperate with the Soviet Union on missile technology proliferation when the Soviets continue to export SCUD missiles to Afghanistan?

A: We remain deeply concerned about Soviet export of SCUDs to Afghanistan and have repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to end such transfers. We have told the Soviets that the transfer of SCUDs are inconsistent with the MTCR guidelines. The Soviets say our concern about SCUDs can only be resolved in the context of an overall settlement of the Afghan problem. We are not satisfied with this response and will continue to press this issue.

Q: What's the purpose and value of the statement that was issued at the Summit on non-proliferation?

A: The joint statement sets a standard by which the Soviet Union has said it is willing to be measured. We will challenge Moscow to live up to this commitment.

MIDDLE EAST

Q: Are you satisfied with Arafat's disclaimer of PLO responsibility for the recent terrorist/commando attack on Israel?

A: No, we are not satisfied with Arafat's answer. We are still looking into this matter. What we have heard from the PLO is not enough.

Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms

The President of the United States George Bush and the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Mikhail S. Gorbachev discussed the status of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the great progress which has been made in the negotiations on this Treaty. In particular, they welcomed the mutually acceptable solutions which have been found on major issues in the talks and reaffirmed their determination to have the Treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year. They instructed their negotiating teams in Geneva to accelerate their work to complete the Joint Draft Text recording the details of these solutions in order to fulfill this goal.

The START Treaty will be a major landmark in both arms control and in the relationship between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It results from the recognition by both sides of the special obligation they bear to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, enhance strategic stability, and strengthen peace and international security. As such, the START Treaty will signal a turning point in U.S. - Soviet arms control efforts toward a more rational, open, cooperative, predictable and stable relationship. The Treaty will complement to a remarkable degree the important political changes which have recently begun to remove the hostility and suspicion and will facilitate the reduction of the sizeable stockpiles of strategic offensive arms which now exist.

The benefits of this Treaty are many. For the first time ever, both sides will carry out significant reductions in strategic offensive arms -- up to 50 percent in certain categories. More importantly, these reductions will be designed to make a first strike less plausible. The result will be greater stability and a lower risk of war.

Major agreed provisions of the Treaty are as follows:

The total number of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 1600; within this total deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers will be reduced to no more than 154;

The total number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 6000. Of these, no more than 4900 will be warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, no more than 1540 will be warheads on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 1100 will be warheads on mobile ICBMs;

The aggregate throw-weight of the deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of each side will be limited to an agreed level which will be approximately 50 percent below the existing level of the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as of a date to be determined. This limit will not be exceeded for the duration of the Treaty;

Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit and will be attributed with one warhead against the 6000 limit;

Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit and shall be attributed with an agreed number of warheads against the 6000 limit. Existing and future U.S. heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with 10 warheads each. Existing and future Soviet heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with 8 warheads each;

Within the 1600 limit on delivery vehicles the United States of America may have no more than 150 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are attributed with 10 warheads each. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may exceed that number of heavy bombers by 40 percent. If the United States of America exceeds the 150 number, each additional heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics exceeds 210 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, each such heavy bomber will be attributed with the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped;

Existing and future U.S. heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs; existing and future Soviet heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 12 long-range nuclear ALCMs;

Long-range ALCMs will be considered those with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Future long-range non-nuclear ALCMs will not be considered nuclear if they are distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. There will be no restrictions on deploying such ALCMS on aircraft not limited by the Treaty.

Reductions will be carried out in three phases over a period of seven years. Specific, equal interim levels for agreed categories of strategic offensive arms will be achieved by the end of each phase of reductions;

The numerical limitations provided for by the Treaty will be achieved and complied with through conversion or elimination in accordance with agreed procedures.

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will not be constrained in the START Treaty. Each side will provide the other with a unilateral declaration of its policy concerning nuclear SLCMs and, annually for the duration of the Treaty, with unilateral declarations regarding its planned deployments of nuclear long-range SLCMs, i.e., those with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Those declarations will be politically binding. In the annual declarations the maximum number of deployed nuclear SLCMs for each of the following five Treaty years will be specified, provided that the number declared will not exceed 880. In the declarations of policy it will be specified that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads. The sides reaffirmed their 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement to continue to seek "mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification".

Except as specifically prohibited, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

The START Treaty will include specific prohibitions on certain categories of strategic offensive arms, basing modes and activities. The following are among the bans under the START Treaty:

- new types of heavy ICBMs;

- heavy SLBMs and launchers of heavy SLBMs;

- mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

-new types of ICBMs and SLBMs with more than 10 reentry vehicles;

-flight testing and deployment of existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number specified in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987;

- rapid reload of ICBM launchers;

- long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads.

The far-reaching reductions and other constraints contained in the Treaty will be accompanied by the most thorough and innovative verification provisions ever negotiated.

Taken together, the START Treaty's comprehensive verification regime will create a degree of transparency in the military sphere which would have been unthinkable only a short time ago. It will not only provide for effective verification of the obligations of

the Treaty, but will also greatly increase the mutual confidence which is essential for a sound strategic relationship. In addition, this verification system can provide a model which may be incorporated into future agreements. The verification regime under development includes:

-- On-site inspections: For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the Treaty, each side will, on the basis of reciprocity, conduct twelve kinds of on-site inspections, as well as continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production facilities, in accordance with agreed procedures. Inter alia, each side will conduct short-notice inspections at facilities related to strategic offensive arms, including inspections to verify the numbers of reentry vehicles on deployed ballistic missiles, inspections to verify elimination of strategic offensive arms and facilities related to them, suspect site inspections, and various exhibitions.

