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2009-0275-S

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91117
Folder ID Number: 91117-004

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Chris Needels to Robert M. Gates Re: US/USSR Counterterrorism Consultations (2 pp.)	7/7/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Cable	Re: U.S. - Soviet Counterterrorism Discussions, June 26 - 27 (3 pp.)	6/28/89	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Europe from the Atlantic to the Polish - Soviet Border (1 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on Berlin (1 pp.)	7/26/89	(b)(1)	C
03b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev on Berlin (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03c. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03d. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Marshal Sergey Feodorovich Akhromeyev of the Soviet Union (3 pp.)	7/27/89	(b)(1)	S
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Marshal Akhromeyev (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap990
OA/ID Number: 91117-004
Date Closed: 2/20/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04c. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	7/17/89	(b)(1)	S
04d. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Marshal Akhromeyev (2 pp.)	7/25/89	(b)(1)	S
05. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Regional Consultations with the Soviets (2 pp.)	7/28/89	(b)(1)	S
06a. Summary	Re: Letter from Chairman Gorbachev of the USSR (1 pp.)	8/9/89	(b)(1)	S
06b. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter from Gorbachev to the President (1 pp.)	8/8/89	(b)(1)	S
06c. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	
06d. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	
07. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: The Impact of Soviet Internal Difficulties on U.S. - Soviet Relations (3 pp.)	8/9/89	(b)(1)	S
08a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to William H. Webster Re: U.S. Policy of Soviet Emigration (1 pp.)	8/21/89	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

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Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08b. Memo	Nancy Bearg Dike and Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter from Judge Webster on Review of U.S. Policy on Soviet Emigration (2 pp.)	8/14/89	(b)(1)	S
08c. Memo	William H. Webster to Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	7/31/89	(b)(1)	
08d. Letter	William H. Webster to Lawrence S. Eagleberger (3 pp.)	7/27/89	(b)(1)	S
08e. Memo	Re: Memorandum for the Record (2 pp.)	7/20/89	(b)(1)	S
08f. Memo	Re: Memorandum for the Record (5 pp.)	7/24/89	(b)(1)	S
09. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
10a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Potential Benefits from an Open Skies Regime (2 pp.)	8/29/89	(b)(1)	S
10b. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Potential Benefits from an Open Skies Regime (1 pp.)	8/28/89	(b)(1)	S
10c. Memo	Florence E. Gantt to et.al. Re: Actions #2 -- August 31, 1989 (1 pp.)	8/31/89	(b)(1)	S
10d. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Potential Benefits from an Open Skies Regime (1 pp.)	8/28/89	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10e. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Potential Benefits from an Open Skies Regime (2 pp.)	8/29/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 4 of 4

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Date Closed: 2/20/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5331

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

July 7, 1989

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR.

FROM: CHRIS NEEDELS *CM*

SUBJECT: US/USSR Counterterrorism Consultations

*I still am most
uneasy about this.
Watch State very closely.*

On 26-27 June Ambassador Busby, State Department Coordinator for counterterrorism, led a U.S. six person interagency delegation in counterterrorism consultations with the Soviets. The meetings were held as a follow-on to a commitment made by Secretary Baker to the Congress and to Mr. Shevardnaze to hold such discussions. At Tab I is a summary of the consultations, as provided by Ambassador Busby and the delegation. A complete record of the meeting is being prepared by State.

The key points I took from the meeting are these:

- Both sides condemn terrorism and agree that it is universally wrong, i.e. there is no political justification for terrorizing innocent people.
- Of the terrorist groups identified by each side, the ANO, JRA, Hizballah, and the Sendero Luminoso are common threats to both.
- The PFLP-GC is not considered by the Soviets to be the problem as presented by the U.S. The Soviets believe that the PFLP-GC is changing its outlook and the situation will improve. My view of this comment is that the Soviets are trying not to damage their delicate relationship with PFLP-GC host Syria. It is also possible that the Soviets are putting pressure on Syria to distance itself from the PFLP-GC because of the negative impact that Syria may have on the "new image" of the USSR.
- The Soviets dodged the issue of state sponsorship of terrorism at every opportunity. To speak out against specific state sponsorship of terrorism would jeopardize delicate relationships with Syria, North Korea, et al.

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0935-MR
SCS 8/5/13

- Both sides avoided the sensitive issues of support to national liberation movements, Zionism, Israel and other hot political issues. This for the most part was based upon the early agreement to deal with terrorism independent of why it was being conducted or by whom.
- Although the Soviets agreed to work bilaterally, they clearly indicated their preference for multilateral, particularly within the U.N. The U.S. indicated its preference for bilateral arrangements.
- Both sides meticulously avoided discussion of liaison or exchange of intelligence data.

With the conclusion of the consultations both sides remain predictably cautious and wary. However, there are some opportunities to continue to test the sincerity of each side. Both sides agreed to work through respective embassies (RSOs or equivalents) to pass immediate threat warnings which are directed at the other. Similarly, non-immediate terrorist information (especially policy information) would be passed between our State/CT and their DCM in Washington. Finally, it was suggested that both sides would look at crisis management as it pertains to a terrorist act directed against both countries, i.e. a terrorist act against an Aeroflot/Pan Am flight on the US/USSR route (assumes passengers from both countries). Each of these initiatives are subject to further considerations within respective governments.

