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2009-0275-S

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# FOIA MARKER

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** USSR Collapse Files  
**Subseries:** U.S - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

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**OA/ID Number:** 91117  
**Folder ID Number:** 91117-001

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**Folder Title:**  
USSR Collapse: U.S - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - April 1989)

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| Stack:   | Row:      | Section: | Shelf:   | Position: |
|----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| <b>G</b> | <b>34</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>4</b>  |

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type       | Subject/Title                                                                                                | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 01a. Memo             | Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Secretary Baker's Letter to Shevardnadze (1 pp.)               | 1/30/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 01b. Memo             | Re: Secretary's Letter to Shevardnadze (2 pp.)                                                               | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 01c. Handwritten Memo | Bob [Blackwill] to Brent [Scowcroft] (1 pp.)                                                                 | 1/28/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 01d. Handwritten Memo | Page 2 from James Baker III (1 pp.)                                                                          | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 02a. Memo             | Rudolf V. Perina to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Timing of Nato Summit (1 pp.)                                     | 2/3/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 02b. Memo             | Melvyn Levitsky to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: NATO Summit (1 pp.)                                                | 1/30/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 02c. Memo             | John Tower to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs<br>Re: NATO Summit (1 pp.)            | 2/1/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 03a. Memo             | Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Cable from Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock (1 pp.) | 2/14/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

Page 1 of 3

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

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**Series:** USSR Collapse Files

**Subseries:** U.S. - Soviet Relations Chronological Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** USSR Collapse: U.S. - Soviet Relations Thru 1991 (January - April 1989)

**Pinksheet Number:** cap987

**OA/ID Number:** 91117-001

**Date Closed:** 2/19/2009

**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S

**Re-review Case #:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type     | Subject/Title                                                                                                                                         | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 03b. Memo           | Jeffrey M. Menath to Condolessa Rice<br>Re: Secret (10 pp.)                                                                                           | 2/14/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 04. Memo            | James A. Baker III. To POTUS<br>Re: Scandinavia Meetings, February 14 (3 pp.)                                                                         | 2/16/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05. Memo            | Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Work Program for NSRs 3, 4, and 5 on US-Soviet, US-East European and US-West European Relations (1 pp.) | 2/16/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 06a. Memo           | Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Meeting with Ambassador Dubinin on Friday, February 17, 1989 (1 pp.)                                       | 2/16/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 06b. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Ambassador Dubinin<br>February 17, 1989 (2 pp.)                                                                | 2/17/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 07a. Memo           | Jerry W. Leach and Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re:<br>Handling the No-Expectations Policy (4 pp.)                                             | 2/27/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 07b. Outline        | Re: UK Demarche (1 pp.)                                                                                                                               | 2/22/89 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 08. Memo            | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: Getting Ahead of Gorbachev (4 pp.)                                                                                    | 3/1/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 09. Memo            | Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Your Meeting with Jack Matlock on March 3, 1989 (2 pp.)                                                    | 3/2/89  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

Page 2 of 3

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| Doc. No. / Type    | Subject/Title                                                                                                                                | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 10a. Letter        | Brent Scowcroft to Congressman Les Aspin (1 pp.)                                                                                             | 3/20/89 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 10b. Letter        | Congressman Les Aspin to James A. Baker III (3 pp.)                                                                                          | 2/15/89 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 10c. Memo          | Linton Brooks to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Aspin Report on Soviet Trip (1 pp.)                                                                  | 2/27/89 | (b)(1)      | ✓              |
| 11a. Memo          | Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: President's Message to Gorbachev Concerning th Mike-class<br>Submarine Accident Yesterday (1 pp.) | 4/8/89  | (b)(1)      | ✓              |
| 11b. Memo          | G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy<br>Re: Reply to Gorbachev Message Concerning the Mike-class<br>Submarine Accident (1 pp.)               | 4/8/89  | (b)(1)      | ✓              |
| 11c. Draft Message | Re: Thank you for your message... (1 pp.)                                                                                                    | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | ✓              |
| 11d. Message       | Re: Urgent Message from President Gorbachev to President<br>Bush (1 pp.)                                                                     | n.d.    | (b)(1)      |                |
| 12. Memo           | William L. Stearman to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Soviets Still Exporting Revolution in Southern Africa (3 pp.)                                  | 4/26/89 | (b)(1)      | ✓              |

Page 3 of 3

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**Re-review Case #:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**



~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

**CHRON FILE** 0241

January 30, 1989

**Natl Sec Advisor**  
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: Secretary Baker's Letter to Shevardnadze

Per our discussion, attached is a suggested text for this letter.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Letter

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By cap NARA, Date 3/13/12

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Secretary's Letter to Shevardnadze

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you for your message of congratulations on my appointment as Secretary of State. I look forward to working with you and hope to continue the productive dialogue you had with George Shultz, one in which both sides are able to address the full range of U.S.-Soviet issues with clarity and candor.

Our countries represent two fundamentally different approaches to the organization of society. We will inevitably have differences. But we also share an enormous responsibility for promoting peace.

There have been positive developments in U.S.-Soviet relations in the last three years. We hope and expect that these positive trends will continue and allow U.S.-Soviet relations to develop on a solid and steady course. It is both President Bush's and my intention to build on what has already been achieved. While continuity will mark much of our approach, the President will of course put his own stamp on the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2009-0932-MR  
SCS 5/20/13

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

2

It is important that we work on all parts of a comprehensive U. S. -Soviet agenda. This should include the familiar four agenda items of human rights, arms control, and regional and bilateral issues. The President and I believe as well that the agenda should be broadened to include transnational issues such as the environment and the fight against drugs and international terrorism which are of importance to the international community.

As you know, President Bush has directed a comprehensive review of such issues. Let me assure you that we do not intend to prolong this review unnecessarily. The time will be well spent, in terms of our being prepared to address all the issues comprehensively and without further delay.

I look forward to our joint work on issues in which both our nations have a high stake and particular responsibility.

Sincerely,

James Baker III

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

(B)

11/28/89  
1738

Brent --

with regard to Balser's proposed visit to Moscow, the following questions arise:

- 1) Will we be finished with our internal review?
- 2) If not, would it be useful to go to Moscow in a listening mode? Might that be interpreted by publics as a demonstration that the Administration was not yet open for U.S.-Soviet business and ensure that the initiative remained with Gorbachev? As for me, I like to be ready before talking to Soviets, and especially these Soviets.
- 3) I would recommend instead that Balser have a bilateral with Shevardnadze in Vienna around March 9 when the conventional force talks begin and save the drama of a Moscow visit until we have completed and digested our internal deliberations.
- 4) Why do we wish to rush this?

Concerning the substance of the message,

- 1) I would not begin the first substantive message of this Administration with environment, drugs and terrorism.
- 2) I would not say "human rights will remain at the top of our agenda." (my emphasis).
- 3) The paragraph on regional disputes could be interpreted to mean that we want the Soviets in the middle of our Central American and Middle East diplomacy. (I don't).
- 4) The language on START seems to anticipate changes in the U.S. position that Moscow will like, perhaps even concussions.
- 5) All these issues relate to our policy review and decisions the President has not yet made.
- 6) Making policy by clearing telegrams is not a good idea.

Beb



SECRET

*The President and I believe*

2

It is important that we work on all parts of a comprehensive U.S.-Soviet agenda. This should include the familiar four agenda items of human rights, arms control, and regional and bilateral issues, *that the agenda should be broadened to include* as well ~~as other matters~~ such as the environment and the fights against drugs and international terrorism which are of importance to the international community.

As you know, President Bush has directed a comprehensive review of such issues. Let me assure you that we do not intend to prolong this review unnecessarily. The time will be well spent, *in terms of our being prepared to address all the issues comprehensively and without further delay.* I look forward to our joint work on issues in which both our nations have a high stake and particular responsibility.

Sincerely,

James Baker III

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2009-0932-MR  
SCS 5/20/13

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0255

CHRON FILE

February 3, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: RUDOLF V. PERINA *RP*

SUBJECT: Timing of NATO Summit

At Tab A is a memorandum from the State Department soliciting some indication of the President's preferences for the timing of a NATO Summit. At Tab B is a memorandum from Senator Tower reporting on a conversation with NATO Secretary General Woerner, who urged a mid-May Summit.

It would be useful to decide on our preference early so that we can start bringing Allies over to our position, particularly during Secretary Baker's tour of NATO capitals. We think that a Summit in the second half of May would give adequate time to complete our policy reviews and prepare a solid Summit agenda with Allies.

*Don*  
Don Mahley and Don ~~Anider~~ concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you discuss this subject with the President and elicit his guidance on Summit timing.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A State Memo  
Tab B Tower Memo

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2009-0932-MR  
SCS 5/20/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*We would prefer a date as late in May as possible - per General. R*



S/S 8901213  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

0255

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 30, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: NATO Summit

Sentiment is building within NATO for a spring summit meeting to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Alliance. An early NATO Summit would afford the President an opportunity to consult with important friends on the range of Alliance defense and political issues before the first U.S.-Soviet Summit.

Key Allies believe (and we agree) that trying to organize a NATO Summit for the April 4th anniversary would be rushing the process. Mrs. Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl have expressed a strong preference for a Summit in the first half of May. A comprehensive Summit arms control statement would strengthen Bonn's hand prior to Gorbachev's visit to the FRG in late May or early June. A second option is to schedule the Summit in late May/early June, closer to the June 8-9 dates now reserved for a NATO ministerial in London. However, because of the Gorbachev visit to Bonn, Kohl is opposed to leaving it so late.

It is in our interests to define U.S. preferences for the timing of a NATO Summit as early as possible. With an indication of which timeframe the President would prefer, we can begin appropriate consultations with NATO and key allies.

*Melvyn Levitsky*

Melvyn Levitsky  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED

CAP 2003.0368.F/1  
11/24/2008

89 JAN 31 10:28  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

0359

1 FEB 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: NATO Summit (U)

(U) During the Wehrkunde Conference over the weekend, Manfred Woerner asked me whether or not the President wanted to have a NATO Summit. He asked me to raise the issue and stressed that an answer should come as soon as possible. He was interested in the President's thoughts on when such a Summit could take place. Woerner's view was that a NATO Summit was time urgent and suggested mid-May. Woerner made clear his belief that such a Summit was necessary for completion of the NATO document on a "Comprehensive Concept of Security and Disarmament." Otherwise, Woerner said it would not be possible to make structural decisions such as those related to SNF Modernization. He also stressed that a NATO Summit would be a good opportunity for getting out our political message.

(U) I assured Woerner that I would pass this question on to you immediately.

  
John Tower  
Secretary of Defense-Designate

cc: Secretary of State

CLASSIFIED BY: ISP  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0932-MR  
SCS 12/1/13

000001 67:13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X49317




CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

0748



February 14, 1989

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*  
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Cable from Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock

On February 9, you received a detailed assessment from Ambassador Matlock of the situation in Moscow (attached at Tab I).