-- National technical means of verification: For the purpose of ensuring verification, each side will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. The Treaty will include a series of cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. There will be a ban on interference with such means;

-- Ban on denial of telemetric information: The sides agreed to make on-board technical measurements on ICBMs and SLBMs and to broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. Except for strictly limited exemptions, there will be a ban on any practice, including the use of encryption, encapsulation or jamming, that denies full access to telemetric information;

-- Information exchange: Before signature of the Treaty the sides will exchange data on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of their strategic offensive arms. These data will be updated on a regular basis throughout the lifetime of the Treaty;

-- A comprehensive agreement on the manner of deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles and appropriate limitations on their movements so as to ensure effective verification of adherence to the numerical limitations provided for in the Treaty. In addition, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers will be limited and mobile ICBMs will be subject to identification through the application of unique identifiers, or tags.

To promote the objectives of the Treaty, the sides will establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The sides have agreed that the Treaty will have a duration of 15 years, unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. If the sides so agree, the Treaty can be extended for successive five year periods, unless superseded.

The progress outlined above fulfills the aim, set forth by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during their Malta meeting, of agreeing upon the basic provisions of the strategic offensive arms Treaty by the time of their Washington meeting. The two Presidents express confidence that the Foreign Ministers and the delegations of the two countries at the Geneva talks will be able to reach agreement in the remaining months on the outstanding issues that are still being negotiated.

JOINT STATEMENT ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS AND FURTHER ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, building on the results of the current negotiations, agree to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. The objectives of these negotiations will be to reduce further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries. This will be achieved by seeking agreements that improve survivability, remove incentives for a nuclear first strike and implement an appropriate relationship between strategic offenses and defenses.

In order to attain these objectives, the sides have agreed as follows:

First. This year the sides will complete work on the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Following the signing of the Treaty, the sides will hold consultations without delay regarding future talks and these important talks will begin at the the earliest practical date. Both sides in these future talks will be free to raise any issues related to any strategic offensive arms.

Within the existing negotiating framework on Nuclear and Space Arms in Geneva, the two sides will continue negotiations on ABM and space without delay.

Thus, in the future talks the two sides will discuss strategic stability issues of interest to them, including the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, taking into account stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and development of new technologies. The sides will work toward the important goal of reaching an early outcome in these negotiations.

Second. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as is the case in the emerging START Treaty, will, in the new negotiations, seek to reduce their strategic offensive arms in a way consistent with enhancing strategic stability. In the new negotiations, the two sides agree to place emphasis on removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, on reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, and on giving priority to highly survivable systems.

In particular, the two sides will seek measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles as a whole, including measures related to the question of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs. Effective verification will be provided by national technical means, cooperative measures, and on-site inspection.

Third. Having agreed on the need to ensure a predictable strategic relationship between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the sides will, for the entire duration of the START Treaty, exchange, at the beginning of each calendar year, information on planned changes in the numbers of strategic offensive arms as of the end of the current year.

Fourth. The sides will pursue additional measures to build confidence and ensure predictability of the military activities of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that would reduce the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war as a result of accident, miscalculation, terrorism, or unexpected technological breakthrough, and would prevent possible incidents between them.

Fifth. The sides believe that reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war is the responsibility not only of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that other States should also make their contribution toward the attainment of this objective, in particular in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. They call upon all States to consider the new opportunities for engagement in mankind's common effort to remove the risk of outbreak of nuclear war worldwide.

Accordingly, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give these future negotiations the highest priority so that the benefits of strengthened stability can be realized as soon as possible.

Washington, D.C.
June 1, 1990

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 1, 1990

U.S.-U.S.S.R CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT: Fact Sheet

Background

The Agreement signed by President Bush and President Gorbachev calls for the destruction of the vast bulk of the U.S. and Soviet declared chemical weapons stockpiles, with on-site inspections to confirm that destruction has taken place. Destruction will begin in 1992, as soon as it can be undertaken in a safe and environmentally sound manner. Destruction will proceed until both sides reach a declared stockpile of 5,000 tons -- about twenty percent of the existing U.S. stockpile level -- by the year 2002.

This Agreement is based on President Bush's September 1989 initiative which proposed that the U.S. and USSR take the lead in destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles as a significant step toward the conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. To promote the objective of a global ban, both countries have agreed to cease chemical weapons production when the bilateral destruction Agreement enters into force, and encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to follow suit.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R Bilateral Agreement

The key provisions of the destruction Agreement are:

- Destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to begin by the end of 1992.
  - -- Destruction of at least 50% of declared stocks by the end of 1999.
  - -- Declared stocks to be reduced to 5,000 agent tons by 2002.
  - -- Both countries will stop producing chemical weapons upon entry into force of this Agreement, without waiting for the global chemical weapons ban.

- On-site inspections during and after the destruction process to confirm that destruction has taken place.

  -- Annual exchanges of data on the stockpile levels to facilitate monitoring of the declared stockpiles.

  -- Details of the inspection procedures will be worked out by December 31, 1990.

- Both countries will cooperate in developing and using safe and environmentally sound methods of destruction;

- The U.S. and U.S.S.R. will take steps to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention.

Both countries took an initial step in this direction by exchanging data on declared chemical weapons stockpiles in December 1989, and by initiating verification experiments to build confidence and gain experience for a chemical weapons ban treaty.

This Agreement will be submitted to Congress for its review and approval.

A Global Chemical Weapons Ban

The bilateral U.S.-Soviet Agreement was designed to provide new impetus to the conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable global chemical weapons ban at the earliest possible date. Toward that end:

- Both countries have agreed to accelerate their destruction of chemical weapons under a global chemical weapons convention so that by the eighth year after it enters into force, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will have reduced their declared stocks to no more than 500 agent tons.

