

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91116
Folder ID Number: 91116-008

Folder Title:
German Unification (June 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Outline	Re: Meeting and Dinner with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of FRG [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting and Dinner with FRG Chancellor Kohl (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Report	Re: Report regarding Helmut Kohl (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01d. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting and Dinner with Chancellor Kohl on June 8, from 7:00 to 9:15 pm (1 pp.)	6/7/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Giscard D'Estaing (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Giscard D'Estaing (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02d. Memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: President's Meeting with Giscard D'Estaing (1 pp.)	6/9/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Outline	From Brent Scowcroft, Re: Meeting and Luncheon with Lothar De Maiziere, Prime Minister of GDR [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/9/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (June 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap981
OA/ID Number: 91116-008
Date Closed: 2/18/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting and Luncheon with Prime Minister Lothar De Maiziere (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03c. Report	Re: Lothar de Maiziere [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	6/1/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
03d. Memo	Robert Hutchings/Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Meeting with Prime Minister De Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic, on Monday, June 11 (1 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	S
04a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to William F. Sittmann Re: The President's Meetings with Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic (1 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic (4 pp.)	6/11/90	(b)(1)	S
04c. Memcon	Re: Luncheon Meeting with Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic (5 pp.)	6/11/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Admiral Lanxade, June 29, 1990 (2 pp.)	6/28/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	1/3/90	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: French Views on NATO (2 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 3

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05d. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: NATO as a "Political" Organization (5 pp.)	3/26/90	(b)(1)	S
05e. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Florence E. Gantt Re: Visit by Admiral Lanxade (1 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	S
05f. Memo	From Adrian A. Basora to Florence E. Gantt , Re: Views of Admiral Lanxade [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	4/5/90	(b)(1)	S

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004543
RECEIVED: 06 JUN 90 10

CHRON FILE

2

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 07 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

VISIT

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MTG & DINNER W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF FRG ON 8 JUN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 09 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF: 9003239 9003611

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 2/18/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 3 OF 3

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RECORD ID: 9004543

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HUTCHINGS
001
002 SCOWCROFT
003

Z 90060610 PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
Z 90060816 NFAR PER HUTCHINGS
Z 90061208 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
X 90061208 NOTED BY PRES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/18/09

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Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/6/2023

Date Closed: 2/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 91116-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-0661-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/5/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
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Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4543

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0661-MR
MM 2/5/2016

MEETING AND DINNER WITH
CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL of FRG


DATE: June 8, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office/Residence
TIME: 7:00 - 9:15 pm
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT



I. PURPOSE

To assure Chancellor Kohl that we support his plans for rapid unification and all-German elections this year and arrive at a joint strategy for addressing Soviet concerns during the next few months.

II. BACKGROUND



Kohl will count on you to keep leading Allied support for his program. A recent poll indicates that German voters are more worried about the environment, drugs, and unemployment

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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than about the importance of achieving unification. Kohl is worried that, if unification is drawn out, this apathy -- coupled with resentment about the costs of unity -- could be costly to the governing coalition.

We believe that rapid German unification, which would be accompanied by the end of Four Power rights and responsibilities and the restoration of full German sovereignty, is in our interest. That is the position we will take to the next Two Plus Four Ministerial on June 22.

The Soviets would prefer to see unification, or at least the external issues associated with it, remain unsettled past the FRG elections (which must be held by mid-January 1991). The serious possibility of an SPD victory in these elections (especially if the elections are held only in the current FRG) means the Soviets hope to be dealt a new hand of cards, with a wild card -- Lafontaine -- that can only be an improvement on what they are holding now. We want the Soviets to realize that the diplomatic game will not go on indefinitely and that a time will come, sooner not later, when history will move on, with the now united FRG remaining a full member of NATO.

Kohl may be prepared to go forward with internal unification regardless of Soviet views. Many FRG politicians are disappointed and concerned because of the apparent lack of agreement between you and Gorbachev on Germany. If Kohl asks how we would handle a Soviet intransigence in the Two Plus Four, he should know that when internal unity is complete, the US is prepared to do what it can to restore full German sovereignty, even if the Soviets do not agree.

But you can reassure Kohl, as you did in your June 3 call, that your talks with Gorbachev helped defuse the tensions surrounding the German issue and won some acceptance for the principle that Alliance membership was a matter for the German people to decide. The Soviets are also being more forthcoming in listing their key concerns, many of which we are prepared to address.

