

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91117
Folder ID Number: 91117-009

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Robert Gates Re: Contingency Paper (1 pp.)	1/13/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Background Report	Re: Contingencies (8 pp.)	1/12/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Paper	Moscow's Leverage Over the Baltic Republics [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (11 pp.)	1/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Objectives (3 pp.)	1/13/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum on Objectives (1 pp.)	1/9/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: [Soviet Union] (3 pp.)	1/24/90	(b)(1)	S
04a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1 pp.)	1/31/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (4 pp.)	1/31/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap995
OA/ID Number: 91117-009
Date Closed: 2/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04c. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Phone Call to Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Moscow (3 pp.)	2/1/90	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Robert M. Gates Re: Background Information (1 pp.)	2/1/90	(b)(1)	S
06b. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Response (1 pp.)	1/29/90	(b)(1)	S
06c. Cable	Re: Cable (3 pp.)	1/22/90	(b)(1)	S
06d. Memo	To the Secretary (1 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	S
06e. Report	Re: Background Report (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06f. Memo	Diane G. Ross to et.al. Re: Action Taken (1 pp.)	2/8/90	(b)(1)	C
06g. Report	Re: A Summary of US Understandings (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07b. Message	Prime Minister to President Mitterrand (3 pp.)	1/31/90	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap995
OA/ID Number: 91117-009
Date Closed: 2/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07c. Letter	Re: received Friday, 2 February [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	
07d. Letter	Re: received Friday, 2 February [Russian] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	
07e. Cable	Re: Reply to President Bush (4 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	S
07f. Memo	George Van Eron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	2/7/90	(b)(1)	ϕ
08. Memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: First Round Negotiations (1 pp.)	2/14/90	(b)(1)	S
09a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
09b. Letter	Re: received Friday, 2 February [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	
09c. Letter	Re: received Friday, 2 February [Russian] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	
09d. Letter	Re: Gorbachev Letter (3 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	
09e. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to the President [French] (5 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	

Page 3 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Collapse Files

Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap995

OA/ID Number: 91117-009

Date Closed: 2/23/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003608
RECEIVED: 07 MAY 90 12

CHRON FILE

TO: GATES

FROM: RICE

DOC DATE: 13 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BALTIC STATES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BALTIC CONTINGENCIES

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RICE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/23/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9003608

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 90050712 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/23/09

~~SECRET~~

3608

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 13, 1990

Noted 1/14/90
has been

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Contingency Paper on the Baltics

The Baltic contingency paper is at Tab I. The paper can be sent to your counterparts once you have had an opportunity to review it. You may want to schedule a meeting of the group for late next week or early the following week.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0942-MR
12/1/2014 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Background Report	Re: Contingencies (8 pp.)	1/12/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Paper	Moscow's Leverage Over the Baltic Republics [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (11 pp.)	1/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Collapse Files

Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 10/20/2015

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0942-MR(500.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	1/16/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



Washington, D.C. 20505



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

JANUARY 1990

MOSCOW'S LEVERAGE OVER THE BALTIC REPUBLICS 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Summary

Moscow has a broad range of painful measures it can inflict on the Baltic republics to slow their push for independence. At the moderate end of the scale, it could revoke the special economic autonomy that the Balts currently enjoy, particularly their ability to establish foreign ties. Moscow's most powerful option would be sanctions on selected commodities or a complete economic blockade. The Balts are heavily dependent on the rest of the Soviet Union for their most vital inputs and final products. They are completely dependent on outside supplies for crude oil, natural gas, and coal. If the blockade imposed only affected shipments from the other Soviet republics, the Balts could find alternative world suppliers, but only after some time and at great cost. Moreover, the Balts have few potential exports that would yield the hard currency needed to pay for these imports; they have specialized in manufactured goods which lag behind world standards in quality and technological level. Economic sanctions would not be costless to Moscow, however. The Balts, for example, produce consumer goods that are much in demand by the Soviets at a time when shortages and consumer discontent are of great concern to the leadership. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

This typescript memorandum was prepared by Elizabeth Denton, Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from analysts in the 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, 1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)

SECRET

1.4(c); (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0942-MR

1/16/2014 MM

Parliamentary Pressure

Gorbachev might use the USSR's rejuvenated legislative system as a "democratic" way to rein in the Balts. The legislature in this way could serve as a force of moral suasion and give a pan-Soviet legitimacy to Moscow's wants. A newly formed constitutional review committee is empowered to declare invalid certain acts approved by the Baltic legislature. In December 1989 ^{1.4(c); (b)(3)} Supreme Soviet was drafting a law on secession. Gorbachev told the Central Committee plenum in December that he was considering asking the Supreme Soviet to ban political groups that advocate secession. Between sessions of the legislature, its presidium would be empowered to take such action. ^{1.4(c); (b)(3)}

Punishment of Party Independents

In response to Baltic communist parties' efforts to split from the Soviet party and adopt nationalist agendas, Moscow could recognize those communists loyal to Moscow as the only legitimate representatives and confiscate from the renegades all party assets including buildings, printing facilities, and mass news media, and revoke their claims to party pensions. These measures would be difficult to implement without the use of force and probably would be effective for only a short period of time until replacement facilities could be found. ^{1.4(c); (b)(3)}

Increase in Inter-Ethnic Tensions

Moscow could use its control over the media and covert action to stir up already serious inter-ethnic tensions in the Baltic republics. It could, for example, increase central media criticism of Baltic legislation for discriminating against the rights of local minorities in an effort to encourage protests, strikes and acts of violence by them against the Balts. In Estonia, in which nearly one third of the population is Russian, Russian workers staged lengthy strikes this summer to protest residency requirements for voters and candidates for local legislatures. Moscow reportedly encouraged and financed these strikes. Moscow could also give covert financial and other support to ethnic minority groups in Estonia and Lithuania who are pushing for their own autonomous regions. The central leadership could also engineer provocations by exaggerating the seriousness of violent acts by ethnic Balts against local minorities. ^{1.4(c); (b)(3)}

Cancellation of Elections and Arrest of Nationalist Leaders

^{1.4(c); (b)(3)} Baltic nationalists are concerned that Moscow will use some kind of provocation or pretext--such as the discriminatory republic election laws--to cancel upcoming republic

elections. The Soviets could find some pretext - legal or otherwise--to arrest the leaders of the popular fronts and independent communist party.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Economic Leverage

In the economic sphere, Moscow has a broader and potentially much more damaging set of measures to employ to discourage the move toward independence. These range from revoking the special privileges that the Balts already enjoy to a cutoff of deliveries of one or more categories of badly needed goods. In the case of several of these measures, however, Moscow would also be inflicting some economic harm on itself.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Moscow Withdraws Recent Grant of Autonomy

