Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91117
Folder ID Number: 91117-003

Folder Title:
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (May - June 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev Concerning "Open Skies" (1 pp.)	5/16/89	(b)(1)	C
01b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft To POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev Concerning "Open Skies" (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01c. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Repudiating the Brezhnev Doctrine (2 pp.)	6/20/89	(b)(1)	
02b. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Repudiating the Brezhnev Doctrine (1 pp.)	6/10/89	(b)(1)	
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Could the Chinese Upheaval Happen in the USSR? (3 pp.)	6/21/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Could the Chinese Upheaval Happen in the USSR? (1 pp.)	6/12/89	(b)(1)	S
04a. Memo	Chris Needels to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S./U.S.S.R. Counterterrorism Consultations (1 pp.)	6/23/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (May - June 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap989
OA/ID Number: 91117-003
Date Closed: 2/20/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Bilateral Counter-terrorism Policy Consultations with the Soviet Union: Strategy and Objectives (1 pp.)	6/21/89	(b)(1)	S
04c. Outline	Re: US - Soviet Bilateral Counter-Terrorism Policy Consultations (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Admiral William Crowe (1 pp.)	6/28/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Summary	Re: Summary of Cables Reporting on Admiral Crowe's Trip (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: President's Luncheon with Admiral Crowe on June 30 (1 pp.)	6/27/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (May - June 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap989
OA/ID Number: 91117-003
Date Closed: 2/20/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

CHRON FILE 3461

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 9, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

Talked to Cheney. Speech being revised. BS

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CLINTON BROOKS/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: DON M. SNIDER

SUBJECT: Secretary Cheney's Speech for Tomorrow Evening, May 10, 1989

Attached at Tab I is the draft text for Secretary Cheney to present at CSIS tomorrow evening (Bob Blackwill earlier provided you a copy with a note recommending you call Secretary Cheney). Our reading of the speech is similar to Bob's, it serves too well its intended purpose -- strongly suggesting that no major changes are needed in US defense policy vis-a-vis the Soviets.

Additionally, given the intent and tone of the speech, presentation tomorrow evening is very poorly timed:

- less than 48 hours before the President's address on the same subject,

- during the time of Secretary Baker's ministerial meetings in Moscow,

- less than a week before the NSC will be asked to consider at least some changes to US defense policy as a result of the NSR-12 review.

We suggest that, after reviewing the text, if you agree with our concerns you discuss them with Secretary Cheney with a view toward changing to a different topic.

Don Mahley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Secretary Cheney and authorize Philip Hughes to release the memorandum at Tab II denying clearance for the speech.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Draft of Secretary Cheney's Speech
Tab II Hughes Memorandum to Cole

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/9

Brent:

Dick Cheney's Executive Secretary at DoD earlier today asked to see a draft of the President's Texas A&M speech -- probably to check it against Cheney's proposed text. However you dispose of the Cheney speech at breakfast, please let me know if it's appropriate afterwards to provide a copy of the draft speech to DoD. (Incidentally, I'd prefer not to. Just increases chances of leaking the President's message and getting more kibbitzers involved.)

Phil

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3461

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	1	MD	A
Philip Hughes	2	APK	
Bob Gates	3	✓	✓
Brent Scowcroft	4	APNSA Has Seen	I
Philip Hughes	5		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	5/11	A
NSC Secretariat	7		N/R

89 MAY 9 P7:28

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Must be reviewed prior to Wednesday breakfast 5/10.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP 89 MAY 9 P1:50

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 3461

ACTION OFFICER: SNIDER

DUE: NOON, WED, MAY 10

- ☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
- ☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi
- ☒ Prepare Memo HUGHES
- ☐ Appropriate Action
- ☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes to SALMON

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

*PHONE** to action officer at ext. 3975

	FYI		FYI		FYI
☐	☐ Basora	☐	☐ Lampley	☐	☐ Reiss
☐	☐ Beers	☐	☐ Leach	☒	☐ Rice
☐	☐ Blackwill	☐	☐ Lewis	☐	☐ Rodman
☐	☐ Brooks	☐	☐ Lowenkron	☐	☐ Rostow
☐	☐ Cabelly	☐	☒ Mahley	☐	☐ Salvetti
☐	☐ Charles	☐	☐ Mandel	☐	☐ Snider
☐	☐ Coulson	☐	☐ McCue	☐	☐ Tahir-Kheli
☐	☐ Deal	☐	☐ Melby	☐	☐ Tobey
☐	☐ Donley	☐	☐ Menan	☐	☐ Welch
☐	☐ Dyke	☐	☐ Miller	☐	☐ Working
☐	☒ Ebner	☐	☐ Miskel	☐	☐ Zelikow
☐	☐ Grant	☐	☐ Needels	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Haass	☐	☐ Paal	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Hoffamann	☐	☐ Pacelli	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Hutchings	☐	☐ Pastorino	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Jackson	☐	☐ Popadiuk	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ LaMagna	☐	☐ Porter	☐	☐ _____
☐	☒ Kanter	☐	☐ Rademaker	☐	☐ _____

INFORMATION
- ☐ Hughes
- ☐ Scowcroft (advance)
- ☐ Gates (advance)
- ☒ Secretariat
- ☐ Exec. Sec. Desk
- ☐ _____

COMMENTS

Logged By GAD

Return to Secretariat

3461 b

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 08 MAY 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
GROUND FLOOR, WEST WING
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft SECDEF Remarks for Review and Comments

The attached draft remarks were prepared for Secretary Cheney's speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 May 1989.

Request that you review and telephone any comments you might have to Jeff Salmon, (697-8191) by 12:00 noon, Wednesday, May 10, 1989.

George P. Cole Jr.
Colonel, USAF
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Salmon
2:00PM
8May89

3461

Remarks by Secretary Cheney
At The
Center for Strategic and International Studies

10 May 1989

[Introduction material]

Since becoming Secretary of Defense, I have received my share of free advice. One of the most striking recommendations I sometimes get is that America should have a new defense policy.

