

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91117
Folder ID Number: 91117-005

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Afghanistan: 6 Months After the Soviet Withdraw (3 pp.)	9/6/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Afghanistan (1 pp.)	8/24/89	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	William W. Working to Brent Scowcroft Re: New Moscow Embassy (1 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to James A. Baker, III Re: Moscow Embassy (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Memo	William W. Working to Robert M. Gates Re: Moscow Embassy Report (1 pp.)	8/25/89	(b)(1)	S
02d. Report	Re: Moscow Embassy Building Issue (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Boris Yeltsin (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	S
04. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Regional Issues Discussions with the Soviets (3 pp.)	9/14/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: "Open Lands" Proposal (1 pp.)	9/19/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 5

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Collapse Files

Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap991

OA/ID Number: 91117-005

Date Closed: 2/20/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05b. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft, et.al. Re: Interagency Consensus Statement on "Open Lands" (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Curtis W. Kamman to PCC Participants Re: Consensus Paper on Modification of Travel Restrictions ("Open Lands") (1 pp.)	9/15/89	(b)(1)	S
05d. Paper	Re: Background and Rationale: Interagency Consensus (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05e. Talking Points	Re: Secretary's Talking Points on "Open Lands" (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05f. Cable	Re: Drafter... (1 pp.)	9/14/89	(b)(1)	
05g. Memo	Curtis W. Kamman to PCC Participants Re: Consensus Paper on Modification of Travel Restrictions ("Open Lands") (1 pp.)	9/15/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Who Lost Russia? (2 pp.)	9/20/89	(b)(1)	S
07. Outline	Re: Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (4 pp.)	9/20/89	(b)(1)	S
08. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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09. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	12/1/88	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (3 pp.)	9/19/89	(b)(1)	S
12. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Shevardnadze (1 pp.)	9/18/89	(b)(1)	S
13a. Memo	Robert Blackwill to G. Philip Hughes Re: Memorandum of Conversation with Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (1 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S
13b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (8 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S
14a. Memo	Robert Blackwill/Arnold Kanter to Brent Scowcroft Re: Gorbachev Letter (1 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S
14b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Gorbachev Letter (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
14c. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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15a. Memo	Philip Zelikow/Barry Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Messages to President Gorbachev and to Allied Leaders Informing Them of the President's CW Initiative (2 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S
15b. Message	Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
15c. Message	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
15d. Message	Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
15e. Message	Re: Message to Prime Minister Hawke from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
15f. Message	Re: Message to Heads of Government of All NATO Member States, Japan, and South Korea from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
16a. Cable	Re: Changes to Presidential Letter on COCOM Machine Tool Deliberations (1 pp.)	9/23/89	(b)(1)	S
16b. Memo	Jerry W. Leach to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Letter on Machine Tools (1 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S
16c. Draft Letter	From President Bush (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
16d. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Presidential Letter on Machine Tools (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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17. Cable	Re: CW - Message from President Bush (3 pp.)	9/23/89	(b)(1)	S
18a. Profile Sheet	Welch to Hughes Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	9/27/89	(b)(1)	S
18b. Memo	C. David Welch to G. Philip Hughes Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	9/27/89	(b)(1)	S
18c. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
18d. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	9/25/89	(b)(1)	S

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Afghanistan (1 pp.)	8/24/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

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AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	William W. Working to Brent Scowcroft Re: New Moscow Embassy (1 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

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I don't want
to send a memo -
D

I will raise it
with Baker

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to James A. Baker, III Re: Moscow Embassy (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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02c. Memo	William W. Working to Robert M. Gates Re: Moscow Embassy Report (1 pp.)	8/25/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

August 23, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Moscow Embassy Buildings Issue

Attached is a brief status report on the Moscow Embassy buildings issue for your use in bringing the President up to date.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Status report

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET
ATTACHMENT

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02d. Report	Re: Moscow Embassy Building Issue (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 7133

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓

SYSTEM PR5 NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOC CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>SP7</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>27-9/16</u>	<u>✓</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>NR</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: "Open Lands" Proposal (1 pp.)	9/19/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed: 2/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft, et.al. Re: Interagency Consensus Statement on "Open Lands" (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Memo	Curtis W. Kamman to PCC Participants Re: Consensus Paper on Modification of Travel Restrictions ("Open Lands") (1 pp.)	9/15/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed: 2/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Paper	Re: Background and Rationale: Interagency Consensus (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05e. Talking Points	Re: Secretary's Talking Points on "Open Lands" (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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"Open Lands"

With a view toward facilitating contact and interchange between the citizens of the United States and the citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of the United States of America proposes that the governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to modify existing travel restrictions by abolishing all "closed areas."

To implement these proposals, the Governments would further agree to maintain a system of notification of travel by official personnel resident in the host country and to ensure that those personnel continue to book accommodations and transportation through OFM and UpDK, respectively.

The Governments would retain the right to leave certain installations off-limits for reasons of security and safety.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05f. Cable	Re: Drafter... (1 pp.)	9/14/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed: 2/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05g. Memo	Curtis W. Kamman to PCC Participants Re: Consensus Paper on Modification of Travel Restrictions ("Open Lands") (1 pp.)	9/15/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 1375

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

RECEIVED

89 DEC 28 AID . 59

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

COMMENTS

WWD

I am not sure of
where the orig. is,
but BS responded
to this copy.

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

7396

September 20, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN 

SUBJECT: Who Lost Russia?

The Democrats have begun to criticize the Administration for failing to respond to the opportunities of a new period in East-West relations (Senator Mitchell, Peter Tarnoff, Dick Holbrooke, et al.). Most of this criticism is quite silly ("nostalgia for the Cold War," and the like), especially at a time when strategic trends -- the disabling if not disintegration of the Soviet empire -- couldn't be more favorable.

Nevertheless, I worry that we could face a more serious problem down the road. With Gorbachev now confronted by unrest and succession problems in both East Germany and the Ukraine, two of the most vital pillars of the empire, his own position must surely be more precarious than ever. I would bet that he's out of office within six months -- and that the Democrats assault George Bush for the historic blunder of not doing enough to save him and all the positive trends that he represented.

I was encouraged to hear from Bob Blackwill that at the Oslo IISS meeting, our European friends had dropped the argument that we needed to do more to help Gorbachev; the crises he was facing were now so obviously fundamental that no joint ventures, credits, or other Western goodies could make a big difference. Our own domestic debate, however, may not be so sophisticated. The bitterness of liberals if their hopes for an end to the Cold War have been dashed will undoubtedly find expression in blaming us, rather than in questioning their own illusions. It will be a genuine tragedy, but one should never underestimate the attraction of finding scapegoats. ("Who lost Russia?")

We need to give thought to how to position ourselves to avoid this, or what steps to take to preempt it. Little gestures, like treating Yeltsin at arm's length in order to ease Gorbachev's sensitivities, will not be enough. Perhaps Gates, Blackwill, Rice, and other wise heads should sit down with you to talk about this.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1584-MR
ES 6/10/13

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

2

We need, clearly, to educate people to the reality that the Soviet system is so inherently rotten that no Western help could save him; that powerful forces are at work whose unfolding is not the product of Western action or inaction.* We will need somehow to prepare the ground so that, if Gorbachev falls, it is understood as vindicating not only the prudence of the Administration but also the principles it espouses (vigilance, strong defense, etc.), which will be all the more important for U.S. policy amid the uncertainties of a post-Gorbachev period.

Concurrence by: Bob Blackwill, Condi Rice

*The echoes here of the Acheson White Paper on China (unconscious when I first drafted this) should remind us how difficult it can be to make such a case in a highly politicized debate.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Outline	Re: Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (4 pp.)	9/20/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
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RESTRICTION CODES

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Director, European and Soviet
Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Dmitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
V. Karpov, Deputy Foreign Minister
A. Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Ambassador
A. Obukhov, Chief, US and Canada Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
T. Stepanov, Assistant to the Foreign Minister
S. Tarasenko, Chief, General Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
G. Mamedov, First Deputy Chief, US and Canada Directorate,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Notetaker)
P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

DOOR

DOOR

The Cabinet Room

The President

Mr Blackwill
Amb Matlock
Mr Wolfowitz
Gov Sununu
Sec Baker
Gen Scowcroft
Mr Gates

Mr Seitz

Mr Stepanov

Mr Amb Dubinin

Mr Karpov

FM Shevardnadze

Mr Bessmertnykh

Mr Obukhov

Mr Tarasenko

Mr Mr Mamedov

DOOR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	12/1/88	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed: 2/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

7356

September 19, 1989

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

James A. Baker, III 

SUBJECT:

Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Overview

Shevardnadze's visit provides an opportunity to inject new momentum into our relationship with the USSR and to keep the Soviets focused on our broad agenda. Your meeting with the Minister -- your first encounter as President -- should set the tone for what I hope will be a highly productive Ministerial in Wyoming, one that launches a more intensive phase of high-level diplomacy leading up to your first summit with Gorbachev.