Moscow has used the Baltics as a hothouse for decentralizing reforms; as of 1 January they were among the first to transfer to so-called regional khozraschet in which they have a measure of autonomy in running and financing their economy. Among these rights is the ability to establish foreign economic ties, and the Balts are busily establishing their own foreign trade associations. Last June Estonia sent its first trade representative to Finland, and Baltic economists and businessmen have been meeting with Western trade officials and searching for joint venture partners. Estonia in particular has pushed to become a free economic zone to attract foreign capital and to gain access to Western technology and business practices. All three republics want to introduce their own currencies which they hope will eventually become convertible.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

The Balts are proud of their special status, and Moscow could inflict a painful wound by retracting these rights. It would seem particularly easy for Moscow to recentralize dealings with foreign businessmen, who see the Baltic largely as an entree to the vast Soviet market and would be loath to risk this potential gold mine.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Economic Sanctions

Moscow's most powerful option in the economic area would be sanctions on selected commodities or a complete economic blockade. With only 2.8 percent of the country's population and producing 3.3 percent of its national income, the Baltic republics, economically, make a relatively small contribution to the USSR (see Table 1). Conversely, because of their small size and because traditional Soviet regional policy has stressed interdependence and the division of labor, the Baltics are heavily dependent on the rest of the Soviet Union for their most vital inputs and final products. Moscow with its naval power could seal off almost completely (Lithuania has a border with Poland) trade between the

Table 1

OUTPUT OF SELECTED COMMODITIES BY THE BALTIC REPUBLICS
(as percent of total USSR in 1988)

Electricity	2.8
Steel	0.3
Commercial timber	2.6
Cement	3.9
All consumer goods (except alcoholic beverages)	5.3
Textiles	4.5
Shoes	3.5
All agricultural output	4.3
Grain	2.6
Meat	5.7
Potatoes	5.9
Vegetables	2.4

Source: Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR, 1988

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Baltics and the rest of the world, and Soviet ground forces could seal the border with Poland. If foreign trade was permitted, the Balts could find alternative suppliers, but only after some time and at great cost. Moreover, the Balts now have few potential exports that would yield the hard currency needed to pay for these imports. Rather they have specialized in manufactured goods--producer and consumer durables--in which the Soviets typically lag behind world standards in quality and technological level, and which, as a result, are unattractive to hard currency customers. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Infrastructure. Moscow's shutdown of communications and transportation links with the rest of the country would deprive the Balts of vital coordinating and supply lines, which would be most damaging in the short run. The Balts would be left, however, with infrastructures and stocks of machinery and equipment that would become good bases for new national structures. Moreover, Moscow would be deprived of valuable facilities. Latvia and Lithuania, for example, are major shipping points to the outside for Soviet exports of oil and coal. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Fuel and Power. All three Baltic republics are heavily dependent on energy supplied by other republics, but there are wide variations in dependency. In 1988, for example, Estonia could supply 62 percent of its own energy needs, while Lithuania and Latvia could manage only 25 percent and 10 percent, respectively. The Baltic republics are completely dependent on outside supplies for crude oil, natural gas, and coal. What measure of energy self-sufficiency they have is based on shale oil, small hydroelectric plants, and the Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

In the event Moscow chose to use the fuel and power weapon, the Baltics would be best equipped to cope with an electricity cutoff. A high level of cooperation among the republics would be necessary, however, and the Ignalina nuclear plant--staffed by Russians--would have to be kept online. Cutbacks in deliveries of coal, natural gas, and oil, in contrast, would be more difficult for the Balts to counter, but would vary in effectiveness from case to case. The impact of a cutoff in coal supplies would not be large--because of its relative small share in total fuel consumption--but would produce enough of an economic dislocation to send a powerful message from Moscow. A natural gas cutoff would produce the most immediate impact because there are no stocks. The Lithuanian and Latvian chemicals industry would be shut down immediately since it uses gas extensively. Within a few days, however, most facilities outside the chemical industry could switch to fuel oil. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Latvia and Lithuania use about 500,000 b/d of oil annually, while Estonia manages on much less because of its shaleoil industry. Assuming

Moscow would not impose a total economic blockade, these republics could buy this oil on the world market, but would have to spend over \$3 billion annually at current prices. The Mazeikiai refinery--tenth largest in the USSR--is located in Lithuania and probably is a key supplier of gasoline and diesel fuels to much of northwest European USSR. A cutoff of oil here, therefore, would disrupt the economy far outside the Baltic republics. Presently, large fuel stocks in Estonia and Latvia would delay the impact of a supply cutoff. Stocks in Latvia amount to about 20 percent of annual use, and stockpiles in Estonia equal more than 25 percent.

Industrial Materials and Machinery. Moscow's leverage over the Balts in basic industrial materials varies greatly depending upon the type of good in question. The three republics get roughly three quarters of their cement and forest products from native sources, for example, but they are almost entirely dependent on the rest of the USSR and some foreign imports for rolled steel products and nonferrous metals. We estimate that they would have to spend roughly \$100-200 million annually at current prices to buy steel products on the world market.

Such inputs would be essential to sustain the Baltic republics' output of machinery and consumer durables. By the same token, Moscow would miss, at least in the short term, the Balts' machinery sector. Every fifth tram car and every other milking machine made in the USSR bear the mark of a Latvian plant. The Tallinn excavator plant supplies a significant share of such equipment to the country, as does the Estonian Volta electric motor factory. In the high tech area, the Vilnius firm Sigma is a major producer of minicomputer systems, but gets its integrated circuits from non-Baltic republics. The research institute of Latvia's Radio, Telephone and Electronics Plant, although far behind counterparts in the West, is one of the best in the USSR and is responsible for developing a computer-controlled digital switch.

Consumer Goods. Moscow could easily lower living standards in the Baltic republics, which are the highest in the Soviet Union. Although the Balts are net exporters of many major categories of consumer goods (see Table 2), their consumer goods industries rely heavily on raw materials imported from other republics. They rely, for example, on grain imports from other regions of the USSR for livestock feed to support their meat and dairy industry, which currently enables them to enjoy the USSR's highest per capita consumption of meat and milk.

