

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91118
Folder ID Number: 91118-002

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Baltic American Leaders (2 pp.)	4/10/90	(b)(1)	☐
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Baltic American Leaders (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	☐
01c. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Baltic American Leaders, April 11, 1990 (1 pp.)	4/9/90	(b)(1)	☐
02. Memo	Michael Hayden/Coni Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Upcoming US-Soviet Military to Military Contacts (2 pp.)	4/19/90	(b)(1)	☐
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Jim Cicconi Re: The President's Talking Points for the Meeting with the Congressional Leadership (1 pp.)	4/24/90	(b)(1)	☐
03b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Meeting with Congressional Leaders (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	☐
03c. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Meeting with Congressional Leaders (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	☐
03d. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Talking Points for the Meeting with the Congressional Leadership (1 pp.)	4/23/90	(b)(1)	☐

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (April - May 1990) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap997
OA/ID Number: 91118-002
Date Closed: 2/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04. Memo	Nicholas Rostow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Lithuania and the Internaitonal Court of Justice (2 pp.)	4/24/90	(b)(1)	C
05. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for President Landsbergis (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Memo	Michael Hayden to Brent Scowcroft Re: Soviet Defense Spending to "Double" (1 pp.)	4/26/90	(b)(1)	C
07a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Landsbergis (1 pp.)	4/26/90	(b)(1)	C
07b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Landsbergis (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07c. Draft Letter	To President Landsbergis (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
07d. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for a Phone Call to Vytautas Landsbergis (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07e. Letter	President Landsbergis to President Bush (2 pp.)	4/14/90	(b)(1)	
08a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene of Lithuania (3 pp.)	5/3/90	(b)(1)	S
08b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08d. Report	Biography Re: Kazimiera Danute Prunskiene [redacted] (1 pp.)	4/19/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
08e. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene, May 3, 1990 (1 pp.)	5/2/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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
2749
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 10, 1990

MEETING WITH BALTIC AMERICAN LEADERS

DATE: April 11, 1990
LOCATION: Roosevelt Room
TIME: 10:00 - 10:30 a.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *RS for*



DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-1197-F CAP
3/6/08

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm your support for the aspirations of the Baltic peoples for independence and to seek the understanding of this group for your efforts to help the Lithuanian people through quiet diplomacy.

II. BACKGROUND

The Baltic American leaders will urge you to recognize the new Lithuanian Government and lend the moral and political support of the American Presidency to the cause of Baltic independence. After the meeting, they will want to report to their constituents (and probably immediately to the press) that they took a firm line and gained your support for at least some of their arguments. Although members of this group have been supporters of your Presidency and muted in criticizing your handling of Lithuania, they will see this meeting as their opportunity to deliver a strong message and seek specific assurances from you.

We will issue a press release along the lines of the attached (Tab C) immediately after the meeting to ensure that our version of the meeting is on record early. It includes the point you made last week to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, that the issue could "adversely affect" U.S.-Soviet relations.

Moscow, meanwhile, continues to ratchet up the pressure on Lithuania and the Baltic States generally. On April 9, the Presidential Council, saying that Lithuania's response to Gorbachev's March 30 telegram was insufficient, threatened further economic, political "and other" measures against Lithuania. (It is not clear whether Moscow really will require a full revocation of the declaration of independence or, as Yakovlev implied in his meeting with Lithuanian leaders last week, if a partial backtracking would be sufficient.) Similarly, Gorbachev declared Estonia's more modest call for a negotiated transition to independence "illegal" and demanded that it too be rescinded. No similar

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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confrontation with Latvia is likely until its newly elected parliament convenes for the first time May 3, but leaders of the Popular Front are already saying publicly that they intend to press for independence.

In light of this hardening of Soviet attitudes, the Baltic American leaders may argue that the time has come for a tougher approach on our part. They may also try to pin you down on press reports claiming that the Administration has decided to side with Gorbachev over the Baltic States. Your best response is to describe the steps we have taken, including your letter to Gorbachev and meeting with Shevardnadze.

While you are unlikely to gain the outright support of these Baltic Americans, you should explain why you are convinced that your approach is the one most likely to help the Baltic peoples achieve their goals. You might also note that bloody repression could set those goals -- as well as U.S.-Soviet relations -- back for years to come.

At least some in the group may be aware of Senator Lugar's approach to President Landsbergis on the possibility that a national referendum might defuse the situation. If the issue is raised, you should simply say that the Administration is using every available channel to get its message across to both parties.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and meeting in the Roosevelt Room

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Draft Press Release

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH BALTIC AMERICAN LEADERS

- I appreciate your counsel. We are meeting at a good time, after I have had a chance to raise this issue directly with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
- I hope you will stay in close touch with the Administration as this process continues to unfold between the Baltic states and Moscow.
- I very much want to hear your comments. First, though, let me explain what we have been doing with regard to Lithuania, and why.
- We support the Lithuanian people, who have, through their freely elected Government, expressed their desire to reestablish the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania.
- We believe the best way to help Lithuania in this complex and delicate situation is through a careful policy of quiet diplomacy and public support.
- Our approach has been to:
 - o Reiterate our longstanding policy of refusing to recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR.
 - o Urge the Soviet Government to enter into an immediate dialogue with the Lithuanian Government, without pressure and intimidation.
 - o Convey to the Soviet leadership the high costs of repression against the Lithuanians, and to keep all peaceful options open.

- The U.S. Government should do nothing that would inadvertently make Lithuania's task more difficult by inflaming the situation or making it harder to find a solution through peaceful means.
- It is premature to establish formal relations with Lithuania right now. Rather than take any action that might escalate the tensions between Moscow and the Lithuanians, we want to keep pressing on peaceful dialogue.
- I raised the Lithuanian situation very directly with Shevardnadze. I told him of my personal support and sympathy for Lithuania, and I restated our policy of nonrecognition of the annexation of the Baltic states and of self-determination. I told him that much is at stake here, that repression in Lithuania would have an adverse impact on U.S.-Soviet relations across the board.
- I made these same points in my letter to President Gorbachev.
- We may not have brought Gorbachev and Shevardnadze around to our way of thinking, but they clearly understand how important this matter is for us and to U.S.-Soviet relations.
- Our policy is based on helping the Lithuanian people -- and the Estonians and Latvians as well. We want to avert a bloody repression, which could set back the aspirations of the Baltic peoples for many years to come.
- We are convinced that our approach offers the best hope

of helping them, in the end, achieve their goals.

-- (SENATOR LUGAR'S MEDIATION -- IF ASKED) I can't go into specifics, but we are using every available channel to get our message across to both parties.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

This morning, the President met for approximately thirty minutes with leaders of the Baltic American community. They raised with him their concerns about the current situation in Lithuania and the other Baltic States and expressed their strong support for the rights of the Baltic peoples to self-determination and independence.