With the unique backdrop of the Grand Tetons, I intend to highlight the new opportunities we see for cooperation with Moscow on global problems like the environment, as well as pursue the full range of arms control and regional problems. The relaxed setting is consistent with the spirit of increased openness we have established in our dialogue, and which is the unifying theme of many of our proposals -- from Open Skies to CW verification.

The View from Moscow

Shevardnadze comes with domestic woes on his mind. Moscow had a rocky summer: the economic crisis worsened, widespread coal strikes erupted, and nationality troubles proliferated, especially in the Baltics. The nationality problem in particular is one that directly involves Shevardnadze. These domestic upheavals increase the urgency for Gorbachev of generating movement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Shevardnadze expressed unhappiness with the pace of relations in a September 11 Izvestiya interview, complaining that opportunities were being lost due to our "restrained, irresolute stance" and leveling particularly strong criticisms on START. A lot of this is posturing aimed at putting us on the defensive and focusing the relationship on arms control. But there is genuine uncertainty in Moscow's mind about where our relationship is heading, and whether we intend to hang back until the Soviet domestic picture clarifies.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1584-MR
23 610113

The letter from Gorbachev that Shevardnadze will be carrying is likely to challenge us to demonstrate our professed support for perestroika by adopting a more activist approach toward the USSR. We are told it will contain new arms proposals on START and, possibly, CFE to push us along. While we should not allow the Soviets to make arms control the centerpiece of this visit, you will want to assure the Soviet Foreign Minister of your desire to move forward as quickly as progress on the issues permits. You will also want to remind him that real progress in the relationship requires translating "new thinking" into action, for example, in Central America.

Our Perspective

Here in the U.S., there is broad consensus that we should take advantage of new opportunities offered by Gorbachev's reform effort, tempered by recognition of the need for caution given the reversibility of Soviet reforms over the long term. New and unique forms of contacts are developing between the U.S. and USSR, including with Soviet legislators and entrepreneurs eager to learn how to run a civil society. At the same time, there is concern about a possible violent crackdown in the Baltic republics and high levels of military assistance to Soviet clients. You will want to address both sides of the coin in frank terms with Shevardnadze.

The Ministerial

We will take up the entire five-part agenda in Wyoming, preceded by working group meetings in Washington. I will stress with Shevardnadze that the way the Gorbachev letter was handled is not conducive to progress. On arms control, we expect to make some concrete progress:

- o CW. We expect to finalize a memorandum of understanding establishing an early U.S.-Soviet data exchange plus visits and inspections of CW sites. Its completion will underscore the Administration's seriousness in the effort to eliminate chemical weapons.
- o Nuclear testing. We should be able to respond to the Soviet package proposal with a package of our own including hydrodynamic and seismic monitoring, on-site inspection and trigger levels, providing a real spur to the testing talks.
- o START. We hope to make headway on several verification and stability measures and sign an agreement on strategic exercise notification. We will want to see if movement is possible on some of the major unresolved issues, basing our approach in part on what the Gorbachev letter contains.

I intend to press for Shevardnadze's agreement in principle to your Open Skies initiative, and to underscore our interest in quickly wrapping up a conventional forces agreement.

As for regional issues, I will press Shevardnadze on the contradictions we are seeing between the rhetoric of "new thinking" and increasing Soviet arms transfers to clients, including Afghanistan, Cambodia and Ethiopia. In terms of specifics, Central America will top my agenda. Moscow has stated that it has provided no arms to Nicaragua since 1988; but Cuban and other East Bloc arms deliveries are way up this year. I plan to speak to Shevardnadze frankly on this: the Soviets have influence that they can use to curb their clients' actions; they should use it.

Afghanistan will head Shevardnadze's list. While rebuffing old proposals for an international conference and an arms halt (after they have massively supplied Kabul), I will make clear the ball is in the Soviets' court to get a process moving toward a comprehensive settlement: the first step in this must be Najibullah's departure. We will also review the situation in the Middle East and Cambodia.

On human rights, we are considering issuing a joint statement expressing the sides' intentions to broaden exchanges on human rights, humanitarian and social issues to include subjects like the rule of law, drug abuse, women's rights and interethnic relations -- areas in which the Soviets are reaching out to learn from our experience. While addressing this "new" agenda, we will keep pressing Shevardnadze on the old, reminding him that we expect Moscow to accelerate its efforts to resolve remaining divided family and refusenik cases.

Shevardnadze and I will bless a new work program covering a wide range of bilateral issues. We will also sign agreements on visa-free travel and a commission in the Bering Straits area.

Finally, in the transnational basket, we will introduce several new initiatives for expanded cooperation on the environment, including a plan to establish ecological research sites in both countries for joint research and monitoring global change.

The Question of a Summit

Ambassador Matlock reports that the Soviets expect we will propose specific dates for a summit during Shevardnadze's visit. Public expectations on this score are also rising, and further delay on the question risks conveying the mistaken impression that we are reluctant to engage with the Soviets at the highest level.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Shevardnadze (1 pp.)	9/18/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed: 2/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

09 SEP 19 4 9: 52

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 7356

ACTION OFFICER: RICE

DUE: 20 SEP

URGENT

- ☒ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi
☐ Prepare Memo _____ to _____

- ☐ Appropriate Action
☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 3912

FYI

- ☐ Basora
☐ Beers
☒ Blackwill
☐ Briggs
☐ Brooks
☐ Charles
☐ Coulson
☐ Deal
☐ Donley
☒ Dyke
☐ Ebner
☐ Grant
☐ Haass
☐ Hoffmann
☐ Hutchings
☐ Jackson
☐ LaMagna
☐ Kanter

FYI

- ☐ Lampley
☐ Leach
☐ Levin
☐ Lewis
☒ Mahley
☐ Mandel
☐ McCue
☐ Melby
☐ Menan
☐ Miller
☐ Miskel
☐ Needels
☐ Paal
☐ Pacelli
☐ Passage
☐ Popadiuk
☐ Porter
☐ Pryce

FYI

- ☐ Rademaker
☐ Reiss
☐ Rice
☐ Rodman
☐ Rostow
☐ Salvetti
☐ Snider
☐ Tilley
☐ Tobey
☐ Welch
☐ Whitley
☐ Working
☐ Zelikow
☒ GORDON
☐ _____
☐ _____
☐ _____
☐ _____

INFORMATION ☒ Hughes
☒ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Gates (advance)
☒ Secretariat

☐ Exec. Sec. Desk

☒ Sittman

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 2/20/09

Logged By 

~~SECRET~~

Return to Secretariat

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: *[Signature]*

LOG # 7300

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM *RRS* NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG *RR* A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u><i>W</i></u>	<u><i>A</i></u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u><i>SPB</i></u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u><i>5</i></u>		<u><i>A</i></u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u><i>OBE/air</i></u>

7 92 OCT 30
A = Action *7* Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres. meeting w/ Shevardnadze
9/21

on Hungary
as an option?

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907300
RECEIVED: 18 SEP 89 11

TO: HUGHES

CHRON FILE

FROM: BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 22 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
MEMCON

AP

PERSONS: SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ SHEVARDNADZE ON 21 SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES

DUE DATE: 21 SEP 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF: 8907356

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/20/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

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7300 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NOTED

September 22, 1989

CHRON FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Eduard
Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Soviet Union

The subject Memorandum of Conversation is attached at Tab I.
A separate Memorandum of Conversation will be submitted for the
President's more restricted discussion with Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By SS NARA, Date 2/26/24

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

7300 Add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000 - 0429-F
SS 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign
Minister of the Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, Ambassador to the Soviet
Union
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(notetaker)
Dmitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Viktor Karpov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Alexander Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign
Minister
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Ambassador to the United
States
A. Obukhov, MFA Chief of US and Canada
Directorate
T. Stepanov, Assistant to the Foreign
Minister
S. Tarasenko, MFA Chief of General
Secretariat
G. Mamedov, MFA First Deputy Chief of US and
Canada Directorate (notetaker)
P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME September 21, 1989, 2:00 p.m. - 3:05 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Let me welcome you to the United States. I am
delighted with the letter from President Gorbachev and was very

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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pleased to receive it. There is a great deal of interest across the country in your visit. I am pleased that you and Secretary Baker can continue your dialogue. We are very pleased with the preparations for this visit. (U)

I feel in a personal sense that I have a good relationship with President Gorbachev. We feel nothing but affection and warmth for him and I want him to understand this at a personal level. I hope he knows I want to accelerate this relationship. I can comment on your arms control proposals and Secretary Baker will later faithfully represent my views. There are no serious elements in the U.S. that want Soviet reforms to fail. Please reaffirm that to President Gorbachev, although I hope it is not necessary. We support perestroika and we do not want to complicate your reform efforts. In New York, President Gorbachev said some elements in the United States did not want perestroika to succeed. That does not include either me or my Administration. Please tell him that. We have confidence in him, and please do not place great weight on the gloomy forecasts sometimes heard in both our countries. The important thing is that the reforms continue. Between us, President Gorbachev and I can create a whole new fabric of U.S.-Soviet relations. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Thank you, Mr. President. On behalf of all my colleagues I would like to greet you here in the White House. This is my first meeting with you as President. You have made a personal contribution to U.S.-Soviet relations. I would like to convey to you most warm greetings from President Gorbachev and the leaders of the Soviet Union. I recall the meeting and good talk I had with you when I was Vice President, during the election campaign. The thoughts you expressed were captured in the phrase, "the new closeness." This fully reflects our concept of U.S.-Soviet relations at the current stage. (S)

