

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91118
Folder ID Number: 91118-003

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Responding to Soviet Sanctions against Lithuania (1 pp.)	4/25/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Q&A	Re: Draft Q's and A's (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	Michael Hayden/Coni Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Soviet Ship Visit to San Diego (2 pp.)	5/11/90	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Ambassador Dubinin Message Regarding Lithuania (1 pp.)	5/14/90	(b)(1)	
03b. Letter	Re: In the course of her recent contacts... (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Summit Planning Group Meeting: Wednesday, May 16; 4:30 p.m. (2 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Summit Schedule (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Briefing the President for the U.S. -Soviet Summit (2 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. -Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap998
OA/ID Number: 91118-003
Date Closed: 2/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06. Memo	From Blair Dorminey to Robert M. Gates, Re: Report on Warning Meeting, May 17 [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions redacted] (8 pp.)	5/21/90	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S
07a. Memo	Memorandum for the Record Re: Aid to the Soviet Union (3 pp.)	5/29/90	(b)(1)	S
07b. Handwritten Notes	Re: Aid (2 pp.)	5/24/90	(b)(1)	
08a. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Nuclear Testing -- Commitment to Follow-On Negotiations (2 pp.)	5/30/90	(b)(1)	S
08b. Report	Re: Examples of Previous Administration's Statements on Follow-on Nuclear Testing Limitation Negotiations (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09a. Memo	Brent [Scowcroft] to POTUS Re: Mr. President (1 pp.)	5/29/90	(b)(1)	S
09b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call with Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09c. Message	Re: Message from the President to Prime Minister Mulroney (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10a. Memo	Paul Wolfowitz to National Security Advisor Re: Changes in U.S. Defense Posture (2 pp.)	5/30/90	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Collapse Files

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WHORM Cat.:

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10b. Talking Points	Re: Cutting Back and Reshaping the U.S. Defense Posture (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
10c. Table	Re: U.S./USSR Comparison of Military Production (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Fred McClure Re: Points To Be Made in the President's Meeting with the CODEL to the Soviet Union (1 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	✓
11b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made in Meeting with CODEL to the Soviet Union (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
11c. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Points to be Made in the President's Meeting with the CODEL to the Soviet Union (1 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	✓

Page 3 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

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FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Nonlog

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 25, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

SUBJECT: Responding to Soviet Sanctions against Lithuania

Further to our brief conversation on the option of continuing negotiations but withholding the President's signature on any economic agreements with Moscow, here is a possible formulation for use in the President's letters and statement:

Therefore, I have decided not to sign any of the economic agreements which are under negotiation as a result of the initiatives I put forward at Malta, until and unless the Soviet leadership enters into a good-faith dialogue with Lithuania's representatives *[and until the economic sanctions*

At Tab I are draft Q's and A's explaining the measure and the rationale behind it.

Your reaction?

CR *CR for RBL*
Condi Rice and Bob Hutchings concur.

Attachment

Tab I Draft Q's and A's

So long as the economic conditions

*Brent - Just talking
isn't good enough!
J.*

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-1197.F CAP

3/6/08

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Declassify on: OADR

DRAFT Q'S AND A'S

- Q: Does this mean the United States will continue to negotiate with the Soviet Union on these agreements? What is the point in that?
- A: -- Yes. The President does not want to prejudge Soviet actions or take steps now that would rule out the possibility of timely conclusion of the economic agenda he announced at Malta should circumstances permit.
- Q: What economic agreements would be affected?
- A: -- They are a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement, a bilateral investment treaty, and a tax treaty. All are under negotiation as a result of the President's initiatives at Malta. They are described in a Fact Sheet.
- Q: How long will this condition remain in effect?
- A: -- The President has made it clear that he will not sign those agreements so long as the current circumstances continue. He calls on the Soviet leadership to enter into discussions in good faith with Lithuania's representatives, free from pressure or intimidation.
- Q: Are our Allies in agreement with these measures?
- A: -- The President's announcement affects U.S. initiatives only. The President has sent a personal message to each of our Allies regarding this decision, and we have consulted with other European Governments. We share a common hope that a genuine dialogue will begin between the Soviet leadership and Lithuania's representatives.
- Q: How will Moscow react? Is the Summit in jeopardy?
- A: -- The President has sent a personal message to President Gorbachev explaining what he is doing and why, and he reiterated the need for a good-faith dialogue, without pressure or intimidation.
- The President hopes that the positive movement in U.S.-Soviet relations can continue. There is a great deal at stake, not only for the U.S. and the Soviet Union but for all of Europe and indeed for the world. He intends to proceed with the Summit at the end of May.

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003604
RECEIVED: 07 MAY 90 11

COMMON FILE

~~SECRET~~

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 25 APR 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: USSR
SANCTIONS

ECONOMICS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO SOVIET SANCTIONS AGAINST LITHUANIA / QUESTIONS &
ANSWERS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLACKWILL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3777

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 11, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: MICHAEL HAYDEN/CONDI RICE

SUBJECT: Soviet Ship Visit to San Diego

You may recall that three Soviet warships are scheduled to visit San Diego from 31 July to 4 August as part of the agreed two-year calendar of military contacts. The Soviets intend to send two destroyers and an oiler with their PACFLT commander embarked. The San Diego port visit is similar to one made by Soviet warships to Norfolk last summer in what was a very high-profile event. The Navy has repeatedly asked for approval to begin public planning with the city of San Diego for the visit. We have so far told them to put any public actions on hold but have given no indications to the Soviets that the visit is in question.

The port visit is the most visible in a series of military contacts scheduled between now and General Moiseyev's visit in September. An NDU group is in the Soviet Union, a Soviet icebreaker is in San Francisco for the bicentennial of the Coast Guard, and we will shortly begin INCSEA talks in Moscow. Later in May an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force and U.S. aerospace industry representatives will tour the Soviet Union (in return for a Soviet tour of General Dynamics last year). U.S. ships with CINCPACFLT embarked are scheduled to visit Vladivostok in September.

We have learned that, without a go ahead by early June, there will be insufficient time to plan the San Diego visit and it would have to be cancelled. We have also learned that losses for cancelling -- after our go ahead has been given -- could run up to \$75,000-100,000 for the Navy and \$40,000-60,000 for the city.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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2009-0946-MR
SCS 4/25/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We recommend three steps:

- We inform the Navy they will have a definitive answer in early June.
- In June, assuming a positive Summit and no Baltic crackdown, we give the Navy approval to go public with their planning.
- If approval is given, we inform the Navy that future events could cause us to revisit the issue and sunk costs would not be an impediment to cancelling.

Concurrences by: Nick Burns^{NB} and Don Pilling.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the plan outlined above.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: DAO LOG # 3777
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM RRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 24 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Bill Sittmann</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>w</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>traveling</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

RECEIVED
 90 MAY 14 P 2:37

☒ A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Soviet Ship Visit to
 San Diego

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003810
RECEIVED: 14 MAY 90 12



TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: RICE
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 14 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

PERSONS: DUBININ, YURIY V

PRUNSKIENE, KAZIMIERA

SUBJECT: AMB DUBININ MSG RE LITHUANIA

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 17 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RICE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9003810

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 RICE
002 SCOWCROFT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90051412 PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
Z 90051512 FOR INFORMATION
X 90052211 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 14, 1990

(Signature) 5/14/90
1128

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Bent --

Not good news.

Bob Black

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Dubinin Message Regarding Lithuania

Secretary Baker has forwarded the text of a message which Ambassador Dubinin delivered to him orally on May 14.

The Dubinin statement reports on Mrs. Prunskiene's meeting with Soviet Ambassador Kvitsinsky in Bonn. It constitutes a rejection of Prunskiene's somewhat tentative effort to offer a compromise. The report takes an extremely negative view of Lithuania's "double game" assuring Western representatives of its willingness to accept a dialogue, expecting to gain some political capital on it, and in deed, it has done nothing to make such dialogue a reality.

Attachment

Tab I Incoming

In the course of her recent contacts with a number of Western leaders, Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania K. Prunskiene contended that the present Lithuanian leadership wants dialogue with the USSR leadership and is prepared to suspend the decisions of the Lithuanian Parliament of March 11, which unilaterally proclaimed the Republic's independence, as well as other recently adopted laws and resolutions which run contra ry to the USSR Constitution.

At the same time, in her conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn on May 11, while proposing an urgent meeting with the Soviet leadership, Prunskiene again put forward a member of conditions and reservations. She said bluntly that the decision of the Lithuanian Parliament of March 11 cannot be suspended or rescinded. She was saying in this context, though, that it would be possible to suspend a number of laws and resolutions by the Lithuanian authorities, which affect the interests of the Soviet Union. She didn't say what, specifically, could be suspended, giving to understand that this should be the subject of negotiations with Moscow.

Prunskiene admitted that the Lithuanian authorities' decisions to repudiate the army draft and dismantle the organizational structures of the local organs of power were somewhat hasty. The issuance of Lithuanian citizenship IDs is, in her words, largely symbolic. But in order to remove all fears the Lithuanian leadership is prepared to provide guarantees of the

rights of the "non-Lithuanian population". She also said that for the transition period one could think of a "dual border", "dual visas", and "dual customs".