- The U.S. and U.S.S.R. will propose that a special conference be convened at the end of the eighth year of a multilateral convention to determine whether participation in the convention is sufficient to complete the elimination of chemical weapons stocks over the following two years.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 1, 1990

The Nuclear Testing Protocols: Fact Sheet

Background

- US and Soviet Union completed verification protocols for two previously existing but unratified treaties -- the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976).
  - -- Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) covers tests of nuclear weapons.
  - -- Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) covers nuclear explosions conducted at other than declared test sites for such peaceful purposes as excavations. (US has not conducted PNE since 1973 and plans none; USSR has not conducted any since 1988, but has sought to preserve its right to do so.)
  - -- Treaties ban nuclear explosions with planned yields exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT).
- Both countries have stated they observe the 150 kiloton limit. Questions about Soviet compliance with TTBT's 150 kt limit could not be resolved because of inadequate verification procedures.
- Once protocols are signed, Administration will seek Senate advice and consent as to ratification of TTBT and PNET and their protocols.

Verification Methods

- Two verification protocols being signed at Washington Summit will provide for effective verification of compliance with the treaties.
- Verification methods for TTBT and PNET include hydrodynamic yield measurement, on-site inspection, and some seismic monitoring on the territory of the testing party.
  - -- U.S. hydrodynamic method is CORRTEX (Continuous Reflectrometry for Radius versus Time Experiments) -- most accurate non-intrusive technique U.S. has found.
  - -- CORRTEX determines yield by measuring, at the detonating site, rate at which supersonic shock wave in the ground crushes co-axial cable buried near explosive device.

-- On-site inspections permit each side to take core samples and rock fragments from area of the explosion to confirm geological/geophysical data near the explosion.

-- Seismic monitors measure distant shock waves produced by the explosion (as in measuring earthquakes), in order to arrive at an estimate of explosive yield.

o National technical means also will be used to monitor all explosions.

How the Protocols Work

o PNET verification:

-- Sides have right to hydrodynamic measurement (CORRTEX for US) for explosions with planned yields above 50 kilotons.

-- Right to on-site inspections for explosions with planned yields above 35 kilotons.

-- Right to local seismic network for group explosion above 150 kilotons.

o TTBT verification:

-- Right to hydrodynamic measurements of nuclear weapons tests with planned yields above 50 kilotons.

-- On-site inspection for tests with planned yields above 35 kilotons.

-- In-country seismic monitoring for tests with planned yields above 50 kilotons, using three designated seismic stations off test site but within testing party's territory.

-- Special provisions for monitoring unusual cases: tests with non-standard geometries, tests with multiple nuclear explosions.

-- In each of first 5 years of treaty, if a side does not have at least 2 tests with planned yields above 50 kilotons, other side may use hydrodynamic measurement that year on up to 2 tests with planned yields below 50 kilotons.

- Required notifications under TTBT (PNET notifications are similar):

  -- Each June, parties will inform each other of the number of explosions with planned yields above 35 kilotons and 50 kilotons for the following calendar year.

  -- No later than 200 days prior to planned date of any explosion that other side would have the right, under protocol provisions, to monitor, the testing party must provide notification of planned date, location, and whether planned yield exceeds 35 or 50 kilotons.

  -- Within 20 days of receipt of such notification, verifying party must inform testing party whether it plans to carry out verification activities, and, if so, which type.

- Under both Treaties, joint commissions will be used to discuss implementation and verification issues.

AGREEMENT ON EXPANSION ON UNDERGRADUATE UNIVERSITY EXCHANGES

BACKGROUND

- At Malta meeting, President Bush proposed that both countries undertake to expand undergraduate university exchanges by 1000 students in each direction.

- U.S. and USSR have signed general agreement on expanding university exchanges, will work out implementing details later.

- Sides have agreed to phased increase in undergraduate university exchanges beginning in academic year 1991-1992.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Increase existing exchanges (~~500~~ 750 U.S. and 250 Soviet) by 250 students both ways in academic year 1991-1992.

- Increase targeted numbers to 1500 each way by 1995-96, subject to availability of funds.

- Mix of private and USG funding (arrangements to be determined) to cover costs of Soviet participants in U.S.; USSR to cover all in-country costs for Americans.

- Participants on both sides to be chosen on basis of academic excellence and language proficiency.

- Participants would pursue full-time academic work in variety of disciplines. Preferred length of students' participation would be one year, though shorter periods would be considered.

Initialing ceremony.

FACT SHEET: PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Revised U.S.-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (PUAE) updates and expands upon cooperation begun in 1973.

- Important addition is annex on protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), which conforms with new regulations and laws developed in both countries in last few years.

- New initiative on civilian nuclear reactor operational safety will enable both countries to benefit from lessons of 1986 Chernobyl accident and provide vehicle for joint research on health and environmental effects of Chernobyl.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Agreement provides substantial cooperation in several fields of atomic energy research, including fundamental properties of matter, magnetic fusion and civilian nuclear safety.

- Sides will explore proposals for renewing cooperation on safety of liquid metal reactors and management of hazardous and radioactive waste.

- Other fields of cooperation may be added by mutual consent.

- Joint Committee will convene each year, alternately in U.S. and USSR, to oversee implementation of cooperative programs.

COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- At Malta President proposed targeting June summit for completion of MFN commercial agreement, provided that Soviets approve and implement new emigration legislation.

- New emigration legislation passed first reading in Supreme Soviet in November.

  -- Second Supreme Soviet reading, which would codify the law, was set for May 31. No serious opposition has appeared, but press of other business could delay final passage.

  -- We have emphasized to Soviets at all levels importance of expeditious passage.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Agreement breaks much new ground in commercial agreements with Soviets. Specifically, it:

  -- provides improved market access, for example, by prohibiting adoption of standards which are discriminatory or designed to protect domestic production;

  -- facilitates business by establishing expedited accreditation procedure for commercial offices; allowing offices to hire directly local and third-country employees on mutually agreed terms; permitting access to all advertising media; and allowing companies to engage and serve as agents and to conduct market studies; and

  -- offers strong intellectual property rights protections by reaffirming commitments to Paris Convention and Universal Copyright Convention; obligating adherence to Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; providing copyright protection for computer programs and data bases and protection for sound recordings; providing product and process patent protection for virtually all areas of technology; and providing comprehensive coverage of trade secrets.