During the last few years we have gone through an important period of establishing a level of mutual understanding. Having this positive experience in building our relationship, we can move to partnership where possible, and we are ready for this further stage. The INF treaty and the steps forward in bilateral relations, such as over 40 bilateral agreements signed in the last few years, demonstrate how far our relations, including people to people contacts, have come. (S)

We can be bolder. There has been an erosion in both of our countries in the image of the enemy. The atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations is quite different than when I became Foreign

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Minister four years ago, when the tone was so confrontational. Now, we are planning a joint statement on human rights. The Soviet Union is moving toward the highest standards in this area and we appreciate your support for holding the CSCE human rights conference in Moscow. The Supreme Soviet will soon adopt new legislation on entry into and exit out of the U.S.S.R. (P)

You spoke warmly of President Gorbachev. I would like to stress the important political asset represented in your personal relationship with President Gorbachev. Nothing must spoil or poison this trust. (P)

I would not wish to idealize our relationship, but one truth is elementary. Relations between states can only develop if there is domestic stability. Therefore, we appreciate the high degree of U.S. interest in democratization and renewal in the U.S.S.R. We have reassessed and condemned our previous policies quite a bit recently, but we will not wipe out or negate the accomplishments of the decades of our country. There are tragic events in our past which are difficult to explain. But the historical goal we have traversed is glorious and only on the basis of these accomplishments can we move forward on reform. We must not forget our two countries together saved world civilization in the Great Patriotic War. There is no alternative to perestroika. We have just completed a Central Committee plenum on the nationalities problem, a painful problem. We are a union of 15 states, as stated in our constitution, which poses special problems. We believe we have now adopted policies that ensure each state will be self-governing, and that will restore stability. We are creating a new political culture and we have made mistakes. But we do not see anything bad about this expanding political awareness. People in the Soviet Union are in favor of perestroika, although there are conservatives who oppose it. But our people believe in perestroika, want perestroika, and this process cannot be reversed. (P)

It is not easy to develop our new laws on the economy, including those on cooperatives -- which produced 6 billion rubles of goods last year. We are trying to reduce the incompatibility of our economy with those in the West. Thus, we have emphasized joint ventures, 1500 in all and 80 with the United States. I call your attention to all this work on our economic legislation because these developments should allow more economic interaction between us. We are not asking for aid from you. We want only equal cooperation. We have no doubt, to conclude, that perestroika will succeed. I know some of my friends say we have 5 months, or

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1 year, or 18 months and then we will collapse. This is not a serious view. I know my country, and predictions of catastrophe for perestroika are not serious at all. We will succeed. (Ø)

Let me say a few words about President Gorbachev's letter. In the past several months, we have moved forward in arms control. But the goal of 50% reductions in START remains to be achieved. The main theme in President Gorbachev's letter is that we must remove obstacles to agreement in Geneva on strategic arms. You were right when you said in your letter of June 20 that there is a conceptual gap on the ABM issue. We should stick to the Washington formulation and return to the subject after a START treaty is concluded. We will have to decide what is permissible under the ABM Treaty. Research and testing could be permitted except for ABM components. We would not insist on a fixed period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Our political decision to eliminate the Krasnoyarsk radar site demonstrates our commitment to the ABM Treaty. (Ø)

One important question remains and I would like to speak frankly. A year ago, your scientists visited the Krasnoyarsk radar. It would be good if our experts could visit your radars in Greenland and the United Kingdom. (Ø)

On the issue of SLCMs, the question is different. Important political decisions need to be taken. We should look at this problem in a broader way, in the effort to rid the seas of nuclear weapons. We hope you will join us in this effort. We should concentrate on verification, without which no progress is possible. A limit on SLCMs could be set by means of mutual obligations which would be made in connection with the treaty, but outside of it. (Ø)

On ALCMs and heavy bombers, we are ready not to count B-52s and other aircraft that are conventionally armed within the 1600 limit. These aircraft would be counted outside the 1600, perhaps with a limit of 100. The U.S. side should then accept a realistic counting of ALCMs and reaffirm a 600 kilometer range cut-off in defining such systems. There should be interim work on verification measures, as you have proposed, but covering all strategic offensive arms. We have the same approach to data exchanges. We hope to sign an agreement with notifications for strategic exercises. (Ø)

We do not see any insurmountable obstacles to agreement on nuclear testing, based on work already done. Work should be

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completed at the end of this year and can be signed at the Summit. (Ø)

We would like to ban fissionable material. I will discuss this with Secretary Baker. (Ø)

On chemical weapons, we should speed up work on a convention banning CW. Your personal interest and that of President Gorbachev will assist that effort. It would be good for us to set a target date to complete a treaty, in 1990 or 1991. (Ø)

On CFE, I will discuss this with Secretary Baker. We think we can get results, as you have suggested, in 6-12 months. We are ready to work together with you. We would like to have the 35 CSCE Foreign Ministers meet in 1990 to work on a treaty and, by the end of the year, hold a Summit to sign the agreement. (Ø)

In order to accelerate work in Vienna, we need to start negotiations on short-range nuclear forces. Conditions are ripe for such discussions. We could start moving toward elimination of these weapons. (Ø)

We are interested in your Open Skies plan. We shall participate in an international conference on this subject. We have some suggestions that we will put forward in Wyoming. (Ø)

Concerning regional problems, there is a great range of possibilities for cooperation: Lebanon, the Middle East, Central America, Asia, Cyprus, and other problems. I would like to discuss with Secretary Baker the situation in and around Afghanistan. This is very important to us. (Ø)

To conclude, Secretary Baker and I have already had useful meetings this year. We have developed a frank, businesslike relationship that makes it possible to discuss all complex problems and move toward solutions. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. I was hoping to hear such a broad treatment of the issues. On the regional issues, President Carter was here this morning discussing the upcoming elections in Nicaragua. The question of Nicaragua is a thorn in the side of our bilateral relationship. I want Secretary Baker to discuss this with you in detail in Wyoming. On the subject of Afghanistan, we have no interest in seeing an anti-Soviet regime installed in Kabul. Secretary Baker will elaborate on this. We should be able to find a solution to the Afghan problem. We need

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to make progress. (S)

On conventional forces, I am pleased with the Soviet willingness to see positive aspects in the NATO proposal. We want to move forward, keep the momentum. An early CFE agreement would be good. (S)

On START, we, despite what columnists here say, are interested in an early agreement that enhances stability and will reduce the risk of war. You are not going up against a stone wall in START. We are ready to move. Secretary Baker will go into this more later. (S)

Secretary Baker: I think the letter from President Gorbachev is interesting, but it does raise questions we will want to go into detail on in Wyoming. (S)

The President: On DST, a START treaty should not be held hostage to an agreement on Defense and Space, negotiations which should stand on their own. (S)

I appreciate what you said on chemical weapons and this is an area on which we must find a solution. Secretary Baker will discuss a new CW initiative on our part. If we can reach a CW agreement, we will greatly reduce our stockpile. Secretary Baker will give you the details. As we lead up to full ban, we can make major reductions in our respective stockpiles. (S)

I also appreciate your position on Open Skies. Secretary Baker will go into this in more detail. (S)

On the issue of nuclear testing, we have made good progress on verification, and I think decisions on our side will push forward the negotiations and allow us to finalize the nuclear testing treaties in the near future. (S)

Turning to the subject of perestroika, we are fascinated by the process of reform in your country. We have great respect for the principle of cultural autonomy. We are sensitive to the changes going on in the U.S.S.R. I do not want our interest, however, to be misunderstood, to complicate developments in the Soviet Union. This is a delicate issue, and needs to be handled carefully. (S)

It is important that you and Secretary Baker have a good, frank discussion about Eastern Europe. We think the Soviet leadership has handled the Polish situation admirably. We hope you feel the

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same way about our policy. We want to support changes toward democracy in Eastern Europe, but do not want to be reckless or silly about it. We also admire your policy approach toward Hungary. On Eastern Europe, I want us to be in such close touch that we do not misunderstand each other's intentions. (S)

We need to work on mutual problems together. I would love to hear your view on Cuba and Castro, who is so far behind the power curve. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I cannot promise that, but I will discuss Nicaragua, where I will stop after New York. This will be my first visit to Nicaragua, the first by a Soviet Foreign Minister. We want a free, fair election and the Nicaraguan leaders want that too. I want to say we are not sending weapons to Nicaragua. We gave our word and we have kept it. Before the election, there will be no arms supplies to Nicaragua. (S)