Attachment

Tab I State Summary of Consultations

DIST>PRT: DONLEY GATES HUGHES SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN
IT: BEERS MILLER BLACKWILL RICE DORMINEY RODMAN VAX BRANSCUM

PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUEHMO<DTG> 281422Z JUN 89
ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9234

SUBJ>SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET COUNTERTERRORISM
DISCUSSIONS, JUNE 26-27

TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 17321

JODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PTER, UR, US

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET COUNTERTERRORISM
DISCUSSIONS, JUNE 26-27

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE JUNE 26-27 COUNTERTERRORISM TALKS IN MOSCOW. A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT WILL BE FORTHCOMING. THE TALKS WERE USEFUL IN EXPOSING SOVIET ATTITUDES ON A NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES. THE SOVIETS SEEM PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND ON ESTABLISHING SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS FOR PASSING COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION. IN DISCUSSING TERRORIST GROUPS AND STATE SUPPORT, TOO, THE SOVIETS SHOWED A MORE FORTHCOMING POSTURE THAN WAS THE CASE IN PREVIOUS TALKS. THEY DELIVERED CAREFUL, WELL PREPARED PRESENTATIONS ON EACH ISSUE AND DID NOT SEEK TO OBSTRUCT THE TALKS WITH CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. RYBAKOV CLEARLY DID NOT WANT TO QUIBBLE--HE URGED EARLY ON IN THE TALKS THAT BOTH SIDES AVOID A DISCUSSION ON THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM. "WE BOTH KNOW WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT," HE SAID. THE SOVIETS ALSO AGREED EARLY ON THAT THERE WAS NO POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR TERRORIST ACTS, THEREBY AVOIDING A DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, ETC. THOUGH THE SOVIETS STILL KEYED ON MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO COUNTERTERRORISM, RYBAKOV STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES MOSCOW'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE BILATERALLY. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

3. STATE SUPPORT

/ ----- THOUGH AMBASSADOR BUSBY REPEATEDLY PUSHED THE SOVIETS TO DISCUSS STATE SUPPORT, NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OCCURRED. BUT THE SOVIETS NOW SEEM WILLING TO LISTEN, AND AGREED THAT SOME STATES SUPPORT TERRORIST GROUPS. AMBASSADOR RYBAKOV ALLOWED THAT TERRORISM HAD BEEN IN SOVIET TALKERS FOR MEETINGS WITH IRAN, AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RAISED TERRORISM ISSUES IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH 'VARIOUS GROUPS AND STATES'. RYBAKOV SAID THE SOVIET UNION CONDEMNED ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM, WITHOUT REGARD TO POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION, "NO MATTER SUPPORTED BY WHOM"; HE WOULD NOT GO FURTHER. HE MADE A FINAL, HALF-HEARTED EFFORT TO TOSS STATE SUPPORT INTO THE MULTILATERAL ARENA BY NOTING THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING STATE SUPPORT IN THE UN AND THE FINAL ACT.

4. GROUPS

/ ----- WHILE THERE WERE NO DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGHS, THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE ON TERRORIST GROUPS HAS MOVED FORWARD SINCE OUR LAST DISCUSSIONS;

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2009-0935-MR

SCS 8/5/13

IN PARTICULAR, OUR VIEWS ON ABU NIDAL (ANO), JRA, IZBOLLAH AND S.L. ARE CLOSER. RYBAKOV LEFT HIMSELF ROOM FOR MANEUVER BY NOTING NUANCES OF DIFFERENCE IN OUR PERSPECTIVES ON THESE GROUPS, AND FEATURED THESE NUANCES RATHER THAN THE LARGER AREAS OF GENERAL CONCURRENCE IN LATER REPRESENTING TO HIS BOSS (DFM OMPLEKTOV) OUR TALKS ON THIS ISSUE. THE SOVIETS ALSO REFUSED TO INCLUDE PFLP-GC IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS THE OTHER FOUR GROUPS. THEY CLAIMED TO SEE A TREND TOWARD MODERATION IN THEIR PFLP-GC, BUT COULD OFFER NO DATA TO SUPPORT IT. NEVERTHELESS, OPEN AND FRANK SOVIET CONDEMNATION OF HIZBOLLAH AND ABU NIDAL REPRESENTS A CONSIDERABLE CHANGE IN THEIR VIEWS, AND INDICATES THAT THERE MAY BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE FORWARD IN THIS AREA.

5. CHANNELS

/ ----- BUSBY RAISED THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING IN WASHINGTON A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION SIMILAR TO THE EXISTING CHANNEL IN MOSCOW BETWEEN THE RSO AND THE MILITIA. RYBAKOV REACTED POSITIVELY. HE ALSO SEEMED FAVORABLY INCLINED TOWARD SETTING UP A POLITICAL CHANNEL BETWEEN EACH EMBASSY (MINISTER LEVEL) AND ITS HOST COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE. ADDITIONALLY, RYBAKOV LIKED THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR EMBASSIES IN THIRD COUNTRIES WHICH COULD BE USED WITH SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION FROM CAPITALS. RYBAKOV PROPOSED THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN MINISTRY "STIMULATE" COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

6. CRISIS MANAGEMENT

/ ----- THE SOVIETS SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN COOPERATION ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT. BUSBY SKETCHED OUT SOME OF THE FORMS
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 17321
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PTER, UR, US

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET COUNTERTERRORISM
CRISIS MANAGEMENT COOPERATION COULD TAKE:
ESTABLISHING POINTS OF CONTACT; CHANNELS FOR NOTIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AS INCIDENTS DEVELOP; GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR INCIDENTS INVOLVING U.S. OR SOVIET AIRCRAFT IN EITHER COUNTRY OR THIRD COUNTRIES; COORDINATED PRESS STATEMENTS; PROSECUTION AND LEGAL ACTION AFTER AN INCIDENT; AND A WAY TO JOINTLY REVIEW OUR ACTIVITIES AFTER AN INCIDENT. RYBAKOV APPEARED RECEPTIVE TO THESE IDEAS AND LATER ASKED BUSBY TO PROVIDE (IN WASHINGTON) A NON-PAPER SETTING OUT SPECIFICALLY WHAT THE U.S. SIDE HAD IN MIND.