- Soviets have reaffirmed their commitment, once they receive MFN and USG lending restrictions (Stevenson and Byrd amendments) are lifted, to resume lend-lease repayments.

Joint Statement on CFE

President Bush and President Gorbachev agreed that early conclusion of an agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) is essential to the future stability and security of the continent. A CFE agreement will constitute the indispensable foundation for new European relationships and for a future security architecture in Europe. The Presidents reaffirmed the commitment they made at their meeting in Malta in December 1989 to conclude a CFE agreement by the end of 1990. They agreed further that the forthcoming summit of the CSCE nations should be held after the CFE agreement is ready for signature.

In the course of their talks, the Presidents committed themselves to intensifying the pace of the negotiation in Vienna and to reaching rapid agreement on all outstanding issues.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 1, 1990

FACT SHEET

CFE

The completion of a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty continues to be the President's highest arms control priority in Europe. In their meetings here in Washington, the President and President Gorbachev:

-- reaffirmed their commitment to sign a CFE Treaty in 1990;

-- agreed that a CSCE Summit should not be held before a CFE agreement is ready for signature;

-- agreed that a CFE agreement is essential to the future security of Europe and will constitute the indispensable foundation for new European relationships and for a future security architecture in Europe; and

-- committed themselves to intensifying the pace of the CFE negotiations in Vienna.

Since the CFE negotiations opened in March 1989 tremendous progress has been made. In May 1989, at the initiative of President Bush, NATO leaders expanded Western proposals and agreed to accelerate the pace of the negotiations. In January 1990, in his State of the Union address, the President proposed to revise the NATO proposal and to lower substantially the levels of U.S. and Soviet ground and air force manpower stationed on foreign territory in Europe. Foreign Ministers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed on the President's proposal at their meeting in Ottawa in February 1990.

In his discussions with President Gorbachev, the President emphasized the importance of a CFE Treaty to the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe. Now, as we enter the final phase of the negotiations, the United States, in close consultation with its Allies, will redouble its efforts to negotiate mutually acceptable agreements on all outstanding issues in line with our security interests.

Joint Statement on the Establishment of a U.S.-USSR International Park in the Region of the Bering Strait

The Presidents of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, expressing support for the expansion of bilateral cooperation in the field of environmental protection and in the preservation of cultural heritage, endorse the intention of the two countries to create, in the region of the Bering Strait, a U.S.-Soviet International Park embracing protected terrestrial and aquatic areas.

Both leaders recognize that elements of natural and cultural heritage of the Bering region represent a common heritage of the American and Soviet peoples. Thousands of years ago, across a land bridge uniting the Asian and American continents, the first arrivals came to North America. Later, the sea divided the continents but failed to destroy the ecological, cultural and spiritual community of the inhabitants of Beringia. This community has remained essentially undisturbed by the influences of historical change.

Both leaders recognize that the creation of an international park would facilitate permanent recognition of the unity of this heritage and secure a framework for joint efforts in its preservation.

During 1990-1991, both countries will undertake the following practical steps:

-- preparation and signature of a protocol on the creation of a complex of specially designated protected terrestrial and aquatic areas; and

-- determine all organizational details connected with the functioning of the park.

Continuing close cooperation regarding the international park, between the representatives of both countries, may take the form of regular meetings of senior park management officials, the exchange of park personnel for professional training and orientation, joint research and consultations on planning and exchange visits to both sides of the park for touristic and cultural purposes, in particular by native populations.

The two sides express their confidence that establishment of the international park will serve the development of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the protection of nature, and the activities of local populations in preserving the unique natural and cultural heritage of the Bering region.

WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

Joint Statement Of Intent to Establish Beringian Heritage International Park

FACT SHEET

Background

- January 1990 Joint Committee Meeting of U.S.-USSR Environmental Agreement endorsed project to establish a U.S.-Soviet International Park in Beringian region (Alaska/Siberia).

- Purpose is to advance bilateral cooperation in conserving and protecting natural and cultural heritage of Beringian region, a shared heritage of American and Soviet peoples.

- Project will be implemented by U.S. National Park Service and USSR State Committee for the Protection of the Environment.

- The U.S.-USSR Join Report, "International Park Program, Beringian Heritage Cooperation," contains recommendations for establishing the paired parks.

Terms of the Statement

- The U.S.-USSR Joint Report is endorsed as framework for establishing an international park by end of 1991.

  -- Sides will negotiate protocol under Environmental Agreement to establish the park.

- Bering Land Bridge National Reserve will be initial companion site to be linked with a Soviet protected area on Chukotskiy Peninsula.

- Sides will undertake a number of cooperative activities to help advance planning and establishment of new Soviet protected area on Chukotskiy Peninsula.

FACT SHEET: U.S.-USSR MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Agreement, which concludes nine years of negotiations, resolves differences concerning depiction of maritime boundary in North Pacific Ocean, Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean.

- Agreement represents very favorable outcome in terms of U.S. strategic and resource interests:

  -- it removes significant potential source of dispute between U.S. and USSR;

  -- fisheries enforcement disputes and harassment of U.S. oil companies should no longer arise;

  -- it resolves differences regarding jurisdiction over fishing and oil/gas, enabling resource development to go forward in previously disputed areas; and

  -- it places about 70% of Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction and gives U.S. an extra 13,200 square nautical miles as compared with the most favorable equidistant line.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Parties agree that the line described as the "western limit" in 1867 U.S.-Russia Convention Ceding Alaska is maritime boundary along its entire length.