The key judgements in the cable were as follows:

The Kremlin will be preoccupied with internal problems for the next several (3-5) years. The pace of reform is so slow and the problems are mounting so rapidly that any hope for early successes of perestroika are now fading.

Gorbachev is, himself, personally secure. This does not mean that there is no opposition to him but his political base is strong enough to prevent his overthrow. Gorbachev's political position was strengthened significantly in the September personnel shakeup in the Kremlin. Upheaval as a result of the nationality problem continues to be the major political threat to the leadership.

The Soviets will continue their present foreign policy course to concentrate on internal reform.

Attachment:

Tab I Moscow Message 02962

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2009-0932-MR  
SCS 5/20/13

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-Feb-1989 10:18 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Condoleezza Rice

(. RICE )

FROM: Jeffrey M. Menath  
(MENATH)

SUBJECT: ~~SECRET~~

<DIST>  
PRT: SDO  
SIT: BLACKWILL MENATH VAX

<PREC>  
ROUTINE  
<CLAS>  
~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>  
RUEHMO  
<DTG>  
031826Z FEB 89

<ORIG>  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

<TO>  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4104  
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

<SUBJ>  
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

<TEXT>  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 02962

EXDIS  
S/S: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT  
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN MY PERSONAL ASSESSMENT, WE CAN PLAN OUR FOREIGN POLICY WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNAL REFORM WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE FIRST BUSH ADMINISTRATION. IT IS ALMOST AS CERTAIN

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2009-0932-MR  
SCS 5/20/13

THAT PERESTROIKA WILL NOT RPT NOT BRING MARKED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN THIS PERIOD AND THAT INTERNAL RESISTANCE TO MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE REFORM PROGRAMS WILL FORCE THOSE AT THE SOVIET HELM TO TACK AGAINST THE WIND MUCH OF THE TIME. THE POTENTIAL FOR SEVERE OUTBREAKS OF PUBLIC DISORDER WILL GROW. THIS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A SENSE OF AMXIETY IN THE SUPREME COUNCILS OF THE PARTY AND STATE, THOUGH I BELIEVE THAT THEY IN THE END WILL MAINTAIN ORDER.

3. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IS LIKELY TO REMAIN THE TOP SOVIET LEADER FOR AT LEAST FIVE (PROBABLY TEN) MORE YEARS, BUT MY CONFIDENCE IN THIS PROSPECT IS LOWER THAN THAT IN THE CONTINUATION OF A SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNAL REFORM. THAT PREOCCUPATION, COMBINED WITH THE MULTITUDINOUS DIFFICULTIES OF FORCING THE SOVIET MASTODON TO ADAPT TO THE MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD, WILL BRING AN INEXORABLE PRESSURE TO CURTAIL THE AMOUNT OF RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE MILITARY SECTOR.

4. IN SUM, THE SOVIET UNION HAS, IN EFFECT, DECLARED THE BANKRUPTCY OF ITS SYSTEM, AND JUST AS WITH A CORPORATION WHICH HAS SOUGHT THE PROTECTION OF CHAPTER XI, THERE IS NO TURNING BACK. END SUMMARY.

5. CRYSTAL BALLS ARE NEVER AS CLEAR AS ONE WOULD LIKE, AND THEY TEND TO CLOUD OVER DURING TIMES OF RAPID AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE CAN MAKE SOME ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET DOMESTIC SCENE OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS WITH A HIGH LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE. THIS MESSAGE WILL ATTEMPT TO ENCAPSULATE MY PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MOST SALIENT TRENDS. SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES WILL LOOK AT PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND US-SOVIET RELATIONS.

#### FOCUS ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS

6. I BELIEVE WE CAN STATE WITH NEAR CERTAINTY THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNAL REFORM WILL CONTINUE AT LEAST FOR ANOTHER FOUR YEARS -- AND PROBABLY MUCH LONGER. THIS PREOCCUPATION WILL NOT PRECLUDE AN ACTIVIST FOREIGN POLICY (AS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE) BUT WILL MEAN THAT FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS WILL BE HEAVILY -- AND OFTEN DECISIVELY -- INFLUENCED BY DOMESTIC NEEDS AND IMPERATIVES.

7. WHILE THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ATTEMPTED SOME CHANGE IN SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRACTICE, TODAY'S PERESTROIKA IS POTENTIALLY THE MOST PROFOUND -- AND THEREFORE MOST DESTABILIZING

-- EFFORT TO PUSH THE ECONOMY, POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE INTO A NEW MOLD. ALTHOUGH MANY INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THIS EFFORT CAN BE STALLED OR EVEN REVERSED, ENOUGH OF THE OLD STRUCTURE, THE OLD HABITS AND THE OLD IDEOLOGY HAVE BEEN DISCREDITED TO MAKE RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE QUITE IMPOSSIBLE.

IT IS AS IF A DELICATE (BUT ILL-FUNCTIONING) MACHINE HAS BEEN PARTIALLY DISMANTLED BEFORE A NEW DESIGN HAS BEEN DEVELOPED, LET ALONE TESTED AND NEW PARTS FABRICATED. MANY OF THE OLD PARTS HAVE BROKEN SO THE MACHINE CANNOT BE QUICKLY RESTORED EVEN TO ITS EARLIER INEFFICIENT CONDITION. SUCH IS THE DILEMMA THE SOVIET LEADERS FACE, AND IT WILL CLAIM THEIR PRIORITY ATTENTION FOR YEARS.

THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

8. PERESTROIKA, AS IT HAS DEVELOPED, DIFFERS FROM PAST EFFORTS TO REFORM THIS OR THAT SOVIET PRACTICE (KRUSHCHEV'S ATTACK ON STALIN'S TERROR) OR THIS OR THAT ASPECT OF THE SYSTEM (THE ABORTIVE "LIBERMAN" REFORMS OF THE 60'S) BY ITS INCREASING ATTENTION TO

BT

#2962

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 MOSCOW 02962

EXDIS

S/S: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, ECON, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS FUNDAMENTALS. EARLIER ATTEMPTS AT "REFORM" TRIED TO KEEP THE IDEOLOGY INTACT AND SIMPLY CHANGE THE WAY IT WAS IMPLEMENTED. THIS SUFFICED TO ELIMINATE THE GROSSER ASPECTS OF STALINIST TERROR, BUT NOT TO IMPROVE THE MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY OF THE ECONOMY.

9. WHEN GORBACHEV FIRST CAME TO POWER IT APPEARED THAT HE, TOO, WAS GOING FOR SUPERFICIAL "FIXES" IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, AS HIS PROGRAM DEVELOPED, IT BEGAN MORE AND MORE TO CONFRONT THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE OLD PRACTICES -- AND TO CHANGE THE OLD ASSUMPTIONS.

10. THIS PROCESS FOLLOWED SEVERAL PATHS. ONE WAS AN ALL-OUT ATTACK ON STALINISM, WHICH IMPLICITLY -- AND SOMETIMES EXPLICITLY -- DENIED THAT THE STALINIST SYSTEM OF STATE MONOPOLY WAS EVEN A LEGITIMATE FORM OF SOCIALISM. CONCOMITANTLY, A GRADUAL REHABILITATION OF NON-STALINIST MARXIST THINKERS SUCH AS BUKHARIN HAS OCCURRED, WITH THE OBVIOUS INTENT OF PROVIDING VARIANT AND MORE CONGENIAL INTERPRETATIONS



OF MARXIST PRINCIPLES.

11. LENIN HAS REMAINED SACROSANCT, BUT HIS UTTERANCES ON TOPICS OF THE DAY WERE SO VARIED THAT THE DILIGENT RESEARCHER CAN FIND A QUOTE TO BOLSTER VIRTUALLY ANY PROPOSITION. "LENINISM" IN EFFECT BECOMES WHAT THE CURRENT LEADERS WANT IT TO BE -- EVEN IF THIS REQUIRES AN UNACKNOWLEDGED TRANSFORMATION OF MARXISM ITSELF.

12. AMONG THE MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL POINTS WHICH THE REFORMERS ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF THE MARKET IN DETERMINING ECONOMIC VALUE (WE DON'T SEE MUCH ON MARX'S LABOR THEORY OF VALUE

ANYMORE!); THE IMPORTANCE OF FOSTERING INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE AND TAPPING INDIVIDUAL CREATIVITY; THE NECESSITY FOR MORE POWERFUL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES; THE NEED TO SHIFT FROM "ADMINISTRATIVE" TO "ECONOMIC" (READ MARKET) CONTROLS OF ECONOMIC LIFE; AND -- NOT LEAST -- A DOWNGRADING OF THE "CLASS STRUGGLE" TO A POSITION SUBORDINATE TO THE "COMMON INTERESTS OF MANKIND."

13. NONE OF THESE PROPOSITIONS HAS FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN PAST MARXIST THINKING -- TO PUT IT MILDLY -- AND AN INTENSE STRUGGLE IS STILL UNDERWAY HERE OVER THEM. MANY (INCLUDING LIGACHEV) ARE OPENLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT BASING SO MUCH ON MARKET FORCES, AND THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION (RISING PRICES) ARE FIERCELY RESENTED BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY. STILL, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT IF PERESTROIKA EVER IS MADE TO WORK, ULTIMATE ADOPTION OF THESE VERY UN-MARXIST PRINCIPLES WILL BE ESSENTIAL. "DIVIDENDS" SLOW TO MATERIALIZE

14. GIVEN THE DEPTH OF THE SOVIET UNION'S PROBLEMS, AND THE DIFFICULTY OF BREAKING THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL AND ATTITUDINAL BARRIERS, IT SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISING THAT CONCRETE ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS IN THE FORM OF FOOD AND GOODS IN THE SHOPS HAVE BEEN SLOW IN COMING. BUT WHILE IT SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISING, THE GORBACHEV LEADERSHIP SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SURPRISED. THEY CLEARLY HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO STRETCH OUT THEIR PLANS AND ADJUST THEIR INTERIM TARGETS DOWNWARD, EVEN AS THEY WERE DEVISING EVER MORE AMBITIOUS FINAL GOALS.

