

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91118
Folder ID Number: 91118-001

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (February - April 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Phone Call to Gorbachev (1 pp.)	2/26/90	(b)(1)	✓
01b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Telephone Call to Soviet President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
01c. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for the President's Telephone Call to Gorbachev (1 pp.)	2/26/90	(b)(1)	✓
02. Memo	John M. Ordway to Brent Scowcroft Re: Contacts with the Soviets on Africa (2 pp.)	2/26/90	(b)(1)	✓
03. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (2 pp.)	3/1/90	(b)(1)	✓
04. Memo	Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S. -Soviet Trade Negotiations (2 pp.)	3/6/90	(b)(1)	✓
05. Memo	Stephen Rademaker to Brent Scowcroft Re: Recognition of an Independent Lithuania (3 pp.)	3/8/90	(b)(1)	✓
06. Talking Points	Re: The Administration... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (February - April 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap996
OA/ID Number: 91118-001
Date Closed: 2/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Senator Edward Kennedy (2 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	~~✓~~
07b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made in Meeting with Senator Kennedy (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	~~✓~~
07c. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Senator Kennedy (1 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	~~✓~~
08a. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to President Nixon (4 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1)	~~✓~~
08b. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to President Ford (4 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1)	~~✓~~
08c. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to President Carter (4 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1)	~~✓~~
08d. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to President Reagan (4 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1)	~~✓~~
08e. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letters to Former Presidents (1 pp.)	3/26/90	(b)(1)	~~✓~~

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Collapse Files

Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (February - April 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap996

OA/ID Number: 91118-001

Date Closed: 2/24/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRON FILE

1496

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *RS for*
SUBJECT: Phone Call to Gorbachev

NOTED

Purpose

To thank Gorbachev for Soviet support of the free and fair elections that have just taken place in Nicaragua and tell him that you look forward to working with the Soviet Union toward promoting an orderly transfer of power.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Gorbachev and discuss the outcome of the Nicaraguan elections using the points at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points to Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0944-MR

SCS 4/24/13

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR TELEPHONE CALL TO SOVIET
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0944-MR
SCS 4/24/13

- I want to talk with you about the outcome of the Nicaraguan elections. And then I would like to say a few words about the very good meetings that Chancellor Kohl and I held at Camp David.
- The Nicaraguan elections were conducted freely and fairly and that -- in and of itself -- was a tremendous victory for democracy and for the Nicaraguan people.
- We are, of course, delighted by Mrs. Chamorro's victory which is a major step forward for democratization in Central America.
- I want to thank you and the Soviet leadership for all that you did to encourage a free and fair electoral process.
- The Sandinista leadership is also to be congratulated for holding free and fair elections.
- But I am now troubled by their public statements that they will not give up control of the army and the police.
- I hope that you will use your influence to encourage them to transfer power fully to the freely elected government.
- All parties -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- must now work together to ensure the orderly

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

transfer of power so that democracy can be established fully in Nicaragua.

((IF ASKED ABOUT THE KOHL VISIT))

- May I also tell you about my helpful conversation Chancellor Kohl this weekend.
- The FRG and the United States agree that German unity -- which has long been the aspiration of the German people -- is a positive development.
- We expressed our common goal of building a democratic and united Germany which -- in firm alliance with its long-standing allies and as a part of an increasingly integrated Europe -- will be one of the pillars of stability and peace in Europe for the long-term.
- The Chancellor and I agreed that the unified Germany should remain in NATO; that American troops will remain in Europe as long as the Europeans want them; and that there needs to be a special status for the former territory of the GDR.
- The unification of Germany should not abridge the legitimate security interests of any state in Europe and the FRG is ready to work with its neighbors, the Soviet Union and its Allies to promote peace and stability in a rapidly changing Europe.

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CONFIDENTIAL

-- We both agree that you have personally made a tremendous contribution to reconciliation in Europe through your respect for the will of the people of Eastern Europe.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

1496

February 26, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for the President's Telephone Call
to Gorbachev

Your memorandum to the President is at Tab I and talking points
are at Tab A. The points concern the Nicaraguan elections and
the Kohl visit.

CR for DP
David Pacelli concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to President
Tab A Talking Points

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PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By CRP NARA, Date 4/13/12

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Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9001501
RECEIVED: 26 FEB 90 11

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ORDWAY
MILLER

CHRON
DOC DATE: 26 FEB 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ANGOLA
USSR

ETHIOPIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CONTACTS W/ SOVIET ON AFRICA

ACTION: OBE PER SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 01 MAR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ORDWAY

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~

1501

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 26, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR.
FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY
SUBJECT: Contacts with the Soviets on Africa

Hank Cohen met with his Soviet counterpart, Yuriy Yukalov, twice on Friday, February 23. I sat in. You may recall that Baker sent a letter to Shevardnadze suggesting urgent consultations on Ethiopia, and these meetings were the result. Angola was the topic of discussion for an hour in the morning; Ethiopia was discussed for a little over an hour in the afternoon.