- Further, agreement contains innovative provisions to ensure that all areas within 200 miles of either coast fall under resource jurisdiction of one or the other party:

  -- USSR transfers to U.S. jurisdiction in three "special areas" within 200 miles of Soviet coast, beyond 200 miles of U.S. coast, and on U.S. side of maritime boundary.

  -- U.S. transfers to USSR jurisdiction in one "special area" within 200 miles of U.S. coast, beyond 200 miles of Soviet coast, and on Soviet side of maritime boundary.

OCEAN STUDIES AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- The U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean, signed in 1973, expires on June 14.
- Bilateral marine science cooperation under the agreement lapsed following 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- Since 1987, both countries have been exploring means for resuming cooperation.
- 1988 U.S.-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in World Ocean Studies identified areas of common interest, forming basis of new Ocean Studies Agreement.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Provides for broad range of oceanographic research cooperation, use of port facilities in each other's countries, and far-reaching scientific exchanges.
- Intellectual property rights (IPR) provisions are included.
- Results of joint studies will be published openly.
- Shared use of research vessels will result in substantial savings for both sides.

EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- 1966 Civil Air Transport Services Agreement, as amended, allows service by only two airlines (Pan Am and Aeroflot) between Moscow, Leningrad, Washington and New York.

- At Wyoming ministerial, Secretary Baker proposed expanding agreement to include more airlines to more destinations.

- After three rounds of talks, sides agreed to quadruple number of flights to total of 14 cities.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Total passenger and cargo flights per side would increase from 7.6 Boeing-727 equivalents/week to 15.1 immediately; to 42 on April 1, 1991; to 58 on April 1, 1992.

- U.S. airlines could increase services to Moscow and Leningrad; they would gain new rights over North Atlantic to four additional cities, and over Pacific to two additional cities.

- Soviet airlines could increase services to New York and Washington; they would gain new rights over Atlantic to two additional cities (with onward service to South America) and over Pacific to two additional cities.

- Each side could designate up to seven airlines to serve the other, with no more than two passenger airlines per side serving a city pair.

- Charter article would be added guaranteeing each side annual approval of 100 charter flights over Atlantic, within certain national constraints, and positive consideration of charter flight requests over Pacific.

- Soviet airlines would retain unrestricted rights to sell tickets in U.S.; until Soviet currency becomes convertible for purchase of air transportation, U.S. airlines could only sell tickets in USSR for hard currency.

  -- To ensure U.S. sales access to Soviet citizens in absence of ruble convertibility, Soviet airlines would sell ruble tickets on U.S. airlines equal to 8.75 percent of our airlines' round-trip capacity, and remit the profits to U.S. airlines in hard currency.

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Bilateral Maritime Transportation Agreement concludes discussions begun in December 1985.

- It normalizes and introduces principle of nondiscrimination to U.S.-Soviet maritime relations.

- It facilitates further development of U.S.-Soviet bilateral and international trade by providing for easier movement of goods between the two countries.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Agreement commits both parties to eliminate discriminatory treatment, although it permits Soviet shippers to pay Soviet carriers in rubles as interim measure.

- Agreement contains no provisions for cargo-sharing, but does require Soviets to charter U.S.-flag carriers for Soviet government-controlled bulk cargoes whenever U.S. carriers are available on terms and conditions equal to or better than those offered by non-U.S. carriers.

  -- U.S. carriers wishing to participate in bilateral bulk trade are encouraged to inform Soviets of their interest, time availability and price.

- Agreement establishes forecast mechanism to trigger consultations on U.S. liner trade.

  -- Agreement goes into effect following conclusion of first joint forecast, expected to take place within a few months of signature.

- It grants two-day reciprocal notification access to 42 U.S. and 42 Soviet ports.

- Soviet-flag vessels are permitted to re-enter U.S. cross-trades, subject to Soviet assurances with regard to past Soviet predatory rate practices.

FACT SHEET: LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Current $2^1/_4$-year extension of 1983 Long-Term Grains Agreement, which requires USSR to buy nine million tons of grain from U.S. annually, expires December 31.

- Negotiations on new agreement began in December 1989.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- New agreement to take effect January 1, 1991.

- Soviets required to buy minimum of 10 million metric tons of grain from U.S. annually (up from nine million metric tons), including:

  -- at least four million metric tons of wheat;

  -- four million metric tons of feed grains (corn, barley or sorghum); and

  -- two million additional metric tons of either wheat, feed grains or soybeans/soymeal, with soy measures counted double for purposes of quantity.

- Soviets may buy up to 14 million metric tons annually (up from 12 million metric tons) without prior consultation with U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Joint Statement on the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

At their meeting in Geneva in 1985, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union emphasized the importance of the work aimed at utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes, and advocated the widest practical development of international cooperation in obtaining this essentially inexhaustible source of energy for the benefit of all mankind.

The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, involving joint efforts by the USSR, the United States, Japan and the European Community, under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is making significant progress towards this end. A conceptual design will soon be completed.

Noting with satisfaction the results being attained under this project, the United States and the Soviet Union look forward to continued international efforts aimed at promoting further progress in developing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes.

FACT SHEET: JOINT STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL THERMONUCLEAR EXPERIMENTAL REACTOR (ITER)

BACKGROUND

- ITER is a four-party (U.S., USSR, Japan and EC) project to develop controlled fusion energy for peaceful purposes.
- ITER was proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan at 1985 summit. Cooperation began in 1988.
- ITER is based on compatibility of fusion programs of the four parties and value of maximizing resources through international collaboration.
- Parties have agreed only to initial design phase; they are reviewing domestic fusion programs and beginning exploratory talks on whether to continue to engineering design stage.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Statement notes progress since 1985 and endorses international efforts aimed at promoting further progress in field of thermonuclear fusion.

Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles capable of carrying such weapons, and certain other missiles and missile technologies. The more nations that possess such weapons, the more difficult it will be to realize the desire of people everywhere to achieve effective arms control and disarmament measures and to reduce the threat of war. Weapons proliferation can provoke or intensify insecurity and hostility among nations, and threatens mankind with warfare of unprecedented destructiveness.

Our discussions over the past months point the way to a new era in relations between our two countries. We have taken major steps toward concluding agreements to reduce our own strategic nuclear arsenals, to bring limits on nuclear testing into force, and to reach a global ban on chemical weapons. Together with the nations of Europe, we are taking unprecedented steps to reduce existing conventional weaponry as part of a process of building a lasting structure of European security. The progress we are making and the commitments we have made in these bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts clearly demonstrate that arms reductions can contribute to increased security, even when there have been long-standing and deep-seated differences between countries.

The historic steps we have taken to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and to cooperate in the interests of international stability create the possibility of even closer and more concrete cooperation in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and missile non-proliferation.

With these considerations in mind, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Declare their commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and missiles capable of carrying such weapons and certain other missiles and missile technologies, in particular those subject to the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR);

- Agree to work closely together and with other members of the international community to develop and to put into action concrete measures against the proliferation of these types of weapons; and

- Call on other nations to join in a renewed commitment to effective non-proliferation measures as a means of securing international peace and stability and as a step toward the effective limitation worldwide of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and missile technology.

The two sides have taken specific actions to advance these commitments.

Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation

In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Reaffirm their steadfast and long-lasting commitment to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to strengthen the international nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime;

- Reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and agree that it continues to make an invaluable contribution to global and regional security and stability;

- Urge all countries which have not yet done so to adhere to the NPT;

- Urge all NPT parties to implement scrupulously their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations under the Treaty;

- Affirm their intention to cooperate together and with other Treaty parties to ensure a successful 1990 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which would reaffirm support for the objectives of the Treaty and its importance to international security and stability;

- Support the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and urge all countries in the region to bring it into force at an early date;

- Reiterate their continuing commitment to strengthening the IAEA, whose unique system of safeguards has contributed to the widespread peaceful use of nuclear energy for social and economic development;

- Support increased international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards;

- Call on all non-nuclear-weapons states with unsafeguarded nuclear activities to place these activities under international safeguards;

- Agree on the need for stringent controls over exports of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology, to ensure that they will not be misused for nuclear explosive purposes, and urge all other nations capable of exporting nuclear-related technology to apply similarly strict controls;

- Continue to support efforts to improve and strengthen the international nuclear export control regime;

- Support discussions among states in regions of nuclear proliferation concern for the purpose of achieving concrete steps to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, and, in particular, join in calling on the nations of the Middle East, Southern Africa, and South Asia to engage in and pursue such discussions;

- Agree to continue their regular, constructive bilateral consultations on nuclear weapons non-proliferation.

Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation

In order to stem the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Have signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, demonstrating that controls on -- indeed the elimination of -- such missiles can enhance national security;

- Reaffirm their intention that the START Treaty be signed by the end of the year;

- Affirm their support for the objectives of the Missile Technology Control Regime, covering missiles, and certain equipment and technology relating to missiles capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms of payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers and they call on all nations that have not done so to observe the spirit and the guidelines of this regime;

- Are taking measures to restrict missile proliferation on a worldwide basis, including export controls and other internal procedures;

- Have instituted bilateral consultations to exchange information concerning such controls and procedures and identify specific measures to prevent missile proliferation;

- Agree to work to stop missile proliferation, particularly in regions of tension, such as the Middle East;

- To this end, affirm their intent to explore regional initiatives to reduce the threat of missile proliferation, including the possibility of offering their good offices to promote such initiatives;

- Recall that they favor international economic cooperation including cooperation aimed at peaceful space exploration, as long as such cooperation could not contribute to missile proliferation;

- Appeal to all countries -- to exporters of missiles and missile technology as well as purchasers -- to exercise restraint, and express their willingness to continue their respective dialogues with other countries on the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology.

- Are resolved, on their part, to continue to work to strengthen such international restraint with respect to missile and missile technology proliferation.

Chemical Weapons Non-proliferation

In order to stem the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Declare that a multilateral, effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention banning the development, production and use of chemical weapons and eliminating all stocks on a global basis is the best long-term solution to the threat to international security posed by the use and spread of chemical weapons, and that non-proliferation measures are considered a step toward achieving such a convention;

- Will intensify their cooperation to expedite the negotiations in Geneva with the view to resolving outstanding issues as soon as possible and to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date;

- Have instituted bilateral confidence building measures, including chemical weapons data exchange and reciprocal site visits;

- Have just signed a trailblazing agreement on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;

- Commit themselves, in that agreement, to take practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention;

- Having declared their possession of chemical weapons, urge other states possessing chemical weapons to declare their possession, to commit to their destruction, and to begin immediately to address, through research and cooperation, the need for chemical weapons destruction capability;

- State that they themselves will not proliferate chemical weapons;

- Have instituted export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons. These measures are not intended to hinder or discriminate against legitimate peaceful chemical activities;

- Have agreed to conduct bilateral discussions to improve the effectiveness of their respective export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;

- Conduct regular bilateral consultations to broaden bilateral cooperation, including the reciprocal exchange of information on the problems of chemical weapons proliferation;

- Confirm their intent to pursue political and diplomatic actions, where specific cases give rise to concerns about the production, use or spread of chemical weapons;

- Join with other nations in multilateral efforts to coordinate export controls, exchange information, and broaden international cooperation to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;

- Reaffirm their support for the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law;

- Are taking steps to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol by:

  -- Encouraging states that are not parties to accede;

  -- Confirming their intention to provide active support to the United Nations Secretary General in conducting investigations of reported violations of the Protocol;