15. AN OBJECTIVE LOOK AT THE MAJOR ECONOMIC INITIATIVES LAUNCHED UNDER THE BANNER OF PERESTROIKA SHOWS A RECURRENT FLAW. TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS HAVING TO REVISIT EACH INITIATIVE IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN OR REBUILD MOMENTUM WHICH IS OTHERWISE LOST WHEN THE LEADERSHIP ITSELF IS NOT FOCUSED ON IT. THE POLITICAL THRUSTS OF EACH MAJOR ECONOMIC INITIATIVE



(E.G., LAND-LEASING, CONSUMER GOODS, FREE TRADE ZONES, FINANCIAL AUTONOMY, INDUSTRIAL POLICY, CONSUMER GOOD PRODUCTION) HAVE FAR OUTDISTANCED ECONOMIC SUSTANCE, AND PROVISION OF THE SPECIFICS NECESSARY FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERCOMING RESISTANCE TO REFORM AT ALL LEVELS. MOREOVER, THE

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 MOSCOW 02962

EXDIS

S/S: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, ECON, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS  
FAILURE TO ENGAGE ADEQUATELY ON KEY REFORM ISSUES  
LIKE MONETARY AND PRICE REFORM, CREATION OF WHOLESALE  
MARKETS, EXTERNAL COMPETITIVENESS AND CONVERTIBILITY,

COMBINES WITH THE MOMENTUM PROBLEM TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS EFFECTIVELY NO INTEGRATED, MUTUALLY REINFORCING, SEQUENTIALLY SENSITIVE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM.

16. AS THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BECAME EVER MORE EVIDENT, LEADERSHIP ATTENTION FOCUSED INCREASINGLY ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REFORM. MOST SOVIET OBSERVERS I TALK TO ATTRIBUTE THIS TO A RECOGNITION THAT POLITICAL REFORM IS A PRECONDITION FOR EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC REFORM. (SINCE ONE OF THE ROOT PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMY IS THE STRANGLEHOLD EXERCISED BY THE RIGID PARTY BUREAUCRACY, ONE MUST LIMIT THE POWERS OF PARTY OFFICIALS, PARE DOWN THE BUREAUCRACY, AND MAKE WHAT IS LEFT MORE RESPONSIVE TO PUBLIC OPINION IF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS ARE TO BE FEASIBLE.) IN ADDITION, ONE SUSPECTS THAT ANOTHER MOTIVATION FOR SOME OF THE POLITICAL REFORMS WAS A DESIRE TO PROVIDE POPULAR BENEFITS TO THE PUBLIC AT A TIME WHEN ECONOMIC RESULTS WERE DISAPPOINTING. IF BREAD WAS SHORT, AT LEAST THERE COULD BE CIRCUSES: LOCAL MEETINGS TO "NOMINATE" CANDIDATES TO A BRAND-NEW "PARLIAMENT," FOR EXAMPLE. BUT POLITICAL REFORM IS PROCEEDING NEITHER SMOOTHLY NOR AUTOMATICALLY. ITS ACHIEVEMENTS ARE PARTIAL AND QUALIFIED ONES, AND THE INITIAL ENTHUSIASM OF MANY IS TURNING INTO FRUSTRATION AND EVEN DESPAIR AS THEY SENSE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK AHEAD.

STRUCTURAL AND ATTITUDINAL BARRIERS

17. FUNDAMENTALLY, SOVIET REFORMERS HAVE TO CONTEND WITH MUCH MORE THAN THE FAMILIAR AND DAUNTING

PROBLEMS OF OVER CENTRALIZATION, RED-TAPE, BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE, PARTY ARROGANCE, UNREALISTIC PLANS, CORRUPTION, AND ALL THE OTHER ILLS WHICH HAVE RECEIVED SO MUCH ATTENTION OF LATE. THE (FOR THEM) SAD FACT IS THAT THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED TO WORK ONLY FROM TOP DOWN, ON A COMMAND BASIS, AND TO RESIST CHANGE AND SPONTANEITY, MUCH AS THE BODY'S IMMUNE SYSTEM RESISTS INFECTIONS. MOVING TO A SYSTEM WITH THE OPPOSITE ORIENTATION -- CLEARLY IMPLIED BY PERESTROIKA -- MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF INCREMENTAL CHANGE. TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, EACH CHANGE TENDS EITHER TO BE SMOTHERED BY THE SYSTEM ITSELF OR -- IF IT IS PRESSED RELENTLESSLY -- TO THREATEN COLLAPSE OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM.

18. IF THE BULK OF THE POPULATION HAD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS REQUIRED TO GET OUT OF THE MESS ALL ACKNOWLEDGE THEY ARE IN, THE STRUCTURAL BARRIERS NOTED MIGHT SEEM SOMEHOW ERODABLE. ALAS, MOST PEOPLE HERE HAVE NOT THE FOGGIEST NOTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES MARKET ECONOMICS. NURTURED FOR DECADES ON THE MYTH THAT THERE IS A "FREE LUNCH" (SOCIALIST "BENEFITS" OF "FREE" EDUCATION, "FREE" MEDICAL CARE, CHEAP FOOD AND HOUSING) AND THAT IT IS IMMORAL TO

LIVE BETTER THAN ONE'S NEIGHBOR, THERE IS FIERCE RESISTANCE TO MARKET PRICES, IF THEY MEAN HIGHER PRICES -- AS THEY INEVITABLY DO IN AN ECONOMY OF SCARCITY AND PRINTING-PRESS MONEY. THUS, WE NOW WITNESS THE PHENOMENON OF THE PUBLIC DEMANDING PRICE AND OTHER CONTROLS ON THE FLEDGLING COOPERATIVE (I.E., PRIVATE) SECTOR, WHICH WOULD AT BEST FORCE UPON THEM THE SAME INEFFICIENCIES AS THE STATE SECTOR AND MORE LIKELY KILL THEM OFF ALTOGETHER. POPULAR EXPLOSIONS MAY OCCUR

19. DIFFICULT AS THE CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE, THEY ARE LIKELY TO GET WORSE. THE EXASPERATION OF THE SOVIET CONSUMER IS ALMOST PALPABLE. THE COMBINATION OF SHORTAGES AND INFLATION, THE LATTER RAPIDLY BECOMING A MAJOR PROBLEM, ARE MOVING THE SOVIET UNION TOWARD A BARTER ECONOMY. SOVIETS, FROM TAXI DRIVERS TO INTELLECTUALS, ARE NOT INTERESTED IN HAVING RUBLES; THEY WANT GOODS. LARGE-SCALE STRIKES AND RIOTS ARE CONCEIVABLE IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATES FURTHER AND THE LEGENDARY PATIENCE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE IS

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 MOSCOW 02962



EXDIS

S/S: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, ECON, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS EXHAUSTED. MOST LIKELY, SUCH OUTBURSTS CAN BE CONTROLLED -- BUT AT ENORMOUS COST TO THE FORWARD MOMENTUM OF REFORM.

20. MORE SERIOUS IS THE POTENTIAL FOR MAJOR ERUPTIONS OF NATIONALIST FEELING, AS THE BALTICS AND THE CAUCASUS HAVE SHOWN OVER THE PAST YEAR. INDEED, DESPITE ALL OF THE CHANGES IN SOVIET SOCIETY OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE GLASNOST AND THE PERESTROIKA, ONLY NATIONALISM HAS BEEN CAPABLE OF IGNITING POPULAR PASSIONS. AND WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE UKRAINE AND CENTRAL ASIA -- AREAS WHERE, BECAUSE OF POPULATION SIZE, RESOURCES AND RELIGION, NATIONALISM COULD REPRESENT A MAJOR DANGER TO THE SOVIET EMPIRE -- HAVE REMAINED THUS FAR ALMOST EERILY QUIET, A CALM THAT NEITHER WE NOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHOULD EXPECT TO CONTINUE.

21. A BACKLASH OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM HAS ALREADY BEGUN. WE CAN EXPECT IT TO INTENSIFY OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS AS THE MINORITY NATIONALITIES BECOME MORE ASSERTIVE, EITHER IN THE PRESS OR IN THE STREETS. NO MATTER WHAT THE DANGER TO HIS REFORM PROGRAM, THERE ARE LIMITS BEYOND WHICH NO SOVIET LEADER WILL BE ABLE TO GO, AND STILL RETAIN HIS JOB, IN TOLERATING NATIONALIST OUTBURSTS. FOR THAT VERY REASON, GORBACHEV AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL

INVEST GREAT ENERGY AND RESOURCES IN THE EFFORT TO HEAD OFF OR MANAGE NATIONALIST EXPLOSIONS.

GORBACHEV'S POSITION

22. THE GLOOMY OUTLOOK FOR TANGIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE HAS LED MANY TO QUESTION GORBACHEV'S STAYING POWER. MINDFUL ESPECIALLY OF KHRUSHCHEV'S FATE AND ALSO, PERHAPS, INFLUENCED BY THE LOGIC OF WESTERN POLITICAL PROCESSES, SOME OBSERVERS FEEL THAT WITHOUT AN UPTURN IN THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD AND CONSUMER GOODS FAIRLY SOON, GORBACHEV COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED BY RIVALS.

23. THIS IS POSSIBLE, BUT I DO NOT CONSIDER IT LIKELY. MY GUESS IS THAT GORBACHEV WILL REMAIN THE SOVIET LEADER FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME TO COME, WHETHER OR NOT HIS DOMESTIC POLICIES ARE SUCCESSFUL. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE SOVIET UNION IS BY NO MEANS A PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. GORBACHEV WILL NOT BE VOTED OUT BY A PUBLIC IMPATIENT FOR TANGIBLE REWARDS. IF

HE IS REMOVED, THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE SCENARIO FOR HIS REMOVAL BY POLITICAL MEANS WOULD INVOLVE A CONSPIRACY AGAINST HIM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. ANY SUCCESSFUL CONSPIRACY WOULD HAVE TO INVOLVE A FAIRLY WIDE CIRCLE, SO THAT THE ORGANIZERS COULD BE CONFIDENT OF OVERWHELMING SUPPORT ONCE THE ISSUE WERE JOINED. KHRUSHCHEV FELL VICTIM TO SUCH A CONSPIRACY, SO WE KNOW IT CAN HAPPEN. SO DOES GORBACHEV, OF COURSE, AND THAT IS PROBABLY WHY HE HAS PLACED THE KGB AND (LESS IMPORTANTLY) THE ARMY IN LOYAL HANDS. SO LONG AS THE KGB CHAIRMAN, THE COMMANDER OF THE KREMLIN GUARD AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARE LOYAL TO HIM, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW A CONSPIRACY COULD BE MOUNTED SUCCESSFULLY, SINCE HE WOULD BE WARNED IN TIME TO TAKE "PROPHYLACTIC" STEPS -- AND WOULD HAVE THE MEANS TO DO SO. EVEN THE FIRST TWO OF THE TRIO NAMED WOULD PROBABLY PROVIDE ADEQUATE INSURANCE.