The meeting on Angola did not go particularly well. Hank presented a proposal (approved by Baker) for "secret" quadripartite talks with UNITA, the MPLA, the USSR and the US. The purpose would be to get the two warring sides down at the bargaining table, initially to discuss the principles of a settlement and how to achieve a cessation of hostilities. In large measure, this initiative was designed to overcome the apparent incurable inertia afflicting President Mobutu--who is supposed to be mediating.

Yukalov said he would report the proposal to Shevardnadze, but then asked about the "Hassan initiative." (The Moroccans have approached us, on behalf of dos Santos, to propose direct negotiations between UNITA and the GPRA on condition that the US and USSR both agree to negative symmetry.) Cohen said that the zero-zero option was a complete non-starter, and that we needed Mobutu's blessing for any direct negotiations--unlikely if he perceived Hassan replacing him as mediator. (State's suspicion is that Yukalov has dreamed up this unworkable abortion, and sold dos Santos on it. Consequently, Baker is sending a letter to Shevardnadze, pursuing the initiative by going over Yukalov's head.)

On Ethiopia, things went much better. With Ambassador Pickering and the Soviet UN perm rep (Belonogov) both present, agreement was achieved on the following points:

- The Soviets will go back to Mengistu and try again to convince him to allow a UN observer at the Carter-mediated peace talks. (Yukalov was quite pessimistic on the prospect for success, however).

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2009-0944-MR
SCS 4/24/13

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2

- The US will go back to the EPLF in an effort to convince them to agree to start negotiations, perhaps by proposing another observer instead of the UN.
- Both the US and USSR will explore the possibility of getting a "cousin" of the Secretary-General (e.g., UN High Commissioner for Refugees, head of the WFP) to be the observer instead of the SYG in an effort to provide a UN presence, but without the political overtones that Mengistu rejects.
- Simultaneously, (subject to approval from Moscow) the two perm reps will approach the Secretary-General and suggest that the UN try to get some direct or indirect negotiations going between the Government and the EPLF on the subject of relief. This could be followed up by a donor's conference, an SYG's appeal, etc. Everybody agreed it would be good to get the UN out in front in coordinating relief efforts.

Concurrences by: Condi Rice, Nancy Bearg Dyke

Condi Rice concurs but is concerned that this approach may cheapen the currency of the Baker-Shevardnadze channel and, under current circumstances, may be bounced back to Yukalov.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Mar-1990 17:50 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: John M. Ordway
(ORDWAY)

SUBJECT: Package OBE'd

Package 1501, an information memo to Scowcroft on recent contacts with the Soviets on Africa, was sent up on February 27. It is now obe'd and, if it is still on his desk, can safely be pulled.

Thanks.

Distribution:

FOR: William F. Sittmann
CC: Norma D. Schillaci
CC: David Miller
CC: Cathy Millison
CC: Barbara Browne
CC: Brenda I. Hilliard

(SITTMANN)
(SCHILLACI)
(MILLER)
(MILLISON)
(BROWNE)
(HILLIARD)

*Thanks
for
information
6-1
7*

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9001620
RECEIVED: 01 MAR 90 13

TO: SCOWCROFT


CHRON FILE

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 29 FEB 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ECONOMICS
USSR

EUROPE



PERSONS: MULFORD, DAVID

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT / EBRD

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 05 MAR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
DEAL

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSRLG

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DOC 1 OF 1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1620

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL 

SUBJECT: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD)

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0944-MR
8/15/2014 MM

David Mulford briefed Dick McCormack and me yesterday on the G-7 Deputies meeting in London concerning the EBRD. The lengthy discussions on February 26-27 focussed on two issues:

1. Soviet Status as Borrower: The Deputies agreed to the following proposal on an ad referendum basis:
 - a. The Articles of Agreement would include annexes putting the Eastern and Central European countries, including the USSR, into two baskets.
 - b. Basket A would include all these countries. They would be eligible to borrow up to the amount of their paid-in and callable capital, but only for technical assistance and private sector projects.
 - c. Basket B would include these same countries minus the USSR. They would be eligible to draw on the full resources of the Bank, that is, beyond their quota without the restrictions on technical assistance and private sector activity as in Basket A.
 - d. The USSR would provide the Chairman of the conference, the member governments, or some other designated authority a Memorandum of Understanding explicitly stating that the Soviets would not seek to move from Basket A to Basket B for 5 years.
 - e. Movement of any country from Basket A to Basket B (including the USSR after 5 years) would require an 85% majority vote. (Under the current share proposal that would give the U.S. and Japan together an effective veto.) The same majority would be required to allow a new country into Basket A (e.g., Lithuania).
 - f. Regarding "backsliding," any Eastern or Central European country failing to live up to the democratic conditionality criterion set forth in the Articles of Agreement could be suspended after a call by 20% of the

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membership for such a change. Final approval for punitive action would, however, require a majority vote.

2. Infrastructure and Loans to State Enterprises: The Deputies debated at length whether there should be ceilings on the amount of infrastructure lending and whether state-owned enterprises engaged in competitive activity (e.g., a state-owned automobile manufacturer) should be eligible. The Europeans took a hard line on this issue, reflecting the mixed economy status of countries such as France and Italy. Finally, the Deputies agreed to a formula which would permit 40% of the Bank's lending authority for use in public sector activities in East and Central Europe, which presumably would involve a heavy dose of infrastructural loans, and 60% for use in the private sector. If there were not sufficient viable private sector projects to meet the 60% target, the funds would simply earn interest, that is, no spillover into public sector activity.