At the same time, although the Baltic region's contribution to the other republics' consumer economies is small, the region produces by Soviet standards high quality goods that are much in demand, including soft goods, jewelry, pharmaceuticals, and toys. The Balts, moreover, are the country's largest per capita producers of consumer durables. The

Table 2

Net External Trade in Consumer Goods in the Baltic Republics

	1987*		
	<u>Lithuania</u>	<u>Latvia</u>	<u>Estonia</u>
Total consumer goods (million rubles)	+1582	+1095	+741
Food (million rubles)	+748.2	+465.5	+455.9
Meat and meat products (thousand tons)	+173.0	+80.9	+63.6
Milk and milk products (thousand tons)	+1248.3	+623.2	+511.6
Vegetables (thousand tons)	-18.5	-26.2	-11.4
Fruit (thousand tons)	-23.2	-19.4	-13.1
All goods of light industry (million rubles)	+548.9	+253.8	+222.4
Furniture (million rubles)	+51.1	+69.2	+87.8
Refrigerators (thousand units)	+270.3	71.1	-30.4
Radios (thousand units)	-105.1	+739.9	-70.3
TVs (thousand units)	+532.6	-82.9	-47.8

* + = net exports

- = net imports

Source: Torgovlya SSSR

1.4(c); (b)(3)


region also supplies dairy products to the Northwestern region of the RSFSR and fish products to the entire Soviet Union. At a time when consumer discontent is on the rise throughout the USSR and supplies of food and consumer goods are tight, the Balts' role in this sector might give Moscow pause in considering economic sanctions. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Labor. The Baltic republics are also vulnerable in the area of labor supplies. Because of low indigenous birthrates, Baltic industry has had to rely on labor imported from the RSFSR and other republics. The share of the titular nationality in the total state labor force is now 59 percent in Estonia, 48 percent in Latvia, and 76 percent in Lithuania. Russian workers often dominate in blue collar industries and lower level jobs in the militia. Their power was reflected in the success of their recent strikes to pressure republic governments to tone down language laws and residency requirements for voting. The Balts would like to send the Russian workers home but they realize the large impact it would have. According to a statistical pamphlet published in Estonia, if the republic were to become a closed economy, at least 15 percent more workers would be needed to maintain current levels of production and consumption. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Military Leverage

The final and most dramatic pressure that Moscow could bring to bear is the threat or actual use of armed force. Police or military force could be used by itself or as support for political measures--the securing of republic party headquarters against the rebels, for example--or economic levers such as a blockade. Paradoxically, however, the Soviet military have been most vocal in condemning the Baltic independence campaign but also quite adamant in the negative wake of the April Tbilisi tragedy in insisting that the military should not be used in a repressive role. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)



Use of Ground Force Divisions

A more serious situation, particularly one involving imposition of martial law, would require much larger forces. In order to mount such an operation in Lithuania, for example, the Soviets might mobilize and fill out with reservists approximately a dozen divisions before taking action. Some of these divisions would not actually be used initially but would act as reserves for Lithuania, and as a guard against possible trouble in Latvia or Estonia. The four divisions of the Baltic MD's 11th Guards Army--located in the Russian republic around Kaliningrad and divisions from the Belorussian and the Leningrad MDs could be used. The remaining ground force divisions in the Baltic MD would likely be used after a selective callup of ethnic Russian reservists to fill out those units. A military action of this scale probably would require at least ten days preparation. Imposition of martial law simultaneously in all three republics would require substantially larger forces, probably including divisions from the Carpathian and Moscow MDs. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Positive Leverage

Moscow's arsenal of options for dealing with the Balts also includes a variety of "positive" levers -rewards to the Balts for desisting from their secessionist course or arguments that would emphasize the benefits of remaining a part of the USSR. In the political area, for example, Moscow possibly could try to resolve the current impasse over party independence by offering the republic parties substantial autonomy in return for their remaining in the Soviet party. On the larger issue of secession, Gorbachev, as head of a commission to consider changes in the USSR constitution, could offer to push for changes that would guarantee the republics substantial autonomy within the framework of a union perhaps transformed into a confederation. Alternatively, he could recognize the Baltic right to secede in return for flexibility on the length of the transition period and retention of a Soviet military presence. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3) following republic elections in Lithuania in February and Latvia and Estonia in March, the republic legislatures will hold public referenda on independence and then seek negotiations on independence with Moscow. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

In the economic area, Moscow could offer the Balts continued special status as economic experiments in increased autonomy while pointing out the economic advantages of remaining within the union. A recent article in the Soviet press pointedly argues that the Baltic republics, especially Lithuania, would have huge trade imbalances if forced to trade at world prices. According to the article, Lithuania would have had to pay almost

~~SECRET~~

1.4(c); (b)(3)

quadruple the price of oil and almost double the price for gas if Moscow had pegged domestic energy prices to world prices. The article also attempts to deal with Baltic complaints that they would get much better prices for their exports on world markets by arguing that higher prices for these goods would not compensate for higher fuel costs. Indeed, the switch from Soviet to world prices would double Estonia's and Latvia's trade shortfall and triple Lithuania's. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Moscow could also argue that the Baltic republics' importance in foreign trade flows mainly from their role as a bridge between the West and the Soviet Union and that foreign traders would find little of interest for export or import if the Baltic republics were cut off from the rest of the country. Indeed, a complete split with Moscow--combined with likely labor unrest from the Russian minority in the region--probably would make the Baltics unattractive to foreign investment. Moreover, countries such as Finland would be loath to jeopardize their trading relationship with Moscow to begin trade with the outcasts. At a minimum, Moscow could argue that if the Balts were still intent on eventual secession, they would be well advised economically to use a transition period to prepare themselves. The education in world trade practices and competition that Moscow could offer them as a "window on the West" would be invaluable later when independence came. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Outlook

Moscow is well-positioned for leverage over the Balts. It has a large number of options--political, economic and military--in its arsenal, which can be used singly or in tandem depending on the flow of events in the central leadership's preferences. Possessing a wide range of options from scalpel to bludgeon, Moscow can apply them selectively either preemptively or in response to Baltic moves. Moscow can also differentiate the options by republic since the Baltic economies and ethnic mixes are not alike. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Nonetheless, if Moscow's objective is to keep the Baltic republics from seceding, it is unclear how effective negative leverage would be. The options could ratchet upward quickly to the draconian end of the scale. At some point, it is likely that the Balts would dig in and their resolve become irrevocably hardened. In this case, real leverage would be lost, and Moscow's actions would become purely punitive rather than persuasive. It is unclear where this point of no return lies. The imposition of tough economic sanctions probably constitutes such a turning point. The Balts are so vulnerable economically--the economic costs would be so swift and massive--that the Baltic leadership probably would calculate that being on their own permanently would be no less painful than experiencing such pressure. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Negative leverage has such a downside that it is plausible that Moscow would find positive leverage to be the more attractive option. Acknowledging the Balts' special status and playing to their feelings of political and economic superiority probably would go a long way toward convincing the fence-sitters to remain within the Soviet orbit. And this tactic could buy time for Moscow, which it could sorely use in a period when serious nationwide economic problems threaten to derail perestroika. This option would allow the Balts to keep their special status, which they could use to prepare for eventual independence. There is a politically significant number of Balts, however, who will not be swayed by this perspective and will demand independence no matter what the cost.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9000307
RECEIVED: 13 JAN 90 11