24. IN ADDITION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES NOW PLANNED WILL CREATE AN ADDED INSTITUTIONAL BARRIER TO A SUDDEN, CONSPIRATORIAL REMOVAL OF THE SOVIET LEADER. ONCE GORBACHEV OCCUPIES THE REVAMPED OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, THOSE WHO WOULD PLAN HIS REMOVAL BY OTHER THAN CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WOULD FACE A POSSIBLE HURDLE WHICH DOES NOT EXIST TODAY. SINCE STRICT ADHERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE HAS NEVER BEEN A NOTICEABLE SOVIET OR RUSSIAN TRAIT, ONE CANNOT SAY THAT HE COULD NOT BE REMOVED BY A CONSPIRATORIAL CLIQUE WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, BUT IT WOULD BE A MORE COMPLICATED TASK THAN THAT FACING BREZHNEV AND HIS ASSOCIATES WHEN THEY MOVED AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV. THIS IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT OF GORBACHEV'S MOTIVATIONS IN PRESSING SO HARD FOR THE CREATION OF A STRONGER PRESIDENCY WITH A FIXED TERM, TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE OFFICE

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 MOSCOW 02962

EXDIS

S/S: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, ECON, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS OF PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY.

THE MILITARY BURDEN

25. AS PERESTROIKA FOUNDERS AND PRESSURES ON GORBACHEV TO DELIVER INCREASE, ONE FACT LOOMS LARGER AND LARGER: THE POLICY OF ALLOCATING



DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY SECTOR HAS IMPOVERISHED THE CIVILIAN SECTOR AND IS ONE OF THE ROOTS OF TODAY'S ECONOMIC DISARRAY. FURTHERMORE, GIVEN ITS SIZE AND TECHNICAL SOPHISTICATION, THE MILITARY SECTOR PROVIDES A TEMPTING "RESERVE" WHICH CAN BE TAPPED TO ALLEVIATE TODAY'S SHORTAGES. THUS, THE RECENT DECISION TO PROCEED WITH THE UNILATERAL ARMS REDUCTIONS -- AND EVEN MORE SUBSTANTIAL CUTBACKS IN THE INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY DEVOTED TO MILITARY PRODUCTION -- ARE A REACTION TO WHAT THE GORBACHEV LEADERSHIP MUST VIEW AS AN URGENT NECESSITY.

26. THE MILITARY -- AND THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AS A WHOLE -- CAN HARDLY BE ENTHUSIASTIC OVER SUCH MOVES, AND WE CAN ASSUME THAT THOSE ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY WILL PUT UP A STIFF FIGHT, ESPECIALLY IF ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO CONTINUE RETRENCHMENTS BEYOND THOSE ALREADY ANNOUNCED. THIS WOULD NOT BE TRIVIAL RESISTANCE, BUT IT MIGHT NOT AUTOMATICALLY CARRY THE DAY.

27. THE SOVIET CONCENTRATION ON BUILDING UP THEIR MILITARY MACHINE HAS LED MANY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY IS AN INVINCIBLY POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED MORE BY THE MILITARIZED THINKING OF THE PREVIOUS PARTY LEADERSHIP THAN BY THE DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET MARSHALS. THE POLITICAL LEADERS MOST LIKELY ORDERED UP THE MILITARY HARDWARE BECAUSE IT SERVED THEIR PERCEIVED POLITICAL NEEDS AND NOT BECAUSE THE GENERAL STAFF FORCED THEM TO PROCURE MORE THAN THEY WANTED.

28. IF THIS IS THE CASE, THEN GORBACHEV IN FACT MAY HAVE A FREER HAND TO SQUEEZE THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX THAN MANY HAVE SUPPOSED.

IS PERESTROIKA IRREVERSIBLE?

29. I, OF COURSE, MAY BE GUESSING WRONG IN PREDICTING GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL LONGEVITY -- AND IT WOULD BE JUST MY LUCK IF I WAKE UP THE DAY AFTER THIS CABLE IS DISPATCHED TO LEARN THAT THE CC HAS ELECTED A NEW GENERAL SECRETARY IN AN UNANNOUNCED SESSION AND MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH HAS ASSUMED THE DUTIES OF KOLKHOZ CHAIRMAN AT SOME LOCATION TO THE EAST.

30. THOUGH I DOUBT THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN, LET US ASSUME THAT THIS DOES -- IF NOT TOMORROW, THEN NEXT YEAR OR THE YEAR AFTER. WHAT THEN? WOULD THAT BE THE END OF PERESTROIKA?

31. ESSENTIALLY, ANY SUCCESSOR OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS WOULD FACE PRECISELY THE SAME PROBLEMS

GORBACHEV DOES -- POSSIBLY IN MORE ACUTE FORM. PRESUMABLY, AN INITIAL ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO APPLY THE THROTTLE TO THOSE ASPECTS OF THE REFORM PROCESS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PARTICULARLY PAINFUL OR DESTABILIZING. MORE SEVERE LIMITS MIGHT BE PLACED ON THE EXPRESSION OF OPINION AND ON UNOFFICIAL GROUPS, NATIONALIST TENDENCIES MIGHT BE OPPOSED MORE FORCEFULLY, IMPLEMENTATION OF A MARKET PRICE MECHANISM POSTPONED FURTHER, AND PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP ACTIVELY DISCOURAGED. SUCH SLOWDOWNS OR REVERSALS OF POLICY COULD OCCUR. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THEY CAN OCCUR EVEN IF GORBACHEV STAYS IN POWER. BUT SUCH SHIFTS WOULD ONLY CAUSE THE ECONOMY TO SINK DEEPER INTO THE QUAGMIRE OF INEFFICIENCY, TECHNICAL BACKWARDNESS AND UNREQUITED HUMAN NEEDS. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S PREOCCUPATION WITH DOMESTIC PROBLEMS WOULD CONTINUE AND EVENTUALLY ANOTHER RADICAL REFORMER WOULD LIKELY EMERGE. THERE IS A LOT OF TRUTH IN GORBACHEV'S FREQUENT ASSERTION THAT PERESTROIKA IS CONDITIONED BY OBJECTIVE

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 MOSCOW 02962

EXDIS

S/S: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, ECON, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS NECESSITY AND IS NOT DEPENDENT ON ANY INDIVIDUAL.

OVER THE LONG RUN, THIS IS PROBABLY RIGHT.

32. ONE THING A SUCCESSOR REGIME COULD NOT DO IS PUT THINGS BACK LIKE THEY WERE, VINTAGE LATE 70'S OR EARLY 80'S. THE SOVIET UNION HAS, IN EFFECT, DECLARED THE BANKRUPTCY OF ITS SYSTEM, BUT IS STICKING STUBBORNLY TO MOST OF ITS PRIMARY SOCIAL GOALS, AND LIKE A CORPORATION UNDER CHAPTER XI, IS NOW SEEKING TO REORGANIZE ITS MODE OF OPERATION IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES. THERE IS NO TURNING BACK, HOWEVER, AND IN TIME, EVEN IDEOLOGICALLY-BASED GUARANTEES OF SOCIAL EQUITY MAY HAVE TO GIVE GROUND TO MARKET-BASED EFFICIENCIES, WITH ALL THE IMPLICATIONS THAT CARRIES FOR A REORIENTATION OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY.

33. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MATLOCK

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: SCANDINAVIA MEETINGS, FEBRUARY 14

DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY, I VISITED NATO'S TWO SCANDINAVIAN CAPITALS, COPENHAGEN AND OSLO, RETURNING TO BONN IN THE EVENING TO MEET WITH KOHL. THERE SEEMED TO BE GENUINE APPRECIATION FOR OUR EARLY EFFORT TO VISIT AND SEEK VIEWS. THEY ALSO APPEARED TO CONCUR IN OUR ANALYSIS OF GORBACHEV'S SERIOUS INTERNAL CHALLENGES.

IN BOTH PLACES, THE PRIMARY MESSAGE WAS THE EFFECT GORBACHEV WAS HAVING ON PUBLIC OPINION--AND THAT WHILE NATO WAS SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING ITS SUBSTANTIVE ENDS, OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION WAS BECOMING CONSTRAINED BY THE LESSENER PERCEPTION OF A SOVIET THREAT. THEY BELIEVE GENERAL PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATO REMAINS STRONG, BUT THEY ARE MOST SENSITIVE TO THE SELECTION, CONTENT AND TIMING OF THE ISSUES ON WHICH THE ALLIANCE DEMONSTRATES ITS RESOLVE.

IN COPENHAGEN, FOREIGN MINISTER ELLEMANN-JENSEN SPOKE IN A COOPERATIVE TONE, BUT PREDICTED TROUBLE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT SNF MODERNIZATION NOW. HE SAID SNF MODERNIZATION WAS A MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR THE GERMANS. HE SAW NO MAJORITY FOR THE CLEAR SIGNAL WE WANTED, HOPED THE ALLIES COULD GIVE US THE SUPPORT WE NEEDED FOR CONGRESS WITHOUT STIRRING UP A DIVISIVE DEBATE, AND ADVISED US NOT TO CREATE A PROBLEM. I SAID WE NEEDED TO REACH AGREEMENT BEFORE A NATO SUMMIT, TO CONTINUE TO SHOW RESOLVE AND REQUIRE HARD CHOICES OF THE SOVIETS, AND TO KEEP OUR WEAPONS UP TO DATE. WE WEREN'T TRYING TO CREATE A PROBLEM, BUT IN FACT THERE IS A PROBLEM.

ELLMANN-JENSEN ALSO STRESSED THAT NAVAL/NUCLEAR FORCES WERE AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEM FOR THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND URGED THAT THEY BE INCLUDED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. IN HIS VIEW, WE COULD MAKE THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT FORWARD-LOOKING BY INCLUDING THESE FORCES AND THEN EXPLAINING WHY WE SHOULD NOT BE OPEN TO NEGOTIATE THEM NOW. I SAID THAT APPROACH WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS BECAUSE IT WOULD INCREASE PRESSURE TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS ON THEM AT SOME POINT; IF WE NEEDED TO MAKE THE CASE FOR NAVAL FORCES, WE SHOULD DO SO OUTSIDE THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT.

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NORWEGIAN PM BRUNDTLAND WAS EVEN BLUNTER ON SNF. WHILE GENERALLY AGREEING WITH MY EAST-WEST ASSESSMENT, SHE QUESTIONED WHAT "SHOWING RESOLVE" MEANT IN TERMS OF OUR SPECIFIC AGENDA. SHE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL SUMMIT. SHE MADE CLEAR SHE DID NOT WANT TO REPEAT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MARCH 1988 SUMMIT, WHEN NATO PRIME MINISTERS HAD ARGUED UNTIL PAST MIDNIGHT OVER THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON MODERNIZATION. I POINTED OUT THAT CONGRESS WOULD WANT TO KNOW WHETHER NATO WILL ACT BEFORE SPENDING LARGE SUMS, BUT AGREED WE SHOULD TRY TO WORK OUT OUR DIFFERENCES IN ADVANCE.