All of this was being presented by Prunskiene as her personal initiative to settle the conflict. She emphasized that Lithuania will relax its maximalist posture, but that it must be met halfway. In the course of the conversation Prunskiene was throwing numerous lightly veiled threats. She said she could allegedly send a signal, - and oil tankers would start coming to Lithuania, for the USSR is not likely to stop them by force, is it? Money had been promised to her. There was also this theme: as a result of her trip to the US she had showered Gorbachev's road to Washington with flowers. And if there is no agreement with Lithuania, his meeting with Bush could be soured.

Prunskiene insisted that her trip to Western countries had been very successful. She allegedly found support and understanding.

Prunskiene's conversation with the Soviet Ambassador makes it clear that the present Lithuanian leadership is trying to play a double game: in words, it assures Western representatives of its willingness to accept a dialogue expecting to gain some political capital on it, and in deeds, it has done nothing to make such dialogue a reality.

The Soviet leadership - and I wish to stress it - is for dialogue and a political solution to the Lithuanian problem. The solution, however, can only be found within the framework of the constitutional process, on the basis of the legislation which is in force.

To begin the dialogue, it is necessary first of all to restore the situation as it existed on March 10 last. The USSR President has an absolutely clear mandate from the Third Congress of Peoples' Deputies, and the Lithuanian leadership must reckon with it. Unfortunately, the present Lithuanian leadership ignores it, and by its actions is creating insurmountable obstacles to dialogue.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003902
RECEIVED: 16 MAY 90 09

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BURNS
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 16 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMIT PLANNING GRP MTG / MAY 16

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 19 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
BURNS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cep NARA, Date 3/21/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9003902

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90051611 FOR INFORMATION
X 90061507 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/24/09

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 3902
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 27 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

RECEIVED

90 MAY 16 AM 11:17

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*4:30 Summit Planning
Group Mtg -*

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3902

May 16, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL NB *for*

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Summit Planning Group Meeting: Wednesday, May 16;
4:30 p.m.

*Nat Sec Advisor
has seen*

You and Governor Sununu will chair a Summit Group planning meeting to review the major decisions to be made for the May 30-June 4 visit by President Gorbachev. The following is a suggested agenda for the meeting for your use as a way of organizing discussion.

I. Review of Schedule

- You may want to ask Ambassador Reed to review the schedule (draft copy attached at Tab I) for the group. As you know, the schedule is essentially the one the Soviets proposed to us, and which Secretary Baker accepted in a May 14 conversation with Ambassador Dubinin (the timing of some of the events differs slightly from the schedule you sent to the President last week--also attached at Tab II).

II. Major Outstanding Issues

In reviewing the schedule, you may want to focus on the following major outstanding issues which require the President's decision

- State Dinner: The President will need to decide on the size and character of the dinner. For example, we could make the dinner USG officials only to emphasize the business-like nature of the Summit, or we could invite the normal mix of public and private guests. Numbers could range from 130 in the East Room to 200 in the Rose Garden, with the possibility of inviting private sector guests to entertainment afterward.
- Signing Agreements: The President will, of course, also need to decide which agreements the U.S. should sign with the Soviets. This decision is best left until Secretary Baker returns from the Moscow Ministerial.
- Camp David: The Soviets are interested in which American and Soviet officials will be asked to accompany the two Presidents to Camp David. Ambassador Reed has put them off

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0946-MR
SCS 4/24/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

until now, and has emphasized that the President would like to keep the day informal and limited to a very few. The President will need to make this call.

III. Mrs. Gorbachev's Schedule

You might ask Ambassador Reed to review Mrs. Gorbachev's planned schedule.

- The visit to Wellesley College will be the most difficult part of her schedule to arrange since she would like to be back in Washington by mid-afternoon (Commencement begins at 10:00 a.m.). Ambassador Reed is working with Mrs. Bush's office to coordinate with the Soviets on these arrangements.

IV U.S. Logistical Support for the Soviets

Our meetings with the Soviet Embassy Charge d'affaires yesterday make it very clear that the Soviets have done little planning and are far behind where they should be two weeks before Gorbachev's arrival. At this point, they are completely disorganized, and have made no preparations for the especially difficult logistical arrangements in Minneapolis and San Francisco (as you are aware, they did not inform President Reagan, Stanford and the Governor of Minnesota of their proposed meetings until May 15).

We suggest you raise two ways by which we should proceed starting tomorrow to try to steer the Soviets in the right direction:

- They need to be told at a fairly senior level in a friendly but frank way that they have proposed an exceedingly complicated trip and are far behind schedule. They do not seem to realize the difficulty of the job ahead (clearances for aircraft, hotel space, security etc) or how to get it done. You might ask Ambassador Reed to deliver this message (he has been careful not to make such a statement until now).
- Although the Soviets are responsible for costs incurred outside of Washington, and are taking the lead in planning, we believe the USG will have to offer substantial support to make the visits to Minnesota and San Francisco a success. You may want to suggest creation of a core White House/State support group (comprising 20-25 people) to provide logistical and advance advice and assistance to the Soviet advance party which will arrive shortly. We do not think they are currently capable of making these stops successful without us.

Concurrence by: Bill Sittmann *BS*

Attachments:

Tab I Draft #2 Summary Schedule
Tab II Summit Schedule - Log #3711

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE STATE VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES
OF
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT
OF
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND
MRS. GORBACHEV

DRAFT #2
5/15/90

MAY 30 TO JUNE 4, 1990

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

WEDNESDAY
MAY 30

6:30 pm- Greeted by _____,
6:35 pm Chief of Protocol Reed,
and Welcoming Committee, Andrews
Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

6:35 pm Depart via motorcade en route
Soviet Embassy.

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

WEDNESDAY

MAY 30

(Continued)

7:00 pm Arrive Soviet Embassy.

Private evening.

Overnight: Soviet Embassy.

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

THURSDAY

MAY 31

10:00 am- Arrival Ceremony with The
10:20 am President and Mrs. Bush, South
Lawn, The White House.

10:30 am- Coffee offered by
11:00 am Mrs. Bush in honor of
Mrs. Gorbachev, Green
Room, The White House.

10:30 am- Meeting with President Bush, Oval
12:00 pm Office, The White House.*

1:00 pm- Luncheon with Prominent
2:30 pm Intellectuals, Soviet embassy.

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

THURSDAY

MAY 31

(Continued)

3:30 pm- Mrs. Gorbachev opens
5:00 pm the exhibition of
ancient Russian
manuscripts and tours
the Library of
Congress.

4:00 pm- Meeting with President Bush,
5:30 pm _____ The White
House.*

7:15 pm- Reception, State Dinner and
11:00 pm After-Dinner Entertainment, East
Room and State Dining Room, The
White House.*

Overnight: Soviet Embassy.

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

FRIDAY
JUNE 1

9:30 am- Meeting with Congressional
TBD am Leaders, Soviet Embassy.

10:00 am- Mrs. Bush and Mrs.
1:30 pm Gorbachev participate
in graduation ceremony,
Wellesley College,
Boston.

11:00 am- Meeting with President Bush,
1:00 pm _____ The White House.*

2:00 pm- Private lunch, Soviet Embassy.
3:30 pm

3:30 pm- Presentation of Awards to
4:30 pm President Gorbachev, Soviet
Embassy.

5:00 pm- Meeting with President
6:00 pm Bush, _____ The White
House.*

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

FRIDAY

JUNE 1

(Continued)

6:00 pm- Signing Ceremony, _____
6:30 pm The White House.*

7:30 pm- Return dinner offered by
TBD pm President and Mrs. Gorbachev,
Soviet Embassy.

Overnight: Soviet Embassy.

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

SATURDAY
JUNE 2

9:30 am- U.S. Presidential Helicopters
10:00 am to Camp David.

10:00 am- Private time with The President
6:00 pm and Mrs. Bush, Camp David.*

Private evening.

Overnight: Soviet Embassy.

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

SUNDAY
JUNE 3

10:00 am Joint Press Conference - East Room

TBD am Depart Soviet Embassy via
 motorcade en route Andrews Air
 Force Base.

TBD am Arrive Andrews Air Force Base.

TBD am Farewell Ceremony
 with _____, Chief of
 Protocol Reed, and Farewell
 Committee, Andrews Air Force
 Base.

12:00 pm Depart Andrews Air Force Base
 via _____ en route
 Minneapolis, Minnesota.

TBD pm Luncheon offered by Governor and
 local authorities.

5:00 pm- Meeting with Mid-West business
TBD pm leaders_____.

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

SUNDAY

JUNE 3

(Continued)

7:00 pm Depart Minneapolis, Minnesota
 via _____ en route
 San Francisco, California.

TBD pm Arrive San Francisco, California.

Private evening.

Overnight: _____.

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

MONDAY
JUNE 4

9:30 am- Breakfast meeting with former
10:15 am President Reagan, _____.

11:00 am- President Gorbachev addresses
1:00 pm students of Stanford University.

1:30 pm- Luncheon offered by West Coast
3:00 pm political and Business
Leaders _____.

3:30 pm Depart San Francisco
via _____ en route
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NICK
BURNS

3711

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Summit Schedule

Purpose

The notional schedule below is for your review and comment.