The Soviets may never agree to the virtue of full German membership in NATO. But, if the Soviets know the game will end, they will have maximum incentives to get the best bargain they can. You may wish to review, with the Chancellor, the nature of this bargain.

1. A transformed and more benign NATO. This is an issue which you told Gorbachev would be addressed at the NATO Summit on July 5-6, in London. Chancellor Kohl is likely to support ambitious Summit proposals to enhance NATO's political role and show a marked change in NATO's approach to defense.

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2. A stronger CSCE. The Soviets have proposed several ideas, some of which go too far toward involving the CSCE in collective security. Both we and the Germans are, however, considering ideas which come close to what the Soviets want -- ideas such as a conflict prevention center for required exchanges of information about military activities. You have called for NATO leaders to announce their vision for the future of the CSCE at the NATO Summit.

3. Economic incentives for the Soviets. The Germans have already been talking about this with Moscow. These incentives could take the form of concessionary terms for fulfillment of GDR trade obligations, or building housing for withdrawn Soviet soldiers, or even direct financial assistance. Teltschik recently flew to Moscow to raise economic issues with the Soviets. You might want to ask Kohl about these discussions.

4. Constraints on the Germans. We are opposed to placing any new discriminatory constraints on a united Germany. The idea of limiting Germany's military may be especially persistent, although it is noteworthy that Gorbachev did not press you on this point during his visit.

On the question of limits on the Bundeswehr, Chancellor Kohl agreed with you, in your May 30 call, that such a move is premature. However, on the margins of the Turnberry NAC, the Foreign Ministry's Arms Control Commissioner has circulated a paper (with Genscher's approval) to key allies proposing a ceiling on the forces of the countries in Central Europe, including the FRG (and the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Benelux). Other parties, including the Soviets, would accept de facto ceilings on their forces by making a commitment not to increase their military manpower in Europe, and all would promise to accept negotiated national ceilings on personnel in the follow-on conventional arms control talks.

Our first priority should be to determine Chancellor Kohl's views, especially since this new idea seems to go far beyond what the Germans have been telling us they could accept. So far, we have tried to avoid singularizing the Germans by putting the idea of limits on the Bundeswehr in the context of limits on all armed forces in Europe, and pushing such discussions into the conventional arms control talks that would follow conclusion of a CFE treaty. However, if the proposal given to us at Turnberry is supported by Kohl, you should tell him we will take a look at it.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The Participants list is at Tab B.

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IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

V. SEQUENCE

Meeting in Oval Office followed by dinner in Residence.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biographies

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING
AND DINNER WITH
FRG CHANCELLOR KOHL

German Unification

- I understand your interest in having all-German elections this year. We are certainly prepared to support a rapid schedule for unification.
- I don't like the idea of the Soviets holding on to Four Power rights indefinitely until they can find more leverage.
- I agree with you that all Four Power rights and responsibilities should end when Germany unites.
- We therefore agree that the Two Plus Four should complete its work before the CSCE Summit. I don't want the question of German sovereignty, or Germany's membership in NATO, left unsettled when the CSCE leaders meet.
- We must stay united on our absolute requirements for German unification: a united Germany as a full member of NATO, including its integrated military structures; application of NATO's security guarantees to all of a united Germany; continued stationing of US military forces in Germany and elsewhere in Europe; Two Plus Four termination of Four Power rights at the time of unification, with no new constraints on German sovereignty; and keeping the Two Plus Four out of decisions on German membership in NATO, the status of NATO's nuclear and conventional forces, or the size of the Bundeswehr.

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0661-MP
MM 2/5/2016

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-- I will be seeing Prime Minister De Maiziere on Monday. What kind of message would you like him to hear in Washington?