BRUNDTLAND SAID NORWAY WAS NOT PUSHING FOR MODERNIZATION, AND WAS NOT READY TO MAKE A DECISION. SHE SAID IF WE PUSHED FOR FOR ONE, WE WOULD CREATE A VERY CONTENTIOUS DEBATE IN GERMANY AND ELSEWHERE.

IN BOTH CAPITALS I COVERED A FULL RANGE OF OTHER SUBJECTS. ELLEMANN-JENSEN MADE THE INTERESTING SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD EXPAND OUR UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE BALTIC STATES--WHILE CAREFULLY AVOIDING CHARGES OF MEDDLING IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE ALSO THOUGHT WE MAY WISH TO EXPLORE A NEW APPROACH TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE AFTER WE GET THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT BEHIND US. HE ADVOCATED A KIND OF "WISE MEN'S STUDY". THOUGH SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT A COMPETITION FOR CREDITS TO THE EAST, HE FAVORED A STREAMLINED COCOM LIST AND RELAXATION OF THE "NO EXCEPTIONS" POLICY.

ELLEMANN-JENSEN SAID HE APPRECIATED OUR EFFORT TO BROADEN THE BURDENSARING CONCEPT TO ENCOMPASS OTHER FORMS OF CONTRIBUTION (CREATIVE RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING). THEN HE SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY THE DANES' RELATIVELY SMALL DEFENSE SPENDING WITH SOME QUESTIONABLE POINTS--ALTHOUGH HIS COMMENT THAT WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE DENMARK'S INVESTMENTS IN THE STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT FAROES AND GREENLAND, AND IN OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, HAVE MERIT.

I TOLD HIM OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT EC 1992 AND OUR PERCEIVED NEED FOR A SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM ON PARTICULAR EC REGULATIONS. HE SAID HE BELIEVES THE PROCESS IS RELATIVELY OPEN, URGED THAT WE INTENSIFY OUR CONTACTS WITH THE COMMISSION, AND SUGGESTED WE WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF WE FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC MATTERS. I PUSHED HARD FOR SOME MOVEMENT FROM THE COMMUNITY ON AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES; HE RESPONDED THAT OUR IDEAS WERE NOT REALISTIC AND THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND A MIDDLE WAY. HE ALSO URGED BOTH SIDES TO GET THE HORMONE CASE OFF THE TABLE BY PUSHING IT INTO A GATT PROCESS. WE ALSO SPOKE BRIEFLY ABOUT DEBT POLICY.

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FINALLY, ON AN ISSUE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO DENMARK, I REASSURED HIM WE UNDERSTOOD WE PLAY A SENSITIVE ROLE IN GREENLAND'S ECONOMIC HEALTH AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. I SAID WE WOULD CONSULT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF OUR SONDESTROM BASE IN GREENLAND AND RON LEHMAN FROM OSD NOTED WE ANTICIPATED A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT AT SOME LEVEL. ELLEMANN-JENSEN STRESSED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEND A DELEGATION IN ADVANCE OF OUR ANNOUNCEMENT, TO HELP STRUCTURE THE MESSAGE.

IN OSLO, FOREIGN MINISTER STOLTENBERG AND I COVERED THE REGIONAL ISSUES BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER JOINED US: CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTH AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, LDC DEBT. NORWAY HAS ONE OF THE LARGEST EUROPEAN AID PROGRAMS TO THE SANDINISTAS, AND I URGED STOLTENBERG TO CONDITION AID ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ESQUIPULAS II. STOLTENBERG REPLIED THAT NORWAY COULDN'T CONDITION ITS AID DIRECTLY, BUT WOULD LOOK TO NICARAGUA'S POLICIES IN MAKING A DETERMINATION. HE AGREED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN SANCTIONS HAD NOT WORKED, BUT SEEMED TO RELY ON SUPPLEMENTING THEM WITH INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH THE SAG. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HIS MAIN MESSAGE WAS THAT WE SHOULD KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM WITH THE PLO BECAUSE THE ALTERNATIVE TO ARAFAT WOULD BE MUCH WORSE.

FINALLY, I GAVE PRIME MINISTER BRUNDTLAND A DIG ABOUT THE STILL OFFICIALLY SECRET ENVIRONMENTAL CONFERENCE IN THE HAGUE ON MARCH 11. I MADE THE POINT THAT ALLIANCE CONSULTATION WAS A TWO-WAY STREET. SHE RESPONDED BY PLACING THE BLAME FOR A LACK OF CONSULTATION ON THE FRENCH AND BY MAKING THE NOT-VERY-SATISFACTORY POINT THAT THEY WANTED TO TAKE PART SO AS TO CHANNEL THE EFFORT INTO THE EXISTING UN INSTITUTIONS.

BAKER

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE 0941

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

February 16, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

SUBJECT: Work Program for NSRs 3, 4, and 5 on US-Soviet,  
US-East European and US-West European Relations

A steering group met on February 16 at State to decide on a program for completion of the above-mentioned NSRs. State, NSC, and CIA were represented; no representative from OSD attended. Full PCCs will meet on February 17 to review this program and settle agency taskings.

Invited to describe our conception of what these reviews are meant to accomplish, I stressed the personal involvement and interest of the President in these projects and the emphasis, found in all the NSRs, on new perspectives and creative thinking. I also mentioned the need to avoid any discussion of these papers with the press.

The timeline looks like this: For each of the reviews, State will obtain agency contributions for the three major papers by next Wednesday, February 22. State will then produce drafts of these papers by Friday, February 24, for discussion in working groups that day. On the following Monday, February 27, the Soviet and European PCCs will meet to review the products. We will decide at that point what schedule of meetings and pace of work is necessary to complete the papers for possible DC review on March 13. The papers would then be ready for distribution to NSC principals by the March 15 deadline.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

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Declassify on: OADR



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

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February 16, 1989

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Natl Sec Advisor  
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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Dubinin on Friday,  
February 17, 1989, at 11:00 a.m. (in your office)

According to Sergei Kislyak, Counselor in the Soviet Embassy, Ambassador Dubinin's agenda for Friday is general in nature. Kislyak told me that the Ambassador will raise two specific matters. He would like to hear your views on where the U.S.-Soviet "dialogue" is going and is, in turn, ready to offer his thoughts on the direction of Soviet foreign policy. A brief set of talking points is appended at Tab I.

The Ambassador will also deliver a message from Mrs. Gorbachev to Mrs. Bush concerning their joint sponsorship of a concert in New York for Armenian relief. (Susan Porter Rose has copied you on all correspondence concerning the concert.)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the talking points provided at Tab I for your meeting with Ambassador Dubinin.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Attachment:

Tab I Talking Points for Dubinin Meeting

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0914

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH  
AMBASSADOR DUBININ  
FEBRUARY 17, 1989

U.S.-Soviet Dialogue

- At the direction of the President, we are undertaking a comprehensive review of U.S.-Soviet relations as well as other aspects of our foreign policy. It is natural for a new administration to want to take a fresh look at key foreign policy issues. Though the review will be comprehensive it will not be protracted. We expect to complete it within two months.
- We want to build on the achievements of General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. We intend to be creative, taking into account the changes that are taking place in your country and in others. But we want to make certain at the outset that we set a course for sustainable progress.
- We took note of the timely withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and urge you to continue to work in the spirit of the Geneva Accords for a stable, non-aligned Afghanistan.
- Progress must be made on all fronts in our relationship; human rights, arms control, settlement of regional conflicts, economic relations and, a new area of emphasis, transnational issues like the environment and problems of terrorism.

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- We are watching the process of reform in your country with interest. Political, cultural and economic liberalization in the Soviet Union will make the path toward a more cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship easier.
- The comprehensive review includes an examination of our arms control policies. We cannot yet set a date for resumption of the START talks but strategic arms control will be a very high priority of our administration. Our goal is to enhance stability both through the treaty and through prudent military planning. The number of weapons cut is not the primary issue.
- General Secretary Gorbachev's announcement of a unilateral reduction in Soviet forces was a welcomed and important step. We are particularly encouraged by the emphasis on cuts in heavy armor, as well as other forces that support offensive operations (bridgelaying equipment and paratroopers.) The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations give us an excellent chance to build on that initiative and to lessen dramatically the threat of surprise attack in Europe.

Armenian Relief

- The tragedy of the Armenian earthquake allowed us to see how compassionate our peoples can be toward one another. The concert that Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev are sponsoring will be a symbol of the goodwill that is growing between our citizens.

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0866

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-1588-MR

32 12/6/12

February 27, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: STEPHEN P. FARRAR <sup>SPF</sup>  
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL <sup>RB</sup>

FROM: JERRY W. LEACH <sup>JW</sup>  
CONDOLEEZZA RICE <sup>CR</sup>

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

SUBJECT: Handling the No-Exceptions Policy

The "no exceptions policy" was announced by the United States on January 12, 1980 with minimal prior consultation with the allies. The policy meant that the U.S. would veto any licenses (or "exceptions") in COCOM, where unanimity is required, for exports of controlled goods or technologies to the Soviet Union. Prior to the announcement, our policy was to consider case-by-case exceptions to the general embargo.

Shortly after the announcement, we asked our COCOM allies to adhere to the policy formally. They would not do so officially for three reasons:

- o it was painful for them domestically for commercial reasons and because they did not want to be seen to be kowtowing to US dictates;
- o they were upset because they had not been consulted prior to the announcement; and,
- o they regarded the policy as a "foreign policy" abuse of the COCOM system by the United States.

At the time, we presented the no-exceptions policy to our COCOM allies and to the public as a sanction in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A subsidiary argument was that high technology exports inevitably helped the Soviet military and were not in the interests of the West. Nonetheless, all other governments saw Afghanistan as the primary reason for the imposition of the no-exceptions policy. They eventually gave unofficial, tacit support to the policy.

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### Implementation

During the 1980s, three modifications weakened the policy somewhat. First, the policy was never used, except by us briefly, to stop the flow of equipment on the second tier of the control lists, i.e., less sophisticated equipment that requires a license from a national capital but not COCOM review. Second, we developed a list of stated exceptions to the no-exceptions policy. These included items for use in public health and safety, items in small quantities with low performance, and spare parts for previous exports. Third, in taking positions on COCOM cases, we have not used the explicit rationale of no-exceptions since 1986, although we have acted on the basis of the policy and been able to block most cases that have arisen.

### Anticipating Soviet Withdrawal

All of our 15 COCOM partners, but particularly the UK, the FRG, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium, served notice last fall that they expected us to drop the no-exceptions policy when the Soviets withdrew. This would reestablish the status quo ante--case-by-case COCOM review without prior assumption of denial.

Because he anticipated alliance pressure to revoke no-exceptions, Secretary Shultz discussed the matter repeatedly with Secretary Carlucci in December and January. No agreement was reached. DOD wanted no change at all, while State wanted to drop the policy officially but establish a tougher line on a case-by-case basis than we had before 1980. Commerce is likely to agree with State.