  -- Affirming their intention to consider the imposition of sanctions against violators of the Protocol, including those under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

  -- Agreeing to consult promptly in the event of a violation of the Protocol to discuss possible bilateral and multilateral actions against the offender, as well as appropriate assistance to the victims of such violation;

- Agree that the presence and further proliferation of chemical weapons in areas of tension, such as the Middle East, is particularly dangerous. The two countries therefore affirm their intent to explore regional initiatives in the Middle East and other areas, including the possibility of offering their good offices to promote such initiatives as:

  -- Efforts to broaden awareness of the dangers of chemical weapons proliferation and its negative impact on implementation of the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;

  -- Bilateral or multilateral efforts to stem chemical weapons proliferation, including the renunciation of the production of chemical weapons;

  -- Efforts to destroy chemical weapons in advance of the multilateral convention on chemical weapons, as the United States and the Soviet Union are doing.

The United States and the Soviet Union call on all nations of the world that have not already done so to join them in taking comparable, effective measures to stem chemical weapons proliferation.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 1, 1990

Non-Proliferation Joint Statement: Fact Sheet

Background

The Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation underscores the importance that the U.S and U.S.S.R. attach to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and missiles, which pose a growing threat to international security and stability.

The Joint Statement reflects bilateral discussions held over the last six months, in which each area of proliferation was discussed, and mutual concerns identified. It contains a commitment to work together and in parallel to prevent proliferation and to urge other states to do so as well.

Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation

- The U.S. and U.S.S.R. strongly support efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, while encouraging the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

- Both countries will encourage further adherents to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They urge current NPT parties to implement scrupulously their IAEA safeguards, and support stringent export controls on nuclear-related material, equipment and technology.

- The U.S. and U.S.S.R. support the concept of regional non-proliferation efforts, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East, South Asia and Southern Africa.

Missile Non-Proliferation

- The Soviet Union affirms its support for the objectives of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and will discuss its possible participation in it. The U.S. welcomes this decision, and the other measures, such as export controls, which both countries are taking.

  -- The MTCR, concluded in 1987 among the Economic Summit partners, limits the transfers of missiles and missile technology for systems capable of delivering at least a

500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, as well as the production facilities for these systems.

-- As a major supplier of missiles and missile technology, Soviet support will strengthen the regime, and should encourage others to observe the guidelines.

-- The U.S. will be discussing the Soviet decision with its MTCR partners in the near future.

o The U.S. and U.S.S.R. propose to explore regional missile non-proliferation initiatives, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia, and urge missile suppliers and purchasers to exercise restraint.

Chemical Weapons Non-Proliferation

o Both countries agree that an effective, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons is the best long-term solution to the problem of proliferation, and that efforts to prevent proliferation complement the negotiation of a global ban.

o To complement the bilateral Agreement on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have declared their chemical weapons stockpiles, and committed themselves not to proliferate chemical weapons. They will pursue political and diplomatic efforts to discourage chemical weapons proliferation and use worldwide.

o Bilateral discussions on improving the effectiveness of export controls will be held.

o The U.S. and U.S.S.R. affirmed their support for the concept of regional chemical weapons non-proliferation efforts to:

-- broaden awareness of the dangers of such proliferation;

-- encourage other countries to destroy their chemical weapons in advance of a convention; and

-- take confidence-building steps such as the renunciation of chemical weapons production.

Joint Statement on Bering Sea Fisheries Conservation

In the course of the state visit by the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United States of America, the sides reviewed problems posed by the development of an unregulated multi-national fishery for pollock in the central Bering Sea. In light of the magnitude of that fishery, which accounts for more than one-third of the total annual catch of pollock in the Bering Sea, the situation is of serious environmental concern. In particular, there is a danger to the stocks from overfishing. This may result in significant harm to the ecological balance in the Bering Sea and to those U.S. and USSR coastal communities whose livelihoods depend on the living marine resources of the Bering Sea.

The sides agreed that urgent conservation measures should be taken with regard to this unregulated fishery. The sides noted that, in accordance with international law as reflected in the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, all concerned states, including coastal states and fishing states, should cooperate to ensure the conservation of these living resources. To this end, both sides noted that they would welcome cooperative efforts towards the development of an international regime for the conservation and management of the living marine resources in the central Bering Sea.

FACT SHEET: JOINT STATEMENT ON BERING SEA FISHERIES

BACKGROUND

- Unregulated fishing has in past few years severely disrupted fish stocks in central Bering Sea "donut," the area beyond U.S. and Soviet 200-mile zones.
  - -- Such unregulated fishing accounts for more than one-third of total annual catch of pollock in Bering Sea.
  - -- Extensive nature of this unregulated fishery threatens these pollock stocks, and in turn ecological balance of Bering Sea.
- U.S. negotiators have been cooperating with Soviets and others during past two years to seek ways to mitigate this unregulated fishery.
  - -- Soviets have agreed in principle to adopt multilateral approach to address this problem.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Statement draws world attention to importance U.S. and USSR attach to this problem.
- It will serve as touchstone for effort to mount multilateral management and conservation scheme for central Bering Sea.

Joint Statement on Technical Economic Cooperation

The two sides reiterated their commitment to the program of technical economic cooperation outlined by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at Malta in December and expressed a desire to expand the scope and number of joint projects. This program is a concrete expression of U.S. and Soviet commitment to work together in support of economic perestroyka. Its goal is to advance the process of market-oriented economic reform by sharing experience and expertise regarding the problems and opportunities involved in building market structures and institutions.

Projects and contacts currently underway at the expert level include statistical cooperation, development of small businesses, establishment of financial markets, banking reform, and tax administration. The two sides also had useful discussions on economic policy issues during visits by the Soviet Minister of Finance and State Bank Chairman to Washington, and the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board to Moscow.

