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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: Donated Historical Materials
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91117
Folder ID Number: 91117-008

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (December 1989)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: European Press Reaction to the President's Speech on the Future of Europe (1 pp.)	12/5/89	(b)(1)	C
01b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: European Press Reaction and Your Speech on the Future of Europe (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Frederick D. McClure Re: Talking Points for Congressional Meeting (1 pp.)	12/6/89	(b)(1)	C
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made on Malta/Brussels Trip (9 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02c. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for Congressional Meeting (1 pp.)	12/6/89	(b)(1)	C
03a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Bettino Craxi, Chairman of the Socialist Party of Italy (2 pp.)	12/6/89	(b)(1)	C
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Italian Socialist Party Chairman Bettino Craxi (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (December 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap994
OA/ID Number: 91117-008
Date Closed: 2/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy, December 6, 1989 (1 pp.)	12/4/89	(b)(1)	C
04a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft To David Bates Re: Cabinet Meeting (1 pp.)	12/5/89	(b)(1)	S
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made on Malta/Brussels Trip (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made on Malta/Brussels Trip (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Cabinet Meeting (1 pp.)	12/5/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Report	Re: Press and Official Reaction to the Malta Summit and the NAC Meeting [redacted] (2 pp.)	12/5/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Cable	Re: Finnish Reaction to Gorbachev's Proposal for a 1990 "Helsinki-2" Summit Meeting (3 pp.)	12/5/89	(b)(1)	C
06a. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Former Presidents (1 pp.)	12/12/89	(b)(1)	S
06b. Letter	President Bush to President Nixon (5 pp.)	12/14/89	(b)(1)	S
06c. Letter	President Bush to President Ford (5 pp.)	12/14/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06d. Letter	President Bush to President Carter (5 pp.)	12/14/89	(b)(1)	S
06e. Letter	President Bush to President Reagan (5 pp.)	12/14/89	(b)(1)	S
06f. Memo	Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: Carter Letter (1 pp.)	12/14/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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CHRON FILE 9801

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

[redacted]

December 5, 1989

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2

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: European Press Reaction to the President's Speech on the Future of Europe

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President attaching two USIA reports on initial European press reaction to his NAC speech on the future of Europe and of Germany. As your memo explains, reactions have been quite positive, but there are already some telling differences among countries. We will update this assessment as more focused press reaction emerges.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A USIA Special Report: In the Wake of Malta
Tab B USIA Foreign Media Reaction Early Report

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0764-MR
SCS 9/24/12

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9801

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: European Press Reaction to the NATO Summit and Your Speech on the Future of Europe

At Tabs A and B are USIA reports excerpting European press reaction to the NATO Summit and your speech on the future of Europe.

The bulk of the reaction is extremely positive. Figaro commented that "all European chiefs of state" congratulated you for your approach, and the London Times added that "NATO heads of government flew home from Brussels last night reassured by what they had heard from President Bush." Radio Luxembourg saluted you for conducting your press conference "in a masterly way and with good humor." Berliner Morgenpost hailed the Malta meeting as a "total success both for the U.S. President and the Soviet leader." Stuttgarter Zeitung added that your Brussels stopover turned into a full-fledged "second summit" which affirmed that "during these stormy times, NATO must remain firm as a rock."

Beyond that, reaction so far breaks down three ways. The British press is focusing on your "defiance" of Mrs. Thatcher on European integration. In the FRG, most commentaries note your support (and NATO's) for German reunification, but several argue that the Alliance wants to pull Kohl back from his 10-point plan and commit him more firmly to the EC's integration agenda. Elsewhere in Europe -- and for many of the same reasons that cause some in the FRG discomfort -- reactions have been extremely favorable.

The French press laid particular stress on the durability of the U.S. commitment to Europe, the role of both alliance systems in assuring stability, and the importance of stronger U.S.-EC links, as symbolized by your 30-minute meeting with Delors. Figaro said bluntly that you "decided to throw some cold water on the 10-point plan for the reunification of Germany." Parisien added that "the only chance to prevent German unity from overwhelming European unity" is rapid progress on the EC agenda for economic integration.

We will keep you posted, particularly on reactions in the FRG, where commentary tends to be slow but excruciatingly thorough.

Attachments
Tab A USIA Special Report: In the Wake of Malta
Tab B USIA Foreign Media Reaction Early Report

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0764-MR
SCS 9/24/12

Foreign Media Reaction

Tuesday, December 5, 1989

Special Report

IN THE WAKE OF MALTA

Summary

Foreign media reports from 47 countries December 3-5 praised the Malta meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev as heralding a new, post cold war era of detente in which the two superpowers were no longer adversaries. New U.S.-Soviet economic cooperation and an increased pace of arms reductions were noted, but a few felt disappointed at the lack of specific agreements. The two leaders' perceived caution over the rapid change in Eastern Europe led some to conclude they were "overwhelmed by the pace of history" and "could no longer dictate the future shape of Europe." As they covered both Malta and the President's NATO meeting, analysts also dwelled on the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the "German Question" and the summit performances of the two leaders.

"Burial at Sea"

"The Cold War Is Over" was the dominant headline in Malta summit wrap-up reports in the foreign press. Ottawa's conservative Globe and Mail said, "it was given a burial at sea," while Parisian conservative Figaro claimed, "Bush officially buried the cold war at NATO." Copenhagen's labor-oriented Det fri Aktuelt called the Malta meeting "an outstretched hand from the U.S." In Paris, liberal Le Monde wrote, "In the space of three days, the Soviet Union ceased being regarded as an adversary by the principal religious leader of the Western world and also by the President of the planet's most powerful democracy." The Washington correspondent for Bonn's conservative Die Welt noted, "For the first time...not opponents but partners were meeting."

The Balance Sheet

Although most observers rated the storm-tossed Malta summit "a success," Paris' right-of-center Quotidien said it produced "a meager balance sheet" and Tel Aviv's nationalist Maariv saw "no new agreements." An announcer for Belgian Radio, however, felt "distrust had virtually vanished" and London's liberal Guardian said a "committed relationship is more important than any number of zippy initiatives." TASS called the event "most memorable" and Radio Moscow saw the two countries "moving forward within the framework of Helsinki." A writer for Melbourne's liberal Age concluded, "The Malta summit was about setting the mood for the most exciting arms reduction agreements in history" and Danish National Television said, "the good mood resulted in extended economic cooperation."

"Europe Has Slipped Through Their Fingers"

Pointing to the end of the "bipolar post-war era," overseas media highlighted the pace of change in Europe. Tokyo's moderate Yomiuri, for example, commented that the "rapid changes in Eastern Europe far exceed the tempo of the U.S.-Soviet response." Centrist La Suisse of Geneva maintained, "Europe has slipped through their fingers," Rotterdam's independent NRC-Handelsblad claimed, "They do not have any political grip on Europe" and independent France Soir opined, "They were overwhelmed by the new pace of history."

As the two leaders reported to their respective alliances, commentators tried to assess the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. While Die Welt said, "The Alliance still speaks with one voice," BBC radio saw a "possible decoupling of the Warsaw Pact." London's conservative Times highlighted President Bush's assurances to NATO leaders, but added, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact...will also undergo something of a metamorphosis....Strategic rethinking will be required....Defense budgets will shrink....(For NATO) flexible response will vanish....burden sharing arguments will become more acute." The Washington correspondent for Turin's centrist La Stampa saw Mr. Bush "launching NATO toward political and economic cooperation with the Warsaw Pact" and conservative Berlingske Tidende told Copenhagen readers the alliances would be "the scaffolding around the new European house."

German Reunification

While observers in Malta described the German Question as being downplayed by summit participants, journalists covering the NATO meeting gave it plenty of attention. Left-of-center Liberation of Paris' Washington correspondent concluded, "For Bush, NATO is the best venue for dealing with the German issue." "Unrest Over Germany at NATO Summit" read a headline in conservative Catholic Gazet van Antwerpen. Amsterdam's Labor Party-oriented De Volkskrant said, "Chancellor Kohl's plan for the reunification of Germany has caused a division within NATO." West Berlin's far-left Die Tageszeitung concluded that the real question was, "Which should come first, Germany or Europe?"

"Their Smiles Told the Story"

The images the two leaders projected were best seen during their historic press conference aboard the Soviet liner Maxim Gorki. London's conservative Daily Telegraph wrote, "They admitted differences, but their smiles told a story of success. They were friendly, even chirpy...in short, they had become shipmates." Brussels socialist De Morgen called their "unanimity almost touching". France's TV-5 said, "Bush made no mistakes....Gorbachev had every reason to be pleased." Bonn's centrist General Anzeiger noted that Gorbachev "was trying to appear a bit less flashy at this summit" and Quotidien concluded, "The U.S. President appeared to be the star."

Foreign Media Reaction

Early Report

Tuesday, December 5, 1989

MAJOR STORIES

-- Bush at NATO/Malta Summit

SUMMARY OF MAJOR STORIES

BUSH AT NATO/MALTA SUMMIT--President Bush's and Soviet leader Gorbachev's meetings with their respective alliances prompted media abroad to conclude that they had "launched the movement" to embark both NATO and the Warsaw Pact "on the road toward establishing a new order in a Europe that is also free and whole."

Papers discussed President Bush's "dramatic" and "unambiguous support for faster European integration" in his speech in Brussels yesterday. Reporters also saw NATO as certain that it "continues to play a role as an element of stability, and that the German issue can be resolved only within a stronger Europe."

BUSH AT NATO/MALTA SUMMIT

Britain "Bush's Call for European Integration" (BBC Radio 4)

BBC Radio 4 interviewed Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, asking if "President Bush's unambiguous support for European integration is in clear defiance of Mrs. Thatcher's known objections." Mr. Hurd replied, "We're in favor of doing what the President asked."

"Decoupling Possible" (BBC Radio)

In reporting on the Warsaw Pact's announcement renouncing the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, a commentator for BBC Radio concluded that there now was "a very real possibility that decoupling could occur...within the Warsaw Pact."

"U.S. Urges Faster EC Integration" (Guardian)

According to the liberal Guardian's Washington correspondent Martin Walker and another writer on today's page one, "President Bush yesterday threw the full weight of the United States behind faster economic and political integration in the European Community--in clear defiance of Mrs. Thatcher's known objections.

"The President's unambiguous support for faster European integration...comes on the eve of the Strasbourg European summit, where the Prime Minister is already isolated over plans for economic monetary union...

"Chancellor Kohl was left in no doubt that faster European integration was the only context in which the superpowers and their allies would tolerate total German reunification...

"Although the NATO heads of government endorsed President Bush's report from his Malta summit, there was no clear answer to the question of NATO's future. There was general agreement that there would be a continuing need for NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but President Bush clearly shifted the focus to the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe....The real division in Europe may be between those who want to maintain the tumultuous momentum of political change and those who want to slow it down..."

"Bush Surprises Thatcher With EC Unity Call" and "Bush Enjoys Sweet Taste of Success" (Daily Telegraph)

The conservative Daily Telegraph's political editor and Washington correspondent Ian Brodie reported on the front page,

"President Bush intervened dramatically in the debate over the future of Europe yesterday when he coupled an unprecedented call for the Common Market to become more integrated with a pledge that American troops will stay in Europe as long as the NATO allies want..."

Ian Brodie also contributed this piece for the Daily Telegraph, "President Bush...had reason to be pleased....For the first time at a meeting with President Gorbachev, America has made the running. The Soviet leader offered none of the headline-grabbing initiatives that have become his summit hallmark..."

"Arms and the President" (Times)

In the editorial opinion of the conservative Times, "NATO heads of government flew home from Brussels last night reassured by what they had heard from President Bush. But they left the Alliance's command staff with its biggest challenge in decades. Developments in Eastern Europe and the two Germanies will require it to recast NATO strategy to cope with a rapidly changing threat scenario..."

West Germany

"Malta and Its Ramifications" (Die Welt)

Washington correspondent Fritz Wirth wrote on page one of right-of-center Die Welt, "This 'post-summit' in Brussels revealed the glory and the misery of the realities within the Atlantic Alliance....What is even more remarkable is the extent of agreement and mutual confidence between the Western European partners and Washington....The decisive outcome of the meeting is that the Alliance still speaks with one voice..."

"Good News and a Rebuke" (Sueddeutsche Zeitung)

Centrist Sueddeutsche Zeitung of Munich's Brussels correspondent commented in an editorial, "The invitation to dinner with George Bush made Chancellor Kohl feel proud....But the meeting left a bitter aftertaste. With his 10-point plan on reunification...Kohl obviously exposed the Americans aboard the Maxim Gorki to some unpleasant questions by Gorbachev. And this at a time when the predictability of the FRG's policy is more important than ever...

"But Kohl also returned home with positive news....Off Malta, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that the FRG can support the GDR economically if East Germany maintains its political independence and its membership in the Eastern alliance....The second condition the two superpowers agreed upon will certainly embarrass the CDU leader who has to heed his right flank: A formal guarantee for the Polish western borders..."

USIA/P/M

"Second Summit" (Stuttgarter Zeitung)

Centrist Stuttgarter Zeitung's editorial held, "It was more than a routine summit in Brussels. George Bush's stopover in Brussels turned into a second summit, namely: Malta, part two. Obviously, George Bush demonstratively wanted to integrate the Western allies into the U.S.-Soviet dialogue and thus dispel any suspicion of deciding over the heads of the Europeans..."

"Malta--How Important Was Summit for Germans?" (Bild Zeitung)

Mass-circulation, right-of-center Bild Zeitung observed, "How important was the summit for the Germans? It was important because the German question could be discussed by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in a quiet, relaxed atmosphere...

"Do Bush and Gorbachev oppose German unity? Bush is in favor of German reunification, as long as Germany is going to be tied into the security system yet to be built. In Gorbachev's opinion, Germany must not be the leading Western military and economic power...

"Is the cold war over? The answer is yes....Did the summit strengthen Gorbachev's position? Not much....What does the summit mean for disarmament? It means a lot. In 1990, both superpowers will reduce their strategic nuclear weapons arsenal by 50 percent. In Europe, the most far-reaching East-West troop and weapon reductions are under way since 1945..."

"Bush Talks About 'Our Friends' Now" (General-Anzeiger)

Bonn's centrist General-Anzeiger ran this commentary by Washington correspondent Siegfried Maruhn, "George Bush gave assurances that he struck a good personal relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev. U.S. TV coverage from Sunday morning did not quite support this view....Although Gorbachev was trying to appear a bit less flashy at this summit, he was still the more flamboyant and dynamic person in comparison with Bush, who was stiffly trying to appear smiling and happy. The real moving power in Moscow-Washington relations seem to be James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze."

West Berlin

"Superpowers Put Their Stakes on Gaining Time" (Die Tageszeitung)

Far-left Die Tageszeitung concluded, "When taking a closer look at the indications and statements made by Bush and Gorbachev, we find that the two primarily want to gain time. This also applies to the subsequent conversation between Bush and Kohl: Bush neither wanted to say 'yes' to Kohl's German-German program, nor was he able to say 'no.'...

USIA/P/M

"The conflict in the background seems to center on the question of whether Germany or Europe should come first."

France

"Malta Constitutes 180-Degree Turnabout--
Disarmament Will Go Even Faster" (TF-1)

Privately-owned TF-1 TV's NATO correspondent in Brussels said yesterday, "Mitterrand was in no hurry this morning to hear the U.S. President report on the Malta summit. He was 30 minutes late. But the pace of events is accelerating and the Alliance seems somewhat overwhelmed by the current situation. Malta constitutes a 180-degree turnabout....Disarmament will go even faster....

"The reduction of military spending will upset the economy of the Western countries....The feeling here is that there will never be total disarmament but that the Alliance will have to change, to adapt itself. Bush and Gorbachev launched the movement. It's now up to the Europeans to react....On both the economic and the military level, Bush seems to have gone further than expected only a few weeks ago."

"Bush Did Not Come to Brussels to Shake
Alliance" (Antenne-2 TV)

Principal public television network Antenne-2 carried this report yesterday afternoon, "Bush risks having a more difficult dialogue with his allies than with Gorbachev. First because a conversation between two people is always easier than among 16 people. Bush did not come to Brussels to shake the Alliance--this is not his style--but he wanted to make some clarifications."

"'Yes,' U.S. Is on the Side of Europe"
(Radio Luxembourg)

Radio Luxembourg broadcast this correspondent's report this morning from Brussels, "Bush restored serenity: 'Yes,' the United States is on the side of Europe. 'No,' troops will not be withdrawn although a change will take place in the long run. Bush did not yield in Malta like Reagan did in Reykjavik and he was able to convince his allies."

"Bush to Allies: 'We'll Stay in Europe'
'Let's Remain Strong and Cautious'" (Figaro)

Conservative Figaro reported today, "Bush officially buried the cold war at NATO without condemning the Alliance....This is a time of great hope. We must not blur the distinction between promising expectations and present realities.

"All European chiefs of state present yesterday in Brussels congratulated him for this approach....Bush decided to throw some cold water on the 10-point plan for the reunification of Germany."

USIA/P/M

Italy "Bush: 'Moscow Wants U.S. in Europe'" and "Warsaw Pact: 'Prague Invasion a Mistake'" (La Stampa)

Ennio Caretto, Washington correspondent, filed for centrist La Stampa from Brussels, "President Bush yesterday launched NATO toward political and economic cooperation with the Warsaw Pact as the two alliances dealt jointly with the 'peaceful revolution which is underway in Eastern Europe.'..."

A correspondent in Brussels added in La Stampa, "What is most important, NATO leaders declared in front of the world that NATO continues to play a role as an element of stability, and that the German issue can be resolved only within a stronger Europe."

A front-page report in La Stampa from its Moscow correspondent said, "The Warsaw Pact's condemnation of the Prague invasion...represents the official rehabilitation of the Prague Spring and of the Dubcek group, a sensational self-criticism which ends a chapter in Moscow's relations with satellite countries..."

Belgium "No Surprises" (BRT TV)

Government-owned, Dutch-language BRT TV stated, "This NATO summit has not yielded surprises. President Bush has not taken decisions over the heads of the Europeans, and they are glad. But the road has been paved now for more concrete talks--talks which make next year the year of disarmament accords."

"NATO and a United Germany" (De Standaard)

Liberal Catholic De Standaard opined, "People in the two Germanies realize fully that German reunification would mean the end of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as they are now, and that it can be achieved only in the framework of a pan-European peace settlement. So, there is little disagreement about the heart of the matter, but a clever political and psychological approach will be needed to not give the increasingly self-conscious Germans the impression that they barely can have a say in their own fate. Gorbachev sees the maintenance of the 'condominium' as the best way to use developments in Eastern Europe to achieve a pan-European peace settlement offering Moscow a 'say' on the entire continent. He finds objective allies in the West who want to put off German reunification indefinitely.

"But considering the pace of developments in Central Europe, people in NATO seem to nourish illusions about the time they have to formulate concrete answers. If NATO and the EC wait too long, it may tempt people in the center of Europe to look more toward Moscow for a solution of the German question."

USIA/P/M

Soviet Union

"Caution, Restraint and Realism" (Izvestia)

In reviewing the Malta meeting for today's edition of Government-owned Izvestia, a correspondent wrote, "By no means succumbing to euphoria, both sides are displaying caution, restraint and a sense of realism as shown by the joint press conference given by M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush, and are not concealing their differences on a number of issues, particularly in their approaches to the problems of Central America.

"But one can say that they are civilized differences, when while disagreeing on something, they look for points of understanding and seek to reduce rather than increase these differences. This, in my view, is how one should assess the general outcome of the ...meeting."

Japan

"Toward Establishing a New Order in Europe" (NHK-TV)

Publicly-financed NHK-TV said, "Both President Bush and Soviet leader Gorbachev expressed strong hope that they will be able to hold a summit of 23 nations from East and West if agreement can be reached on an arms treaty. It is evident that, through their emergency summit meetings, both NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances have started embarking on the road toward establishing a new order in Europe that is also free and whole."

U.S., USSR Declare They Will Cooperate on Difficult Issues (Yomiuri)

Moderate Yomiuri today editorialized, "We are pleased that both leaders declared they will jointly cope with difficult issues...

"One of the aims of the summit between Bush and Gorbachev was to work out measures to deal with the drastic changes in Eastern Europe. However, the two leaders seemed to be unable even to keep up with the speed of the tremendous political developments which keep occurring."

"Superpowers Used Reserve" (Asahi)

Liberal Asahi commented, "What strongly impressed us at the Malta summit was the fact that the U.S. and Soviet leaders both seemed to know the limits of their powers and that they tried to behave with reserve.

"Concerning the issue of a reduction in strategic arms, we welcome the reduction of such weapons by half but at the same time, we are concerned over the two nations upgrading their nuclear weapons. We must keep watch over future U.S.-Soviet negotiations so that the negotiations are not just limited to discussing reduction in numbers."

USIA/P/M

Israel

"Gorbachev to Bush: Ready to Try to Mellow PLO" (Al Hamishmar)

The diplomatic correspondent informed readers of left-socialist Al Hamishmar, "President Gorbachev proposed to President Bush at Malta to cooperate with him to promote the peace process, and promised that Moscow will try to influence the PLO to moderate its positions. But it was learned in Jerusalem that Bush prefers that the United States should be the only player in the Middle East. Bush came up with a counter-proposal for Moscow to renew its ties with Israel.

"This was reported on Monday by Secretary Baker, who telephoned Foreign Minister Arens from Air Force One....Sources at the Prime Minister's office said that once again it has been proven that, despite legitimate differences, basic relations between the Bush-Baker Administration and the Shamir-Arens Government were good."

"Today's Understanding May Develop Into Tomorrow's Agreements" (Davar)

An editorial in left-of-center Davar pointed out, "With American and Soviet leaders coordinating their positions...understanding between Bush and Gorbachev on Israel is shaping up. It may produce full-fledged agreements aimed at forcing the parties to the conflict to start moving in the direction of compromise."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9832

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1989

CHRON FILE

1

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK D. McCLURE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Congressional Meeting

Attached at Tab A are Talking Points for the President's meeting with Congressional leaders tomorrow.

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/9/12

cc: James Cicconi

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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POINTS TO BE MADE ON MALTA/BRUSSELS TRIP

-- Thank you for coming today. I want to say a few words about my discussions with Gorbachev and with the Allies and report to you on the Presidential Mission to Poland that Clayton Yeutter led last week.

-- The session with Gorbachev was very good -- exactly the kind of meeting I envisioned. We had a chance to discuss a lot of issues, some of them contentious, and agreed to take some steps that will push the relationship forward.

-- I found Gorbachev confident -- even buoyant -- in spite of the problems he faces. There were some differences of opinion, particularly concerning Soviet regional policy.

-- I told Gorbachev that Soviet behavior in the Third World -- particularly in Central America -- was out of step with their behavior elsewhere -- including in Eastern Europe.

-- I wanted to impress upon him that -- while I want to build a cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship -- Soviet support for states like Nicaragua and Cuba which are fueling regional conflict hinders improvement in the relationship.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0941-MR
SCS 8/5/13

-- Gorbachev did not make any major new proposals. But I think that he left the meeting convinced that my Administration is committed to aggressive pursuit of the opportunities before us.

-- Let me go through a few of the proposals that I put on the table.

-- First, on economics:

-- I told Gorbachev that we should target the 1990 Summit for completion of a trade agreement granting Most Favored Nation status to the Soviet Union, so that I can grant a Jackson-Vanik waiver at that time.

-- To reach that goal, I proposed that we begin negotiations on a trade agreement now and urged the Supreme Soviet to complete action on its emigration legislation early next year.

-- I informed the Soviets that I intend to tell the members of GATT now that I will support GATT observer status for the Soviet Union when the Uruguay Round is completed.

-- I proposed expanding U.S.-Soviet technical economic cooperation and presented him with a paper proposing specific economic projects, covering topics such as finance, agriculture, statistics, small business development, budgetary and tax policy, a stock exchange, and anti-monopoly policy.

-- I told him that I would explore with Congress the lifting of statutory restrictions on export credits and guarantees after a Jackson-Vanik waiver is granted.

-- I said that we should begin discussions of a bilateral investment treaty.

-- I also suggested improving ties between the Soviets and the OECD, and East-West economic cooperation through the economic basket of the CSCE process.

-- On arms control, I proposed:

-- An end to U.S. production of binary weapons when the multilateral convention on chemical weapons enters into force, in return for Soviet acceptance of the terms of my UN proposal to ban chemical weapons.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- Signing an agreement at the 1990 Summit to destroy U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons down to 20 percent of the current U.S. level.

-- Joint U.S.-Soviet support for a CFE Summit to sign a CFE treaty in 1990.

-- Accelerating START in order to resolve all substantive issues and to conclude a treaty, if possible, by the 1990 Summit.

-- To that end, I suggested that Jim Baker and Shevardnadze concentrate on resolving at their January meeting three of the outstanding START issues: ALCMs, non-deployed missiles, and telemetry encryption.

-- Completing work on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) for signature at the 1990 Summit.

-- Proposing that the Soviet Union join efforts to constrain missile proliferation more effectively by observing the limits developed by the U.S. and its allies in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

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-- On human rights:

-- I proposed that we resolve all divided family cases by the time of the 1990 Summit.

-- On the environment:

-- I told Gorbachev that the U.S. would host a conference next fall to negotiate a framework treaty on global climate change, after the working groups of the treaty on global climate change submit their final report.

-- I informed him that I intend to convene an international meeting at the White House next spring for top level scientific, environmental, and economic officials to discuss global climate change issues. I invited the Soviets to come and Gorbachev accepted.

-- On educational exchanges:

-- I suggested that we increase university exchanges so that an additional 1,000 American and 1,000 Soviet college students will be studying in the other's country by the beginning of the 1991 school year.

-- This was an idea suggested by David Boren.

-- After I met with Gorbachev, I consulted with our allies at NATO in what I believe was a remarkable meeting. We started to talk openly about the impact of the changes taking place in Europe -- East and West -- for the Alliance.

-- This is not an easy conversation to have and there are going to be some differences among the European Allies on the future of Germany and economic integration in the EC because we are dealing with fundamental questions.

-- During my remarks, I said that the last six months had been a remarkable period of rapid change and that the task for NATO is to consolidate the fruits of the peaceful revolution and provide for continued peaceful change.

-- In that regard, I asked our allies to push hard to conclude a CFE agreement by 1990 which will transform the military landscape into one more consistent with the political changes that are taking place in Eastern Europe.

-- I also felt that we had to be on the record concerning German reunification which the Alliance has consistently supported for forty years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- I said that we believed that German unification should be based on the following principles:

-- First, self-determination should be pursued without prejudice to its outcome, endorsing nor excluding any particular vision of unity at this time.

-- Second, unification should occur in the context of Germany's continued commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated European community, and with due regard for the legal role and responsibilities of the Allied powers.

-- Third, in the interest of general European stability, moves toward unification must be peaceful, gradual, and part of a step-by-step process.

-- Lastly, on the question of borders we should reiterate our support for the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

-- In addition to the points on German reunification, I felt it important to say:

-- That the United States will remain a significant military power in Europe as long as our Allies need us in a common defense effort; and

-- that we welcome European integration because a stronger Europe means a stronger America.

-- I returned from these two meetings more convinced than ever that we need to support the reformist East European governments that are transforming the East-West relationship.

-- It is only fitting, then, that Clayton Yeutter, Bob Mosbacher, Libby Dole and Mike Boskin led the mission to Poland last week to stimulate thinking on how to ensure effective use of U.S. assistance.

-- I am told that the Mission was well received in Poland and given excellent access to all key policy makers.

-- There was substantial consensus in the U.S. private sector group on the situation in Poland.

-- On the plus side, the Mazowiecki government is strongly committed to profound and rapid reforms.

-- But the bureaucracy is still a big obstacle to reform in Poland.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- The members of the Mission came away convinced that, though the economic reform program faces many pitfalls, the population supports the government, wants real change and understands that sacrifice will be essential.

-- We will be getting a fuller report from the Mission to you shortly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 6, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Congressional Meeting

Attached at Tab A are Talking Points for the President's meeting with Congressional leaders tomorrow.

The points focus both on the President's European trip and the Presidential mission in Poland.

Concurrences by: Virginia Lampley and Arnie Kanter

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Fred McClure forwarding the Talking Points.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Fred McClure
Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 4/7/2012

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CHRON FILE THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 977

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0941-MR
SCS 8/5/13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 5, 1989

MEETING WITH BETTINO CRAXI,
CHAIRMAN OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF ITALY

DATE: December 6, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:00 - 10:20 a.m. EST

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To discuss your meetings with President Gorbachev in Malta and with NATO leaders and continue our dialogue with Craxi, who remains among Italy's most influential politicians.

II. BACKGROUND

Craxi is here on a four-day private visit, which includes receiving an honorary degree from Catholic University on December 6. He has just arrived from Rome, where he, along with other Italian party leaders, met with President Gorbachev.

Although out of government for now, Craxi is by no means out of political influence. The youngest man and the only Socialist ever to have been Prime Minister, he served an unprecedented four-year term from 1983 to 1987. He seems reconciled to Andreotti's retaining the prime ministership for some time to come but is using this period to strengthen his Socialist Party and his own position as the key Italian political figure on the left.

In this regard, his fortunes also ride on the internal reform debates in the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its plans to rename itself along more acceptable lines. A reconstituted and renamed PCI could siphon off votes from the Socialists, but an outright split in the PCI would give Craxi opportunities for bringing disaffected voters into his Socialist camp. Craxi may hope that his meeting with you will offset the favorable impact among leftist voters of Italian Communist leader Ochetto's long private meeting with Gorbachev in Rome last week.

Craxi plays a key foreign policy role through (Socialist) Foreign Minister De Michelis, whose relative innocence in foreign affairs causes him to defer regularly to Craxi. Craxi has taken a particularly visible personal stance on counternarcotics, arguing for tough penalties for consumers as well as traffickers, and will be meeting with Bill Bennett during his visit here.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Craxi will, of course, seek your readout from Malta, both to compare notes from his own encounter (in the company of other Italian party leaders) with Gorbachev last week and to show himself an important leader on the world stage. He will be particularly interested in what the U.S. is prepared to do to "help" Gorbachev -- a familiar Italian theme -- and to take advantage of new arms control opportunities. In his capacity with the Socialist International, he will be playing a leading role in a meeting between European socialist leaders and Gorbachev scheduled for January. The SI is also considering membership by several East European parties.