Six cases from UK, Belgium, and Japan are currently on the COCOM docket and are clearly intended as a test of our post-February 15 policy.

### Secretary Baker's Views

The no-exceptions issue was brought up in London, Bonn, and (we think) The Hague on Secretary Baker's recent trip. His statement to Meet the Press on Sunday, February 19 indicated that he takes this to mean that the issue is not as high a priority for the Europeans as some have thought.

The Secretary seems to be looking for a way to extract concessions from the Soviets in return for a change of policy on our part, possibly as a part of a larger package which might include changes in Jackson-Vanik, GATT membership, or the like.

While we do not have a detailed report on the exchanges in London, the Secretary clearly floated the possibility of a change

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-3-

in the no-exceptions policy in return for Soviet concessions in Central America. This discussion prompted a demarche from HMG after the Secretary's return (Tab I) to Washington. The key points of the demarche are:

- a) that the no-exceptions policy should be dropped;
- b) disappointment that the US appears to envisage continuing the policy; and,
- c) that introducing "extraneous political considerations such as Central America" would lead to a major row in COCOM.

COCOM by tradition does not use out-of-context or out-of-area linkage to resolve issues before it. This probably explains the British reaction above. Such linkage, however, is not impossible. It would have to be carried at the ministerial or head-of-government level, i.e. above the level at which COCOM business is normally conducted. The fact that COCOM business is not normally conducted at the cabinet level, e.g. Secretary Shultz almost never discussed COCOM issues in seven years, may have some bearing on why the issue was raised so few times with Secretary Baker.

In looking for concessions from the Soviets, by implication Secretary Baker is pursuing an approach which would work best if the USG is prepared to allow a substantial liberalization in the pattern of exports to the USSR. The discussion of no-exceptions in Washington to date, however, has not revolved around the concept of substantially liberalizing exports to the Soviets but around the concept of optical changes in policy, for alliance management purposes, which would have little or no impact on the pattern of exports to the Soviets.

#### Options

Our options appear to be as follows.

1. Leave the policy unchanged. This policy would be unpopular with our allies, possibly retarding our efforts to strengthen COCOM and shape a consensus on East-West relations in advance of the NATO Summit. Mrs. Thatcher, the most supportive ally in this regard, has publicly stated that she thinks that the no-exceptions policy should be dropped and so told Jim Baker. We could argue that there is no significant change in the Soviet threat or in the Soviet's active program of technology acquisition. If this option were selected, we would want to be seen as listening and consulting before a decision because part of the allies' frustration comes from the lack of real dialogue.

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2. Drop the policy officially but maintain the same tough approach to the cases as we have since 1986. This strategy calls for an appearance of change that would at least make us seem somewhat responsive to the allies. Public pressure would be diminished but the allies might view our behavior in COCOM as both devious and obstructionist. Very little difference in the pattern of actual exports to the Soviets would occur as a result of this change.

3. Drop the policy and go to case-by-case review in return for concessions. The question then is: concessions from our allies or concessions from the Soviets or both? If concessions from the allies, the clear candidate for linkage is stronger national export control systems in Europe and Japan. For several years, we have been seeking to get them to actually enforce their own export control laws. Enforcement is better in a few places--UK, Canada, Norway, France, and Japan--but it is far from fully satisfactory. Concessions from the Soviets might be in Nicaragua or human rights, but also might include on-site monitoring and inspection rights for Western high tech equipment sold to them. Concessions from COCOM partners probably imply only a small amount of liberalization of actual exports. Concessions from the Soviets imply a substantial change.

4. Drop the policy and return to case-by-case review without concessions. Unless done very skillfully, this would signal that we are returning to the pre-Afghanistan status quo ante. It would be likely to trigger a large number of export applications in Washington and in other Western capitals. We would still review each case but, presumably, veto far fewer than we do now. There would probably be favorable press but there might be opposition from those who would view it as the first move on a slippery slope toward much more technology transfer to the Soviet Union. The pattern of exports to the USSR would probably grow over time as the door is opened more and more widely by successive case approvals.

From the standpoint of bilateral relations with the Soviets, Moscow would obviously prefer Option 4 but might have some interest in Option 3 if our concessions were substantial enough. It would also profit from a major U.S.-European scrap over the issue.

In our judgment, the key to success of any option will be interagency unity in Washington and high-level participation and leadership. Key COCOM issues, which are inherently political, have been dealt with for far too long at too low a level in the bureaucracy.

Attachment

Tab I UK Demarche on No-Exceptions Policy

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UK Demarche  
on No exceptions  
following Baker visit  
to London.

(I) WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY MADE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BRING THE NO CES POLICY TO AN END,

(II) WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE US NOW APPEARS TO ENVISAGE ITS CONTINUATION FOR QUITE UNRELATED POLITICAL REASONS.

(III) THE US SHARES OUR VIEW THAT THE KEY ROLE FOR COCOM IS TO PROTECT CRITICALLY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY,

(IV) COCOM CONTROLS WILL REMAIN EFFECTIVE, CREDIBLE AND DEFENSIBLE TO PUBLIC OPINION ONLY IF THEY ARE USED FOR CLEARLY STRATEGIC PURPOSES,

(V) TO INTRODUCE EXTRANEOUS POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS CENTRAL AMERICA WOULD LEAD TO A MAJOR ROW WITHIN COCOM,

(VI) COCOM HAS ENOUGH ON ITS PLATE AND APPEARS TO BE MAKING AT ANY RATE SOME PROGRESS IN A NUMBER OF TARGETTED, CAREFULLY IDENTIFIED AREAS. WE WOULD NOT WANT COCOM BLOWN OFF COURSE,

(VII) GRATEFUL FOR CLARIFICATION OF US THINKING.

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Received 2/22/89



**National Security Council  
The White House**

**89 FEB 27 P 2: 17**

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|-----------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| Bob Perito      | <u>1</u>    | <u>Rmp</u> | <u>I</u>    |
| Philip Hughes   | <u>2</u>    | <u>JPB</u> |             |
| Bob Gates       | <u>3</u>    | <u>J</u>   |             |
| Brent Scowcroft | <u>4</u>    |            |             |
| Philip Hughes   |             |            |             |
| Situation Room  |             |            |             |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>5</u>    |            | <u>N</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>6</u>    |            | <u>N</u>    |
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| A = Action | <u>Information</u> | D = Dispatch | R = Retain | N = No further Action |
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cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0766-MR

31 10/29/12

March 1, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Getting Ahead of Gorbachev

*But -*  
*Interesting paper*  
*GB*  
*3-6*



This memorandum lays out the premises that I believe should guide the way we go about developing an overall strategy for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Gorbachev presents us with major challenges but also with opportunities. As you know, he is a skilled leader whose diplomatic activities have significantly altered the international community's view of the Soviet Union. He is very good; we have to be better.

Getting and staying ahead of Gorbachev is less a question of a few early and dramatic proposals than a requirement that we develop a sound strategy. Trying to match Gorbachev headline for headline, given our need for domestic and allied consensus, will lead us down the wrong path. Rather, we need to put forth considered and consistent positions while negotiating from strength. We will be creative, but should seek a steady pace that can lead to real and sustainable progress.

Gorbachev's adroit diplomacy is rooted in an understanding of international politics that far outstrips his predecessors' in breadth and sophistication. Not satisfied to number only weak and dependent states like Vietnam and Ethiopia among Soviet partners, Gorbachev is determined to improve relations with all of the global power centers, including China, Japan and our Western European allies. Gorbachev wants to turn adversaries into potential sources of support, smoothing points of friction that drain his all too scarce political and economic resources.

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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The rhetoric of his peace offensive has been accompanied by a willingness to make dramatic "concessions" in the military arena. Gorbachev possesses a refined understanding of the role of military power. He will sometimes conduct a tactical retreat, surrendering military advantages in order to gain the upper hand politically. Weakening NATO remains his prime international objective.

If the troop cuts in Eastern Europe are carried out as reportedly planned, they will be militarily significant. The political impact will be even greater. The pictures on the day that Soviet boys begin to leave Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia will do more to promote the image of a changed Soviet Union than four decades of Soviet proclamations of peaceful intent.

The bold activity on the international front complements his domestic reforms. Yet the pace of change is slow in the U.S.S.R. Economic, nationality and social problems are mounting. Gorbachev enjoys the support of intellectuals but most workers are suspicious of the reforms and many bureaucrats are hostile. But whatever the reception at home, perestroika and glasnost' are having an impact on the Soviet Union's image abroad.

Some of Gorbachev's rhetoric (and some of the initiatives) could unsettle the postwar status quo. You may face major upheavals in Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union itself during your Presidency. As uncertainties grow, we must preserve the traditional pillars of American postwar strength: military power, economic resilience, firm alliances and skillful diplomacy.

We must continue to stress the fact that Soviet flexibility is, in large part, a response to Western, especially U.S., policies. Clearly, it would be unwise to walk away from a successful strategy which has brought us to this point. This is our agenda, not his, and we need to recapture credit for it.

Yet in the current environment we cannot afford to be naysayers. Gorbachev's "new foreign policy" cannot be dismissed as propaganda. It is often backed up by action. And we do not want to miss opportunities to improve the relationship and move to our own vision of the future.

Our review of policy has begun and we will proceed with dispatch. But the worst thing that we can do at this critical juncture is make policy precipitously or in a piecemeal fashion. This is an especially bad time to put forth flashy proposals on the assumption that Gorbachev cannot accept them. He has surprised us before.

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I suggest the following strategic approach:

First, we should work on the domestic side to strengthen the image of America's foreign policy as driven by clear objectives. The appeal of Gorbachev is his decisiveness. We cannot meet him head on if we do not appear confident about our purposes and agenda. Attending to the economic problems that weaken us abroad, including the trade and budget deficits, will reinforce our global image as strong and vital. And the spirit of bipartisanship that you have rekindled gives us an opportunity to present a united American policy for the first time in a generation. We may, at last, be able to concentrate on our core goals instead of warring over the details of implementation.

Second, we need to send a clear signal that relations with our allies are our first priority. Jim Baker's trip to Europe was a good start in this direction. Perhaps as we approach a NATO summit, you should make a major speech dealing with Europe. One of the aims of Soviet policy is to distance us from our friends. We can counter Gorbachev's "common European home" theme by pointing out that we remain in that home as welcome guests, not as with the Soviets in Eastern Europe, as occupiers.

In the European security realm, our first priority is to underscore the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent through modernization. With regard to conventional arms control, the alliance must develop a political strategy soon concerning conventional force reductions and where we want them to lead. We might be able to offer an innovative proposal for a more extensive troop inspection regime and other confidence building measures. These measures should be announced as building on Gorbachev's troop cut to reduce the possibility of "surprise attack" through our own proposals to increase transparency.