Background

We have now received a new Soviet notional schedule informing us that Gorbachev has accepted your invitation to Camp David on June 2 but does not want to overnight there. Mrs. Gorbachev will accompany Mrs. Bush to Wellesley College on Friday, June 1. The Gorbachevs will go on to Minnesota and San Francisco on Sunday, June 3. The Soviet schedule is at Tab I.

There are a number of issues that need to be decided concerning the official part of the Summit program (May 31-June 3). There are also questions concerning the nature of the Camp David portion of the trip.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1990

6:30 p.m.

President and Mrs. Gorbachev arrive
Andrews AFB (Open Press)

THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1990

10:00 a.m.

State Arrival Ceremony on the South Lawn

10:40 a.m.

Oval Office Meeting

(Pool Photo opportunity at beginning of meeting)

In keeping with your Malta meetings, we assume that you will want to begin with a restricted session.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0946-MR
SCS 4/24/13

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Declassify on: OADR

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Participants:	The President	President Gorbachev
	Notetaker	Notetaker
	Interpreter	Interpreter

11:40 a.m. **Expanded Bilateral Meeting in the
Cabinet Room (Closed Press)**

The Malta meeting was limited to:

Participants:	The President	President Gorbachev
	+ 6 U.S. participants	+ 6 Soviet participants

1:00 p.m. **Gorbachev will host a luncheon at the
Soviet Embassy for prominent Americans.**

3:00 p.m. **Conclude Luncheon and Begin Second
Expanded Bilateral Meeting of Seven on a
Side in the Cabinet Room (Closed Press)**

4:30 p.m. **Conclude Bilateral Meetings**

7:15 p.m. **State Dinner (Black Tie)**

It is the practice of the men in the Soviet Party to wear business suits rather than black tie attire.

We have discussed a number of possible variations for the State Dinner and that will depend on the tone we wish to set in view of the situation in Lithuania. The primary questions concern the size and character of the dinner. Not surprisingly, this will be the most sought after invitation to a State Dinner since the Administration came to office. If you decide to emphasize the business-like nature of the Summit (perhaps appropriate under current political circumstances), we may want to invite only U.S. government officials (including representatives from the Executive and Legislative branches and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court). Other guests from the private sector (businessmen, artists, sportsmen) who would normally attend a State Dinner could be invited to the coffee and entertainment after the dinner. In order to give these people a greater sense of participation, one suggestion was to have you give somewhat longer remarks than usual at the coffee -- perhaps including the primary champagne toast between you and Gorbachev.

A dinner for approximately 130 could be held in the East Room. If we hold the dinner under a Rose Garden tent, the number could be expanded to approximately 200.

11:00 p.m. **Dinner Concludes**

FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1990

9:30 a.m. **Gorbachev will meet with Congressional
leaders at the Soviet Embassy**

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11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.	Third Expanded Bilateral Meeting
2:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.	Private Lunch
3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.	Gorbachev will receive awards at the Soviet Embassy
5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.	Concluding Expanded Bilateral Meeting
6:00 p.m. - 6:30 p.m.	Ceremony to Sign U.S.-Soviet Agreements
7:30 p.m. -	Return Dinner

SATURDAY, JUNE 3, 1990

9:30 -	President and Mrs. Bush and President and Mrs. Gorbachev depart for Camp David by helicopter
--------	--

Camp David lends itself to informal discussion and maximum time for one-on-one conversation with Gorbachev. You will need to decide what members of your team you wish to take with you to Camp David.

Finally, you may wish to invite other couples -- close personal friends or perhaps artists like Slava and Galina Rostropovich -- to dinner at Camp David, or you and Mrs. Bush may wish to dine alone with the Gorbachevs.

The Gorbachevs wish to return to Washington Saturday evening.

SUNDAY, JUNE 3, 1990

10:00 a.m.	Joint Press Conference
11:00 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.	Official Departure Ceremony

RECOMMENDATION

That you comment on the above notional schedule.

Attachment
Tab A New Soviet Schedule

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a STATE VISIT to US from across - - -
② Want to know who pays what? i.e. what normal practice is + how this " will be applied in case?
③ also Want all details of trip to Boston w/ Mr B.

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICIAL VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES

(May 30 to June 5, 1990)

May 30, Wednesday

18.30 Arrival in Washington, D.C.
(Andrews AF base).

19.00 Arrival at the Embassy.
No functions scheduled.

May 31, Thursday

10.00 Official arrival ceremony at the White House.

10.30-12.00 Meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.
Mrs. Bush invites Mrs. Gorbachev for a cup of coffee to the White House Green Room.

13.00-14.30 Luncheon at the Embassy for prominent intellectuals (the list of American participants to be transmitted later)

15.30-17.00 Mrs. Gorbachev opens the exhibition of ancient Russian manuscripts at the Library of Congress.
Tour of the Library.

Church

16.00-17.30

Second meeting with President Bush.

19.00-

Official dinner hosted by President Bush at the White House.

June 1, Friday

9.30-

Meeting at the Embassy with Congressional leaders over a cup of coffee (Speaker Foley, House and Senate majority and minority leaders Gephardt, Michel, Mitchell, Dole, Chairmen of Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees: Fascell, Les Aspin, Pell, Nunn).

11.00-13.00

Third meeting with President Bush.

10.00-13.30

Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush depart for Boston.
Call on the Wellesly College.
Brief address.

X 14.00-15.30

Private lunch.

15.30-16.30

Presentation of awards to President Gorbachev (at the Embassy):
FDR Medal of Freedom;
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Sciences of the Brown University;
International Martin Luther King Prize for 1990.

X 17.00-18.00

Concluding meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.

18.00-18.30

Ceremony of signing Soviet-US documents

19.30-

Official dinner hosted by President and Mrs. Gorbachev at the Embassy.

Entertainment by Soviet performers.

June 2, Saturday

9.30-

Depart for Camp David (by helicopter).

10.00-

Talks at Camp David.

Evening

Return to Washington, D.C.

June 3, Sunday

10.00-

President Gorbachev and President Bush hold joint press conference.

11.00-11.30

Official departure ceremony at the White House.

12.00-

Depart for Minneapolis, Minnesota.

- Luncheon hosted by the Governor and local authorities.

17.00-

Meeting with Mid-West business leaders and with US agricultural leaders (Cristal, Block and others).

19.00-

Depart for San Francisco.

21.30-

Arrive San Francisco.

Evening

Free time.

June 4, Monday

9.30-10.15

Breakfast and conversation with President Reagan (at the Soviet residence).

11.00-13.00

Visit to Stanford University
(by invitation from the leadership of the student organization and faculty).
President Gorbachev will make an address.

13.30-15.00

Luncheon hosted by West Coast political and business leaders.

15.30-

Depart San Francisco for Petropavlovsk Kamchatskiy.

June 5, Tuesday

8.30-
(local time)

Arrive Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

УТОЧНЕННЫЙ ПРОЕКТ СХЕМЫ ПРОГРАММЫ
ОФИЦИАЛЬНОГО ВИЗИТА В США
(30 мая - 4 июня 1990 г.)

30 мая, среда

- | | |
|-------|---|
| 18.30 | - Прибытие в Вашингтон (авиабаза "Эндрюс"). |
| 19.00 | - Размещение в совпосольстве.

- Вечер свободный. |

31 мая, четверг

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 10.00 | - Официальная церемония встречи в Белом доме. |
| 10.30-12.00 | - Встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома.

- Б.Буш приглашает Р.М.Горбачеву на кофе в Зеленую гостиную Белого дом |
| 13.00-14.30 | - Завтрак в совпосольстве для видных представителей интеллигенции. (Список американских участников готовится). |
| 15.30-17.00 | - Р.М.Горбачева открывает выставку древнерусских рукописей в Библиотеке конгресса США. Осмотр Библиотеки конг |
| 16.00-17.30 | - Вторая встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем. |
| 19.00 | - Официальный обед от имени Дж.Буша в Белом доме. |

1 июня. ПЯТНИЦА

9.30

- Встреча в посольстве за чашкой кофе с лидерами конгресса (спикер палаты представителей Т.Фолли, лидеры демократического большинства и республиканского меньшинства в палате и в сенате - Р.Гепхардт, Р.Майкл, Дж.Митчелл, Р.Доул, председатели комиссий по иностранным делам и вооруженных сил палаты представителей и сената Д.Фассетт, Л.Эспин, К.Пэлл, С.Нанн).

11.00-13.00

- Третья встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем.

10.00-13.30

- Поездка Р.М.Горбачевой в сопровождении Б.Буш в Бостон. Посещение женского колледжа Уэлзли.
Краткое выступление.

14.00-15.30

- Частный завтрак.

15.30-16.30

- Церемония вручения М.С.Горбачеву (в совпосольстве) Медали Свободы им.Ф.Рузвельта.
Почетной степени доктора наук Брауновского университета.
Международной премии им.Мартина Лютера Кинга 1990 года.

17.00-18.00

- Заключительная встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома.

18.00-18.30

- Церемония подписания советско-американских документов.

19.30

- Официальный обед от имени М.С.Горбачевой с супругой в совпосольстве. Концерт советских артистов.