The President: I hope you will have a good talk with Secretary Baker on this problem. We are troubled by the flow of substantial arms shipments into Nicaragua. The arms are coming from somewhere. I do not question what you say, but we need to talk in detail with you about this. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It is one thing when a journalist makes such a charge, another when a U.S. official makes such a charge. We keep our word. (S)

Secretary Baker: You need to tell us who that official was and when the charge was made. The level of East bloc shipments to Nicaragua has increased and that is what we have said. If we said it was Soviet arms, then please give us chapter and verse. (S)

The President: We can iron this out, but we are concerned. The total amount of Bloc arms supplies to Nicaragua has increased. (S)

Secretary Baker: In a spirit of candor, we think arms are coming through Cuba and are East Bloc, including Soviet, in origin. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I have no reason to suspect the Cubans but, in any event, the Soviet Union cannot be held responsible for all countries with whom we have good relations. (S)

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The President: We appreciate your coming. You and Secretary Baker have much to talk about. (U)

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

Thanks
(B)

September 21, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER

OBE-NFAR

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Letter

As you asked, we attach a memorandum to the President on the Gorbachev letter and suggested talking points.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Gorbachev Letter

10/15
for Gen S - PR8 OBE

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 601 NARA, Date 11/21/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Gorbachev Letter

A copy of the letter from Gorbachev is attached. It concentrates exclusively on arms control issues and is silent on the other subjects on the U.S.-Soviet agenda, further evidence that Gorbachev sees arms control as his preferred center of U.S.-Soviet relations. The letter shows both Gorbachev's desire to move forward quickly on arms control and his willingness to make concessions in order to do so. It also demonstrates that despite his manifold internal difficulties, he still clearly has the capacity to force tough decisions out of the Soviet bureaucracy.

Following are highlights of the letter, our quick analysis, and suggested talking points.

Nuclear and Space Talks

Gorbachev suggests that we put aside until after the conclusion of a START treaty our arguments concerning whether SDI would promote or weaken strategic stability. The significance of this point is unclear, but he goes on to reiterate an old Soviet proposal to construct an agreed list of activities that would be permitted and prohibited under the ABM treaty. We have rejected this approach in the past as unverifiable and imposing restrictions on SDI beyond those contained in the ABM treaty.

Gorbachev then makes what seem to be two important concessions. First, he indicates Soviet willingness to drop their insistence on a fixed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty, but the letter is unclear whether this is contingent on U.S. acceptance of the Soviet proposal for an agreed list of permitted and prohibited activities. Second, he says he has decided to eliminate the Krasnoyarsk ABM radar. We have declared this radar to be illegal under the ABM treaty and have been pressing the Soviets to dismantle it, something until now they have

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refused to do. He adds that he expects the U.S. to reciprocate by meeting Soviet concerns regarding U.S. radars in Greenland and Great Britain, radars we believe are fully within the confines of the ABM treaty.

With regard to nuclear SLCMs, he repeats the Soviet desire to focus on verification and says that Shevardnadze will be taking this up with Jim Baker. We have told the Soviets that SLCM limits are unverifiable, but that we are willing to listen to any new idea. He hints broadly that the Soviets will be prepared during the Wyoming Ministerial to compromise on the treatment of ALCMs in START.

He agrees that our proposed package of verification and stability measures is useful but insists that it be expanded to cover all of the systems limited by START, not just the ones of interest to the U.S. Our approach has been more limited, seeking agreement on those systems on which the two sides already have narrowed their verification differences in Geneva (e.g. MIRVed mobile ICBMs, telemetry encryption). The Soviets seem to want to use this exercise to get our agreement through the back door to their broader START positions. If the final details can be worked out, Jim Baker will sign in Wyoming an agreement in principle to pursue verification and stability measures, without resolving the differences noted above.

Nuclear Testing

Gorbachev confirms the Soviet concessions to our verification requirements and expresses the hope that you and he can sign the verification protocols of the 1974 and 1976 Nuclear Testing Treaties in his Summit meeting with you. With your new decisions on this subject, Jim Baker should be able to narrow the differences between the two sides in Wyoming enough so that you can sign the protocols in the near future.

The letter proposes that the two sides should phase out the production of all weapons-grade plutonium by the year 2000. The U.S. has not produced plutonium for some time, while the Soviets have maintained a substantial capability. We will have to look at this one carefully since it has been a controversial issue in the past.

Chemical Weapons

Gorbachev indicates his hope that the two sides can sign a Memorandum of Understanding on a CW data exchange and verification experiment. (This MOU should be signed in Wyoming.) In addition he suggests that the U.S. and the Soviet Union make a joint appeal that a CW multilateral convention be concluded in

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Geneva in 1990 or 1991. You will be previewing your CW initiative with Shevardnadze and may wish to defer whether to set such a specific deadline until we receive the Soviet reaction.

Conventional Force Reductions

In pursuit of your ambitious CFE timetable, Gorbachev proposes Ministerial meetings in Vienna to push the negotiations along and a Summit of the twenty-three CFE nations in the second half of 1990 in order to sign a CFE agreement. It is unclear now whether such Ministerials will be necessary or desirable, but we should not foreclose the possibility. As for a CFE Summit, such a meeting would probably occur if we can conclude a treaty. But a CFE Summit that was designed instead (as the Soviets have earlier proposed) to resolve remaining issues in the talks would be a madhouse.

The letter hints at Soviet flexibility on including in reductions more of their aircraft in Europe. If this does represent real movement in the Soviet position, it will help narrow the large gap between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on which aircraft should be included in the CFE reductions and limitations.

SNF

Unsurprisingly, Gorbachev would like to begin now discussing how to remove all SNF from Europe. As he mentioned in his Strasbourg speech, Gorbachev notes he is considering major unilateral reductions in Soviet SNF.

Open Skies

Gorbachev welcomes your Open Skies proposal and agrees to participate in an international conference to work out the regime.

Talking Points

- I have read President Gorbachev's letter which you were kind enough to deliver to me before this meeting.
- Although we will, of course, have to study it with great care, it is clear the letter represents a serious effort by President Gorbachev to move our arms control agenda forward quickly. For that I am grateful.
- Particularly welcome is the Soviet decision to dismantle Krasnoyarsk; your willingness to drop your insistence on a fixed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty; and your

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agreement to work together on a package of START verification and stability measures.

- I agree with Mr. Gorbachev that we should be able to move forward quickly to complete the verification protocols on nuclear testing.
- In addition, I am pleased that you are willing to work intensively to narrow NATO and Warsaw Pact differences on reducing and limiting aircraft within a CFE agreement.
- And, I am particularly delighted that the Soviet Union has decided to participate in an Open Skies conference. Such a regime could do much to increase openness and confidence between East and West.
- As for chemical weapons, Secretary Baker will be working with you to resolve the remaining differences on the Memorandum of Understanding. He also will be going over with you the details of my major new effort that I will present to the UNGA on Monday to move quickly to a global CW ban.
- Secretary Baker will be discussing all these matters with you in Wyoming and I will naturally be responding myself to President Gorbachev's letter in due time.
- For the moment, I would appreciate it if you would convey to President Gorbachev my pleasure at receiving his letter, my recognition of its importance and my determination to work with him in order to strengthen the U.S.-Soviet relationship and promote international peace and stability.

Attachment
Tab A

Gorbachev Letter

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Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I think that the letter you sent me on June 20 opens a new and important stage in our private exchanges. I share your view that direct contacts between us are indispensable, particularly as regards exchanges on the substance of the most important problems whose solution would advance relations between our two countries and strengthen international security.

Negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, with which your letter is concerned, unquestionably require our priority attention both as the essential component in the efforts to reduce the risk of war in general and as assurance of continuity in the historic process of real nuclear disarmament which we started by signing the landmark INF Treaty.

We in the Soviet Union believe--and the round of the Geneva talks which ended in August has confirmed this--that progress achieved thus far provides good groundwork on which to build. Our approaches have quite a lot in common, as has already been recorded in joint documents adopted at summit meetings and in the documents being worked out at the talks. In a word, as you put it, the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement. This is a very important political statement, binding on both sides.

At the same time there are issues of a fundamental nature which remain unresolved, thus impeding the conclusion of a treaty on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. I urge you to focus on their solution. I think that at present the talks have reached a critical point, which requires bold political decisions that would bring them to an early successful completion.

In your letter you address the principles of strategic stability. Indeed, removing incentives for first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving preference to systems with higher survivability are important guidelines for the NST talks. I am convinced that we must adhere to them both during the talks on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and at the talks which should follow them to consider even deeper and more radical cuts in the context of strategic stability.

One more general consideration: For a long time the development of the strategic armed forces of our two countries was influenced by geographical and other factors that led to the emergence of significant differences as to their structure. In seeking agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms we must of course, regard with understanding those special features of each side. We must find common denominators which, while taking account of the differences in the structure of our strategic arms, would result in strengthening strategic stability.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the
United States of America

To turn now to some specific issues of the NST talks.