We hear that world politics is undergoing a fundamental change, that the Soviet threat has diminished, if not totally evaporated, and that in response to all this we must reshape our strategy for keeping the peace and securing our national interest.

However attractive these notions, and however genuine the reforms taking place in the Soviet Union, this is not the time to engage in a wholesale reworking of American defense policy.

There is no question that we wish to encourage democratic developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We have every reason to hope that Soviet military power takes on a less threatening posture. And we have every reason to hope that people now subjected to dictatorial rule may be given a breath of freedom.

Hopes, however, cannot rule defense policy. And there are a great many reasons why we should maintain the policy that has brought us to the point where we can even consider a new and better security arrangement with the Soviet Union.

Since the early days of the cold war, our defense policy has pursued two basic goals:

First, with the essential help of our allies, the West has tried to contain Soviet power, to make expansion of its ideology and military forces seem too risky or simply unrealistic.

Second, we have sought to maintain a global presence to insure that our interests are secure and that we live in an international environment that is congenial to free governments.

As we all know, George Kennan, among others, provided the justification for the first of these goals -- the policy of containment. As he put it in 1947: "we can increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force on the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection..." This, Kennan noted, "can

promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."

A vigilant attitude, ready military forces, and a steady policy from the United States and its allies could frustrate Soviet designs and force it to live with the inevitable failure of its communist system.

We should be clear about the nature of Soviet change we were hoping for 40 years ago. Obviously, we looked forward to a time when Soviet military doctrine and capabilities would become less threatening. We could hardly have expect the Kremlin to disarm and join the West as a democratic neighbor. But we could expect the offensive posture of its military forces to change. We could certainly hope that the Soviet military would become truly defensive, rather than arrayed against the world in an aggressive pose.

In addition, we also hoped for political change as well. Indeed, we hoped political and military change would go hand-in-hand. If the Soviet political system were to make a significant shift away from communist ideology, and so become less hostile to democratic values, the West would have far less reason to be concerned about the structure and size of the Kremlin's military forces.

Containment of our major adversary, however, is not the only goal of our defense policy. Even in the early days of the cold war, when the aggressive nature of Soviet power was of great concern, other global issues were a consistent challenge.

American military power has always stood behind our efforts to create political and economic stability that gives nations -- both large and small -- the chance to make their own decisions. In short, our defense policy has always attempted to support

an international environment in which free states can prosper, and in which all states might one day be at least open to democracy. Our global military presence supports our efforts to build a just political and economic international system.

It seems clear that this defense policy has worked rather well. Has it always functioned perfectly? Of course not. Have we made great mistakes? Certainly. But given the dizzying complexity of the problems our defense policy is supposed to meet, we have been quite successful.

We can say this because, judged by its own standards, our defense policy appears to be doing what it set out to accomplish. On the one hand, we see a host of nations turning toward democracy. We see nations like China in the midst of a significant reappraisal of its economic and political

system, and most telling, we've seen forty years of relative international peace.

On the other hand, it appears that the Soviet Union is beginning to do precisely what we had hoped for. It may be the case that the Soviet Union is becoming less of a threat, as it restructures its political and economic system.

I say it may be the case, because we cannot be certain what the outcome of glasnost and perestroika will be, nor can we be certain that a more modern Soviet economy means a less threatening Soviet military. It will depend upon the nature of the political changes we see in the Soviet Union.

But uncertainties about the Soviet Union are only half the story. The other half is the certainties. We are certain about the Soviets' enormous

military capabilities and we are certain that much of its military power is being modernized.

We know the USSR continues to build three new modern aircraft carriers, has deployed road and rail mobile ICBMs and is increasing its overall defense spending by about three percent a year.

We know that for decades the Kremlin has spent between 15 and 18 percent of its Gross National Product on defense, while we spend less than six percent. And we know that despite its talk of a more defensive military positive and drastic cuts in defense spending, Moscow still produces about 3,500 tanks a year. We produce around 700.

Of equal concern, is the Kremlin's continued adherence to the Brezhnev Doctrine. Some 515 million dollars in military aid went to Nicaragua in 1988, up from 280 million dollars in 1985. These expenses were all incurred under Mr. Gorbachev,

and all at odds with his "new thinking" in foreign and defense policy.

President Gorbachev wants to be understood as the leader of a new generation of Soviet officials who have put behind them the rhetoric, propaganda, and aggressive intent of the past. And this Administration wants to take seriously Mr. Gorbachev's pronouncements about Soviet military reform and "new thinking."

But our problem comes when we try to compare the rhetoric with the reality. For example, Mr. Gorbachev recently claimed that NATO's intended modernization of short range nuclear forces undercut the spirit of the INF Treaty. But in fact, the Soviets are currently undertaking a modernization program of their own that is far more comprehensive than the one NATO has been talking about. It includes deployment of improved

SCUD missiles, replacing inaccurate FROG systems with the vastly improved SS-21 missile, and upgrades in their nuclear-capable artillery and aircraft. In fact, modernization of its short range nuclear forces hardly seems necessary given that the Warsaw Pact already has a 16 to 1 advantage in ~~these forces~~ SNF launchers over NATO.

Mr. Gorbachev also said that Moscow had ceased upgrading its short range forces. In fact, as Mr. Gorbachev knows, the negotiating record, as well as the Treaty, clearly permits the type of modernization planned by NATO.

So Soviet criticisms of NATO's modernization program make no sense, except as heavy handed attempts to intervene in the internal politics of our Western alliance.

Another example of mismatched rhetoric and reality is President Gorbachev's announcement of

the closure of two plutonium production reactors and a halt in the production of highly enriched uranium. In fact, even after closing two reactors, the Soviets will still have eight reactors dedicated to weapons production, as well as an ample stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Meanwhile, the fact that we closed down our own highly enriched uranium production 25 years ago seems to have gone largely unnoticed. We currently have no reactors dedicated to weapons production.

These mismatches between rhetoric and reality have to make us wonder about the seriousness of Mr. Gorbachev's new thinking.