On the Middle East, Craxi has pushed for years for closer Western ties with the PLO. If Arafat's planned trip to Rome later this month materializes, Craxi will lead the call for Italy to normalize relations with "Palestine." He and De Michelis, who met with Shamir in Rome November 23, also favor an EC role as broker of a Middle East settlement. Your meeting will be an opportunity to lay down some markers on these issues, as well as on the need for more active Italian support for the new Lebanese government.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and meeting in the Oval Office.

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY CHAIRMAN BETTINO CRAXI

MALTA MEETING AND THE NAC

-- My meetings with President Gorbachev went extremely well. I gained a much better sense of the man and his priorities.

-- I was particularly encouraged by his approaches toward the enormous changes taking place in Eastern Europe. He seems prepared to accept the consequences of self-determination there, even in the GDR.

-- Of course, he wants to see change without an upheaval. I assured him that we in the West want the same thing and that we would not exploit difficulties for unilateral advantage.

-- Gorbachev was quite frank about the difficulties he faces at home. I think he was encouraged by our readiness, and Italy's, to help through improved trade possibilities.

-- I was also very pleased with our NATO meeting in Brussels. At this time of enormous change, it is important that the Alliance remain united on the important questions.

-- I would be interested in your impressions from your meeting with Gorbachev in Rome.

ARMS CONTROL/CFE

-- Although my meeting with Gorbachev was not intended to get into the specifics of arms negotiations, we did set as our goal to meet in 1990 to sign a CFE agreement.

-- To meet that timetable, we in the Alliance have a lot of work before us. I intend to push just as hard as possible toward that goal. I look to Italy to do the same.

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-- (IF ASKED) Congress has provided the appropriations so that we can proceed with construction of the air base at Crotone, and it is my intention to do so. Relocation of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing to Italy is important to the security of NATO's Southern Region.

MIDDLE EAST

-- All of us must push hard for a dialogue between the Israelis and Palestinians on elections and the negotiating process.

-- We believe the final status of the West Bank and Gaza must be resolved through negotiations, not through unilateral acts by any party.

-- I hope you can use your influence on Chairman Arafat to urge him to take the hard decisions necessary to support the negotiating process.

-- On Lebanon, I would hope for more active Italian support for the legitimately constituted government of President Hraoui.

-- A way must be found to overcome the obstacle of General Aoun.

NARCOTICS

-- Our bilateral anti-narcotics and law enforcement cooperation has been outstanding. Much of this developed during your tenure as Prime Minister. I appreciate your efforts.

-- I appreciate Italy's offer to help in the battle against Colombian narcotics traffickers. Italy has also been supportive in developing a common approach within the EC.

-- I am pleased that you will be meeting with Bill Bennett and others during your stay in Washington. We will be open to any suggestions you might have for improving our cooperation.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
James Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director, European Political Affairs, NSC
Staff (Notetaker)
Sim Smiley (Interpreter)

Italy

Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Socialist Party
Margharita Boniver, Foreign Policy Advisor
to Mr. Craxi
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador
Elvira Bonaccorsi Lewis (Interpreter)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (December 1989)

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91117-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 4, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

NOTED

THROUGH: ADRIAN A. BASORA (Acting) AAB

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy, December 6, 1989

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with PSI leader Craxi. Craxi, who met with Gorbachev in Rome last week, will be particularly eager to compare notes and, more to the point, recapture some of the international limelight from Prime Minister Andreotti.

Concurrences by: Heather Wilson, David Welch (in substance, in draft)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biography
Tab C Participants List

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0941-MR
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909797
RECEIVED: 05 DEC 89 11

CHRON FILE

TO: BATES, D

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 05 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR NATO
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PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: CABINET MTG RE PRES MTG W/ GORBACHEV & NATO ALLIES

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 08 DEC 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLACKWILL
		RICE

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 2/23/09

COMMENTS: _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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December 5, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID BATES

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Cabinet Meeting

Attached at Tab A are talking points for the President for today's Cabinet Meeting. They review the President's meetings with Gorbachev and with the Allies at NATO.

Attachments
Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By CAP NARA, Date 4/10/2012

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POINTS TO BE MADE ON MALTA/BRUSSELS TRIP

-- WE HAVE A FULL AGENDA TODAY. I HAVE ASKED CLAYTON YEUTTER, WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM POLAND, TO DISCUSS -- WITH COMMENTS FROM BOB MOSBACHER, LIDDIE DOLE AND MIKE BOSKIN, THE OUTCOME OF THEIR MISSION TO POLAND AND BRENT WILL SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES.

-- FIRST, THOUGH, I WANTED TO GIVE YOU A READ-OUT ON MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AND THE DISCUSSIONS THAT I HELD WITH THE ALLIES AT NATO.

-- THE SESSION WITH GORBACHEV WAS VERY GOOD -- EXACTLY THE KIND OF SESSION I ENVISIONED. WE HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS A LOT OF ISSUES, SOME OF THEM, CONTENTIOUS AND AGREED TO TAKE SOME STEPS THAT WILL PUSH THE RELATIONSHIP FORWARD.

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-- I FOUND HIM CONFIDENT -- EVEN BUOYANT -- IN SPITE OF THE PROBLEMS HE FACES. THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, PARTICULARLY ON CENTRAL AMERICA, BUT THE CONVERSATION WAS CANDID AND FRIENDLY.

-- HE DID NOT MAKE ANY MAJOR NEW PROPOSALS. AND I THINK THAT HE LEFT THE MEETING CONVINCED THAT MY ADMINISTRATION IS COMMITTED TO AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING OPPORTUNITIES BEFORE US.


-- I MADE A STRONG PITCH TO GORBACHEV THAT THE TWO OF US COULD NOT ALLOW BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA TO GET IN THE WAY OF THE WORK THAT WE HAVE TO DO BEFORE THE 1990 SUMMIT WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE THE LAST TWO WEEKS IN JUNE HERE IN THE UNITED STATES.

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-- I PUT SOME IDEAS ON THE TABLE TO GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO ARMS CONTROL AND TO START IMPROVING OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS.
-- I NEED YOUR HELP -- YOU HAVE TO BE MY VOICE WITHIN YOUR AGENCIES. I DO NOT WANT TO LOSE THE MOMENTUM THAT MALTA PROVIDED.
-- THERE ARE A LOT OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES TO BE DECIDED WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AS WE TRY TO MOVE FORWARD IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. I WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ITSELF DOES NOT BECOME AN IMPEDIMENT TO GETTING THE WORK DONE.
-- LET ME RUN THROUGH THE PROPOSALS THAT I PUT ON THE TABLE. I AM JUST GOING TO GO THROUGH THOSE THAT REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ACTION OR PREPARATION ON THE PART OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.



-- FIRST, ON ECONOMICS:
-- I TOLD GORBACHEV THAT I WANT TO START NEGOTIATIONS ON A TRADE AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY.

-- IF THE SUPREME SOVIET HAS CODIFIED THE SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW AND WE CAN COMPLETE A TRADE AGREEMENT BY THE TIME OF THE 1990 SUMMIT, I WILL WAIVE JACKSON-VANIK AND THAT WILL ALLOW ME TO ANNOUNCE MFN STATUS FOR THE SOVIET UNION WHEN GORBACHEV AND I MEET.
-- I INFORMED THE SOVIETS THAT I INTEND TO TELL THE MEMBERS OF GATT NOW THAT I WILL SUPPORT GATT OBSERVER STATUS FOR THE SOVIET UNION WHEN THE URUGUAY ROUND IS COMPLETED.
-- I PROPOSED EXPANDING U.S.-SOVIET TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND PRESENTED HIM WITH A PAPER PROPOSING SPECIFIC ECONOMIC PROJECTS,



COVERING TOPICS SUCH AS FINANCE, AGRICULTURE, STATISTICS, SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, BUDGETARY AND TAX POLICY, A STOCK EXCHANGE, AND ANTI-MONOPOLY POLICY.

-- I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD EXPLORE WITH CONGRESS THE LIFTING OF STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORT CREDITS AND GUARANTEES AFTER A JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER IS GRANTED.

-- I SAID THAT WE SHOULD BEGIN DISCUSSIONS OF A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY.

-- I ALSO SUGGESTED IMPROVING TIES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE OECD, AND EAST-WEST ECONOMIC COOPERATION THROUGH THE ECONOMIC BASKET OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

-- ON HUMAN RIGHTS, I PROPOSED THAT WE RESOLVE ALL DIVIDED FAMILY ISSUES BY THE TIME OF THE 1990 SUMMIT.

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ CARD 6 OF 12

-- ON ARMS CONTROL, I PROPOSED:

-- AN END TO U.S. PRODUCTION OF BINARY WEAPONS WHEN THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ENTERS INTO FORCE, IN RETURN FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF OUR UN PROPOSAL TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- SIGNING AN AGREEMENT AT THE 1990 SUMMIT TO DESTROY U.S. AND SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS DOWN TO 20 PERCENT OF THE CURRENT U.S. LEVEL.

-- JOINT U.S.-SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A CFE SUMMIT TO SIGN A CFE TREATY IN 1990.

-- ACCELERATING START IN ORDER TO RESOLVE ALL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND TO CONCLUDE A TREATY, IF POSSIBLE, BY THE 1990 SUMMIT. TO THAT END, I SUGGESTED THAT JIM BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE CONCENTRATE ON RESOLVING AT THEIR JANUARY MEETING THREE OF THE OUTSTANDING START ISSUES:

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ALCMS, NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES, AND TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION.

-- COMPLETING WORK ON THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY (PNET) FOR SIGNATURE AT THE 1990 SUMMIT.

-- PROPOSING THAT THE SOVIET UNION JOIN EFFORTS TO CONSTRAIN MISSILE PROLIFERATION MORE EFFECTIVELY BY OBSERVING THE LIMITS DEVELOPED BY THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES IN THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.

-- ON THE ENVIRONMENT:

-- I TOLD GORBACHEV THAT THE U.S. WOULD HOST A CONFERENCE NEXT FALL TO NEGOTIATE A FRAMEWORK TREATY ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AFTER THE WORKING GROUPS OF THE TREATY ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE SUBMIT THEIR FINAL REPORT.

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-- I PROMISED TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE NEXT SPRING FOR TOP LEVEL SCIENTIFIC, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND ECONOMIC OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES. I INVITED THE SOVIETS TO COME AND GORBACHEV ACCEPTED.

-- ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES:

-- I SUGGESTED THAT WE INCREASE UNIVERSITY EXCHANGES SO THAT AN ADDITIONAL 1,000 AMERICAN AND 1,000 SOVIET COLLEGE STUDENTS WILL BE STUDYING THE U.S. BY THE BEGINNING OF THE 1991 SCHOOL YEAR.

-- THIS IS, AS YOU CAN SEE, AN AMBITIOUS PROGRAM POINTING TOWARD THE 1990 SUMMIT. LET ME SAY AGAIN -- IT WILL TAKE AN EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT BY ALL OF US TO GET THIS DONE BUT IT IS A VERY HIGH PRIORITY.

-- AFTER I MET WITH GORBACHEV, I CONSULTED WITH OUR ALLIES AT NATO IN WHAT I BELIEVE WAS A REMARKABLE MEETING. WE STARTED TO TALK OPENLY ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE REMARKABLE CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE -- EAST AND WEST -- FOR THE ALLIANCE.

-- THIS IS NOT AN EASY CONVERSATION TO HAVE AND THERE ARE GOING TO BE SOME DIFFERENCES AMONG THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ON THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND EC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BECAUSE WE ARE DEALING WITH FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS.

-- DURING MY REMARKS AT NATO, I SAID THAT THE LAST SIX MONTHS HAD BEEN A REMARKABLE PERIOD OF RAPID CHANGE AND THAT THE TASK FOR NATO IS TO CONSOLIDATE THE FRUITS OF THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION AND PROVIDE AN ARCHITECTURE FOR CONTINUED PEACEFUL CHANGE.

-- I FELT THAT WE HAD TO BE ON THE RECORD CONCERNING GERMAN REUNIFICATION WHICH THE ALLIANCE HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED FOR FORTY YEARS.

-- I SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:


-- FIRST, SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD BE PURSUED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ITS OUTCOME, NEITHER ENDORSING NOR EXCLUDING ANY PARTICULAR VISION OF UNITY AT THIS TIME.

-- SECOND, UNIFICATION SHOULD OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMANY'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO NATO AND AN INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE LEGAL ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ALLIED POWERS.



-- THIRD, IN THE INTERESTS OF GENERAL EUROPEAN STABILITY AND THE MOVE TOWARD UNIFICATION MUST BE PEACEFUL, GRADUAL, AND PART OF A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.
-- LASTLY, ON THE QUESTION OF BORDERS WE SHOULD REITERATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
-- IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION, I FELT IT IMPORTANT TO SAY:
-- THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL REMAIN A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY POWER IN EUROPE AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES NEED US IN A COMMON DEFENSE EFFORT; AND
-- I ALSO ASKED OUR ALLIES TO PUSH HARD TO GET A CFE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BY 1990.

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-- THAT, AS I SAID IN MY BOSTON SPEECH, WE WELCOME EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BECAUSE A STRONGER EUROPE MEANS A STRONGER AMERICA.
-- ALL IN ALL, THIS WAS A SUCCESSFUL TRIP. NOW I WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO CLAYTON FOR A REPORT ON THE MISSION TO POLAND.



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POINTS TO BE MADE ON MALTA/BRUSSELS TRIP

-- We have a full agenda today. I have asked Clayton Yeutter, who has just returned from Poland, to discuss -- with comments from Bob Mosbacher, Liddie Dole and Mike Boskin, the outcome of their mission to Poland and Brent will say a few words about the Philippines.

-- First, though, I wanted to give you a read-out on my meeting with Gorbachev and the discussions that I held with the Allies at NATO.

-- The session with Gorbachev was very good -- exactly the kind of session I envisioned. We had a chance to discuss a lot of issues, some of them, contentious and agreed to take some steps that will push the relationship forward.

-- I found him confident -- even buoyant -- in spite of the problems he faces. There were some differences of opinion, particularly on Central America, but the conversation was candid and friendly.

-- He did not make any major new proposals. And I think that he left the meeting convinced that my Administration is committed to aggressively pursuing opportunities before us.

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-- I made a strong pitch to Gorbachev that the two of us could not allow bureaucratic inertia to get in the way of the work that we have to do before the 1990 Summit which will take place the last two weeks in June here in the United States.

-- I put some ideas on the table to give new impetus to arms control and to start improving our economic relationship with the Soviets.

-- I need your help -- you have to be my voice within your agencies. I do not want to lose the momentum that Malta provided.

-- There are a lot of controversial issues to be decided within the U.S. government as we try to move forward in these negotiations with the Soviets. I want to make sure that the U.S. government itself does not become an impediment to getting the work done.

-- Let me run through the proposals that I put on the table. I am just going to go through those that require immediate action or preparation on the part of the U.S. government.

-- First, on economics:

-- I told Gorbachev that I want to start negotiations on a trade agreement immediately.

-- If the Supreme Soviet has codified the Soviet emigration law and we can complete a trade agreement by the time of the 1990 Summit, I will waive Jackson-Vanik and that will allow me to announce MFN status for the Soviet Union when Gorbachev and I meet.

-- I informed the Soviets that I intend to tell the members of GATT now that I will support GATT observer status for the Soviet Union when the Uruguay Round is completed.

-- I proposed expanding U.S.-Soviet technical economic cooperation and presented him with a paper proposing specific economic projects, covering topics such as finance, agriculture, statistics, small business development, budgetary and tax policy, a stock exchange, and anti-monopoly policy.

-- I told him that I would explore with Congress the lifting of statutory restrictions on export credits and guarantees after a Jackson-Vanik waiver is granted.

-- I said that we should begin discussions of a bilateral investment treaty.

-- I also suggested improving ties between the Soviets and the OECD, and East-West economic cooperation through the economic basket of the CSCE process.

-- On human rights, I proposed that we resolve all divided family issues by the time of the 1990 Summit.

-- On arms control, I proposed:

-- An end to U.S. production of binary weapons when the multilateral convention on chemical weapons enters into force, in return for Soviet acceptance of the terms of our UN proposal to ban chemical weapons.

-- Signing an agreement at the 1990 Summit to destroy U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons down to 20 percent of the current U.S. level.

-- Joint U.S.-Soviet support for a CFE Summit to sign a CFE treaty in 1990.

-- Accelerating START in order to resolve all substantive issues and to conclude a treaty, if possible, by the 1990 Summit. To that end, I suggested that Jim Baker and Shevardnadze concentrate on resolving at their January meeting three of the outstanding START issues: ALCMs, non-deployed missiles, and telemetry encryption.

-- Completing work on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) for signature at the 1990 Summit.

-- Proposing that the Soviet Union join efforts to constrain missile proliferation more effectively by observing the limits developed by the U.S. and its allies in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

-- On the environment:

-- I told Gorbachev that the U.S. would host a conference next fall to negotiate a framework treaty on global climate change, after the working groups of the treaty on global climate change submit their final report.

-- I promised to convene an international meeting at the White House next spring for top level scientific, environmental, and economic officials to discuss global climate change issues. I invited the Soviets to come and Gorbachev accepted.

-- On cultural exchanges:

-- I suggested that we increase university exchanges so that an additional 1,000 American and 1,000 Soviet college students will be studying the U.S. by the beginning of the 1991 school year.

-- This is, as you can see, an ambitious program pointing toward the 1990 Summit. Let me say again -- it will take an

extraordinary effort by all of us to get this done but it is a very high priority.

-- After I met with Gorbachev, I consulted with our allies at NATO in what I believe was a remarkable meeting. We started to talk openly about the impact of the remarkable changes taking place in Europe -- East and West -- for the Alliance.

-- This is not an easy conversation to have and there are going to be some differences among the European Allies on the future of Germany and EC economic integration because we are dealing with fundamental questions.

-- During my remarks at NATO, I said that the last six months had been a remarkable period of rapid change and that the task for NATO is to consolidate the fruits of the peaceful revolution and provide an architecture for continued peaceful change.

-- I felt that we had to be on the record concerning German reunification which the Alliance has consistently supported for forty years.

-- I said that we believed that German unification should be based on the following principles:

-- First, self-determination should be pursued without prejudice to its outcome, neither endorsing nor excluding any particular vision of unity at this time.

-- Second, unification should occur in the context of Germany's continued commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated European community, and with due regard for the legal role and responsibilities of the Allied powers.

-- Third, in the interests of general European stability and the move toward unification must be peaceful, gradual, and part of a step-by-step process.

-- Lastly, on the question of borders we should reiterate our support for the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

-- In addition to the points on German reunification, I felt it important to say:

-- That the United States will remain a significant military power in Europe as long as our Allies need us in a common defense effort; and

-- I also asked our allies to push hard to get a CFE agreement concluded by 1990.

-- That, as I said in my Boston speech, we welcome European integration because a stronger Europe means a stronger America.

-- All in all, this was a successful trip. Now I would like to turn to Clayton for a report on the Mission to Poland.

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 9797

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 5, 1989

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Cabinet Meeting

At Tab I are talking points for the Cabinet meeting today at 2:00. They review, in some detail, the President's meetings with Gorbachev and with the Allies at NATO.

Upon your approval, they will be hand-carried to David Bates for the President's package.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the talking points at Tab A and sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Tab I Memo to David Bates
Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By CAP NARA, Date 4/10/2012

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8910419
RECEIVED: 28 DEC 89 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: WEBSTER, W

DOC DATE: 05 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MALTA SUMMIT
MEDIA

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: PRESS & OFFICIAL REACTION TO MALTA SUMMIT & NAC MTG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 01 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLACKWILL
		CHARLES
		HAASS
		HUTCHINGS
		WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/23/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 1 OF 1

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Report	Re: Press and Official Reaction to the Malta Summit and the NAC Meeting [redacted] (2 pp.)	12/5/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (December 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 11/6/2013

Date Closed:	2/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91117-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0941-MR (503)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	7/31/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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For The President
from DCI.

Return to NSC

CB 12.7

5 December 1989

(b)(1); (b)(3)

DDI/EURA (b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Press and Official Reaction to the Malta Summit and the NAC Meeting

1. The vast majority of the reactions are positive, with most observers seeing the meetings as a success for the United States and a sign that the Cold War is over. (b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Some leaders, such as Thatcher and France's Mitterrand, have sounded a note of caution about changing the role of NATO at a time when so much else is in flux. Several commentators also interpret the Malta meeting as showing that the superpowers no longer control Europe and therefore the Europeans will have to take charge of their own destiny. East European commentaries have applauded the end of the Cold War, but have given more attention to the Warsaw Pact's condemnation of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

2. Below are a few typical quotes from some of the major papers:

-- Paris, "Liberation": The end of the Cold War . . . a new great alliance between the two former adversaries.

-- London, "The Times": The weather exposed the underlying impotence of the superpowers . . . an opportunity for both men to seek common ground at a moment of great change."

-- Bonn, "Die Welt": What is even more remarkable is the extent of agreement and mutual confidence between the West European partners and Washington. . . The decisive outcome of the meeting (in Brussels) is that the alliance still speaks with one voice.

-- Brussels, "Le Soir": Bush and Gorbachev did not demonstrate that they could control world events, but they displayed such a determination to cooperate that it by itself is a stabilizing element.

-- The Hague, "De Telegraaf": Bush and Gorbachev wrote history by their mutual commitment that the Cold War between East and West is definitely over . . . what is of concern are the concrete actions to follow those beautiful words.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0941-MR
SCS 7/31/12

-- London, "The Times": adds the President's "Reiterated call for European unity, on the eve of the Strasbourg Summit, will strengthen the argument of President Mitterrand--bitterly opposed by Mrs. Thatcher--that Europe should speed up its own integration in response to the turmoil in Eastern Europe."

RYUMIL
327
-NATO-THATCHER

Mon Dec Ø4 Ø8:46:53 1989

THATCHER URGES NO CHANGE TO EUROPE'S BORDERS UNTIL 21ST CENTURY

By Peter Gregson

BRUSSELS, Dec 4, Reuter - British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said on Monday that Europe's borders must stay the same until after 1Ø to 15 years of "genuine democracy" in the Eastern bloc.

A British official quoted Thatcher as telling the NATO summit in Brussels that the Western alliance must also be kept intact. She called it "a winning concept that has kept the peace for 4Ø years".

The British leader, who said last month that the question of German reunifcation was not on the international agenda, added that the Western allies must ask themselves what they could do to nourish the democracy movement in Eastern Europe.

But she warned her partners in the 16-nation alliance:

"If we value peace and the continuation of peace, the peace that has protected freedom and justice, we must continue NATO with its present borders. Anything else would jeopardise the security that we seek.

"On the other hand, by the time we've had 1Ø to 15 years of other countries with genuine democracy, we should be in a new world and it might be possible to look at other possibilities."

The official said Thatcher underlined the importance of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

"NATO is our collective defence. The two alliances are the way we negotiate arms reductions," she said.

"It is very important for the future, for defence, peace and the negotiation of arms reductions, to retain the two alliances."

Thatcher told the one-day meeting she was amazed by the speed of events in Eastern Europe since NATO leaders last met in Brussels in May. It was "an extent of change that could not have been foretold".

She said a prime objective for the West was to secure genuine democracy, backed by the rule of law, in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

"That is the single most important thing and it is not going to be easy," she added.

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UNCLAS 7I/PMU/WE EUP
SERIAL: LD0412153489
BODY
COUNTRY: FRANCE
SUBJ: MITTERRAND RECONFIRMS 20-22 DEC GDR VISIT
SOURCE: PARIS DOMESTIC SERVICE IN FRENCH 1500 GMT 4 DEC 89
TEXT:

((TEXT)) THE NATO SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS: THE LEADERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SAID TODAY THAT THEY CONSIDERED THAT NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED, AND GIVEN A POLITICAL ROLE, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE STABILITY OF A EUROPE UNDERGOING BROAD TRANSFORMATION. PREVIOUSLY, U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, WHO HAD COME TO REPORT ON THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT IN MALTA, WHILE EXPRESSING SATISFACTION THAT HE HAD OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED THE END OF THE COLD WAR WITH MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, STATED THAT NEITHER WASHINGTON NOR MOSCOW WISHED TO MODIFY THE CURRENT MILITARY ALLIANCES.

STILL IN BRUSSELS: FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, CITED BY HIS SPOKESMAN HUBERT VEDRINE, CONSIDERS THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO GO OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALLIANCES, AS THEY PLAY A STABILIZING ROLE IN EUROPE. FURTHERMORE, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND ANNOUNCED THAT HE IS GOING AHEAD WITH HIS VISIT TO EAST GERMANY DESPITE THE POLITICAL CRISIS THAT COUNTRY IS GOING THROUGH: THE VISIT WILL TAKE PLACE 20-22 DECEMBER.

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UNCLAS BRUSSELS 15569

USIA

USIA FOR P/M, EU (SPIKES), R
STATE FOR EUR/NE

E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
SUBJECT: BELGIA MEDIA REACTION
MALTA MEETING AND BUSH'S BRUSSELS VISIT

A. COVERAGE

MEDIA GAVE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE MALTA MEETING, WHICH WAS HAILED UNANIMOUSLY AS SUCCESSFUL. ALL FOUR TELEVISION STATIONS CARRIED LONG EXCERPTS FROM THE JOINT BUSH-GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE AND RAN FILMED REPORTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL IN BRUSSELS, HIS AIRPORT STATEMENT AND MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER MARTENS AND CHANCELLOR KOHL. TV COVERAGE NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO THE SHOOTING-RANGE ACCIDENT IN BRUSSELS IN HIS ARRIVAL STATEMENT.

RADIO/TV

1. BRT TV COMMENTED THAT "SYMPATHY, UNDERSTANDING AND HOPE MARKED THE MALTA SUMMIT. WHILE NO ACCORDS WERE CONCLUDED, IMPORTANT DECLARATIONS OF PRINCIPLE WERE ISSUED....IT WAS A VERY FRUITFUL SUMMIT PERMEATED WITH THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST....A NEW STEP FORWARD IN EAST-WEST DETENTE."

2. VTM SUMMARIZED THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING AS "SATISFACTION WITHOUT A GREAT BREAKTHROUGH." "THE SUMMIT WAS CONCLUDED WITHOUT ANY REAL BREAKTHROUGH IN ANY FIELD. BUT, AS THE U.S. PRESIDENT SAID AT HIS JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GORBACHEV, THE STAGE WAS SET FOR THE FUTURE..."

3. RTL SPOKE OF A "DETENTE CORDIALE" AND CALLED THE TWO MEN "THE GREAT PACIFIERS" WHO INITIATED "A NEW ERA OF PEACE."

4. RTBF TV INTRODUCED A CLIP OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL WITH THE REMARK THAT "IN PRINCIPLE ALL THE ALLIES IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE EQUAL, BUT SOME ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS...." RTBF ALSO OBSERVED THAT THE BRITISH ARE LIKELY TO FROWN BECAUSE KOHL WAS THE FIRST TO RECEIVE A REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF MALTA.

5. BRT RADIO COMMENTED: "AT THIS FIRST POST-COLD WAR SUMMIT, THE LAST REMAINS OF DISTRUST BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE TWO SUPER POWERS VIRTUALLY VANISHED. QUESTIONS REMAIN ABOUT THE POWERFUL U.S. FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN -- OBVIOUSLY RUSSIAN QUESTIONS -- AND PRESIDENT BUSH IS STILL CONCERNED ABOUT COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA, BUT THIS SLIGHT RANCOR HAS NOT CAST SHADOWS ON THE RESULTS....THE GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO IS STRIKING, AND BUSH DID NOT SPARE PRAISE FOR GORBACHEV. THE AMERICANS SUPPORT GORBACHEV FOR WHOM THEY HAVE ENORMOUS RESPECT."

PRESS

HEADLINES:
-- "BUSH AND GORBACHEV VIEW 'MALTA' AS BEGINNING OF NEW ERA" (LIBERAL CATHOLIC DE STANDAARD -CIRC. 382,000);
-- "END OF COLD WAR" (SOCIALIST TABLOID DE MORGEN -CIRC. 52,000);
-- "START ACCORD READY IN JUNE 1990" AND "BUSH SATISFIED WITH MALTA RESULTS - BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FIRST TO BE INFORMED" (CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN -CIRC. 190,000);
-- "PRESIDENT BUSH EXTENDS HAND TO GORBACHEV" (CONSERVATIVE HET LAATSTE NIEUWS -CIRC. 302,000);
-- "WORLD LEADERS IN MALTA: 'TOWARDS NEW ERA'" (CATHOLIC HET BELANG VAN LIMBURG -CIRC. 102,000);
-- "IN MALTA, BUSH AND GORBACHEV OPENED A NEW ERA OF PEACE" (INDEPENDENT LE SOIR -CIRC. 209,000);

-- "THE MALTA SUMMIT SEALS ENTENTE AFTER DETENTE"
(CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC LA LIBRE BELGIQUE -CIRC. 81,000);
-- "THE MALTA NAUTICAL SUMMIT DID NOT SINK"
(CONSERVATIVE LA DERNIERE HEURE -CIRC. 93,000);
-- "AT THE MALTA SUMMIT, ONLY THE SEA DISAGREED!"
(CATHOLIC VERS L'AVENIR -CIRC. 146,000);
-- "'CORDIAL DETENTE'" AND "BUSH-KOHL DINNER IN BRUSSELS: PRIVILEGED RELATIONS" (SOCIALIST LA WALLONIE -CIRC. 48,000).

B. COMMENTARY
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1. LIBERAL CATHOLIC DE STANDAARD (CIRC. 382,000) UNDER
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 BRUSSELS 15569

USIA

USIA FOR P/M, EU (SPIKES), R
STATE FOR EUR/NE

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: BELGIA MEDIA REACTION
THE HEADING: "GOOD TALK": "THE TWO LEADERS DID AS ANNOUNCED: THEY STRENGTHENED THEIR PERSONAL CONTACTS AND EXCHANGED THOUGHTS EXTENSIVELY IN A RELAXED ATMOSPHERE ABOUT A BROAD RANGE OF WORLD PROBLEMS. THEY DID IT WITH THE AWARENESS, WHICH CONTINUED TO GROW OVER THE WEEKEND, THAT, IN THE WORDS OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT, WE 'ARE ON THE THRESHOLD OF A BRAND-NEW ERA' IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BIG TWO....EVEN THOUGH THE MEETING ABOARD THE 'MAXIM GORKY' MAY NOT HAVE BEEN AN OFFICIAL SUMMIT, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT SINCE SUNDAY AFTERNOON THAT THE TALKS MADE A NEW CONTRIBUTION TO FURTHER DETENTE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST."