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 13 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OBJECTIVES FOR US / SOVIET RELATIONS 1990

ACTION: OBE PER SECRETARIAT DUE DATE: 17 JAN 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF:
FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/23/90

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEF

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

0307

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1990

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0942-AA
12/1/2014 JAM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT:

Objectives for U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1990

This is a rare period in which we can seek to achieve a fundamental shift in the strategic balance, particularly in Europe. The future of the Soviet Union remains cloudy, but it is clearly in our interest to do what we can to prolong the tenure of the reformers -- men who have inadvertently set in motion events that have put long-standing U.S. objectives regarding the Soviet Union well within our reach: freedom for Eastern Europe; a significant reduction of the Soviet military threat to the West; and the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy in the regions.

The principal challenge that you face in U.S.-Soviet relations this year is to engage Gorbachev effectively at a time when he faces mounting chaos at home; declining influence and authority in Eastern Europe; and uncertainty about the future of Russia's traditional nemesis, Germany. Gorbachev's sense of security stems from still powerful Soviet military forces and the conviction -- bordering on faith -- that sophisticated diplomacy can convince his adversaries not to take advantage of him. But there are observable cracks in Moscow's confidence about the fruits of the new foreign policy -- particularly where Germany is concerned -- and that Soviet insecurity is likely to grow.

1990 promises to be another very difficult year for Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union's ills are worsening. Problems like whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should have a constitutionally guaranteed "leading role" -- precluding fair competition with other parties; whether a command economy can be expected to produce the needed economic turnaround; whether to have private property; whether territory belonging to Azerbaijan should be transferred to Armenia; whether the Baltic states -- and other republics -- should be allowed to secede from the Union and similar issues cannot be resolved through Gorbachev's usual jawboning and equivocation. If they continue to grow worse, they could be his undoing.

Over time, the Soviet population -- while appreciating his role in initiating reform -- has increasingly come to see Gorbachev as ineffective and indecisive. Nationalists from Armenia and

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Azerbaijan to the Baltics regard him as a man without a bottom line and it is Gorbachev, not the nationalists, who has retreated in the face of repeated challenges.

The saving grace for Gorbachev at this time is that he is still regarded by moderate nationalists in the Republics as their best hope for the peaceful achievement of their goal -- total independence. But moderates, to say nothing of extremists, may take Gorbachev's continuing appeasement as weakness, leading them to press even harder (as with the mass demonstrations in Lithuania when Gorbachev visits there.) That in turn will further alarm conservatives, who already see these trends as a threat to the integrity of the Union. Challenges to Gorbachev's power will probably increase markedly in the next year. Within the last two months, Gorbachev has reportedly threatened to resign twice. The first Baltic elections in Lithuania at the end of February and the 28th Party Congress, now scheduled for October 1990, will be crucial tests for him.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The Soviet leadership will be anxious to keep U.S.-Soviet relations moving forward. Gorbachev cannot afford, in the face of mounting failures at home, to have his foreign policy line discredited too. Objectively, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has never had better prospects from our point of view. Your meeting at Malta infused U.S.-Soviet relations with a greater sense of direction -- pointing toward the June Summit. On arms control, human rights and the incipient economic agenda, there is every reason to be optimistic that the progress made in 1989 can be sustained and perhaps Moscow can even be moved to be more sensible on Central America.

But it is, of course, the unraveling of communist power in Eastern Europe that has changed the strategic environment and the face of U.S.-Soviet relations. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has been the most enduring and most fundamental source of American conflict with Moscow. Thus, our central and overriding objective in 1990 should be to facilitate the continued and graduated withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe.

A preeminent challenge, in this regard, is to help the FRG and the Soviet Union to manage their relationship. If there is a single external issue that might cause Moscow to reassess its course in Eastern Europe, might even bring Gorbachev down, it is the German question. With that much at stake for the United States, we will need to be intensively involved in the increasingly complicated diplomatic environment in Europe which will be ever more preoccupied with the future of Germany.

While we can do little to affect internal Soviet politics, we should do what we can to prolong perestroika as long as Gorbachev continues to tolerate the diminution of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. If Moscow maintains its present course, it will be impossible within a few years for the Soviet Union to do anything

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

about the changes in Eastern Europe, short of all out invasion. With this in mind, we need to work hard to insure a successful June U.S.-Soviet Summit -- particularly in arms control and the economic sphere -- which may boost Gorbachev's image at home and thus his staying power.

We must grasp while we can the chance for an early CFE agreement which would bring the conventional military balance into line with the new political realities in Eastern Europe. These reductions will also facilitate the orderly withdrawal of Soviet military power from the territory of its former allies. Rapid progress toward an "Open Skies" accord also would institutionalize Soviet openness on an unprecedented scale.

Finally, it is important that you continue to engage Gorbachev personally while emphasizing that it is the process of perestroika, not the man, on which U.S. policy is based.

As 1990 begins, the uncertainties surrounding the future of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev have only multiplied. At present, Gorbachev appears to be playing for time in the hope that, by some miracle, perestroika will succeed in creating a stable and prosperous Soviet Union. We have clearer and more realistic goals: the liberation of Eastern Europe and the consolidation of pluralist rule throughout the region; and a dramatic reduction in the Soviet military threat to Europe and the United States.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0307

January 9, 1990

Lead memo.



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Objectives for U.S.-Soviet Relations
in 1990

The memorandum for the President at Tab I examines the challenges in U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly relating to Europe, in light of continuing Soviet internal difficulties.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0942-MR
12/1/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0577

~~SECRET~~

January 24, 1990

Interesting
(circled)

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PR*

SUBJECT: The Soviet Military and the Internal Crisis

Lessons of 1989

Looking back at last year's upheavals in the Communist world, one can see a common thread: the pivotal role of the military, which was played out in different ways:

- In China, in May and June, the PLA hesitated, not wanting to be drawn into a domestic crackdown. It eventually was, but may have been split in the process, and there is uncertainty about how it might behave if faced with a new crisis of the same kind.
- In Poland, in 1981, military rule was resorted to because the Communist Party had disintegrated. In 1988-89, the Polish military lost their stomach for such a role and took on instead the "patriotic" role of supporting a democratic transition.
- In Romania, in December, the Army repudiated Ceausescu rather than repress the populace, and then defended the populace against the elite security forces. In Timisoara, more recently, the Army commander has taken temporary charge of regional government because of the disarray of the local National Salvation Front.