We cannot afford to assume that Soviet policy today is a straight line pointing toward the end of the cold war. We may be headed in that direction. We certainly hope so. Indeed, an end to the cold

war is precisely what our defense policy is aimed to accomplish.

But it would be dangerous -- extremely dangerous -- to believe we should abandon a policy that works, just because we have some reason to hope. Let us do what we can to bring those hopes to fruition. Meanwhile, let us not forget that the cold war may not be over and we will still have to face real Soviet capabilities.

The best way to convince the Soviet Union that its offensive military posture is a costly mistake. And that is to continue to maintain sufficient military strength and preparedness and to keep our alliances strong.

As our defense policy itself recognizes, we have always had concerns other than the Soviet Union. No matter what happens to the Soviet threat, America is still going to be a major force in world

politics, we are still going to be concerned about the stability of the international system, and we are still going to be concerned with the future of democracy and freedom.

Many of us forget that America's first inclination after the Second World War was to shy away from the role of superpower, or an attempt to work out a long-term alliance with Europe. We were first inclined to turn backward toward isolationism. Some members of my own party were vehemently opposed to further involvement in Europe. They argued that our atomic bombs could protect us. They argued that a democratic society would never support an indefinite commitment to global peacekeeping.

Fortunately, wiser heads prevailed -- some of them were even Republicans. One of the reasons

wiser heads prevailed in the late 1940s was that we had the example of 1920 to instruct us.

What we had learned was that no matter how much wealth we had, no matter how well the international economic system worked, America still had to play an important military role in the world.

This of course meant a commitment of forces worldwide and the expense that goes with such a commitment. It also meant something more profound. It meant that we were taking the responsibility for seeing to it that liberty and free government had a congenial home in the world.

In other words, our commitment to the exercise of global military power became not just a temporary expedient, but a permanent condition.

With worldwide commitments have come worldwide risks. Today we face a host of diplomatic, economic, and military challenges that often have very little to do with the Soviet Union. Hostile or unstable third world nations and terrorists now have ready access to high technology weapons. This poses a very real threat to our friends' -- indeed to our own -- national interests. Chemical and biological weapons, nuclear arms, and the means to deliver these deadly weapons are too readily available for us to ignore the danger they pose.

We must be certain we can deter the variety of threats that will face us. As more nations and groups gain access to destructive weapons, we will make what adjustments are required to insure that we have the means and the flexibility to protect our friends and maintain international stability.

Let me close by returning to our main adversary. The United States from the first wanted to build a security arrangement with the Soviet Union that does not depend so greatly on military force. That may be possible, we do not yet know.

But we must have the self-confidence to admit that what is happening in the Soviet Union is at least in part a result of our own post-war policies.

Having maintained a vigilant posture toward the Soviet Union and toward our global interests for well over forty years, it would be a supreme folly to quit the struggle on what may well be the eve of a less threatening world.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Draft SECDEF Remarks for Review and Comments

The National Security Council staff has reviewed the draft SECDEF remarks for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 May 1989, and does not provide clearance. The National Security Advisor will call the Secretary to discuss the proposed remarks.

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

5/17/89
0945

May 16, 1989

I don't want to do this via memo. Let's discuss first & see him.

Brent --

I hope you will raise this with Dubinin.

Bob Blackwill

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev Concerning "Open Skies"

1

The letter from the President to Gorbachev, attached at Tab I, reiterates the President's proposal on "Open Skies." The letter is intended to communicate to the Soviet leader the sincerity of the proposal and to explain the spirit in which it was offered.

We expected Secretary Baker to raise the proposal with the Soviets in Moscow but it is our understanding that he did not. We believe that a personal communication from the President to Gorbachev will help to convince the Soviets that this was not a propaganda ploy, intended to catch them off balance.

Your memorandum to the President, asking him to sign the letter to Gorbachev is at Tab II.

Arnie Kanter concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President asking him to sign the letter to Gorbachev.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo for the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0934-MR
SCS 6/14/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3732

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev Concerning "Open Skies"

Purpose

To confirm to Gorbachev your proposal for "Open Skies."

Background

I believe that a personal letter from you to Gorbachev will help to convince him of the sincerity of your proposal. The letter places the proposal in the context of your hopes for a more open and permanently beneficial relationship.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Chairman Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0934-MR
SCS 6/14/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Chairman Gorbachev:

In a speech on May 12, I renewed President Eisenhower's visionary proposal to the Soviet Union that we adopt jointly a policy of "Open Skies." I suggested that we broaden that vision and ask not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to seek agreement to allow unarmed aircraft of the participating countries to conduct territorial overflights.

Such surveillance flights, complementing satellites, would provide regular scrutiny of military activities. But perhaps more importantly, such unprecedented territorial access would demonstrate our commitment to openness.

Mr. Chairman, I proposed "Open Skies" in the spirit of sincere cooperation. You are encouraging changes in your country that give me hope that we may be on the verge of building a more open and permanently beneficial relationship. Your agreement to explore my proposal for "Open Skies" would underscore that commitment to proceed from a new basis and to move ahead to true and enduring cooperation. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: SA LOG # 3732

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 27 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	1		A
Philip Hughes	2	PH	
Bob Gates	3	✓	
Brent Scowcroft	4	✓	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	5/6/9	N
NSC Secretariat	6		N/R

89 MAY 17 A9:52

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Letter to Gorbachev re "Open Skies"

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4018

June 20, 1989

CHRON FILE

Brent — Tell Peter I thought this was a very good paper — right in its conclusions

GB 6-22

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Repudiating the Brezhnev Doctrine

What It Was: The "Brezhnev Doctrine," as you know, refers to a series of authoritative Soviet statements in 1968, around the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that the interests of the "socialist community" were paramount, implying a limitation on the sovereignty of East European countries.

You have called for the Soviets to repudiate this doctrine. Their usual response has been to deny that it ever existed. True, they have never used the phrase "Brezhnev Doctrine" or "limited sovereignty" to describe their policy, but the meaning of the 1968 statements was unmistakable.