Germany and the Soviet Union

- I think I made some progress with Gorbachev on the question of Germany. I wouldn't call it a breakthrough, but our discussions did take away the atmosphere of tension that seemed to be building when he arrived in Washington.
- I also noted, as I mentioned in my call to you, that Gorbachev seemed ready to acknowledge that the choice of Alliance alignment was up to the German people to decide.
- It will be important for us to stay together in deciding what we can -- and cannot -- do to help ease Soviet concerns about unification, and about full German membership in NATO.
- I told Gorbachev that a united Germany should be part of a transformed North Atlantic Alliance, with much more emphasis on the political dimension. We should be ready to get some ambitious ideas on this subject adopted at the NATO Summit next month in London.
- We are not interested in coming up with new constraints on your sovereignty. Gorbachev didn't push me on this. He didn't even raise the idea of limits on your forces, although we were expecting it.
- The Soviets are also interested in the expansion of the CSCE. We have been thinking about that too, and we may be able to go a good distance toward what they want. We still see no merit, though, in the idea of CSCE as a collective security body that might somehow replace NATO.

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- I know you have been thinking about economic incentives for the Soviets. I'd like to hear more about your ideas on this. Did Horst Teltschik make any progress during his trip to Moscow?

CFE and Limits on German Armed Forces

- I've heard that, in Scotland, your Arms Control Commissioner has passed out some new ideas for meeting Soviet concerns about the size of the German Army.
- I want to be clear on one thing: For me, this matter of limiting your military is a false issue. There is no way that your forces could be considered threatening, and we see no need to limit them.
- But what is your thinking about whether to offer the Soviets new limits that would encompass your forces? If you do want to make a move on the Bundeswehr, I would like to hear your views on the timing for such a step.

Export Controls

- I'm glad your government prepared such good legislation on export controls. We think the situation at Rabta is still very serious, and we need to work together to stop the proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, as well as chemical weapons.
- I heard that the legislation has run into some trouble in Parliament. What is your assessment of the prospects for passage?

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Vice President

Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State

John Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Federal Republic of Germany

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor

Walter Neuer, Director of the Chancellor's Office

Peter Hartmann, Deputy National Security Adviser

Hans Klein, Spokesman of the Federal Government

Dorothea Kaltenbach, Interpreter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Report	Re: Report regarding Helmut Kohl (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (June 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SLS (NLGB) on 2/15/13

Date Closed: 2/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 91116-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-0661-MR(500.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/25/2010

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Helmut KOHL**FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

*Chancellor (since October 1982);
Chairman, Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) (since 1973)*

Addressed as: Mr. Chancellor

Helmut Kohl is riding a wave of confidence and popularity since the surprise victory of his CDU-backed Alliance for Germany in East Germany's mid-March 1990 election. The political capital he and his party gained in the East German campaign offsets a string of CDU losses since 1987, and Kohl hopes the momentum will boost Alliance fortunes in the GDR's 6 May 1990 communal elections. Recent polls indicate that Kohl has achieved his best rating in over seven years and that, if West German parliamentary elections were held now, his coalition would win by a solid majority. (b)(1)



Kohl still faces some high hurdles, however, in the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1990. (b)(1) Social Democrat Oskar Lafontaine is a strong challenger who is poised to exploit growing anxiety about the costs of unification in West Germany's electorate. (Lafontaine, hospitalized following an assassination attempt on 25 April 1990, will reportedly remain his party's chancellor candidate.) The latest poll shows that Lafontaine still remains more popular than Kohl. Moreover, Kohl is concerned about the East Germans' continued immigration to the FRG; West German resentment of the resettlers could become a factor in upcoming state elections. Kohl, who intends to be remembered as "the Chancellor of Unity," is determined to keep Lafontaine on the sidelines in the unification process. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) he has constantly been underestimated, and his government has been unable to garner credit for eight years of uninterrupted economic growth under his stewardship. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

Chancellor of Unity

Kohl has said that election as chancellor of a united Germany would be the "crowning of his life's work," and his recent orchestration of terms for German economic and monetary union (GEMU) demonstrates that he is firmly in command of the unification train. On 24 April 1990 Kohl and GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere agreed to economic, monetary, and social union between the two German states as of July 1990. Kohl's GEMU

(b)(1)

(cont.)

LDA M 90-12899

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PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED

2009-0661-MR

② 5/25/10

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4543

June 7, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting and Dinner with Chancellor Kohl on June 8, from 7:00 to 9:15 pm

A briefing package for the President is attached for your review at Tab I.

Concurrences: *CR* Condoleezza Rice, *PZ* Arnold Kanter, *GR* and *H* Heather Wilson

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B List of Participants
Tab C Biographical Material

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By *ji* NARA, Date 12/17/09

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Declassify on: OADR

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RECORD ID: 9004668
RECEIVED: 11 JUN 90 12

CHINA FALL

DOC DATE: 09 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

2.