2. SOCIALIST TABLOID DE MORGEN (CIRC. 52,000): "THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE WAS SOLEMNLY BURIED AT THE GORKY SUMMIT. IN DOING SO, MOSCOW HAS WRITTEN OFF EASTERN EUROPE FOR GOOD AND, AS BOTH GENTLEMEN ABOARD THE GORKY NOTED ALMOST LYRICALLY, A NEW ERA OF PEACE IS LIKELY TO BEGIN. CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS WERE NOT MADE IN MALTA, SINCE THIS SUMMIT WAS NOT TO BE A NEW EDITION OF YALTA WHERE THE SUPER POWERS DIVIDED THE WORLD. THE TIME QFOR THATQ IS OVER. THE SUPER POWERS NO LONGER HAVE THE MEANS FOR IT AND HAVE FORSWORN THE POLICY OF CONFRONTATION. AT THE FIRST JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE IN EAST-WEST HISTORY, THE UNANIMITY BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS WAS ALMOST TOUCHING. NOTHING STANDS IN THE WAY OF FURTHER DETENTE AND STEPPED-UP DISARMAMENT. A NEW ERA AFTER ALL?"

3. CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN (CIRC. 190,000): "GORBACHEV'S PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IN 'THROWING

OPEN EASTERN EUROPE IS TO OBTAIN WESTERN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR HIS BANKRUPT REGIME. HE PARTIALLY SUCCEEDED IN REACHING IT. PRESIDENT BUSH EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS DURING THE MALTA SUMMIT TO HELP THE SOVIET ECONOMY....BUT GORBACHEV NEEDS MORE, AN 'ENGINE' TO PULL HIS REGIME FROM THE ECONOMIC MORASS AND TAKE IT IN TOW. THIS ENGINE MUST BE EITHER THE EC OR A UNITED GERMANY, ASSISTED BY JAPAN IF NECESSARY, BUT NOT THE U.S.....THE ERA OF AMERICAN DOMINANCE IN EUROPE APPEARS TO BE OVER. EUROPE (OR GERMANY) IS BECOMING MOSCOW'S INTERLOCUTOR."

5. CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC LA LIBRE BELGIQUE (CIRC. 81,000): "THE SKILLFULNESS DEMONSTRATED BY GEORGE BUSH MUST BE EMPHASIZED. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, HE COULD HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE PROBLEMS FACING HIS INTERLOCUTOR AT HOME AS WELL AS IN THE BLOC WHICH HE CONTINUES TO LEAD. BUT POLITICAL FARSIGHTEDNESS PROMPTED HIM -- ON THE CONTRARY -- TO ASSIST MR. GORBACHEV AS MUCH AS HE CAN AND TO HELP HIM SCORE THE DIPLOMATIC SUCCESSES WHICH HIS REFORMS DESERVE....BY DEMONSTRATING THAT IT IS NOT TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE UPHEAVAL IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE U.S. OFFERS THE BEST GUARANTEES NEEDED FOR DETENTE TO BECOME 'IRREVERSIBLE'...."

6. INDEPENDENT LE SOIR (CIRC. 209,000): "IN MALTA, MESSRS. BUSH AND GORBACHEV OF COURSE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY COULD CONTROL WORLD EVENTS, BUT THEY DISPLAYED SUCH A DETERMINATION TO COOPERATE THAT IT BY ITSELF IS A STABILIZING ELEMENT. AFTER A LONG PERIOD OF REFLEXION, FOLLOWED BY REAL HESITATION, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION FIRMLY DEMONSTRATED THIS WEEKEND THAT IT IS DETERMINED TO SUPPORT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV...."

7. CONSERVATIVE LA DERNIERE HEURE (CIRC. 93,000): "DISAGREEMENTS REMAIN OVER CENTRAL AMERICA AND NAVAL DISARMAMENT. HOWEVER, GEORGE BUSH AND MIKHAIL GORBACHEV HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY INITIATED A 'NEW ERA' ACCORDING TO THE VERY WORDS OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT...."

HARROD

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

IN BRUSSELS LAST NIGHT AS A FURTHER SIGN OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION DISTANCING ITSELF FROM BRITAIN'S VIEWS AND LEANING CLOSER TO WEST GERMANY.

"WASHINGTON IS KNOWN TO BE CONCERNED THAT BRITAIN COULD BECOME ISOLATED FROM THE EUROPEAN MAINSTREAM.

"MR. BUSH WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO EMPHASIZE THE VITAL ROLE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MSUT PLAY IN THE 'NEW EUROPE' WITH A SPECIFIC TASK OF HELPING THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES OF POLAND AND HUNGARY.

"THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO DEVELOP RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER EUROPEAN LEADERS, IN ADDITION TO MRS. THATCHER, WAS UNDERLINED BY HIS DECISION TO INVITE CHANCELLOR KOHL TO DINNER IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL IN BRUSSELS ON SUNDAY...

"MRS. THATCHER HAS NO SCHEDULED MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, ALTHOUGH THEY CHATTED INFORMALLY DURING A BREAK IN THE NATO TALKS.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 011 ******/
"BRITISH OFFICIALS POINTED OUT THAT MRS. THATCHER HAD BEEN THE PRESIDENT'S GUEST AT HIS CAMP DAVID RETREAT ONLY 10 DAYS EARLIER. BUT THE IMPRESSION PERSISTS THAT SHE IS SHARING THE SPOTLIGHT MORE THAN SHE DID DURING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TERM OF OFFICE...

"A FURTHER CAUSE OF TENSION FOR MRS. THATCHER COULD BE MR. BUSH'S READINESS TO LOOK WITH AN OPEN MIND AT 'EVEN LOWER LEVELS' OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE..."

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH'S WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT IAN BRODIE REPORTED FROM BRUSSELS: "PRESIDENT BUSH RELAXED OVER A GLASS OF WINE AS HE FLEW TO BRUSSELS TO BRIEF NATO.

"HE HAD REASON TO BE PLEASED. DESPITE HAVING TO CANCEL AN ENTIRE SUMMIT SESSION AND DINNER BECAUSE OF THE MALTA STORM, FOR THE FIRST TIME AT A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AMERICA HAS MADE THE RUNNING. THE SOVIET LEADER OFFERED NONE OF THE HEADLINE-GRABBING INTIATIVES THAT HAVE BECOME HIS SUMMIT HALLMARK.

"RATHER, HE HAD TWO BROAD OBJECTIVES, TO WIN SUPPROT FOR PERESTROIKA AND TO ESTABLISH A MUTUAL INTEREST WITH MR. BUSH IN PURSUING STEADY BUT UNPROVOCATIVE POLICIES TOWARDS THE CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE. TO HIS DELIGHT, HE GOT BOTH.

"BETTER STILL, HE LEARNED THAT WASHINGTON WAS NOT SIMPLY SATISFIED TO LET PERESTROIKA HAPPEN BUT WAS WILLING TO TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE OF ENCOURAGEMENT BY OFFERING HTE SOVIET UNION A COMMERICAL AGREEMENT, LIFTING TRADE BARRIERS AND SUPPORTING OBSERVER STATUS FOR MOSCOW IN GATT...

"AS FOR THE RAPPORT THAT DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS, THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID: 'THEY SAW EACH OTHER IN FAIRLY SIMILAR TERMS. THEY'RE BOTH VERY INVOLVED, KNOW THEIR POLICIES, KNOW THE DETAILS, HAVE DONE THEIR HOMEWORK..."

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH EDITORIALIZED: "ALMOST UNNOTICED AT THE MALTA SUMMIT, AMID THE EUPHORIA SURROUNDING THE DECLARED END OF THE COLD WAR, LAY THE ECONOMIC UNDERPINNING OF THE IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 012 ******/
EAST AND WEST...

"THE SUMMIT UNDERLINED IN NO UNCERTAIN MANNER THE STAKE THAT THE WEST HAS IN THE CONTINUANCE OF MR. GORBACHEV'S POLICIES. THE KEY FACTOR IN HIS SURVIVAL IS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY, CURRENTLY IN A DESPERATE STATE AS SHORTAGES INCREASE WHILE PENT-UP INFLATION FUELS A THRIVING BLACK MARKET...

"...THERE ARE WAYS IN WHICH THE WEST CAN SPEED THE CHANGES MOST LIKELY TO CREATE WORKING ECONOMIES OUT OF THE RUBBLE OF MARXIST PLANNING. ALREADY WESTERN THINK-TANKS ARE ADVIZING THE POLISH GOVERNMENT, AMONG OTHERS, ON PRIVATIZATION. WESTERN EXPERTIZE IS NEEDED TO SHOW EASTERN EUROPE HOW TO SET UP CAPTIAL MARKEST: HUNGARY HAS EMBARKED ON THIS PATH, EAST GERMANY HAS THE MASSIVE CAPITAL OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AWAITING THE RIGHT CONDITIONS, WHILE POLAND COULD SET UP A TRUSTWORTHY BANKING SYSTEM TO UNLOCK THE SAVINGS OF ITS FARM SECTOR. THE ENORMOUS NATURAL WEALTH OF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SURELY FEED A PRODIGIOUS CAPITAL MARKET. GIVEN A PRIVATE SECTOR CAUTION ABOUT INVESTING IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE STATE MAY YET HAVE A ROLE, THOUGH SUCH INSTITUTIONS AS THE WORLD BANK, IN CATALYZING FUNDS TOWARD VIABLE PROJECTS. THERE MAY ALSO BE AN ARGUMENT FOR FINANCING LARGE-SCALE IMPORTS OF CONSUMER GOODS TO TIDE RUSSIA OVER UNITL ITS OWN INDUSTRIES COME ON STREAM. BUT THE ESSENTIAL POINT IS THAT ANY AID MUST BE DIRECTED NOT TOWARDS PROPPING UP AN IDEOLOGICALLY BANKRUPT ECONOMIC ORDER, BUT CREATING A NEW ONE FOUNDED UPON ENTERPRIZE AND THE INDIVIDUAL SPIRIT."

THE INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL TIMES' U.S. EDITOR PETER

RIDDELL AND DAVID BUCHANAN IN BRUSSELS REPORTED: "NATO LEADERS YESTERDAY AGREED ON A GRADUAL APPROACH TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION AS U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, REPORTING BACK ON THE WEEKEND SUPERPOWER SUMMIT, PRESENTED A DETAILED STATEMENT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE AND OFFERED HIS STRONGEST SUPPORT YET FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

"THE AGREEMENT - REPRESENTING THE FIRST COMMON ALLIANCE VIEW ON HOW THE FUTURE OF THE TWO GERMANYS SHOULD DEVELOP SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNIST PARTY AUTHORITY IN EAST GERMANY THREE WEEKS AGO - CAME AFTER ASSURANCES

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 013 ******/
FROM CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL THAT THERE WAS NOT SET TIMETABLE TO HIS PROPOSALS FOR CLOSER LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

"AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP GAVE ITS FIRST INDICATION THAT IT WAS WILLING AT LEAST TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION WITH MR. HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, THE WEST GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO IS ON A VISIT TO MOSCOW. TASS, THE OFFICIAL SOVIET NEWS AGENCY, SAID THE USSR WAS 'PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT IN THE SPIRIT OF NEW THINKING.'

"REPORTING BACK AFTER HIS WEEKEND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, THE SOVIET LEADER, MR. BUSH PRESENTED A DETAILED STATEMENT ABOUT THE FUTURE NOT ONLY OF GERMANY, BUT OF EUROPE AND THE WHOLE NATO ALLIANCE. HIS STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WAS THE MOST SPECIFIC ON THE SUBJECT SO FAR, APPARENTLY TAKING MRS. MARGARET THATCHER, THE PRIME MINISTER, BY SURPRISE..."

THE FINANCIAL TIMES' WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT LIONEL BARBER REPORTED: "PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH WON GENERAL ACCLAIM AT HOME FOR HIS PERFORMANCE AT THE MALTA SUMMIT BUT HIS CALL TO ACCELERATE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH MOSCOW IS STIRRUNG UP CRITICISM IN WASHINGTON.
"MR. PAUL NITZE, THE VETERAN U.S. ARMS NEGOTIATOR, SAID IT WAS WRONG TO COMMIT THE U.S. BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT YEAR TO PRODUCE AGREEMENTS, PARTICULARLY ON CUTTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY 50 PER CENT. 'I HOPE THE PRESIDENT DOESN'T TAKE IT TOO SERIOUSLY.'

"MR. SAM NUNN, THE DEMOCRAT WHO CHAIRS THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, AGREED: 'I DON'T BELIEVE WE GAVE AWAY CHIPS, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT SETTING AN ARBITRARY TIMEFRAME FOR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES TO ACTUALLY BE COMPLETED AND SIGNED IS NOT WISE.'..."

THE CENTRIST INDEPENDENT'S PETER PRINGLE AND DAVID

USBORNE IN BRUSSELS REPORTED: "AMID AN OUTPOURING OF SOLIDARITY FROM NATO LEADERS, AND PRAISE FOR PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH IN THE WAKE OF THE MALTA SUMMIT, MARGARET THATCHER WAS YESTERDAY PUSHED FURTHER INTO THE SIDELINES OF WHAT MR. BUSH CALLED THE NEW ALLIANCE 'ARCHITECTURE' TO END THE DIVISION OF EUROPE.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 014 ******/
"TAKING SCANT ACCOUNT OF HER CONCERNS ABOUT EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INTEGRATION, AND IGNORING HER RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF EC INSTITUTIONS TO CONDUCT THE KIND OF CHANGE SHE FAVORS, MR. BUSH TOLD THE ALLIES: 'THE EVENTS OF OUR TIMES CALL BOTH FOR A CONTINUED, PERHAPS EVEN INTENSIFIED EFFORT OF THE TWELVE TO INTEGRATE, AND A ROLE FOR THE EC AS A MAGNET THAT DRAWS THE FORCES OF REFORM FORWARD IN EASTERN EUROPE.' TO WHICH MRS. THATCHER, WHO APPEARED UNSETTLED BY THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, RETORTED: 'CLOSER INTEGRATION IN ERUOPE DOES NOT GIVE US IN BRITAIN ANY DIFFICULTIES...OUR PROBLEM IS NOT WITH THE INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE BUT THE KIND OF EUROPE WE WANT TO SEE.'

"EXCUSING HERSELF FROM FURTHER COMMENT, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID MR. BUSH'S REPORT FROM MALTA WAS 'SO FULL OF MEAT' SHE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER IT VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE REPLYING. IN FACT, THE DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. THATCHER ON THREE KEY ISSUES AFFECTING EUROPE'S FUTURE - THE ROLE OF THE EC INSTITUTIONS, THE CORRECT MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE DIMINISHING SOVIET THREAT AND THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY - IS CLEARER NOW THAN EVER.

"THE 'SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP' BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES REACHED YET ANOTHER LOW EBB AS MRS. THATCHER PREPARES FOR THE EC SUMMIT IN STRASBOURG OPENING ON FRIDAY. OTHER EC LEADERS ARE CERTAIN TO USE MR. BUSH'S COMMENTS AS AMMUNITION IN PRESSING FOR MONETARY UNION AND THE SOCIAL CHARTER, BOTH OF WHICH CAME IN FOR STILL MORE FIERCE CRITICISM FROM MRS. THATCHER YESTERDAY. MONETARY UNION AND AN EC CENTRAL BANK 'WENT FOR THE JUGULAR' OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS, SHE SAID..."

THE INDEPENDENT CARRIED A REPORT FROM ROBIN LODGE, REUTERS: "BACK HOME AFTER HIS MALTA SUMMIT WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, PRESIDENT GORBACHEV YESTERDAY BRIEFED THE INCREASINGLY DISPARATE BAND OF HIS WARSAW PACT ALLIES, FROM THE HARDLINE ROMANIAN PRESIDENT, NICHOLAE CEAUSESCU, TO POLAND'S NON-COMMUNIST PRIME MINISTER, TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI.

"SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN STAND THE NEW LEADERS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND BULGARIA. THE FORMER EAST

GERMAN PARTY LEADER, EGON KRENZ, WHO RESIGNED ALONG WITH THE ENTIRE PARTY LEADERSHIP ON SUNDAY, WAS IN

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 015 ******/
MOSCOW IN HIS CAPACITY AS STATE PRESIDENT. CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS REPRESENTED BY ITS NEW, REFORMIST LEADERS, THE COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF, KAREL URBANEK, AND THE PRIME MINISTER, LADISLAV ADAMEC, PRESIDENT GUSTAVE HUSAK, WHOSE RESIGNATION THE PRAGUE CROWDS HAVE DEMANDED, STAYED AT HOME.

"EAST EUROPEAN SOURCES SAID THEY BELIEVED THE BRIEFING ABOUT THE RESULTS OF MALTA WOULD ALSO COVER THE CHANGES IN THEIR REGION. 'I THINK THE FIRST AIM OF THE MEETING IS TO HEAR ABOUT MALTA AND THEN IT IS A CHANCE FOR ALL SIDES TO EXCHANGE EXPERIENCES OF THE CHANGES GOING ON IN THEIR COUNTRIES,' ONE ANALYST SAID..."

THE INDEPENDENT'S PETER JENKINS REPORTED FROM MALTA: "...ALL HOPEFUL VISIONS OF THE NEW EUROPE MUST BE SET AGAINST THE EXTREME PRESSIMISM ENCOUNTERED HERE THESE LAST FEW DAYS AMONG THE WESTERN JOURNALISTS BASED IN MOSCOW WHO SEE BEFORE THEM A PROSPECT OF DISINTEGRATION QUITE POSSIBLY DEGENERATING INTO CIVIL WAR. THE NEW EUROPE WOULD NOT BE EASILY BUILT AROUND THAT.

"THE RUSSIAN QUESTION IS MORE SOBERING, MORE AWESOME, MORE DIFFICULT AND MORE URGENT THAN THE GERMAN QUESTIONS. THAT IS WHY IT WAS SO IMPORTANT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT PERESTROIKA, AS IT NOW HAS DONE, NOT ONLY WITH WORDS BUT DEEDS.
"SINCE LAST SUMMER, WHEN MR. BUSH'S EYES WERE OPENED BY HIS VISITS TO POLAND AND HUNGARY, THE AMERICAN POSITION HAS DEVELOPED FAR AND RAPIDLY. THERE, TOO, A CLEARER NOTION IS BEGINNING TO EMERGE OF THE 'EUROPE, WHOLE AND FREE' OF WHICH MR. BUSH FIRST SPOKE VAGUELY IN THE SPRING. IT WOULD BE A EUROPE NOT WITHOUT AMERICANS, OR RUSSIANS, BUT ONE IN WHICH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WOULD PLAY A LESSER MILITARY ROLE AND A GREATER POLITICAL ONE. ON THE SOVIET SIDE, TOO, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THAT THINKING IS MOVING AWAY FROM THE OLD DEMAND THAT THE ALLIANCES BE DISSOLVED, TOWARDS THE NOTION THAT A CONTINUING AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE AND A REFORMED WARSAW PACT COULD SERVE AS PILLARS OF STABILITY FOR THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME..." COURTNEY
ADMIN
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USIA

USIA FOR P/M, INFO EU (JORIA)

STATE FOR EUR/EEY

E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: MALTA MEETING

1. THE MALTA MEETING WAS FRONT-PAGE NEWS AGAIN IN WARSAW'S MAJOR DAILIES ON THE MONDAY AFTER ITS CONCLUSION. MOST MAJOR PAPERS PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED PHOTOGRAPHS OF BUSH AND GORBACHEV TOGETHER ON THE FRONT PAGE. MUCH ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO THE WEATHER'S EFFECT ON THE SUMMIT, AND ARTICLES DREW HEAVILY FROM THE FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE.

2. GOVERNMENT DAILY RZECZPOSPOLITA CARRIED A WIRE SERVICE STORY DRAWN FROM AGENCE FRANCE

PRESSE AND POLISH PRESS AGENCY. THERE WAS ALSO A COMMENTARY BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT ALEKSANDER PERCZYNSKI. THE MAIN HEADLINE WAS QUOTE THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA UNQUOTE, WHILE THE WASHINGTON DISPATCH WAS CALLED SIMPLY QUOTE THE CONTRAST UNQUOTE. IN THE COMMENTARY, PERCZYSNKI WROTE THAT QUOTE THE NON-SUMMIT SUMMIT SHOWED THAT ON MANY QUESTIONS THE OUTLOOKS OF BOTH STATES ARE CONVERGENT OR SIMILAR UNQUOTE. THE PIECE REVIEWS SOME ISSUES ON WHICH THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT, CHIEFLY ON LATIN AMERICA, AND CLOSES QUOTE THESE PROBLEMS REMAINED MOST MARKEDLY ON THE SIDELINES OF ISSUES ON WHICH THE LEADERS OF THE USSR AND USA BEGAN (SOME) PROMISING AGREEMENTS -- EVEN IF, WITH THE PREVAILING FORMULA OF THE MEETING, THE AGREEMENTS WERE NOT OFFICIAL AGREEMENTS UNQUOTE.

3. COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY TRYBUNA LUDU FEATURED A FRONT-PAGE DISPATCH BY SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT ZBIGNIEW LESNIKOWSKI ENTITLED QUOTE THE MALTESE SUMMIT FULFILLED ITS IMPORTANT ASSIGNMENTS UNQUOTE. THE PIECE CONTAINED NO COMMENTARY. IT CONTINUED INSIDE, WHERE THE BUSH AND GORBACHEV STATEMENTS WERE PRINTED, AS WELL AS A DISPATCH FROM MOSCOW ABOUT SOVIET COMMENTARY ENTITLED QUOTE GORBACHEV'S UNUSUAL WEEK UNQUOTE. ALSO ON PAGE FIVE WAS A DISPATCH BY TRYBUNA'S WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT ZYGMUNT BRONIAREK HEADLINED QUOTE FOR WHOM ARE THE MALTESE CASTLE CELLS? UNQUOTE, A REFERENCE TO PETER JENNINGS' QUIP THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR THOSE WHO ADVISED BUSH TO MEET ON THE WATER. BRONIAREK'S DISPATCH CONTAINED NO COMMENTARY.

4. MASS-CIRCULATION DAILY ZYCIE WARSZAWY CARRIED A DISPATCH BY SPECIAL ENVOY ZDZISLAW MORAWSKI UNDER THE HEADLINE QUOTE THE MALTA SUMMIT STARTED A NEW ERA OF USSR-US RELATIONS UNQUOTE. IN THE LEAD PARAGRAPH MORAWSKI WROTE QUOTE THIS WAS A SUMMIT WHOSE ATMOSPHERE WAS SO WARM THAT IT SUBSTANTIATED THE UNIVERSALLY HELD OPINION HERE THAT THE LEADERS OF TWO NOW FRIENDLY (STATES) MET, AND NOT ENEMY SUPERPOWERS UNQUOTE. A COMMENTARY BY RYSZARD BANKOWICZ HEADLINED QUOTE THE BUSINESS AND THE PURPOSE UNQUOTE SAID QUOTE FOR THE FIRST TIME, WE ARE DEALING WITH THE IDENTITY OF THE LONG TERM GOALS OF THE USSR AND USA. (THIS IDENTITY) IS BASED ON THE CONVICTION THAT THE PERIOD OF THE COLD WAR HAS BEEN BURIED, ITS COFFIN IS DEEP, AND ITS EXHUMATION IS IMPOSSIBLE UNQUOTE. ZYCIE CARRIED

SHORT EXCERPTS FROM THE BUSH AND GORBACHEV CLOSING STATEMENTS.

5. MASS-CIRULATION SOLIDARITY-AFFILIATED DAILY GAZETA WYBORCZA ALSO RAN THE STORY ON THE FRONT PAGE HEADLINED QUOTE BUSH-GORBACHEV: MALTESE DOVES UNQUOTE. THE SHORT PIECE BEGAN QUOTE A JOINT BUSH-GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE, FIRST IN THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC RELATION BETWEEN BOTH POWERS, ENDED THE SATURDAY-SUNDAY SUMMIT OFF MALTA UNQUOTE.
6. THE MAIN EVENING NEWS AT 19:30 SATURDAY SHOWED NEARLY TWO MINUTES OF FOOTAGE FROM THE MEETING, WHILE ON SUNDAY IT SHOWED THREE AND A HALF MINUTES OF FOOTAGE. THERE WAS NO COMMENT, BUT THE NARRATIVE SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 WARSAW 16726

USIA

USIA FOR P/M, INFO EU (JORIA)

STATE FOR EUR/EEY

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: MALTA MEETING

POINT IN THE TALKS WAS THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, AND THAT THERE ARE HOPES FOR AN ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT AT THE JUNE SUMMIT, AND FOR A NATO-WARSAW PACT AGREEMENT NEXT YEAR. DUBROW
ADMIN
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SERIAL: LD0412215989
BODY
COUNTRY: USSR
SUBJ: JARUZELSKI COMMENTS ON PACT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW
REF: LD0412215589 WARSAW PAP ENGLISH 042139 -- POLAND'S MAZOWIECKI ON PACT SUMMIT MEETING
SOURCE: WARSAW PAP IN ENGLISH 2126 GMT 4 DEC 89
TEXT:

((TEXT)) MOSCOW, DEC. 4 -- POLAND'S PRESIDENT WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI SAID IN AN INTERVIEW FOR PAP FOLLOWING THE MOSCOW SUMMIT OF WARSAW TREATY STATES:

THIS SUMMIT, LIKE THE PREVIOUS ONES, WAS PRIMARILY DEVOTED TO AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IT ONCE AGAIN SHOWED OUR CONCORDANCE IN APPROACH, IN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, IN POLITICS -- IN ITS GENERAL TERMS. THE POLICY AND STANCE ADOPTED BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV HAS WON FULL APPROVAL AMONG US AS BEING IN LINE WITH THE FOREIGN POLICY OF STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY.

IT IS TRUE THAT THE PARTICIPANTS (IN THE MEETING) WERE DIFFERENT TO A LARGE EXTENT -- THE LEADERSHIPS HAVE CHANGED IN MANY COUNTRIES. OF COURSE WE WERE AWARE THAT OUR FOREIGN POLICY IS BEING PURSUED IN NEW CONDITIONS, IN A PERIOD OF CHANGES TAKING PLACE TODAY IN NEARLY ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

OWING TO ITS HISTORY, LOCATION AND PROBLEMS AND TASKS TACKLED BY US TODAY AND TO DEEP REFORMS AND TRANSFORMATIONS, POLAND IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE PROCESS OF DIALOGUE, REAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS OF EUROPE AND A GENERAL RAPPROCHEMENT ON THE GLOBAL SCALE TAKING PALCE AS FAST AND FULLY AS POSSIBLE. WE CAN IMPLEMENT OUR NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS ONLY IN THESE CONDITIONS.

BECAUSE THE MALTA SUMMIT CONSTITUTES A CERTAIN STEP ON THE ROAD TO RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS, IT ALSO SETS UP A CERTAIN PLANE FOR A PEACEFUL POLICY OF ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE TWO BLOCS. HENCE, IT IS VERY ADVANTAGEOUS FOR POLAND AND THAT IS WHY WE HAVE EXPRESSED FULL SUPPORT FOR ITS OUTCOME. WE ARE COUNTING ON IT BEARING FRUIT SOON, AT THE NEXT SUMMIT, IN THE FORM

OF FAR-REACHING DISARMAMENT STEPS.

THIS IS OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FOR US. OUR INITIATIVES, OUR DISARMAMENT PLAN IS A PART OF THESE GLOBAL SOLUTIONS. WE ARE ALSO VERY ACTIVE IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND I THINK THAT AT PRESENT WE ARE GETTING ADDITIONAL IMPETUS FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO END IN SUCCESS. I AM NOT REFERRING TO ECONOMIC ASPECTS BECAUSE THEY ARE OBVIOUS. THE BROADER AND DEEPER EAST-WEST COOPERATION IS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE, THE MORE FRUITFUL THE EFFORTS IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION CAN BE, AND THESE WE NEED VERY MUCH.

ADMIN

(ENDALL) 042126 SCRACE/PX 0/2316Z DEC

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SERIAL: LD0412215589
BODY
COUNTRY: USSR
SUBJ: POLAND'S MAZOWIECKI ON PACT SUMMIT MEETING
SOURCE: WARSAW PAP IN ENGLISH 2139 GMT 4 DEC 89
TEXT:

((TEXT)) MOSCOW, DEC. 4 -- POLISH PRIME MINISTER TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI GRANTED AN INTERVIEW TO PAP IN CONNECTION WITH MONDAY'S MEETING OF LEADERS OF STATES -- PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY.

EXCERPTS:

"THE MEETING'S AGENDA INCLUDED MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S DETAILED REPORT ON, FIRST, TALKS IN ITALY, A MEETING WITH POPE JOHN PAUL II AND, SECOND, TALKS WITH PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH. I MUST STRESS HERE THAT THE REPORT'S PART DEVOTED TO THE TALK WITH THE POPE WAS VERY INTERESTING AND SHOWED MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S HIGH RESPECT FOR JOHN PAUL II. MR GORBACHEV PUT A GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN A VERY, VERY INTERESTING MEETING FOR HIM.

"AS REGARDS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV PRESENTED SOME ISSUES IN A MORE DETAILED WAY. IT WAS A SORT OF A REVIEW OF WORLD PROBLEMS. ISSUES WHICH CONCERNED A POSSIBLE PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT TALKS IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS ARE WORTH MENTIONING. IN MY OPINION THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT.

"A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF THE MEETING WAS THE ADOPTION OF A STATEMENT BY LEADERS OF BULGARIA, THE GDR, POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE SOVIET UNION WHICH CONDEMNED THE 1968 INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. I AM GLAD THAT THIS COULD TAKE PLACE AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE WARSAW TREATY STATES' LEADERS IN WHICH I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE."

ADMIN
(ENDALL) 042139 SCRACE/ML 04/2252Z DEC
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SERIAL: LD0512130889

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
COUNTRY: INTRABLOC
SUBJ: TAKE 1 OF 2 -- NEMETH ON OUTCOME OF PACT MEETING
SOURCE: BUDAPEST DOMESTIC SERVICE IN HUNGARIAN 1100 GMT 5 DEC 89
TEXT:

//((INTERVIEW WITH HUNGARIAN PREMIER MIKLOS NEMETH ON 5 NOVEMBER, ON ARRIVAL AT AIRPORT FROM MOSCOW WARSAW PACT BRIEFING, BY TAMAS FORRO AND GYORGY TOTH; INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS' QUESTIONS NOT IDENTIFIABLE -- RECORDED))

((TEXT)) ((ANNOUNCER)) AS WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED, FOLLOWING THE MALTA SUMMIT, THE LEADING POLITICIANS OF THE WARSAW PACT HELD A MEETING IN MOSCOW WHERE OUR HOMELAND WAS REPRESENTED BY PREMIER MIKLOS NEMETH AND REZSO NYERS, CHAIRMAN OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST PARTY. SHORTLY BEFORE OUR BROADCAST, THEY ARRIVED HOME AND GAVE A STATEMENT AT THE AIRPORT TO HUNGARIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION. TAMAS FORRO AND GYORGY TOTH REPORT.