What Has Changed: Under Gorbachev, we have seen a series of much more moderate statements -- for example, declaring that "freedom of choice is a universal principle to which there should be no exceptions" (his UNGA speech, December 7, 1988) and renouncing "any threat or use of force and interference in the internal affairs of other states under any pretext whatsoever" (Soviet-Yugoslav declaration during Gorbachev visit, March 18, 1988). Clearly there is much greater Soviet tolerance for experimentation and liberal reform in the bloc today. Thus, the latest Soviet line is that the Brezhnev Doctrine is ancient history.

What Is Left: All this is welcome. Our residual doubts, however, stem not from the degree of tolerance that is clearly evident but from the nagging suspicion that, somewhere out there, there is still a limit to that tolerance. A close reading of some of Gorbachev's own statements uncovers frequent qualifications buried in the new rhetoric. For example:

-- In Warsaw on June 30, 1986, Gorbachev warned ominously that "socialist gains are irreversible. ...To threaten the socialist order, try to undermine it from outside, and tear one country or another from the socialist community means encroachment not only on the will of the people but also on the entire postwar order and, in the final analysis, on peace."

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

-- In Prague on April 11, 1987, Gorbachev declared that "the successes of the socialist community are impossible without each party and country caring not only about its own but also about common interests, without a respectful attitude toward friends and allies, without the obligation to take into account their interests."

-- In his speech November 2, 1987, on the 70th anniversary of the Revolution, he said: "We all know what damage can be done by deviation from the principles of mutual benefit and mutual aid, and by a lack of attention to the general interests of socialism in action on the world arena."

-- In January 1988, on the 20th anniversary of the launching of the Prague Spring, Pravda reprinted a vicious tirade against Dubcek that had appeared in the Czech Party newspaper. Gorbachev, in a Washington Post interview before the May 1988 Moscow Summit, repeated the old canard about outside "interference" provoking the events of both 1956 and 1968.

So there is room for speculation about how the Soviet leadership would react to a new challenge. The new tolerance has not yet been finally tested -- by, say, a bloc country's attempt to go neutral, or to vote the Communist Party out of office.

This is why it's essential to keep the heat on the Soviets. The key, of course, is not to debate whether there was or was not a Brezhnev Doctrine, but to push the Soviets (a) to renounce as categorically and definitively as possible all pretexts and excuses for intervention and (b) actually to allow East Europeans full self-determination up to the point of voting the Communist parties out of office, if they choose, and choosing their own foreign policy as well as domestic policy.

Events may test the new Soviet tolerance some time soon.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4018 Redo

June 10, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN PWR

SUBJECT: Repudiating the Brezhnev Doctrine

A recent article in Moscow News argues that the reforms in Poland and Hungary prove that the "dead dogmas" of "limited sovereignty" no longer apply. Other Soviet commentators, of course, assert that the "Brezhnev Doctrine" never existed.

Thus, there may be some confusion about what remains for the Soviets to do to meet our demand that they "repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine." The answer is, a lot. The Doctrine still lives, in the repeated qualifications and hookers that Gorbachev himself has included in many of his expressions of tolerance for East European diversity.

A suggested memorandum for the President, attached at Tab I, lays this out.

PWR for Concurrences by: Bob Blackwill, Condi Rice and Nick Rostow

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8904339
RECEIVED: 06 JUN 89 12:

CHRON FILE

TO: GATES

FROM: RICE

DOC DATE: 08 JUN 89
SOURCE REF:

1

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES PROCLAMATION / BALTIC FREEDOM DAY 1989

ACTION: GATES APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 06 JUN 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLACKWILL
		RICE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWJR CLOSED BY: NSMDC DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	RICE	Z	89060612	PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
002	GATES	Z	89060816	FOR DECISION
002		X	89061211	GATES APPROVED RECOM

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8904339
RECEIVED: 06 JUN 89 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: MILLER, A
GREEN, S

DOC DATE: 06 JUN 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES PROCLAMATION / BALTIC FREEDOM DAY 1989

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 06 JUN 89 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
RICE		BLACKWILL
		HUGHES
		RODMAN
		WOOLSEY
		WORKING

COMMENTS: Completed 6/8/89. Copy used. mc

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWJR CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES RMG

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Proclamation/Baltic Freedom Day

The draft proclamation at Tab I would in accordance with Senate Resolution 63, designate June 14, 1989, as Baltic Freedom Day.

The proclamation has been revised to reflect reforms in the Soviet Union.

Upon your approval, the revised text will be given to Presidential Messages for dispatch.

State concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the revised text for the Draft Presidential Proclamation.

Approve ✓ as further revised. See especially last bracketed sentence on p 2. I agree with that. Disapprove_____

Attachment
Tab I Draft Proclamation

4339

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: C. BOYDEN GRAY
DAVID Q. BATES, JR.
FREDERICK D. McCLURE
ROGER B. PORTER
DAVID DEMAREST
STEPHEN SOLOMON
GREGG PETERSMEYER
JOSEPH W. HAGIN II
[redacted]

FROM: Amy Miller for
SHIRLEY GREEN
93 OEOB

SUBJECT: (Draft Proclamation)
Baltic Freedom Day, 1989

Attached for your review is the above mentioned proclamation designating June 14, 1989 as Baltic Freedom Day.

It was submitted by the Department of State and edited/revised by this office.

(IMMEDIATE ATTENTION REQUIRED.) Written response required by no later than [redacted] p.m. TODAY, [redacted]. For routine clearance, questions, or discussion, call Amy Miller, extension 2276. Thank you.

cc: Ron Geisler

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAY 2 3 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James C. Murr
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

SUBJECT: Baltic Freedom Day, 1989

Attached is a proclamation which, in accordance with Senate Joint Resolution 63, would designate June 14, 1989, as Baltic Freedom Day. Senate Joint Resolution 63 passed the Senate on February 28, 1989, and House passage is anticipated in the near future.

The proposed proclamation was submitted by the Department of State, and editorial and format changes were made in this Office.