AP

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES MTG W/ GISCARD D'ESTAING 13 JUN

STATUS: C

LOGREF: 9003683

CODES :

NSX CHRON

By Cop NARA, Date 2/18/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY DATE 6/12 BY HAND W/ATTCH

DOC 1 OF 2

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: LMS

LOG # 4668

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Bill Sittmann</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>CM 6/12</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres mtg w/ Giscard D'Estaing
on June 13 at 2:00pm
(Exec Sec office has diskette)

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
GISCARD D'ESTAING

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0661-MR
MM 2/5/2016

- It's a pleasure to see you again after such a long time (Spring of 1982, in Paris).
- I know that you remain very active in French and European politics. I would be interested in your views.
- Given the importance of the historic changes going on in Europe, close French-U.S. cooperation is essential.
- This is particularly true in the management of the Two Plus Four negotiations, and in designing the changes in the Alliance needed to maintain its vigor and pertinence.
- I realize that France is not likely to rejoin the NATO integrated command, but I am pleased to see that President Mitterrand is taking a positive stance on developing NATO's political dimension.
- As the EC integration process moves forward, closer linkage between the U.S. and the EC will also be important.
- I would be interested in your views on these issues, and on other aspects of the future European and trans-Atlantic architecture.

Germany and NATO

- I know you agree that a united Germany's full membership in NATO, including its integrated military structure, is essential for European stability and security.
- Without Germany's full membership in NATO, the Alliance would be seriously, perhaps fatally, undermined as a security organization. Without a strong NATO, it would be

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- difficult, if not impossible, to maintain U.S. military forces in Europe.
- We think NATO's solidarity, and the presence of significant U.S. forces, are key reasons for Europe's unprecedented period of peace. We don't want to tinker with that, or return to the days of traditional rivalry among the European powers. NATO is a totally defensive organization, with wide public support, that knits the European democracies together.
 - At the same time, it is essential for NATO to change, to take on new challenges in the new Europe. I have proposed that next month's NATO Summit take steps to transform the Alliance. We would change its political role, its defense plans, and put forward a common position on the future of the CSCE.
 - We want CSCE to play a stronger role in the new Europe, in helping build free societies in Eastern Europe, as well as giving those countries -- and the Soviet Union -- a strong voice in the political dialogue in a more integrated Europe.

The Soviet Union and the Two Plus Four

- I had a good discussion with President Gorbachev. There were no breakthroughs, but I think we defused some of the tension about the future of Germany.
- He expressed his opposition to a united Germany in NATO.
- He seemed to acknowledge, however, that the Germans have the right, as stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act, to choose their own alliance arrangements. And he seemed to agree that Germany should not be "singularized."

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- We will have to see, of course, whether this will mean real flexibility in the Soviet position.
- We recognize that the Soviet Union has legitimate security concerns. We want to address them and are addressing them. I discussed with President Gorbachev my proposals for a transformed Atlantic Alliance, further negotiations on conventional and nuclear forces, and a stronger role for CSCE.
- We want Mr. Gorbachev to be assured that a united Germany in NATO -- a NATO that is changing -- is no threat to Soviet security. But we cannot allow German sovereignty or European security to be held hostage to Soviet concerns.
- That is why we think the Two Plus Four should concentrate on ending Four Power rights when Germany unites, and stay away from debates about Germany's security arrangements in NATO, including the status of foreign stationed forces in the current FRG and the size of the Bundeswehr.
- Overall, I was encouraged by my meetings with President Gorbachev. I am hopeful that we are laying the foundation of an entirely new U.S.-Soviet relationship. I told him I had great respect for the changes he has supported or encouraged in Central and Eastern Europe. I believe he knows that the U.S. will not exploit these changes for unilateral advantage or to undermine Soviet security.