There are still other unresolved issues (e.g., the payment of the U.S. contribution in dollars rather than ECU), but nothing truly significant. This would be a decent package from our standpoint. Consequently, we can expect the French at least to try to gain back in technical negotiations what they appear to have lost in the G-7 discussions. But if this agreement holds and has the support of the broader group, and if we can satisfy ourselves on some nuts and bolts money issues (e.g., open procurement practices, a senior position for the U.S. in the Bank's management), we should be in a position to recommend to the President that the U.S. join the EBRD.

Treasury will try to schedule a meeting next week among you, Nick Brady, and Jim Baker to review the bidding before seeking the President's approval. The next round of G-39 (count 'em) discussions are scheduled for March 10-11 in Paris. Attali hopes, perhaps naively, that this will be the final negotiating round. The group has grown as Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Korea, and Liechtenstein expressed interest in joining before the February 22 cutoff date for new members.

Concurrence by: Robert Blackwill *AMB for RB*

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9001733
RECEIVED: 06 MAR 90 10

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: MELBY
DEAL

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: INTL TRADE

USSR

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: US - SOVIET TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 09 MAR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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DEAL

MELBY

BLACKWILL

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By Coe NARA, Date 3/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

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1733

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0944-MR
SCS 4/24/13

March 6, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL 

FROM: ERIC MELBY 

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Trade Negotiations


Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

The second round of negotiations for the U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement took place March 1-2 in London. Deputy USTR Jules Katz chaired for the U.S.; Deputy Foreign Economic Relations Minister Chumakov chaired the Soviet side.

Working from the U.S. text, Chumakov explained Soviet concerns -- and in some cases strong objections -- to provisions which go beyond a simple exchange of most favored nation status (MFN). In turn, Katz explained our need to satisfy Congress and U.S. business that the trade agreement would provide a balance of opportunities for U.S. business.

Despite Chumakov's rhetoric, the entire Soviet delegation engaged in a constructive, detailed discussion of our draft text. The main difference centers on whether U.S. business should get the better of MFN or national treatment in the Soviet Union, particularly on issues covering doing business and currency transactions. On intellectual property rights, a key U.S. requirement, the Soviets appear fairly forthcoming. Chumakov told Katz privately that he had instructed his delegation to consider our points carefully and to prepare a revised text by February 9 for our review. He said he would require high level political direction to agree to our key points.

The third negotiating round will take place March 19-22 in Vienna, during which Katz expects separately to conclude negotiations on the long-term grain agreement. In Vienna, Katz hopes to complete negotiation on the bulk of the trade agreement, while clarifying U.S. and Soviet differences on the key points so that these can be pushed up for political guidance, e.g, by Baker and Shevardnadze when they meet in early April. Katz is cautiously optimistic that the trade agreement could be wrapped up in a fourth negotiating session in April or early May.

There will be an opportunity to discuss our views on the trade agreement next week when Soviet Finance Minister Pavlov and State Bank President Gerashchenko are in town for meetings with senior Administration officials.

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My impression from the London meeting is that we should be able to break new ground in the trade agreement, without getting everything Congress and U.S. business would find desirable.

Concurrence by: Robert Blackwill 

cc: Condi Rice
Adrian Basora

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004347
RECEIVED: 31 MAY 90 11

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: DUBININ, YURIY V

DOC DATE: 07 MAR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM AMB DUBININ OF USSR RE THANKS FOR HELPING ARMENIAN
PEOPLE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 04 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
BURNS
DYKE
RICE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9004347

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 90053111 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 2/24/09

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4347
712

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

3-7-90

Dear Mr. President,

I was deeply touched to receive
your letter.

You, Mrs. Bush, your whole fa-
mily did a great deal for the
Armenian people in an hour of
need. Your personal contribution
is so representative of the
exceptional generosity of the
American people that you
were symbolically present at
our ceremony.

Thank you again.

My best regards to Mrs. Bush.

With deep respect,

N. S. Khrushchev

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9001790
RECEIVED: 07 MAR 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

ON FILE

FROM: RADEMAKER
ROSTOW

DOC DATE: 08 MAR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: LEGAL ISSUES

USSR

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENT LITHUANIA

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 10 MAR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RADEMAKER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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RICE
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1790

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 8, 1990

INFORMATION

Not Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *NR*
FROM: STEPHEN RADEMAKER *SR*
SUBJECT: Recognition of an Independent Lithuania

We have explored the question whether legally we will be required to take some action in the event that Lithuania declares itself independent of the Soviet Union. We conclude that action will not be required as a matter of law, although, if we choose to, we could recognize the new government.

International law distinguishes between recognition of states, recognition of governments, and establishment of diplomatic relations. These can be regarded as progressive steps, each having as a prerequisite, expressly or impliedly, the preceding step. Under U.S. law, the recognition of foreign states and governments and the establishment of diplomatic relations are matters exclusively within the discretion of the President.