Similarly, we will need to prepare carefully for bilateral arms control, including START. Arms control is not the only issue on the U.S.-Soviet agenda, but it is the one watched most closely by the world community. If we perform competently in arms control, confidence in our ability to manage the broader relationship will soar.

Third, after our review of policy, we may wish to undertake initiatives with Eastern Europe. The East Europeans, to varying degrees, are taking advantage of Gorbachev's invitation to exercise greater control over their own affairs. Eastern Europe is a weak link in Gorbachev's strategy. We should exploit this but must do so in a prudent way.

Our best lever is economic assistance to the East. But the management of East-West economic relations poses special

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challenges for us. For political and economic reasons, Japan and Europe are more sympathetic than we to East European and Soviet requests for Western investment. They are pressing for a weakening of COCOM procedures and restrictions. The Administration needs to establish acceptable boundaries for East-West economic cooperation and then coordinate them with our allies.

Fourth, the recent settlements in Afghanistan and Southern Africa have raised hopes that U.S.-Soviet cooperation will spur agreements in other parts of the world. We should work aggressively to promote regional stability, aware that the Soviet Union can be an important asset in some but not all regions. In Central America, for instance, multilateral efforts may be more effective if the Soviet Union is excluded.

Finally, you will, in due course, need to lay out a vision of American power as a global stabilizing force in its own right. Whatever the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, America will continue to have interests abroad to defend. In the Persian Gulf, for instance, our military commitment provided the stability that supported the UN search for a peaceful settlement. We need to establish the principle that American power is not simply a reaction to Soviet military capability. This will be important over the next few years because Gorbachev may succeed in diminishing the sense of an overt Soviet threat in a number of areas of the world.

"Getting ahead of Gorbachev" is a complicated and enduring task. The American people, our allies and the international community are looking to you for steady and confident leadership. The time that you take now to set a sure course is a good investment, one that will pay dividends throughout your Presidency.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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0420

February 7, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*  
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*  
SUBJECT: Getting Ahead of Gorbachev

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President with suggestions for "getting ahead of Gorbachev." In preparing this paper, I have profitted from many useful suggestions of my NSC staff colleagues.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum for the President

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*Brent. This is an outstanding memo. I'm impressed - and on the subject, that's not easy. It's long. To get at the two aspects of the challenge: (1) PR + (2) policy. We need to think more about (1).  
RJ.*



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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PER E.O. 13526  
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Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

March 2, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*  
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*  
SUBJECT: Your meeting with Jack Matlock on March 3, 1989,  
8:45 a.m. to 9:15 a.m., in your office

Jack Matlock has recently sent a series of cables outlining his views of Soviet foreign and domestic policy and the implications for U.S. policy. This meeting should provide an opportunity to draw him out on some of his interesting ideas. You might also wish to ask the Ambassador's views on the purpose and scope of the Shevardnadze-Baker meeting in Vienna.

Matlock's cables argue that the process of reform in the Soviet Union is so difficult and protracted that the leadership will be preoccupied with internal problems throughout at least the first Bush Administration. The Soviet leadership has, he argues, declared the system bankrupt and must now deal with the consequences, including increasing public disorder and growing resistance both from radical reformers and reactionaries.

Given this internal preoccupation, Matlock sees no alternative to current Soviet foreign policy which seeks a benign international environment and generally cooperative relations with the West.

Matlock believes that American leverage over Moscow's affairs, while not unlimited, is greater now than at any other time. This leverage, he says, should not be used to "help Gorbachev" but to push the reforms in directions that are favorable to us; democratization of the Soviet political system, demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy and establishment of a freer, market-oriented economy.

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Matlock's most controversial proposal is that we develop a more aggressive policy in regard to East-West economic relations, using the economic lever to promote change in the Soviet Union. Matlock stops short of suggesting that the U.S. government subsidize or guarantee commercial activity but does say that we should define for Soviet policy makers the conditions under which the Administration would encourage and facilitate trade and investment in areas not prohibited by COCOM.

In short, the core argument of this very interesting cable is that we have greater leverage now over Moscow because there is so much that the Soviet Union needs; in particular, economic resources and the knowhow of the Western business community. The Matlock message stops short of its logical conclusion. Moscow is in the midst of domestic turmoil and is looking to the outside world for ideas and resources to rebuild a failing system. It is his implicit assumption that we can leverage that situation to make dramatic progress across the U.S.-Soviet agenda. This is an argument for setting our sights on literally transforming the character of the Soviet Union at home and abroad.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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DUPLICATE FILE

March 20, 1989

Dear Les,

Thank you for your recent letter enclosing the report of your trip to the Soviet Union and your discussions with Marshal Akhromeyev. While much of what the Marshal said was not new, the coherent summary of the Soviet position is particularly interesting. We will make good use of it as we conduct our review of our arms control and defense policies.

*Many thanks*

Sincerely,

*Brent*  
Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Les Aspin  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515



CHARLES E. BENNETT, FLORIDA  
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, NEW YORK  
BILL NICHOLS, ALABAMA  
G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, MISSISSIPPI  
RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIFORNIA  
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLORADO  
BEVERLY B. BYRON, MARYLAND  
NICHOLAS MAVROULES, MASSACHUSETTS  
EARL HUTTO, FLORIDA  
IKE SKELTON, MISSOURI  
MARVIN LEATH, TEXAS  
DAVE McCURDY, OKLAHOMA  
THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, PENNSYLVANIA  
ROY DYSON, MARYLAND  
DENNIS M. HERTEL, MICHIGAN  
MARILYN LLOYD, TENNESSEE  
NORMAN SISISKY, VIRGINIA  
RICHARD RAY, GEORGIA  
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA  
FRANK McCLOSKEY, INDIANA  
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, TEXAS  
GEORGE (BUDDY) DARDEN, GEORGIA  
TOMMY F. ROBINSON, ARKANSAS  
ALBERT G. BUSTAMANTE, TEXAS  
BARBARA BOXER, CALIFORNIA  
GEORGE J. HOCHBRUECKNER, NEW YORK  
JOSEPH E. BRENNAN, MAINE  
OWEN B. PICKETT, VIRGINIA  
H. MARTIN LANCASTER, NORTH CAROLINA  
LANE EVANS, ILLINOIS

1104

# U.S. House of Representatives

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, DC 20515

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

LES ASPIN, WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN

15 February 1989

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FLOYD SPENCE, SOUTH CAROLINA  
ROBERT E. BADHAM, CALIFORNIA  
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JIM COURTER, NEW JERSEY  
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ROBERT W. DAVIS, MICHIGAN  
DUNCAN L. HUNTER, CALIFORNIA  
DAVID O'B. MARTIN, NEW YORK  
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CURT WELDON, PENNSYLVANIA  
JON KYL, ARIZONA  
ARTHUR RAVENEL, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA  
JACK DAVIS, ILLINOIS

G. KIM WINCUP, STAFF DIRECTOR

Honorable Brent Scowcroft  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

During my recent trip to the Soviet Union, I discussed several issues at length with Marshall Sergey Akhromeyev, who seems to be acting as President Gorbachev's personal advisor on arms control. I summarized the most important points in a letter to Secretary of State James Baker. I thought you might be interested as well, so I have enclosed a copy of the letter. I hope you find it useful.

Sincerely,

  
Les Aspin  
Chairman

LA:amv  
Enclosure

*Staff  
for copy*

CHARLES E. BENNETT, FLORIDA  
 G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, MISSISSIPPI  
 RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIFORNIA  
 PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLORADO  
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## U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, DC 20515

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

LES ASPIN, WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN

15 February 1989

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Honorable James A. Baker III  
 Secretary of State  
 Department of State  
 2201 C Street N.W.  
 Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have recently returned from a two-week visit to the Soviet Union. I had a particularly interesting discussion with Marshall Sergey Akhromeyev, who certainly acted as if he were Mr. Gorbachev's personal arms control adviser. I wanted to share some of his observations with you since they seem relevant to some of the issues you must be addressing now.

I asked Marshall Akhromeyev what his reaction was to NATO's proposal in conventional arms control. After noting that it was his job to prepare a detailed analysis of the proposal, he commented that he "was not embarrassed by the numbers" and had no objections to the scale of reductions proposed for each side. He said that he had only two objections:

- First, that the Soviet Union would agree to reach such figures, but "simultaneously with strike aviation." Noting that it was the Luftwaffe that was "decisive" in battle against Soviet ground forces in 1941, he argued that we have to be "realistic: we can't just cut artillery and tanks -- weapons in which the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization has superiority -- and leave strike aviation intact."
- Secondly, he insisted that it was "unrealistic for the West to say that each country on each side should have no more than 30 percent of the total force." After ticking off the personnel strengths of France, Spain and Germany, he observed that only Poland had an army larger than 200,000. Thus, it was "natural" for Soviet forces to make up more than 50 percent of the total.

Throughout the conversation, Marshall Akhromeyev returned to the subject of naval arms control, even suggesting at one point that his judgement as a negotiator was being questioned because naval weapons weren't being addressed. He also said that "until we sit down at the table [to discuss naval systems], it will be an obstacle to START and European negotiations." When I asked him later if he was setting a new

Honorable James A. Baker III  
15 February 1989  
Page 2

condition for a START or CFE agreement, however, he said "no, no ultimatum but we had to understand the concern of his military people" that we were not addressing naval arms control.

On the actual substance of naval arms control, Marshall Akhromeyev maintained that he was a "realist" who was not seeking "just to disarm the U.S. Navy." He recalled that Admiral Trost had expressed his concern about the threat that 200 Soviet multipurpose submarines posed to U.S. SLOCs to Europe. He acknowledged the legitimacy of the Admiral's concern but then asked why the United States had 15 carrier groups if it were not preparing for deployments against the Soviet Union. Both sides had too much, he concluded. Perhaps, the United States should put 5-7 carriers into "storage" while the Soviet Union did the same with 100 of its submarines. He added subsequently that there should be an independent set of talks just between the United States and the Soviet Union about their navies, although he noted that this was his personal, not an official, view.

When I raised the subject of SNF modernization, it sparked a vigorous reaction from Marshall Akhromeyev. He asked me to understand his position, that the Soviet Union had pledged, when it signed the INF Treaty, to destroy weapons with a range of 500 kilometers. And it then destroyed a weapon that had a maximum range of 500 kilometers. "Are we now to give our consent to such a missile [the Lance follow-on]," he asked. "Of course not." He then noted that the Soviet Union had an "old missile" with a range up to 300 kilometers and "new one" with a range of 70-90 kilometers, with no plans for going further.