The two sides will work to expand the scope of current cooperation projects and in particular to develop new projects in areas of special interest, including anti-trust issues, enterprise management, and economic education. The two sides also noted that private exchanges and projects can be consistent with and complement technical cooperation. Both sides believe that technical economic cooperation is in their mutual benefit in promoting the successful development of market-oriented reforms.

FACT SHEET: JOINT STATEMENT ON TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

BACKGROUND

- At Malta, President Bush presented President Gorbachev with list of proposed technical economic cooperation projects designed to permit U.S. and Soviet experts to exchange information and facilitate Sovet movement toward more market-oriented economy.

- Sides have already had useful exchanges under this program, involving a number of U.S. and Soviet government agencies. These have included:

  -- Visits by Soviet Finance Minister Pavlov and State Bank Chairman Gerashchenko to Washington and by Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan and CEA Chairman Boskin to Moscow to discuss economic policy issues.

  -- Visits by Soviet delegations to U.S. to study ways to foster small business development, the formation of stock exchanges, the banking system and other issues.

  -- Exchanges between U.S. and Soviet statistical experts.

- Further projects under consideration include exchanges on anti-trust issues and Moscow Conference on the formation of capital markets, organized by New York Stock Exchange.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Statement draws attention to importance of technical economic cooperation as concrete expression of U.S. and Soviet commitment to work together in support of economic perestroyka.

- Sides agree to expand scope of current cooperation projects and develop new projects in areas of mutual interest.

Joint Statement on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

During the state visit of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, President of the USSR, at the invitation of George Bush, President of the United States, the sides concluded a new U.S.-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. This Agreement strengthens the long-standing framework for important research in a number of fields of mutual interest, including controlled thermonuclear fusion, fundamental properties of matter, and civilian nuclear reactor safety.

Recognizing the need to manage responsibly the development and utilization of nuclear power, the two sides have agreed on cooperation in the study of the health and environmental effects of past, present and future nuclear power generation, and in strengthening operational safety practices in civilian nuclear reactors. The sides intend to develop and implement promptly a mutually beneficial joint program of work in these fields under this Agreement. They also agreed to explore the possibilities for cooperation in the management of hazardous and radioactive waste.

FACT SHEET: JOINT STATEMENT ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

BACKGROUND

- Cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy began under Agreement first signed in 1973.
- 1973 Agreement has been extended four times, most recently in 1989.
- Joint statement notes conclusion of the renegotiated Agreement and highlights expanded cooperation in civilian nuclear reactor operational safety.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Notes conclusion of the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.
- Underscores strengthened framework for cooperation in thermonuclear fusion, fundamental properties of matter, and civilian nuclear reactor safety.
- Highlights cooperation in studying health and environmental effects of nuclear power generation and in strengthening operational safety practices in civilian nuclear reactors.
- Adds that sides will explore possible cooperation in management of hazardous and radioactive waste.

FACT SHEET: CUSTOMS COOPERATION AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Agreement negotiated by U.S. and Soviet customs services.
- Concrete example of enhanced cooperation between U.S. and USSR in combatting narcotics trafficking and abuse, facilitated by January 1989 Memorandum of Understanding.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Agreement provides for mutual assistance between customs services of U.S. and USSR.
- Agreement provides basis for cooperative activity in deterring and detecting narcotics trafficking.
- Agreement designed to strengthen cooperative measures which the two services typically undertake.
- Agreement provides formal basis for cooperation in areas of customs law enforcement assistance, export control and commercial fraud.

FACT SHEET: CULTURAL CENTERS AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Establishment of U.S. cultural center in Moscow has been long-standing U.S. policy objective.

- Reciprocal centers will deepen mutual understanding between our countries and strengthen bilateral relations.

  -- U.S. operates cultural centers in more than 100 countries.

  -- USSR has signed cultural center agreements with other Western countries, including FRG, UK, France and Italy.

- Bilateral Program of Cooperation (1989-1990), signed at 1988 Moscow summit, includes agreement to conduct negotiations on bilateral agreement to establish reciprocal cultural centers.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Centers, constituted as non-diplomatic, non-profit institutions, will be opened in Washington and Moscow.

- Center Directors and one Deputy Director for each side to have diplomatic titles and be accredited by their governments to their respective Embassies; with this exception, Center personnel, properties and papers will not have diplomatic status.

- Centers will carry out variety of functions, e.g. operating libraries; sponsoring seminars, films and performances; and providing student counseling and language instruction.

- Public guaranteed free, unrestricted access to centers.

- U.S. center in Moscow has right to use rubles to cover domestic operating expenses.

- Occupancy and opening dates to be determined by mutual agreement on basis of reciprocity.

- Agreement to take effect after exchange of notes confirming each side has completed domestic measures required for implementation.

FACT SHEET: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO INCREASE CIRCULATION OF "AMERICA" AND "SOVIET LIFE" MAGAZINES

BACKGROUND

- 1989-1991 Program of Cooperation under U.S.-USSR General Exchanges Agreement mandated increased distribution levels of "America" and "Soviet Life" magazines.
  - -- Circulation was to increase reciprocally in phases from 60,000 to 80,000 copies in 1989, reaching 120,000 by 1991.
- At February 1990 U.S.-USSR information talks, sides agreed in principle to raise circulation ceilings for both magazines to 250,000 copies in 1991 and to eliminate ceilings thereafter.

TERMS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

- Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) amends 1989-1991 Program of Cooperation under General Exchanges Agreement.
- MOU provides for increased circulation of "America" and "Soviet Life" magazines up to 250,000 copies in 1991.
- Distribution of both magazines after 1991 to be governed solely by demand.
- Each side may print commercial advertising and distribute unsold copies of its magazine at official premises, cultural centers and exhibitions under its sponsorship.