One common feature here is the army's ability (or tendency) to identify with the population -- as a conscript force, and as an institution in a sense more "basic" to the society than a Communist Party. Another element is the military's traditional identification with nationalism, which in Eastern Europe these days means independence from the Soviet Union. Both elements

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2007.0496.MR 12/28/09
CAP

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

produce hesitation about enforcing Party repression -- especially at a moment in history when the legitimacy of Party rule is eroding.

The Soviet Union

What does it mean for the Soviet Union?

The Soviet military have never in 72 years been involved in military coup plotting, though the support of particular individuals (Zhukov, Malinovski) has sometimes been important at moments of leadership crisis. The political leaders were always careful subsequently to cut the military leaders down to size (to prevent "Bonapartism"). Gorbachev has tamed the military (and security) services by appointing weak figures to head them. The Party, in other words, has always been firmly in control.

The military must certainly be uneasy today, however, about the near-collapse of the Warsaw Pact security buffer. They must be nervous at the spreading calls in East Europe for withdrawal of Soviet troops. Already East Germans are beginning to reject the "Singularity" of being the only ones with Soviet troops on their soil. If the Soviet military indeed have their "redlines" of what cannot be tolerated, loss of the forward position in the GDR might be one of them.

Another source of unease -- perhaps more important -- is the loss of privileges suffered by those demobilized in the new cutbacks. COZ Moiseyev told Colin Powell last week in Vienna that he has been allocated 70 million rubles over the next few years for housing, pensions, jobs, and other amenities for the military. So they see the problem and are determined to head it off.

Yet, even this may be overtaken now by the impact of the disintegration at home. At first, the burden of inter-ethnic "peacekeeping" in the Caucasus fell on the Interior Ministry (MVD) troops, but now the Army is involved and Yazov has called up reservists. The Baltic secession movements have featured a heavy dose of resentment at the Soviet military presence (which Gorbachev flaunted by a visit to the troops in Lithuania). And the overall weakening of the Party in the society -- fostered by Gorbachev's reforms -- raises the prospect of an institutional vacuum. The Supreme Soviet has filled much of that void. But the disintegration of Party control will only accelerate after the local and regional elections coming up (which are expected to humiliate the Party all over the country).

Thus the Soviet military, willy-nilly, could find themselves a political factor again -- perhaps more so than ever -- as the country tastes anarchy, the Party's legitimacy evaporates, and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

the burden of keeping order is thrust on them. The example of other countries suggests how events could draw them into a more pivotal role -- as king-makers, or supporting a political evolution, or something else. Stay tuned.

Concurrence by: *pmc for* Condi Rice, *pmc for* Doug Paal. Condi comments that the Soviet army tends to look with disdain upon militaries that intervene in politics. The military could be drawn in if domestic turmoil -- bordering on chaos -- disabled the Party but their desire to play such a role should not be overestimated.

~~SECRET~~

From Rochester
The Soviet M. L. Party & the
Internal Crisis

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9000878
RECEIVED: 02 FEB 90 13

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICE
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 31 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

TELCON

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES W/ GORBACHEV ON JAN 31 & LIST OF TALKING PTS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 06 FEB 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RICE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 2/23/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

BS has seen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0928

January 31, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL MB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Mikhail
Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR

Nat Sec Advisor
has seen

The memorandum of the President's January 31 telephone
conversation with Gorbachev is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the Memorandum of Conversation.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/2012

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2007.0057-MR
CAP 5/13/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Mikhail
Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Chairman
Interpreter
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice, NSC

DATE, TIME January 31, 1990, 7:04 - 7:30 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Good morning. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Good morning, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I want to thank you for taking the call. I want to start by wishing you well. There have been wild rumors here in Washington and there are a lot of interesting events. Obviously, we cannot talk about everything on an open line but I am glad to have this chance to talk to you on an arms control matter. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Good. I welcome your initiative. I understand that our possibilities on this open channel are limited -- so greetings and I welcome the chance to talk to you. As for the rumors, there are many here in my country and in yours too. (S)

The President: That's for sure. Maybe it is just best if I go through my proposal and then we can talk about it. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Good. (U)

The President: At Malta, our two governments agreed to place a very high priority on the early conclusion of a CFE treaty. Our common aim remains to sign the treaty this year. I have been considering ways to accelerate progress at the Vienna talks, and Jim Baker will be prepared to discuss the full range of CFE issues with Mr. Shevardnadze, including some new ideas on the aircraft proposal. (S)

The conclusion of this treaty is even more urgent today because of the hopeful and fast-moving events taking place in Eastern Europe. We need to do everything possible to make sure that the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

military situation reflects the new political realities. I have been examining with my advisors, and with U.S. allies, the question of the maximum number of troops that the United States and the Soviet side should have stationed on foreign territory in Europe when this CFE agreement has been fully implemented. (S)

I have come to the conclusion that the 275,000 figure is too high for both your country and mine. I hope you agree that we should set a new lower manpower ceiling for the treaty. (S)

My proposal is that we agree to drop the 275,000 figure for the U.S. and Soviet stationed forces and revise the current position on manpower in CFE to set a new ceiling for those forces at 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe. 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe is the proposal I will make. (S)

Tonight I will announce this proposal to the American people in a speech on the State of the Union. If the proposal is acceptable it will be a clear signal that the CFE negotiations in which we are now engaged can keep pace with the political events that are changing the continent. (S)

We have had consultations with our key allies and there is general agreement that this is a good, sound proposal. We intend to keep a substantial military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future -- that is an Alliance decision -- and it would hold regardless of the decisions you take about your own forces. I hope you recognize that the U.S. presence makes a helpful and important contribution to European stability. (S)

But for today, the issue is how to treat U.S. and Soviet manpower in this agreement and I believe this proposal is fair. It doesn't push either side too fast but it shows a readiness to change. (S)

The main thing is we want to conclude the CFE agreement. I do not want this new proposal to delay our CFE negotiations in any way. But my experts think it is possible to accommodate this change and have an agreement that is a little more in line with current conditions. (S)

I will push our side and I hope you will push your side. It is a major priority of my Administration to conclude this treaty by the time we meet in June. (S)

I know this is sudden but I wanted to give you the courtesy of telling you before my speech tonight. If you want to react now that's fine or if you want to wait until you have had time to talk with your people. (S)

Well. Over to you. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Thank you for letting me know what you will tell Congress. Let me react to two or three points. (S)

First of all, we share your approach to the talks in the context of the changes now happening in the world and I agree that the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

Vienna talks -- the pace and content of the Vienna talks -- must keep pace with the new realities. (S)