((BEGIN RECORDING)) ((REPORTER)) WERE YOU SURPRISED AT THE MEETING THAT THERE WAS A UNANIMOUS CONDEMNATION OF THE 1968 EVENTS, OR WAS THIS IN THE AIR?

((NEMETH)) IT FEATURED IN OUR CALCULATIONS. I WAS SURPRISED INASMUCH AS WE DID NOT GET PRIOR INFORMATION ABOUT IT, BUT THIS IS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE HITHERTO PROCESSES.

((REPORTER)) IN THE END, IS THE PREMIER SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAPPENED? WHAT LEVEL WERE THE TALKS HELD AT AS REGARDS ((WORDS INDISTINCT)), INCLUDING THOSE IN WHICH WE HUNGARIANS PARTICIPATED DIRECTLY?

((NEMETH)) THE BRIEFING WE WERE GIVEN ON THE SUMMIT DEFINITELY ENTITLES US TO BE HOPEFUL. THE COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IS CONTINUING ON QUESTIONS WHICH ARE EXTREMELY (?IMPORTANT) AND WHICH AFFECT US TOO, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. SO, THE ATMOSPHERE AND MOOD OF THE MEETING WAS DEFINITELY ENCOURAGING AS REGARDS THE FUTURE.

AT THE SAME TIME, AT A BRIEFING OF THIS NATURE, NATURALLY A MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS OF THE MOOD AND MEANING TO WHICH YOUR

QUESTION REFERRED CANNOT BE CREATED, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE SHORTAGE OF TIME.

((REPORTER)) DO THE TWO SUPERPOWERS EVALUATE THE PROCESSES IN HUNGARY IN A SIMILAR OR A DIFFERENT WAY?

((NEMETH)) THE SUBJECT OF HUNGARY, IN THIS WAY WAS NOT ON THE AGENDA; EUROPE, EAST EUROPE, FOCAL POINTS OF THE WORLD'S GREAT AREAS, YES, BUT HUNGARY WAS NOT HIGHLIGHTED SEPARATELY.

((REPORTER)) AND IN THE WAKE OF THE MALTA SUMMIT, CAN ANY CHANGE BE EXPECTED FROM THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IN THE EVALUATION AND HANDLING OF HUNGARY?

((NEMETH)) NO, I THINK THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT BASIC PRINCIPLE WHICH WAS FORMULATED BY THE PRESIDENTS OF BOTH SUPERPOWERS IS THAT EVERY NATION CHOOSES THEIR OWN PATH, THE CHOSEN SETUP, AND SO ON, FREELY AND INDEPENDENTLY.

((REPORTER)) DID YOU PERSONALLY FIND ANYTHING INSTRUCTIVE FROM ALL THAT YOU HEARD ABOUT THE MALTA SUMMIT?

((NEMETH)) I THINK THAT WE MUST STILL AWAIT THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED, AND LONGER TERM CONCLUSIONS SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE ACTIONS AND THE FOLLOWING STEPS.

((REPORTER)) WHY DID ROMANIA NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE WARSAW PACT MEETING?

((NEMETH)) ROMANIA WAS PRESENT.

((REPORTER)) THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIQUE DID NOT BEAR THE NAME OF ROMANIA.

((NEMETH)) IT MUST BE A PRINTING ERROR; ROMANIA WAS THERE.

((REPORTER)) ONE MORE QUESTION. YOU HELD TALKS WITH PREMIER RYZHKOV TOO; THE WORDING OF THE COMMUNIQUE WAS, ABOUT THE MOST BURNING QUESTIONS OF HUNGARIAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC COOPERATION. WHAT REALITY IS THERE FOR ELIMINATING THE HUNGARIAN SURPLUS, AND GOING OVER TO DOILLAR ACCOUNTING?

/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 ******/
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TEXT:

((TEXT)) ((NEMETH)) I VERY DETERMINEDLY ASKED -- OUTLINING THE PROBLEMS AND WORRIES OF THIS YEAR AND NEXT YEAR -- THAT IN THE REAL SPHERE, THAT IS IN GOODS TURNOVER, WE SHOULD SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION, AND NOT MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF CREDIT AGREEMENTS. WITHIN THIS, I PINPOINTED SOME QUESTIONS RELATING TO PRODUCT GROUPS, RAW MATERIALS, ENERGY CARRIERS, OIL DELIVERIES, WHICH ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR US. AS REGARDS THE MECHANISM, I HANDED OVER THE DOCUMENT SUMMARIZING THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT'S STANDPOINT. THIS ISSUE SPHERE, ALONGSIDE THE TRANSFER TO CONVERTIBILITY, USE OF THE WORLD MARKET PRICE BASIS, FOMULATES VERY MARKEDLY ALSO THE NEED TO INCREASE THE INDEPENDENCE OF ENTERPRISES, THAT IS MARKET METHODS, AND RESTRICTING THE UNDERTAKING OF STATE OBLIGATIONS. SO, IN OUR CONCEPTION, THESE TWO SIDES ARE VERY STRONGLY CONNECTED AND ARE CONDITIONAL UPON EACH OTHER. WE WILL EXCHANGE OPINIONS ON THESE QUESTIONS AT THE CEMA MEETING TO BE HELD NEXT YEAR IN SOFIA, AROUND 9 JANUARY.

((REPORTER)) RYZHKOV SAID HE WAS UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING ENERGY DELIVERIES TO HUNGARY. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? HUNGARIANS ARE A BIT ANXIOUS AS TO WHETHER THERE WILL BE ENOUGH GAS.

((NEMETH)) WELL, IN THE SHORT TERM, THIS MEANS PRIMARILY THAT THE PARTNER WILL FULFIL THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN THE CONTRACT.

((REPORTER)) THANK YOU.

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UNCLAS BRUSSELS 15634

USIA

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STATE FOR EUR/NE

E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
SUBJECT: BELGIAN MEDIA REACTION
BRUSSELS NATO SUMMIT

I. COVERAGE

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1. COVERAGE OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S REPORT ON HIS MALTA MEETING WITH GORBACHEV EMPHASIZES HIS CALL FOR SUPPORTING PERESTROIKA WHILE MAINTAINING A STRONG NATO. HIS REMARKS ON THE CONCLUSION OF AN EARLY DISARMAMENT ACCORD IN VIENNA AND ON THE GERMAN REUNIFICATION ISSUE ARE ALSO WIDELY REPORTED.

2. BOTH RTL/TVI AND RTBF PRESENTED LONG EXCERPTS OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S PRESS CONFERENCE. RTL SUMMARIZED IT BY SAYING THAT WHILE PERESTROIKA MUST BE HELPED, THE WEST SHOULD NEVERTHELESS REMAIN STRONG.

3. BRT TV ALSO RAN EXTENSIVE EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT NATO. IT OBSERVED THAT: "THIS NATO SUMMIT HAS NOT YIELDED SURPRISES. PRESIDENT BUSH HAS NOT TAKEN DECISIONS OVER THE HEADS OF THE EUROPEANS, AND THEY ARE GLAD. BUT THE ROAD HAS BEEN PAVED NOW FOR MORE CONCRETE TALKS -- TALKS WHICH MAKE NEXT YEAR THE YEAR OF DISARMAMENT ACCORDS."

4. BRT FURTHER CARRIED AN INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER MARTENS WHO SAID: "WHAT IS VERY IMPORTANT IS THAT THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS HAS RECEIVED A NEW IMPULSE FROM THE MALTA MEETING, AND THAT 1990 MAY BE AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT YEAR IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS, LONG-RANGE MISSILES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS; THIS COULD BE AN HARBINGER OF FURTHER-REACHING DECISIONS ON SHORT-RANGE MISSILES."

5. OVER EXCERPTS OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S REMARKS AT NATO, VTM SAID: "NATO HAS TURNED A PAGE. THIS IS THE IMPRESSION PRESIDENT BUSH GAVE AT NATO HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS WHERE HE INFORMED THE ALLIES ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER GORBACHEV....ONE OF THE CONSEQUENCES IS THAT NATO MUST ADOPT MORE OF A POLITICAL THAN A MILITARY STANCE AND THAT EUROPE BE GIVEN A LARGER ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE."

6. HEADLINES:
-- "NATO LEADERS AT EVERE SUMMIT: GERMAN QUESTION IS NOT PURELY A GERMAN QUESTION" AND "BUSH URGES EARLY DISARMAMENT ACCORD IN VIENNA" (LIBERAL CATHOLIC DE STANDAARD -CIRC. 382,000);
-- "BUSH TO NATO ALLIES: 'NO DEALS ON FUTURE OF EUROPE'" (LABOR CATHOLIC HET VOLK -CIRC. 190,000);
-- "BUSH AND GORBACHEV INFORM PARTNERS -- LARGER EUROPEAN ROLE IN MILITARY PACTS" (FINANCIAL DAILY FINANCIEEL-EKONOMISCHE TIJD -CIRC. 31,000);
-- "UNREST OVER GERMANY AT NATO SUMMIT -- MOSCOW WANTS CONTINUATION OF ALLIANCES" (CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN -CIRC. 190,000);
-- "NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT VOW TO BE THE PILLARS OF STABILITY IN EUROPE" (INDEPENDENT LE SOIR -CIRC. 209,000);
-- "NATO VALUES THE WARSAW PACT" (CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC LA LIBRE BELGIQUE -CIRC. 81,000);
-- "NATO SATISFIED: THE COLD WAR HAS SUNK IN THE MALTA STORM" (FINANCIAL L'ECHO DE LA BOURSE -CIRC. 31,000);
-- "NATO AND EUROPE SHOULDER TO SHOULDER" (CONSERVATIVE LA DERNIERE HEURE -CIRC. 93,000);
-- "THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE PAYS HOMAGE TO PERESTROIKA" (CATHOLIC VERS L'AVENIR -CIRC. 146,000)

II. COMMENTARY

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1. LIBERAL CATHOLIC DE STANDAARD (CIRC. 382,000): "IT IS OKAY TO SUDDENLY SHOW SO MUCH UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES FOR THE STABILITY ASSURED BY THE POST-WAR DIVISION, EMBODIED BY THE EXISTENCE OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. BUT ONE MUST BE CAREFUL ABOUT WHICH SIGNALS TO SEND TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AND POSSIBLY TO THE GDR. NOW THAT A MOMENTUM HAS GOTTEN UNDERWAY IN CENTRAL EUROPE IT IS NOT THE MOMENT TO TELL THE GERMANS THAT THEIR FUTURE IS IN FACT NOT THEIR BUSINESS....

"PEOPLE IN THE TWO GERMANIES REALIZE FULLY THAT GERMAN REUNIFICATION WOULD MEAN THE END OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT AS THEY ARE NOW, AND THAT IT CAN BE ACHIEVED

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 BRUSSELS 15634

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E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: BELGIAN MEDIA REACTION

ONLY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A PAN-EUROPEAN PEACE SETTLEMENT. SO, THERE IS LITTLE DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE HEART OF THE MATTER, BUT A CLEVER POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH WILL BE NEEDED TO NOT GIVE THE INCREASINGLY SELF-CONSCIOUS GERMANS THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY BARELY CAN HAVE A SAY IN THEIR OWN FATE. GORBACHEV SEES THE MAINTENANCE OF THE 'CONDOMINIUM' AS THE BEST WAY TO USE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE TO ACHIEVE A PAN-EUROPEAN PEACE SETTLEMENT OFFERING MOSCOW A 'SAY' ON THE ENTIRE CONTINENT. HE FINDS OBJECTIVE ALLIES IN THE WEST WHO WANT TO PUT OFF GERMAN REUNIFICATION INDEFINITELY.

"BUT CONSIDERING THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, PEOPLE IN NATO SEEM TO NOURISH ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE TIME THEY HAVE TO FORMULATE CONCRETE ANSWERS. IF NATO AND THE EC WAIT TOO LONG, IT MAY TEMPT PEOPLE IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE TO LOOK MORE TOWARDS MOSCOW FOR A SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION."

2. LABOR CATHOLIC HET VOLK (CIRC. 190,000): "ALTHOUGH THE KREMLIN IS WILLING TO DISCUSS A POSSIBLE REUNIFICATION OF THE TWO GERMANIES IN A LATER STAGE, ONE CAN ASSUME THAT MOSCOW WILL SET ITS CONDITIONS FOR IT. ONE OF THE CONDITIONS COULD BE THAT A REUNIFIED GERMANY WOULD BECOME MILITARILY NEUTRAL. THIS WOULD BE HEAVY BLOW TO NATO AND PLANS FOR A EUROPEAN DEFENSE POLICY, OF WHICH THE FRG IS CONSIDERED AN IMPORTANT PILLAR. A UNITED BUT NEUTRAL GERMANY WOULD MOREOVER CERTAINLY CAUSE TENSIONS AGAIN IN EUROPE....A FORMAL REUNIFICATION IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY A MATTER FOR THE TWO GERMANIES.

THERE MUST ALSO BE A CONSENSUS ABOUT IT IN THE REST OF EUROPE. IN THE MEANTIME, IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE THAT THE TWO MILITARY PACTS REMAIN PREPARED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL. IT WOULD RELEASE RESOURCES THAT COULD BE USED FOR THE ECONOMIC REVIVAL OF THE EAST BLOC COUNTRIES. AND THIS IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO INCREASE STABILITY IN ALL OF EUROPE."

3. INDEPENDENT LE SOIR (CIRC. 209,000): "THE DRASTIC ARMS REDUCTION ENVISAGED TODAY WILL PROBABLY PROVE TO BE OF INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET ECONOMY. BUT ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS THAT IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY BUDGET WILL FAVOR THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY, THE DIFFICULTY IN A FIRST STAGE OF REASIGNING HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS WILL ADD TO THE DIFFICULTY OF IMPROVING THE COUNTRY'S PRODUCTIVITY. AGONIZING REAPPRAISALS WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY IN THE WEST, PARTICULARLY IN THE STRATEGIC AND MILITARY FIELDS, BUT THEY WILL ALSO HAVE INDUSTRIAL CONSEQUENCES....IN THE U.S., THE SOVIET-AMERICAN PACIFICATION COULD DEAL A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE COUNTRY'S INDUSTRIAL FABRIC. THE PENTAGON ITSELF IS PRESENTLY ISSUING STUDIES THAT SHOW, ON ONE HAND, THAT THE SOVIET ARMY WILL SOON BE UNABLE TO LAUNCH A LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE IN EUROPE, AND WHICH ON THE OTHER HAND FORECAST A REDUCTION BY HALF OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET BY 1999. IN TEN YEARS THIS COULD REPRESENT A LOSS OF 500 BILLION DOLLARS FOR THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX."

4. CONSERVATIVE LA DERNIERE HEURE (CIRC. 93,000): "RENOUNCING EVERY ACTIVE PRECAUTION AGAINST POSSIBLE ERRORS OR CHANGES OF COURSE WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE. TOO SPEEDY OR TOO RADICAL A REUNIFICATION OF THE TWO GERMANIES, FOR INSTANCE, COULD RESULT IN TOUGH AWAKENING. MALTA SHOULD NOT BE THE FORERUNNER OF A NEW YALTA."

5. CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC LA LIBRE BELGIQUE (CIRC. 81,000): "THE TWO MEN CLEVERLY MANAGED TO DISGUISE IT, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE PROVED TO BE A MAJOR BONE OF CONTENTION BETWEEN GEORGE BUSH AND MIKHAIL GORBACHEV DURING THEIR MALTA MEETING. THE PRESIDENT OF THE US. IS REPORTEDLY SO IRRITATED BY THIS ISSUE THAT HE IS SAID TO HAVE MADE IT A QUID PRO QUO WHEN HE PROMISED HIS INTERLOCUTOR TO SUPPORT PERESTROIKA....WHEN MIKHAIL GORBACHEV REPLIES THAT HE CANNOT INTERFERE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HE RESORTS TO THE LOGIC OF A PERESTROIKA WHICH PRESIDENT BUSH IS WILLING TO SUPPORT, BUT PREFERABLY IN ANOTHER REGION."

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E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: BELGIAN MEDIA REACTION
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BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
TAGS: PREL, US, UR, NL, CSCE, NATO
SUBJECT: DUTCH LEADERS REACT TO PRESIDENT'S
- BRIEFING ON MALTA MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

1. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS AND FOREIGN
---------- MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK PRAISED THE PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING AND THE OBVIOUS POSITIVE SPIRIT EMANATING FROM THE MALTA MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. THEY HIGHLIGHTED THE PRESIDENT'S FOCUS ON GETTING A CFE AGREEMENT ON THE NATO SCHEDULE WHILE LOOKING TOWARD FURTHER CUTS AND GIVING ASSURANCES THAT US ARMED FORCES WOULD STAY IN EUROPE. LUBBERS NOTED NATO'S CONTINUING POLITICAL ROLE. HE RECALLED THE SPECIAL STATUS OF THE FOUR POWERS IN THESE EXCITING TIMES FOR GERMANS, AND PLACED EC DEEPENING ABOVE EASTERN MEMBERSHIP. VAN DEN BROEK SAID HE WOULD PROPOSE

AT NEXT WEEK'S MINISTERIAL THAT THE CSCE 35 AND NOT JUST THE NATO/WTO 23 BE INVITED TO THE VIENNA CFE SIGNING CEREMONY. END SUMMARY.

CFE -- AND CFE TWO
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2. LUBBERS SPOKE OF THE DESIRE TO SIGN A CFE ACCORD BY MID-1990. HE RECALLED THAT THIS IS IN LINE WITH THE PROPOSAL MADE BY PRESIDENT BUSH SIX MONTHS AGO. "DESPITE ALL SORTS OF HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENTS," HE SAID, "IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS STILL A LOT TO DO. PRESIDENT BUSH THEREFORE MADE AN APPEAL TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED TO MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THEIR CAPITALS AND TO GIVE THE RIGHT INSTRUCTIONS SO THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA CAN REACH AGREEMENT. PERHAPS WE COULD THEN ALSO WORK OUT A ROUTE TO A FOLLOW-UP CONVENTIONAL ARMS ACCORD."

3. LUBBERS ADDED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD TO LOOK BEYOND TROOP REDUCTIONS UNDER A CFE ACCORD. "PRESIDENT BUSH ASKED US TO THINK ABOUT QUESTIONS SUCH AS WHAT SHOULD BE THE LOWEST LEVEL OF ARMAMENT AND HOW CAN THIS BE COMBINED WITH A CREDIBLE FORM OF DETERRENCE."

4. VAN DEN BROEK ALSO SPOKE OF THE NEED TO DETERMINE MINIMAL ARMAMENT LEVELS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE DETERRENT. HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED AT PRESIDENT BUSH'S ASSURANCES THAT THE US WILL MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE IN EUROPE AS LONG AS THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WISH IT TO DO SO.

NATO'S POLITICAL ROLE
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5. ASKED IF IT IS TRUE THAT NATO IS STARTING TO PLAY A POLITICAL RATHER THAN A MILITARY ROLE, LUBBERS POINTED OUT THAT "THE POLITICAL ROLE HAS ALWAYS EXISTED. THAT WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, CLEAR SIX MONTHS AGO IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S SPEECHES WHEN HE TALKED ABOUT OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE. AND NATO COMMUNIQUES ALSO USED TO INCLUDE THE FAMILIAR REFERENCES TO FREEDOM AND DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES, WHICH THEN USED TO BE REGARDED AS PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE WARSAW PACT. NOW THEY ARE UNDERSTOOD AS REFLECTING WHAT WE ALL REALLY WANT: DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES. SO THE

POLITICAL ELEMENT HAS ALWAYS EXISTED, BUT YOU CAN NOW BETTER SEE IT; IT IS LESS MISUNDERSTOOD AND YOU CAN ALSO SEE IT AS JOINING IN WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST BLOC."

GERMAN REUNIFICATION: THE FOUR POWER ROLE
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6. ASKED ABOUT CHANCELLOR KOHL'S PLAN FOR REUNIFICATION, LUBBERS EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE EVERYTHING STEP BY STEP. HE NOTED THAT THE FOUR POWERS HAVE A SPECIAL STABILIZING ROLE TO PLAY WHEN IT COMES TO GERMANY'S FUTURE. THIS HISTORIC FACT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN, HE CONCLUDED.
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 THE HAGUE 09723

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, US, UR, NL, CSCE, NATO
SUBJECT: DUTCH LEADERS REACT TO PRESIDENT'S

THE EEC: DEEPEN BEFORE WE BROADEN
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7. LUBBERS EXCLUDED EXPANSION OF THE EC TO ENCOMPASS EASTERN EUROPE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. "WE SHOULD FIRST CARRY ON WITH THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND, ON THAT BASIS, OFFER VERY GENEROUS POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. IT WOULD GET TOO COMPLICATED IF WE . . . NOW CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERSHIP."

CFE SIGNING CEREMONY: THE 35, NOT JUST THE 23
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8. COMMENTING ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSAL TO INVITE THE HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT OF THE 23 NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO ATTEND THE SIGNING NEXT YEAR OF A CFE ACCORD IN VIENNA, VAN DEN BROEK ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD ADVOCATE INVITING ALL 35 CSCE COUNTRIES AT THE NATO MINISTERIAL NEXT WEEK. VAN DEN BROEK ARGUED THAT THIS IS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE NOT ONLY "THE SECURITY COMPONENT, BUT ALSO ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE HUMANITARIAN DOMAIN ARE PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS." (COMMENT:

VAN DEN BROEK HAS BEEN URGING MORE CSCE MEETINGS FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS NOW, AND SPOKE OUT QUICKLY IN SUPPORT OF THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL -- SEE THE HAGUE 9643, 9641 PARA 17 AND 9240.)
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E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
BODY
TAGS: CSCE, PREL, CFE, FI, UR
SUBJECT: FINNISH REACTION TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR
- A 1990 "HELSINKI-2" SUMMIT MEETING

REF: (A) HELSINKI 8229
- (B) HELSINKI 8041
- (C) HELSINKI 7998
- (D) HELSINKI 7690

1. (Ø) SUMMARY: THE FINNS WERE SURPRISED BY GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL TO HOLD A "HELSINKI-2" SUMMIT OF THE 35 CSCE STATES IN 1990 INSTEAD OF 1992. THEY INTERPRET THIS CHANGE IN THE PROPOSED TIMING AS APPLYING ONLY TO A SUMMIT AND NOT TO THE 1992 CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE

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ITSELF. THE GOF IS WILLING TO HOST A SPECIAL CSCE SUMMIT IN HELSINKI IN 1990, BUT ONLY IF ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES AGREE- END SUMMARY.

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2. (U) THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT AND PRESS HAVE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL IN ROME THAT A "HELSINKI-2" SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE 35 CSCE PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES BE ADVANCED FROM 1992 TO 1990. THE FINNS WERE SURPRISED BY THIS PROPOSAL, PARTICULARLY SINCE ONLY A MONTH EARLIER, DURING GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO FINLAND (REFS A AND B), HE HAD PROPOSED THAT THE 1992 HELSINKI CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE BE ATTENDED AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL IN ORDER TO LOOK AT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN EUROPE AND ITS FUTURE, AND THAT THIS "HELSINKI-2" SUMMIT TAKE PLACE IN HELSINKI.

3. (U) THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT REACTED CAUTIOUSLY BUT POSITIVELY TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL TO MOVE THE SUMMIT FORWARD TO 1990. FOREIGN MINISTER PAASIO AND MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR BLOMBERG NOTED THAT FINLAND HAD NO ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF GORBACHEV'S ROME PROPOSAL AND THAT FINLAND COULD ONLY AWAIT REACTIONS FROM OTHER CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES. LATER PAASIO SAID IN A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT FINLAND IS THEORETICALLY READY TO HOST A CSCE SUMMIT MEETING IN 1990 PENDING THE RECEIPT OF REACTIONS FROM THE OTHER CSCE STATES. HE CALLED GORBACHEV'S IDEA OF A 1990 SUMMIT "INTERESTING" AND SAID THAT CSCE IS A SUITABLE FORUM FOR EXAMINING THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN EUROPE.

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4. (Ø) THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION IN THE FINNISH PRESS ABOUT WHETHER GORBACHEV WAS PROPOSING THAT BOTH THE HELSINKI CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE AND THE SUMMIT BE ADVANCED FROM 1992 TO 1990 OR ONLY THE "HELSINKI-2" SUMMIT. MFA OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL PROPOSAL FROM THE SOVIETS ABOUT A 1990 MEETING AND THEY NOTE THAT GORBACHEV IN ROME DID NOT SPECIFICALLY PROPOSE THAT THE 1990 SUMMIT MEETING TAKE PLACE IN HELSINKI. THEY INTERPRET GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR 1990 AS APPLYING ONLY TO THE "HELSINKI-2" SUMMIT IDEA, HOWEVER, AND NOT TO THE 1992 HELSINKI REVIEW CONFERENCE. ONE OFFICIAL TOLD US THAT THE FINNISH CSBM DELEGATION HAD INQUIRED INFORMALLY OF THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS IN VIENNA AND WERE TOLD THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF MOVING UP THE REVIEW CONFERENCE TO 1990. ANOTHER OFFICIAL NOTED THAT MFA DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR REIMAA HAD BEEN QUOTED RECENTLY IN A DIFFERENT CONNECTION AS SAYING THAT ONLY THE HELSINKI REVIEW CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE HELSINKI REVIEW CONFERENCE, SINCE IT WAS DECIDED BY THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE.

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5. (C) MFA OFFICIALS TELL US THAT FINLAND'S PROPOSAL FOR HOLDING THE 1992 REVIEW CONFERENCE AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL STANDS, BUT THE RAPID CHANGES IN EUROPE COULD JUSTIFY HOLDING AN AD HOC CSCE MEETING AS EARLY AS 1990, IF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AGREE, AND FINLAND WOULD BE READY TO HOST A SUMMIT IN 1990. HOWEVER, THEY INTERPRET PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENT IN HIS DECEMBER 4 BRUSSELS PRESS CONFERENCE AS A COUNTER-PROPOSAL, I.E. FOR A SUMMIT OF THE 23 CFE PARTICIPATING STATES TO SIGN A CFE AGREEMENT INSTEAD OF A "HELSINKI-2" SUMMIT OF THE 35 IN 1990. IF THERE IS A DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS OVER A 1990 EUROPEAN SUMMIT, FINLAND WILL NOT TAKE SIDES, THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE MFA DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY OFFICE ASSURED US.
WEINMANN
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ICS/HC/EE, ICS/HC/EU, ICS/HC/UR, NIO/GPF, OIR, PPS/CLBC, PPS/PO,
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E.O. 12356:N/A

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT, DECEMBER 5, 1989
KEY STORIES: FRONT PAGES WERE DOMINATED BY PRESIDENT'S BUSH'S SPEECH YESTERDAY TO THE NATO ALLIES, BRIEFING THEM ON THE MALTA SUMMIT.
INSIDE FOREIGN NEWS PAGES CONTINUED TO CHART THE UNREST IN EASTERN EUROPE, WITH MORE DEMONSTRATIONS AND ACCUSATIONS OF GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION IN EAST GERMANY, AND THE SOVIET UNION'S FIRST OFFICIAL DENOUNCEMENT OF THE 1968 INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY WARSAW PACT TROOPS AS PRESIDENT GORBACHEV BRIEFED THE WARSAW PACT ALLIES ON THE SUMMIT.
THE TIMES' ANNE MCELVOY REPORTED FROM EAST BERLIN:
"...FOR THE DISPIRITED MEMBERS (OF THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY) WHO ARE GATHERING THEIR LAST STRENGTH TO FACE THE PARTY'S MOST DIFFICULT CONGRESS EVER, THE UNENVIABLE, INEVITABLE TASKS ARE TO DISBAND THE PARTY AS THE COUNTRY KNOWS IT, AND TO APAOLOGIZE TO A BRAVE, CONFUSED POPULATION FOR THE SINS OF PAST LEADERS AND FOR PAST COMPLICITY."
THE FINANCIAL TIMES' EDWARD MORTIMER COMMENTED ON "GERMANY'S FUTURE, AND A CONTINENT'S" AND SAID:
"...WHAT MR. GORBACHEV'S COMMON EUROPEAN HOME IS ABOUT (IS)...A NEW SECURITY ORGANIZATION EMBRACING BOTH THE PRESENT ALLIANCES AND THUS OVERCOMING THE DIVISON BETWEEN THEM. WHAT NATO SHOULD NOW BE ALL ABOUT IS ENSURING THAT THE U.S. IS FULLY INCORPORATED IN THAT NEW STRUCTURE, SO THAT IT CONITINUES TO ACT AS AGEOPOLITICAL COUNTERWIEGHT TO THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WITHOUT HAVING TO BE THE LEADER OF AN ANTI-SOVIET ALLIANCE. THIS OF COURSE PRESUPPOSES A MUCH LOWER LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT. MONITORING TROOP LEVELS, AND AUTHORIZING THE USE OF OF

FORCE FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES DEFINED IN ITS CHARTER,
WOULD BE THE MAIN TASKS OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION.
MILITARY FORCE WOULD THUS COME TO BE SEEN AS A
TECHNICAL ASPECT OF THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER RATHER
THAN THE ULTIMATE MANIFESTATION OF POLITICAL POWER.
ONCE THAT PERSPECTIVE IS ACCEPTED THE COMMUNITY WOULD
NO LONGER HAVE TO SEE COMPETENCE IN MILITARY MATTERS AS
THE ULTIMATE TEST OF ITS POLITICAL IDENTITY; AND, THE
MILITARY BLOCS HAVING CEASED TO EXIST, IT WOULD BE FREE
TO RECRUIT MEMBERS IN EASTERN ERUOPE WITHOUT EITHER
JEOPARDIZING ITS POLITICAL VOCATION OR POSING A
MILITARY THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION."
WIDE COVERAGE WAS GIVEN TO THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT FIGHTING
IN THE PHILIPPINES. THE DAILY TELEGRAPH'S BARRY
RIDDELL IN MANILA REPORTED: "AS GUNFIRE PARALYZED