7. COMMENT

/ ----- THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT LEAKS. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, THE PROGRESS WE MAKE WITH THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY WILL DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE ON HOW DISCREET WE CAN BE--AT LEAST IN THE INITIAL STAGES, AS THE SOVIETS GET USED TO THE IDEA. WE DO NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BY MAKING OUR DISCUSSIONS A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD. THOUGH NO FIRM COMMITMENTS WERE MADE, THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO WORK WITH US ON ESTABLISHING NEW CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION AND, WE THINK, ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT. AFTER THEY HAVE DIGESTED OUR VIEWS ON GROUPS AND STATE SUPPORT, WE MAY WELL SEE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF THEIR VIEWS IN THESE AREAS AS WELL. WE SHOULD NOT INFER FROM ANY OF THIS THAT

SOVIET APPROACHES TO COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION ARE
MORE DEVELOPED THAN IS ACTUALLY THE CASE.
NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAS BEEN A DISTINCT EVOLUTION IN
THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE WITHIN THE LAST FIVE MONTHS.
IN OUR VIEW, CONTINUED CONSULTATIONS, APPROPRIATELY
SPACED, COULD YIELD FURTHER PROGRESS. JOYCE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 7321<STOR> 890628150439 MSG000236358279
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 7321<STOR> 890628150453 MSG000236358292
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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MC LOG # 5331
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes	<u>4</u>	<u>APB</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>WIn 7/10</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N/R</u>

☐ A = Action
 ☒ I = Information
 ☐ D = Dispatch
 ☐ R = Retain
 ☐ N = No further Action

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

US/SSR counterterrorism
evaluations

09 JUL 10 A10:44

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5554

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

July 14, 1989

CHRON FILE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*

SUBJECT: Europe from the Atlantic to the Polish-Soviet
Border

I want to call your attention to an interesting notion that has lately developed -- and which seems to be driving Gorbachev crazy. This is the notion that "Europe," properly conceived, extends from the Atlantic to the Polish-Soviet border (or, as occasionally said, "from Brest to Brest").

I am struck by Gorbachev's very defensive reference to, and denunciation of, this concept in his Council of Europe speech.

As you may recall, Henry has been writing in this vein since last year, but I am not aware that it has had broader currency, and it has not been featured explicitly in any USG commentary. In fact, some in the USG are wary of it, perhaps because we naturally resist concepts that exclude us. However, it has its uses for us, and I think Gorbachev is right to fear it.

"Europe" has many meanings, including, for example, the Helsinki process and CFE forum which necessarily include both us and the Soviet Union. But in the Atlantic Alliance and US-EC contexts, we have long since come to terms with a (West) European identity; we can be fairly confident that there is a natural basis for long-term partnership with such a European entity. Gorbachev can have no such confidence with respect to his allies.

The President's vision of Europe's future -- as expressed in the Boston University speech -- encompasses exactly this resurgent Western Europe, plus an Eastern Europe that is drawn to it and has managed to pull away from Soviet dominance. This idea of a Europe freed from the dominance of both superpowers must have broad appeal in Europe, West and East. Our theme of "Europe whole and free" captures the same thought subliminally. Gorbachev fears it because it may be the most potent antidote to the "Common European Home" nonsense. Perhaps we should find ways to play on the theme.

AAB
Concurrence by: Adrian Basora

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ES 6/25/13

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SUSPENSE

National Security Council
The White House

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DOCLOG 6AD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>APB</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u> FFA
<u>Hutchings</u>	<u>7</u>		<u>FFA</u>

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

① TO Hutchings
For further Action

② RETURN to SECRETARIAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5879

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 26, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on Berlin

*I am very skeptical
See memo.*

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President attaching a letter to Gorbachev (Tab A) for signature. The letter follows up on the President's Mainz speech, in which he reaffirmed U.S. support for the 1987 Allied initiative on Berlin. So far, Soviet reactions have been unencouraging, and we believe that a personal letter from the President is needed to engage Soviet attention at the highest level.

The letter puts the Berlin initiative in the broader context of East-West relations and suggests that progress among the four powers in Berlin could show the way to progress beyond the city itself. In the letter, the President proposes that the Soviet Union join us, the U.K. and France for four-power discussions in early fall, as has already been communicated in a June 27 demarche delivered in Moscow.

We propose that the substance of the letter be shared with the U.K., France, and FRG, as well as with the Berlin Senat. At Tab II is a memorandum tasking State to prepare a crosshatch cable for release as soon as the letter is sent.

The State Department has cleared this initiative and the substance of the Presidential letter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the Tab I memorandum for the President.

That you authorize Philip Hughes to sign the Tab II memorandum for State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev
Tab II Hughes Memorandum for Roy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

CAP 2008.0727.MR
3/9/2009

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5879

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on Berlin

Purpose

To follow up on your Mainz initiative and engage Gorbachev personally on Berlin.

Background

Soviet reactions to your reaffirmation of the 1987 Allied initiative on Berlin have been unencouraging. This letter will underscore your personal commitment and put Berlin in a broader context, suggesting that progress among the four powers in Berlin could show the way to progress beyond the city itself. It expresses the hope that Berlin become a place of cooperation, rather than a point of confrontation, and proposes ways that Moscow might join us toward that end.

We would share the substance of your message with our Allies.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

CAP 2008.0727.MR
3/9/2009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5879

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Attached is the text of a Presidential letter to Chairman Gorbachev concerning Berlin. It should be included in a cable to London, Paris, Bonn, and the U.S. Mission in Berlin, along with appropriate instructions for passing the substance to Allied governments, and should be handled in the Crosshatch system.

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Text of Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

CAP 2008.0727.MR
3/9/2009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Chairman Gorbachev:

In my speech in Mainz on May 31, I reaffirmed U.S. support for the 1987 Western initiative on Berlin. I expressed the hope that Berlin could become a place of cooperation rather than a point of confrontation.

It has now been forty years since the ending of the Berlin air lift and the first post-war Berlin crisis. On August 13, we mark the twenty-eighth anniversary of another Berlin crisis and the erection of the Wall that still divides the city. It is my deep conviction that we now have an opportunity to take important steps toward ensuring that Berlin never again become a flashpoint in East-West relations.

In that spirit, let me propose that your country join the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in discussing practical steps we might take together to improve the situation in and around Berlin. The French Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, accompanied by British and American diplomatic representatives, delivered that proposal to your Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 27, suggesting that preparatory talks be held in early fall.

At this time of hope for ending Europe's division, Berlin stands more than ever as the symbol of that division. By the same token, progress in Berlin would facilitate other steps toward European reconciliation. Our initiative offers proposals for making Berlin a more open city without undermining four-power responsibilities there. It is also a modest beginning to what could be a broader dialogue.