Attachment

BALTIC FREEDOM DAY, 1989

- - - - - - -

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

Fifty years ago on August 23, 1939, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The secret protocols to this treaty condemned the independent Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the foreign domination they still endure today.

Less than 1 year after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union invaded the three Baltic Republics and imposed upon them a regime antithetical to the ideas of national sovereignty and individual liberty. The suffering of the Baltic people was exacerbated when Nazi forces drove through these states during the beginning of the Nazi-Soviet War and established ~~a Gestapo run civil~~ a brutal administration. ~~When the Red Army recaptured the Baltic States during World War II, it reinstituted a reign of terror under the Soviet secret police that fully matched the brutality of the Gestapo.~~ Hundreds of thousands of innocent men, ~~women,~~ and children were deported to Siberia, thousands of others perished in armed resistance, ~~to the attempt upon their national independence and individual rights~~ By the end of World War II, the Baltic States had lost a quarter of their population.

Since their forcible annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, the people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have suffered political oppression, religious persecution, and repression of their national consciousness. Their culture heritage has been denigrated and suppressed, and russification has threatened their survival as distinct ethnic groups. An aggressive program of industrialization has posed hazards to their health as well as the environment. Members of the clergy and lay religious leaders have been systematically harassed and imprisoned for activities deemed unacceptable by the authorities.

brc

spirit of the Baltic people. Tod[illegible], thei[illegible] g[illegible] and [illegible]es for liberty remain strong. Hundreds of thousands of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian men and women have publicly demonstrated their desire for freedom and democracy, calling for national autonomy and control over their own ~~social~~, ~~political, and economic~~ affairs.

~~The undeniable voice of Baltic people has begun to stir~~ But the future looks brighter today than at any other time in the Baltic States' post war experience, ~~the occupying regimes.~~ Some religious shrines -- desecrated by the Communist government and used to house concerts, ~~arts,~~ artwork and even a museum of atheism -- have been returned to the churches. Members of the clergy have been allowed to take up their pastoral duties. The unique languages, national flags, and patriotic songs of the three countries have been restored. Some political prisoners have been released.

The undeniable energy of the Baltic peoples is stirring again.

These are important steps, but justice demands that more be made. ~~Recent improvements in human rights practices by the ruling Communist officials are not complete, as they have been instit[illegible]utionalized.~~ Recent human rights advances must be institutionalized. But for the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia there is a more fundamental right -- the right to self-determination. ~~[illegible]storted [illegible] fundam[illegible]~~

original is preferable STET

~~The~~ Government of the United States does not and will not recognize the unilateral incorporation by forces of arms of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. ~~The Baltic people have a God given right to shape their own future free from foreign domination.~~ On this observance of Baltic Freedom Day, we express our solidarity with them and call upon the Soviet Union to ~~heed~~ listen to their calls for freedom and self-determination.

By S.J. Res 63, the Congress of the United States has designated June 14, 1989, as "Baltic Freedom Day" and has requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim June 14, 1989, as Baltic Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate remembrances and ceremonies and to reaffirm their commitment to principles of liberty and freedom, ~~for all oppressed people~~.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this day of , in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-nine, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirteenth.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

BALTIC FREEDOM DAY, 1989

- - - - - - -

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

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Less than 1 year after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union invaded the three Baltic Republics and imposed upon them a regime antithetical to the ideas of national sovereignty and individual liberty. The suffering of the Baltic people was exacerbated when Nazi forces drove through these states during the beginning of the Nazi-Soviet War and established a Gestapo-run civil administration. When the Red Army recaptured the Baltic States during World War II, it reinstituted a reign of terror under the Soviet secret police that fully matched the brutality of the Gestapo. Hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and children were deported to Siberia; thousands of others perished in armed resistance to the attack upon their national independence and individual rights. By the end of World War II, the Baltic States had lost 20 percent of their population.

Since their forcible annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, the people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have suffered political oppression, religious persecution, and repression of their national consciousness. Their cultural heritage has been denigrated and suppressed, and Russification has threatened their survival as distinct ethnic groups. An aggressive program of industrialization has posed hazards to their health as well as the environment. Members of the clergy and lay religious leaders have been systematically harassed and imprisoned for activities deemed unacceptable by the authorities.

However, half a century of repression has not broken the spirit of the Baltic people. Today, their longing and hopes for liberty remain strong. Hundreds of thousands of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian men and women have publicly demonstrated their desire for freedom and democracy, calling for national autonomy and control over their own social, political, and economic affairs.

more

(OVER)

The undeniable voice of Baltic people has begun to stir the occupying regimes. Some religious shrines -- desecrated by the Communist government and used to house concerts, arts, and even a museum of atheism -- have been returned to the churches. Members of the clergy have been allowed to take up their pastoral duties. The unique languages, national flags, and patriotic songs of the three countries have been restored. Some political prisoners have been released.

These are important steps, but justice demands that more be made. Recent improvements in human rights practices by the ruling Communist officials are not complete, nor have they been institutionalized. The people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia both demand and deserve lasting guarantees of their fundamental rights.

The Government of the United States does not and will not recognize the unilateral incorporation by force of arms of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. The Baltic people have a God-given right to shape their own future, free from foreign domination. On this observance of Baltic Freedom Day, we express our solidarity with them and call upon the Soviet Union to heed their calls for freedom and self-determination.

By S.J. Res 63, the Congress of the United States has designated June 14, 1989, as "Baltic Freedom Day" and has requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this day of , in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-nine, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirteenth.

GEORGE BUSH

# # #

Edited version

FREEDOM DAY, 1989

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION

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Since their forcible annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, the people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have suffered political oppression, religious persecution, and repression of their national consciousness. Their cultural heritage has been denigrated and suppressed, and russification has threatened their survival as distinct ethnic groups. An aggressive program of industrialization has posed hazards to their health, as well as the environment. Members of the clergy and lay religious leaders have been systematically harassed, and imprisoned for activities deemed unacceptable by the authorities.