And I fully agree that we must push forward the process to live up to the hopes of the peoples of Europe. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I believe that under no circumstance should we abandon or slow down the process. We need to work to find mutually acceptable solutions. (S)

As I understand it -- your proposal envisions a new and lower ceiling. You have emphasized that the U.S. will maintain its military presence in Europe after the negotiations are completed. If I understand you, this is regardless of what the Soviet Union does. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: We'll give it thought. But let me say that we will need to talk about the Central Zone of Europe and other zones. We'll need to talk not just about U.S. and Soviet forces but other forces. Baker and Shevardnadze will have a lot to do. You and I will need to talk too. You can expect our cooperation -- our constructive cooperation. (S)

And you can be assured that my response means that I am happy that we are keeping in touch to look at the most important problems today. I fully expect you will get more detailed answers from me or when Baker is in Moscow. (S)

Let me say that I share the spirit of your approach -- we must act consistently with the changes in Europe. (S)

The President: This call is interesting for me. As you were talking I was thinking that I wish we could talk more often without a fixed agenda because there are so many problems and changes to address. I just hope we can find ways to talk more often. Baker will talk with Shevardnadze and he has our full confidence and that is a useful channel. But I wish we could talk more often. I appreciate the spirit of this phone call and I wish you well. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Mr. President, I fully agree. I do believe that both of us feel the need for personal contact and work is underway to get a secure communications link for us that will allow us to talk more freely. (S)

Today the President of Brazil gave me a verbal message from you. Well, I want to thank you and I value these gestures from the President of the United States. (S)

Let me thank you -- you are just beginning your working day and I wish you a good day. Raisa and I send our best to you and Barbara. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

The President: I want to say one more thing in substance. We have wrestled with the proper number in discussions here and with our allies. You'll have your own ideas on that but let me say that the number was achieved after consultations with the Allies and with the military here. This number was not pulled out of the hat. We are, therefore, attached to the number. ~~(S)~~

Chairman Gorbachev: Mr. President, I take note of this and assure you that we will look at it carefully and seriously. ~~(S)~~

The President: I did have a good talk with the Brazilian President and I'm glad he remembered me to you. My best to Raisa. ~~(C)~~

Chairman Gorbachev: Goodbye (in English) (U)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS FOR PHONE CALL TO GORBACHEV
CONCERNING YOUR CFE PROPOSAL

*Review before
meeting with
Dubinin*

- At Malta, our two governments agreed to place a very high priority on the early conclusion of a CFE treaty. Our common aim is to be able to sign the treaty this year.
- I have been considering ways to accelerate progress at the Vienna talks, and Secretary Baker will be prepared to discuss the full range of CFE issues with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, including some new ideas on the aircraft problem.
- The conclusion of this treaty is even more urgent today because of the hopeful and fast-moving events taking place in Eastern Europe.
- We need to do everything possible to make sure that the military situation reflects the new political realities.
- I have been examining with my advisors, and with U.S. allies, the question of the maximum number of troops that the United States and the Soviet Union should have stationed on foreign territory in Europe when this CFE agreement has been fully implemented.
- The current Western position is that neither your country nor ours should have more than 275,000 troops stationed on foreign soil in Europe.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

- In light of recent political developments, I have come to the conclusion that 275,000 figure is too high for both your country and mine.
- I hope you agree that we should set a new lower manpower ceiling for the CFE treaty.
- I want to propose to you that we agree to drop the 275,000 figure for U.S. and Soviet stationed forces and revise the current position on manpower in CFE to set a new ceiling for these forces at 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe.
- I intend to announce this proposal to the American people tonight in my address on the State of the Union.
- If you accept my proposal, it will be a clear signal that the CFE negotiations in which we are now engaged can keep pace with the political events that are changing the continent.
- We intend, with the consent of our allies, to retain a substantial military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future, regardless of the decisions you take about your own forces.

- I believe you recognize that the U.S. presence makes a helpful and important contribution to European stability.
- Today, the issue is how to treat U.S and Soviet manpower in this agreement and I think our new proposal is a fair solution.
- I hope that you will see in this initiative, Mr. Chairman, my commitment to accelerated progress toward a CFE treaty.
- We have each taken important steps in the last year to give a political impetus to the CFE negotiations.
- I believe that we are close to a completed treaty and hope that you will join me in quickly resolving the remaining differences so that we can conclude this crucial treaty.
- I hope that we can do so before we meet in the United States in June.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

0855

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By CAF NARA, Date 1/14/2010

February 1, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: Showdown in Moscow?

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

The rumors this week that Gorbachev is thinking of resigning his Party post may be just that -- rumors. But they are symptomatic of intense maneuvering within the CPSU in advance of the Central Committee Plenum on Monday.

All signals point to a sharpening of the conflict between conservatives and reformers in the Party apparatus. This is not a conflict about a return to Brezhnevism -- an option which is now completely discredited. Rather, this conflict is about the soul of the Party. Fundamental issues are on the table including the constitutionality of the Party's "leading role." It is possible that the CPSU could, even before the Party Congress in October, split into two factions (in a replay of the historic Bolshevik/Menshevik split).

As usual, these philosophical differences are intertwined with a number of key policy issues -- in particular the threat of the nationality problem to the integrity of the Union and the pace of economic reform. And there is no time for an academic debate -- the Soviet Union is sinking deeper into chaos everyday. The consensus among members of the Party, intellectuals, and the population as a whole -- whatever their political stripe -- is that the Soviet Union is burning while Moscow fiddles.

Thus, pressure is building for Gorbachev to force a showdown with the conservatives and to establish his leadership. Le Monde has published a fascinating document that was leaked to it from inside the Soviet Union. Said to be an appeal to Gorbachev from his advisers, the report tells him bluntly that he must expose the conservatives as the obstacle to reform because, they say, perestroika -- not opposition to it -- is now blamed for the disarray in the country. "The refusal, which has gained strength in recent months, to describe the conservative forces as the main obstacle to the realization of the Party's leadership... has clearly lost all justification, if it ever had any." And in a not too thinly veiled appeal for leadership, "The tactics of maintaining a course midway between right and left, is clearly not profitable... In a period of revolutionary restructuring,

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

society needs a vanguard, in other words the Party must be sufficiently homogeneous, at least as regards its positions of principle."

In this light, the "rumor" takes on a different cast. It could be that the rumor was floated to smoke out the opposition -- a tactic that Khrushchev used in advance of his rout of the "anti-party group" in 1957. Alternatively, the rumor might have been a "suggestion" from those who think that Gorbachev cannot win a struggle within the Party but that he can break the power of the Party from without. Finally, and most troubling, the rumor may have been floated by those who wish to force Gorbachev to resign -- a kind of "trial balloon" to test the impact of the news internationally and domestically.