The President shared their concerns and reiterated his support for the right to self-determination for the Baltic States and the long-standing U.S. policy of not recognizing the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. He explained the Administration's approach toward Lithuania, stressing that the issue must be dealt with through peaceful means and through a dialogue between the Soviet leadership and the freely elected representatives of the Lithuanian people. He also reiterated that this is an issue that could adversely affect the prospects for progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The President told the Baltic American leaders that the U.S. must avoid taking actions that would inadvertently make Lithuania's task more difficult by inflaming the situation. He stressed that the course of quiet diplomacy and public support is the approach most likely to lead to a peaceful outcome of self-determination for the Lithuanian people.

TO: CICCONI, J

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 10 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BALTIC STATES
AP

USSR

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRESS RELEASE RE PRES MTG W/ BALTIC AMER LEADERS 11 APR

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 12 APR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
SITTMANN

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSEF DOC 3 OF 3

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT
001
002 PRESIDENT
002
003

Z 90041012 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
X 90041210 GATES APPROVED RECOM
Z 90041019 FOR INFORMATION
X 90041210 NOTED BY PRES
X 90041210 SITTMANN SGD MEMO

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

2749
ADD ON

April 10, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. CICCONI
FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN *W*
SUBJECT: Draft Press Release

Attached is a draft press release for use after the President's meeting with the Baltic American Leaders on Wednesday, April 11, 1990.

Attachment
Tab A Draft Press Release

cc: Marlin Fitzwater
Roman Popadiuk

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2749
1. Make files.
2. Original to Cicconi
3. Copy
Scowcroft to
Mead in car.

April 9, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *R LH*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Baltic American
Leaders, April 11, 1990

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with
leaders of the Baltic American community.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
2. That you authorize Bill Sittmann to sign the attached memo to
Jim Cicconi forwarding the draft press release.

Approve 8

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
 - Tab A Points to be Made
 - Tab B Participants List
- Tab II Memo to James Cicconi
 - Tab A Draft Press Release

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 4/13/12

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CHRON FILE
3021

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 19, 1990

*Not found
2 copies*



Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: MICHAEL HAYDEN/CONDI RICE

SUBJECT: Upcoming US-Soviet Military to Military Contacts

Although General Moiseyev has asked to postpone his May 13-19 trip to the United States until late September, there are several other military-to-military programs scheduled to take place in the next 45 days. Some of them have a potentially high profile.

The Soviets took great pains to emphasize that Moiseyev's request to reschedule was based solely on the timing of the Washington summit. "Preparation" demanded Moiseyev's presence in Moscow and, in fact, his trip would have been coincident with the Moscow ministerials. The Soviet spokesman specifically noted that Moiseyev's decision had nothing to do with the postponement of General Vuono's visit to the Soviet Union. He also expressed concern that this trip and other exchanges would be affected by U.S. reactions to events in Lithuania.

The Soviet initiated postponement is good news for us as the Moiseyev visit would have been high profile: Gettysburg, Ellsworth AFB, San Francisco (with a speech to the Commonwealth Club), Fort Ord, San Diego, and Washington (including a session with the President "if he is available). The Moiseyev visit would also have been the occasion to announce the next two year calendar of military contacts with the Soviets. Since it covers such a long period, the calendar will look impressive even if it is carefully drawn and appropriately limited. We have not yet seen a Soviet proposal but our current draft (which will shortly go through interagency review) is fairly ambitious. The delay in the Moiseyev trip allows us to slow the pace in developing our proposed program and pushes back the time when we must share it with the Soviets.

A group of six officers from the Voroshilov Academy will visit the U.S. from 29 May to 5 June. They will split their time between NDU here in Washington and the Naval War College in Newport.

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2009-0945-MR
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-2-

Although not strictly a military-to-military contact, the Coast Guard will host a Soviet icebreaker in San Francisco from 10-13 May as part of the Coast Guard's bicentennial celebration. The icebreaker will likely be joined by vessels from Canada, Japan and Mexico. This visit is part of a rich exchange program the Coast Guard has developed with their Soviet counterpart, a program that has a higher proportion of substance over style when compared to DoD's.

There is a potential problem with optics, however, as the Coast Guard's Soviet equivalent is the Maritime Border Guards, a component of the KGB. The problem will not be eased by the presence of the commander of the Maritime Border Guards at the San Francisco celebration. We have also learned that a Coast Guard cutter is scheduled to call at Petropavlovsk in early June although that visit has not yet gone through all the bureaucratic wickets for final approval.

The postponement of the Moiseyev visit was a stroke of good fortune; it pushes it to the background as we react to events in the Baltic. The Voroshilov visit is low level, workmanlike and will likely pass without notice. The San Francisco portcall, however, points out the problem of trying to fine tune (or even be fully aware of) what has become an exceptionally broad agenda of bilateral contacts. In our view the visit, on its own merits even with the "KGB connection", should proceed. Our cancelling it now would almost certainly be viewed as a far stronger signal than the one we sent in postponing the Vuono trip and would be read by the Soviets as a sign that the entire military-to-military relationship was in jeopardy. We should take that step only as it is needed to support our broader reaction to events in Lithuania.

Concurrence by: Don Pilling

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 3071
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>SW</i> Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>MEM 4/30</u>	<u>AJ</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N/R</u>

RECEIVED
90 APR 20 P 1. 28

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS *FyI — Upcoming US-Soviet Military to Military Contacts*

APNSA Has Seen

TO: CICCONI, J

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 24 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
EUROPE EAST
AP

CONGRESSIONAL
GATT



PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: PRES TALKING POINTS FOR MTG W/ CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 26 APR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RICE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC CLOSED BY: NSMDC DOC 2 OF 2

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT
002

Z 90042408 FOR SIGNATURE
X 90042411 SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO

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By cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3181

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 24, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: The President's Talking Points for the Meeting
with the Congressional Leadership

The President's talking points for his April 24 meeting with the
Congressional leadership are at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 1/13/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

- FIRST, LET ME SAY HOW GRATEFUL I AM FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING ON LITHUANIA. THIS IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE TO HANDLE, BUT IT HAS BEEN ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL THAT LEADERS FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE HAVE DELIVERED A STRONG BIPARTISAN MESSAGE TO MOSCOW.
- I WANT TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON MY THINKING REGARDING LITHUANIA, AND TO SEEK YOUR COUNSEL.
- AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION THROUGH A CAREFUL POLICY OF QUIET DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE LITHUANIANS TO SELF-DETERMINATION.
- WE HAVE STRESSED ON EVERY OCCASION THAT THE ISSUE MUST BE DEALT WITH THROUGH GENUINE