We have recognized Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as independent states continuously since 1922. When the Soviet Union occupied and annexed these countries in 1940, we took the position that the action violated international law and that we would not recognize it. The governments of these countries ceased to exist following the Soviet annexation, but, to symbolize our non-recognition of the Soviet action, we have allowed the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian legations in this country to continue to operate with full diplomatic privileges and immunities.

For fifty years, we have regarded the missions as representing the former Baltic governments, not governments in exile. In other words, since 1940, while continuously recognizing the Baltic republics as states, we have not recognized any government of the Baltic republics. This policy has been in accord with international law, which generally requires that a regime be the "effective government" of a state before it can be recognized.

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2004.1999.MR
CAP 12/3/07

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The head of Lithuania's mission is a charge d'affaires. Deaths and retirements occasionally have required personnel changes at this and the other Baltic missions, and we have procedures in place to issue carnets and take other appropriate steps when a mission requests such changes.

If Lithuania were to declare independence from the Soviet Union, and the Soviets did not contest that action, there presumably would be no obstacle to U.S. recognition of the new government. If the Soviets were to object, however, the question of recognizing the new government would be more complicated, at least at a political level. (In no case would the question of recognizing Lithuania as a state arise; a Lithuanian declaration of independence would provide no occasion to reconsider our longstanding recognition of a Lithuanian state.)

If the Soviets contested Lithuania's declaration of independence, the President would have, as a matter of U.S. law, discretion not to recognize the new government. As a matter of international law, so long as the putative government of Lithuania was not the "effective government" of that country (which could be considered an open issue if the Soviets step up pressures against it), arguably it would be premature to recognize the new government. If the United States decided not to recognize the government, we could explain it as a matter of prudence, waiting for the situation to clarify before recognizing a government. (As a matter of U.S. law, the President also would have discretion in this circumstance to recognize the new government, but this step at least arguably would be inconsistent with international law.) If the putative government of Lithuania were in "effective control" of its territory, there would be no bar to recognition under either U.S. or international law.

If we decide to wait and see, the only complication would be the presence in the United States of a Lithuanian mission with full diplomatic privileges and immunities. We understand that the mission is in close contact with the Lithuanian independence movement and, if independence were declared, would likely consider itself the representative of the new government. The new government might send additional personnel to staff the mission, and we would confront the question whether to accept the credentials of those individuals.

We have procedures in place to deal with personnel changes in the Baltic missions, and have used those procedures in the past. Thus, with the cooperation of the Lithuanian mission, we could handle any request to accredit new diplomats from Lithuania under those procedures without according recognition to the new government. We could treat the mission, including the new personnel, as continuing to represent the old (i.e., pre-1940) government, regardless of who they claimed to represent. The new

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
government could try to force our hand by seeking personnel changes outside of those procedures, or by publicly seeking an exchange of ambassadors, but if we were prepared to accept the domestic political consequences, we could simply reject such efforts.

Concurrences by: ^{RB} Robert Blackwill, ^{CR} Condoleezza Rice, Peter ^{PMR} Rodman, Virginia Lampley

BB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 22, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*SUBJECT: Themes on the Administration's Policy toward
Lithuania

The themes on our policy toward Lithuania for use in your
discussions with Congressional leaders are at Tab I.

me
Ginny Lampley concurs.

--The Administration shares the aim of the sponsors of the resolution -- to support the Lithuanian people who have, through their freely elected government, expressed their desire to reestablish the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania.

-- The best way to help Lithuanian in this complicated, complex and fragile situation is to pursue a careful policy of quiet diplomacy and public support.

-- Lithuania's skillful leaders are moving steadily toward the achievement of their goal.

-- The U.S. government should do nothing that would inadvertently make Lithuania's task more difficult by inciting the parties or exacerbating tensions between Moscow and the Lithuanians.

-- It is the Administration's view that it has taken the most appropriate steps at this sensitive time including:

-- Reiterating U.S. support for the right to self-determination for the Baltic States and the long-standing policy of refusing to recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

-- Urging the Soviet government to enter into immediate negotiations with the Lithuanian government which has itself called for talks that can take into account the interests of all parties.

-- Expressing concern that the Soviet government not engage in intimidation or increase tensions at a time when only dialogue with representatives of the people of Lithuania can result in a solution to the situation.

-- Making clear to the Soviet government that the use of force or the threat of the use of force would have grave consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations -- both publicly and in private contacts at all diplomatic levels.

-- U.S. practice is to establish formal relations with the lawful government of any state once that government is in effective control of its territory and capable of entering into fulfilling international obligations.

-- It is premature to establish formal relations with Lithuania now.

-- We believe that the course that we have adopted is the most likely to lead to a peaceful outcome of self-determination for the Lithuanian people.

-- ((This is why we feel that the amendment is inappropriate at this time.))

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RECORD ID: 9002256
RECEIVED: 22 MAR 90 18

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 22 MAR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CONGRESSIONAL

AP

PERSONS: KENNEDY, EDWARD

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ SEN KENNEDY ON 23 MAR / TALKING POINTS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 26 MAR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

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RICE

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/21/09

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2256
PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

March 22, 1990

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2009-0944-MR
SCS 4/24/13

MEETING WITH SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY

DATE: March 23, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 10:40 a.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To meet with Senator Kennedy in advance of his trip to the Soviet Union.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Kennedy has asked to meet with you prior to his March 24 trip to the Soviet Union. He expects to see Gorbachev during the visit and wants to make certain that he addresses sensitive subjects in a way that is consistent with the Administration's policies.