However, half a century of repression has not broken the spirit of the Baltic people. Today, their longing and hopes for liberty remain strong. Hundreds of thousand of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian men and women have publicly demonstrated their desire for freedom and democracy, calling for national autonomy and control over their own social, political, and economic affairs.

The undeniable voice of Baltic people has begun to stir the occupying regimes. Some religious shrines -- desecrated by the Communist government and used to house concerts, arts, and even a museum of atheism -- have been returned to the churches. Members of the clergy have been allowed to take up their pastoral duties. The unique languages, national flags, and patriotic songs of the three countries have been restored. Some political prisoners have been released.

These are important steps, but justice demands that more be made. Recent improvements in human rights practices by the ruling Communist officials are not complete, nor have they been institutionalized. The people of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia both demand and deserve lasting guarantees of their fundamental rights.

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By S.J. Res. 63, the Congress of the United States has designated June 14, 1989, as "Baltic Freedom Day" and has requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event...

NOW, THERFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim

see also SJ Res 63

BALTIC FREEDOM DAY, 1989

- - - - - - -

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

Fifty years ago on August 23, 1939, the Foreign ministers of ~~Stalin's~~ the Soviet Union and ~~Hitler's~~ Nazi Germany signed the ~~disgraceful~~ infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The secret protocols to this treaty condemned Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to a cruel fate and cast them as spoils to be divided between these two aggressive neighbors. A Soviet invasion and brutal occupation in 1940, followed by Nazi attack and depredations later during World War II, destroyed or imprisoned tens of thousands of innocent Baltic people.

colorful, but VAGUE

As written, this would be confusing to those not familiar with the facts/chronology

The Red Army's reconquest of the Baltic States during World War II reinstituted a reign of terror under the Soviet secret police that fully matched the earlier cruelties and brutality of the Gestapo. Mass deportations sent thousands of innocent men, women, and children to a cruel Siberian exile, ~~thus tragically repeating their forefathers' fate under the czars.~~ Thousands of others perished in armed resistance to the attack on their political, religious, cultural, and historical patrimony.

relevance? simply opens a whole new can of worms

Yet a half century of oppression and cruelty has not weakened the people's spirit. Today the longing for liberty has never been more visible. Hundreds of thousands of brave Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian men and women have publicly demonstrated their commitment to democracy and freedom. Their cries even have stirred the occupying regimes. Some religious

term used repeatedly

we could be specific ... i.e. recent votes/calls for Sovereignty from the Supreme Soviet

shrines have been returned to the churches and long ~~suffering~~ clergy have been allowed to take up their pastoral duties. The unique languages, national flags, and patriotic songs of the three countries have been restored. Overt oppression has been lessened and political prisoners released. These are important steps toward restoration of long-denied justice.

The Government of the United States does not and will not recognize the unilateral incorporation by force of arms of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. The peoples of the Baltic States have a God-given and inalienable right to control their own destiny. On this commemoration of Baltic Freedom Day we reaffirm our commitment to that noble goal.

By S. J.Res. 63, the Congress of the United States has designated June 14, 1989, as "Baltic Freedom Day" and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim June 14, 1989, as Baltic Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate remembrances and ceremonies and to reaffirm their commitment to principles of liberty and freedom for all oppressed people.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this

day of , in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-nine, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirteenth.

IH

101ST CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. J. RES. 63

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 2, 1989

Referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Post Office and Civil Service

JOINT RESOLUTION

Designating June 14, 1989, as "Baltic Freedom Day", and for other purposes.

Whereas the people of the republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (hereinafter referred to as the "Baltic Republics") have cherished the principles of religious and political freedom and independence;

Whereas the Baltic Republics existed as independent, sovereign nations and as fully recognized members of the League of Nations;

Whereas 1989 marks the 50th anniversary of the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in which the Soviet Union colluded with Nazi Germany, thus allowing the Soviet Union in 1940 to illegally seize and occupy the Baltic Republics and to incorporate such republics by force into the Soviet Union against the national will and the desire for independence and freedom of the people of such republics;

Whereas due to Soviet and Nazi tyranny, by the end of World War II, 20 percent of the total population of the Baltic Republics had been lost;

Whereas the people of the Baltic Republics have individual and separate cultures and national traditions and languages which are distinctively foreign to those of Russia;

Whereas since 1940, the Soviet Union has systematically implemented Baltic genocide by deporting native Baltic peoples from Baltic homelands to forced labor and concentration camps in Siberia and elsewhere;

Whereas by relocating masses of Russians to the Baltic Republics, the Soviet Union has threatened the Baltic cultures with extinction through russification;

Whereas through a program of russification, the Soviet Union has introduced ecologically unsound industries without proper safeguards into the Baltic Republics, and the presence of such industries has resulted in deleterious effects on the environment and well-being of the Baltic people;

Whereas the Soviet Union, despite recent pronouncements of openness and restructuring, has imposed upon the captive people of the Baltic Republics an oppressive political system which has destroyed every vestige of democracy, civil liberty, and religious freedom;

Whereas the people of the Baltic Republics are subjugated by the Soviet Union, are locked into a union such people deplore, are denied basic human rights, and are persecuted for daring to protest;

Whereas the Soviet Union refuses to abide by the Helsinki accords which the Soviet Union voluntarily signed;

Whereas the United States stands as a champion of liberty, is dedicated to the principles of national self-determination, human rights, and religious freedom, and is opposed to oppression and imperialism;

Whereas the United States, as a member of the United Nations, has repeatedly voted with a majority of that international body to uphold the right of other countries of the world to self-determination and freedom from foreign domination;

Whereas the Soviet Union has steadfastly refused to return to the people of the Baltic Republics the right to exist as independent republics, separate and apart from the Soviet Union, or to permit a return of personal, political and religious freedoms; and

Whereas 1989 marks the 49th anniversary of the continued policy of the United States of not recognizing the illegal forcible occupation of the Baltic Republics by the Soviet Union: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That—

(1) the Congress recognizes the continuing desire and right of the people of the Baltic Republics for free-

dom and independence from the domination of the Soviet Union;

(2) the Congress deplores the refusal of the Soviet Union to recognize the sovereignty of the Baltic Republics and to yield to the rightful demands for independence from foreign domination and oppression by the people of the Baltic Republics;

(3) June 14, 1989, the anniversary of the mass deportation of Baltic peoples from their homelands in 1941, is designated as "Baltic Freedom Day", as a symbol of the solidarity of the people of the United States with the aspirations of the enslaved Baltic people; and

(4) the President is authorized and requested—

(A) to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe Baltic Freedom Day with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and

(B) to call upon the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Democratic Republic of Germany to renounce the acquisition or absorption of the Baltic Republics by

the Soviet Union as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Passed the Senate February 28 (legislative day January 3), 1989.