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- DIALOGUE, WITHOUT FORCE OR INTIMIDATION.
- WE HAVE COMMUNICATED THAT MESSAGE BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, MOST RECENTLY IN SECRETARY BAKER'S TELEPHONE CALLS TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. SENATOR MITCHELL AND HIS COLLEAGUES DELIVERED THE SAME MESSAGE, AS DID SENATOR KENNEDY BEFORE HIM.
- ALL OF US KNOW THAT GORBACHEV FACES GRAVE PROBLEMS. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS TRIED TO CONDUCT ITSELF IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID EXACERBATING AN ALREADY COMPLICATED SITUATION IN LITHUANIA. WE HAVE ALSO TRIED TO KEEP ALL GORBACHEV'S PEACEFUL OPTIONS OPEN.
- AND WE RECOGNIZE HOW MUCH IS AT STAKE -- FOR THE SUCCESS OF PERESTROIKA, THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND

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2009-0945-MR
SCS 4/22/13

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CARD 3 OF 6

FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY. WE DON'T WANT TO RETURN TO A SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH.

- WE FACE A REAL DILEMMA. WE ARE MORALLY BOUND TO SUPPORT THE LITHUANIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.
- YET IT IS IMPORTANT TO WORK TO PRESERVE THE CHANGED SOVIET POLICIES, FOR WHICH GORBACHEV SHOULD BE GIVEN CREDIT, THAT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO POSITIVE CHANGES IN SOME PARTS OF THE WORLD, AND ESPECIALLY IN EASTERN EUROPE.
- I AM INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO REPRESS THE RIGHT OF THE LITHUANIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WHICH THEY HAVE EXPRESSED THROUGH THEIR FREELY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES.
- THE IMPOSITION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BY MOSCOW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 4 OF 6

IS A STEP THAT HAS ONLY DEEPEDED THE CONFLICT AND INCREASED TENSIONS.

- MOSCOW MUST ENTER INTO A GOOD-FAITH DIALOGUE WITH LITHUANIA'S REPRESENTATIVES. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE.
- THERE IS A LITHUANIAN DELEGATION IN MOSCOW RIGHT NOW BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO MEET WITH KEY SOVIET OFFICIALS.
- THERE IS OBVIOUSLY SOME POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING GOING ON BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER IT GIVES THE TWO SIDES A BASIS FROM WHICH TO BEGIN THEIR DIALOGUE.
- WE ARE REVIEWING OUR OPTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE.
- AFTER ALL, THE SOVIETS ARE USING THEIR ECONOMIC MIGHT AS A WEAPON AGAINST THE LITHUANIANS.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 5 OF 6

- WE ARE EXAMINING A NUMBER OF MEASURES, INCLUDING WHAT TO DO WITH RESPECT TO U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON COMMERCIAL, BILATERAL INVESTMENT AND TAX AGREEMENTS, AS WELL AS ALL EXCHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH OUR PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
- WE ARE ALSO CONSULTING WITH THE ALLIES TO SEE IF THE MEMBERS OF THE GATT SHOULD DEFER CONSIDERATION OF THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR OBSERVER STATUS.
- I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I WANT TO AVOID TAKING ANY STEPS CONCERNING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH ARE IN THE INTEREST OF US AND OUR ALLIES. THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THAT WE ARE NEGOTIATING WILL SERVE TO REDUCE MILITARY TENSIONS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
- LET ME SAY ONCE MORE THAT I APPRECIATE YOUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CARD 6 OF 6

- SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S. CONTINUE TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE.
- I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

- First, let me say how grateful I am for your support and understanding on Lithuania. This is a difficult issue to handle, but it has been enormously helpful that leaders from both sides of the aisle have delivered a strong bipartisan message to Moscow.
- I want to bring you up to date on my thinking regarding Lithuania, and to seek your counsel.
- As you know, we have been trying to deal with this situation through a careful policy of quiet diplomacy and public support for the rights of the Lithuanians to self-determination.
- We have stressed on every occasion that the issue must be dealt with through genuine dialogue, without force or intimidation.
- We have communicated that message both privately and publicly to the Soviet leadership, most recently in Secretary Baker's telephone calls to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Senator Mitchell and his colleagues delivered the same message, as did Senator Kennedy before him.
- All of us know that Gorbachev faces grave problems. The Administration has tried to conduct itself in such a way as to avoid exacerbating an already complicated situation in Lithuania. We have also tried to keep all Gorbachev's peaceful options open.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0945-MK
Sec 4/22/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- And we recognize how much is at stake -- for the success of perestroika, the consolidation of democratic change in Eastern Europe, and for East-West relations generally. We don't want to return to a Soviet leadership that is impossible to deal with.
- We face a real dilemma. We are morally bound to support the Lithuanians' right to self-determination.
- Yet it is important to work to preserve the changed Soviet policies, for which Gorbachev should be given credit, that have contributed to positive changes in some parts of the world, and especially in Eastern Europe.
- I am increasingly concerned about Soviet attempts to repress the right of the Lithuanian people to self-determination, which they have expressed through their freely elected representatives.
- The imposition of economic sanctions by Moscow is a step that has only deepened the conflict and increased tensions.
- Moscow must enter into a good-faith dialogue with Lithuania's representatives. That is the only way out of the current impasse.
- There is a Lithuanian delegation in Moscow right now but they have not yet been able to meet with key Soviet officials.
- There is obviously some political and diplomatic maneuvering going on but it is not clear whether it gives the two sides a basis from which to begin their dialogue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- We are reviewing our options, particularly in the economic sphere.
- After all, the Soviets are using their economic might as a weapon against the Lithuanians.
- We are examining a number of measures, including what to do with respect to U.S.-Soviet negotiations on commercial, bilateral investment and tax agreements, as well as all exchanges associated with our program of technical economic cooperation.
- We are also consulting with the Allies to see if the members of the GATT should defer consideration of the Soviet request for observer status.
- I want you to know that I want to avoid taking any steps concerning arms control negotiations, which are in the interest of us and our Allies. The arms control agreements that we are negotiating will serve to reduce military tensions in East-West relations.
- Let me say once more that I appreciate your support and understanding. It will be important that the U.S. continue to speak with one voice.
- I look forward to hearing your views.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

3181

April 23, 1990

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: The President's Talking Points for the Meeting
with the Congressional Leadership

Your memorandum to Jim Cicconi forwards talking points for the
President's meeting with the Congressional leadership tomorrow.