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
MANILA'S INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND DIPLOMATIC CENTER
FOR THE FOURTH DAY YESTERDAY, THERE WERE INDICATIONS
THAT THE PHILIPPINES MAY NO LONGER WISH TO EXPEL THE
UNITED STATES FORCES FROM THEIR TWO BIGGEST OVERSEAS
BASES IN 1991 SENATOR ERNESTO MACEDA, CHAIRMAN OF THE
PHILIPPINE SENATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE, SAID THE SENATE
WAS SOFTENING ITS STANCE ON FORCING THE AMERICANS TO
LEAVE THEIR BASES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE..."
THE FINANCIAL TIMES EDITORIAL "NO ALTERNATIVE TO MRS.
AQUINO" COMMENTED: "...WHATEVER MRS. AQUINO'S
DIFFICULTIES AND POLITICAL WEAKNESSES , ALL THE
ALTERNATIVES APPEAR WORSE..."
THE GUARDIAN CARRIED A FRONT PAGE REPORT "PRIVATE
MANAGERS TO RUN ALDERMASTON" AND DEFENSE CORRESPONDENT
DAVID FAIRHALL SAID: "BRITAIN'S MOST SECRET MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT, THE ALDERMASTON ATOMIC WEAPONS
ESTABLISHMENT, IS TO BE HANDED OVER TO COMMERCIAL
MANAGEMENT..."
THE TIMES CARRIED A REPORT FROM WASHINGTON
CORRESPONDENT MARTIN FLETCHER "BUSH DRUGS CHIEF ADMITS
HE IS LOSING WAR" AND SAID: "MR. WILLIAM BENNETT, THE
WHITE HOUSE 'DRUGS TSAR' HAS CONCEDED THAT AMERICA IS
FAILING TO WIN ITS WAR AGAINST RAMPANT DRUG ABUSE...HE
DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS 'MAD' AND 'FRUSTRATED', RAILING
AGAINST ADMINISTRATION COLLEAGUES, CONGRESS, STATE
AUTHORITIES, LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS AND SCHOOL AND
COLLEGE ADMINISTRATORS WHOM HE ACCUSES OF BUREAUCRATIC
INERTIA AND LACK OF WILL. THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS THAT
HE IS CLOSE TO RESIGNATION, THOUGH HE DENIES
THESE...ONE OF HIS OWN PROBLEMS IS THAT HE IS NOT A
CABINET MEMBER AND HAS NO AUTHORITY TO OVERRIDE THOSE
WHO STAND IN HIS WAY. MR. BENNETT'S ANTI-DRUGS
STRATEGY LAID GREAT EMPHASIS ON RIGID LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND TOUGH NEW PENALTIES, BUT HE IS CONSTANTLY AT ODDS
WITH MR. RICHARD THORNBURGH, THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, WHO
IS DETERMINED TO SAFEGUARD THE AUTONOMY OF THE JUSTICE

DEPARTMENT..."
SEVERAL PAPERS REPORTED AN INCIDENT BETWEEN THE U.S. NAVY AND A GREENPEACE SHIP. THE GUARDIAN'S WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT MARK TRAN REPORTED: "A GREENPEACE SHIP WAS THREATENED, HOSED, RAMMED AND THEN TOWED AWAY FROM A MILITARY AREA YESTERDAY AFTER TRYING TO STOP THE U.S. NAVY SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHING A TRIDENT II D5 NUCLEAR MISSILE FROM A SUBMARINE OFF FLORIDA..." THE DAILY TELEGRAPH REPORT "U.S. WARSHIPS 'RAMS GREENPEACE BOAT' AT MISSILE TEST SITE" SAID "GREENPEACE CLAIMED U.S.NAVY

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
SHIPS DELIBERATELY RAMMED ONE OF ITS VESSELS YESTERDAY AS IT WAS TRYING TO PREVENT THE TESTING OF A TRIDENT 2 MISSILE OFF CAPE CANAVERAL...IT SAID THE MV GREENPEACE - WITH SIX BRITONS ON BOARD WAS ATTACKED BY THE U.S.S. GRASP...LT-CDR CRAIG QUIGLEY ADMITTED THE U.S. NAVY HAD TAKEN ACTION...BUT SAID THE MV GREENPEACE HAD BEEN 'GENTLY SHOULDERED OUT OF THE WAY'..."
THE GUARDIAN CARRIED AN ARTICLE BY SIMON WINCHESTER, "LET THE BOAT PEOPLE STAY" AND CONCLUDED: "...ACCIDENTS OF GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY, AND THE PATTERNS OF WIND AND WATER HAVE DETERMINED THAT HONG KONG HAS ENJOYED GREAT FORTUNE IN THE CENTURY AND A QUARTER OF ITS EXISTENCE. THESE DAYS, SIMILIAR ACCIDENTS OF GEOGRAPHY AND THE PATTERN OF WINDS HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE TERRITORY BEARS A LITTLE MORE OF A BURDEN THAN IT IS ACCUSTOMED TO. PERHAPS HONG KONG SHOULD COUNT THE BLESSINGS SUCH ACCIDENTS HAVE GIFTED OVER THE YEARS, AND BE A LITTLE MORE PHILOSOPHICAL ABOUT THE OCCASIONAL TRIALS..."

BROADCAST MEDIA: EARLY MORNING TELEVISION AND RADIO LED WITH THE CONTINUING DEMONSTRATIONS AND UNREST IN EAST GERMANY. TELEVISION LED WITH PLANS TO EVACUATE FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING SOME BRITONS, FROM THE PHILIPPINES.
BBC RADIO 4'S HEADLINE AT 08:00 WAS "SIR GEOFFREY HOWE (LEADER OF THE COMMONS AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER) HAS DENIED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S CALL FOR CLOSER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WILL CAUSE ANY DIFFICULTIES FOR THE (U.K.) GOVERNMENT."
RADIO 4'S TODAY PROGRAM INTERVIEWED FOREIGN SECRETARY FOR DOUGLAS HURD. INTERVIEWER BRIAN REDHEAD ASKED MR. HURD IF "PRESIDENT BUSH'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IS IN CLEAR DEFIANCE OF MRS. THATCHER'S KNOWN OBJECTIONS." MR. HURD REPLIED "WE'RE IN FAVOR OF DOING WHAT THE PRESIDENT ASKED" AND REFERRED TO THE U.K. PARTICIPATION IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THE DELORS PLAN.

A) TODAY'S MAJOR STORIES:

1. NATO SUMMIT

B) SUMMARY OF COVERAGE:

1. NATO SUMMIT: FRONT PAGES REPORTED THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AT THE MEETING IN BRUSSELS YESTERDAY. REPORTS

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
TENDED TO STRESS PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S ALLEGED ISOLATION AND LOOKED FOR EVIDENCE FOR WHAT IS SEEN AS WASHINGTON'S FEAR THAT THE U.K. IS INCREASINGLY AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH THE REST OF EUROPE, BOTH IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO AND OF THE E.C. SOME REPORTS ALSO LOOKED AT ISSUES RAISED BY THE MALTA SUMMIT.

C) HEADLINES:

1. NATO SUMMIT:

"BUSH PLEDGES U.S. WILL STAY IN EUROPE" (TIMES PAGE 1)
"DEMOCRACY 'MUST TAKE ROOT FOR DECADE'" (TIMES)
"SOVIET DEAL ON SCRAPPING NAVAL MISSILES REJECTED" (TIMES)
"ARMS AND THE PRESIDENT" (TIMES EDITORIAL)
"U.S. URGES FASTER E.C. INTEGRATION" (GUARDIAN PAGE 1)
"THINKING QUICKLY" {GUARDIAN EDITORIAL)
"BUSH SURPRISES THATCHER WITH E.C. UNITY CALL" (DAILY TELEGRAPH PAGE 1)
"BUSH ENJOYS SWEET TASTE OF SUCCESS" (DAILY TELEGRAPH)
"SPEEDING PERESTROIKA" (DAILY TELEGRAPH EDITORIAL)
"NATO AGREES POLICY ON GERMAN UNITY" (FINANCIAL TIMES PAGE1)
"DOUBTS IN U.S. ON BUSH ARMS PACT TIMETABLE" (FINANCIAL TIMES)
"BUSH TELLS E.C. TO SPEARHEAD UNITED EUROPE" (INDEPENDENT PAGE 1)
"GORBACHEV BRIEFS HIS MOTLEY ALLIES" (INDEPENDENT)
"HOT QUESTIONS AS COLD WAR ENDS" (INDEPENDENT)
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
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THE CONSERVATIVE TIMES' U.S. EDITOR PETER STOTHARD AND MICHAEL BINYON REPORTED FROM BRUSSELS: "PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH DECLARED YESTERDAY THAT THE WORLD STOOD ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW ERA: 'THE BRAVE PEOPLE OF THE EAST ARE ILLUMINATING THE FUTURE.'

"SPEAKING AFTER A SUMMIT OF WESTERN ALLIES AND THE WARMEST POST WAR TALKS A U.S. PRESIDENT HAS HELD WITH A SOVIET LEADER, HE SAID THE CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AMOUNTED TO NOTHING LESS THAN A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION.

"'THE TASK BEFORE US IS TO CONSOLIDATE THE FRUITS OF !HAT REVOLUTION AND TO END THE DIVISIONS OF EUROPE AND GERMANY, TO MAKE EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE,' HE SAID.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 ******/

"THE PRESIDENT GAVE A FIRM COMMITMENT THAT AMERICAN TROOPS WOULD STAY IN EUROPE AS LONG AS THE ALLIES REQUIRED THEM AS PART OF A COMMON DEFENSE EFFORT, DESCRIBING AS 'UTOPIAN' THE DAY SUCH FORCES WOULD NO LONGER BE NECESSARY. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS NOT TO SEND A SIGNAL OF DECOUPLING THE U.S. FROM EUROPE AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME. MR. GORBACHEV, HE SAID, HAD MADE THE SAME POINT TO HIM.

"BUT THE NATO LEADERS DIFFERED ON EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE HISTORIC CHANGES. MR. BUSH EMPHASIZED THE VITAL ROLE THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MUST PLAY IN THE PROCESS, AND CALLED FOR 'CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED EFFORTS BY THE TWELVE TO INTEGRATE'. HE SAID THE COMMUNITY SHOULD ACT LIKE A MAGNET FOR REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE.

"HIS REITERATED CALL FOR EUROPEAN UNITY, ON THE EVE OF THE STRASBOURG SUMMIT, WILL STRENGTHEN THE ARGUMENT OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND - BITTERLY OPPOSED BY MRS. THATCHER - THAT EUROPE SHOULD SPEED UP ITS OWN INTEGRATION IN RESPONSE TO THE TURMOIL IN EASTERN EUROPE. "/

"MRS. THATCHER, FACING A LEADERSHIP CONTEST TODAY THAT TURNS IN LARGE PART ON HER POLICIES TOWARDS EUROPE, SAID THE BUSH SPEECH HAD BEEN 'CAREFULLY DRAFTED', BUT WOULD NOT COMMENT UNTIL SHE HAD STUDIED THE FULL TEXT....
"MRS. THATCHER AGREED WITH PRESIDENT BUSH THAT GERMAN REUNIFICATION WAS NOT ON THE IMMEDIATE AGENDA, AND THAT IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST 10 TO 15 YEARS OF STABLE DEMOCRACY IN THE EAST BEFORE CHANGES IN BORDERS AND ALLIANCES COULD BE CONSIDERED.

"PRESIDENT BUSH, WHO WENT OUT OF HIS WAY IN MALTA TO REASSURE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT PUSH FOR IMMEDIATE REUNIFICATION, REFUSED TO SET ANY TIMETABLE FOR THIS.

"HE SET OUT FOUR POINTS WHICH HE SAID REPRESENTED THE AMERICAN POSITION: THAT THERE SHOULD BE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL THE GERMAN PEOPLE; THAT UNIFICATION SHOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMANY'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO NATO AND THE E.C.; THAT THE MOVES SHOULD BE PEACEFUL AND GRADUAL; AND THAT THE

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 ******/
COMMITMENT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ON MAINTAINING THE PRESENT BORDERS SHOULD BE RESPECTED.

"HE ALSO SAID THE WEST WOULD NOT TRY TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS, AND INSISTED THAT CHANCELLOR KOHL WAS COMFORTABLE WITH THE AMERICAN POSITION.

IN AN ATTEMPT TO REASSURE SOME OF THE MORE NERVOUS EUROPEANS - INCLUDING BRITAIN - OVER THE PACE OF ARMS CUTS, MR. BUSH PLAYED DOWN THE DISCUSSION HE HAD IN MALTA ON CUTS BEYOND THE CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)...

"HE REFUSED TO TALK ABOUT THE END OF THE COLD WAR, SAYING: 'I'M NOT GOING TO USE THE CODE WORDS. IF I DO, "THEY'LL SAY, 'WHAT ARE THOSE TROOPS DOING IN EUROPE?.' HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE STILL HAD BIG DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS, ESPECIALLY OVER SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NICARAGUA AND CUBA.

"MRS. THATCHER WAS ALSO CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE COLD WAR. 'WE HAVE GREAT HOPES FOR THE FUTURE. THE ENLARGEMENT OF FREEDOM IS A GREAT JOY TO US. WE HOPE THAT THE STRUCTURES OF FREEDOM WILL NOW BE SET UP IN THESE COUNTRIES.'

"PRESIDENT BUSH SPOKE WARMLY OF THE SOVIET LEADER, EXPLAINING WHY HE HAD CHANGED HIS INITIAL COOL ASSESSMENT OF HIM. 'AS I WATCHED THE WAY GORBACHEV HANDLED CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE, HE DESERVES NEW THINKING - HE ABSOLUTELY MANDATES NEW THINKING.'..."

THE TIMES' U.S. EDITOR PETER STOTHARD AND MICHAEL BINYON IN BRUSSELS REPORTED: "MRS. THATCHER WARNED NATO LEADERS YESTERDAY THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE BORDERS OF EASTERN EUROPE UNTIL DEMOCRACY HAD TAKEN A FIRM HOLD FOR AT LEAST 10 YEARS.

"NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN IN PLACE, BUT WILL ALSO UNDERGO SOMETHING OF A METAMORPHOSIS. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY WILL TURN, AS MR. GORBACHEV HAS HINTED, INTO POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. THE ASSUMPTION MUST BE THAT THEY WILL RETAIN, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THEIR ESSENTIALLY MILITARY CHARACTER.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 007 ******/
"STRATEGIC RETHINKING WILL HOWEVER BE REQUIRED BECAUSE, IN ADDITION T THE QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS, THERE ARE WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS WHICH NOW SEEM UNLIKELY TO SEE THE LIGHT OF DAY. WEST GERMANS WERE DISPLAYING SOME ANGST ABOUT NUCLEAR MISSILES ON THEIR TERRITORY LONG BEFORE THE MOST RECENT EVENTS IN EUROPE. WILL THEY EVER ACCEPT THEM NOW? DEFENSE BUDGETS ALREADY UNDER PRESSURE WILL FURTHER

SHRINK - JEOPARDIZING FOR INSTANCE THE PROJECTED EUROFIGHTER. WITH THOSE TANKS AND ARTILLERY WHICH VANISH FROM THE BATTLEFIELD WILL GO THE LAST REMNANTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

"MR. BUSH ASSURED THE ALLIES YESTERDAY THAT THE AMERICANS WILL NOT ABANDON EUROPE. THE U.S. PRESENCE HAS BEEN A STABILIZING ELEMENT, AS EVEN THE RUSSIANS HAVE COME TO ACKNOWLEDGE. BUT THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES IS NONE THE LESS BOUND TO BE ADJUSTED: THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT BURDEN-SHARING WILL BECOME MORE, NOT LESS, ACUTE."
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THE LIBERAL GUARDIAN'S JOHN PALMER AND WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT MARTIN WALKER REPORTED: "PRESIDENT BUSH YESTERDAY THREW THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES BEHIND FASTER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY - IN CLEAR DEFIANCE OF MRS. THATCHER'S KNOWN OBJECTIONS.

"THE PRESIDENT'S UNAMBIGOUS SUPPORT FOR FASTER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION - MADE AT THE SPECIAL NATO SUMMIT HERE YESTERDAY - COMES ON THE EVE OF THE STRASBOURG EUROPEAN SUMMIT, WHERE THE PRIME MINISTER IS ALREADY ISOLATED OVER PLANS FOR ECONOMIC MONETARY UNION.

"SPEAKING TO A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT, PRESIDENT BUSH SAID: 'I APPRECIATE THE VITAL ROLE OF THE TWELVE IN THE NEW EUROPE, AND IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE EVENTS OF OUR TIMES CALL BOTH FOR CONTINUED AND EVEN INTENSIFIED EFFORTS BY THE TWELVE TO INTEGRATE, AND THAT THERE IS A ROLE FOR EUROPE AS A MAGNET TO DRAW FORCES OF REFORM TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE.'

"AFTERWARDS SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS SAID THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS WERE A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT THE U.S. STOOD BEHIND THOSE IN THE E.C. PUSHING FOR FASTER PROGRESS TOWARDS A MORE UNITED EUROPE.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 008 ******/
"CHANCELLOR KOHL WAS LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT FASTER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WAS THE ONLY CONTEXT IN WHICH THE SUPERPOWERS AND THEIR ALLIES WOULD TOLERATE TOTAL GERMAN REUNIFICATION. ACCEPTING THIS, THE CHANCELLOR AGREED TO THE NEW NATO FORMULA THAT 'GERMAN SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD BE A PEACEFUL, STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS, LINKED FIRMLY TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE NATO ALLIANCE.'

"FOR HER PART MRS. THATCHER WAS OBVIOUSLY STUNG BY THE UNEXPECTED FORCE OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S BACKING FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WHICH WAS RECEIVED WITH DELIGHT BY THE OTHER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LEADERS.

"SPEAKING AFTER THE END OF THE NATO MEETING, MRS. THATCHER POINTEDLY SAID THA THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY PREPARED AND WOULD 'REQUIRE STUDY IN DEPTH' BEFORE SHE REPLIED...

"COMING AS TORY MPS PREPARE TO VOTE TODAY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON HER LEADERSHIP...EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS NO LONGER ON TH SAME WAVE-LENGTH AS THE WHITE HOUSE OVER EUROPEAN UNITY IS A DEMORALIZING BLOW.

"IT WILL ALSO INCREASE CONCERN IN LONDON THAT BRITAIN IS IN DANGER OF BECOMING AS ISOLATED IN NATO AS IT ALREADY IS WITHIN THE E.C.

"ALTHOUGH THE NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ENDORSED PRESIDENT BUSH'S REPORT FROM HIS MALTA SUMMIT, THERE WAS NO CLEAR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF NATO'S FUTURE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUING NEED FOR NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, BUT PRESIDENT BUSH CLEARLY SHIFTED THE FOCUS TO THE 35-NATION CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE...

"WITH THE WESTERN LEADERS ENDORSING WHAT MR. BUSH YESTERDAY CALLED 'THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE,' THE REAL DIVISION IN EUROPE MAY BE BETWEEN THOSE WHO WANT TO MAINTAIN THE TUMULTUOUS MOMENTUM OF POLITICAL CHANGE AND THOSE WHO WANT TO SLOW IT DOWN.

"MRS. THATCHER DECLARED HERSELF THE SLOWEST OF THE SLOWS YESTERDAY, TELLING THE OTHER NATO LEADERS THAT

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 009 ******/
SHE WANTED TO SEE '10 TO 15 YEARS OF GENUINE DEMOCRACY' IN THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BEFORE 'TALK OF NEW WORLDS WOULD BECOME POSSIBLE.'

THE GUARDIAN EDITORIALIZED: "PREDICTIONS, PREDICTIONS...FOR 'REUNIFICATION OF THE TWO GERMANYS IS UNTHINKABLE FOR YEARS TO COME,' PLEASE READ 'EVERYONE IS SUDDENLY THINKING ABOUT REUNIFICATION.'...AT THE VERY LEAST THE PICKET FENCE WHICH MRS. THATCHER WOULD LIKE TO IMPOSE AROUND THE MERE MENTION OF THE WORD IS NOT ONLY SAGGING BUT BREACHED IN SEVERAL VULNERABLE PLACES. ON SUNDAY THE TWO MOST POWERFUL PEOPLE IN THE WORLD (OR SO THEY USED TO BE CALLED) DISCUSSED GERMANY'S FUTURE ALMOST AS IF THEY WERE SPECTATORS AT AN EVENT OVER WHICH THEY HAD LITTLE OR NO CONTROL...

"...WHO NOW DARES PREDICT WHETHER THE 'CAUTION' CALLED FOR IN MALTA CAN WITHSTAND THE HEADLONG PACE OF HISTORY?"

THE CONSERVATIVE DAILY TELEGRAPH'S POLITICAL EDITOR GEORGE JONES AND WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT IAN BRODIE REPORTED: "PRESIDENT BUSH INTERVENED DRAMATICALLY IN THE DEBATE OVER THE FUTURE OF EUROPE YESTERDAY WHEN HE COUPLED AN UNPRECEDENTED CALL FOR THE COMMON MARKET TO BECOME MORE INTEGRATED WITH A PLEDGE THAT AMERICAN TROOPS WILL STAY IN EUROPE AS LONG AS THE NATO ALLIES WANT.

"RIDING THE CREST OF HIS WELL-RECEIVED SUPERPOWER SUMMIT IN MALTA, MR. BUSH SURPRISED MRS. THATCHER AND OTHER NATO LEADERS GATHERED IN BRUSSELS BY DELIVERING A MAJOR STATEMENT ON HOW THE UNITED STATES SEES THE FUTURE OF EUROPE.

"HE WON THEIR AGREEMENT THAT, WHILE THE WEST SHOULD BE READY TO OFFER ECONOMIC HELP TO THE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT ALLIANCE SHOULD REMAIN IN BEING TO GIVE STABILITY AT A TIME OF GREAT UPHEAVAL.

"THE NATO LEADERS, SEEKING TO REIN IN SPECULATION OF ANY RACIAL RE-DRAWING OF THE POLITICAL MAP OF EUROPE, WELCOMED CHANCELLOR KOHL'S ASSURANCE THAT THERE WAS NO TIMETABLE FOR HIS DECLARED AIM OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 010 ******/
"MR. BUSH, IN JAUNTY MOOD AFTER HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, FLEW TO BRUSSELS TO BRIEF NATO BEFORE FLYING HOME TO WASHINGTON.

"THREE DAYS BEFORE THE 12 COMMON MARKET LEADERS MEET IN STRASBOURG, THE PRESIDENT INTENSIFIED THE PRESSURE ON MRS. THATCHER TO MODERATE HER OPPOSITION TO CRUCIAL DECISIONS ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION.

"HIS INTERVENTION, WHICH REFLECTED CONCERNS IN WASHINGTON THAT BRITAIN SHOULD PLAY A FULL PART IN MOVES TOWARDS GREATER EUROPEAN UNITY, CAUGHT MRS. THATCHER OFF GUARD.

"ALTHOUGH CLEARLY DELIGHTED BY THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG COMMITMENT THAT AMERICAN WILL REMAIN A EUROPEAN POWER, SHE WAS FORCED ON THE DEFENSIVE BY HIS PUIBLIC BACKING FOR GREATER INTEGRATION IN THE COMMON MARKET...

"HAVING MADE THE RUNNING IN HIS FIRST AMERICAN-SOVIET SUMMIT, MR. BUSH MAINTAINED THE MOMENTUM WITH HIS FORTHRIGHT DECLARATION ON WHO A DIVIDED EUROPE COULD BE TRANSFORMED INTO A CONTINENT 'WHOLE AND FREE'..
"THE AMERICAN EMPHASIS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WAS SEEN

AND TO BE LISTENED TO.... THIS HAS BEEN A TIME OF CHANGE. AND WHAT IS EVEN MORE REMARKABLE IS THE EXTENT OF AGREEMENT AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND WASHINGTON.... THE DECISIVE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING IS THAT THE ALLIANCE STILL SPEAKS WITH ONE VOICE...."

2. CENTRIST SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG OF MUNICH CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY BRUSSELS CORRESPONDENT WINFRIED MUENSTER UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"GOOD NEWS AND A REBUKE."

"THE INVITATION TO DINNER WITH GEORGE BUSH MADE CHANCELLOR KOHL FEEL PROUD.... BUT THE MEETING LEFT A BITTER AFTERTASTE. WITH HIS 10-POINT PLAN ON REUNIFICATION...KOHL OBVIOUSLY EXPOSED THE AMERICANS ABOARD THE 'MAXIM GORKY' TO SOME UNPLEASANT QUESTIONS BY GORBACHEV. AND THIS AT A TIME, WHEN THE PREDICTABILITY OF THE FRG'S POLICY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAT EVER....

"U.S. DIPLOMATS BELIEVE THAT ONE CANNOT DEAL WITH GORBACHEV CAREFULLY ENOUGH. THIS MEANS THAT KOHL GOT A REBUTTAL BY BUSH. AND THIS REBUTTAL WAS ALL THE MORE PAINFUL BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT WAS IRRITATED. THE REASON WAS THAT BUSH HAD TO FOCUS NOT ONLY ON A CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT GERMANY, BUT ALSO ON A LACK OF DIPLOMATIC STYLE, SINCE PLANS ON GERMAN-GERMAN POLICY MUST BE A COORDINATED WITH THE ALLIES....

"BUT KOHL ALSO RETURNED HOME WITH POSITIVE NEWS.... OFF MALTA, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. AGREED THAT THE FRG CAN SUPPORT THE GDR ECONOMICALLY IF EAST GERMANY MAINTAINS ITS POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP IN THE EASTERN ALLIANCE.... THE SECOND CONDITION THE TWO SUPERPOWERS AGREED UPON WILL CERTAINLY EMBARRASS THE CDU LEADER WHO HAS TO HEED HIS RIGHT FLANK: A FORMAL GUARANTEE FOR THE POLISH WESTERN BORDERS. THIS IS THE ELEVENTH POINT TO KOHL'S PLAN, THE FDP AND THE SPD HAVE

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 007 ******/
"PERISABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVIC"
USIA EU, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/FN, P/R, P/RWE, P/GR,
VOA/BRE,P/P,MBFR - STATE EUR/CE;EUR:P;PM;INR/RWE
BRUESSELS F. AMB GLITMAN,
USDELMC BRUSSELS FOR COL. SULLIVAN
VAIHINGEN FOR ECPA-O:CDR MCCURDY

E.O. 12356: N/A
CALLED FOR AS WELL."

3. RIGHT-OF-CENTER RHEINISCHE POST OF DUESSELDORF CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY BRUSSELS CORRESPONDENT HELMUT WEIAND UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"WINNERS' DILEMMA."

"THE FOUR VICTORIOUS POWERS OF WW II ARE FACING A DILEMMA. ONLY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV CLEARLY MENTIONED WHAT THE OTHERS POSSIBLY THINK: GERMAN REUNIFICATION IS NOT YET POSSIBLE, AND THERE ARE TWO GERMAN STATES....

"NATO DODGES THE ISSUE, SINCE NOBODY WANTS TO ANTAGONIZE HELMUT KOHL WHO HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE WITH HIS 10-POINT PLAN. THERE ARE ALSO OTHER PEOPLE ABROAD WHO THINK THAT THE GROWING TOGETHER OF THE TWO GERMANYS IS AN UNAVOIDABLE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORY, BUT THOSE WHO SAY THIS DO NOT HOLD GOVERNMENT OFFICES.

"WITH TACIT TOLERANCE AND WITHOUT ENCOURAGING WORDS, NATO ALLOWS KOHL TO GO ON WITH HIS POLICY. FOR THE ALLIES IT IS ONLY IMPORTANT THAT THE BONN STRATEGISTS ARE NOT GETTING LOST IN GERMAN-GERMAN EMOTIONS AND NOT LOSE THE NECESSARY STRENGTH TO PLAY THEIR PART IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. THE NEW ERA THAT WAS LAUNCHED IN MALTA WILL TAKE PLACE, FOR THE TIME BEING, WITHOUT REUNIFICATION...."

4. CENTRIST STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG CARRIES AN EDITORIAL UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"SECOND SUMMIT."

"YESTERDAY, IT WAS MORE THAN A ROUTINE SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS. GEORGE BUSH'S STOPOVER IN BRUSSELS TURNED INTO A SECOND SUMMIT, NAMELY: MALTA, PART TWO. OBVIOUSLY, GEORGE BUSH DEMONSTRATIVELY WANTED TO INTEGRATE THE WESTERN ALLIES INTO THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE AND THUS DISPEL ANY SUSPICION OF DECIDING OVER THE HEADS OF THE EUROPEANS. BUT ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED IN BRUSSELS THAT THE MORE PROFOUND THE CHANGES IN THE EAST, THE MORE IMPORTANT ARE THE TWO ALLIANCES. DURING THESE STORMY TIMES, NATO MUST REMAIN AS FIRM AS A ROCK....

"OBVIOUSLY, EVERYBODY IS HAPPY THAT THE STRUCTURES ARE HOLDING, SINCE THE ALLIANCE SYSTEMS IN EAST AND WEST ARE THE NECESSARY FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS AND THE NARROWING OF VIEWS CAN TAKE PLACE. THIS IS WHY THE PARTNERS IN THE ALLIANCE REMINDED CHANCELLOR

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 008 ******/
KOHL OF THE FACT THAT GERMAN-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT HAS TO ADHERE TO THE COORDINATE SYSTEM. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, KOHL'S 10-POINT PLAN WAS CONSIDERED LESS HELPFUL AND DISRUPTIVE: OIL IN THE FIRE AT A SITUATION THAT IS TENSE ANYWAY."

5. CENTRIST NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG CARRIES AN

EDITORIAL BY FRANZ SCHMEDT UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"THEORY AND PRACTICE."

"IN BRUSSELS, THE WIND BLEW INTO HELMUT KOHL'S FACE. IN VIEW OF THE RECENT EXPERIENCES, THIS WAS NOT SURPRISING.... IT WAS EASY TO BACK THE TOGETHERNESS OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES AS LONG AS THEY WERE OF A PLATONIC NATURE. BUT NOW THAT THE SITUATION HAS DRAMATICALLY CHANGED THE REMARKS SOUND CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT THAN DURING NATO'S SUMMIT IN MAY....

"THIS CHANGE WAS NOT ONLY CAUSED BY CONCERN ABOUT...A DESTABILIZATION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FRANCE AND BRITAIN ALSO PURSUE SOUND INTERESTS BECAUSE THEY ARE AFRAID OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ECONOMICALLY TOO POWERFUL GERMAN STATE. IN BRUSSELS THIS WAS PUSHED TO THE FORE IN ITS CLEAREST FORM: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE...."