In a very real sense, Berlin's concerns are Europe's concerns, and our mutual responsibilities in Berlin are connected to our larger responsibilities in the center of Europe. Expanding air traffic between East and West, working together toward solving environmental problems, facilitating economic ties: these are areas in which Berlin can show the way to a broader process of cooperation and joint action. We hope the four powers can exercise their unique responsibilities in ways that let Berlin be a leader, not a barrier, toward European reconciliation.

I would welcome your views on how we might proceed together to address these issues.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

UNKNOWN FILE

~~**SECRET**~~

CONFIDENTIAL with
SECRET Attachment

5853

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 27, 1989

MEETING WITH
MARSHAL SERGEY FEODOROVICH AKHROMEYEV OF THE SOVIET UNION

DATE: July 28, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 2:00 - 3:00 pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

1
2/3
4/5

I. PURPOSE:

To discuss issues of security and arms control with Marshal Akhromeyev.

II. BACKGROUND:

Your meeting with Akhromeyev provides an opportunity to discuss a number of security and arms control issues. He has been travelling throughout the United States and has testified before Les Aspin's committee.

Akhromeyev is known for his grasp of detail and his willingness to engage on technical matters. You may want to reiterate your determination to achieve early agreement at CFE and explain our rationale for the START verification package. Akhromeyev is likely to highlight Soviet concerns with our ceilings for U.S. and Soviet manpower and U.S. inclusion of air defense aircraft in CFE. He may repeat his public appeal for the inclusion of naval aircraft in the context of a CFE agreement. You could also ask him to elaborate on Moscow's view of outstanding issues at START.

You may also find it interesting to probe broader security issues with Akhromeyev. He has said during this trip that the Soviet Union intends to cut back on security assistance to the Third World and categorically ruled out Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe.

In raising these broader issues, you may be able to get a feel for how he views perestroika and its impact on Soviet military concerns. The Soviet Union has a long tradition of civilian control, maintained through a combination of

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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SECRET Attachment
Declassify on: OADR

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SCS 4/30/13

normative appeals and coercive means. Akhromeyev is, in keeping with that tradition, a good soldier and has been publicly supportive of Gorbachev's entire agenda. Yet questions remain about his decision to step down as Chief of the General Staff on the morning of Gorbachev's December announcement at the U.N. of the unilateral force reduction - a policy against which he had argued publicly prior to the decision.

Akhromeyev embodies the contradictory impulses that Soviet professional military men feel concerning perestroika. The Soviet military was an early supporter of economic reform, arguing well before Gorbachev rose to power that the weak economy threatened the Soviet Union's superpower status. Many in the General Staff, which Akhromeyev headed at the time, understood that the weak Soviet technological base could not support ever increasing demands for sophisticated military technology, particularly in the field of computers and information processing. They share Gorbachev's desire to build a modern economic and technological base.

But increasingly, the entire course of reform threatens core military interests that go well beyond the allocation of resources to defense. Glasnost' has produced unparalleled scrutiny of the defense budget, exposed corruption within the armed forces and unleashed criticism of their role in Afghanistan. The military has been pressured to produce civilian goods in defense plants and to convert several facilities permanently to civilian use. The top leadership, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze among them, consistently downgrades the role of military power in a way that must be offensive to the army which has, throughout Soviet history, been Moscow's strongest asset in foreign policy. Finally, the military recently has been forced to impose civil order in rebellious republics. Unaccustomed to a role usually reserved to internal security forces, the military has bristled at the criticism of their use of lethal force in Georgia.

Perhaps most disturbing from the military's point of view is the degree to which they have lost control of the security agenda. Until Gorbachev, "military-technical issues" as they were called, were the domain of the Soviet General Staff which prepared options for central political decisionmakers. While political leaders could and did reject military advice, the range of options was so narrow as to almost always serve professional military interests.

Gorbachev appears to rely less on the General Staff for the generation of options, and more on a group of trusted aides drawn from wide variety of backgrounds. It is not clear whether Akhromeyev is a part of this inner circle but as a former Chief of the General Staff, he speaks authoritatively and can cushion Gorbachev against criticism within the

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military that he is recklessly threatening Soviet security interests.

The new national security decision structure accounts for the ability of the Soviet Union to propose sweeping military initiatives. But as Gorbachev and his closest advisers become more and more preoccupied with domestic difficulties, the danger of a reemergence of bureaucratic inertia in Soviet security policy increases. The recent back and forth in Moscow concerning your timetable for a CFE agreement is perhaps a case in point. The military planners do not think that they can reduce and demobilize their forces in three years and are pressing their case.

There is no evidence that the Soviet military threatens Gorbachev or perestroika. The mechanisms of civilian control, including KGB moles among the officer corps, are an effective deterrent to a politically active military. But this is a difficult and fluid time for political-military relations in the Soviet Union. The military is trying to find its bearings in a radically different international and domestic environment. Akhromeyev, a former Chief of the General Staff, provides a window on how professional military men see the evolution of Soviet security policy as the Gorbachev revolution proceeds.

III. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

IV. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by discussion with Marshal Akhromeyev.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B List of Participants
Tab C Akhromeyev Biography

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV

PERESTROIKA

- I want to take this opportunity to say what I have said publicly several times -- the United States supports perestroika in the Soviet Union and wishes President Gorbachev success in the pursuit of reform.
- As the reforms take place, I believe that there will be a firm basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation. As I have said, we can now look to move beyond containment to enduring cooperation.
- I would be interested in your views of the challenges that lie ahead for perestroika. I am particularly interested in how you see the relationship of your security policies to the process of domestic economic reform.
- We are following economic reform with interest. How will the proposed changes impact on the future character of Soviet military forces?
- Do you think that the military is adjusting well to the demands of perestroika?
- You have said that there will be reductions in military procurement after 1990. Will you elaborate?

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START

- I want to emphasize the importance of the work our START negotiators are doing in Geneva. In these negotiations we seek an agreement that improves the security of both our countries and reduces the risk of war. Nothing has higher priority.

- Much has already been accomplished in these negotiations, but significant problems remain. Among the outstanding issues, verification is the most complex.