2 июня, суббота

9.30

- Отлет вертолетом в Кэмп-Дэвид.

10.00

- Переговоры в Кэмп-Дэвиде.

Вечер

- Возвращение в Вашингтон.

3 июня, воскресенье

10.00

- Совместная пресс-конференция
М.С.Горбачева и Дж.Буша.

11.00-11.30

- Официальная церемония проводов
в Белом доме.

12.00

- Отлет в Миннеаполис (шт.Миннесота).
- Завтрак от имени губернатора и
местных властей.

17.00

- Встреча с представителями деловых
кругов Среднего Запада, а также с
лидерами сельского хозяйства США
(Блок, Кристалл и др.).

19.00

- Отлет в Сан-Франциско.

21.30

- Прибытие в Сан-Франциско.

Вечер

- Свободный.

4 июня, понедельник

9.30-10.15

- Завтрак и беседа с бывшим президентом
Р.Рейганом (в советской резиденции).

11.00-13.00

- Посещение Стэнфордского университета (есть приглашение руководства студенческой организации и от профессоров).
Выступление.

13.30-15.00

- Обед от имени ведущих представителей политического и делового мира Западного побережья.

15.30

- Вылет из Сан-Франциско в Петропавловск-Камчатский.

5 июня, вторник

8.30

(время местное)

- Прибытие в Петропавловск-Камчатский.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003933
RECEIVED: 17 MAY 90 08

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BURNS
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 17 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR ECONOMICS
ARMS CONTROL

SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PRES FOR US / SOVIET SUMMIT 23 - 30 MAY

ACTION: STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

DUE DATE: 23 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

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DOC 1 OF 1

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Briefs for Pres - Soviet Summit

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: 24. LOG # 3933
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 24 AIO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>		<u>N</u>
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	<u>Has Has Seen</u>	<u>See note</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			
<u>Burns</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>PPA</u>

30 MAY 17 AIO: 58

Copy for Florence, pls.

24.5/22

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Briefings for P
re - Summit*

*done (5/22)
Lgr*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3933

May 17, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL ^{RB}

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS ^{NB}

SUBJECT: Briefing the President for the U.S.-Soviet Summit

The President has agreed to five, one-hour briefings on the U.S.-Soviet Summit between May 23-30, and times have been set aside by Presidential scheduling. Secretary Baker was to have taken one of the hours to brief on the Moscow Ministerial. Due to schedule difficulties, however, the Secretary will brief the President on May 22. That leaves us with an extra session for briefing the President on the Summit, should we choose to use it, and the President agrees. We suggest using the extra session during the last briefing time to summarize major issues and objectives for the Summit.

We would propose structuring the briefings in the following manner:

-- Each invited briefer would speak for five minutes, followed by question and answer and general discussion.

-- We would suggest including, in addition to the briefers, you and Bob Gates, Bob Blackwill and Condi Rice, Secretary Baker plus two (total of seven), in the discussions on Soviet Domestic Politics, the Soviet Economy, Soviet Policy Toward Germany, and the Summary Issue discussion.

-- For the Arms Control discussion, we suggest making it principals only, including Cheney, General Powell, and Webster.

We propose the following briefings and outside participants (we have not extended invitations to any of the outside participants pending your review of the schedule):

May 23: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.

The Soviet Economy

Participants: Ed Hewitt-Brookings Institution

John Hart-Congressional Research Service

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Declassify on: OADR

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AS AMENDED
1999.0301.F CAP
5/13/03

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May 24: 3:00-4:00 p.m.

Soviet Policy Toward Germany

Participants: Administration Officials

May 29: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.

Soviet Domestic Politics

Participants: Paul Goble-Radio Free Europe
Nationalities

Seweryn Bialer-Columbia University
Domestic political issues

Stephen Meyer-MIT
Soviet Military

May 29: 1:30-2:30 p.m.

Arms Control Issues and Agreements

Participants: Administration Officials

May 30: 10:00-11:00 a.m.

Summary Discussion of Summit Issues and Objectives

Participants: Administration Officials

Condi Rice concurs

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the proposal outlined above and indicate your approval or other preferences.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

*OK for #1. Let's talk about
the others.*
[Signature]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	From Blair Dorminey to Robert M. Gates, Re: Report on Warning Meeting, May 17 [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions redacted] (8 pp.)	5/21/90	(b)(1), (b)(6)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. -Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [2]

Document Declassified
Copy of **(Document Follows)**
 By MM on 7/11/2022

Date Closed: 2/24/2009 FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S Re-review Case #: P-2/P-5 Review Case #: AR Case #: AR Disposition: AR Disposition Date:	OA/ID Number: 91118-003 Appeal Case #: Appeal Disposition: Disposition Date: MR Case #: 2009-0946-MR(505) MR Disposition: Released in Full MR Disposition Date: 10/26/2015
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 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4015

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CHRON FILE

May 21, 1990


INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: PETER W. RODMAN *WR*

FROM: BLAIR DORMINEY *ABD*

SUBJECT: Report on Warning Meeting, May 17



Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

I thought a summary of last week's warning meeting might be useful to you. The general subject was the likely impact of the Soviet domestic scene on Gorbachev's approach to the Summit. Three sub-topics were discussed:

Gorbachev's Political Standing

Jack Sontag (INR) led off with several points: Gorbachev is not preoccupied with the domestic situation to the extent of being unable to focus on the Summit, nor is he significantly restricted in his room for maneuver. Further, the Gorbachev politburo realizes more keenly now that they must "hang together or hang separately." Gorbachev's accession to the new presidency has not affected his ability to bargain or make decisions at the Summit. He possibly has more strength, but he was already quite strong. In all, not much change. As to what Gorbachev wants from the Summit and how it will affect his standing, getting what he wants could give him a "boost." He needs all the help he can get on the eve of the Party Congress. More than any previous leader, he knows how to use the publicity, etc., to enhance his stature and power.

This view was critiqued by a representative from SOVA: There is genuine disagreement within the leadership; they are not "circling their wagons." Yakovlev is sometimes moving in a direction 180 degrees from Gorbachev, e.g. unemployment. This is not a case of politics as usual; the stakes are much higher. Ligachev, for example, has no toehold in the government structure; if the party splits he may have nothing to stand on. As to the question of how the Summit results will play at home, concessions could "confound" Gorbachev. Consequently, it can be expected that Gorbachev will be "quite leery" of anything that

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would appear concessionary at home. It can be debated how much the Soviet stance has changed on arms control between February and April. There is more constraint now and more attention paid to the "right" flank. (This seems overtaken by the Moscow Ministerial, at least with respect to START.)

A wide-ranging discussion then followed, with one participant suggesting that Gorbachev has a "good bit" of room for maneuver going into the Summit, and will be little affected by the domestic scene. An NSA participant believed that Gorbachev will be "attentive to rhetoric, although not restrained." He further observed that any boost from the Summit will be "short-lived": Soviet needs will not be satisfied by gains likely to be made there.

Another discussant said that at the moment, "power is everywhere and nowhere." Disagreements about basic foreign policy are coming to the surface. Gorbachev will be more attentive to symbolism. However, he is unlikely to feel constrained by the military on arms control. To this comment, Mary LNU answered that she was not suggesting that Gorbachev is "succumbing directly to military pressure but rather that there is a confluence of concerns."

Marty LNU opined that the perceived split between the military and Gorbachev is "artificial." To the extent that Gorbachev bows to the military, it will be in delaying the CFE or CSCE summits.

Blackwell interjected that he tended to agree with the NSA representative (Jeff LNU) that it is unclear how summitry would help Gorbachev with his domestic problems. Another participant echoed the point, saying that "the Soviet people have seen this before, that the West gives too much credit to Gorbachev."

Sontag noted that Gorbachev faces a need to cut military spending. By the Summit and other means, he can relieve the appearance of a threat.

Mary LNU replied that she doesn't see reformers talking about foreign policy issues. The value of a reduced threat is already known to them and "taken to the bank." In contrast, "people on the right are concerned about foreign policy." Consequently, "a failed Summit would play badly in the traditionalist camp." A "tongue-lashing" from Americans on the Baltics might not go down well. In sum, a normal successful Summit won't help Gorbachev that much but there is the potential to harm him with a certain constituency.

Blackwell summarized, observing that there are "limits to what a Summit can do for you." He then referred to the negotiations on

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ALCMs and SLCMs, saying these were now "down to haggling." The evidence suggests that the Soviets do "want to close on START, and are looking for solutions." This can be seen in their movement from earlier positions.

Blackwell then asked whether there was a difference of views as to whether there is disagreement in Moscow on major issues likely to surface at the Summit.

Ed LNU replied that he didn't "subscribe to polarization." Rather, "all sides are not sure how to proceed." Some have tendencies in one direction or another. For example, in the Baltics, some see a need to be tougher but don't have concrete solutions.

Another participant agreed that "many issues are cross-cutting." But on ideological matters, "polarization" is the correct term. This point was amplified by Jim LNU: real polarization can be seen among Russian nationalists. Although these are not yet a major influence on policy, their presence is growing. Clearly, they have a "different vision" of where the Soviet Union is going.