6. BUSINESS NEWSPAPER HANDELSBLATT OF DUESSELDORF CARRIES AN EDITORIAL ON THE FUTURE TALKS OF NATO AND THE EC. EBERHARD WISDORFF WRITES UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"NEW TASKS."

"EVEN THOUGH THE GERMAN QUESTION AND THE SWEEPING CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE WERE NOT THE ONLY TOPICS OFF MALTA AND IN BRUSSELS...IT IS, NEVERTHELESS, CLEAR THAT THEY WILL EXPLICITLY INFLUENCE NATO AND THE EC....

"CHANCELLOR KOHL, WHO IS CONVINCING IN HIS EUROPEAN POLICY, IS NOW FORCED TO INCREASE HIS COMMITMENT TO EUROPE IF HE WANTS TO CONVINCINGLY DISPEL DOUBTS WITH RESPECT TO A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANYS. BUT HIS COMMITMENT WILL NOT BE AN EASY ONE. FOR PARIS THE YARDSTICK IS A CLEAR STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF AN ECONOMIC AND CURRENCY UNION WITH THE FIXING OF A TIME FOR A GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE THAT WILL LAY DOWN THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE TREATIES. BUT HERE KOHL IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THOSE IN THE FRG WHO CONSIDER SUCH A MOVE A THREAT TO THE GERMAN MARK."

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 009 ******/
"PERISHABLEINFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE"
USIA EU, P/M, P/R, P/FW, P/FN, P/R, P/RWE, P/GR,
VOA/BRE,P/P,MBFR- STATE EUR/CE;EUR:P;PM;INR/RWE
BRUESSELS F. AMBGLITMAN,
USDELMC BRUSSELS FOR COL. SULLIVAN
VAHINGEN FOR ECPA-O:CDR MCCURDY

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: GERAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT

7. DF TV'S EARLY EVENING NEWSCAST HEUTE CARRIED A RPORT BY GERD HELBIG ON NATO'S CONSULTATIONS AFTER HE MALTA SUMMIT. HELBIG SAID:

"BUSH PERONALLY WANTED TO INFORM THE ALLIES ABOUT HIS REATIONSHIP WITH GORBACHEV AND, ABOVE ALL, HIS VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE MOST IMPORTANT ITEM IN HIS LUGGAGE WAS THAT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN ALL MATTERS OF DISARMAMENT."

SHOWING THE LINE-UP OF NATO POLITICIANS, HELBIG COMMENTED: "THE FAMILY PICTURE IN TIMES OF UPHEAVAL: FOR NATO, 1990 WILL BECOME THE YEAR OF DISARMAMENT AND THEREFORE OF THE GRADUAL TURNAROUND FROM A MILITARY TO A POLITICAL ALLIANCE. THIS AND THE EUROPEAN ROOF OFFER THE BEST SECURITY AGAINST A DESTABILIZATION FROM THE TURBULENT EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE...."

8. ARD TV'S EARLY EVENING NEWSCAST TAGESSCHAU CARRIED A REPORT BY JOACHIM BAEUMEL SAYING: "IT BECAME CLEAR IN BRUSSELS THAT BOTH SUPERPOWERS ARE INTERESTED IN NOT LETTING THE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE GET OUT OF CONTROL. FURTHERMORE THEY AGREE THAT NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT NEED TO BE MAINTAINED."

9. ARD TV'S LATE EVENING NEWSCAST TAGESTHEMEN CARRIED A COMMENTARY BY MARTIN SCHULZE SAYING:

"WE CAN BE GRATEFUL THAT NATO FINALLY COMES UP WITH SOMETHING MORE ENLIGHTENING THAN THE OLD USED-UP FORMULA 'THIS IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.' AS OF RIGHT NOW, THE ALLIANCE WANTS TO UNDERSTAND ITSELF AS A POLITICAL PACT AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. THIS IS GREAT. A SIMILAR COMMITMENT BY THE WARSAW PACT IS AS YET OUTSTANDING. NATO IS GETTING A NEW MEANING. THE COUNTRIES CAN NOW START WORKING FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WORLD, AND THE SOLDIERS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT ARE NO LONGER NEEDED TO THREATEN OR DETER EACH OTHER..... THEY CAN NOW JOINTLY FIGHT THE DANGERS THAT THREATEN US ALL - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND OTHER CATASTROPHES.... THIS IS NO UTOPIA, BUT COULD GET UNDER WAY TOMORROW....

"POLITICAL REASON GAINED YET ANOTHER VICTORY: THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANYS CONTINUES TO BE LINKED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIANCES AND THE CSCE PROCESS. OUR WESTERN AND EASTERN NEIGHBORS' FEAR OF A SPECIAL GERMAN ROAD HAS, FOR NOW, BEEN CALMED."

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 010 ******/
D. GDR: CONTINUING PROTESTS

1. LEFT-OF-CENTER FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU CARRIES AN

EDITORIAL ON THE SCHEDULE FOR THE FIRST FREE ELECTIONS IN THE GDR UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"NO POWER VACUUM."

"HANS MODROW, ONE OF THE FEW SED MEMBERS WHO HAS THE PEOPLE'S CONFIDENCE, CANNOT CREDIBLY STAGE DEMOCRACY IF HE IS RESPONSIBLE TO A PARLIAMENT NOT FREELY ELECTED. THIS IS WHY IT IS ONLY LOGICAL THAT THE FIRST FREE ELECTIONS IN THE GDR WILL NOT TAKE PLACE AT THE END OF NEXT YEAR, BUT EARLIER IN 1990. THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK FOR THE NEW OPPOSITION GROUPS BECAUSE THEY WILL THEN HAVE LESS TIME TO GET ORGANIZED. BUT FOR THE SAKE OF IT THE SHOULD JUMP INTO THE COLD WATER. IT MIGHT BE A CONSOLATION FOR THEM THAT THE SED IS FIGHTING FOR ITS SURVIVAL IN THIS WATER."

2. RIGHT-OF-CENTER FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE CARRIES A FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL BY ERNST-OTTO MAETZKE. HE HAS A MORE PESSIMISTIC VIEW AND WRITES UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"THE SED STATE - MORE OR LESS STABLE."

"IT WILL BE A LABORIOUS AND PROTRACTED, MAYBE EVEN HOPELESS UNDERTAKING TO PRODUCE LEGITIMACY UNDER THE CURRENT HABITS. FREE ELECTIONS ON ALL LEVELS ARE INDISPENSABLE AND REQUIRE A LOT OF TIME. UNTIL THEN, EVERYTHING GOES ITS NORMAL SOCIALIST WAY. THE SAME PEOPLE...SIT AT THE SAME LEVERS. THE GDR WILL REMAIN, FOR A LONG TIME, THE SAME STATE AND THE BONN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO QUESTION THIS STATE. IT MUST RATHER BACK THE GDR.... THERE IS NO NEW PERSONNEL AND THERE IS ONLY VAGUE HOPE THAT THE NEW PARTIES WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE NEW PERSONNEL....

"THUS, THE GDR HAS TO CONTINUE LIVING, FOR A LONG TIME, WITH THE STRUCTURES THAT EXIST IN THE COUNTRY. THE TIME PERIODS THAT WILL BE NECESSARY BEFORE CHANGES BECOME PALPABLE MIGHT EVEN BE USED TO BOLSTER THE EXISTING STRUCTURES. AND AT CLOSE SIGHT, THIS IS ALREADY TAKING PLACE. THE SOCIALIST GDR HAS NOT BEEN UPSET YET AND WILL NOT BE UPSET FOR A LONG TIME TO COME."

3. CENTRIST SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG OF MUNICH CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY HERMANN RUDOLPH FOCUSING ON THE SED'S

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 011 ******/
FATE UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"THE COLLAPSE."

"OF COURSE IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THE SED'S 'SELF-DECAPITATION' A SPECTACULAR ACT WHICH IS THE

CULMINATION OF THE DRAMATIC TRANSFORMATION PROCESS IN THE GDR...BUT IN REALITY THIS EVENT GOES MUCH DEEPER. AFTER ALL THE TREMORS THAT HAVE SHAKEN THE GDR FOR MONTHS, THIS IS REALLY THE TWILIGHT OF THE GODS, PENULTIMATE ACT. IT IS A OPENING OF THE ABYSS THAT IS ABOUT TO SWALLOW THE STRUCTURES OF POWER. THIS MEANS NOTHING BUT THE SED'S COLLAPSE FORCED BY THE REVOLT OF ITS RANK AND FILE. NOTHING WILL REMAIN OF THE PARTY THAT CONTROLLED THE FATE OF THE STATE FOR MORE THAN 40 YEARS....

"THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS TO DOUBT THAT, AS THE REFORMERS IN THE PARTY THINK, ONLY STALINIST WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE SED. THE FALL IS SO ENORMOUS THAT SOMETHING ELSE WILL BE PULLED DOWN INTO THIS ABYSS...BUT THE TYPE OF PARTY REPRESENTED BY THE SED HAS COME TO AN END....

"THE UPCOMING SED PARTY CONGRESS CAN HARDLY BE CONSIDERED A CONGRESS FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE PARTY. IT WILL BECOME A PARTY CONGRESS THAT WILL RESULT IN THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTY BUT NOT IN THE SED'S RENEWAL.... IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THIS CONGRESS WILL END A CHAPTER OF GERMAN HISTORY, NAMELY THE CHAPTER THAT BEGAN WITH THE FORCED UNIFICATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY KPD AND THE SPD...."

4. FAR-LEFT DIE TAGESZEITUNG OF WEST BERLIN CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY KLAUS HARTUNG UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"WHERE DOES THE POWER GO TO?"

"THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS WILL NO LONGER COINCIDE WITH THE UNIFORM MASS MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE, AS SUGGESTED BY THE HUMAN CHAIN THROUGH THE GDR. THE OBVIOUS POWER VACUUM, THE STALEMATE AMONG THE OLD LEADERSHIP, WILL SUCK IN ALL POLITICAL FORCES AND SHRED THEM. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THAT THE COLLAPSE OF THE STATE WILL COME SOONER THAN DEMOCRATIZATION. BUT IT MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE STILL SHAPELESS 'REUNIFICATION PARTY' WILL GROW TREMENDOUSLY BECAUSE NO LAW IN THE GDR'S NEW DEMOCRACY CAN STOP THEM."

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 012 ******/

5. RIGHT-OF-CENTER BERLINER MORGENPOST CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY RUDOLF STIEGE UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"WITHOUT A HEAD, BUT NOT DEAD."

"A NOT VERY PIOUS STORY IS CURRENTLY BEING TOLD IN GERMANY: IT SAYS THE SED, BY WAY OF EXECUTING ITS POLITBURO AND ITS CENTRAL COMMITTEE, DECAPITATED ITSELF

AND THUS CEASED TO EXIST POLITICALLY. THIS IS WRONG. IN SPITE OF THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION OF THE PEOPLE, THE GDR REMAINS AN SED STATE. THE SED STILL DOMINATES THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE'S CHAMBER.

"OF THE 16 MILLION EAST GERMANS, TWO MILLION ARE SED MEMBERS.... FOR TOO MANY OF THEM...THE SED HAS BECOME A TOOL TO GET A SPECIAL INCOME. THE OLD COMRADES STILL HAVE THEIR POSITIONS IN DISTRICTS, COMMUNITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES - AS IF NOTHING HAS HAPPENED. THEY ARE STILL IN CONTROLS. THE OLD MACHINERY IS STILL WORKING...."

6. CENTRIST DER TAGESSPIEGEL OF WEST BERLIN CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY GUENTHER MATTHES UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"INTERREGNUM."

"IF CHEATED AND DISAPPOINTED SED MEMBERS WANT TO REFORM THE PARTY TO BECOME A DEMOCRATIC ONE, THEN THAT PARTY CANNOT REMAIN COMMUNIST IN ITS TRADITIONAL SENSE. AND, SINCE KRENZ IS NO LONGER PARTY CHIEF, HE WILL ALSO BE REMOVED FROM THE POSITION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL.... THE MODROW ADMINISTRATION IS WALKING ON THIN ICE. THE MISTRUST AMONG THE EAST GERMANS WHO, AFTER 40 YEARS OF SUPPRESSION, HAVE DEVELOPED TO AN ADMIRABLY MATURE PEOPLE IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE PARTY APPARATUS ITSELF."

7. LEFT-OF-CENTER VOLKSBLATT BERLIN CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY HANS HOEPPNER UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"THE SED IS DEAD."

"MODROW'S POSITION, TOO, IS IN JEOPARDY. WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ENTIRE POLITBURO BEFORE THE SED PARTY CONFERENCE HAS EVEN BEEN SUMMONED, THE SED IN ITS CURRENT SHAPE HAS ABANDONED ITS LAST CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP IN THE GDR'S POLITICAL LIFE. THE FIRST FREE ELECTIONS - AT THE LATEST THEY WILL POSSIBLY TAKE PLACE IN EARLY SUMMER NEXT YEAR - WILL CONDEMN THE SED, INCLUDING MODROW, TO PLAY AN

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 013 ******/
OUTSIDER'S ROLE, I.E. PROVIDED THE PEOPLE HAVE THAT MUCH PATIENCE."

E. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: NEW GOVERNMENT

1. CENTRIST SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG OF MUNICH CARRIES A COMMENTARY BY MICHAEL FRANK UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"THE CITIZEN FORUM WATCHES OUT - THE CZECH OPPOSITION IS PREPARING FOR A
NEW CONFLICT WITH THE GOVERNMENT."

"IF ADAMEC DOES NOT WANT OR IS UNABLE TO STAND UP AGAINST THE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERSHIP AROUND KAREL URBANEK, THE FORUM COULD FIND SUPPORT WHERE IT DOES NOT EXPECT IT. GUSTAV HUSAK...HAS NOW HINTED THAT HE MAY NOT HOLD ON TO HIS OFFICE AS PRESIDENT. THE FORUM DELIVERED AN ULTIMATUM TO HIM TO RESIGN BY DECEMBER 10, TOO. HUSAK SEEMS TO REALIZE THE GROTESQUE NATURE OF HIS STUBBORN INSISTENCE OF PLAYING THE ROLE OF A RELIC OF THE FORMER POWER APPARATUS. BUT IF THE STATE LEADER RESIGNS, THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY OUSTED AS WELL.... THAT WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT.

"IT SHOWS GOOD THINKING THAT THE FORUM CONFINES ITSELF TO MAKING DEMANDS AND DOES NOT PRESENT PROPOSALS. IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES OF TURNABOUT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE FORUM DOES NOT WANT TO SEE ITS BEST PEOPLE TORN APART BY POLITICS. AND UNTIL FREE ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE, THE FORUM IS ALSO LACKING DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY. THE OLD COMMUNISTS' HOPES THAT THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT MAY FINALLY SUBSIDE AND GIVE UP ARE IN VAIN. THE LATEST DEMONSTRATION ON WENCESLAS SQUARE WAS LIVING PROOF OF THAT."

2. LEFT-OF-CENTER FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU CARRIES A COMMENTARY BY HARRY SCHLEICHER UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"PRAGUE POWER STRUGGLE."

"THE ONLY MEANS FOR THE CITIZEN FORUM TO PUSH THROUGH ITS DEMANDS ARE DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES. THEY ARE USING THOSE INSTRUMENTS AGAIN NOW. AS LONG AS THESE MEANS FUNCTION, THE PRESSURE TO REFORM WILL CONTINUE. BUT USING THEM TOO MUCH COULD LEAVE THESE INSTRUMENTS BLUNT....

"IT WAS NOT AN INTELLIGENT MOVE BY THE FORUM TO REFUSE PARTICIPATION IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THE REFUSAL

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 014 ******/
MAY BE BASED ON DOUBTS OF WHETHER THERE ARE ENOUGH COMPETENT PEOPLE IN ITS RANKS...."

F. SOVIET UNION: NATIONALITIES CONFLICTS

LEFT-OF-CENTER FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU CARRIES A COMMENTARY UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"POWER LIMITS."

"AZERBAIJAN COULD END UP AS A NEW AFGHANISTAN. AND WHAT IS REALLY BREWING EAST OF THE CASPIAN SEA IN TERMS OF NEO-NATIONALISM IS ALSO UNKNOWN. THE SOVIET POWER

COULD FINALLY REACH ITS LIMITS FOR TRYING TO KEEP PEACE IN THOSE REGIONS. THIS DANGER ALONE IS A FACTOR IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AS A MILITARY SUPERPOWER. THE THREATENING COLLAPSE IS NOT A TRIUMPH OF WESTERN VALUES. THE CHAOS WAS CAUSED BY THE INCOMPETENCY AND ARROGANCE OF THE NOMENCLATURE ALONE...."

G. FRG: CONTROVERSY ABOUT KOHL'S 10-POINT PLAN, REUNIFICATION

1. CENTRIST GENERAL-ANZEIGER OF BONN CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY EKKEHARD KOHRS UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"THE CLIMATE IS NOT O.K."

"THE FDP'S MOVE TO INSIST ON A CLEAR CDU WORD ON THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE POLISH WESTERN BORDERS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE UPCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN, BUT MUCH MORE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S IRRITATION. THE POLITICAL 'CHEMISTRY' BETWEEN GENSCHER AND KOHL NO LONGER FUNCTIONS. IT IS THIS FOREIGN MINISTER WHO DID NOT MENTION KOHL'S PLAN DURING THE PAST CONFERENCE OF THE EXTENDED FDP PARTY LEADERSHIP. AND IT IS THIS VERY FOREIGN MINISTER WHO HAD TO EXPLAIN THE PLAN IN LONDON AND PARIS AND WHO WILL TALK ABOUT IT TODAY IN MOSCOW.

"IT IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT GENSCHER FEELS TO BE LEFT ASIDE...BUT BECAUSE THE FDP CANNOT CRITICIZE DETAILS OF THE KOHL PLAN, IT IS NOW TRYING TO PLAY THE POLISH BORDER CARD AND TO DEMONSTRATE ITS LIBERAL PROFILE. KOHL DID NOT WANT TO HEAR TOO MUCH TALK ABOUT HIS PLAN AND THIS IS WHY HE KEPT IT TO HIMSELF. KOHL KNOWS THAT REUNIFICATION WILL NOT COME FROM ONE DAY TO THE NEXT AND THIS IS WHY HE PRESENTED A RATIONAL MODEL IN WHICH HE WILL CERTAINLY ALSO INCLUDE THE RECOGNITION OF THE WESTERN BORDERS AT SOME DAY IN THE FUTURE...."

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 015 ******/

2. RIGHT-OF-CENTER RHEINISCHE POST OF DUESSELDORF CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY RUDOLF BAUER CONCENTRATING ON THE FDP CRITICISM OF KOHL'S 10-POINT PLAN UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"GERMAN STORIES."

"AN EVENT OF HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS MISUSED FOR CHEAP PARTISAN TACTICS. GENSCHER ALSO USED IT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE REVENGE FOR CHANCELLOR KOHL'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR HORST TELTSCHICK'S FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITIES. THIS IS EMBARRASSING."

3. RIGHT-OF-CENTER DIE WELT OF BONN CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY EDITOR-IN-CHIEF MANFRED SCHELL DEALING WITH THE LACK OF CONSULTATION BEFORE KOHL PRESENTED HIS PLAN.

HE WRITES UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"SMALL-MINDED DEBATE."

"KOHL'S PLAN WAS CRITICIZED BECAUSE HE DID NOT CONSULT THE ALLIES BEFORE HE PRESENTED IT. BUT THIS DEMAND CAN BE RAISED ONLY BY PEOPLE WHO WANT TO STOP SUCH INITIATIVE. IF KOHL HAD STARTED A 'CONSULTATION POLICY' BEFORE, PARIS WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY SLOWED DOWN THE PROCESS AND LONDON WOULD HAVE BLOCKED IT. AND WHAT WOULD THE SPD AND GENSCHER THEN HAVE SAID?

"THIS GAME WAS PLAYED TOO OFTEN BEFORE, BUT, THIS TIME, THE TOPIC DIRECTLY AFFECTS GERMAN INTERESTS. THE PEOPLE FEEL IT AND THEY KNOW HOW TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN POLIT SHOWS AND SERIOUS EFFORTS."

4. CENTRIST KOELNER EXPRESS CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY ANDREAS MERTA UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"NO BIG SUCCESS."

"KOHL'S 10-POINT PLAN WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A BIG HISTORICAL SUCCESS, BUT POLITICAL EVERY DAY LIFE HAS LONG SINCE CAUGHT UP WITH HIM."

5. MASS-CIRCULATION RIGHT-OF-CENTER BILD ZEITUNG CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY REGINALD RUDORF UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"UNITY IS CLOSE."

"ON THE DAY WHEN THE WALL BREACHED, GERMAN

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 016 ******/
REUNIFICATION BEGAN. NOTHING AND NOBODY WILL STOP IT. (A REUNIFIED) GERMANY WILL COME."

H. ECONOMIC: U.S.-SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET UNION

RIGHT-OF-CENTER FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE CARRIES AN EDITORIAL BY CAROLA KAPS FOCUSING ON U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE SOVIET UNION UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"CAUTIOUSLY AHEAD."

"WHAT GEORGE BUSH OFFERED TO MIKHAIL GORBACHEV...IS NEITHER NEW NOR DOES IT SPEED UP THE INTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY INTO THE WESTERN SYSTEM. THE NORMALIZATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS...IS ONLY OF A SYMBOLIC NATURE. THE SAME IS TRUE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A MUTUAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENT.... BUT BUSH'S SILENCE ABOUT A STREAMLINING OF THE COCOM LIST DEMONSTRATES THAT THE U.S. IS NOT WILLING, WITH RESPECT

TO SECURITY QUESTIONS, TO HONOR REFORM EFFORTS IN ADVANCE."

I. BUNDESWEHR: LOW-LEVEL FLIGHTS, REMSCHEID, BUNDESWEHR PLANNING

1. CENTRIST GENERAL-ANZEIGER OF BONN CARRIES A FRONT-PAGE REPORT UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"RESERVATIONS AGAINST FIXING OF TROOP STRENGTH."

"AN OPEN COALITION CONTROVERSY ON BUNDESWEHR PLANNING BROKE OUT.... AFTER FDP CHAIRMAN OTTO GRAF LAMBSDORFF MADE CLEAR THAT THE FDP DOES, AT THE MOMENT, NOT WANT TO FIX THE BUNDESWEHR STRENGTH, IT BECAME CLEAR IN THE AFTERNOON THAT THE CDU/CSU ALSO HAS RESERVATIONS AGAINST A FIXING OF THE BUNDESWEHR STRENGTH...."

2. CENTRIST SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG OF MUNICH CARRIES A COMMENTARY UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"NEW COALITION PROBLEMS."

"THE FDP IS NOW JOINING THOSE WHO REJECT GERHARD STOLTENBERG'S NEW BUNDESWEHR CONCEPT. THE FDP CREATES THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS DISSONANCE IS OF A DELIBERATE NATURE. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT COALITION HAS GENERAL PROBLEMS TO SOLVE OR WHETHER THIS IS SIMPLY THE FIRST RAMBLE OF THE UPCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION DEPENDS ON STOLTENBERG'S

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 017 ******/
WILLINGNESS TO RECONSIDER HIS CONCEPT. IT DOES NOT LOOK LIKE HE WILL....

"IT IS EVIDENT THAT STOLTENBERG'S ATTITUDE IS CONTRADICTING GENERAL POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, I.E. THE FACT THAT, BECAUSE OF THE DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE GDR AND EASTERN EUROPE, DISARMAMENT WILL CONTINUE. THIS WAS ALSO THE SPIRIT OF THE BUSH-GORBACHEV SUMMIT. A BIGGER COALITION CONTROVERSY WILL BECOME INEVITABLE IF THE DEFENSE MINISTER CONTINUES TO IGNORE THE FDP'S COMPLAINTS...."

3. FAR-LEFT DIE TAGESZEITUNG OF WEST BERLIN CARRIES A REPORT UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"STOLTENBERG'S PRESENT TO REMSCHEID."

"ALMOST TO THE DAY A YEAR AFTER THE JET CRASH IN REMSCHEID, THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MILITARY LOW-LEVEL FLIGHTS BETWEEN DEFENSE MINISTER GERHARD STOLTENBERG AND THE BUNDESLAENDER FAILED. ON MONDAY, DURING THE FOURTH

SESSION OF THE LOW-LEVEL FLYING COMMISSION IN BONN, THE SPD RULED LAENDER DEMANDED A 'ONE-YEAR-SUSPENSION' OF ALL FLIGHTS BELOW 300 METERS. ACCORDING TO NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIAN UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE WOLFGANG CLEMENT (SPD), THE CDU RULED LAENDER BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG AND RHINELAND-PALATINATE SUPPORT THE DEMAND. GERHARD STOLTENBERG REJECTED THE MOTION AGAIN.

"THE DEFENSE MINISTER SAID THAT A SUSPENSION OF THOSE FLIGHTS WOULD ENDANGER TRAINING AND SECURITY STANDARDS OF THE TROOPS. CLEMENT REBUKED STOLTENBERG FOR NOT EVEN CONFRONTING THE ALLIES WITH THE DEMAND....

"OUT OF CONSIDERATION FOR THE RESIDENTS, NO MEMORIAL WILL BE ERECTED IN REMSCHEID ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE CRASH...."

4. RIGHT-OF-CENTER RHEINISCHE POST OF DUESSELDORF CARRIES A REPORT ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE REMSCHEID CRASH. THIS REPORT, AS WELL AS THE REPORT IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED DIE TAGESZEITUNG DESCRIBE THE CRASH AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN DETAIL, MORE OR LESS LIKE THE REPORT INCLUDED IN YESTERDAY'S MEDIA REACTION. THE REPORT IS HEADED:

"LOST A PIECE OF ONES OWN - ONE YEAR AFTER THE REMSCHEID INFERNO MENTAL
DAMAGE HAS NOT YET BEEN OVERCOME."

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 018 ******/
"COMING FRIDAY, ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE CRASH, THE TERRIBLE EVENT WILL BE COMMEMORATED IN MEMORIAL SERVICES AND DEMONSTRATIONS.... MYSTERIOUS SKIN DISEASES THAT AFFLICTED RESIDENTS OF THE CRASH SITE AND THE HIGH PCB CONCENTRATIONS IN THE SOIL OF SOME GARDENS PROVE THAT THE JET CRASH DID NOT SEIZE TO BE OF A SAD IMPORTANCE THESE DAYS."

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E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: DAILY MEDIA REACTION REPORT
PARIS - TUESDAY DECEMBER 5

LEADS: ELECTORAL VICTORY BY FAR-RIGHT FRENCH POLITICAL PARTY NATIONAL FRONT'S CANDIDATE IN DREUX (NEAR PARIS); OUTCOME OF MALTA MEETING; EASTERN EUROPE; SOVIET UNION ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS A MISTAKE.

(A) STORIES COVERED IN REPORT:

POST-SUMMIT REPORTS

(B) SUMMARY OF TYPE OF COVERAGE:

PRESIDENT BUSH'S REMARKS TO THE ALLIANCE WAS A LEAD ITEM ON EVENING TELEVISION AND RADIO NEWS PROGRAMS. REPORTS UNDERLINE NATO SUPPORT TO WARSAW PACT AND PRESIDENT BUSH'S REMARK THAT "U.S. WILL MAINTAIN FORCES IN EUROPE AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES DESIRE." COMMENTATORS SAY PRESIDENT BUSH WAS ABLE TO REASSURE HIS ALLIES. MAIN RESULT OF BRUSSELS MEETING IS DESCRIBED AS PRESERVATION OF THE MILITARY ALLIANCES. LE MONDE HEADLINES THAT RESULT OF MALTA IS THAT THE U.S.S.R. HAS REJOINED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ECONOMIC LES ECHOS SAYS THE BUSH-DELORS MEETING SHOWS U.S. INTEREST IN A EC ROLE IN EASTERN EUROPE. FOR QUOTIDIEN THE "TIME OF TRUTH" FOR THE EC WILL BE THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT NEXT WEEKEND IN STRASBOURG. LIBERATION SAYS PRESIDENT BUSH CONDUCTED HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN BRUSSELS IN "A MASTERLY WAY AND WITH GOOD HUMOR."

(C) HEADLINES:

POST-MALTA REPORTS:

"A 'NORMAL' COUNTRY" (LE MONDE)
"NATO MAKES POST-MALTA BALANCE SHEET" (LIBERATION)
"ALLIANCES" (QUOTIDIEN)
"HOLY ALLIANCE" (FRANCE-SOIR)
"BUSH TO THE ALLIES: 'WE'LL STAY IN EUROPE' 'LET'S REMAIN STRONG AND CAUTIOUS'" (FIGARO)
"WASHINGTON FOR 'STRONG' EUROPEAN COMMUNITY" (LES ECHOS)
"TIME OF TRUTH FOR THE EC" (PARISIEN)
"PEACE IS THE STAR" (HUMANITE)
(D) SUPPORTING TEXT:

POST MALTA REPORTS:

RADIO LUXEMBOURG AT 7:30 A.M. WITH CORRESPONDENT IN BRUSSELS: "BUSH RESTORED SERENITY: 'YES' THE U.S. IS ON THE SIDE OF EUROPE, 'NO' TROOPS WILL NOT BE WITHDRAWN ALTHOUGH A CHANGE WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE LONG RUN. BUSH DID NOT YIELD IN MALTA LIKE REAGAN DID IN REYKJAVIK AND HE WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE HIS ALLIES."

LEFT-OF-CENTER LIBERATION ON PAGE 26 BY SPECIAL CORRESPONDENTS IN BRUSSELS SERGENT AND VALLADAO: "FIRST POST COLD WAR ATLANTIC COUNCIL, THE BRUSSELS MEETING
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WAS THAT OF 'UNAMINOUS SUPPORT TO PERESTROIKA,'....THE U.S. PRESIDENT WAS EAGER TO REASSURE HIS ALLIES AND TO EXPLAIN THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN DECIDED WITH GORBACHEV BEHIND THE BACKS OF THE EUROPEANS....UNSURPRISINGLY GERMANY AND ITS FUTURE WHICH WERE THE MAIN TOPICS OF CONCERN....FOR BUSH, NATO IS THE BEST GUARANTEE TO DEAL WITH THE GERMAN ISSUE...IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, CONDUCTED IN A MASTERLY WAY AND WITH A GOOD HUMOR, BUSH TRIED TO DEFEND NATO AND ITS NEW MISSIONS....JOKING ABOUT HIMSELF, BUSH WENT AS FAR AS COMPARING HIMSELF TO A 'MACHO VISIONARY GUY'."