- It is for this reason that I proposed last month that we make a special effort to agree on and begin implementing as soon as possible a series of verification and stability measures.

- I am heartened by evidence that the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate seriously toward a START agreement that promises to reduce the risk of war. I urge you to give our proposed verification and stability initiatives the most serious consideration. Early agreement on them will speed resolution of outstanding issues and give added momentum to our joint efforts to conclude a fair and far reaching agreement in START.

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CFE

-- I want you to know that we are serious about rapid progress in the CFE negotiations. The President is committed to an ambitious timetable for concluding, and implementing, an agreement. We are communicating this priority to our officials and to our negotiators in Vienna. We hope you are doing the same.

-- There are a number of areas of common ground between us on fundamental issues. We must do more to consolidate these areas of agreement and clear away trivial issues, so that we can concentrate on the big questions that divide us.

-- One of these, I know, is aircraft. We do not believe a meaningful, or verifiable, distinction can be made between aircraft armed at a particular moment for some missions but not for others. All land-based aircraft designed for combat, and their look-alike variants, must be counted.

((If SNF talks are raised))

-- The alliance has agreed publicly that there should be no negotiations on short-range nuclear forces until after conclusion of a CFE agreement. If you are anxious to begin SNF talks, I hope that will improve our chances for an early and successful outcome to our talks in Vienna.

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((If carrier aircraft are raised))

- We cannot accept your argument for discussion of carrier-based aircraft. You agreed to exclude these forces, which can operate anywhere around the world, from the mandate for the CFE talks. Moreover, as a military man, you know that the numbers of carrier aircraft that could actually operate over Europe are marginal in comparison to the thousands of aircraft at issue in Vienna and the thousands which would remain after any agreement.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- I am sure you share my desire to eliminate the threat and capability of chemical weapons.
- This is a growing worldwide problem, but one where both our countries must set the example in moving to eliminate these weapons.
- We appreciate your experts' efforts with ours at the latest bilateral discussions but there is still much to be done before these weapons are eliminated.
- We would welcome Soviet cooperation in preventing the spread of chemical weapons to additional states.

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SOVIET SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD

- I am interested in how you think security assistance fits into your new policy toward the Third World. For instance, we continue to be concerned about Soviet military assistance to the Sandinistas and the sale of advanced weaponry to Libya and to North Korea.

- It is important for regional stability that we work together to prevent proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State

Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Condoleezza Rice, Director, European and Soviet Affairs

Peter Afanessenko, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

Marshal Sergey Feodorovich Akhromeyev, Security Policy Advisor to President Gorbachev

Sergey B. Chetverikov, Charge d'Affaires

Col. F. F. Popov, Interpreter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	7/17/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State

Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Condoleezza Rice, Director, European and Soviet Affairs

U.S.S.R.

Marshal Sergey Feodorovich ~~Akhromeyev~~, Security Policy Advisor to President Gorbachev

Sergey B. Chetverikov, Charg'e d'Affaires, Soviet Embassy

Col. Popov, Interpreter

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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5853

July 25, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNIE KANTER *CR for AK*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Marshal Akhromeyev

The memorandum at Tab I from you to the President provides background on Marshal Akhromeyev and suggests a number of topics that might be raised in the meeting. The President has met Marshal Akhromeyev several times, including last year when, as Vice-President, he received him formally. Akhromeyev remembers that meeting as one in which they shared experiences as veterans of World War II.

Akhromeyev is known for his grasp of detail and willingness to engage on technical matters of arms control and military policy. The President can use this opportunity to reiterate his determination to reach early agreement at CFE and on chemical weapons; and to explain the rationale for the START verification package. He might also press Akhromeyev on Soviet defense spending and the importance of transparency in the military relationship.

Marshal Akhromeyev's portfolio is believed to focus relatively narrowly on military policy and he may be uncomfortable discussing foreign policy issues. Yet he has made interesting statements during this trip on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe saying that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the internal affairs of those states. The President might wish to draw him out on what "new thinking" means for Soviet security policy in terms of Soviet willingness to intervene in Eastern Europe and security assistance in the Third World.

The memorandum to the President provides some background on the current state of political-military relations in the Soviet Union. It is important to put Akhromeyev's role as a retired professional military man, turned adviser to Gorbachev, into perspective. The Soviet military is caught in the maelstrom accompanying perestroika. Professional officers are generally supportive of Gorbachev's economic modernization plan, though undoubtedly uncomfortable with its impact on Soviet security policy in the short-term.

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Akhromeyev thus often finds himself defending specific security policies that he has, at earlier times, rejected. Such was the case with the unilateral troop reductions announced by Gorbachev in December 1987 to which all professional military men, including Akhromeyev, objected publicly prior to the announcement. But he is a good soldier and defends Gorbachev's security policies articulately and ardently. He provides a window on the professional military's view of how Soviet security policy will evolve as the Gorbachev revolution proceeds.

RD in draft
Rich Davis concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Presidential Talking Points
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Akhromeyev Biography

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8905959
RECEIVED: 28 JUL 89 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON 111

FROM: LOWENKRON
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 28 JUL 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS W/ SOVIETS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 01 AUG 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LOWENKRON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen
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July 28, 1989

Agree

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*
SUBJECT: Regional Consultations With the Soviets

Bob Blackwill chaired a meeting among the relevant senior directors to assess the state of our regional discussions with the Soviet Union currently being held on an intensive schedule at the Assistant Secretary level. This is a practice that originally had a rationale, which has been lost sight of.

The practice began (or revived) about 1985, as the U.S.-Soviet relationship itself began to revive. The intention was -- correctly -- to reflect the fact that the regional conflicts and Soviet behavior in them were crucial to the overall relationship. In other words, there was the flavor of linkage.

In addition, the idea was that it was useful for our experts to be well informed about each other's policies, and that channels could be established that might prove useful when conditions in the regions produced real possibilities for settlement. (This proved the case on Angola, Iran-Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, on Afghanistan.)

Regional Talks and the Overall U.S.-Soviet Relationship Today.
At the meeting there was NSC staff consensus that the regional talks were being scheduled so frequently and becoming so automatic that they were becoming increasingly independent of strategic purpose. Indeed, the absence of a link between these consultations and the direction of U.S.-Soviet relations is so strong that the Soviets could not help but take note and advantage of it.