You note in your letter that we are divided by a conceptual gap on the questions of ABM and space. Is there a way out of this situation? I think it can be found if the problem is approached more pragmatically.

The important thing here is to continue to abide by the understanding regarding the ABM Treaty which was reached in December 1987 at the Washington summit, namely to observe the Treaty as signed in 1972.

I wish to propose the following: Let us set aside, for the time being, our conceptual argument about whether the placing of weapons in outer space and the deployment of ABM systems will strengthen strategic stability or have an opposite effect. Let us not make more difficult the already complex NST talk by pressing this issue. We could go back to it at the talks on strategic stability, right after the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. We have already agreed to hold such talks.

We also continue to differ in our understanding of what is prohibited and what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Even though I am convinced that our interpretation is correct, we will evidently fail to make headway if we continue arguing along old lines. The way out, as we see it, would be to attempt to define specifically what can be done within the framework of the ABM Treaty.

The discussion of the question of establishing a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has also taken on the character of a conceptual debate. In order to facilitate the solution of other issues at the talks we could drop our insistence on our proposal for such a fixed period of non-withdrawal.

The Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State could, if the above considerations prove to be acceptable, work out on their basis appropriate instructions for our delegations at the NST talks.

As we understand, difficulties remain in connection with the so-called issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar. On several occasions I offered various solutions which, in our view, could remove the concerns of the US side. Unfortunately, they have failed to reach their goal. In order to clear up completely the path toward the early conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, we have taken a radical decision--to completely eliminate that facility. We would expect that the US side will reciprocate so as to remove our concerns related to the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

As regards the questions related directly to strategic offensive arms, the greatest difficulties concern long-range SLCMs. Breaking the deadlock in this issue is long overdue. This, as I see it, calls for a major political decision to trade off our mutual concerns. This problem should be analyzed jointly once again, among other things from the standpoint of a broader approach to the problem of naval armaments.

A productive dialogue on that problem should begin at long last at the NST talks. Your side is invoking the difficulties of verification. Why not focus at these talks on the problem of verification with regard to nuclear SLCMs, while the problem of limiting them could be solved taking account of the results of the work on verification. Eduard Shevardnadze is prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail with the Secretary of State. And you and I could return to this question, if necessary, at our upcoming meeting.

The problem of ALCMs also remains unresolved although some approaches to its solution began to emerge during the last round. It is obvious that the issues related to ALCMs and heavy bombers must be dealt with as a package. In so doing it is important not to allow the possibility of eroding the ceiling of 6000 warheads. I think that this knot can be untied already in the course of this ministerial meeting.

Finally, the questions of verification. It appears that we can note our common desire to ensure maximum confidence of the two sides that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms will be observed. Your idea of testing verification methods prior to its conclusion appears to be useful. At the same time this can hardly be achieved effectively if a selective method is used, under which monitoring the facilities for the production of strategic offensive arms would apply to mobile ICBMs only.

Clearly, under the treaty itself verification will cover all arms falling within the category of strategic offensive arms and verification obligations must be equal so as to rule out a one-sided approach. Therefore, trial verification measures should be tested with regard to any kind of strategic offensive arms to be covered by the future treaty. This would provide reliable guarantees of compliance.

We advocate a similar approach to the question of data exchange on strategic offensive arms. We are also prepared to accept familiarization visits on the basis of reciprocity.

I believe that an agreement in principle could be reached between our two countries at foreign minister level concerning the preparation of trial verification and stability measures and their implementation as they become ready. In the course of the upcoming round of the NST talks specific parameters and procedures for carrying out such trial measures could be negotiated.

It would seem that an agreement on notifications regarding major strategic force exercises, which is virtually ready, could be signed at this ministerial meeting.

I wish now to address two more problems that deal with the set of nuclear issues.

The first one concerns our nuclear testing talks. It seems to me that our acceptance, at the latest round of the talks, of using the CORTEX method to monitor all nuclear tests above the agreed yield threshold, as the US side had insisted, makes it possible to bring the first stage of these talks to the concluding phase. I hope that our US partners will now look in the same unbiased way at the verification procedures that we propose. If during the ministerial meeting the two sides

recorded their fundamental understanding regarding the verification mechanism, instructions could then be given to our respective delegations at the Geneva talks to complete as soon as possible--in any case before the end of the year--work on the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties and to prepare them for signing at our meeting. I also think that it is time for us to give general consideration to the guidelines for further restrictions on the yield and number of tests, which we are going to set for our delegations as their goal for the second stage of the talks.

The other problem to which I would like to call your attention has to do with the possibility of starting talks to ban the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Today, as we see it, we have a favorable situation--the United States has actually ceased the production of fresh weapon-grade plutonium while the Soviet Union has adopted a program for phasing out before the year 2000 all the industrial reactors used to produce weapon-grade plutonium. Eduard Shevardnadze will inform the US side about the specific details of the program. I want to point out that we are ready to speed up its implementation in the event of matching reciprocal steps on your part.

In these circumstances our two countries could address in practical terms the problem of a verifiable cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissionable materials. As a first step we could even now instruct our experts to consider jointly the issues related to the mechanism of mutual verification of such a measure. It is our view that the reciprocal cessation of the production of fissionable material not only would help to strengthen predictability in the strategic field, but would also make it possible for both sides to solve--at a much lower cost--a large number of environmental problems involved in the operation of nuclear production complexes.

Another priority issue--and we seem to be of one mind on this-- is the conclusion of a global and effectively verifiable convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We welcome your statement that every effort must be made to achieve such a prohibition. In this, our approaches coincide.

I also wish to note with satisfaction that during the last two rounds of bilateral consultations progress was made toward achieving this goal. I hope that our ministers will be able during their current meeting to sign a memorandum of understanding on a bilateral verification experiment.

We have also decided to take an additional step to accommodate the US position by agreeing to the inclusion of saxitoxin and ricin into the relevant list under the convention.

The multilateral talks on the convention have now entered a crucial phase. At the same time they still seem to lack a sense of purpose. Perhaps this is due to some extent to the fact that there is no agreed date by which the negotiators would seek to complete the preparation of the convention. Why shouldn't our two countries take an initiative here by issuing a joint appeal to conclude the convention as early as 1990 or 1991? Such a time limit seems to be quite realistic.

Mr. President, there is another issue which calls for the personal efforts of the two of us. I am referring to the reduction of conventional armed forces. Actually, both you and I took these talks into our own hands when we proposed the initiatives which are now paving the way to resolving the problems which for decades have poisoned East-West relations. It is precisely those political decisions taken at the highest level that have made it possible for the Vienna talks to take an unprecedented start and make very good headway.

You took a bold step, Mr. President, by proposing that the talks be completed within six to twelve months, which is an unheard-of challenge. Well, we accept it, even though I will say frankly that it will not be easy to do it.

But if you and I want to give effect to those commitments we must work out a kind of strategy for speeding up the Vienna talks. We could perhaps agree between ourselves and with the other participants from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to convene in the second half of 1990 a summit meeting in order to sign the agreement on conventional arms, to be attended by all the leaders of the European states. I am confident that such a European conference would be unprecedented as regards its results.

To that end we should instruct our foreign ministers to intensify work to find solutions to outstanding issues. Perhaps it will take two or three meetings between our ministers and the ministers from other states concerned which participate in the Vienna talks; meetings not for making speeches but to find solutions to outstanding issues.

For example, why not hold the first such meeting in Vienna early next year to review the principal difficulties holding up the talks?

We have duly appreciated agreement by the United States and other NATO countries to reduce combat aircraft. This is an important step toward accommodating the position of the Warsaw Treaty. But let me say frankly that it fails to address our serious concern regarding air defense aircraft based in the European territory of the Soviet Union and intended only to protect vital facilities against possible air strikes from various directions. They do not have the capability to strike ground targets. Those aircraft are not part of the surprise attack capability. We are prepared to give American experts an opportunity to see for themselves that that is precisely the case. In order to resolve this issue we could agree to set a certain limit for such aircraft, which would not include frontline fighters. Of course, we expect that there should not be any buildup of systems which these aircraft are intended to counter.

In the context of the likely breakthrough at the Vienna talks we believe it is possible even now to begin discussing the question of a gradual removal of the tactical nuclear component from the European military equation. All the more so since we understand that in Brussels the NATO countries gave their agreement in principle to such discussions. I would like to inform you that with due regard for this evolution in NATO's

position, the Soviet Union, as I already said in Strassbourg, is considering the possibility of further major unilateral reductions in its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe.

And now the last point. We welcome your proposal concerning an "open skies" regime which would provide for mutual overflights by unarmed aircraft over the territories of the USSR and the United States and their Warsaw Treaty and NATO allies for the purpose of monitoring their military activities, and we agree to take part in an international conference to discuss issues involved in establishing such a regime.

I think that we are now on the threshold of mutually acceptable agreement. But you and I together will have to cross that threshold. And we can do so if we take into account each other's fundamental concerns.