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Adrian A. Basora, Director for European Economic Affairs,
NSC Staff

James F. Dobbins, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for European and Canadian Affairs

France

Valery Giscard D'Estaing

Jacques Andreani, French Ambassador to the United States

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (June 1990)

Date Closed: 2/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 91116-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

V. GISCARD d'ESTAING and Helmut SCHMIDT :

**"STRENGTHENING THE FRANCO-GERMAN AXIS
IN RESPONSE TO
RECENT EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE"**

**Published by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate
11 February 1990.**

01

STRENGTHENING THE FRANCO-GERMAN AXIS
IN RESPONSE TO
RECENT EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

In 1950, inspired by Jean MONNET, Robert SCHUMAN proposed that the coal and steel resources of France and Germany be pooled. Since then, the Franco-German axis has played a decisive role in progress towards European unification.

Not only our two countries but also, Italy, the Benelux and, more recently, other countries such as Spain, have boosted progress towards European unification. But none of the decisive steps forward could have been taken without the impulse provided jointly by France and West Germany.

Acknowledgement of this fact first brought the leaders of both countries closer together, and later the ordinary people. Today, opinion polls show the French and the West Germans are "best friends" of the other nation.

Can this close friendship survive the situation created by recent events in Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany? Has the Franco-German axis a specific role to play in the policy that will redraw the map of Europe?

We firmly believe that it has. Joint Franco-German action is necessary.

What do we expect it to achieve?

The political leaders of Western Europe are going to have to face up to three problems: the reuniting of the two Germanies, unification of the 12 European Community Member States, and the definition of new relations with the democratic countries of Eastern Europe. Regarding the reunion of the two Germanies -- a word which we prefer to "reunification", since that last word suggests a return to a previous situation -- three attitudes are possible for West Germany's partners, especially France:

- They may try to slow down the process;
- They may seek new alliances to act as a counterweight to growing German power;
- They may act to incorporate the gradual reunion of the two Germanies in the process leading to a federal union of the states of Europe.

A word of warning against the first two options :

Any obvious intention to oppose the two Germanies' desire to unite would destroy the climate of confidence so patiently built up between France and West Germany. Opposition to German reunion might ignite a dangerous outburst of German nationalism.

As for seeking new alliances to act as a counterweight to German influence --with the Southern European countries, the United Kingdom or even, as some people have imprudently suggested, with the Soviet Union-- this would take us back to a trial of strength, particularly to the type of relations existing between European countries before the two world wars. It would set us back 80 years.

In practical terms, the problem of the gradual reunion of the two Germanies will arise just after March, 18, 1990, when elections will be held in East Germany. The proclamation of these election results will have an outstanding impact on world public opinion : it will signal the death of 45 years of communist rule over Eastern Europe. The two German states will then understand the necessity of a long, drawn-out pragmatic process leading to a common political structure.

It is clear that rapprochement between the two Germanies will be at the heart of the political debate in Europe. The only approach consistent with the maintenance of Franco-German Friendship and understanding is to incorporate the reunion of the two Germanies within the strategy of establishing a federal union of the Member States of the EC.

Such a federation would include not only economic and monetary union, but also the integration of foreign policies and ultimately of military and security policies --in which France and Germany will have a special role to exercise jointly.

Acting in this way would avoid going against the tide of history by setting the problem of reunion in pre-war terms. Rather, it would place German reunion in a contemporary context at the intersection of two major movements : the construction of a united Europe and the awareness of ethnic solidarity.

The German leaders must take into account the common concern of all other Europeans to prevent the restoration of German hegemony. And no nation in the world is better positioned than France to lend credibility to the German people's legitimate wish to

Unit 0.

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Opting to deal with this problem in a postwar perspective entails practical consequences that will provide a real test of the Germans' intentions. The German Government's answers to the following question will decisively influence the options for the future of a united Europe : From the German perspective, will a united Europe be only a large economic and monetary area with no common personality, or a federal union of the states of Europe ?

The first consequence of the German acceptance of a federal union would be the strict and clear recognition, with no legal niceties and no strings attached, of the frontier between East Germany and Poland.

The second consequence would be that reunion must take into account all the rules and obligations that the Member States of the EC have laid down for themselves in their progress toward a united Europe. East Germany will not join forces with a West Germany isolated in a national context, but with a state that is already part of the European Community, abiding by its operational procedures and participating in its institutions.

This means that the steps towards the reunion of the two Germanies will have to take full account of East Germany's capacity to comply with Community obligations. Those obligations are strict and precise.

They led new member countries such as Spain and Portugal to seek and obtain a transitional period for accession.