This disconnect damages American credibility and our policy of seeking to effect Soviet regional conduct. For example, telling the Soviets that we will raise the costs to them in response to their meddling in such areas as Central America is irrelevant if we do not define among ourselves what these costs are in terms of our overall relationship with Moscow.

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- 2 -

Coordination. Our failure to integrate these talks into our strategy stems in part from the bureaucratic inertia of inherited practice and from the multiplicity of State Department actors involved in specific regional issues: Bob Kimmitt on Cambodia and Afghanistan, Dennis Ross on the Middle East, Bob Zoellick and Bernie Aronson on Central America, Hank Cohen on Africa.

Remedies

We need to create a process through which these regional talks take place under clear policy guidance derived from our regional objectives as well as our overall objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In the first instance, Bob Blackwill will discuss the problem with Bob Kimmitt early next week and suggest that Kimmitt hold a meeting of Soviet and regional folks from around the Administration before each regional meeting with the Soviets. NSC staff should be invited to participate in every such meeting with the Soviets. Further, the basic approach that regional Assistant Secretaries intend to take with Moscow should be discussed and cleared in advance over here. (Here the record of State-NSC coordination is mixed.) In the longer run, you will need to try to engage Secretary Baker in a discussion of whether there is a clear rationale for such a frequency of meetings or for proceeding with individual meetings except where they fit into a broader strategy.

McL - R Ditt

Peter Rodman, Nick Rostow, Richard Haass, Tim Deal, Doug Paal and Ted Briggs concur.

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RECORD ID: 8906237
RECEIVED: 09 AUG 89 07

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 08 AUG 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
HS

NORWAY
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM GENSEC GORBACHEV RE LOSS OF SOVIET SUBMARINE IN
NORWEGIAN SEA

ACTION: NFAR PER RICE	DUE DATE: 15 AUG 89	STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: RICE	LOGREF: 8905972	
FILES: PA	NSCIF:	CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 2/20/07

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DOC 2 OF 2

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RECORD ID: 8906237

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STATE	Z 89080907	PENDING STATE RECOMS
001	X 89081019	PRES NOTED SUMMARY OF LTR
002	Z 89092711	RECD STATE RESPONSE
002	Z 89092711	NOTED BY PRES PER VAN ERON
002	X 89092815	NFAR PER RICE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/20/09

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8906237
RECEIVED: 09 AUG 89 07

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

DOC DATE: 09 AUG 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
HS

NORWAY

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD By cap NARA, Date 2/20/09

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM GENSEC GORBACHEV RE LOSS OF SOVIET SUBMARINE IN
NORWEGIAN SEA

ACTION: ~~RECOMMENDATIONS~~

DUE DATE: 15 AUG 89

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF: 8905972

FILES: PA

NSCIF:

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9/24/89
No action required per Rice

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RECORD ID: 8906237
RECEIVED: 09 AUG 89 07

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

DOC DATE: 29 JUL 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
HS

NORWAY

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM GENSEC GORBACHEV RE LOSS OF SOVIET SUBMARINE IN
NORWEGIAN SEA

ACTION: PENDING STATE RECOMS DUE DATE: 15 AUG 89 STATUS: D

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

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WOOLSEY
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/20/09

-- Reassemble
-- Send to Condi Rice for status check & recommendations.
-- Give to Van

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSALW CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 2

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August 9, 1989

**Letter from Chairman Gorbachev of the USSR
Dated July 29, 1989**

Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev very much appreciates your letter and offer of assistance concerning the recovery of the Soviet submarine lost in the Norwegian Sea. Soviet experts are presently studying the project, and should they resolve to be in need of assistance, will be grateful for US assistance.

As well, Chairman Gorbachev notes his satisfaction over the development of Soviet-US dialogue on the key problems of strengthening security and reducing military confrontation.

Chairman Gorbachev hopes that exchanges between you and him will continue to improve in the ways of mutual understanding, both personal and otherwise.

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seen.
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8/10/89

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 6237

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
August 8, 1989

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from Gorbachev to the President

During the U.S.-Soviet bilateral meeting in Paris on July 29, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze handed Secretary Baker a letter to the President from Chairman Gorbachev. The letter to the President is enclosed. We understand that the President received the text of this letter through other channels.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), July 21, 1997
By CAP NARA, Date 3/15/12

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DECL: OADR

Moscow, July 29, 1989

Dear Mr. President,

I have read very carefully your letter concerning the loss of a Soviet submarine in the Norwegian Sea. Your humane gesture has been highly appreciated by the Soviet leadership.

Mr. President, you mentioned the possibility of raising the submarine, expressing the US side's readiness to cooperate if it is decided to undertake such a project. I thank you for this offer.

Soviet experts are now studying the question of whether the project is feasible. I am told that it involves a number of rather difficult technical problems. We intend to continue working on them and if, upon completion of this work, there is a need for assistance from the US side or for discussing the question together, we shall be grateful to take advantage of your offer.

Mr. President, we would like to thank you for the friendly feelings conveyed in your letter.

His Excellency
Mr. George Bush,
President of the United
States of America
Washington D.C.

I take advantage of this opportunity to express satisfaction over the development of Soviet-US dialogue, particularly on the key problems of strengthening security and reducing military confrontation.

It is precisely in the context of our shared responsibility for building a stable and safe world that we regard the resumed negotiations on nuclear and space arms, chemical weapons, the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, the meeting between the chiefs of staff of our countries' armed forces, and the continuation of exchanges on regional, humanitarian and other problems.

I hope for progress in these areas and for further improvement in mutual understanding between us in the course of our exchanges, including personal contacts.

Sincerely,

Mikhail Gorbachev

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ДЖОРДЖУ БУШУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон; Белый дом

Уважаемый господин Президент,

С большим вниманием прочитал Ваше послание по поводу гибели советской подводной лодки в Норвежском море. Ваш гуманный жест высоко оценен советским руководством.

Вы, господин Президент, затрагиваете вопрос о подъеме лодки, говорите о готовности американской стороны к сотрудничеству, если будет решено осуществить такой подъем. Благодарю Вас за это предложение.