The Marshall then turned to General Rokke, the DATT, and asked him to tell General Gavin that the Soviet Union was "not reorganizing its tactical nuclear forces no matter what Evans and Novak said." He added that he wanted to "officially declare, we are not modernizing our tactical nuclear forces." He concluded that while the soon to be released Warsaw Treaty data will show that the Soviet Union has a superiority (1200 or so) in surface-to-surface missiles, it was wrong to talk of their tactical nuclear superiority without mentioning NATO's aircraft (such as the Tornado) and artillery.

On the subject of possible negotiations over SNF, Marshall Akhromeyev responded to my argument that the presence of some nuclear weapons in the European theater is stabilizing by remarking that "if you disagree with it [the zero option], it can't be realized. But when talking about reductions, there is much to be done in artillery, aircraft and missiles." His comment, along with statements by other Soviet officials, suggests to me that it might be possible to think about designing a mandate for SNF talks that precludes a zero outcome.



Honorable James A. Baker III  
15 February 1989  
Page 3

Finally, we discussed START issues briefly. Akhromeyev noted that only "big headaches" remained: the ABM Treaty connection, ALCM counting rules and SLCM limits. Presumably his exclusion of mobile ICBMs and verification suggests that he considers those problems solved or soluble. The Marshall also said that "it would be helpful to know the U.S. interpretation of the ABM Treaty. If it is clear that it is in the traditional [i.e., narrow] sense, a lot can be moved [to resolve remaining issues]."

Although our conversation covered several other topics, I found these exchanges to be the most interesting. I hope you will find them useful as you review the bidding in your preparations for future discussions with the Soviets.

Sincerely,



Les Aspin  
Chairman

LA:cmv  
cc: Brent Scowcroft  
John Tower

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1104

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

ACTION

February 27, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

LINTON BROOKS *lint*

**SIGNED**

SUBJECT:

Aspin Report on Soviet Trip

Attached (Tab II) is a copy of Les Aspin's report to Secretary Baker on his recent trip to the Soviet Union, specifically his discussions with Marshal Akhromeyev, who he believes is acting as Gorbachev's personal advisor on arms control. The positions set forth by Akhromeyev are familiar, but Les' letter provides an excellent summary.

You will note that once again the Soviets have stressed the subject of naval arms control. This has been a repetitive theme in Soviet pronouncements for the past two years; the previous administration elected to ignore it. My personal policy preferences are to continue to ignore it; I see no benefit to the United States in so-called naval arms control. I believe, however, that sooner or later we may have to face up to this subject and thus far very little is being done in the bureaucracy to prepare for that day.

I have prepared a brief acknowledgement to Les Aspin (Tab I) for your signature.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Les Aspin.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Bob Blackwill, Condi Rice, Ginny Lampley, and Don Mahley concur. *CB* *Wal* *Ham*

Attachments

Tab I

Scowcroft Letter to Aspin

Tab II

Aspin Letter to Scowcroft

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2009-0932-MR  
SCS 5/20/13

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2481

April 8, 1989

**CHRON FILE**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *CA for RS*  
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*  
SUBJECT: President's Message to Gorbachev Concerning the  
Mike-class Submarine Accident Yesterday

The draft message at Tab I is a reply from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev's note concerning the Mike-class submarine accident yesterday. The original Gorbachev message is at Tab II.

The message has been cleared with the State Department.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Gorbachev.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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SCS 5/20/13

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2481

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 8, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev Message Concerning the  
Mike-class Submarine Accident

Attached is a reply from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev's note concerning the Mike-class submarine accident yesterday. Please prepare the response for transmittal via the Crosshatch system.

for *Mr. Donley*  
G. Philip Hughes  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Outgoing Message

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2009-0932-MR  
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Thank you for your message concerning the tragic submarine accident yesterday. The people of the United States join with me in extending our sincere condolences to the families of the lost crewmen and in hoping that your rescue efforts will successfully prevent further loss of life.

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White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By CAF NARA, Date 3/14/12

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# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

# C

MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 2

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES \_\_\_\_\_  
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MSG / SUBMARINE ACCIDENT  
NSC # 2481

| <u>TO (AGENCY)</u> | <u>DELIVER TO:</u>      | <u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u> | <u>EXTENSION</u> |
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REMARKS \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/19/09



**Urgent Message from President Gorbachev to President Bush**

On April 7, 1989 at 1141 Moscow time on board a nuclear-powered torpedo submarine located in neutral waters in the area at a distance of approximately 180 kilometers southwest of Medvezhinskiy Island, a fire started in one of the compartments.

Unfortunately, despite the measures taken, the submarine could not be saved. At 1715 Moscow time, the submarine sank at a depth of over 1500 meters. - The crew is being helped by Soviet ships and vessels, which came to the area where the accident occurred. There are casualties.

The circumstances which led to the loss of the submarine are still being investigated. The reactor is shut down. By the assessment of specialists, a possibility of a nuclear explosion and radioactive contamination is excluded. Organizational and technical measures are being worked out in view of what has happened.

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TIME: 12:40  
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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MESSAGE NO. 0467 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 2

FROM G. PHILIP ROBERTS (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MSG / SUBMARINE ACCIDENT  
NSC 02481

| TO (AGENCY)  | DELIVER TO:           | DEPT/ROOM NO.   | EXTENSION |
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REMARKS

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MESSAGE NO. 0407 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 2

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MSG / SUBMARINE ACCIDENT

NSC # 2481

| TO (AGENCY)  | DELIVER TO:             | DEPT/ROOM NO.   | EXTENSION |
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| <u>STATE</u> | <u>J. Stapleton Roy</u> | <u>EXEC SEC</u> |           |

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/19/09

REMARKS

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2009-0932-MR  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 26, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*  
SUBJECT: Soviets Still Exporting Revolution in  
Southern Africa

*Brent  
As usual, a useful  
thinkpiece from Bill  
J.*

Recent Soviet assurances of weapons support for the ANC's "liberation movement" in South Africa and continued Soviet support for SWAPO hardly seem to square with Gorbachev's announced opposition to exporting revolution.

Gorbachev's April 5 Havana statement opposing the export of revolution was greeted by some in the media and elsewhere as clear evidence of a shift away from Soviet involvement in regional conflicts. Even Steve Rosenfeld, who should know better, wrote (Washington Post, April 7, 1989): "No export of revolution: this seeming renunciation of conducting class war by armed struggle is what the West has been hoping to hear for 70 years."

Actually, public statements opposing the export of revolution have been made by the Soviets for over sixty years. This was, for example, a basic tenet of the Comintern. Back in November 1960, a Soviet-drafted "Statement of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties" declared: "Communist parties, guided by Marxist-Leninist doctrine, have always been against the export of revolution."

Less than two months later, on January 6, 1961, Khrushchev delivered his notorious speech promoting "wars of national liberation." You will recall that this speech sparked the Kennedy Administration's energetic counterinsurgency campaign. This is all germane because history seems to be repeating itself.

In a March 31 press conference in Harare, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin said that the Soviet Union was the only major source of weapons for the African National Congress (ANC) and would continue supplying it. He added: "Those who think we are going to stop supplying the ANC with arms to force it into negotiations are engaged in wishful thinking."

Adamishin noted: "There is movement towards political settlement of all regional conflicts in the world. We began this process with our withdrawal from Afghanistan." He stressed his country's preference for achieving "national liberation" in a peaceful way, but added that since South Africa was engaged in "state violence"

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against its own citizens and the ANC, "who can tell the people not to reciprocate to violence with violence." He then declared: "The Soviet Union will continue to render assistance to the liberation movements in full compliance with the decisions of the international community and the United Nations which have declared apartheid a crime against humanity."

While the ANC "liberation movement" now shows only long-range promise, prospects for Namibia are much brighter. Public statements indicate that the Soviets believe SWAPO will win no less than 70 percent in "free and democratic" elections; however, this prediction is accompanied by warnings that South Africa plans to bring in "thousands of members" of UNITA to vote against SWAPO and is also setting up "warehouses for weapons and ammunition in various regions of Namibia" for an uprising against SWAPO should it win the elections (Krasnaya Zvezda, April 9, 1989).

On April 11, Adamishin announced that the Soviets planned to open a "communications mission" in Windhoek and would establish diplomatic relations with Namibia when it became independent. After over twenty years of bankrolling, arming and training SWAPO, the Soviets finally see the payoff within grasp. The Soviets are bound to have a great deal of influence and considerable presence in a SWAPO-controlled Namibia. While SWAPO proclaims it will not permit foreign bases to be established in Namibia, this should not rule out landing rights for Soviet military aircraft (especially Bears) and port calls for Soviet naval vessels.

Also, agreement or no agreement, ANC guerrilla bases are most certainly going to sprout up in Namibia (assuming SWAPO wins) and will be supported by direct Soviet assistance. Since SWAPO is already officially recognized by the UN and the OAU, complaints against it by UN monitoring teams and by others are not going to arouse much international indignation. South African violations, alleged or real, will inevitably receive the most attention.

It should be noted here, that the Soviets were clearly very annoyed with the premature armed SWAPO penetration of Namibia. Adamishin insisted (on April 16) that neither the Soviets, the Cubans nor Angolans knew that SWAPO units were going to cross the border, and he may well be right. The Soviets must have been beside themselves seeing SWAPO about to blow it just as the long Soviet investment in SWAPO was finally paying off.

In a recent interview, Adamishin was asked if the Soviet Union now desires to withdraw from Africa. He replied: "If this can be called a withdrawal, it is only a withdrawal from certain forms of cooperation which have not justified themselves . . . the ending of armed conflicts in southern Africa will enable us too to considerably reduce expenditure and switch to mutually advantageous economic cooperation . . . African states themselves do not want us to withdraw. Many would like to rely on the Soviet Union and cooperate with us in a whole number of spheres



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

. . . So we have no intention of yielding our positions in Africa to anyone" (Sovetskaya Rossiya, April 18, 1989). In the meantime, back on Capitol Hill there are calls for eliminating U.S. assistance to UNITA. Such sentiment may well grow as the Soviets, the OAU and others keep insisting that UNITA endangers the peace process in southern Africa. As the Soviets put it: ". . . it is simply immoral for Washington to support this subversive organization . . . . Continued U.S. support for Savimbi will delay the process of internal settlement in Angola" (Izvestiya, April 14, 1989). I personally believe that the Soviets are convinced that eventually UNITA will be abandoned by everyone, giving the Soviets and their Angolan allies a free hand throughout Angola without a Cuban military presence -- which demonstrates how smart and imaginative they have become in the last few years.

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**National Security Council  
The White House**

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| Philip Hughes   | <u>2</u>    | <u>RP</u> |                       |
| Bob Gates       | <u>3</u>    | <u>✓</u>  | <u>✓</u>              |
| Brent Scowcroft | <u>4</u>    | <u>✓</u>  |                       |
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~~Information~~ I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action  
 cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS *Soviets Still Exporting  
Revolution in Southern  
Africa*