Similarly, the uniting process will have to guarantee the equilibria laid down in the Treaty of Rome, and confirmed with each subsequent accession, which have seen the EC expand from being a Community of Six to a Community of Twelve. With regard to the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers and the number of Members of the European Parliament, demographic proportions are not strictly adhered to : The countries with the smallest population are better represented, and a rule of parity is applied to the four most populous countries : West Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom. The parity will have to be maintained in the event the two Germanies unite.

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The reunion of the two Germanies must be seen as part of the process leading toward the establishment of the Union of the Member States of the Community.

The current outlook toward European unity lacks dynamism and clarity. Is Europe seeking a single market with monetary stability where all member states retain their sovereign powers or a federation to which member states allot joint powers? It is time that the objective must be clearly set out: the institution of a federal organization that respects the diversity of its Member States. The realization of this option requires a strong political impulse that can only be provided jointly by France and Germany.

The first task to undertake without delay is to clear up any misunderstandings, especially those affecting the United Kingdom. A specific and exhaustive list of the areas that will be the responsibility of the Union, and of those which will remain the responsibility of the Member States and their local authorities, must be drawn up. That list will be based on the "subsidiarity principle", which restricts the powers and responsibilities of central government to those that can't be handled at lower levels.

This federation, of a type never seen before, will require a Constitution or a "Basic Law" because the existing institutions can no longer cope with the rapid pace of European developments.

It is essential that this task be carried out during the 1990s. There are no insurmountable problems, although certain compromises will obviously have to be sought.

However, it will not come about without a political will operating at the Community's three levels: the European Council, the Commission and the Parliament. To maintain its momentum, the EC must concentrate its energies to complete its union. Any enlargement that may slow down the process, or dilute the political will, must be postponed until the EC has definitely agreed on its future structure and rules.

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We call on the French and German leaders to join together to demonstrate this political commitment. Without their common will, progress will be slow and minimal, as has been the case in the monetary sphere since 1980.

If we succeed in setting into motion the process leading toward the political unification of Europe, the process for uniting the two Germanies will be incorporated in a movement of which it will only be one part, and it will have to take into account both the political substance and the timetable for achieving the other parts of the whole.

Until the recent events occurred, relations between the Community and the communist countries of Eastern Europe developed on a progressive, case-by-case basis. Trade agreements were negotiated bilaterally. The GDR enjoyed special terms for its trade with the Federal Republic. Some countries participated in the activities of international economic institutions as members or observers. Until recently it seemed probable that, ten years or so from now, isolated applications would have been submitted for association agreements with the Community. The Community would have negotiated such agreements cautiously and, no doubt, concluded one or two.

The democratic uprisings of recent months have changed the picture completely. The public in Western Europe has been made aware by TV's daily and brutal images that another Europe also existed, that it was in a desperate economic situation and that it was turning towards Western Europe, even before turning towards the United States, to seek help and benchmark against which to base its reorganization. And the public in the West is growing impatient at the delay in the response from Western governments.

The call from the East is a simple one : "We want to live like you", but the response must vary because, as the tide of Communism ebbs, the land left uncovered differs from country to country.

France and Germany must together prepare an appropriate response to the popular pleas for rapprochement.

There are two different cases :

Some countries will have the capacity and desire to become incorporated into the Community. At the moment, the only probable candidate for a relatively early accession is East Germany. Others, such as Poland, Hungary and, no doubt, Czechoslovakia, will see

to the goal of their economic reconstruction a standard
of living like that which exists within the EC

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The strengthening of their links with the Community may range from association to accession. The proper approach for dealing with these countries is to provide aid : emergency aid, transfert of know-how, technology and investment aid. Since this aid comes mainly from public funds, it ought to be channelled exclusively through the Community, with France and Germany acting as one.

Although it is right and proper for industrial experts to undertake missions to these countries, why are they undertaken on a strictly national basis ? Measures should be taken to send joint French and German business missions, for banks and insurance companies of both countries, to set up joint subsidiaries in those countries. The next Franco-German summit should be devoted to the coordination of the economic and financial operations undertaken by Germany and France in the Eastern European countries.

Since they have been cut off from Western political life for so long, the public and the new leaders in the countries of Eastern Europe are unaware of the close friendship that now exists between France and Germany. They still imagine that our two countries are suspicious and jealous of each other. This both reassures them and worries them.