Blackwell concluded the sub-topic by summarizing: Gorbachev is not that constrained. The Summit won't do that much for him, and it could hurt him if it goes badly. A nuclear testing agreement could move the Soviets toward a reduced threat perception. If Gorbachev goes too far, he could be accused of not standing up for Soviet interests. Clearly, Gorbachev is not looking for disagreement. The domestic scene is not likely to affect his behavior.

At this point, the NSA representative asked whether it is possible to rule out a "surprise." This was answered by one discussant who observed that although Gorbachev has demonstrated an inclination to surprises in the past, now "things are more subdued." Besides, there is nothing on which there is a consensus so that the leadership could deal it away.

When pressed by Blackwell to elaborate on the possibility of a surprise, the NSA representative asked whether a unilateral moratorium on testing might not be possible. Blackwell observed the effectiveness of such a move depends more on how Gorbachev might play it than the domestic scene.

The Deteriorating Soviet Economy

(b)(6) led the discussion: The first issue was the extent to which Gorbachev would go beyond the Ryzhkov plan in dealing with the economic crisis. After observing that the

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Ryzhkov plan is largely based on the Abalkin blueprint, but leaves out certain things, she made several points: New reforms would go back to the Abalkin blueprint. In the new reform program, details will be fleshed out and it will be more realistic. Price reform will begin at the same time as other reforms. A social safety net will also be set up. This is not "shock therapy." Gorbachev doesn't feel he has the necessary political support for that; there is no Solidarity as in Poland, etc. Further, many of those working out the reforms are in the bureaucracy; few have any business experience. The vestiges of statism may come out and cause the reforms to fail. Price increases can be expected in 1991, and deregulation. However, meat, milk, vegetable oil, and some other things will be excepted. This means that it will be mainly fruit and vegetables that will rise. A compensation scheme is in the works. Partial compensation is envisioned for people on a fixed income. This suggests that workers are the ones who will not be getting compensation. "Commodity markets," meaning wholesale trade, will be opened. There is also talk of a stock market: the real story will be in the details; it could bog down. Moreover, local officials are in charge of the new regulations. A new banking system is also expected; it will be modelled on the U.S. system, i.e. a strong central bank and private, commercial banks. Imposition of wage controls, aimed at promoting stability, can be expected. Ruble convertibility is questionable. There is also talk of antitrust, small business, and personnel training programs.

The lead discussant concluded the new program is not shock therapy, and "probably is not enough to make any real difference in the economy." The leadership still considers the "cost of making drastic change to be higher than the costs of leaving the system the way it is." This is "much more an Abalkin plan" -- further toward a market system, but not enough.

Another participant then commented: Gorbachev wants to come to the Summit and put forward a positive face, the appearance of a more normal country. He also hopes to send a signal to the U.S. business community; however, the Soviets do not expect great changes in the trade flows. Nonetheless, they may make an effort to entice U.S. business, particularly to do larger deals. Along these lines, they are "desperately" trying to clear arrearages before the Summit. Even though they are selling gold, the problem will not be entirely resolved before the Summit. The Soviets also hope to bring to the Summit the message that the reform package is a "bit meatier" than previously. Nonetheless, it is "largely symbolic." If there are to be any surprises, these will probably be in the private sector, perhaps with the American trade consortium. However, no big deals have been struck yet, although the Soviets would like to conclude some.

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The same participant also observed, notably, that there are "no signs" that the Soviets are coming "with hat in hand." They are probably pleased by the way things are going on the international economic front, e.g. COCOM, EBRD, and reassurances from FRG on GDR commitments.

Blackwell agreed, they are not coming hat in hand; besides, it is not clear what they could get.

Discussion then turned to the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement. One participant noted "a number of hang-ups," but negotiations continue and are close to ready. The lead discussant ^{(b)(6)} asked why immigration legislation wasn't moved up on the Supreme Soviet's agenda, considering the flexibility it has otherwise shown. Another answered that there are so many things on Gorbachev's agenda. Someone else reported a conversation with the Soviets in which the Soviets expressed surprise that the trade agreement talks were not called off because of Lithuania. He reported also that the Soviets do not view a trade agreement as being as important as the U.S. seems to think.

Marty LNU commented that joint ventures are "not going well." Interestingly, there is "a lot of domestic resistance" to foreigners making profits in the Soviet Union. He gave the example of a ship-building proposal that has stalled because of Soviet "foot-dragging." Soviet economists "don't envision enormous expansion of trade."

The lead discussant noted a speech in which Gorbachev had told his audience that they would need to get accustomed to foreigners in their city, working in factories, and otherwise doing business. ^{(b)(6)} said this unusual admonition also suggested there is popular resistance.

Blackwell said that for a long time the Soviets have not viewed MFN as a "panacea." Its utility would more likely be in the longterm.

To this another participant added that the goals for MFN are political and foreign policy-oriented, not economic.

Blackwell asked how much "resonance" trade normalization would have in the Soviet Union. Another responded that some Soviet statements placed MFN and START on the same plane, possibly as insurance in the event that START should stall. There might also be a Soviet perception, suggested another, that even if there were a trade treaty, it would not be ratified unless they eased up in the Baltics.

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The lead discussant then mused that a possible Summit surprise might be the proposal of a Marshall Plan-type of aid package in exchange for removal of the economic blockade. Blackwell suggested that if Lithuania does what Prunskiene has said, the Soviets might consider lifting the blockade.

Next, a Treasury representative observed that lend-lease debts remain outstanding, and that MFN will be difficult until those are cleared. The Soviets are now "pushing" to clear these so that discussion of "technical assistance" can begin.

Blackwell ended discussion of the Soviet economy by noting that a number of Soviet economists are currently in the U.S. in connection with the Summit. He wondered aloud whether their presence might suggest the Soviets want to "put something on the table." He noted, however, that it would be "naive" on their part to think that the U.S. could do much.

Domestic Opposition to German Unification

The discussion was led off by Jim LNU: A lot of posturing is emanating from real concern. The bottom line is that the Soviets are "very serious" about resolving the German question through a new security structure. They are also "sincere" when they say that they must take Soviet public opinion into account. Gorbachev should be able to "manage" any vulnerability. However, if a perception should arise that Gorbachev has "botched" the German issue, and this were to be combined with the economic crisis and people in the streets, a "no-confidence vote" could result in the Supreme Soviet. Barring such circumstances, Gorbachev will manage.

As for German neutrality, this means "reasonable sufficiency" of arms for defense of a united Germany. Events, namely the steady dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, are moving the Soviet position beyond dual membership. Some, e.g. Yazov, Ligachev, are reacting in an emotional manner to NATO membership. Others, notably General Batenin, are "way out front." Nonetheless, it is still "unacceptable for a united Germany to be in NATO in a military context."

Soviet troops will not be "stampeded" into leaving East Germany -- even if a "mini-Berlin in reverse" should result, with Soviet garrisons isolated. The Soviets simply will refuse to remove their troops until they "get something" for it.

Blackwell commented that the Germans appear willing to work out a deal, perhaps permitting Soviet troops to remain for 4-7 years, with payments made, in return for a clear departure date.

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The lead discussant noted that the average Soviet citizen has an interest in the issue, but it is "not a burning question." Polls indicate most favor unification, but feel a united Germany must not enter military alliances.

Blackwell asked whether, with troops remaining for a period and payments, a united Germany in NATO would still be an issue.

The lead discussant answered that a peace treaty is "very important" to a broad spectrum of Soviets. These want to see progress toward a "post-NATO world." If Gorbachev is seen as giving in, getting nothing in return, and NATO is viewed as a continuing threat, there could be a problem.

Blackwell probed what was meant by "getting nothing." The lead discussant observed that maintenance payments would be viewed "very favorably" by the Soviet people. They would tend to see these as "reparations," as getting something for their losses in the War, even if not a lot of money is involved.

Marty LNU observed that, in fact, NATO is not the problem; the NATO threat has diminished. The "real issue" is Germany. As evidence, he cited Shevardnadze's nearly apoplectic response to the unveiling of the Kohl plan. The Soviets are gradually "acclimating" to the idea. Again, the peace treaty suggests the issue is how to manage Germany.

The lead discussant agreed that the Soviets are concerned about the reappearance of a "militarily virile" united Germany. Nonetheless, NATO is constantly raised, with the leadership being perhaps most concerned. They fear being accused of having lost Eastern Europe and allowing a united Germany. Accordingly, they "need something to show" -- either "money or a de-fanged Germany."

At this point another participant observed that the Soviets have not come to a conclusion on how to handle Germany. The peace treaty is a "way to push the question into the future." Others also echoed the postponement theme.

This view was then critiqued by another participant. She noted that the Soviets are in fact "getting something", specifically, a commitment to limit German forces under CFE, and a no-nukes pledge. Of course, the Soviets want to prevent a united Germany in NATO -- "wouldn't you in their position?" -- but "they know they may not get it." It's simply "tough luck if the Germans press ahead," she argued.

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The lead discussant responded that the Soviets have the ability to obstruct "by keeping troops and being nasty."

This did not satisfy others. One questioned, "But even if they leave troops, what could they do with them?" The lead discussant admitted he was "not sure."