CR for
Ginny Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Cicconi.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Cicconi
Tab A Talking Points

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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 4/16/12

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003209
RECEIVED: 24 APR 90 15
UNCLASSIFIED



TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROSTOW

DOC DATE: 24 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

LEGAL ISSUES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LITHUANIA & INTL COURT OF JUSTICE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 27 APR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ROSTOW

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJRP

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3209

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 24, 1990

Good analysis
Brent
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

4/24/90
1717
I think Nick
is right. Especially
important given President's
comment at Bipart
meeting.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOWN *R.*

SUBJECT: Lithuania and the International Court of Justice

BB Bludill

Senator Moynihan, among others, has suggested that the United States seek an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) "concerning the right of the Lithuanian people to exercise self-determination" (Tab I). Article 96 of the U.N. Charter specifies that the General Assembly and the Security Council may request an advisory opinion on any legal question. As a request for an advisory opinion appears to be a substantive question, a resolution by the Security Council requesting an opinion probably would be subject to the veto under Article 27. Further, a resolution to treat a Security Council request for an advisory opinion as a procedural question, not subject to the veto, itself would be vetoable. Other U.N. organs and specified agencies also may request advisory opinions when authorized by the General Assembly. The United States acting alone does not have the authority to request an advisory opinion.

The United States, moreover, may not sue the Soviet Union directly because neither we nor the Soviets accept the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction or have a bilateral agreement providing for ICJ dispute resolution with respect to Lithuania.

I strongly recommend against seeking an advisory opinion for the following reasons. First, it is by no means certain that the ICJ would reach a conclusion we would regard as right or acceptable. The membership of the Court is not materially different from what it was during the Nicaragua case.

Second, in the Nicaragua case, we strongly asserted that the Court acted wrongly in terms of its own rules and precedents in accepting jurisdiction. We have said the Court wrongly opined on matters involving self-defense and national security, which, we argue, exclusively fall within the competence of the Security Council and reached a decision on the merits in defiance of the facts and the law. Further, the ICJ will not overturn its prior

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000.1197.F CAP

3/6/08

Nicaragua decision on the ground that it was obtained by fraudulent testimony by Nicaragua, although that is now obvious to all detached observers. We therefore can hardly ask in good faith that the Court opine on a question, which, from the Soviet perspective, is as important to the Soviet Union as Nicaragua was to the United States (whether or not we think the Soviets ought to take Lithuania as seriously as we took Nicaragua).

Third, we are in the midst of negotiations with the five permanent members of the United Nations aimed at securing their agreement to submit disputes to the Court arising under specified multilateral conventions, which provide for ICJ dispute resolution. The proposed agreement specifically excludes any dispute concerning any matter that one of the parties to the proposed convention regards as concerning its national security, broadly defined.

Finally, advisory opinions have been used by the General Assembly to achieve a substantive ruling by the Court when the parties to the dispute in question refuse to accept the Court's jurisdiction for purposes of that dispute. This practice circumvents the principle that the Court can issue substantive decisions only when the parties to a dispute agree that the Court has jurisdiction and easily could be used to the disadvantage of the United States with regard to Latin America, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and other regions as well as with regard to nonregional issues.

I believe the case against the advisory committee is strong and compelling and that private conversations with Senator Moynihan and other congressional leaders on this issue ought to succeed in dampening their ardor.

Concurrences by: Robert Blackwill, Virginia Lampley, Condi Rice

Attachment
Tab I S. Con. Res. 112

the overwhelming majority of the persons living in Lithuania today;

Whereas the Lithuanian people have declared their sovereign independence from the Soviet Union;

Whereas the General Assembly has previously requested and received from the International Court of Justice advisory opinions concerning the right of self-determination for the peoples of Western Sahara and the legal status of Namibia;

Whereas President Gorbachev has repeatedly expressed the Soviet Union's strong desire to adhere to international legal norms and its belief that the United States and the Soviet Union should make greater use of the International Court of Justice; and

Whereas it is in the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, the people of Lithuania, and the world community that disputes be resolved in accordance with principles of law rather than through the use of force: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress--

(1) expresses its grave concern regarding the situation in Lithuania;

(2) calls upon the Soviet Union to adhere to its stated acceptance of the norms of international law as they apply to Lithuania; and


(3) strongly urges the President and the Secretary of State to make all appropriate efforts to ensure that either the Security Council or a special session of the General Assembly requests from the International Court of Justice an advisory opinion concerning the right of the Lithuanian people to exercise self-determination.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003277
RECEIVED: 26 APR 90 08

TO: SCOWCROFT

IRON FILE



FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 25 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

PERSONS: SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

LANDSBERGIS, VYTAUT

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES LANDSBERGIS RE SITUATION IN LITHUANIA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 30 APR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RICE

COMMENTS: ** NO COVER MEMO PROVIDED / SCOWCROFT DID NOT USE **

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT LANDSBERGIS

Shevardnadze
3277
- NOT
USED
4/25

- I have been asked once again to call you on behalf of the U.S. Administration.
- As you know, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has just concluded three days of talks with Secretary Baker and President Bush.
- I want to assure you that the situation in Lithuania was a major topic of their discussions.
- Secretary Baker and President Bush both made it very clear to Mr. Shevardnadze that we stand firm on our policy of not recognizing Soviet sovereignty in Lithuania or in the other Baltic states.
- And we will continue to stand firm: The United States fully supports the right of the people of Lithuania to self-determination.
 - I should add that Senators George Mitchell and Bob Dole, the leaders of our Senate, told Mr. Shevardnadze exactly the same thing when they met with him separately.
- Mr. Shevardnadze, I must tell you, was equally firm in his response.
- The Lithuanians will have the right to self-determination, he said, including the possibility of leaving the Soviet Union.
- But they must exercise that right, he said, within the limits of the U.S.S.R. constitution.
- We understand that you cannot simply repudiate what you've done and accept the legality of Moscow's authority. That would be the same as admitting that what happened in 1940 -- your incorporation into the Soviet Union -- was somehow legitimate.
- We are increasingly worried, however, that the situation in Lithuania is now reaching a dangerous stage and that one incident could set things off -- leading perhaps to direct intervention or even martial law.