В настоящее время советские специалисты изучают вопрос о практической осуществимости этой акции. Как мне докладывают, здесь есть ряд непростых технических проблем. Мы имеем в виду продолжить работу над ними и, если по ее завершении возникнет потребность в содействии американской стороны или в совместном обсуждении вопроса, мы с признательностью воспользуемся Вашим предложением.

Хотели бы, господин Президент, поблагодарить за дружественные чувства, выраженные в Вашем послании.

Пользуюсь случаем, чтобы высказать удовлетворение развитием советско-американского диалога, прежде всего по ключевым вопросам укрепления безопасности и снижения уровня военного противостояния.

Именно в контексте нашей общей ответственности за построение стабильного и прочного мира мы рассматриваем возобновившиеся переговоры по ядерным и космическим вооружениям, по химическому оружию, венские переговоры по обычным вооруженным силам в Европе, встречу руководителей штабов вооруженных сил двух стран, обмен визитами военных кораблей, продолжение обмена мнениями по региональным, гуманитарным и другим проблемам.

Надеюсь на прогресс по всем этим направлениям и дальнейший рост взаимопонимания между нами в ходе контактов, в том числе и личных.

С уважением

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

Москва
29 июля 1989 года

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

6282

August 9, 1989

CHRON FILE

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ADRIAN BASORA (Acting) *AAB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: The Impact of Soviet Internal Difficulties on
U.S.-Soviet Relations

The Soviet Union has experienced intensive and wide-ranging upheavals this summer. Though Gorbachev called several of them grave threats to perestroika, the tensions are a direct outgrowth of his chosen strategy for political and economic reform -- one that is almost "Peronist" in character. He has deliberately increased pressure from below, stirring up the masses and encouraging them to confront local and republic governmental and party officials. At the same time, he has concentrated enormous power in his own hands and that of a few trusted advisers. At every turn, in Georgia, Uzbekistan and more recently in the face of labor unrest, Gorbachev has made local officials the "goats," blaming them for past failures and for the slow pace of reform. In doing so, he has sought to place himself firmly in the camp of "the people," exploiting their growing frustrations and, in turn, increasing even more the pressures for reform. Under Gorbachev Moscow has become the source of solutions as Ryzhkov and Shevardnadze have been dispatched repeatedly to handle disturbances and to chastise local officials for their incompetence.

This strategy has worked reasonably well so far but there are number of inherent dangers in what is a very high risk approach. With each intervention by Moscow, the local apparatus is weakened and loses legitimacy. Gorbachev has called for earlier local elections to replace discredited leaders but it is not clear that there are qualified and trustworthy candidates to run. Eventually, local officials may be so weak that they will be reluctant or unable to impose order; a job that Moscow most certainly does not want to have to do from the center. Already, local Interior Ministry forces (MVD) which are ethnically homogenous and serve in their localities are considered so unreliable that troops are usually deployed from other regions. This is stretching MVD manpower very thin.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1462-MR
SCS 9/17/12

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

In the long-term, the frustration that has been so successfully channeled against local officials will be redirected toward Moscow. This has already happened in Armenia, where the central leadership intervened last summer but has been unable to address adequately the concerns of the Armenian minority. And in order to forestall serious disturbances, for instance in averting a railway strike, the central leadership has made economic concessions that will be difficult to deliver.

This unrest takes place, of course, against the backdrop of a worsening economic situation. Rumors are rampant in Moscow that up to twenty basic commodities will be rationed in the winter. Butter, sugar and some meats are already being rationed. All of this suggests that unrest in the Soviet Union is likely to continue and worsen -- a point made effectively in Bob Gates memorandum to the President on that subject. The tensions may abate this winter -- they usually do in the Soviet Union -- but are likely to be even more intense next summer.

There are numerous signs that Gorbachev's colleagues -- some of them proteges are increasingly concerned about his tactics in promoting reform. But whether Gorbachev survives personally or not, the system has already been weakened enough that, short of an all-out crackdown, unrest will continue whoever occupies the Kremlin.

As Bob suggested in his memo, the sheer unevenness of the process of reform and the likely cycles of upheaval and repression pose challenges for the Administration in keeping U.S.-Soviet relations on track. Too many people on the Hill and in the press expect reform to proceed in a straight line.

There are at least two other potential problems for U.S.-Soviet relations that result from mounting Soviet internal difficulties. First, the Soviet leadership is bound to become increasingly preoccupied with internal problems. This is already evident in Soviet discussions with foreign leaders (including during the recent Baker-Shevardnadze meetings). There are only so many hours in the day and the leadership is spending them largely on internal matters. In fact, Gorbachev was criticized by Ryzhkov for not attending to the reconstruction and management of the Party itself -- adding yet another demand on his time and energies.

This internal preoccupation is not surprising during this critical phase for perestroika but the "time of maximum danger," as the Soviets say, is likely to be protracted. It has become a truism that Gorbachev seeks foreign policy successes as a surrogate for domestic gains. But as these problems mount, the reflected glory of a successful foreign policy may carry less weight at home.

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3

Obviously, the leaders will continue to press their foreign policy agenda. But we might expect them to try and link foreign policy goals and domestic benefits more tightly, pressing harder on those issues that serve perestroika directly. To date, Soviet proposals for economic cooperation have been rather vague, as was the Gorbachev letter to the Summit Seven. But as they become more pointed, a range of issues including COCOM restrictions, insurance for joint ventures and perhaps new credits will surface again.

This is a no-win agenda for the United States and the Alliance. But it will be difficult to simply hold the line on the economic agenda. We might instead be prepared with some ideas for concrete and sensible cooperation in order to divert attention from proposals that do not serve our interests. Energy, agricultural and environmental cooperation (perhaps using space as a laboratory) are promising areas. Most importantly, we must keep economic issues in the context of the larger relationship. Our core concerns with the Soviets -- military issues, human rights and regional problems -- have not changed and should not be diluted.