The discussion trailed off with Marty LNU reiterating that a "process of acclimation" is taking place. Eastern Europe remains uncertain; the Soviets are not sure how Romania and Poland will unfold. Consequently, the Soviets are "trying to slow the process."

The lead discussant again warned that the Soviets will not be "pushovers."

cc: Robert Blackwill
William Working
Nicholas Rostow
Arnie Kanter
Timothy Deal
Adrian Basora
Condoleezza Rice

~~SECRET~~

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Rpt on Warning
mtg, May 17
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: *[Signature]*

LOG # 4015

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRs NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>[Signature]</i> Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u><i>[Signature]</i></u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2.</u>	<u><i>[Signature]</i></u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	_____	<u><i>[Signature]</i></u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP *[Signature]* Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

RECEIVED
90 MAY 21 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 21, 1990

CHRON FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL JACKSON *KJS*

FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*

SUBJECT: Points to be Made on China-MFN for Presidential
Phone Calls to Speaker Foley and Senator Mitchell

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President with recommended points to be made on China-MFN with Speaker Foley and Senator Mitchell.

Concurrence by: Virginia *W* Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft/President Memorandum
Tab A Points to be Made

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: China-MFN: Phone Calls to Speaker Foley and
Senator Mitchell

Purpose

To inform Speaker Foley and Senator Mitchell of your decision to extend MFN status for China.

Background

Your calls should be placed to the Democratic leadership prior to your meeting with the Republican leadership today.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the Points to be Made at Tab A.

Approve_____

Disapprove_____

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE IN TELEPHONE CALLS TO
SPEAKER TOM FOLEY AND SENATOR GEORGE MITCHELL

- Tom/George, I am calling you to inform you that today I will send you my recommendation that MFN status for China be extended another year.
- This was a tough decision for me. I was strongly tempted to use denial of MFN to ratchet up the pressure on China for its failure to be responsive to our human rights concerns.
- But I have concluded that denial of MFN is not the right way to proceed. The harm to both U.S. and Chinese interests would be very substantial. Denial of MFN could result in more, rather than less, influence for China's hardline leaders in their contest with the reformers.
- Hong Kong would be an innocent victim; its prosperity and future would be jeopardized. Twenty thousand jobs, American-owned firms and large U.S. investments would be affected.
- MFN is not a special privilege for China. It is not a concession to the regime.
- Rather, MFN is the way to play a role within China -- through contact, commerce and communication.
- Meanwhile, I am maintaining the pressure from without by keeping the sanctions in place until China takes the necessary steps to improve the human rights situation there.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005110
RECEIVED: 25 JUN 90 18

CHRON FILE

TO: MEMO FOR RECORD

FROM: GATES

DOC DATE: 29 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OVAL OFFICE MTG RE AID TO SOVIET UNION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 28 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GATES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GATES

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: May 29, 1990
LOCATION: Oval
TIME: (1125 - 1200)

SUBJECT: Aid to the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
Chief of Staff to the President
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Assistant to the President and Press
Secretary
Assistant to the President and Deputy
for National Security Affairs

Secretary Baker: I met with Soviet Finance Minister Pavlov who asked about the possibility of a US loan. I was very negative. On this question of a loan, Gorbachev commented at the last Ministerial that the US is like a dam. I asked how they can ask for loans while they are so active elsewhere in the world. He then asked how you can tell people we should cooperate in the world while the US is fighting us in the EBRD, the International Financial Institutions, and so on. The Germans are seeking multilateral credits for the Soviets of \$16 to \$20 billion. This figure raised with Kohl is similar to that mentioned by Pavlov. The FRG wants to provide guaranteed bank loans. These will be used to buy consumer goods, for the conversion of factories, credits for commodities, food and so forth. Soviet access to credit so far has been good. They have oil, gas and gold but, now, because of their economic problems we are seeing banks charging them two to three percent over LIBOR average. They are considered a poor risk. Gorbachev will hit you up on this. There are several ways in which we could engage.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0946-MR
SCS 4/24/13

- The most likely would be to permit the Soviets to borrow in US markets and collateralize it with \$30 billion plus in gold. They still would have to deal with the Johnson Debt Default Act which deals with our claims from 1917. The principal is about \$300 million, the principal plus interest is about \$1.5 billion. We have offered to settle for about \$900 million but the Soviets have offered only \$100 million. We could probably agree to \$200 - \$250 million on a settlement. This would be about 66-75% of principal. Treasury's bottom line is about \$700 million. The lower figure we are talking about compares favorably with other post World War II claims which have averaged about 40% of principal. The Soviets must settle this if they are to have access to US credit. We could work to settle these claims and that would give them access to our private markets. You can tell Gorbachev that. They can get money from the Europeans but they want the US to be a player.
- Another possibility is direct investment by US firms. This would require conclusion of the Bilateral Investment Treaty. This is the kind of thing that's been carried out by the American Trade Consortium involving Chevron.
- Another possibility is US credit or credit guarantees through EXIM or OPIC.
- Fourth would be direct aid, that is, our export program on grain (subsidized prices or surplus CCC stocks).
- It is easier for them to borrow from the IFIs, or the EBRD.

Their best bet is access to our private markets. Negotiate the Kerensky and Tsarist claims. But we have to tell them that we can't ignore the Baltics, clients like Cuba and the need for far reaching economic reforms.

The President: Can we guarantee loans?

Baker: We have no flexibility under the existing legislation. We need appropriations to guarantee loans. We could take the position that if you initiate a dialogue on the Baltics and end your economic blockade then we'll engage on economic matters.

The President: Well, we can talk about what we'll do if they will deal with the Baltics.

Baker: You could talk about access to private markets, encouraging consortia such as the ATC, finalizing the Bilateral Investment Treaty to promote American investment in the USSR, and indicate that we would no longer be negative with the EC and

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Japan regarding the economic assistance for the USSR. But there clearly will be no Congressional approval until there is action in the Baltics. How does OMB carry their debt? None of these approaches, however, deal with the Cuban problem.

General Scowcroft: The principal barriers are Lithuania and Cuba -- holding up cooperative relationship.

The President: Providing the Soviets with economic assistance is hard while their missiles are still targeted on us.

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P, VP, JB, BS, MF, JS, RG

1125-1200

5-29-90

13

Aid

JB - Ri Mi. Parlor - asked about US loan. I was very negative (8-1/2% are like a dam.) How can while so active elsewhere in world? He says - how tell people to coop in world while US fighting in - EBRD, IFIs, G. multilateral credit - \$16-20 b. Sim. to Parlor for Jan, Kohl. The guar. bank loans. Consumer goods, com. of factories credit for commad, Ford. Access to credit has been good - oil & gas - gold - now see Banks - 2-3% over LIBOR, averages - \$7 billion. Poor risk. He will hit you up. Ways we could engage:

-- most likely - permit Sovs to borrow in US markets
collateralize? \$30 b - gold. Johnson Debt Default Act - claims from 1917. Prim 300 billion, P+1 - 1.5. Settle \$900 m. Sovs \$1000 m. Agree to 250 m - 66-75% of prin. Thru \$700 m. Companies for with post WWII claims, 40% of prin. Must settle if to have access to credit. Work to settle claims - access to priv. markets. (Tel. g). Can get \$ from Eur - want US a player.

-- direct investment by US firms - BIT.

III Consortium - Am. Trade Consortium - (Chevron)

-- US Credit or Credit Guar. - EXIM, OPIC.

-- direct aid: export prog. on grain (subsid. prices)

Surplus CCC stocks

-- easier to borrow from IFIs, EBRD.

Next - access to priv. markets. Negot. Kevinsky, Tsar. claims. Think about Batter, clients like Cuba, econ. reforms.

P - Can we give loans?

JB - no flex. except under exist legis. Need approp. to give loans. Have flex. to let them come in to market. NATO consortium. Deal on Baltics, end blockade - will engage on econ.

P - can talk what will do if deal in Baltics

JB - could talk about:

- access to ^{priv.} markets
 - econ. consort. such as ATC
 - finalize BIT - Am. invest in USSR.
 - no longer neg. w. EC + Japan re. econ. assist for you
- No Congress - action in Baltics
- Debt carried by OMB at what?
- Don't give you Cuba.

BS - Benin - Lithuania, Cuba - hold up coop. rel.

JB - good answer - mbr of NATO.

P - econ hard - most func. on us

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004317
RECEIVED: 30 MAY 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: GORDON
KANTER

DOC DATE: 30 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR TESTING

TREATIES

PERSONS: REAGAN, RONALD W

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TESTING / COMMITMENT TO FOLLOW ON NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 02 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR INFO
GORDON
KANTER

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

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CLOSED BY: NSJRP

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4317

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 30, 1990

CHRON FILE

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*
FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*
SUBJECT: Nuclear Testing -- Commitment to Follow-On
Negotiations

At today's arms control meeting with the President, there was a brief discussion of whether there was a commitment by President Reagan to Congress or to Gorbachev about next steps in nuclear testing negotiations. Both Congress and Gorbachev could believe that there was a personal commitment from President Reagan to immediate negotiations once TTBT and PNET were completed. The concern is not just that the two sides may differ over how to proceed, but that we could be accused of welshing on a presidential commitment.