- The use of force would, of course, seriously affect U.S.-Soviet relations, and it would badly damage Western support for President Gorbachev and perestroika.
- But I'm sure I don't need to tell you that such an outcome would be a disaster for everyone.
- We think both sides now need to focus on ways to defuse the situation -- and, if possible, to find creative ways of moving away from confrontation and toward a dialogue, without requiring either side to lose face or to be forced to give up their principles.
- We said this to Mr. Shevardnadze.
- If you'll permit me, I would like to discuss some ideas in this connection.
- We understand that Mr. Yakovlev, in his conversation with Minister Ozolas on Tuesday, mentioned the possibility of temporarily "suspending" -- not annulling (make certain translation is right) -- your March 11 decree and other laws not in conformity with the U.S.S.R. constitution.
- Do you think this is a realistic possibility? It's our sense the Soviets would in fact see a "suspension" as providing them a way to deal with you. That's the first point and we think it's important.
- Secondly, you and others have mentioned that it might be possible to hold a popular referendum which would show beyond a shadow of a doubt that the people of Lithuania truly want independence and not to be part of the Soviet Union.
- Is this a realistic possibility?
- Might it not be possible for you to announce your willingness to have a referendum and to go to Moscow to see Gorbachev? We think your willingness to do both -- indeed to go to Moscow -- would do much to begin a realistic process.
- If you were to go to Moscow, would you be willing to speak to the Federation Council?
 - Not as head of the Lithuanian S.S.R. and not to take part in the discussions.
 - But simply to explain to the leaders of the U.S.S.R. why Lithuania wants its independence now and what practical arrangements it is willing to work out with the Soviet government, in order to guarantee that everyone's interests will be protected.

- We understand that these would be major concessions for you and that you would expect some reciprocal moves by Moscow in return.
- (ONLY IF ASKED TO ELABORATE: If you were to do this, we would expect Moscow to reopen your borders and to allow journalists and diplomats back in. Gorbachev would also have to agree ahead of time to respect the results of a referendum and to negotiate in good faith on the basis of those results.)
- But if you were to take these steps -- perhaps as a single package -- they might be enough to break the deadlock and persuade Moscow to step back and begin a serious dialogue and substantive negotiations.
- I can tell you that such steps on your part would get a very favorable reception in the West.
- It's not our place, of course, to advise you on what to do, and I apologize if I seem to be meddling.
- We only want to be helpful, not to interfere.
- I did, however, want to bring you up to date on our discussions with Mr. Shevardnadze and -- let me repeat what I said earlier -- to reemphasize America's support for your people and your cause.
- On behalf of the Administration and all the American people, I wish you Godspeed.

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HAYDEN
KANTER

DOC DATE: 26 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING TO DOUBLE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 30 APR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAYDEN LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR INFO

HAYDEN
KANTER
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/21/09

COMMENTS: _____

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National Security Council
The White House

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[Handwritten initials] Bill Sittmann
 Bob Gates
 Brent Scowcroft
 Bill Sittmann
 Situation Room
 West Wing Desk
 NSC Secretariat

90 APR 21 P 7. 52

SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
<u>4</u>	<u>2/8/13</u>	<u>OOE</u>
<u>5</u>		<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____
 Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS *Sweet Def*
Spending to Double

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 26, 1990

INFORMATION

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM:

MICHAEL HAYDEN *MH*

SUBJECT:

Soviet Defense Spending to "Double"

John Hines of RAND has informed us that, according to a staffer from the Supreme Soviet's Military Affairs Committee, the official Soviet figure for defense spending will likely double by the end of the summer.

The staffer was escorted by Hines during a tour of the United States and indicated that his committee would soon report to the full legislature an estimate of the military budget just about twice the current announced total of \$77 billion rubles. He believed the legislature had enough leverage to make this stick as the official figure, especially as the Supreme Soviet intended to use it as the baseline for the 19% cut in production and 14% cut overall promised by Gorbachev last year. The staffer was especially concerned that the U.S. government recognize these new numbers for what they were -- a more accurate calculation of current spending -- not an increase.

The new figures, if indeed they are accepted, come close to our overall estimate of Soviet defense spending but our methodologies still differ. The Supreme Soviet's calculations try to use more realistic prices for military goods but they are still based on assigned -- not market -- costs. In addition, the Soviets apparently still omit areas we consider very military (like some space programs) and include items we routinely dismiss. The new estimate, for example, will include a calculation of "rent" for land used by the military in each of the Republics.

DoD is working on some contingency press guidance should this Soviet debate really take place. Their comments will welcome the greater openness, express the hope that market costs will one day be used, and characterize the "increase" as new calculations, not new directions in Soviet military spending.

Concurrence by: *CR* Condoleezza Rice and Bill *FW* Working
R Robert Blackwill

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003285
RECEIVED: 26 APR 90 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICE

DOC DATE: 26 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

PERSONS: LANDSBERGIS, VYTAUTAS

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LTR FM LANDSBERGIS RE LITHUANIA



ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 30 APR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
NSC CHRON
RICE

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

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Wires of to to Landsberg

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 3285

URGENT NOT PROOFED:

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BY PASSED WW DESK: _____

DOC LOG ✓ AIO _____

Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat

RECEIVED

90 APR 26 P 1: 46

SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
1	✓	A
2	8	
3	SEE GENERAL'S NOTE	
4	SP2 SC	
5		FFA

Rice

Please return all
originals and routing slip
to West Wing Desk,

Thank You

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sittmann concerned --

note to General says no phone
call to Landsbergis (send letter)

but in the memo to President
we seem to give the letter
and the phone call equal weight.

April 26, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *PB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Landsbergis

*I think we should not send a letter. Reclawee? *RB**

Your memorandum to the President at Tab I forwards a response to the Landsbergis letter of several days ago (Tab A).

We have also provided talking points should the President decide to call Landsbergis instead. We recommend, however, that the President send the letter in lieu of a phone call. It is not possible to judge Landsbergis' state of mind. He has already accused the President of participating in a "second Munich." We are concerned that Landsbergis could -- without time for reflection -- make an ill-considered comment, distort for the media the President's comments, or simply refuse to take the President's call. The State Department advises that since Landsbergis is President of Lithuania's Supreme Council, the salutation "Mr. President" bestows no notion of recognition of Lithuania. We want to avoid a signature block, however, to avoid offending Landsbergis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to President
- Tab A Letter to Landsbergis
- Tab B Talking Points for Telephone Call
- Tab C Incoming Letter from Landsbergis

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PER E.O. 13526

*2009-0945-MR
SCS 9/5/13*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Landsbergis

Purpose

To answer the letter that Landsbergis sent to you on April 14.

Background

You received a letter from Vytautas Landsbergis of Lithuania. A proposed reply is at Tab A.

Alternatively, talking points for a phone call to Landsbergis -- should you decide to call him instead -- are at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Landsbergis at Tab A.

That you call Landsbergis.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Letter to Landsbergis
- Tab B Talking Points for Telephone Call
- Tab C Incoming Letter from Landsbergis

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 7/16/12

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear President Landsbergis:

Thank you for your recent letter. I support, as American Presidents have for fifty years, Lithuania's right to self-determination. The United States is sympathetic to your unassailable cause.