RIGHT-OF-CENTER QUOTIDIEN ON PAGE 15 BY FOREIGN EDITOR PHILIPPE MARCOVICI: "THE MEETING IN BRUSSELS SOMEWHAT MITIGATED THE RESULTS OF THE MALTA SUMMIT. THE ISSUE FOR BUSH AND GORBACHEV WAS TO BURY THE WAR HATCHET BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST....IN BRUSSELS YESTERDAY, SOURCES CLOSE TO GEROGE BUSH HINTED THAT IT WAS SOMEWHAT UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THE SIGNING OF AN ACCORD ON STRATEGIC ARMS AS EARLY AS THE MONTH OF JUNE....THEY WILL TAKE THEIR TIME. BUT, ON THE OTHER

HAND, THERE SEEMS TO BE A GREATER HURRY CONCERNING AN ACCORD IN VIENNA ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT."

POPULAR FRANCE-SOIR ON PAGE 5 BY FOREIGN EDITOR JACQUES MALMASSARI: "THE NATO COUNCIL RUSHED TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TWO ALLIANCES. NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT HAD NEVER HAD SO MANY VIRTUES. AS IF BOTH THE EAST AND THE WEST DID NOT KNOW WHERE TO FIND HELP TO STOP THE DANGERS WHICH NO ONE SEEMS ABLE TO CONTROL. ONE EVEN NOTED THAT THE WESTERN LEADERS WERE MORE ENTHUSIASTIC IN THEIR SUPPRT TO THE ALLIANCE OF THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES THAN THE PEOPLE MAINLY INVOLVED....IF THE WEST IS BOTH STRONGLY DEFENDING NATO AND THE PACT, IT'S BECAUSE THEY SEE THE TWO ALLIANCES AS THE ONLY BLOCKADE CAPABLE OF STOPPING THE DESTABILIZING FORCES ENGENDERED BY A TOO RAPID CHANGE."

CONSERVATIVE FIGARO ON PAGE 3 BY SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT FRANCOIS HAUTER: "YESTERDAY, BUSH OFFICIALLY BURIED THE COLD WAR AT NATO WITHOUT CONDEMNING THE ALLIANCE.....WITH HIS 15 PARTNERS, GEORGE BUSH WILL ENCOURAGE HIS NEGOTIATORS SO THAT AN ACCORD CAN BE REACHED IN VIENNA IN 1990. THEN THERE SHOULD BE A RATIFICATION IN THE PRESENCE OF THE HELSINKI'S 35 SIGNATORIES....'THIS IS A TIME OF GREAT HOPE. WE MUST NOT BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROMISING EXPECTATIONS AND PRESENT REALITIES.' ALL EUROPEAN CHIEFS OF STATE PRESENT YESTERDAY IN BRUSSELS CONGRATULATED HIM FOR THIS APPROACH....BUSH DECIDED TO THROW SOME COLD WATER ON THE LO-POINT PLAN FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY."

ECONOMIC LES ECHOS ON PAGE 4 BY REPORTER JACQUES HUBERT-RODIER: "AFTER THE MALTA SUMMIT WITH GORBACHEV, PRESIDENT BUSH MET WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE EC FOR MORE THAN 30 MINUTES....THE BUSH-DELORS MEETING HAS A VERY SYMBOLIC ASPECT BECAUSE IT SHOWS WASHINGTON'S DETERMINATION TO ESTABLISH A SOLID DIALOGUE WITH
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BRUSSELS ON THE EAST....THE AMERICANS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE EC MUST BE A 'SOLID PILLAR' IN EUROPE IN THE FACE OF THE CHANGES IN THE EAST."

POPULAR PARISIEN ON PAGE 6 BY COMMENTATOR ALAIN DUHAMEL: "AFTER THE MALTA SUMMIT, THE EC IS ABOUT TO GO THROUGH ITS TIME OF TRUTH....THE ONLY CHANCE TO PREVENT GERMAN UNITY FROM OVERWHELMING EUROPEAN UNITY IS RELATED TO THE AGENDA. IF A MONETARY AND SOCIAL EUROPE IS CREATED FRIDAY AND SATURDAY (IN STRASBOURG) THE INTEGRATION OF THE TWELVE WILL HAVE REACHED AN IRREVERSIBLE STAGE. A STRONG EUROPE WILL BE ABLE TO OPEN UP--IN THE LONG RUN--TO EAST GERMANY. THE DYNAMIC OF THE COMMUNITY IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE RAPPROCHEMENT OF THE TWO GERMANIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF NEXT WEEKEND, EUROPE GETS BOGGED DOWN OR IF ITS MARCH FORWARD SLOWS DOWN, THEN EUROPE WILL PROBABLY BE REDUCED TO A MERE ZONE OF FREE EXCHANGE. A STRONG EUROPE CAN ALLOW A REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY. A WEAK EUROPE WILL NOT RESIST A BONN-BERLIN RAPPROCHEMENT."

INFLUENTIAL LE MONDE FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL: "THE U.S.S.R. HAS BECOME AGAIN A 'NORMAL' COUNTRY ABOUT TO REJOIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. SUCH COULD BE THE BALANCE SHEET OF THE MALTA SUMMIT WHICH WAS NOT ONLY THE FIRST SUMMIT BETWEEN BUSH AND GORBACHEV BUT ALSO AND MAINLY THE FIRST SOVIET-U.S. MEETING ALMOST TOTALLY RID OF ITS TRADITIONAL ANTAGONISMS. MR. GORBACHEV'S SOVIET UNION HAS NOT BECOME A DEMOCRATIC STATE, MUCH LESS A PROSPEROUS ONE. YET THE FACT IS THAT IN THE SPACE OF THREE DAYS, IT CEASED BEING REGARDED AS AN ADVERSARY BY THE PRINCIPAL RELIGIOUS LEADER OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND ALSO BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PLANET'S MOST POWERFUL DEMOCRACY. IT IS A STATE TO WHICH THE WHOLE OF THE WESTERN WORLD IS DETERMINED TO EXTEND ITS HAND. THIS IS WHAT BUSH--LONG BLAMED FOR BEING SKEPTICAL OF PERESTROIKA--WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR WHEN HE REASSURED HIS PARTNER DURING THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE--WHICH WAS ANOTHER FIRST. HE TALKED OF 'RESPECT' AND 'SUPPORT' AND CALLED BUSINESSMEN TO 'HELP.'. HE ALSO ANNOUNCED THE LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE GESTURES ARE INDEED RATHER SYMBOLIC. LITTLE RESULT CAN BE EXPECTED IN MATTERS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AS LONG AS THE U.S.S.R. DOES NOT HAVE A CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY AND COMPETITIVE PRODUCTS TO EXPORT. ON THE U.S. SIDE, IT IS OUT OF THE QUESTION TO REMOVE THE COCOM BARRIERS....THE FIRST TEST OF SOVIET-U.S. DETENTE WILL BE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC DISARMAMENT. MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON HAVE BEEN TALKING FOR THREE YEARS

WITHOUT ANY CONCRETE RESULT. THIS IS NOW THE TIME FOR THE TWO SUPERPOWERS TO DISPLAY SOME GENEROSITY. IN ANY EVENT, THE CALENDAR PROPOSED IN MALTA IS EXTREMELY CROWDED FOR THE COMING YEAR. FROM THE SUMMIT OF THE TWO ALLIANCES TO THE VERY LIKELY 'HELSINKI II' AT THE END OF 1990, NOT FORGETTING ACCORDS IN VIENNA AND GENEVA ON ARMAMENTS, DIPLOMATS WILL HAVE TO WORK HARD TO ADAPT THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE TO THE CURRENT
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CHANGES IN THE EAST."

COMMUNIST HUMANITE ON PAGE 14: "'PEACE AT THE SUMMIT;' 'A NEW ERA;' 'CALM DURING THE TEMPEST;' 'THE MALTA ALLIES;' 'THE PEACE BALLET;' 'THE BEGINNING OF A GREAT ALLIANCE.' FRONT-PAGE HEADLINES IN THE FRENCH PRESS HAILED YESTERDAY THE RESULTS OF THE MALTA SUMMIT. ACTUALLY, IT WAS EASY TO BE CRITICAL AFTER THE EIGHT HOURS OF CONVERSATIONS AND THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE. FOR FIGARO, IT WAS HARD NOT TO ADMIT THE IMPORTANCE OF 'SEEING BUSH AND GORBACHEV IN AGREEMENT ON MOST IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.' FOR SERGE JULY IN LIBERATION, 'THE OPENING OF A NEW ERA ENDED MORE THAN 40 YARS OF COLD WAR.'...SOME COMMENTATORS HOWEVER ARE STILL VERY CAUTIOUS. FIGARO SAID THAT 'EUROPE SHOULD NOT BE THE BIG VICTIM OF THE U.S.-SOVIET ARRANGEMENT.' CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE SHARED BY JACQUES CHIRAC WHO SAID ON RADIO FRANCE-INTER THAT 'THE SUMMIT IS POSITIVE BUT ONE MUST REMAIN CAUTIOUS'."

TELEVISION NEWS PROGRAMS ON MONDAY DECEMBER 4:

"ANTENNE 2" AT 8 P.M. WITH ANCHORWOMAN CHRISTINE OCKRENT: "WE ARE GOING THROUGH EXTRAORDINARY TIMES....TODAY IN BRUSSELS, THE LEADERS OF NATO EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE SURVIVAL OF THE

WARSAW PACT. IN A CHANGING EUROPE, THE MAINTAINING OF MILITARY ALLIANCES HAS BECOME AN ASSURANCE FOR STABILITY."

"TF-1" AT 8 P.M. WITH CORRESPONDENT IN BRUSSELS BERNARD VOLKER: "NEVER HAD NATO FOUND ITSELF IN SUCH A POSITION. THIS PROTECTION AGAINST COMMUNISM, WHICH COST 60 BILLION DOLLARS EACH YEAR, OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED ITS SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE CHIEF OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY. IN ADDITION, NATO LEADERS EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE MAINTAINING OF THE WARSAW PACT. IN REALITY, FACED WITH THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION IN THE EAST, WESTERN LEADERS WANT TO REMAIN CAUTIOUS AND IN CONTROL. THIS AFTERNOON, THE U.S. PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THAT THE U.S. WILL MAINTAIN ITS TROOPS IN EUROPE AS LONG AS THE EUROPANS EXPRESS THE DESIRE."

TELEVISION TF-1 AT 1 P.M. ON DECEMBER 4 WITH NATO CORRESPONDENT IN BRUSSELS BERNARD VOLKER: MITTERRAND WAS IN NO HURRY THIS MORNING TO HEAR THE U.S. PRESIDENT REPORT ON THE MALTA SUMMIT. HE WAS 30 MINUTES LATE. BUT THE PACE OF EVENTS IS ACCELERATING AND THE ALLIANCE SEEMS SOMEWHAT OVERWHELMED BY THE CURRENT SITUATION. MALTA CONSTITUTES A 180 DEGREE TURNABOUT, I.E. DISARMAMENT WILL GO EVEN FASTER. THERE ARE ALREADY TALKS OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE TWO MILITARY BLOCKS....THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY SPENDING WILL UPSET THE ECONOMY OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES....THE FEELING HERE IS THAT THERE WILL NEVER BE TOTAL DISARMAMENT BUT THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO CHANGE, TO ADAPT ITSELF. BUSH AND GORBACHEV LAUNCHED THE MOVEMENT.
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IT'S NOT UP TO THE EUROPEANS TO REACT....ON BOTH THE ECONOMIC AND THE MILITARY LEVEL, BUSH SEEMS TO HAVE

GONE FURTHER THAN EXPECTED ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO."

TELEVISION ANTENNE 2 AT 1 P.M. ON DECEMBER 4 WITH DEFENSE SPECIALIST LAURENT BOUSSIE: "LONG CONSIDERED AS A PURELY MILITARY STRUCTURE, NATO IS NOW BECOMING AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK WHICH SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT."

ALSO ANTENNE 2 AT L P.M. WITH REPORTER JACQUES ABOUCHAR: "BUSH RISKS HAVING A MORE DIFFICULT DIALOGUE WITH HIS ALLIES THAN WITH GORBACHEV. FIRST BECAUSE A CONVERSATION BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE IS ALWAYS EASIER THAN AMONG 16 PEOPLE. BUSH DID NOT COME TO BRUSSELS TO SHAKE THE ALLIANCE--THIS IS NOT HIS STYLE--BUT HE WANTED TO MAKE SOME CLARIFICATIONS. IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING EUROPE, GORBACHEV'S U.S.S.R. NO LONGER CONSTITUTES THE SAME THREAT. THE RISK OF A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST IS RAPIDLY DIMMING. LOGICAL CONCLUSION: IF THE COLD WAR IS OVER, ONE MUST CUT MILITARY BUDGETS AND IF AMERICA WITHDRAWS ONE PART OF ITS FORCES FROM THE OLD CONTINENT, THE EUROPEANS WILL HAVE TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE."

TELEVISION "LA 5" AT 1 P.M. DECEMBER 4 WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPORTER MANUEL SAINT-PAUL: "THE FIRST PERSON WHO GOT SOME CLARIFICATION ON THE U.S.-SOVIET MEETING WAS HELMUT KOHL....THE TWO CHIEFS OF STATE DID NOT SAY MUCH ABOUT THE CONTENT OF THEIR CONVESATION. THE MAIN COURSE WAS CLEARLY GERMAN REUNIFICATION. KOHL WANTED TO BE IN TUNE WITH MALTA. HE REASSURED HIS INTERLOCUTOR AND INDICATED THAT THE GERMAN PROBLEM CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED UNDER A EUROPEAN ROOF AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE." KORENGOLD

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RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
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/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
SUBJECT: GERMAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT

FOLLOWING IS A REVIEW OF GERMAN MEDIA OF DECEMBER 05, 1989
CONTENTS:

A. LEAD STORIES SUMMARY
B. AFTERMATH OF BUSH-GORBACHEV MEETING
C. NATO: BUSH IN BRUSSELS
D. GDR: CONTINUING PROTESTS
E. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: NEW GOVERNMENT
F. SOVIET UNION: NATIONALITIES PROBLEMS
G. FRG: CONTROVERSY ABOUT KOHL'S 10-POINT PLAN, REUNIFICATION
H. ECONOMIC: U.S.-SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET UNION
I. BUNDESWEHR: LOW-LEVEL FLIGHTS, REMSCHEID, BUNDESWEHR PLANNING

A. LEAD STORIES SUMMARY

TODAY'S LEAD STORIES ARE THE SOVIET INTENTION TO TALK ABOUT REUNIFICATION, THE FAILURE OF STOLTENBERG'S CONCEPT OF LOW-LEVEL FLIGHTS, CONTINUING PROTESTS IN THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GEORGE BUSH'S BRIEFING TRIP TO NATO IN BRUSSELS, AND THE CONTROVERSY ON THE BONN GOVERNMENT'S GERMAN-GERMAN POLICY. EDITORIAL COMMENTS FOCUS ON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GDR, KOHL'S 10-POINT PLAN, AND GEORGE BUSH VISIT TO NATO.

B. BUSH-GORBACHEV MEETING

1. MASS-CIRCULATION RIGHT-OF-CENTER BILD ZEITUNG CARRIES A COMMENTARY BY FORMER ARD CORRESPONDENT IN WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND EAST BERLIN LOTHAR LOEWE UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"MALTA - HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE SUMMIT FOR THE GERMANS? - AND FIVE MORE QUESTIONS..."

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
"HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE SUMMIT FOR THE GERMANS? IT

WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE GERMAN QUESTION COULD BE DISCUSSED BY GEORGE BUSH AND MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IN A QUIET, RELAXED ATMOSPHERE.

"DO BUSH AND GORBACHEV OPPOSE GERMAN UNITY? BUSH IS IN FAVOR OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION, AS LONG AS GERMANY IS GOING TO BE TIED INTO THE SECURITY SYSTEM YET TO BE BUILT. IN GORBACHEV'S OPINION, GERMANY MUST NOT BE THE LEADING WESTERN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER.... HOWEVER, IN CASE BERLIN BECOMES GERMANY'S CAPITAL AGAIN, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT SOVIET TANKS WILL RUMBLE OVER THE KURFUERSTENDAMM....

"IS THE COLD WAR OVER? THE ANSWER IS YES. EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN SO HARMONIOUS, EVER SINCE 1945. COOPERATION REPLACED CONFRONTATION, DISARMAMENT REPLACED ARMAMENT AND DISTRUST WAS REPLACED BY TRUST. THERE ARE NO MORE INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

"DID THE SUMMIT STRENGTHEN GORBACHEV'S POSITION? NOT MUCH. HE IS YET FACING HIS GREATEST STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN POWER. HE MUST PREVENT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE BY SOLVING THE NATIONALITIES CONFLICTS AND HE MUST PREVENT THE ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF HIS COUNTRY. A MILITARY COUP BECOMES POSSIBLE IF A HUNGER REBELLION LEADS TO A GENERAL STRIKE IN THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV'S CHANCES TO SURVIVE THE POLITICAL TURMOIL ARE FIFTY-FIFTY.

"WHAT DOES THE SUMMIT MEAN FOR DISARMAMENT? IT MEANS A LOT. IN 1990, BOTH SUPERPOWERS WILL REDUCE THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL BY 50 PERCENT. IN EUROPE, THE MOST FAR-REACHING EAST-WEST TROOP AND WEAPON REDUCTIONS ARE UNDER WAY SINCE 1945. THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE GOING TO WITHDRAW HALF OF THEIR TROOPS FROM GERMANY.

"IS THE U.S. GOING TO RESCUE THE SOVIET ECONOMY? THE ANSWER IS NO. THE RUSSIANS HAVE TO DO THAT THEMSELVES. THE U.S., HOWEVER, IS PREPARED TO HELP WITH ECONOMIC INVESTMENTS. MOSCOW WILL GET THE PREFERENTIAL STATUS, TOO."

2. CENTRIST GENERAL-ANZEIGER OF BONN CARRIES A COMMENTARY BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SIEGFRIED MARUHN UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"BUSH TALKS ABOUT 'OUR FRIENDS' NOW."

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

"BUSH STILL SHYS AWAY FROM OFFICIALLY PRONOUNCING THE COLD WAR AS OVER.... HOWEVER, HE IS AT LEAST TALKING ABOUT A 'BRAND-NEW ERA IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.' THIS

FINE DISTINCTION CHARACTERIZES THE NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS BETTER THAN ANYTHING ELSE.... WASHINGTON IS READY TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY OF ACHIEVING AS MUCH IMPROVEMENT IN THE EAST AS POSSIBLE AND OF MAKING THE CHANGES IRREVERSIBLE....

"BUSH'S CONCESSION TO REVERSE PRIORITIES IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS MAY CAUSE THE GREATEST CRITICISM IN THE U.S.... THE CFE TALKS LOST PRIORITY (TO THE START TALKS). (IN THE U.S.) THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE BLAMED FOR THAT BECAUSE THEY CAUSE TOO MANY PROBLEMS.... WASHINGTON IS NOT YET SURE OF HOW MANY CONCESSION GEORGE BUSH MADE WITH REGARD TO CWS AND WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE SATISFIED WITH THOSE CONCESSIONS....

"GORBACHEV IS TRYING TO MAKE IT LOOK AS IF THE EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE ARE WANTED IF NOT CONTROLLED BY MOSCOW. HOWEVER, LAST WEEKEND'S EVENTS RENDER THIS UNLIKELY.... BUSH SURPRISED EVERYBODY BY REFERRING TO HELSINKI AND ITS BORDER REGULATIONS WHEN GERMANY CAME UP IN THE DISCUSSION. GORBACHEV STILL TALKED ABOUT TROUBLEMAKERS WHO ARE TRYING TO EXPLOIT THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. HE DID NOT NAME THE TROUBLEMAKERS BUT HE OBVIOUSLY REFERRED TO HELMUT KOHL....

"GEORGE BUSH ASSURED THAT HE STRUCK A GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MIKHAIL GORBACHEV. U.S. TV COVERAGE FROM SUNDAY MORNING DID NOT QUITE SUPPORT THIS VIEW.... ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO APPEAR A BIT LESS FLASHY AT THIS SUMMIT, HE WAS STILL THE MORE FLAMBOYANT AND DYNAMIC PERSON IN COMPARISON WITH BUSH WHO WAS STIFFLY TRYING TO APPEAR SMILING AND HAPPY. THE REAL MOVING POWER IN MOSCOW-WASHINGTON RELATIONS SEEM TO BE JAMES BAKER AND EDVARD SHEVARDNADZE."

3. CENTRIST SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG OF MUNICH CARRIES A COMMENTARY BY HANS ULRICH KEMPSKI WHICH CONCENTRATES ON A COMPARISON OF GEORGE BUSH'S AND MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S PERSONALITIES UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"HANDSHAKE FOR THE WILL TO RECONCILIATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST."

"GEORGE BUSH - TALL AND LEAN, ELEGANT AND LOOKING

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
MUCH YOUNGER THAN 65 - IS TRYING TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF AN EXPERIENCED SUMMIT DIPLOMAT. FREE FROM IDEOLOGICAL ZEAL, WITHOUT PHONY POSES, HIS STATEMENTS CLEAR AND SHORT, WITTY, COMPETENT, POLISHED AND WELL-MANNERED - THAT IS GEORGE BUSH'S IMAGE AT MALTA. NEVERTHELESS, HE IS NOT ABLE TO CONCEAL HIS NERVOUSNESS. HE POURS DOWN

LARGE AMOUNTS OF MINERAL WATER, SCRIBBLES NOTES..., FUMBLES AT HIS GLASSES, MASSAGES HIS NOSE. AND SOMETIMES, HIS LIPS ARE TURNING PALE AND TIGHTEN EVEN MORE. HIS PERSONAL PHYSICIAN IS ALWAYS NEAR HIM....

"'I'M GLAD TO SEE YOU,' SAYS GEORGE BUSH WHEN HE MEETS GORBACHEV. HE CANNOT GET RID OF THIS STIFF FORMALITY.... WHEN THEY WERE SHAKING HANDS (FOR NO LONGER THAN 3 SECONDS) GORBACHEV LOOKED KIND OF TROUBLED WHILE BUSH APPEARED ONCE MORE UPTIGHT AND BEARING THE LOOK OF A BOSS WHO IS FORCED TO PARTICIPATE IN A STAFF OUTING....

"VALENTIN FALIN, GORBACHEV ADVISOR, BELIEVES THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSH AND GORBACHEV WILL NEVER BE AS RELAXED AND UNCOMPLICATED AS BETWEEN REAGAN AND GORBACHEV.... IF FALIN IS RIGHT, GORBACHEV AND BUSH WILL HAVE THE SAME PROBLEMS WITH BEING UPTIGHT AND FORMAL IN THEIR COMING MEETINGS. THIS STIFFNESS PREVENTED THAT THEY EVER APPROACHED A FIRST NAME BASIS OFF MALTA."

4. CENTRIST DER TAGESSPIEGEL OF WEST BERLIN CARRIES A COMMENTARY BY MICHAEL BARTH UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"THE SUMMIT MEETING"

"IT IS OBVIOUS THAT FOR GORBACHEV TOPICS LIKE THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS AND NOT THE GERMAN QUESTION ARE THE NUMBER ONE. ENDING EXCESSIVE ARMAMENT AND BEGINNING DISARMAMENT RELEASES THE MEANS SO URGENTLY NEEDED FOR PERESTROIKA. THAT ALSO MEETS BUSH'S INTERESTS, GIVEN THE ENORMOUS U.S. BUDGET DEFICIT. ALTHOUGH MALTA DID NOT PRODUCE AGREEMENTS IN THAT RESPECT, IT DRAFTED A TIMETABLE FOR FURTHER DECISIONS, FOR INSTANCE, REGARDING THE ENVISAGED HALVING OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS.

"THIS HISTORIC PROCESS OF NEW COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS WOULD BE DISTURBED, IF NOT HALTED, BY SHAKY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS. THAT IS THE REASON FOR THE EXTREME CAUTION WITH WHICH BOTH SIDES REACTED TO THE EVENTS IN THE GDR."

5. RIGHT-OF-CENTER BERLINER MORGENPOST CARRIES A

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 ******/
COMMENTARY BY GUENTER STILLER UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"A NEW AGE?"

"IT SPEAKS VOLUMES THAT THE FRG CHANCELLOR WAS THE FIRST TO BE INFORMED BY BUSH, AS EARLY AS SUNDAY NIGHT, ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE MALTA DISCUSSIONS ON THE GERMAN QUESTION. AS WE LEARNED YESTERDAY, NEW THINKING ALSO LED

TO NEW SOVIET IDEAS ABOUT FUTURE TREATMENT OF THE QUESTION OF GERMAN UNITY.

"AFTER ALL, THE TOP LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE IRON CURTAIN, WHICH IS TO BE TORN DOWN, ARE AWARE OF CONTINUING PROBLEMS: WHEN CUBA AND NICARAGUA WERE DISCUSSED ON THE MAXIM GORKY, THE BLOOD PRESSURE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL MEN MUST HAVE RISEN DRAMATICALLY. BUSH WANTS GORBACHEV TO FINALLY STOP THE EXPORT OF REVOLUTIONS AND WEAPONS TO EL SALVADOR. GORBACHEV PLEDGED HIS SUPPORT. IT WAS VERY INFORMATIVE THAT THE KREMLIN LEADER ALLOWED HIS COUNTERPART FROM THE WHITE HOUSE TO CRITICIZE COMMUNIST POWER GAMES IN THE U.S.' LATIN AMERICAN BACKYARD AT THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS CONFERENCE. BUSH HELPS GORBACHEV AND, THEREFORE, GORBACHEV HELPS BUSH....

"LET'S NOT BE MISLED: THOUGH THE WET SUMMIT OFF MALTA WAS A TOTAL SUCCESS BOTH FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND THE SOVIET LEADER. BUSH CAN PRESENT HIMSELF AT HOME AS A SKILLED CONDUCTOR FOR A PEACEFUL FUTURE. GORBACHEV RECEIVED MORE THAN HE HAD EXPECTED."

6. FAR-LEFT DIE TAGESZEITUNG OF WEST BERLIN CARRIES A COMMENTARY BY JRGEN GOTTSCHLICH UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"SUPERPOWERS PUT THEIR STAKES ON GAINING TIME"

"WHEN TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INDICATIONS AND STATEMENTS MADE BY BUSH AND GORBACHEV, WE FIND THAT THE TWO PRIMARILY WANT TO GAIN TIME. THIS ALSO APPLIES TO THE SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN BUSH AND KOHL: BUSH NEITHER WANTED TO SAY 'YES' TO KOHL'S GERMAN-GERMAN PROGRAM, NOR WAS HE ABLE TO SAY 'NO.' AFTER ALL, AS KOHL INSISTED AFTER HIS TALK WITH BUSH, THE U.S. CAN HARDLY OPPOSE THE NATIONS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION... THE CONFLICT IN THE BACKGROUND SEEMS TO CENTER ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER GERMANY OR EUROPE SHOULD COME FIRST."

C. NATO: BUSH IN BRUSSELS

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 ******/

1. RIGHT-OF-CENTER DIE WELT OF BONN CARRIES A FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT FRITZ WIRTH UNDER THE HEADLINE:

"MALTA AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS."

"IN A FASCINATING WAY, THIS 'POST-SUMMIT' IN BRUSSELS REVEALED THE GLORY AND THE MISERY OF THE REALITIES WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. FASTER AND WITH GREATER CURIOSITY THAN EVER BEFORE, NATO LEADERS WENT TO BRUSSELS TO LISTEN

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

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December 12, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN

SUBJECT: Letter to Former Presidents

Attached are letters for your signature to Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan updating them on key recent developments -- Malta/Brussels, the defense budget, El Salvador, the Philippines, and your trip to China.

Concurrence by: per tw { Bob Blackwill, Arnie Kanter, Bill Pryce, and Karl Jackson, Condi Rice and Nick Rostow

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the four letters at Tab I (Nixon), Tab II (Ford), Tab III (Carter), and Tab IV (Reagan).

Attachments
Tab I Letter to President Nixon
Tab A Proposals for Gorbachev
Tab II Letter to President Ford
Tab A Proposals for Gorbachev
Tab III Letter to President Carter
Tab A Proposals for Gorbachev
Tab IV Letter to President Reagan
Tab A Proposals for Gorbachev

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THE PRESIDENT

12-14-89

Dear Rich

Merry Christmas to you
Pat and all your gang.
I hope the attached is
useful to you. Hastily but
with warm regards,

Ron

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 14, 1989

Dear President Nixon:

As President Bush previously informed you would be our practice, here is the second of our periodic updates on key recent developments -- the Malta meeting with Gorbachev; the Brussels meeting with allies; defense budget issues; the violence in El Salvador and the Philippines; and my trip to China.

The Malta Meeting

The Malta meeting turned out to be exactly the kind of informal, wide-ranging conversation which the President had sought in suggesting the meeting and format to Gorbachev. The exchanges were candid yet friendly, and the President feels he achieved all his objectives for the meeting.

Gorbachev seemed confident, despite the desperate problems we know he is facing. He sprang no surprises. The only new ideas were ones he had foreshadowed in speeches in Italy just before -- a Summit-level meeting of the 35 CSCE nations during 1990 (which the President countered by linking it to a CFE treaty) and a call for naval arms control, specifically limits on seaborne tactical nuclear weapons (which the President flatly rejected). The free nations' security and prosperity depend so vitally on the sealanes that there is no symmetry between U.S. and Soviet naval interests, nor is our naval power to be equated with the Soviet ground-forces advantage that we are determined to reduce.

The President seized the initiative at Malta and presented Gorbachev with 20-odd proposals, ideas, and issues. These were later released, and I enclose a copy.

The President made a special point of pressing Gorbachev on certain regional issues, especially Central America. He emphasized the irrefutable evidence of new flows of weapons to the FMLN, in violation of regional peace accords. The Soviets disclaimed responsibility. We stepped up the pressure, holding them accountable in order to press them to use the influence they clearly have with their Cuban and Nicaraguan clients.

Eastern Europe naturally was a major topic. Interestingly, Gorbachev had no grand proposals on Europe and did not call for the "dissolution of the two blocs." Rather, he talked of how NATO and the Warsaw Pact needed to become political rather than military groupings. On German reunification, he declared that history had created the two Germanies and we should leave it to history to resolve the issue -- somewhat softer than the earlier prohibitory statements, but still negative in tone.