Attest: WALTER J. STEWART,

Secretary.

~~SECRET~~ CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~ 4258

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1583-MR
4/21/2014 MM

June 21, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Could the Chinese Upheaval Happen in the USSR?

On May 30, the CIA hosted an experts' discussion to ruminate on the implications for the Soviet Union of the explosion in China. A member of my staff took part and came back with the following reflections.

Factors in China

The analysts considered first what factors made China vulnerable to such an explosion. They noted such immediate causes as:

- the split within the Party over reform, which was exploited by the students and gave them room for maneuver;
- Western influence, which had radicalized a generation of students;
- the Gorbachev visit, which stayed the regime's hand and was exploited by the students;
- the Army's reluctance to get involved, which allowed the protest movement to build.

The underlying causes, however, would seem to be fourfold:

- a mounting disillusionment with a decade of reform whose results, economically and politically, while impressive by some standards, did not keep up with rising expectations;
- a regime that was genuinely moderate, leading students to believe they had scope for vigorous dissent and to press for further change;
- the easing of Sino-Soviet tensions, which (in addition to producing the Gorbachev visit) diminished the sense of "foreign danger" which in earlier times might have inhibited such a challenge to the system; and

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

- a reform program which (like the Soviet) involved reducing the role of the Party in the economy. As one analyst put it, "once you start discrediting the Party, you're taking the lid off." As ideology weakens, the Party's legitimacy comes to hinge more and more on its delivery of results.

Implications for the USSR

The Chinese upheaval may not itself have a direct impact on the Soviet Union, since the Soviet intelligentsia seemed more preoccupied with their own Supreme Soviet elections and the CIA has so far detected no special resonance from the Chinese events. The deeper issue, of course, is whether conditions in the USSR in any way resemble the tinderbox that exploded in China. There are obvious differences in the two situations, e.g.,:

- Soviet students have no significant campus political life, tradition of political activity, or "underground" links to a radicalized student community abroad.

- Unlike the Chinese, who demanded Deng's resignation, the Soviet dissidents feel a powerful stake in Gorbachev's survival. While there may be a leadership split as in China, the "good guys" are still on top.

- Gorbachev, unlike Deng, has a strategy for political reform, which has provided an outlet for discontent.

- The Army and KGB are less likely to be split or hesitant than their Chinese counterparts.

- Up to now it is mainly the non-Russian nationalities who have organized to protest; no broad-based mobilization is evident among Russians at the center. Indeed, the nationality unrest may add to the Russians' disincentives to cause trouble for the regime.

What Could Change All This?

Thus, Soviet conditions do not now resemble those that produced upheaval in China. Yet, conditions could change.

The Soviets are at a much earlier point in the progress of their reform; the souring of reform in China came after more than a decade. Yet, just as in China, the passage of time -- coupled with a failure to deliver results -- could erode stability. Gorbachev has already gone much further than the Chinese in discrediting the system -- its ideology, its history, its institutions, and its past performance. As in China, under a seemingly "liberal" regime the sense of fear that traditionally discourages protest gradually fades. As in China, the easing of "foreign dangers" further weakens the basis for discipline.

If economic performance continues to deteriorate over time, under Gorbachev's rule, it is not impossible that we will see mounting disillusionment coupled with a perhaps mistaken idea of how much protest will be tolerated. Thus, Boris Yeltsin's recent personal attacks on Gorbachev could be a straw in the wind -- combining a remarkable cynicism about Gorbachev with an equally remarkable optimism about how permanently Gorbachev has ended the repressiveness of the Soviet system.

This is an unstable combination. It matches Tocqueville's classic analysis that revolutions come not when a system is at its most repressive but when it starts to ease up. Such instability is a danger above all for Gorbachev, for it could trigger a preemptive coup by the Right. Nevertheless, in the totalitarian Soviet system as in the Chinese, there is an increasing possibility that some brave souls may guess wrong about how far they can go.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4258

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 12, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN

SUBJECT: Could the Chinese Upheaval Happen in the USSR?

On May 30, I took part in a working-level intelligence community discussion at CIA on the implications for the Soviet Union of the explosion in China. It was an interesting discussion, triggering some thoughts of my own which I have written up as a possible memorandum for the President.

Concurrence by: Doug Paal and Condi Rice, and R. Blackwill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memo for the President

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1583-MR
4/21/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 4884

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 23, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

Bad idea! Why did it not get to the Secretariat much less to us before the meeting? [illegible]

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR. Miller

FROM: CHRIS NEEDELS

SUBJECT: U.S./U.S.S.R. Counterterrorism Consultations

On June 26-27, Ambassador Busby, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, will lead a U.S delegation in Moscow to discuss counterterrorism with the Soviets. Attached are the objectives and strategies for these consultations.

I have previously provided draft copies to Condi Rice and Richard Haass. I have also discussed the consultations with Sandy Charles (for specific comments on our position on Iran in the aftermath of Khomeini's death) and with Condi Rice.

Condi CR Rice and Richard RH Haass concur.

Attachment
Tab I Memo from Roy

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0934-MR
SCS 6/20/13

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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LIMITED ACCESS
4884

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 21, 1989

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Bilateral Counter-terrorism Policy Consultations with the Soviet Union: Strategy and Objectives

Ambassador Morris D. Busby will lead an interagency delegation to the Soviet Union for bilateral counter-terrorism policy consultations on June 26 and 27. The Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed that experts should meet to discuss possible areas of cooperation in counter-terrorism, a transnational issue. These consultations provide an opportunity to test Soviet "new thinking". We intend to challenge the Soviets to give greater effect to their rhetoric on terrorism and stimulate new patterns of behavior by which the USSR could make an effective contribution to the international counter-terrorism effort.