Through quiet diplomacy and firm public statements, we have urged the Soviet government to enter into a discussion with Lithuania's representatives. We have also expressed our deep concern about the Soviet decision to impose economic sanctions on Lithuania -- a step that undermines the possibility of a reasoned and good-faith dialogue.

You may expect continued U.S. efforts to convince the Soviet leadership to turn back from the path of confrontation and to enter into discussions with you because a solution that is imposed upon the Lithuanian people will not last. We have asked our friends and Allies throughout the world to undertake similar efforts with regard to the Soviet Union. It is my fervent hope that a good-faith dialogue will begin soon.

Finally, may I say to you that I have read your recent comments about the policy of the United States. I want you to know that every element of our policy is designed to contribute to the creation of an environment in which the goal of Lithuanian independence can be attained. May God bless you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR A PHONE CALL TO VYTAUTAS LANDSBERGIS

- I wanted to have a chance to talk with you about the situation in Lithuania.
- First, let me thank you for your letter. It is important that we communicate -- that I hear your views and you hear mine.
- I want you to know that I support the right of the Lithuanian people to determine their own future.
- I am sympathetic to your cause which is unassailable.
- The United States is doing what it can to help.
- Through quiet diplomacy and firm public statements, we have urged the Soviet government to enter into a discussion with the representatives of the Lithuanian people.
- We have expressed our deep concern about the Soviet decision to impose economic sanctions on Lithuania -- a step that undermines the possibility of reasoned and good-faith dialogue.
- We are trying not to exacerbate the already difficult situation in Lithuania.
- In recent weeks, Secretary of State Baker has written to and talked with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I have written to President Gorbachev urging them to begin a dialogue with Lithuania.
- You may expect continued U.S. efforts to convince the Soviet leadership to turn back from the path of confrontation and to enter into discussions with you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000.1197.F CAP
3/6/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- A solution that is imposed upon the Lithuanian people will not last.
- We have asked our friends and Allies throughout the world to undertake similar efforts with regard to the Soviet Union.
- It is my fervent hope that a good-faith dialogue will begin soon.
- May I also say to you that I read your comments about U.S. policy.
- I want you to know that every element of our policy is designed to help create an environment in which Lithuania can achieve its goal of independence.
- I will continue to look for ways to support Lithuania.
- God bless you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS AUKŠČIAUSIOJI TARYBA

Mr. George Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
United States of America

EMBARGOED

April 14, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

On February 24, 1990, after a fairly contested, multi-party campaign, the people of Lithuania went to the polls to elect national representatives for the first time since the Lithuanian nation came under foreign occupation in 1940. With the completion of the final run-off elections on March 10, 1990, the demand of the people of Lithuania was clear and overwhelming -- immediate restoration of the Republic of Lithuania recognized *de jure* by the United States of America in 1922, and the entry into force on Lithuanian territory of the fundamental human, economic and political rights proclaimed in the first Lithuanian Constitution of May 15, 1920.

On March 11, 1990, the representatives of the Lithuanian people met in the Assembly Hall of the Supreme Council in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius and expressing the will of the nation solemnly proclaimed the restoration of the Republic of Lithuania on the basis of its *de jure* continuity since 1940. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet was re-established as the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, and the 1977 U.S.S.R. Constitution and other Soviet laws were annulled, insofar as they applied to Lithuania. Only those Soviet laws which did not conflict with the Provisional Basic Law of the Republic of Lithuania were permitted to remain *in vigore*. These laws will be examined and replaced with Lithuanian laws after future legislative review and debate.

I have been asked by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania to convey to you and the people of the United States the most significant legislative documents enacted on and after March 11, 1990. In particular, you will observe that the Lithuanian state emphasizes its adherence to universally accepted principles of international law, recognizes the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act with respect to international frontiers, and guarantees the rights of all peoples and ethnic communities living in Lithuania.

Mr. President, it has been nearly five decades since oppression and darkness descended upon the land and people of Lithuania as a result of an illegal and morally reprehensible Non-Aggression Pact with secret protocols entered into by Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin on August 23, 1939. During this period, the Lithuanian people were denied nearly every fundamental human right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Commencing in 1940, hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians of all ages, professions and backgrounds were deported to the U.S.S.R.; our schools and churches closed; our farms and property laid waste; our environment poisoned by industries over which we had little control; and our sons laid to rest on battlefields far beyond our frontiers.


In spite of these heavy burdens, and an unrelenting effort by an alien political system to destroy the religious and moral values of the Lithuanian people, the Lithuanian nation endured. In every Lithuanian heart burned a desire for freedom, justice and peace.

Many of our people have taken great hope and courage from the fact that the United States, like many other nations, has repeatedly stressed its non-recognition of the 1940 annexation and occupation of Lithuania by the U.S.S.R. Today, with increasing freedoms and liberties a reality for most Lithuanians, the people of Lithuania are hoping for your nation's support in the process of political, economic and environmental renewal now sweeping across our nation. We are very grateful for, and have been very much encouraged by, the repeated statements on the part of the United States over the last few weeks in support of Lithuania's expression of its right to self-determination. What we very much need today, however, is your strong political support -- your recognition of the new Lithuanian Government.

At this point, we need your concrete help; use of Soviet military force, and political pressure on other countries to not recognize Lithuania continue, and now there is the threat of an economic blockade as a new Iron Curtain is drawn around Lithuania on the Baltic Sea and the Polish border. This aggression must be recognized for what it is, and labeled as such by the West.

Mr. President, the people of Lithuania and the Supreme Council have asked me to convey to you and the people of the United States their best wishes and warmest Easter greetings. To all the peoples of the Soviet Union and the world, our nation extends only the hand of friendship. I sincerely hope that the people of United States will continue to reaffirm and support the right of the people of Lithuania to freedom and dignity, and the right to take their own path in building an independent democratic state.

Very truly yours,



Vytautas Landsbergis
President of the Supreme
Council of the Republic of
Lithuania

EMBARGOED

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 02 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: USSR
AP
ECONOMICS

BALTIC STATES
INTL TRADE

PERSONS: PRUNSKIENE, KAZIMIERA
KOHL, HELMUT

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PM PRUNSKIENE OF LITHUANIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 04 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI CLOSED BY: NSLMS DOC 3 OF 3

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THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

May 2, 1990

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER KAZIMIERA PRUNSKIENE
OF LITHUANIA

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8000.1197.F CAP
3/6/08

DATE: May 3, 1990
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 2:30 - 2:50 p.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm your support for the aspirations of the Lithuanian people for independence.