Whatever the case, the February 5 Plenum is shaping up as the first of several crucial political tests for Gorbachev in the run-up to the October Party Congress. Here, it is important to focus not just on intra-Kremlin politics but rather on the effect of that political struggle on the bubbling and polarizing currents of dissatisfaction in the population at large. It is the coalescence of these currents -- nationalism, trade unionism, liberalism, -- into active political groupings that makes this situation truly revolutionary. Because Kremlin bosses are, in fact, competing for the allegiance of ordinary people, this resembles the intramural battles of 1913-1917 rather than those of 1964 when Khrushchev was ousted.

If the liberals win outright, Gorbachev will be pressured to accelerate economic reform and there is a good chance that radicalized conservative opposition -- not in the Party but in the working class -- will organize wide-spread strikes and disrupt the already weak economy. If there is yet another impasse -- the already weak economy. If there is yet another impasse -- with neither a conservative nor liberal victory -- the Soviet Union will continue to drift and the polarization of society will intensify as central authorities become less effective. This situation has no historical parallel in the modern Soviet Union but Nicholas II -- completely disconnected from and unable to shape societal forces -- comes to mind. Finally, if the unthinkable happens and the conservatives win, the nationalities and liberal opinion will be radicalized. All outcomes point to unsettled seas ahead.

None of the outcomes is likely to affect -- at least in the short to medium term -- U.S. foreign policy goals vis a vis the East -- with one important exception -- Eastern Europe. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has helped to intensify the political struggle in the USSR. Conservatives see in Eastern Europe a harbinger of things to come and want to strengthen the CPSU's antibodies through greater discipline. The reformers also read the handwriting on the wall but draw the conclusion that the CPSU is in no way immune to -- and must thus make its peace with -- the forces that brought East European communist parties down.

The Soviet Union is probably unable to reextend its tentacles into East European, though in the GDR, conservative forces would

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

meddle more actively in the GDR given the power vacuum there. But even without trying, the Soviet Union's power struggle could have a chilling effect on the rest of the region. Mazowiecki, Havel and others are acting with great confidence and boldness, in large part because they do not fear a Soviet backlash. But evidence of real instability at the top in the Soviet Union may cause them to think twice at a time when bold action, politically and economically, is essential.

Weaker cues from Moscow could also embolden what is left of communist forces in Eastern Europe to disrupt the reforms. The communists are no longer capable of ruling but they are capable of political sabotage. It is no accident, as the Russians are fond of saying, that the rumor of Gorbachev's resignation caused greater consternation in the Baltic States, Eastern Europe and the West than in the Soviet Union itself.

This week's events should remind us that Eastern Europe is not free just yet and that it is still susceptible to Moscow's volatile internal political situation. Turmoil in Moscow also argues powerfully for moving forward quickly on resolving the German question and concluding CFE. The quicker the new European order is in place, the more effective will be the quarantine of Eastern Europe from the probable collapse of perestroika.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COMMENTS

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Robert M. Gates Re: Background Information (1 pp.)	2/1/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Response (1 pp.)	1/29/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06c. Cable	Re: Cable (3 pp.)	1/22/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06d. Memo	To the Secretary (1 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06e. Report	Re: Background Report (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Feb-1990 15:47 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Diane G. Ross
(ROSSDG)

SUBJECT: Action Taken 2/8

Florence called down to let us know that the General has taken action on the following items:

- 1) #0898 - ROADMAP ON CHINA POLICY FOR WEEKS AHEAD
The General has given this package to the President
- 2) #0731 - BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING USSR SHIPMENT OS MIG-29S
The General has noted with the following comment: "O.K."
- 3) #0504 - PROPOSED SECDEF VISIT TO POLAND & SOVIET UNION IN JULY/CROSSHATCH
The General has disapproved the recommendation.

The originals will be forwarded upon the General's return. That's it for now folks!

Distribution:

FOR: Entell Ford	(FORD)
FOR: Anita J. Craig	(CRAIG)
FOR: Carol D. Mitchell	(MITCHELL)
CC: Barbara Browne	(BROWNE)
CC: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
CC: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
CC: Diane G. Ross	(ROSSDG)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: William F. Sittmann	(SITTMANN)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
CC: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

20000116.F/3

CAP 12/13/2006

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06g. Report	Re: A Summary of US Understandings (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

National Security Council
The White House

10
JL 6 2/4

PROOFED BY: JRP LOG # 0731
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOS CH A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>

APNSA Has Seen

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Skypad Info on
Gov Shipments
MIG-29s to Cuba*

RECEIVED

90 FEB 7 P 7: 36

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Collapse Files

Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/23/2009

OA/ID Number: 91117-009

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07b. Message	Prime Minister to President Mitterrand (3 pp.)	1/31/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07c. Letter	Re: received Friday, 2 February [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07d. Letter	Re: received Friday, 2 February [Russian] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07e. Cable	Re: Reply to President Bush (4 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED

0929

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PRT: VANERON
SIT: AYERS PRYCE

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 012006Z FEB 90

FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4870
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

UNCLAS SANTIAGO 00948

WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP JON GLASSMAN

DEPT FOR JOEL CASSMAN-ARA/SC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CI

SUBJ: CHILE'S INAUGURAL EVENTS

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED PRESIDENT-ELECT PATRICIO
AYLWIN'S PERSONAL INVITATION TO PRESIDENT BUSH FOR
THE UPCOMING INAUGURAL EVENTS. UNOFFICIAL
TRANSLATION IS PROVIDED BELOW; ORIGINAL HAS BEEN SENT
TO THE DEPARTMENT, JOEL CASSMAN, ARA/SC.

2. UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION:

SANTIAGO, JANUARY 29, 1990

HIS EXCELLENCY

GEORGE BUSH

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WASHINGTON

ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE THE HONOR TO EXTEND TO YOUR EXCELLENCY A MOST
CORDIAL INVITATION TO THE CEREMONIES FOR MY
INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT OF CHILE WHICH WILL BE HELD
IN SANTIAGO BETWEEN THE 11TH AND THE 13TH OF THIS
COMING MARCH.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION
AND REGARD.