In closing, Mr. President, I wish to express my willingness for further exchanges on the issues addressed here and the hope that they will advance the cause of peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

M. Gorbachev

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907529
RECEIVED: 25 SEP 89 07

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ZELIKOW
LOWENKRON
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 22 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

CW



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MSG TO PRES GORBACHEV & ALLIED LEADERS RE CW INITIATIVES

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT	DUE DATE: 28 SEP 89	STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW / LOWENKRON	LOGREF:	
FILES: PA	NSCIF:	CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
GORDON
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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Caf NARA, Date 2/20/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEF CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 8907529

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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X 89092813 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/20/09

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National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 7529

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	APNSA Has Seen	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>Σ4.9/28</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
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A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

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N = No further Action

FAXED
TO
SCOWCROFT
IN
K-PORT

ILSG to
Gorbachev
Re CW

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15a. Memo	Philip Zelikow/Barry Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Messages to President Gorbachev and to Allied Leaders Informing Them of the President's CW Initiative (2 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed: 2/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15b. Message	Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15c. Message	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15d. Message	Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15e. Message	Re: Message to Prime Minister Hawke from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15f. Message	Re: Message to Heads of Government of All NATO Member States, Japan, and South Korea from President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

UNKNOWN FILE

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907502
RECEIVED: 22 SEP 89 10

TO: HUGHES

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ECONOMICS
USSR

COCOM

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES LTR RE MACHINE TOOLS

ACTION: RECD CY OF STATE CABLE

DUE DATE: 26 SEP 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LEACH

LOGREF: 8907602

FILES: PA

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
LEACH

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/20/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 4 OF 4

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16a. Cable	Re: Changes to Presidential Letter on COCOM Machine Tool Deliberations (1 pp.)	9/23/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 3

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # 08

DTG 222025Z

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX #

RELEASER PL

ROUTINE

FROM/LOCATION

1. G. PHILIP HUGHES

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. GENERAL STANCAFT / K' PAM

2.

3.

4.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Caf NARA, Date 2120/09

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

DELIVER TO NSC OFFICE IMMEDIATE UPON RECEIPT
7502

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16b. Memo	Jerry W. Leach to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Letter on Machine Tools (1 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16c. Draft Letter	From President Bush (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16d. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Presidential Letter on Machine Tools (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907552
RECEIVED: 25 SEP 89 11

CHRON FILE

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
HS

CW

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MSG FM PRES BUSH TO GORBACHEV RE CW INITIATIVE

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 28 SEP 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
DEAL
GORDON
MERCHANT
RICE
RODMAN
ROSTOW
WORKING

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 2/20/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 8907552

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 89092512 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/20/09

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Cable	Re: CW - Message from President Bush (3 pp.)	9/23/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (September 1991)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

7560

September 25, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK D. McCLURE

FROM: ROBERT M. GATES *RJ.*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Bipartisan Leadership Meeting,
Tuesday, September 26, 1989

Attached are suggested talking points for the President's use at his meeting scheduled for Tuesday with the bipartisan Congressional leadership.

They cover the talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the CW initiative, the DoD bills, and Central America.

Attachment
Tab A Presidential Talking Points

cc: Jim Cicconi

POINTS TO BE MADE
BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP MEETING
September 26, 1989

7560

Talks with Shevardnadze

- The Gorbachev letter and the Shevardnadze discussions both showed a new Soviet seriousness and willingness to help solve problems.

- The exchanges with Shevardnadze were marked by a real candor and spirit of openness, with relatively little Soviet attempt to score debating points or play for headlines. We're confident that cooperation can be expanded at a steady pace, recognizing that we'll continue to have fundamental differences.

- The USSR is going through some internal problems. We made clear that we hope for the success of reform. At the same time our best course in U.S.-Soviet relations is a steady one, seeking to make progress that serves our interests.

- I look forward to a productive **Summit** with Gorbachev next spring or summer. However, I do not regard that meeting as any deadline for reaching agreement on outstanding issues. We'll take the time we need to do it right.

- The Soviets shifted toward our positions in START. First, they promised to dismantle **Krasnoyarsk**. Second, they dropped **formal linkage** between a Defense and Space agreement and a START agreement, although they consider that a de facto connection remains. This looks better, but we'll need to read and analyze the fine print.
- This opens the way to rapid progress on START and also lets us pursue the promise of SDI.
- We also heard back from the Soviets on our package of **START verification** and stability measures. We signed one agreement on notification of strategic air exercises as well as an "umbrella agreement" that endorses the concept.
- Our willingness to lift the ban on mobile ICBMs, contingent on Congressional approval of funding for our 2 missile programs, made it possible for us to move ahead in Wyoming on developing verification measures for mobile missiles.
- We agreed on the full verification regime for the 1974 and 1976 **nuclear testing treaties**. I'm hopeful we can wrap them up next year.
- On **CFE**, the Soviets endorsed our goal of completing an agreement within a year. They also showed some movement on

aircraft limits, but there's still a long way to go on that issue.

- The Soviets agreed to attend an international conference on my **Open Skies** proposal, but it's not clear whether they are serious about speedy implementation or will try to make it unworkable.
- We also signed an MOU covering **chemical weapons data exchange** and verification experiments. This is a solid, realistic step toward the larger task of an effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

Chemical Weapons Initiative

- Our **new CW initiative**, too, should bring us closer to my long-standing goal of a global ban.
- In essence, it's a commitment to eliminate 98 percent of our CW stockpile within eight years after the multilateral ban is signed. It also challenges the Soviets to agree to an immediate bilateral reduction to a level less than 20 percent of the current U.S. stockpile.
- We'll continue to insist on verification provisions we need to protect our security.

- I need your continued support for **CW modernization** so that the sharply reduced stockpile we'll have over the next several years is as safe and effective as possible.

Other Ministerial Subjects

- Jim and Shevardnadze had a frank discussion on **regional conflicts**. In fact, there's a disturbing trend these days in Soviet policies in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and especially Central America. The heavy flow of weaponry, and unhelpful policies in some of the negotiations, are quite dangerous; they could do harm to overall U.S.-Soviet relations.
- On other issues: We agreed on exchanges of experts to address **environmental** problems, and coal safety and fire safety.
- We began to broaden the **human rights** agenda to discuss reform of the Soviet legal code.
- We proposed an "**Open Lands**" initiative, to free up diplomats' travel in both our countries.
- In sum, I'm very pleased with what the Soviets agree was one of the most useful ministerials in many years.

Defense Bills

- Our success with the Soviets is not an accident; it's the result of a consistent policy that combines strength with a willingness to negotiate. What we need now -- at this critical moment of opportunity -- is a steady course in both respects. It is not the time to dismantle our strategy of deterrence or our defenses.
- Now is exactly the wrong time to abandon our strategic modernization program. Yet that is the approach that some in Congress are taking to next year's defense bills.
- Generally pleased with **Senate** actions. They took responsible -- if very difficult -- positions on the V-22 Osprey and the F-14D. They recognized the importance of strategic modernization and supported the B-2, rail garrison basing for Peacekeeper, and Small ICBM.
- But the Senate Appropriations Committee cut SDI too deeply and deleted all funding for Trident D-5 missile production. Those actions, if allowed to stand, would seriously jeopardize our security. They are unacceptable.

- **House** is another matter. Some members seem out to dismantle our strategy, but have none of their own.
- House wants to gut SDI by cutting \$1.8 billion. House cuts in B-2 would have perverse effect of increasing the total cost \$3.5 billion.
- House would cancel the Small ICBM program and delay mobile redeployment of Peacekeeper for two years. This would make it impossible to follow through on our offer to drop the START ban on mobile ICBMs.
- We made the hard decisions to present to Congress an affordable, coherent defense program that provides security we need now and looks ahead to the next century. Actions by the House threaten our future and undermine arms control.
- Conferences will be tough. Many of these issues cannot be resolved by splitting the difference. I call on all the conferees to take the hard, responsible actions. If the conference bills resemble the House versions, I will seriously have to consider a **veto**.
- Negotiations on strategic arms resume this week in Geneva. Don't undercut me now, just when the Soviets have made some important moves. Don't let the Soviets think Congress will

give them a better deal than they could negotiate. Don't abandon our mobile programs in the face of two **deployed** Soviet mobile missiles. Don't walk away from the penetrating bomber and the most significant technological breakthrough in combat aircraft we have seen in decades.

-- Stand with me to present a united front to the Soviets. We are optimistic about the future -- but we must be realists. The tone is changing, the threat has not.