Secondly, the preoccupation with internal affairs may make the Soviet leadership less facile in responding to the U.S. but more impatient in pushing its own agenda. We do not need a dialogue of the deaf with agendas that do not link up. Soviet response time to American proposals has slowed noticeably. Gorbachev responds slowly to letters and arms control initiatives have gone unanswered throughout this round at START (in contrast to the quick response to INF initiatives a few years ago).

Soviet security decision-making under Gorbachev has been characterized by high level attention which forces the bureaucracy -- including the General Staff -- to think creatively. The number of officials in Gorbachev's circle of close advisers is believed to be no more than a handful and many, like Yakovlev and Shevardnadze, do double duty in the solution of internal matters. The lack of high level attention to issues that matter to the United States may account for the slower pace of response. "New thinking" in foreign policy -- to the extent that it exists -- does not have deep roots in the Soviet bureaucracy.

There is little that we can do about the leadership's internal preoccupation but we need to be clearer and more focused in pushing a few core issues. The U.S.-Soviet agenda has become so big that it is unwieldy and lacks focus on key priorities. As the Soviet Union has opened up, we have responded by expanding the relationship to encompass virtually all new possibilities. This diffusion of the U.S.-Soviet agenda does have costs, especially in dealing with a leadership that has limited time and energy. We need to decide what we really can and must achieve during this window of opportunity -- a window whose duration is increasingly uncertain.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to William H. Webster Re: U.S. Policy of Soviet Emigration (1 pp.)	8/21/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08b. Memo	Nancy Bearg Dike and Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter from Judge Webster on Review of U.S. Policy on Soviet Emigration (2 pp.)	8/14/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

July 31, 1989

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

I want to keep you up-to-date on the state of play regarding the Soviet emigre issue. Enclosed is a copy of a letter I sent to Larry Eagleburger raising some of my concerns. State is trying to accommodate the Intelligence Community's concerns, but they have already concluded that the Rome processing center will be closed. I think that may be a bit premature.

Sincerely,


William H. Webster

Enclosure

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08d. Letter	William H. Webster to Lawrence S. Eagleberger (3 pp.)	7/27/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08e. Memo	Re: Memorandum for the Record (2 pp.)	7/20/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08f. Memo	Re: Memorandum for the Record (5 pp.)	7/24/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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5972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 29, 1989

CHRON FILE

Mr. President:

Attached is the message to you from President Gorbachev. As I mentioned on the telephone, I will bring with me on the plane Monday a proposed response. We will staff the letter from Mrs. Thatcher for a thoughtful reply on Middle-East developments.



Bob.

Robert Gates

Attachment

*Per Sitecom THE ATTACHED
WAS SENT TO PRES 7/29.*

Lennie

[]

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 5972

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>EF. 7/29</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>Log FRP</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

89 JUL 29 P 2: 20

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Sensitive:
Log for Record
Purpose Per Hughes.
PA Files

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Potential Benefits from an Open Skies Regime (2 pp.)	8/29/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	OA/ID Number:	91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Potential Benefits from an Open Skies Regime (1 pp.)	8/28/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed: 2/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

31-Aug-1989 15:36 EDT

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Florence E. Gantt
(GANTT)

SUBJECT: Actions #2 -- August 31, 1989

Sames rules apply.

#6591 - Presidential Certification for UN Forces in Angola and Namibia
-- BS signed memo to President dated 8/31; President signed
Presidential Determination same date

#6336 - Ltr to President fm American Security Council on US Policy
toward Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance - BS has edited the
letter at Tab I; am returning for redo

#6780 - Hubert Humphrey Award fm American Political Science Association
- BS approved recommendations 1 and 2 and signed letter at Tab I; I
retyped and mailed from up here dated 8/31/89 Kennebunkport, Maine;
FAXed copy to Peter Rodman so he could read it at the dinner

~~#6755 - Potential Benefits of an Open Skies Regime - BS noted; we are
not doing anything with our copy because we understand original was
sent to Cicconi in Washington for the President~~

#20961 - Proposed NSC on Sealift - BS noted; we are not doing anything
with our copy for same reason as above.

#4924 - Request for President to Send Thank You to VOA for China
Coverage - BS said HOLD. Do NOT act!

#6692 - Visit of Canadian PM Mulroney to Kennebunkport: The Catch of
the Day - BS noted

Distribution:

FOR: Jacqueline A. Murphy
FOR: William F. Sittmann
FOR: Diane L. Edwards
FOR: Wilma G. Hall
FOR: Dona F. Proctor
FOR: Cathy Millison
FOR: Diane G. Ross
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard
FOR: G. Philip Hughes

(MURPHY)
(SITTMANN)
(EDWARDS)
(HALL)
(PROCTOR)
(MILLISON)
(ROSSDG)
(HILLIARD)
(HUGHES)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0936-MR
SCS 4/22/13

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # _____

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 33

DTG _____

RELEASER _____

FROM/LOCATION

1. BILL SIMMANN / THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. FLORENCE GANTT FOR BRENTSCOWCROFT / KENNEBUNKPORT

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

6329 - PRES RESPONSE to Helmut Schmidt

6755 - Potential Benefits OPEN SKIES

20961 - Proposed NSD on Sea Lift

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

21 JUL 11

National Security Council
The White House



LOG # 6755

SYSTEM PR NSC INT
DOCLOG CM A/O

PROOFED BY: _____
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

SEQUENCE TO 2 HAS SEEN W DISPOSITION A

Dep Exec

Philip Hughes

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Philip Hughes

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

P 8: 26

28
28
28

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

[Handwritten notes and signatures in the comments section, including "P" and "on Operations"]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10d. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Potential Benefits from an Open Skies Regime (1 pp.)	8/28/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed: 2/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10e. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Potential Benefits from an Open Skies Regime (2 pp.)	8/29/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (July - August 1989)

Date Closed: 2/20/2009	OA/ID Number: 91117-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6755

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PR NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>P</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>W</u>	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>CM 8/25</u>	<u>D/PRON</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

P 8:26

9 AUG 28

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS IN 1 P
Open Sk

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6755

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
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Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>DRN</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch

cc: VP Sununu Other

Originals
returned to
NSCIS
- No further
action req.

-- origs are with Pres.
-- check Doclog