II. BACKGROUND

Both symbolically and substantively, this will be a tricky visit to handle. As the first meeting between an American President and a Lithuanian Prime Minister since the annexation of the Baltic States, it will be a precedent-breaking event, which the press and Prunskiene will want to portray as symbolic recognition of Lithuanian independence. We will explain in a press release afterwards that you have met with her not as Prime Minister of independent Lithuania but as a recognized and freely elected representative of the Lithuanian people, noting also that she has been received by the Prime Ministers of Norway and Sweden and the Danish and Canadian Foreign Ministers.

Acting Secretary Eagleburger -- or, if Larry is still ill, Bob Kimmitt -- will be meeting Prunskiene earlier in the day. This will enable us to get a better sense of what specific requests she may want to deliver to you. Although we believe she will try to avoid putting you on the spot, her earlier meetings on the Hill and with the press will give her ample opportunity for making her case in ways that could be awkward for you.

The very fact of your meeting with Prunskiene will ease somewhat the disappointment the Lithuanians, along with Baltic Americans, have expressed about our policy. Your reaffirmation of the U.S. position regarding the Baltic States and your explanation of the approach you have taken toward Lithuania may also help her understand what we have done and why, though she is nonetheless likely to urge you to exert stronger pressure on Moscow. In that regard, you could indicate that we are actively considering steps the U.S. might take in the economic sphere -- but without mentioning your letter to Gorbachev, which we have not yet announced to our friends and allies.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Following the letter from Mitterrand and Kohl to President Landsbergis, the Lithuanians have begun considering ways of suspending implementation of their new laws in hopes that Moscow will lift its sanctions and enter into a dialogue. While you might welcome any steps toward breaking the impasse between Moscow and Vilnius, you should not give the impression that you are asking the Lithuanians to retreat in the face of Soviet intimidation. Press stories along those lines would undo any good this meeting might accomplish.

Although there have been indications that Moscow is also considering a compromise to defuse the crisis, there is no evidence that the Soviets have done anything toward that end. Moscow's position may be further complicated by possible moves by Latvia on May 3 and Estonia on May 14 to follow the Lithuanian example in declaring independence. Landsbergis, meanwhile, is under an increasingly open attack by Deputy Prime Ministers Brazauckas and Ozolas, who would prefer a leader more willing to compromise with Moscow.

In her meetings in Scandinavia and Canada, Prime Minister Prunskiene did not call for recognition of Lithuanian independence, nor did she make specific requests for Western oil supplies. She did, however, push for stronger bilateral trade relations. This, of course, is wrapped up in the independence question, as we do not trade directly with any of the Soviet Republics. On both oil and trade, we recommend that you indicate firmly that any such steps on our part would only complicate the situation. A noncommittal reply might prompt her to tell the press that the U.S. is considering such actions.

Prunskiene may also raise the matter of humanitarian assistance. As it is still unclear to us why medical supplies are not getting through, you might ask about the severity and the causes of the shortages. We could consider encouraging private American voluntary organizations to help, but much would depend on whether the Soviets are actively and intentionally blocking medical supplies to Lithuania. The Soviets have denied that they are doing so.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

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V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and meeting in the Oval Office

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography
Tab D Secretary Baker's Memorandum

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CARD 1 OF 6

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER PRUNSKIENE

- IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO WELCOME YOU TO THE WHITE HOUSE. YOUR PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION HAS INSPIRED US ALL.
- THIS IS A HOPEFUL, BUT ALSO A VERY DIFFICULT, MOMENT IN LITHUANIA'S HISTORY. I WANT TO EXPLAIN WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN DOING WITH REGARD TO LITHUANIA, AND WHY.
- WE SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF THE LITHUANIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THEIR DESIRE TO REESTABLISH THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA.

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CARD 2 OF 6

- WE BELIEVE THE BEST WAY TO HELP LITHUANIA IN THIS COMPLEX AND DELICATE SITUATION IS THROUGH A CAREFUL POLICY OF QUIET DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT.
- WE HAVE TRIED TO AVOID STEPS THAT WOULD INADVERTENTLY MAKE LITHUANIA'S TASK MORE DIFFICULT BY INFLAMING THE SITUATION OR MAKING IT HARDER TO FIND A SOLUTION THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS.
- OUR APPROACH HAS BEEN TO:
 - o REITERATE OUR LONGSTANDING POLICY OF REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THE FORCIBLE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES INTO THE USSR.
 - o URGE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ENTER INTO AN IMMEDIATE, GOOD-FAITH DIALOGUE WITH THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT. SUCH A

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CARD 3 OF 6

DIALOGUE CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE IN AN
ATMOSPHERE FREE FROM PRESSURE OR
INTIMIDATION.

- O CONVEY TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THE HIGH
COSTS OF REPRESSION AGAINST THE
LITHUANIANS.
- O ASK OUR ALLIES TO DO WHAT THEY
CAN TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP TO ENTER INTO A
DIALOGUE.
- WE DEEPLY REGRET THE SOVIET DECISION TO IMPOSE
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.
- WE HAVE CONVEYED OUR POSITION VERY CLEARLY TO
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE.
- WE ARE CONSIDERING STEPS THE U.S. MAY
TAKE IN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH

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CARD 4 OF 6

MOSCOW IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO
USE ITS ECONOMIC POWER TO STRANGLE
LITHUANIA.

- AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE
PRESERVE THE POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE AND THE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN
EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
- THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR LITHUANIA AS WELL. A
RETURN TO A CONFRONTATIONAL SITUATION IN EAST-
WEST RELATIONS WOULD ONLY MAKE YOUR TASK
HARDER. IT COULD SET BACK THE ASPIRATIONS OF
THE BALTIC PEOPLES FOR MANY YEARS TO COME.
- I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE CONSIDERING THE
SUGGESTION PUT FORWARD BY PRESIDENT
MITTERRAND AND CHANCELLOR KOHL THAT A
POSSIBLE WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE WOULD BE
FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SUSPEND

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- IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME OF YOUR NEW LAWS. OBVIOUSLY, THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO SEE THE OPENING OF A DIALOGUE, AND WE WOULD WELCOME ANY STEPS THAT YOU MIGHT BE WILLING TO TAKE TO GET DISCUSSIONS STARTED.
- WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE IDEA OF MODIFYING OR SUSPENDING IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME OF YOUR NEW LAWS? DO YOU BELIEVE MOSCOW WOULD RESPOND TO SUCH STEPS ON YOUR PART BY LIFTING SANCTIONS AND OPENING A DIALOGUE?
- I HAVE READ WITH GREAT CONCERN THE REPORTS THAT LITHUANIA IS RUNNING SHORT OF CRITICAL MEDICAL SUPPLIES. HOW SERIOUS IS THE SITUATION? WHAT GOODS ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY? WHAT HAS BROUGHT ABOUT THE PROBLEM?
- WE WILL LOOK INTO THE SITUATION TO SEE