Central America

- Jim Baker began consultations with you last week in the spirit of the Bipartisan Accord; we need to move quickly to obtain legislation and to intensify election monitoring.
- If there is to be real peace, the Nicaraguan people must have free choice to decide their own destiny. For that, there must be not only an honest count on election day but a **level playing field** through the whole campaign.
- Our help can go a long way in support of the election process, without stigmatizing the opposition.
- I seek your support for **\$9 million** in reprogrammed AID funds; up to \$5 million of which is for NED to cover the opposition's non-campaign needs, with the other \$4 million for non-partisan technical support for the election process.
- Some of our aid may go to the Supreme Electoral Council, but we'll make every effort to ensure it goes only for non-partisan technical support of the election.
- We are **not** seeking **covert aid**, but I strongly oppose legislation which would prohibit covert aid.
- Wednesday, I will announce formation of a **Presidential Election Monitoring Commission**, drawn from the Congress and other distinguished citizens.
- We strongly support the principle that the Sandinistas should welcome all observers and give them free access.
- We should continue to provide **humanitarian aid to the Resistance** through the elections, while assisting those who feel it is safe for them to return earlier.

- An aid cutoff would only lead to a contentious debate here that would distract attention from the election, and could cause the Resistance to resume fighting.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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*Donna - make
copies for Brent
LJ*

September 25, 1989

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PR*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Bipartisan Leadership Meeting,
Tuesday, September 26, 1989

Attached, for you to transmit to Fred McClure, are requested talking points for the President's use tomorrow at his scheduled meeting with the bipartisan Congressional leadership. They cover the talks with Shevardnadze, the CW initiative, the DoD bills, and Central America.

Concurrence by: *PR* { Condi Rice, Arnie Kanter, John Gordon, and
fw { Dave Pacelli, and Bret Coulson
BC

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Fred McClure at Tab I transmitting the President's talking points.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Fred McClure
Tab A Presidential Talking Points



September 27, 1989

*Thanks. D*Nat'l Sec Advisor
has seenINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PR*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Address to Central Committee Workers,
September 21

Attached is a short speech by Gorbachev on September 21, which is interesting because it encapsulates some themes that crop up in many of his recent statements:

- complaints about his opponents;
- defensiveness about whether he is strengthening or weakening the Party;
- appeals for order and discipline; and
- a deliciously quotable line about how, as the military is cut quantitatively, it is being rearmed qualitatively so that "in this way we are not permitting the overall level of our defense capability to be weakened in any degree."

Concurrence by: *CR* Condoleezza Rice + Robert *BLACKWILL*

Attachment

Tab I Gorbachev Speech
September 21, 1989

Political & Social

Gorbachev Meets Central Committee Workers 21 Sep

Speech to Workers Published

PM2409193189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Sep 89 First Edition p 2

[TASS report on M.S. Gorbachev speech at 21 September meeting at CPSU Central Committee with "a group of workers and collective farm members belonging to the party's central elected organs", published under the general heading "More Organization and Order in the Struggle for Perestroika": "M.S. Gorbachev's Closing Address"]

[Text] It is not merely for the sake of form, but because it is appropriate that I say that I am satisfied that we have spoken so frankly. Perhaps some of you think that those "at the top" do not know everything? No, Comrades, we do. The present leadership knows the situation, takes it to heart, and goes through it all together with you.

Who most of all would like the changes and the renewal to improve and speed up, if not the party and its leadership? That is why there should be no reservations here between us. You have surely seen that for yourselves in the Central Committee. We keep our finger on the pulse of life and we sense it well. Armed with extensive information, we make decisions of a political nature in a number of areas: in the sphere of the economy, in the sphere of ideology, in matters relating to the political reform, and the activity of the party itself. What is the general thrust of these decisions? What is our position here? I am going to tell you about that bluntly, Comrades.

First and most important: We shall not back down from the methods that we have chosen in our revolutionary restructuring, even though there are many sly attempts here to divert us. We will develop our country on the basis of those values which were laid down in October. There will be no deviations. We will develop and enrich socialism and truly make it the system of the working people and for the working people, the system in which every worker and working man feels confident and knows that he is not a bystander, but the active creator of all things and that he is involved in everything. That is the main point, the main philosophy of perestroika: Do everything to ensure that people feel needed in society and able to fully realize their potential.

It all seems simple. But the simplest thing is often also the most complex. We had no ready-made formulas and answers as to the shortest route in implementing our ideas. That is why our position was so difficult from the viewpoint of how to translate the policy of perestroika into the real forms of life. But now we are gaining experience—albeit not without making mistakes. We have adopted a fundamentally correct Law on Enterprise. It is aimed at ensuring that people themselves are in charge in their own area of work. Yet here, too, some people have used that law for their own narrow, egoistic and group purposes. Some people want to increase income and wages more quickly—even at the expense of production funds—forgetting that they need these funds, which must be renewed without fail, to pay for their present and future work.

The implementation of the political reform is also proving difficult. In principle it improves all of society and liberates its spiritual potential. But at the same time, coincidentally, this healthy process is accompanied by negative manifestations which worry us all today. Thus here, too, there must be adjustments. I shall be blunt: Many problems are occurring because we did not have answers ready for all the questions thrown up by life and perestroika. Let us seek those difficult answers together. Such is the logic of life and the development of any society. For example, we did not immediately reach the conclusion that, unless the question of ownership and of the use of various forms of socialist property was resolved, things would not work.

When raising the questions of the economic autonomy of the republics or other administrative formations and of the economic autonomy of enterprises, we must look into all these things thoroughly and fundamentally. But we must do this, mindful of the fact that enterprises in our country are bound by thousands of vital production links which took years to create. And that is why we must not thoughtlessly sever or separate these links as we go along. Neither serious politicians nor serious economists can act like that. Thus we must continue working resolutely, making the necessary adjustments and resolving questions promptly as they occur. That is the first point.

The second point: I receive and take in all your information, advice, and requirements, especially as all that you have said is not just your view—you have brought the feelings of thousands of people here with you. Indeed, we all must improve discipline in the country now in order to increase order in general. In order to do that, however, it is necessary to not only use economic mechanisms, but also the force of law and of party and educational influence, including influence via the press, television, and radio. The questions that you have raised are good. They are fair. They reflect all of society's concern that our ship should steer a steady and true course.

I entirely share your concern of the party's situation and its role in perestroika. You know that this theme is ever-present in my public statements and conversations.

First of all I will say that those who try to attack the party also undermine perestroyka and stability in society. I am not saying this because we are all Communists here, members of the Central Committee, or even because I am general secretary, with certain official obligations. No. It is because it is appropriate, comrades.

We urgently need the strength which constantly helps to elaborate political guidelines. Society must have them if it is to know which way to go and why and on what basis to work. You cannot live without an inspiring purpose, you always need a guiding star. That is true of each man and society in general. The CPSU plays an important role, that of the uniting force in the name of social progress. Only a renewed party can achieve all this. That must be understood clearly. There are forces trying to divert us with other aims and values and to weaken society. They do not like the CPSU's firm perestroyka stance.

In this vein, I must say that we must not only preserve the force represented by our party, but also renew it and give it a powerful dynamism. If we do this, the success of the work we have begun will be assured. That is also a crucial question. We have nothing to be ashamed of. Our positions and aims are honorable. It is necessary to act. Yes, the party has had its Rashidovs, its Shchelokovs, and the like. But they are not the ones who determined the party's face: That was done by the millions of honest Communists who are now advancing the cause of perestroyka by their own labor. So we should not equate party renegades with the party as a whole or renegades from the leadership with the leadership as a whole.

Ultimately the party will do everything in its power to sort matters out. I believe that this process, although difficult and painful, is already making progress. The elections were a loud signal to us. The party must restructure itself if it wants to retain the role of society's leader. We cannot and must not sit complacently in our offices and act in the familiar old way, whereby the apparatus twisted everyone round its little finger and gave instructions to everyone, even Central Committee members. That time has gone forever. Now you must go out to people, see what is happening in life, what is worrying people, help to make life better, develop cadres for that, and always be with people: That is the approach and style that party workers of all ranks need today!

I have already said many times that we are all the children of the October Revolution. I am categorically opposed to any attempts to change the social hue of our ideals and values. But it is a different matter that we must make the people the real master in the enterprise, in the rayon, the city, and the country. And strive through all the democratic processes to ensure that the people, above all the working class, have real power and run the country. Indeed, the people will not accept other guidelines here. We must create and suffer for our cause, the socialist cause. It will be hard and painful but I believe that we will do it, we will survive it all. That is why the party must be strengthened; and I believe that in

this respect the plenum gave a good impetus both to the Central Committee and to all Communists. And this consolidating sense of responsibility of how to act, how to progress, and how to make decisions must be conveyed to all. Everyone must get away from the old and bureaucratic ways, must look for constant contact with the people. That is the main thing. But this is exactly what we currently lack.

Some Communists and party workers have adopted a defensive posture and sometimes, too, they shirk new problems and difficulties. Then the question is: What is stopping them from acting with energy and commitment? Could it be that they lack the ability? Or perhaps some people do not have sufficient ethical or moral right? There will be a struggle for people's hearts and minds, comrades. You Central Committee members must understand that. If we have started a revolution and if profound changes are already taking place, it cannot and will not all be totally simple. And we must clearly see what has happened and is happening here and the direction things are going and act promptly to prevent negative features. If we fail to see these phenomena and let it all come undone, as it were, that will greatly damage our common cause. We must not allow that. Nor can we allow the perestroyka process to slow down or be delayed. There must be no marking time. To stop is disastrous—it is to go backward, to the past where we have already been.