PATRICIO AYLWIN AZOCAR

UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

PRESIDENT-ELECT OF CHILE END TRANSLATION GILLESPIE

BT

#0948

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0995

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 7, 1990

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH: G. PHILIP HUGHES *Philip*
FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON *Boon for*
SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence Summary

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence received by the Secretariat since Friday, February 2.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Summary for the President
Tab A Gorbachev - USSR
Tab B Thatcher - UK
Tab C Doe - Liberia
Tab D Aylwin - Chile

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/13/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9001216
RECEIVED: 14 FEB 90 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

~~SUSPENSE~~ CHRON FILE

FROM: BASORA
BLACKWILL
DEAL

DOC DATE: 14 FEB 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
INTL TRADE

ECONOMICS

PERSONS: CHUMAKOV

SUBJECT: FIRST ROUND OF SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 17 FEB 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA
BLACKWILL
DEAL

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/23/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: First Round Negotiations (1 pp.)	2/14/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 5, 1990

CHRON FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *Rg for*

SUBJECT: Letter from Lane Kirkland's regarding Lithuania

Lane Kirkland has written to the President on behalf of the AFL-CIO urging him to recognize Lithuania as an independent country, and with that recognition offer an exchange of Ambassadors and extend to Lithuania Most Favored Nation Status. He condemned the Soviet Union's acts of intimidation and repression toward Lithuania and called for the United States to express public support of Lithuania's move toward independence.

The letter at Tab A for the President's signature lays out the steps that we have taken and the rationale for a measured approach to the problem.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Lane Kirkland
Tab B	Letter from Lane Kirkland

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Lane:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding Lithuania. I appreciate your concerns and those of the AFL-CIO for the Lithuanian people. The goals set out by the freely elected leaders of Lithuania are unassailable.

My Administration has supported the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination by reiterating our long standing policy of refusing to recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. We have made clear to the Soviet leadership, publicly and privately, that the use of force or attempts to repress Lithuania's independence movement would have grave consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations.

The situation in Lithuania is extremely complex and delicate. I have tried to do nothing that will make the task facing Lithuania's leaders more difficult. I believe that formal U.S. recognition of the Lithuanian government at this time would, in fact, exacerbate an already complicated situation.

We have through quiet diplomacy and firm public statements urged the Soviet government to negotiate in good faith with the Lithuanian government. I intend to raise the situation in Lithuania with Shevardnadze personally as will Jim Baker. I believe that this policy offers our best chance to support the Lithuanian people and help them to achieve the goal for which they are working.

Thanks again for your letter. I think that you know how much I value your counsel.

Sincerely,

Mr. Lane Kirkland
President
American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organization
815 Sixteenth Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006

TAB B

2001

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL SITTMANN

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG

BK

RE: ATTACHED LETTER FROM LANE KIRKLAND ON LITHUANIA

I gave the attached letter from Lane Kirkland on Lithuania to Jim Cicconi and he is placing it in the President's reading file. Jim asked that a response be drafted for the President. This is clearly in your area. Could you please respond directly to Jim. Thanks.

cc: Jim Cicconi



815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 637-5000

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

LANE KIRKLAND PRESIDENT

Albert Shanker
William H. Wynn
Joyce D. Miller
Richard I. Kilroy
William H. Bywater
John T. Joyce
Robert A. Georgine
Jay Mazur
John J. Barry
Susan Blanch-Sand
John N. Sturdivant

THOMAS R. DONAHUE SECRETARY-TREASURER

Edward T. Hanley
John DeConcini
John J. Sweeney
Vincent R. Sombrotto
Marvin J. Boede
Lynn R. Williams
Milan Stone
Lenore Miller
Sigurd Lucassen
Moe Biller
Richard L. Trumka

Angelo Fosco
Wayne E. Glenn
James E. Hatfield
Gerald W. McEntee
Owen Bleber
Morton Bahr
Gene Upshaw
Jack Sheinkman
William J. McCarthy
George J. Kourpias
Frank Hanley

March 30, 1990

The Honorable George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the more than fourteen million members of the AFL-CIO, I urge you to move swiftly and surely to confer U.S. Government recognition on the legitimately elected government of the Republic of Lithuania. As part of this process, I urge you to exchange ambassadors and, with Congressional support, to extend MFN status to Lithuania.

Now, as never before, the brave Lithuanian people are looking for support from all nations that respect democracy and human rights. The AFL-CIO is proud of its fraternal association with the Lithuanian Workers' Union, a labor organization that is a part of the Sajudis movement. We are writing to you about our concerns in response to a direct appeal for help from the chairman of the Lithuanian Workers' Union, Kazimieras Uoka, and to an appeal from President Vytautas Landsbergis. In electing President Landsbergis, Deputy Uoka, and other Sajudis candidates to high office, the people of Lithuania have made a historic and fateful decision to proclaim their inalienable right of national sovereignty.

The people of Lithuania have spoken clearly and unequivocally for their national independence. This is why the AFL-CIO stands with President Landsbergis and all Lithuanian citizens and patriots. And this is why we condemn the tactics of intimidation and repression adopted by the Soviet Union against a democratically-elected sovereign state. Such violation of international law deserves to be criticized resolutely by the United States.

While the AFL-CIO welcomes the gradual opening up of the Soviet political system, we believe that Soviet progress in moving away from totalitarianism deserves to be encouraged further. The U.S., therefore, must not remain silent when significant Soviet abuses of human and national rights occur.

We are certain, as we were in our steadfast support for Solidarnosc in Poland, of the ultimate success of the peaceful struggle for national self-determination waged by the Lithuanians and other peoples forcibly absorbed into the USSR.

I hope that, in this compelling instance, the United States can speak out clearly and forcefully in behalf of liberty in a way that is consonant with our democratic tradition.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jimmy Carter".

President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 4, 1990

SIGNEDACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Lane Kirkland regarding Lithuania

Lane Kirkland wrote the President on behalf of the AFL-CIO urging him to recognize Lithuania as an independent country, and with that recognition offer an exchange of Ambassadors and extend Most Favored Nation Status to Lithuania. Kirkland condemned the Soviet Union's acts of intimidation and repression toward and called for the United States to express public support of Lithuania's move toward independence.

The original letter was received by Bobbie Kilberg and given by her to Jim Cicconi. He in turn forwarded the letter to us.

At Tab I is a memorandum for your signature forwarding a response to Cicconi for the President's signature. We think that the President will want to respond promptly.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Cicconi at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Cicconi
Tab A Letter to Lane Kirkland
Tab B Letter from Lane Kirkland

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: [Signature]

LOG # 2531

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM RRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG [Signature] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>4/5 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>2</u>

RECEIVED

90 APR 4 P 5: 24

<u>(C)</u> A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
-----------------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

P. Reply to Lou Kirkland
see - L. Kirkland

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2531

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Staff to Rice

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09b. Letter	Re: received Friday, 2 February [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09c. Letter	Re: received Friday, 2 February [Russian] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09d. Letter	Re: Gorbachev Letter (3 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09e. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to the President [French] (5 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information