The most sensitive issue at this time is Lithuania. You should tell Kennedy that the Administration is trying to support the Lithuanians' right to self-determination without exacerbating tensions between Lithuania and Moscow. The Administration has called upon the Soviet government to negotiate in good faith with the government of Lithuania and encouraged peaceful dialogue among the parties. You can also register your concern with Moscow's recent attempts to put pressure on the Lithuanians -- steps that are counterproductive and inflame public sentiments.

Gorbachev may also raise Germany with Kennedy. While expressing faith in German democracy, you may want to remind Kennedy of our central goal -- continued full membership for Germany in NATO, including its integrated military structures. He should know that we view NATO as a pillar of European security for the foreseeable future.

Finally, you should stress your strong commitment to a successful U.S.-Soviet Summit in June. You can tell Kennedy that you are doing all that you can to infuse the U.S. interagency process with a sense of urgency and express the hope that Gorbachev will take similar steps in the Soviet Union so that CFE and START can be concluded prior to the Summit. On economic issues, you may want to mention

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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the ongoing trade negotiations and reiterate your intention to grant Most Favored Nation Status to the Soviet Union should the Supreme Soviet pass a free emigration law by the time of the Summit.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Kennedy
General Scowcroft

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and meeting.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

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POINTS TO BE MADE IN MEETING WITH SENATOR KENNEDY

LITHUANIA

- The situation in Lithuania is complicated and fragile and we are trying to pursue a careful policy of quiet diplomacy and public support.
- The Lithuanians are pursuing their goal of independence in a peaceful and dignified manner.
- I do not want to do anything that would make that task more difficult by exacerbating tensions between Moscow and Lithuania.
- We have reiterated our policy of not recognizing the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.
- We have urged the Soviet government to enter into immediate negotiations with the Lithuanian government.
- And we have made it clear to the Soviet leadership, publicly and privately, that the use or the threat of the use of force in the Baltics would have grave consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations.
- Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have assured Jim Baker and me personally that they do not intend to use force.
- Even so, I am concerned about recent acts -- like Gorbachev's ultimatum to the Lithuanian population to disarm -- that simply increase tensions and engender a sense of intimidation.

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- The Soviets must understand that the only way to solve this problem is through negotiation.

GERMANY

- The unification of Germany is proceeding in an orderly fashion.
- The FRG has been a good democratic ally for more than four decades and I am confident that the unified Germany will be a good partner in the future.
- We believe that continued full German membership in NATO -- including its integrated military structures is essential for European security and stability.
- There is no substitute for NATO which has kept the peace through a defensive alliance of democratic nations for forty years.
- Gorbachev has said that a united Germany cannot be in NATO, but I hope we can persuade him to see the point of view of the Western Allies who are united on this issue.

ARMS CONTROL

- I am committed to a successful U.S.-Soviet Summit in June.
- I am doing all that I can to give a political push to the U.S. interagency process so that we can get the work done and conclude the CFE and START treaties before the Summit.
- I hope that Gorbachev will do the same in the Soviet Union.
- Without political intervention, I am afraid that the issues will become mired in the bureaucracy.

ECONOMICS AND TRADE

- The negotiations for a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement have begun.

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-- We intend to have a trade agreement ready for signature in June at the Summit.

-- The Soviets need to pass their emigration law because -- if they do -- it is my intention to grant Most Favored Nation Status to the Soviet Union at the Summit.

((IF THE POLISH BORDER IS RAISED))

-- I had good talks with Prime Minister Mazowiecki while he was here.

-- As I said to him, all countries have the right to live behind secure borders and Poland is no exception.

-- I believe that Germany and Poland will resolve the border issue to the satisfaction of the Polish people.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2256

March 22, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Senator Kennedy

Your memorandum to the President for his meeting with Senator Kennedy is at Tab I.

CR for
Ginny Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

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RECORD ID: 9002103
RECEIVED: 16 MAR 90 17

TO: REAGAN, RONALD W

UNKNOWN FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 03 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
NICARAGUA

DRUGS
GERMANY F R

PERSONS: NIXON, RICHARD M
CARTER, JIMMY

FORD, GERALD R
REAGAN, RONALD W

SUBJECT: LTR TO REAGAN RE RECENT FORN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 30 MAR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RODMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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NIXON, RICHARD M
577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY
97675

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1990

Dear President Nixon:

President Bush has asked me to send you the enclosed copy of the 1990 National Security Strategy Report. This is a Presidential report, mandated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act, on the elements of national strategy and national power. This document is an effort to articulate our strategy for a new era, giving due emphasis to both the continuities in our national security policy and the necessity to respond to change.