The attached paper provides examples of statements by President Reagan. The first excerpt is from a 1986 letter to Congress and states that once the treaties are ratified he would propose to "immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program." The second is a letter to Congress reporting on the Reykjavik summit. Reagan writes that he informed Gorbachev that after ratification he would propose that the US and the USSR would "immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of ultimately ending nuclear testing."

At the last Washington summit, the two Presidents agreed to begin NTT and issued a joint statement that after agreeing upon verification measures that would make it possible to ratify TTBT and PNET, the two sides would "proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations...." Finally, in a 1988 report to Congress, Reagan wrote that once the treaties were ratified "the United States would immediately propose negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program."

These statements are all part of a fuller explanation of U.S. testing policy, including a nod to a CTB as a long term goal and

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the clear need to continue testing as long as we rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence. They also include a statement that these follow-on step would be in association with a program to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.

Clearly Gorbachev could claim, with some justification, that he had a commitment from Reagan to follow-on negotiations. So can some members of Congress who agreed not to press for unilateral testing limitations on the condition that the Administration engage in negotiations that go beyond TTBT and PNET. On the other hand, it may be possible to argue, although probably not very convincingly, that these negotiations were always contingent upon the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and we have yet to realize significant reductions.

The US needs to continue testing. We must decide if the best way to protect that requirement is to agree with the Soviets to resume negotiations on an agreed date after ratification (so that we can in fact have a period of observation) or hold the line now with the Soviets and with the Congress.

You may wish to bring these examples of President Reagan's statements to the President's attention.

RECOMMENDATION

That you bring to the President's attention President Reagan's statements concerning follow-on nuclear testing negotiations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I

Excerpts from President Reagan's Statements on
Follow-on Nuclear Testing Negotiations

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Examples of Previous Administration's Statements
On Follow-on Nuclear Testing Limitation Negotiations

US-USSR expert meetings began in mid-1985 to discuss nuclear test verification. By mid-1987 it was apparent that these meetings were going nowhere, with the Soviets pressing for a CTB and the US opposed to any limits beyond the TTBT. With the impasse at these experts meetings, Congressional pressure for more stringent testing limits had reached a critical point and Congress was about to impose severe testing restrictions on the US test program (most likely a 10 kt yield limit).

Thus was born step-by-step. NTT offered the previous administration a way to defuse Congressional pressures for immediate sharp cuts in testing. The negotiations offered the possibility of two ratified treaties and demonstrated a desire for progress. Thus the US entered the negotiations focused only on the first step and with the goal of avoiding a CTB; the Soviets entered the negotiations focused on latter stages, seeing the TTBT/PNET verification discussions only as minor, preliminary issues on the way to a CTB.

As early as October 1986, President Reagan wrote to Congress:

...once our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties have been ratified, I will propose that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing. These steps can be taken in the near future -- steps which will show the world that the United States is moving forward.

In January 1987, President Reagan reported on his meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik in another letter to Congress:

...I **informed the** General Secretary in Reykjavik that once our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties have been ratified, and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, I **would** propose that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of ultimately ending nuclear testing.

At the 1987 Washington Summit, the two Presidents agreed to begin NTT. Included in the joint statement of that summit was the following:

...the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process.

The last Reagan statement on this issue was in a September 1988 report to Congress on nuclear testing:

Once these verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the United States would immediately propose negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

All these and the numerous similar statements also include statements to the effect that a CTB is a long-term goal, but that so long as we depend upon nuclear weapons for deterrence, we will also need to test them.

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RECORD ID: 9004312
RECEIVED: 30 MAY 90 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 29 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: MULRONEY, BRIAN

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE / PHONECALL TO PM MULRONEY RE BAKER TRIP TO MOSCOW

ACTION: OBE PER WEST WING DESK

DUE DATE: 02 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCOWCROFT

LOGREF: 9006291

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

4312

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1990

Mr. President:

Here are some talking points for
your call from Prime Minister
Mulroney together with the cable
we sent him on Baker's Moscow
visit.

Brent

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONECALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY

- How is your visit with President Gorbachev going so far? I appreciate your calling me so promptly.
- I hope the letter I sent you last week with a readout on Jim Baker's talks in Moscow was useful to you in preparing for it. (A copy is attached.)
- I understand that, when Francois Mitterrand saw Gorbachev last Friday, Gorbachev was tough on the issue of a united Germany in NATO.
- In respnnse, Francois was firm on this point, and as you know, I plan to be as well. It is essential that Gorbachev come to understand that Germany's membership in NATO is in his own best interest.

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY
TO BE SENT THROUGH FEDCAN CHANNEL

Dear Brian,

Given your own impending meeting with Gorbachev, I want to share with you the results of Jim Baker's recent talks in Moscow. Bob Gates, who was with Jim in Moscow, will also be giving Derek Burney a debrief.

Jim had productive -- though at times difficult -- meetings with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. There is still work to do, but we made significant progress toward a START agreement. I am especially pleased that we were able to nail down a chemical weapons accord and to finish the verification protocols to two nuclear testing treaties.

One major disappointment was CFE. Shevardnadze affirmed the Soviet leadership's interest in an early agreement and assured Jim that the Soviets view completion of the treaty as a prerequisite for a successful CSCE Summit. However, when Jim explored the new ideas about which he wrote to Joe Clark, he was unable to make even the slightest progress. The Soviet leadership has been incapable of moving forward on CFE for some time now, and I worry that the paralysis on CFE is just one symptom of general anxiety in Moscow about the Soviet position in Europe. Shevardnadze proposed that the U.S.-Soviet manpower limitations agreed upon at Ottawa be codified as a separate agreement, distinct from the CFE treaty, for signature during Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States. Jim said no, emphasizing that final agreement on these U.S.-Soviet limits must accompany conclusion of the CFE treaty.

I am also disappointed by Soviet intransigence on Open Skies. The Summit will be a critical opportunity to determine whether Gorbachev can support an Open Skies regime that embodies real openness. I intend to raise this subject with him, and urge him to revive our efforts to conclude an agreement. Your own commitment to an Open Skies treaty has, of course, been indispensable and I hope you will hit Gorbachev hard on this.

On Germany, Jim heard from both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze a continuation of the tough line Shevardnadze took in the Two Plus Four Ministerial plenary in Bonn earlier this month. Gorbachev flatly rejected German membership in NATO, saying that it would constitute a shift in the strategic balance which he could not allow. The Soviets clearly intend to try to use the Two Plus Four mechanism to place limitations on the united Germany. They specifically suggested that the Two Plus Four agree upon limits on the Bundeswehr. Jim refused to go along, pointing out that a CFE follow-on negotiation could consider a range of issues, including the question of further limitations on conventional forces in a central region. Such limits were not, however, a matter for negotiation in the Two Plus Four.

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2009-0946-MR
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Helmut Kohl and I had very useful consultations on German unification last week in Washington. We reaffirmed the West's common goals and approaches, as outlined in my May 9 message to you. We also agreed and stressed publicly that, upon unification, Four-Power rights and responsibilities should be ended, without any new discriminatory constraints on German sovereignty.

I have the impression that Soviet anxiety about Germany also stems from the general bad fortune that Gorbachev is experiencing and his concerns about the future of perestroika. He undoubtedly sees Germany as a politically explosive issue at home.

Gorbachev's position on Lithuania was tough, though he emphasized he was committed to a peaceful resolution of the issue, and I was pleased to see that he agreed to meet with Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene during her visit to Moscow. He said he has little room for maneuver on Lithuania and must insist on a suspension of the declaration of independence. Yet there would seem to be room for compromise, and you might try to impress on Gorbachev the need to get a dialogue going. I have done everything that I can to keep U.S.-Soviet relations on track but if there is not some movement on Moscow's part before the Summit, Lithuania will cast a shadow over my meeting with Gorbachev. I know you are in much the same situation.

Finally, Brian, I will be most grateful for any insights or advice that you might have after your meetings with Gorbachev and before we begin our talks here on May 31.

With my very warmest regards,

Sincerely,

George

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: CHENEY, R
ATWOOD, D

DOC DATE: 30 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
SUMMIT

VISIT

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

GORBACHEV, RAISA

SUBJECT: TALKER RE CHANGES IN US DEFENSE POSTURE FOR BUSH / GORBACHEV SUMMIT
ON 30 MAY - 3 JUN

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 22 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF: 9003678 9003711

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/99

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DOC 20 OF 20

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POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

3968

APNSA Has Seen

In reply refer to:
I-90/09930

30 MAY 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

THROUGH: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Changes in the U.S. Defense Posture

Secretary Cheney asked that we prepare the attached talking points for use during the Summit by the President.

Some leading Soviets have claimed -- and some Americans seem to believe -- that Soviet defense cuts and unilateral changes to their defense posture have uniquely furthered the new international climate, while the U.S. has lagged behind. These talking points give credit to the Soviets where credit is due, but also demonstrate that our defense cuts preceded the Soviets' by several years and are wide-ranging. These points also highlight the openness of our defense budget and conclude with a request for greater "military glasnost" from the Soviets.