I agree that we must act more resolutely and now we, the Politburo and the government, are doing that. We need to resolve the question of the many shortages and ease the strain on the market place. The solution of the great social questions will take time to get started. Everyone must understand that well. But, on the other hand, it is patently obvious that we must also direct our keenest attention to the mechanism of distributing all that is produced in the country. I agree, there must be strict workers' control to ensure that scarce output does not find its way to those people who engage in speculation and profit from difficulties. It is necessary to strike a resolute blow against the speculators, the secondhand dealers, and those who produce nothing and sponge off the honest toil of others.

During the meeting I have noted what I see as the most important questions raised here. We must react to them in a fitting manner.

The comments made here on the status of CPSU Central Committee members were correct. As practice shows, this question has not been properly studied here. Communists entering the party's central elected organs do not even have a place to work, where they can receive people and talk with them. The transport question must also be resolved. People spoke correctly here about improving the prompt supply of information to Central Committee members at the local level, so that they have the necessary materials and information roundups on domestic and foreign policy questions in good time so they are completely ready to take part in debates on any question.

In the immediate future it is also necessary to consider enshrining in the CPSU rules a number of new provisions connected with the rights and duties of CPSU Central Committee members.

The meeting confirmed once again that we must all act more vigorously and purposefully. There has been much talk here about local difficulties. The center has been criticized. While accepting this criticism, I must nevertheless point out that no center can do absolutely everything or do all the work in place of those at the local level. People must look less to the center in expectation of orders from above, and there must be more initiative and independence in the solution of the questions and problems that occur. Only then will perestroika become reality. Those who dare, win [dorogu osilit idushchiy].

The comment made here that any management system needs intelligent cadres was right. The better, more competent, and more skillful they are, the more successfully things will progress. That is an axiom born of our whole practice and life. There is another question—we must all improve the cadre selection mechanism. The practice which existed until recently, whereby the administration appointed cadres in secret, impoverished our cadre corps and did not tap its inexhaustible potential. The country suffered as a result. We have a colossal cadre potential in all spheres of the national economy. It must be fully utilized, and cadres must be given greater independence because it is impossible to administer such a juggernaut, such a vast country as ours with all its characteristics by means of commands from the center.

The question of our Army, our defense capability has been raised here. I want to talk about it, even if only briefly. First, you have to know that we will not budge an inch when it comes to ensuring that the reliability of our defense and the country's security are properly safeguarded. To that end we must have a modern army equipped with everything necessary and surrounded by the concern and support of the people, so that its officers and men feel that both now and in the future they will have all that they need to perform their duty. The question of the Army must always be resolved in principle as follows: Everything necessary in the interests of the country and of its security must be done. The Army is the offspring of the people, it is the people's flesh and blood and must serve the people's interests, and that should never be forgotten under any circumstances.

It goes without saying that, in the conditions of the new realities taking shape in the world, we also have to take a new look at the questions of ensuring our defense capability. We have ventured a substantial reduction in military expenditure and a cut in the proportion of national income spent on armament needs. While reducing expenditure for these purposes, we are paying attention to the qualitative rearmament of the Army, and in this way we are not permitting the overall level of our defense capability to be weakened in any degree. I would like to observe in passing that the once essentially closed sphere of our defense interests is becoming

increasingly open and subject to monitoring [kontroliruyemyy]. And this is a guarantee that, here, too, everything will be done in the interests of the people themselves. That, by the way, was precisely Lenin's design for building the Land of the Soviets' Armed Forces.

Of course, the difficult and frequently acute perestroika processes have also affected our Armed Forces. But today everything is being restructured: the economy, science, and the party, too. And, as I have already observed more than once, all this touches people to a greater or lesser extent and affects their real and customary interests. We have to make progress by overcoming all this and renewing ourselves. It will take character, it will take resolution. There must be no shirking, no giving in to difficulties, no riding the current. The situation has to be changed, the circumstances controlled, and practical questions resolved—I emphasize—at all levels, from the center down to the labor collective.

The question of the upcoming soviet elections has also been raised at the meeting here. They are a big task, and the person who observed that the party is responsible for their outcome, as it was for the complex situation in which the working class found itself during the previous election campaign, was right. While I accept that observation, I hope at the same time that the working class will not sit with its arms folded either but will learn a good lesson for itself from everything that has happened. The working class and the party must and will act in unison. All the best and most vigorous experience that has now crystallized from within the working class must be transferred, must be taken into the soviets. The most prestigious, the most active representatives of the working class and the peasantry must enter the soviets. And of the intelligentsia, too, of course. Only that can guarantee the soviets' vitality. That is our starting point.

To wind up this conversation, I want to support once again what you have said. Let us boost our unity, put everything in order, and raise discipline and responsibility for actions and behavior. Let us be bolder about going out to the people, entering into political debates, and acting confidently. We are on the right road, and that is the main thing. As for the specific questions raised here, which are worrying us all, we have to resolve them in the very near future through the common efforts of the party and the people.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907648
RECEIVED: 27 SEP 89 10

TO: HUGHES


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FROM: WELCH

DOC DATE: 27 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

MEMCON



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ ARENS / SEP 25

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES

DUE DATE: 30 SEP 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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ATTACHMENTS

SS 2/26/24

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSMEN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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NOTED

September 27, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *W*

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *W*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Moshe Arens,
Israeli Foreign Minister

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to J. Stapleton Roy transmitting the memorandum of conversation of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens and the President on September 25, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Hughes to Roy Memo

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By SS NARA, Date 2/26/24

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Declassify on: OADR

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7648

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with the President and
Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Arens (S)

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
Presidents meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Arens on
September 25, 1989. Distribution of Memorandum of Conversation
must be handled via NODIS channels and should not be released
below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. If the
Department intends to forward this memorandum to Embassy Tel
Aviv, it should be sent to the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of
Mission (DCM) only. (S)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/26/24

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2000-0429-F
SS 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Moshe Arens of Israel (8)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Ambassador to
the UN
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

Moshe Arens, Israeli Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME September 25, 1989, 8:30 p.m. - 8:36 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Metropolitan Museum, New York City, NY

The President: I just wanted to take a few moments in private to touch base with you on where we stand in the peace process.

Foreign Minister Arens: There is a lot of political turmoil in Israel. It seems President Mubarak does not understand the Israeli coalition and the nature of our politics. Had Mubarak pursued his initiative differently by meeting with Shamir, things would have turned out differently.

The President: What do you mean by political turmoil? Is there the possibility of a breakup of the government?

Foreign Minister Arens: There has been talk of the coalition breaking up. The best way to proceed now in the peace process is for us to convince Mubarak to meet with Shamir. Mubarak has gone about this completely wrong if his objective was to attract Shamir into the process. By putting forward his initiative with Rabin, inviting Rabin to Cairo, he was inviting the third best.

The President: I don't think Mubarak was being mischievous in this. He honestly wants to make progress.

Foreign Minister Arens: He doesn't appreciate the intricacies of Israeli politics. I will see Mubarak on Thursday. I understand that he is reticent about a meeting with Shamir. I will talk to him about this and I think you should do so also.

The President: We could discuss it with him, to see what his thoughts are. However, he has been pretty clear that he's willing to meet Shamir if there is something to show for it.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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Foreign Minister Arens: If Mubarak met Shamir, then the 10 points would likely be more acceptable.

Secretary Baker: His view is that a meeting could be worked out if the outcome is positive. Getting a dialogue going between Israelis and Palestinians might provide the right circumstances, and Mubarak has said something public about this.

Foreign Minister Arens: It is difficult to say to a Prime Minister that he must agree beforehand on something like the 10 points.

Secretary Baker: But that's not the issue, no one has said anything about Israel or Shamir having to agree on the 10 points; the 10 points are Egypt's and the Palestinians' position.

General Scowcroft: You don't have to agree on the 10 points. The issue is the dialogue with Palestinians.

Foreign Minister Arens: Mubarak says that he will not meet with Shamir unless Shamir agrees.

The President: The main thing is to avoid negative answers.

Foreign Minister Arens: This is an issue because of the way it was handled, not because of the substance.

The President: What does the opposition say?

Foreign Minister Arens: The invitation to Rabin was a problem.

Secretary Baker: There was the image of Egypt dealing with Labor, not with Likud, that was a problem.

The President: We kind of had that problem with Boris Yeltsin during his visit, but I didn't let it bother me when he visited with Ted Kennedy and others. I don't see any reason to get offended about that.

Foreign Minister Arens: Your speech today was great. If democracy ever comes to the Arab world then everything will change for the better. I still think that what you must do is convince Mubarak to meet with Shamir. This is the right way to go.

The President: Well, we'll look into it, and see what he says about the idea.

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