At President Bush's request, I am taking this opportunity also to update you on important recent developments in key areas -- U.S.-Soviet relations, German unification, the drug summit at Cartagena, and Nicaragua.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Secretary Baker met with the Soviets, first in Moscow from February 7-9 and then in Ottawa from February 12-14, to follow up on the work laid down by the two Presidents at Malta in December. The objective of those meetings was to make progress on arms control, economic relations, human rights, and regional issues in order to ensure a successful Summit in the U.S. in June.

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At Malta, as you know, the President and Mr. Gorbachev agreed to a series of steps on economic cooperation, including completion of a new bilateral trade agreement by June. If the Soviets codify and continue to implement their new liberalized emigration

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Soviet policy in Lithuania could seriously harm these positive trends in our relations, of course. The Administration has emphatically reiterated the traditional American support for Baltic self-determination, while making clear that the use or threat of force would have grave consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations. We have expressed concern that the Soviet government not engage in intimidation or increase tensions but, instead, enter into immediate negotiations with the Lithuanian government.

President Bush continues to believe that support for Gorbachev's economic reform, democratization, and more cooperative foreign policy is in our interest. The issue is not personalities but the overall trend that Gorbachev has embodied. At the same time, we will continue to press the Soviets hard where their policies are not satisfactory (as in some of the regional conflicts). In the last analysis, it is clear that Gorbachev's fate is in his own hands, and those of the Soviet people, and is not likely to be decided by American policy.

German Unification

The President had an intensive weekend of consultations with Helmut Kohl on February 24-25 and believes both that our partnership with Germany is solid and that unification is proceeding in a responsible manner.

Kohl made it clear he believes that a unified Germany must and will remain embedded in the EC and NATO -- and his hand is strengthened by the East German election results. Kohl told us he was personally committed to full German membership in NATO, including in its integrated military command. He left no doubt of his willingness to allow U.S. forces to remain stationed in the FRG.

President Bush stressed the necessity of U.S. nuclear weapons on German soil to underpin the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe. Kohl cautioned that SNF would be a controversial election issue later this year in the FRG.

The "Two Plus Four" talks (the two Germanies plus the United States, UK, France, and Soviet Union) have begun at the level of senior officials. This mechanism is designed to achieve the

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devolution of Four-Power rights and responsibilities so that a sovereign, united, and democratic Germany can function freely within an increasingly integrated Europe. The unification process should take account of the legitimate interests of Germany's neighbors and the countries of Europe more generally. The Two Plus Four will thus invite Poland to deliberations when issues of its borders are discussed.

We recognize too that, regarding legitimate Soviet security interests, special arrangements for the territory of the former GDR will need to be developed.

Overall, our intention is to work very closely with our Western partners (FRG, France, and the UK) to ensure an outcome consistent with Western strategic interests.

Cartagena Drug Summit

The President met in Cartagena on February 15 with the Presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. The leaders put aside the sterile debate about whether supply or demand was more important -- and agreed to combat both. The posturing was at a minimum, and we consider it a good meeting.

Most of the discussion was on the three countries' programs to reduce their economic dependency on the drug trade. Encouragingly, the Andean Presidents were less interested in U.S. financial aid than in longer-term ways to spur trade, investment, and growth through market forces. They made a good case for greater market access in the United States.

In parallel, the U.S. is expanding assistance to the police, intelligence, and military services of the three countries to strengthen their capabilities against the narco-terrorists. We will have a range of bilateral agreements to support these activities, ranging from an improved extradition treaty with Peru to support for local military forces. The Declaration of Cartagena discussed this dimension of cooperation openly, at some length.

President Bush intends to urge his Economic Summit partners to support these Andean efforts, and we will also seek more support from the international financial institutions and other allies.

Nicaraguan Elections

The election outcome in Nicaragua on February 25 was, of course, enormously heartening. Our concern now is to ensure a smooth and complete transition, in light of disturbing indications we had that the Sandinistas might try either to cling to power or to

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undermine the new government economically or otherwise. An accord has been reached among the Resistance, the Church, UNO, and the outgoing government which we hope will avoid armed clashes, protect the fighters, and allow them to demobilize safely. We have continued to support Mrs. Chamorro in her insistence that the Sandinistas relinquish power totally, including control over the Defense and Interior ministries.

On March 13, President Bush announced a major economic aid package for Nicaragua, including the lifting of all economic sanctions (including the trade embargo); \$21 million in emergency food aid to support reintegration of the Resistance and refugees; steps toward restoring Nicaragua's sugar quota and providing other trade and investment benefits; a request for a supplemental appropriation of \$300 million for FY 90 for agricultural, employment, resettlement, financial, and development purposes; and a separate request for \$200 million for FY 91.

This request, together with the \$500 million we had requested previously for Panama, is now under active consideration on the Hill. The President has met with the Congressional leadership to urge prompt action in very strong terms, and we are working with key Congressional committees to arrive at mutually agreeable offsets from the defense appropriation. We hope that this legislation, of vital importance to these two fledgling democracies where we have special responsibilities, will be passed before the Easter recess.

Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft

Enclosure: National Security Strategy
Report - 1990

The Honorable Richard Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 97675

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1990

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Brent Scowcroft

Enclosure: National Security Strategy
Report - 1990

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
P.O. Box 927
Rancho Mirage, California 92270

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1990

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At Malta, as you know, the President and Mr. Gorbachev agreed to a series of steps on economic cooperation, including completion of a new bilateral trade agreement by June. If the Soviets codify and continue to implement their new liberalized emigration

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policy, the granting of MFN will go forward in the context of the trade agreement. Baker and Shevardnadze, in Moscow, laid some of the groundwork to such an agreement.

Soviet policy in Lithuania could seriously harm these positive trends in our relations, of course. The Administration has emphatically reiterated the traditional American support for Baltic self-determination, while making clear that the use or threat of force would have grave consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations. We have expressed concern that the Soviet government not engage in intimidation or increase tensions but, instead, enter into immediate negotiations with the Lithuanian government.

President Bush continues to believe that support for Gorbachev's economic reform, democratization, and more cooperative foreign policy is in our interest. The issue is not personalities but the overall trend that Gorbachev has embodied. At the same time, we will continue to press the Soviets hard where their policies are not satisfactory (as in some of the regional conflicts). In the last analysis, it is clear that Gorbachev's fate is in his own hands, and those of the Soviet people, and is not likely to be decided by American policy.

German Unification

The President had an intensive weekend of consultations with Helmut Kohl on February 24-25 and believes both that our partnership with Germany is solid and that unification is proceeding in a responsible manner.

Kohl made it clear he believes that a unified Germany must and will remain embedded in the EC and NATO -- and his hand is strengthened by the East German election results. Kohl told us he was personally committed to full German membership in NATO, including in its integrated military command. He left no doubt of his willingness to allow U.S. forces to remain stationed in the FRG. President Bush stressed the necessity of U.S. nuclear weapons on German soil to underpin the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe.

The "Two Plus Four" talks (the two Germanies plus the United States, UK, France, and Soviet Union) have begun at the level of senior officials. This mechanism is designed to achieve the devolution of Four-Power rights and responsibilities so that a sovereign, united, and democratic Germany can function freely within an increasingly integrated Europe. The unification process should take account of the legitimate interests of Germany's neighbors and the countries of Europe more generally. The Two Plus Four will thus invite Poland to deliberations when issues of its borders are discussed.

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Cartagena Drug Summit

The President met in Cartagena on February 15 with the Presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. The leaders put aside the sterile debate about whether supply or demand was more important -- and agreed to combat both. The posturing was at a minimum, and we consider it a good meeting.

Most of the discussion was on the three countries' programs to reduce their economic dependency on the drug trade. Encouragingly, the Andean Presidents were less interested in U.S. financial aid than in longer-term ways to spur trade, investment, and growth through market forces. They made a good case for greater market access in the United States.

In parallel, the U.S. is expanding assistance to the police, intelligence, and military services of the three countries to strengthen their capabilities against the narco-terrorists. We will have a range of bilateral agreements to support these activities, ranging from an improved extradition treaty with Peru to support for local military forces. The Declaration of Cartagena discussed this dimension of cooperation at some length.

President Bush intends to urge his Economic Summit partners to support these Andean efforts, and we will also seek more support from the international financial institutions and other allies.

Nicaraguan Elections

The election outcome in Nicaragua on February 25 was, of course, enormously heartening. Your own efforts are greatly appreciated. Our concern now is to ensure a smooth and complete transition, in light of disturbing indications we had that the Sandinistas might try either to cling to power or to undermine the new government economically or otherwise. An accord has been reached among the Resistance, the Church, UNO, and the outgoing government which we hope will avoid armed clashes, protect the fighters, and allow them to demobilize safely. We have continued to support Mrs. Chamorro in her insistence that the Sandinistas relinquish power totally, including control over the Defense and Interior ministries.

On March 13, President Bush announced a major economic aid package for Nicaragua, including the lifting of all economic sanctions (including the trade embargo); \$21 million in emergency food aid to support reintegration of the Resistance and refugees; steps toward restoring Nicaragua's sugar quota and providing other trade and investment benefits; a request for a supplemental appropriation of \$300 million for FY 90 for agricultural,

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
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employment, resettlement, financial, and development purposes; and a separate request for \$200 million for FY 91.

This request, together with the \$500 million we had requested previously for Panama, is now under active consideration on the Hill. The President has met with the Congressional leadership to urge prompt action in very strong terms, and we are working with key Congressional committees to arrive at mutually agreeable offsets from the defense appropriation. We hope that this legislation, of vital importance to these two fledgling democracies where we have special responsibilities, will be passed before the Easter recess.

Sincerely,


Brent Scowcroft

Enclosure: National Security Strategy
Report - 1990

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
The Carter Presidential Center
1 Copenhill
Atlanta, Georgia 30307

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1990

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Dear President Reagan:

President Bush has asked me to send you the enclosed copy of the 1990 National Security Strategy Report. This is a Presidential report, mandated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act, on the elements of national strategy and national power. This document is an effort to articulate our strategy for a new era, giving due emphasis to both the continuities in our national security policy and the necessity to respond to change.