I have also attached a chart comparing U.S. and Soviet production of major weapons systems in 1989-90. You should stress with Gorbachev the enormous burden his country is bearing to sustain these production levels. (On that point, President Gorbachev's recent statements are telling: "Military spending in our country amounted to 18 percent of national income, more than in any other state in the world." "Incidentally, America has already embarked on a course of cutting its own defense spending." [TASS report of Gorbachev speech at meeting with working people's representatives in Nizhni Tagil on 27 April.]

I would be happy to follow up with additional materials on any of these points.

Paul Wolfowitz

Attachments
a/s

TALKING POINTS -- CLOSE HOLD

SUBJECT: CUTTING BACK AND RESHAPING THE U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE

- o **U.S. HAS BEEN LEADING THE WAY.** U.S. defense posture has helped lead the way to a changed global security climate.
 - We welcome Soviet announcements of budget cuts and defensive doctrine. These are valuable shifts from previous years.
 - U.S. forces have always had a defensive caste; U.S. budgets have steadily dropped since 1985.
 - Since the "Revolution of '89" we have made even more profound changes.
- o **AMERICA UNILATERALLY CUT DEFENSE SPENDING SHARPLY FROM 1985 TO 1990.**
 - From 1985 to 1990 U.S. defense spending has fallen 14% in real purchasing power, roughly 3% per year.
 - Those cuts were focused on acquisition: Total DoD procurement has already been reduced 30 % -- spending on ships has been cut 18%, aircraft procurement is down by 50 %, spending on missiles, ammunition, and other military goods is down as well.
 - We have cancelled 20 major weapons programs, including V-22 Osprey, F-14D, F-15E, AH-64 Apache helo and the M-1 tank.
 - In contrast, from 1985 - 1988 Soviet military spending grew 3 % per year. We welcomed President Gorbachev's announcement last year of cuts (14% by year end 1990).
- o **UNEQUIVOCAL REDUCTIONS IN U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING WILL CONTINUE.** Since the "Revolution of '89," U.S. has announced further cuts.
 - 1991 will see at least a 2.6 % real cut, followed by a 2% real cut for each year for 1992 on.
 - By 1995, the cumulative, 10-year cut in defense spending will be at least 22%.
 - By 1995, DoD outlays will be 4 % of GNP; 21 % of Federal budget -- the lowest shares since before World War II.
 - Note: this is the Administration's proposal. Historically, what comes out of Congress is almost always lower. The Supreme Soviet should exercise greater control over Soviet military spending.
- o **MILITARY CAPABILITIES ARE BEING RAPIDLY REDUCED.** As spending declines, force structure is also being cut across the board.
 - Nuclear forces: MX buy was cut to 50 (from 100); B-2 bomber procurement has been cut to 75 (from 132); NATO has announced that we will forego the Follow-On-to-Lance and nuclear artillery modernization, and we are willing to negotiate SNF reductions.

TALKING POINTS -- CLOSE HOLD

TALKING POINTS -- CLOSE HOLD

- Personnel: We have cut 91,000 since FY 89; by the end of 1991 the Army and Air Force will each be at lowest levels since 1950. This includes the deactivation of 2 Army divisions and some tactical air wings already announced.
- Naval forces: 600 ship goal abandoned; we are now under 550 heading down below 500; most recent cuts include 2 battleships, 8 nuclear submarines and 2 nuclear cruisers; carrier strength now down from 15 to 14, could go lower.
- Bases: Cutting back on base structure is integral part of overall cutback plan. Have announced closure of 86; considering at least 47 more. Overseas bases will be cut, too.
- More cuts contemplated: Early ratification of the expected arms treaties should allow further reductions, such as 3 more Army divisions, 5 more Air Force Tactical Air Wings and much deeper manpower cuts.
Note: Our present planning for the next six year period shows continued cuts: Army divisions reduced 36% (28 down to 18), carrier battle groups cut 20 % (15 down to 12), and tactical fighter wings reduced 22% (36 down to 28).
- o **OPERATING PRACTICES ARE ALSO BEING MODIFIED.** Changes can already be seen in U.S. forward operations.
 - Major exercises, particularly in Europe, have been significantly restructured; major NATO exercise WINTEX-CIMEX has been canceled for this year; REFORGER was sharply cut back in size.
 - NATO Defense Ministers have just announced that readiness will be allowed to decline.
 - Naval presence has been reduced somewhat in all theaters.
- o **U.S. FORWARD MILITARY PRESENCE IS BEING REFINED TO ENHANCE REGIONAL STABILITY.** Enduring U.S. interests dictate maintaining a global presence.
 - As arms agreements permit, forces in Europe will be cut sharply; have already made arrangements with Asian allies to trim troop levels.
 - But some forces will be kept stationed overseas; naval patrols will be maintained. U.S. allies want us to be there; our presence provides a stability useful to all the great powers.
- o **LESSENERED U.S. MILITARY POSTURE CONTRIBUTES TO NEW U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.**
 - We share a new emphasis on lower force levels, more openness, peaceful progress in Eastern Europe, and a stable nuclear balance.
 - U.S. welcomes continued Soviet openness, and further progress to these goals.
 - One important step to this end would be more open information on Soviet defense spending, such as we described earlier and present regularly to our Congress.

TALKING POINTS -- CLOSE HOLD

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

U. S./USSR COMPARISON OF MILITARY PRODUCTION (INCLUDING FMS) (U)

	1988		1989	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS:				
Tanks (M1A1)	784	3500	720	1750
Lighter Armored Vehicles (Bradley)	663	6330	554	6805
Artillery (and MRLs)	126	2385	128	1820
Military Helicopters	225	423	225	390
Fighter/Fighter-bombers (F14, F18, F15, F16; Does not include F117A)	317	686	360	611
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS:				
SSBNs	0	1	2	2
ICBMs	12	160	12	142
SLBMs	*	90	*	90**
Bombers (B1, B2, A-6, AV-8)	37	46	52	40
Strategic SAMs	0	4750	0	3950
NAVAL COMBATANTS:				
General Purpose/Other Submarines	2	8	2	7
Aircraft Carriers	0	0	0	1
Cruisers	2	1	3	1
Destroyers	0	3	0	3

* Data not readily available. Will update.

** CIA estimates for these categories of systems are somewhat lower because of different production assessments for the SS-21 and the SS-N-20

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CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2633

April 4, 1990 1990 APR -4 PM 8:12

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED MC CLURE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS for*
SUBJECT: Points to be Made in the President's Meeting with
the CODEL to the Soviet Union

The points to be made in the President's meeting with CODEL to the Soviet Union on Thursday, April 5, in the Cabinet Room are attached at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Points

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 4/17/12

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Declassify on: OADR

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POINTS TO BE MADE IN MEETING WITH
CODEL TO THE SOVIET UNION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0946-MR
SCS 4/24/13

LITHUANIA

- The situation in Lithuania is complicated and fragile and we are trying to pursue a careful policy of quiet diplomacy and public support.
- The Lithuanians are pursuing their goal of independence in a peaceful and dignified manner.
- I do not want to do anything that would make that task more difficult by exacerbating tensions between Moscow and Lithuania.
- We have reiterated our policy of not recognizing the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.
- We have urged the Soviet government to enter into immediate discussions with the Lithuanian government.
- And we have made it clear to the Soviet Union that the use of force in the Baltics or attempts to crush the Lithuanian independence movement would have serious consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations.
- I am very concerned about recent Soviet acts that increase tensions and engender a sense of intimidation.
- The Soviets must understand that the only way to solve this problem is through negotiation.
- I think that the approach that we are taking is the best possible way to help the Lithuanian people.

GERMANY

- I would not be surprised if the Soviets raise the issue of German unification with you.
- The unification of Germany is proceeding in an orderly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

fashion.

- The FRG has been a good democratic ally for forty-five years and I am confident that the unified Germany will be a good partner in the future.
- We believe that European stability will best be served by continued full German membership in NATO -- including its integrated military structures.
- There is no substitute for NATO which has kept the peace through a defensive alliance of democratic nations for forty years.
- Though Gorbachev has said that a united Germany cannot be in NATO, I hope through dialogue that he comes to share our point of view.

ARMS CONTROL

- I am committed to a successful U.S.-Soviet Summit in June.
- I am doing all that I can to give a political push to the work that needs to be done inside the U.S. government so that we can conclude the CFE and START treaties before the Summit.
- I hope that Gorbachev can do the same in the Soviet Union.

ECONOMICS AND TRADE

- The negotiations for a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement have begun.
- We intend to have a trade agreement ready for signature in June at the Summit.
- The Soviets need to pass their emigration law because -- if they do -- it is my intention to grant Most Favored Nation Status to the Soviet Union at the Summit.
- I am hopeful that the Soviet Union will undertake real steps

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

to reform their economy. Only economic reform can create an atmosphere that will attract Western investment.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2633

April 4, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Points to be Made in the President's Meeting with
the CODEL to the Soviet Union

At Tab I is a memorandum to Fred McClure attaching the points to
be made in the President's meeting with the CODEL to the Soviet
Union on April 5 in the Cabinet Room.

CR for
Ginny Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to McClure
Tab A Points to be Made

SIGNED

fix as clip

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/17/12

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NSC Secretariat	5	_____	N
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>[Signature]</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
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West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>D</u>
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COMMENTS

For 3:30 — Thurs., 5 Apr
 P/Mitchell