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- WHETHER THERE ARE WAYS THAT PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS MIGHT HELP. (STRENGTHENED TRADE RELATIONS -- IF RAISED) WE BELIEVE THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECT TRADE TIES AT THIS TIME WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND LITHUANIA'S REPRESENTATIVES.
- (ECONOMIC AID -- IF RAISED) WE BELIEVE IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL -- AND IS PROBABLY NOT FEASIBLE -- FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ATTEMPT TO SUPPLY OIL THROUGH WATERS THAT ARE UNDER SOVIET CONTROL.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER PRUNSKIENE

- It is a great pleasure to welcome you to the White House. Your peaceful democratic revolution has inspired us all.
- This is a hopeful, but also a very difficult, moment in Lithuania's history. I want to explain what the United States has been doing with regard to Lithuania, and why.
- We support the right of the Lithuanian people to self-determination and their desire to reestablish the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania.
- We believe the best way to help Lithuania in this complex and delicate situation is through a careful policy of quiet diplomacy and public support.
- We have tried to avoid steps that would inadvertently make Lithuania's task more difficult by inflaming the situation or making it harder to find a solution through peaceful means.
- Our approach has been to:
 - o Reiterate our longstanding policy of refusing to recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR.
 - o Urge the Soviet Government to enter into an immediate, good-faith dialogue with the Lithuanian Government. Such a dialogue can only take place in an atmosphere free from pressure or intimidation.
 - o Convey to the Soviet leadership the high costs of repression against the Lithuanians.

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- o Ask our Allies to do what they can to encourage the Soviet leadership to enter into a dialogue.
- We deeply regret the Soviet decision to impose economic sanctions.
- We have conveyed our position very clearly to President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
- We are considering steps the U.S. may take in our economic relationship with Moscow if the Soviet Union continues to use its economic power to strangle Lithuania.
- At the same time, it is important that we preserve the positive atmosphere and the substantial progress that has been made in East-West relations.
- This is important for Lithuania as well. A return to a confrontational situation in East-West relations would only make your task harder. It could set back the aspirations of the Baltic peoples for many years to come.
- I understand that you are considering the suggestion put forward by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl that a possible way out of the impasse would be for your Government to suspend implementation of some of your new laws.
- Obviously, the United States wants to see the opening of a dialogue, and we would welcome any steps that you might be willing to take to get discussions started.
- What is your view of the idea of modifying or suspending implementation of some of your new laws? Do you believe

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Moscow would respond to such steps on your part by lifting sanctions and opening a dialogue?

- I have read with great concern the reports that Lithuania is running short of critical medical supplies. How serious is the situation? What goods are in short supply? What has brought about the problem?
- We will look into the situation to see whether there are ways that private voluntary organizations might help.
- (STRENGTHENED TRADE RELATIONS -- IF RAISED) We believe that establishment of direct trade ties at this time would only complicate efforts to open a dialogue between the Soviet Union and Lithuania's representatives.
- (ECONOMIC AID -- IF RAISED) We believe it would not be helpful -- and is probably not feasible -- for the United States to attempt to supply oil through waters that are under Soviet control.

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs
Condoleezza Rice, Senior Director for Soviet Affairs
James Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
Arunas Pemkus, Interpreter

Lithuania

Kazimiera Prunskiene, Prime Minister
Joseph Kazickas, Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister
V. Bieliuskas, President, Lithuanian World Community
Viktor Nakas, Interpreter



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08d. Report	Biography Re: Kazimiera Danute Prunskiene [redacted] (1 pp.)	4/19/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Collapse Files

Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
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Kazimiera Danute PRUNSKIENE
(Phonetic: PROONskeen)

USSR

*Chairman, Council of Ministers,
Lithuanian SSR (since March 1990);
Member, Sajudis Seimas Council
(since October 1988)*

Addressed as: Madam Prime Minister

Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene is a leader in her republic's efforts to secede from the USSR. Her focus is creating a market economy that would be outside Moscow's control.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)



©

Prunskiene appears to be taking a pragmatic approach to planning.

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

[Redacted]

She has drafted a bill that would create an independent currency, has set up an independent bank, and has agreed to form a Baltic Common Market with Latvia and Estonia. Recently asked how an independent Lithuania would raise revenues, Prunskiene responded, "We are not going to raise taxes."

(b)(3)

Prunskiene is equally pragmatic about other aspects of the secession drive. She insists that the Soviet Government meet Lithuania at the negotiating table as a partner state rather than as a subordinate republic as dictated by President Mikhail Gorbachev; nonetheless, she has often expressed admiration for the Soviet leader. She has repeatedly called for Western recognition of Lithuanian independence as a bulwark against aggression by Moscow.

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

[Redacted]

Prunskiene has defended the right of Lithuanians to refuse to serve in the Soviet armed forces but recently urged deserters to return to their units to take advantage of Moscow's amnesty offer.

(b)(3)

A popular figure in Lithuania, Prunskiene has been called the "Iron Lady" and Lithuania's Margaret Thatcher. An ethnic Lithuanian, she was born in 1943. She holds a doctorate degree in economics from Vilnius University, where she has served as professor of industrial economics. She became rector of the Lithuanian Institute of Higher Qualifications in 1986. Prunskiene was elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989. In May 1989 she was elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet and later became a member of its Economic Reform Committee; she has declined to participate in the activities of the Supreme Soviet since Lithuania's March 1990 declaration of independence. In July 1989 she was appointed a deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, empowered to "ensure the economic independence of the republic and widen foreign economic links." A former member of the Soviet Communist Party, Prunskiene served on the ruling council of Sajudis, the popular front movement in Lithuania. Divorced, she has at least one grandchild. Prunskiene may prefer to be addressed as Prunskis, her name before her marriage. Her name is occasionally transliterated as Prunskene.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

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ATTACHMENT TO BE PROVIDED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 2, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RKH*

SUBJECT:

The President's Meeting with Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene, May 3, 1990

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with Prime Minister Prunskiene. Although the meeting will be a delicate one to handle, we do not anticipate any surprises from Prunskiene, who was very careful in her visits to Scandinavia and Canada. The Mitterrand/Kohl message is a potentially problematic issue, and we recommend that the President avoid any appearance of advising the Lithuanians to retreat in the face of Soviet pressure. We also recommend that the President not mention his letter to Gorbachev, which of course has not been made public or announced to our allies.

The talking points we have provided track with those State has prepared for Eagleburger, except that State's go farther in pursuing the Mitterrand/Kohl proposal.

CR Condi Rice and Nick Burns ^{*NB*} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Participants List
- Tab C Biography
- Tab D Secretary Baker's Memorandum

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