At President Bush's request, I am taking this opportunity also to update you on important recent developments in key areas -- U.S.-Soviet relations, German unification, the drug summit at Cartagena, and Nicaragua.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Secretary Baker met with the Soviets, first in Moscow from February 7-9 and then in Ottawa from February 12-14, to follow up on the work laid down by the two Presidents at Malta in December. The objective of those meetings was to make progress on arms control, economic relations, human rights, and regional issues in order to ensure a successful Summit in the U.S. in June.

On arms control, we made substantial progress. In START, we made headway on key remaining issues: ALCMs, SLCMs, non-deployed missiles, and telemetry encryption. In CFE, the Soviets have agreed with us on the President's initiative on manpower (announced in the State of the Union) on a ceiling of 195,000 in the Central Zone. On CW, the Soviets may join with us to start destroying stocks even before a multilateral ban comes into force. (The President proposed this at the UNGA last Fall.)

On nuclear testing, we expect that the new verification protocols, needed to permit the 1974 and 1976 threshold limitation treaties to come into force, will be ready for signature at the Summit in June. On Open Skies -- another initiative of the President (and the subject of the Ottawa conference that Baker and Shevardnadze were attending) -- the Soviets were generally supportive and the Western allies have a strong common position.

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policy, the granting of MFN will go forward in the context of the trade agreement. Baker and Shevardnadze, in Moscow, laid some of the groundwork to such an agreement. Negotiations are progressing on the trade agreement and on an investment agreement, a new long-term grain agreement, a maritime agreement, and several other areas of economic cooperation.

Soviet policy in Lithuania could seriously harm these positive trends in our relations, of course. The Administration has emphatically reiterated the traditional American support for Baltic self-determination, while making clear that the use or threat of force would have grave consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations. We have expressed concern that the Soviet government not engage in intimidation or increase tensions but, instead, enter into immediate negotiations with the Lithuanian government.

President Bush continues to believe that support for Gorbachev's economic reform, democratization, and more cooperative foreign policy is in our interest. The issue is not personalities but the overall trend that Gorbachev has embodied. At the same time, we will continue to press the Soviets hard where their policies are not satisfactory (as in some of the regional conflicts). In the last analysis, it is clear that Gorbachev's fate is in his own hands, and those of the Soviet people, and is not likely to be decided by American policy.

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The President had an intensive weekend of consultations with Helmut Kohl on February 24-25 and believes both that our partnership with Germany is solid and that unification is proceeding in a responsible manner.

Kohl made it clear he believes that a unified Germany must and will remain embedded in the EC and NATO -- and his hand is strengthened by the East German election results. Kohl told us he was personally committed to full German membership in NATO, including in its integrated military command. He left no doubt of his willingness to allow U.S. forces to remain stationed in the FRG.

President Bush stressed the necessity of U.S. nuclear weapons on German soil to underpin the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe. Kohl cautioned that SNF would be a controversial election issue later this year in the FRG.

The "Two Plus Four" talks (the two Germanies plus the United States, UK, France, and Soviet Union) have begun at the level of senior officials. This mechanism is designed to achieve the

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devolution of Four-Power rights and responsibilities so that a sovereign, united, and democratic Germany can function freely within an increasingly integrated Europe. The unification process should take account of the legitimate interests of Germany's neighbors and the countries of Europe more generally. The Two Plus Four will thus invite Poland to deliberations when issues of its borders are discussed.

We recognize too that, regarding legitimate Soviet security interests, special arrangements for the territory of the former GDR will need to be developed.

Overall, our intention is to work very closely with our Western partners (FRG, France, and the UK) to ensure an outcome consistent with Western strategic interests.

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In parallel, the U.S. is expanding assistance to the police, intelligence, and military services of the three countries to strengthen their capabilities against the narco-terrorists. We will have a range of bilateral agreements to support these activities, ranging from an improved extradition treaty with Peru to support for local military forces. The Declaration of Cartagena discussed this dimension of cooperation openly, at some length.

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
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undermine the new government economically or otherwise. An accord has been reached among the Resistance, the Church, UNO, and the outgoing government which we hope will avoid armed clashes, protect the fighters, and allow them to demobilize safely. We have continued to support Mrs. Chamorro in her insistence that the Sandinistas relinquish power totally, including control over the Defense and Interior ministries.

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Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft

Enclosure: National Security Strategy
Report - 1990

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
2121 Avenue of the Stars
34th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

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March 26, 1990

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *pmc*
SUBJECT: Letters to Former Presidents

Attached for your signature are letters to Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan updating them on recent foreign policy developments. The topics covered are U.S.-Soviet relations (including the Moscow/Ottawa ministerials and Lithuania), the Kohl visit and the GDR elections, the Cartagena drug summit, and the Nicaragua election.

The letters will also enclose a copy of the National Security Strategy Report.

The letter for President Carter is tailored to his interests, including his participation in the Nicaraguan election. The other three letters are identical.

Concurrence by: *pmc* Bob Blackwill, *pmc* John Gordon, Bill Pryce, Rand Beers *pmc*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to Presidents Nixon (Tab I), Ford (Tab II), Carter (Tab III), and Reagan (Tab IV).

Attachments

Tab I	Letter to President Nixon
Tab II	Letter to President Ford
Tab III	Letter to President Carter
Tab IV	Letter to President Reagan

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