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In arms reduction, we set a target -- not a deadline -- to complete the major issues in START in time for a June 1990 Summit. Jim Baker and Shevardnadze are to meet again in January and tackle a number of key issues. We have agreed with the Soviets (and our allies) to try to achieve a CFE treaty during 1990, which we proposed be signed at a CFE Summit. The President also proposed an initiative to speed agreement on a CW ban, agreed we should complete work on the TTBT/PNET verification protocols, and pressed for progress in constraining missile proliferation.

The other highlight was in the economic field. The President had decided it was time to signal the Soviets more strongly where we were prepared to go in economic relations. Gorbachev spoke at length about his plans, explaining the major problems he had in moving to a free price system and a convertible ruble. The President listed a number of small steps (see the enclosed) which the United States was prepared to take to convey our support for economic reform in the Soviet Union. Both sides recognized that the main responsibility for the success or failure of economic reform rested with the Soviets. On Jackson-Vanik, we maintained our requirement that they finish codifying their new emigration laws before a waiver would be possible, but we will start negotiating now on the necessary new trade agreement to replace the 1972 accord. The President has targeted the 1990 Summit for granting a temporary Jackson-Vanik waiver and MFN, if the Soviets have codified their emigration laws and the trade agreement is completed.

Brussels Meeting with Allies

The President flew to Brussels where he dined with Helmut Kohl and then reported to all the allies. In the morning he briefed on Malta; in the afternoon he made an important statement on future challenges and opportunities for the Alliance. It was a delicate moment, because of many allies' nervousness about the rapidity of change in Central Europe and because of differences about the pace and scope of European integration.

The President stressed the need for both NATO and the EC to be consolidated, not diluted, as we face a new era of change in Central and Eastern Europe. Western institutions and values were being vindicated (a point about which Gorbachev is quite sensitive and defensive), and the architecture of a new Europe should rest on these foundations.

The President also put on record his approach to German unification:

-- Self-determination should be pursued without prejudice to its outcome, neither endorsing nor excluding any particular vision of unity at this time.

-- Unification should occur in the context of the FRG's continued commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated EC, and with due regard for the legal role and responsibilities of the Four Powers.

-- In the interests of general European stability, the move toward unification must be peaceful, gradual, and part of a step-by-step process.

-- On the question of borders, we should reiterate our support for the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

The President assured the allies that the United States intended to remain a significant military power in Europe so long as they needed us in a common defense effort. He reiterated U.S. support for the "continued, perhaps even intensified, effort" of the twelve EC nations to integrate, which would serve as a magnet for Eastern Europe. He encouraged other European common efforts, such as the Western European Union in the defense field.

Defense Budget Issues

You may have read some misleading accounts of our defense budget planning. The fact is, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings does put increasing pressure on DoD spending, and the new international environment will -- starting next year -- lead to an even more intense congressional effort to cut. At the same time, the changing strategic landscape warrants adjustments in our posture.

In balancing these factors, our immediate challenge is to ensure that our pace of restructuring is appropriate -- that we do not take hard-to-reverse actions based on anticipated or hoped-for changes in the environment, or trigger a spasm of uncoordinated unilateral cutbacks by our allies. For the near term we will, as much as possible, tie reductions in our own forces to negotiated agreements in START, CFE, and CW.

Over the longer term, we envisage our active armed forces being smaller, more global in their perspective, and less Eurocentric in their equipment, training, and doctrine. We will demand of these active forces a degree of agility, readiness, and sustainability appropriate to the likely regional contingencies. As a hedge against an uncertain future, we will build reversibility into our efforts wherever possible, investing in R&D and retaining substantial reserve forces (albeit at reduced readiness). We hope the FY91 defense budget will begin the transition toward this kind of military in an orderly way.

El Salvador

We are deeply troubled by the terrorism and political intransigence of the FMLN in El Salvador and the support it continues to receive from Nicaragua, Cuba, and indirectly the Soviet Union. The President has assured Salvadoran President Cristiani of our continued support. At the same time, he has made clear the absolute necessity for a prompt and thorough

investigation of the killing of the Jesuit priests and prosecution of the perpetrators, whoever they may be.

As I noted above, the President raised the problem of Nicaraguan and Cuban support for the FMLN very forcefully at Malta. We will continue to press the Soviets to stop the support of revolution in the hemisphere, to end the Sandinista military buildup, and to support a free election in Nicaragua.

In that regard, there are increasing signs that the Sandinistas are beginning to shrink the political space permitted to the Nicaraguan opposition. There have been numerous incidents of harassment of the opposition, including physical attacks by Sandinista thugs and the lifting of Vice Presidential candidate Godoy's parliamentary immunity. Nicaragua also announced that it would not permit an official U.S. election monitoring team, including Congressional members, to visit, despite explicit assurances to us. We will work to restart cease-fire talks with the Resistance, which the Sandinistas abruptly left several weeks ago.

The Philippines

In the early hours of the attempted military coup, a number of military units sat on the sidelines, presumably waiting to see which way the tide was moving. We quickly gave permission for General Ramos to use Clark AFB to ferry in troops for the fighting around Manila, and somewhat later agreed to fly cover over two rebel-controlled airfields to prevent rebel planes from taking off. These demonstrations of U.S. support were not only militarily useful, but I believe helped convince wavering units to support the government.

After eight days of fighting, the immediate military rebellion ended, but prospects for long-term political stability remain clouded. The government appears weakened and its legitimacy eroded, not only with the military but probably with wide segments of the Manila population. "People power," which President Aquino attempted to use against the latest coup, may be a spent force.

More than anything else, the rebel officers sought personal power, but they have also raised troublesome issues, such as: Ramos' fitness to lead the armed forces; the politicization of promotion; failure to pay the troops; the inability to defeat the NPA; corruption in the army, the government, and the President's family; the anti-military hue of Aquino's advisers; and the government's inability to solve the country's major problems.

Since February 1986, we have given substantial aid to the Philippines. The economy has grown at six percent a year, and the NPA has been at least contained. Yet, there have now been six separate armed challenges to Aquino, and the recent one probably would have succeeded without U.S. intervention. Things

are not working well in the Philippines. The army will need to be reorganized and retrained; corruption in government has become a major impediment to the institutionalization of democracy.

My Trip to China

President Bush sent Larry Eagleburger and me to China last week for several interrelated reasons. We have traditionally exchanged views with the Chinese, in good times and bad, on issues of international significance. The President's meeting with Gorbachev was clearly one of those occasions. There is, in addition, a leadership struggle taking place. We should not be trying to promote Chinese isolation at such a critical moment in the evolution of post-Mao China. And, finally, we went there as a gesture, an attempt to break the logjam and elicit some significant response on their part. They seemed to understand our point, but it remains to be seen whether this was enough to shake loose the policy deadlock in their leadership. If there is no significant movement on their part by the time the Congress reconvenes, we will be powerless to stop another downward spiral in relations occasioned by further Congressional action -- sure to come without a change in the climate.

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

Attachment
Tab A Proposals for Gorbachev

The Honorable Richard Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 97675

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Brussels, Belgium)

For Immediate Release December 4, 1989

FACT SHEET

The President's Initiatives During the Malta Meeting

December 2 - 3, 1989

The President and Chairman Gorbachev exchanged views on a variety of issues during their meetings in Malta, including the remarkable events leading to peaceful and democratic change in Eastern and Central Europe.

The President noted his strong support for perestroika and suggested that the two leaders work to give major new impetus to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The President conveyed his strong personal commitment to this goal.

In this spirit, the President put forward the following ideas:

Next Steps

1. Holding the Summit in the United States during the last two weeks in June.

2. Having the next meeting of Foreign Ministers next month in the Soviet Union to prepare for the Summit.

Economics and Commercial Relations

1. Targeting the 1990 Summit for completion of a trade agreement granting Most Favored Nation status to the Soviet Union, so that the President can grant a Jackson-Vanik waiver at that time. To reach that goal, the President proposed beginning negotiations on a trade agreement now and urged the Supreme Soviet to complete action on its emigration legislation early next year.

2. Supporting observer status for the Soviet Union in GATT after the Uruguay Round is completed next year. The President urged the Soviet Union to use the intervening time to move toward market prices at the wholesale level so its economy will become more compatible with the GATT system.

3. Expanding U.S.-Soviet technical economic cooperation. The President presented a paper proposing specific economic projects, covering topics such as finance, agriculture, statistics, small business development, budgetary and tax policy, a stock exchange, and anti-monopoly policy.

4. Exploring with Congress the lifting of statutory restrictions on export credits and guarantees after a Jackson-Vanik waiver.

5. Beginning discussions of a bilateral investment treaty that would provide protections for American business people who want to invest in the Soviet Union.

6. Improving ties between the Soviets and the OECD, and East-West economic cooperation through the economic basket of the CSCE process.

Human Rights

Resolving all divided family issues by the time of the 1990 Summit. In this regard, the President handed over a list of people wishing to emigrate.

- more -

Regional Issues

Expressed disappointment with Soviet policy on Central America, noting it was out of step with the new Soviet direction domestically in Eastern Europe and in arms control. Nicaragua/Cuba remains the single most disruptive factor in the relationship.

Arms Control

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# # #

THE PRESIDENT

Dec 14, 1989

Dear Jerry

I hope you and Betty
have a wonderful Christmas.
Here's a little light reading
I hope it's useful —
Happy New Year too Cy

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 14, 1989

Dear President Ford:

As President Bush previously informed you would be our practice, here is the second of our periodic updates on key recent developments -- the Malta meeting with Gorbachev; the Brussels meeting with allies; defense budget issues; the violence in El Salvador and the Philippines; and my trip to China.

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The President seized the initiative at Malta and presented Gorbachev with 20-odd proposals, ideas, and issues. These were later released, and I enclose a copy.

The President made a special point of pressing Gorbachev on certain regional issues, especially Central America. He emphasized the irrefutable evidence of new flows of weapons to the FMLN, in violation of regional peace accords. The Soviets disclaimed responsibility. We stepped up the pressure, holding them accountable in order to press them to use the influence they clearly have with their Cuban and Nicaraguan clients.

Eastern Europe naturally was a major topic. Interestingly, Gorbachev had no grand proposals on Europe and did not call for the "dissolution of the two blocs." Rather, he talked of how NATO and the Warsaw Pact needed to become political rather than military groupings. On German reunification, he declared that history had created the two Germanies and we should leave it to history to resolve the issue -- somewhat softer than the earlier prohibitory statements, but still negative in tone.

DECLASSIFIED
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2009-0941-MR
SCS 8/5/13

Declassify on: OADR

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In arms reduction, we set a target -- not a deadline -- to complete the major issues in START in time for a June 1990 Summit. Jim Baker and Shevardnadze are to meet again in January and tackle a number of key issues. We have agreed with the Soviets (and our allies) to try to achieve a CFE treaty during 1990, which we proposed be signed at a CFE Summit. The President also proposed an initiative to speed agreement on a CW ban, agreed we should complete work on the TTBT/PNET verification protocols, and pressed for progress in constraining missile proliferation.

The other highlight was in the economic field. The President had decided it was time to signal the Soviets more strongly where we were prepared to go in economic relations. Gorbachev spoke at length about his plans, explaining the major problems he had in moving to a free price system and a convertible ruble. The President listed a number of small steps (see the enclosed) which the United States was prepared to take to convey our support for economic reform in the Soviet Union. Both sides recognized that the main responsibility for the success or failure of economic reform rested with the Soviets. On Jackson-Vanik, we maintained our requirement that they finish codifying their new emigration laws before a waiver would be possible, but we will start negotiating now on the necessary new trade agreement to replace the 1972 accord. The President has targeted the 1990 Summit for granting a temporary Jackson-Vanik waiver and MFN, if the Soviets have codified their emigration laws and the trade agreement is completed.

Brussels Meeting with Allies

The President flew to Brussels where he dined with Helmut Kohl and then reported to all the allies. In the morning he briefed on Malta; in the afternoon he made an important statement on future challenges and opportunities for the Alliance. It was a delicate moment, because of many allies' nervousness about the rapidity of change in Central Europe and because of differences about the pace and scope of European integration.

The President stressed the need for both NATO and the EC to be consolidated, not diluted, as we face a new era of change in Central and Eastern Europe. Western institutions and values were being vindicated (a point about which Gorbachev is quite sensitive and defensive), and the architecture of a new Europe should rest on these foundations.

The President also put on record his approach to German unification:

-- Self-determination should be pursued without prejudice to its outcome, neither endorsing nor excluding any particular vision of unity at this time.

-- Unification should occur in the context of the FRG's cont~~inued~~ commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated EC, and with due regard for the legal role and responsibilities of the Four Powers.

-- In the interests of general European stability, the move toward unification must be peaceful, gradual, and part of a step-by-step process.

-- On the question of borders, we should reiterate our support for the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

The President assured the allies that the United States intended to remain a significant military power in Europe so long as they needed us in a common defense effort. He reiterated U.S. support for the "continued, perhaps even intensified, effort" of the twelve EC nations to integrate, which would serve as a magnet for Eastern Europe. He encouraged other European common efforts, such as the Western European Union in the defense field.

Defense Budget Issues

You may have read some misleading accounts of our defense budget planning. The fact is, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings does put increasing pressure on DoD spending, and the new international environment will -- starting next year -- lead to an even more intense congressional effort to cut. At the same time, the changing strategic landscape warrants adjustments in our posture.

In balancing these factors, our immediate challenge is to ensure that our pace of restructuring is appropriate -- that we do not take hard-to-reverse actions based on anticipated or hoped-for changes in the environment, or trigger a spasm of uncoordinated unilateral cutbacks by our allies. For the near term we will, as much as possible, tie reductions in our own forces to negotiated agreements in START, CFE, and CW.

Over the longer term, we envisage our active armed forces being smaller, more global in their perspective, and less Eurocentric in their equipment, training, and doctrine. We will demand of these active forces a degree of agility, readiness, and sustainability appropriate to the likely regional contingencies. As a hedge against an uncertain future, we will build reversibility into our efforts wherever possible, investing in R&D and retaining substantial reserve forces (albeit at reduced readiness). We hope the FY91 defense budget will begin the transition toward this kind of military in an orderly way.

El Salvador

We are deeply troubled by the terrorism and political intransigence of the FMLN in El Salvador and the support it continues to receive from Nicaragua, Cuba, and indirectly the Soviet Union. The President has assured Salvadoran President Cristiani of our continued support. At the same time, he has made clear the absolute necessity for a prompt and thorough

investigation of the killing of the Jesuit priests and prosecution of the perpetrators, whoever they may be.

As I noted above, the President raised the problem of Nicaraguan and Cuban support for the FMLN very forcefully at Malta. We will continue to press the Soviets to stop the support of revolution in the hemisphere, to end the Sandinista military buildup, and to support a free election in Nicaragua.

In that regard, there are increasing signs that the Sandinistas are beginning to shrink the political space permitted to the Nicaraguan opposition. There have been numerous incidents of harassment of the opposition, including physical attacks by Sandinista thugs and the lifting of Vice Presidential candidate Godoy's parliamentary immunity. Nicaragua also announced that it would not permit an official U.S. election monitoring team, including Congressional members, to visit, despite explicit assurances to us. We will work to restart cease-fire talks with the Resistance, which the Sandinistas abruptly left several weeks ago.

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In the early hours of the attempted military coup, a number of military units sat on the sidelines, presumably waiting to see which way the tide was moving. We quickly gave permission for General Ramos to use Clark AFB to ferry in troops for the fighting around Manila, and somewhat later agreed to fly cover over two rebel-controlled airfields to prevent rebel planes from taking off. These demonstrations of U.S. support were not only militarily useful, but I believe helped convince wavering units to support the government.

After eight days of fighting, the immediate military rebellion ended, but prospects for long-term political stability remain clouded. The government appears weakened and its legitimacy eroded, not only with the military but probably with wide segments of the Manila population. "People power," which President Aquino attempted to use against the latest coup, may be a spent force.

More than anything else, the rebel officers sought personal power, but they have also raised troublesome issues, such as: Ramos' fitness to lead the armed forces; the politicization of promotion; failure to pay the troops; the inability to defeat the NPA; corruption in the army, the government, and the President's family; the anti-military hue of Aquino's advisers; and the government's inability to solve the country's major problems.

Since February 1986, we have given substantial aid to the Philippines. The economy has grown at six percent a year, and the NPA has been at least contained. Yet, there have now been six separate armed challenges to Aquino, and the recent one probably would have succeeded without U.S. intervention. Things

are not working well in the Philippines. The army will need to be reorg~~anized~~ and retrained; corruption in government has become a major impediment to the institutionalization of democracy.

My Trip to China

President Bush sent Larry Eagleburger and me to China last week for several interrelated reasons. We have traditionally exchanged views with the Chinese, in good times and bad, on issues of international significance. The President's meeting with Gorbachev was clearly one of those occasions. There is, in addition, a leadership struggle taking place. We should not be trying to promote Chinese isolation at such a critical moment in the evolution of post-Mao China. And, finally, we went there as a gesture, an attempt to break the logjam and elicit some significant response on their part. They seemed to understand our point, but it remains to be seen whether this was enough to shake loose the policy deadlock in their leadership. If there is no significant movement on their part by the time the Congress reconvenes, we will be powerless to stop another downward spiral in relations occasioned by further Congressional action -- sure to come without a change in the climate.

Hope you have a wonderful holiday season

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

Attachment
Tab A Proposals for Gorbachev

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
P.O. Box 927
Rancho Mirage, California 92270

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Brussels, Belgium)

For Immediate Release December 4, 1989

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The President's Initiatives During the Malta Meeting

December 2 - 3, 1989

The President and Chairman Gorbachev exchanged views on a variety of issues during their meetings in Malta, including the remarkable events leading to peaceful and democratic change in Eastern and Central Europe.

The President noted his strong support for perestroika and suggested that the two leaders work to give major new impetus to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The President conveyed his strong personal commitment to this goal.

In this spirit, the President put forward the following ideas:

Next Steps

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2. Having the next meeting of Foreign Ministers next month in the Soviet Union to prepare for the Summit.

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# # #



12-14-89

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I hope you find the attached memo worthwhile. Merry Christmas to you and yours -

Cy

~~SECRET~~

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December 14, 1989

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P.O. Box 350
Plains, Georgia 31780

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Dec. 14, 1989

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I hope you have a very Merry Christmas. Love to all

Cy

~~SECRET~~

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The President made a special point of pressing Gorbachev on certain regional issues, especially Central America. He emphasized the irrefutable evidence of new flows of weapons to the FMLN, in violation of regional peace accords. The Soviets disclaimed responsibility. We stepped up the pressure, holding them accountable in order to press them to use the influence they clearly have with their Cuban and Nicaraguan clients.

Eastern Europe naturally was a major topic. Interestingly, Gorbachev had no grand proposals on Europe and did not call for the "dissolution of the two blocs." Rather, he talked of how NATO and the Warsaw Pact needed to become political rather than military groupings. On German reunification, he declared that history had created the two Germanies and we should leave it to history to resolve the issue -- somewhat softer than the earlier prohibitory statements, but still negative in tone.

In arms reduction, we set a target -- not a deadline -- to complete the major issues in START in time for a June 1990

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

Summit. Jim Baker and Shevardnadze are to meet again in January and tackle a number of key issues. We have agreed with the Soviets (and our allies) to try to achieve a CFE treaty during 1990, which we proposed be signed at a CFE Summit. The President also proposed an initiative to speed agreement on a CW ban, agreed we should complete work on the TTBT/PNET verification protocols, and pressed for progress in constraining missile proliferation.

The other highlight was in the economic field. The President had decided it was time to signal the Soviets more strongly where we were prepared to go in economic relations. Gorbachev spoke at length about his plans, explaining the major problems he had in moving to a free price system and a convertible ruble. The President listed a number of small steps (see the enclosed) which the United States was prepared to take to convey our support for economic reform in the Soviet Union. Both sides recognized that the main responsibility for the success or failure of economic reform rested with the Soviets. On Jackson-Vanik, we maintained our requirement that they finish codifying their new emigration laws before a waiver would be possible, but we will start negotiating now on the necessary new trade agreement to replace the 1972 accord. The President has targeted the 1990 Summit for granting a temporary Jackson-Vanik waiver and MFN, if the Soviets have codified their emigration laws and the trade agreement is completed.

Brussels Meeting with Allies

The President flew to Brussels where he dined with Helmut Kohl and then reported to all the allies. In the morning he briefed on Malta; in the afternoon he made an important statement on future challenges and opportunities for the Alliance. It was a delicate moment, because of many allies' nervousness about the rapidity of change in Central Europe and because of differences about the pace and scope of European integration.

The President stressed the need for both NATO and the EC to be consolidated, not diluted, as we face a new era of change in Central and Eastern Europe. Western institutions and values were being vindicated (a point about which Gorbachev is quite sensitive and defensive), and the architecture of a new Europe should rest on these foundations.

The President also put on record his approach to German unification:

-- Self-determination should be pursued without prejudice to its outcome, neither endorsing nor excluding any particular vision of unity at this time.

-- Unification should occur in the context of the FRG's cont~~inued~~ commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated EC, and with due regard for the legal role and responsibilities of the Four Powers.

-- In the interests of general European stability, the move toward unification must be peaceful, gradual, and part of a step-by-step process.

-- On the question of borders, we should reiterate our support for the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

The President assured the allies that the United States intended to remain a significant military power in Europe so long as they needed us in a common defense effort. He reiterated U.S. support for the "continued, perhaps even intensified, effort" of the twelve EC nations to integrate, which would serve as a magnet for Eastern Europe. He encouraged other European common efforts, such as the Western European Union in the defense field.

Defense Budget Issues

You may have read some misleading accounts of our defense budget planning. The fact is, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings does put increasing pressure on DoD spending, and the new international environment will -- starting next year -- lead to an even more intense congressional effort to cut. At the same time, the changing strategic landscape warrants adjustments in our posture.

In balancing these factors, our immediate challenge is to ensure that our pace of restructuring is appropriate -- that we do not take hard-to-reverse actions based on anticipated or hoped-for changes in the environment, or trigger a spasm of uncoordinated unilateral cutbacks by our allies. For the near term we will, as much as possible, tie reductions in our own forces to negotiated agreements in START, CFE, and CW.

Over the longer term, we envisage our active armed forces being smaller, more global in their perspective, and less Eurocentric in their equipment, training, and doctrine. We will demand of these active forces a degree of agility, readiness, and sustainability appropriate to the likely regional contingencies. As a hedge against an uncertain future, we will build reversibility into our efforts wherever possible, investing in R&D and retaining substantial reserve forces (albeit at reduced readiness). We hope the FY91 defense budget will begin the transition toward this kind of military in an orderly way.

El Salvador

We are deeply troubled by the terrorism and political intransigence of the FMLN in El Salvador and the support it continues to receive from Nicaragua, Cuba, and indirectly the Soviet Union. The President has assured Salvadoran President Cristiani of our continued support. At the same time, he has made clear the absolute necessity for a prompt and thorough

investigation of the killing of the Jesuit priests and prosecution of the perpetrators, whoever they may be.

As I noted above, the President raised the problem of Nicaraguan and Cuban support for the FMLN very forcefully at Malta. We will continue to press the Soviets to stop the support of revolution in the hemisphere, to end the Sandinista military buildup, and to support a free election in Nicaragua.

In that regard, there are increasing signs that the Sandinistas are beginning to shrink the political space permitted to the Nicaraguan opposition. There have been numerous incidents of harassment of the opposition, including physical attacks by Sandinista thugs and the lifting of Vice Presidential candidate Godoy's parliamentary immunity. Nicaragua also announced that it would not permit an official U.S. election monitoring team, including Congressional members, to visit, despite explicit assurances to us. We will work to restart cease-fire talks with the Resistance, which the Sandinistas abruptly left several weeks ago.

The Philippines

In the early hours of the attempted military coup, a number of military units sat on the sidelines, presumably waiting to see which way the tide was moving. We quickly gave permission for General Ramos to use Clark AFB to ferry in troops for the fighting around Manila, and somewhat later agreed to fly cover over two rebel-controlled airfields to prevent rebel planes from taking off. These demonstrations of U.S. support were not only militarily useful, but I believe helped convince wavering units to support the government.

After eight days of fighting, the immediate military rebellion ended, but prospects for long-term political stability remain clouded. The government appears weakened and its legitimacy eroded, not only with the military but probably with wide segments of the Manila population. "People power," which President Aquino attempted to use against the latest coup, may be a spent force.

More than anything else, the rebel officers sought personal power, but they have also raised troublesome issues, such as: Ramos' fitness to lead the armed forces; the politicization of promotion; failure to pay the troops; the inability to defeat the NPA; corruption in the army, the government, and the President's family; the anti-military hue of Aquino's advisers; and the government's inability to solve the country's major problems.

Since February 1986, we have given substantial aid to the Philippines. The economy has grown at six percent a year, and the NPA has been at least contained. Yet, there have now been six separate armed challenges to Aquino, and the recent one probably would have succeeded without U.S. intervention. Things

are not working well in the Philippines. The army will need to be reorganized and retrained; corruption in government has become a major impediment to the institutionalization of democracy.

My Trip to China

President Bush sent Larry Eagleburger and me to China last week for several interrelated reasons. We have traditionally exchanged views with the Chinese, in good times and bad, on issues of international significance. The President's meeting with Gorbachev was clearly one of those occasions. There is, in addition, a leadership struggle taking place. We should not be trying to promote Chinese isolation at such a critical moment in the evolution of post-Mao China. And, finally, we went there as a gesture, an attempt to break the logjam and elicit some significant response on their part. They seemed to understand our point, but it remains to be seen whether this was enough to shake loose the policy deadlock in their leadership. If there is no significant movement on their part by the time the Congress reconvenes, we will be powerless to stop another downward spiral in relations occasioned by further Congressional action -- sure to come without a change in the climate.

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

Attachment
Tab A Proposals for Gorbachev

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
2121 Avenue of the Stars
34th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Brussels, Belgium)

For Immediate Release December 4, 1989

FACT SHEET

The President's Initiatives During the Malta Meeting

December 2 - 3, 1989

The President and Chairman Gorbachev exchanged views on a variety of issues during their meetings in Malta, including the remarkable events leading to peaceful and democratic change in Eastern and Central Europe.

The President noted his strong support for perestroika and suggested that the two leaders work to give major new impetus to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The President conveyed his strong personal commitment to this goal.

In this spirit, the President put forward the following ideas:

Next Steps

1. Holding the Summit in the United States during the last two weeks in June.

2. Having the next meeting of Foreign Ministers next month in the Soviet Union to prepare for the Summit.

Economics and Commercial Relations

1. Targeting the 1990 Summit for completion of a trade agreement granting Most Favored Nation status to the Soviet Union, so that the President can grant a Jackson-Vanik waiver at that time. To reach that goal, the President proposed beginning negotiations on a trade agreement now and urged the Supreme Soviet to complete action on its emigration legislation early next year.

2. Supporting observer status for the Soviet Union in GATT after the Uruguay Round is completed next year. The President urged the Soviet Union to use the intervening time to move toward market prices at the wholesale level so its economy will become more compatible with the GATT system.

3. Expanding U.S.-Soviet technical economic cooperation. The President presented a paper proposing specific economic projects, covering topics such as finance, agriculture, statistics, small business development, budgetary and tax policy, a stock exchange, and anti-monopoly policy.

4. Exploring with Congress the lifting of statutory restrictions on export credits and guarantees after a Jackson-Vanik waiver.

5. Beginning discussions of a bilateral investment treaty that would provide protections for American business people who want to invest in the Soviet Union.

6. Improving ties between the Soviets and the OECD, and East-West economic cooperation through the economic basket of the CSCE process.

Human Rights

Resolving all divided family issues by the time of the 1990 Summit. In this regard, the President handed over a list of people wishing to emigrate.

- more -

Regional Issues

Expressed disappointment with Soviet policy on Central America, noting it was out of step with the new Soviet direction domestically in Eastern Europe and in arms control. Nicaragua/Cuba remains the single most disruptive factor in the relationship.

Arms Control

1. Speeding achievement of a chemical weapons ban by offering to end U.S. production of binary weapons when the multilateral convention on chemical weapons enters into force, in return for Soviet acceptance of the terms of our UN proposal to ban chemical weapons.

2. Proposing to sign an agreement at the 1990 Summit to destroy U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons down to 20 percent of the current U.S. level.

3. Suggesting joint U.S.-Soviet support for a CFE Summit to sign a CFE treaty in 1990.

4. Accelerating the START process in order to resolve all substantive issues and to conclude a treaty, if possible, by the 1990 Summit. To this end, the President suggested that Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze concentrate on resolving at their January meeting three of the outstanding START issues: ALCMs, non-deployed missiles, and telemetry encryption.

5. Completing work on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) for signature at the 1990 Summit.

6. Proposing that the Soviet Union join efforts to constrain missile proliferation more effectively by observing the limits developed by the U.S. and its allies in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Military Openness

Making public more information on military programs. The President suggested that the Soviet Union make public the details of its military budget, force posture, and weapons production figures, just as the United States now does.

Olympics

Suggesting joint U.S.-Soviet support for Berlin as the site of the 2004 Olympic Games.

Environment

1. Hosting a conference next fall to negotiate a framework treaty on global climate change, after the working groups of the UN-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change submit their final report.

2. Convening an international meeting at the White House next spring for top level scientific, environmental, and economic officials to discuss global climate change issues. The President expressed hope that the Soviets will join us by sending their top officials in the field.

Student Exchanges

Increasing significantly university exchanges so that an additional 1,000 American and 1,000 Soviet college students are studying in each other's country by the beginning of the 1991 school year.

# # #

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 12, 1989

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
BOB GATES
PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN PWR

The letters to Nixon, Ford, and Reagan are identical. The letter to Carter is shorter and less candid.

N.B. If you make changes over there, please make sure they are made, as appropriate, in each letter. Better to let us make the fixes.

SECRET ATTACHED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 14, 1989

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILIP HUGHES Philip

SUBJECT: Carter Letter

We have incorporated all your changes into the letters for Nixon, Reagan, and Ford.

However, in the Carter letter (that was less candid) changes were made to the areas discussed. Please note that I included the more extensive changes in the Philippines and China paragraphs. I hope that is what you intend.

Carter —
lost
2 sections

Via Regular Mail

Done mc 12/15 11:00

12/14

Very Important

The Pres. letters must be matched up w/ the BS letters, once signed. They must go together.



Maria

Done mc 12/15/92 11:00