The attached paper outlines the objectives and strategy for this phase of the US-USSR counter-terrorism dialogue. This round of consultations will at best produce modest results, but hopefully will establish the direction for the future of our bilateral counter-terrorism relationship.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Objectives and Strategy Paper

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0934-MR
SCS 6/20/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

US-Soviet Bilateral Counter-terrorism Policy Consultations

Introduction

The Soviets traditionally have favored a rhetorical, formalistic approach to counter-terrorism, centered on multilateral legal instruments and UN actions. While agreeing on the importance of multilateral efforts, the US has urged that the Soviets complement this approach with the practical, operational steps we have found to be more effective in dealing with terrorism. The Soviets have expressed an interest in exploring such steps during these bilateral consultations. This is an opportunity to test Soviet "new thinking" and perhaps influence Soviet policy by pointing to actions it can take to earn the legitimacy it seeks on the terrorism issue.

Objectives

1. Reach a common understanding of the nature of terrorism, the threat it poses, and the importance of ending state support for terrorism.

2. Encourage consistent Soviet condemnation of terrorist incidents and of those responsible for them, groups as well as states.

3. Induce greater Soviet efforts with clients, such as Syria and Libya, to discourage their support for terrorism; remind the Soviets of Iran's continuing use of terrorism as a policy tool.

4. Encourage the Soviets to counsel their Warsaw Pact allies against allowing terrorists transit, safehaven, and access to arms and materiel.

5. Lay the groundwork for obtaining future selected information on certain individuals of possible prosecutorial interest to the USG.

6. Establish channels of communication to pass information, such as threat alerts, on a case-by-case basis.

7. Discuss elements of a cooperative effort to manage terrorist incidents, especially in the area of civil aviation, which directly involve both countries' interests.

8. Review current international instruments and the need for additional initiatives in the area of terrorism.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0934-MR
SCS 6/20/13

Strategy

1. A productive counter-terrorism relationship with the Soviets could make a substantial difference in our success against groups and states which concern us; however, we must recognize that cooperation will be step-by-step and irregular. And we must be cautious with the Soviets at every step.

2. We need to make clear to the Soviets our ultimate goals and our profound concern over state support of terrorism. We need to be certain that they understand their counter-terrorism performance has implications for our bilateral relations. We must recognize and acknowledge positive developments as well as negative ones.

3. In laying out a track of future cooperation and in establishing benchmarks for Soviet performance, we will identify specific, concrete actions the Soviets can take against terrorists and state supporters.

   -- We will identify specific states and terrorist groups of concern to us; to the degree possible, describe those groups' targets, tactics, and sources of support so there can be no doubt of the depth of our concern.

   -- We will explore whether we can establish a mechanism to identify specific individuals responsible for terrorist activities with a view to seeking agreement to bar their admission to Soviet territory.

   -- We plan to support our positions with limited intelligence data only if needed on a case-by-case basis to procure a specific policy objective.

4. We will be prepared for Soviet demands for US action against groups of concern to them -- but not necessarily to us, increased pressure to share sensitive information, and efforts to pre-empt US support for domestic dissident groups which Moscow may consider as terrorist.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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6/30/89

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0934-MR
SCS 6/14/13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1989

1

MEETING WITH ADMIRAL WILLIAM CROWE
DATE: June 30, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 12:00 - 1:00 pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

You will have lunch with Admiral Crowe, during which time he will debrief you on his recent trip to the Soviet Union.

II. BACKGROUND

This trip was part of the US-Soviet military-to-military contacts, and included senior officers from each of the US services. During the trip, Admiral Crowe and his Soviet counterpart, General Moiseyev, signed an agreement on preventing dangerous military incidents between US and Soviet forces. Although the reporting about this trip has focused on Moscow activities and the "dangerous incidents" agreement, Admiral Crowe visited a wide range of Soviet facilities and sites. Included were: Kubinka airport (Soviet aircraft display); Murmansk port facilities (US WW II lend-lease convoy port); and Leningrad and Volgograd sites of Soviet WW II battles.

Admiral Crowe's reporting has been very enthusiastic. You can expect the same attitude when he briefs you. At Tab A I have prepared a summary of some of the reporting cables on for your background reading.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See List at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer

V. SEQUENCE

Admiral Crowe will describe his trip during and after lunch.

Attachments
Tab A Summary of cables
Tab B Participant List

cc: Vice President
The Chief of Staff

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Summary	Re: Summary of Cables Reporting on Admiral Crowe's Trip (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Collapse Files
Subseries: U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (May - June 1989)

Date Closed:	2/20/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91117-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice-President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Richard D. Cheney, Secretary of Defense
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft,
  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William J. Crowe, Jr.,
  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Robert M. Gates,
  Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 27, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: DON MAHLEY

SUBJECT: President's Luncheon with Admiral Crowe on June 30

At Tab I is a meeting memorandum to the President for his luncheon with Admiral Crowe at noon on June 30. The purpose of the luncheon is for Admiral Crowe to relate to the President information about the Admiral's recent trip to the Soviet Union.

We note that Admiral Crowe has been effusive in his appreciation for the opportunities presented during this trip. The reporting cables have concentrated on Moscow events and have been very optimistic. We have attached at Tab A to the President's memo a summary of the cables Admiral Crowe sent back from the Soviet Union, as background reading for the President. In summarizing, we have been somewhat more balanced than the actual language of the cables. We have not prepared remarks for the President, since the purpose is to receive a briefing from Admiral Crowe. The conversation during lunch will likely be very unstructured.

Concurrences: Robert Blackwill, Condi Rice

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

TAB I		Memorandum to the President
	TAB A	Cables Describing Admiral Crowe's Trip
	TAB B	Participants List

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