In the next few months, they must be persuaded that the Europe with which they will be associated will be based on a close and irreversible friendship between our two countries, each of which, in the past, sought to attract them into hostile alliances against the other. Joint visits by the foreign ministers would demonstrate the new climate of friendship and understanding to which these countries will have to become accustomed.

The growth in economic power of the combined Germanies will have to be offset. If the Community has been able to equip itself with federal structures, and if it respects the principle of parity, this increase in power will not become manifest at a national level. But it is clear that industrial and financial cooperation will occur more rapidly based on a common German culture, thus making Germany economically larger than the others. Here we will have to rely on the joint undertakings of the other European countries, within a market context, to balance the new German economic might.

This must be accompanied by the use of Community resources for accelerating the development of Southern Europe --Italy, Spain and Portugal-- to maintain the existing equilibrium between the different parts of the European Community.

We do believe that, at the beginning of an entirely new era in Europe, France and Germany must act jointly to overcome the dangers and to seize the opportunities as they did daringly through the pooling of resources in the 1950s.

We call on leaders of our two countries to clearly set the new objective of the Union of the European States in which Germany may enjoy its unity while Europe keep the balance it vitally needs.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 9, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AAB*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Giscard D'Estaing

The memo for the June 13 meeting is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography
Tab D Giscard/Schmidt article

Right to done 6/12

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By 36 NARA, Date 12/17/09

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004546
RECEIVED: 06 JUN 90 11

TO: PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~ FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 09 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY D R

VISIT

PERSONS: DE MAIZIERE, LOTHAR

SUBJECT: MTG & LUNCHEON W/ PM DE MAIZIERE OF GDR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 09 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF: 9003239 9003611

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
HUTCHINGS
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/18/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 3 OF 3

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Outline	From Brent Scowcroft, Re: Meeting and Luncheon with Lothar De Maiziere, Prime Minister of GDR [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/9/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (June 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 11/20/2015

Date Closed:	2/18/2009	OA/ID Number:	91116-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2008-0687-MR(503.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/31/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4546



MEETING AND LUNCHEON WITH
LOTHAR DE MAIZIERE, PRIME MINISTER OF GDR

DATE: June 11, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office/Residence
TIME: 11:30 am - 1:15 pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To strengthen our ties with the new, democratically elected East German Government and develop a consensus on the essentials of German unification.

II. BACKGROUND

Prime Minister De Maiziere presides over a government whose chief function is to negotiate itself out of existence. As the first (and destined to be the only) democratically elected Prime Minister of the GDR, he nonetheless takes his historic task seriously and wants to be treated as a political leader in his own right. He is acutely conscious that, despite its innocence and inexperience, his government alone gives East Germans their own voice in negotiations that will decide their future.

Your meeting, the first ever between a U.S. President and an East German Prime Minister, will be an important occasion to engage De Maiziere and shape his thinking as the Two Plus Four talks enter their decisive stage. De Maiziere is close to Chancellor Kohl on most of the internal aspects of German unification. (This contrasts sharply with the East German SPD, which has bridled at the West German SPD's campaign against the high costs -- to West Germans -- of unification.) One area of possible disagreement between De Maiziere and Kohl could be on the timing of unification; the Soviets believe they can exploit De Maiziere's preference for a slower pace to prolong their own influence. However, ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] Kohl has won Maiziere's agreement to a rapid pace that will lead to all-German elections this December. In this regard, it would be useful for you to emphasize that we support Kohl's preference for unification this year, accompanied by the termination of Four Power rights.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

2008-0687-MR

7/31/2014 MM

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De Maiziere has been less solid on the external aspects of unification. With Kohl's urging, De Maiziere has supported Germany's continued membership in NATO, but he has been more willing to consider the French model, or other limitations on Germany's role in NATO. In his bilateral with Secretary Baker in Copenhagen, East German Foreign Minister Meckel also suggested creation of a demilitarized zone in central Europe, consisting of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and current GDR territory -- an idea that could singularize part of Germany and perpetuate East European vulnerability to Soviet influence and intimidation.

It will be particularly important to impress on De Maiziere that Germany should remain a full member of NATO, including participation in its integrated military structure. It will also be useful to mention to him your vision of a transformed Atlantic Alliance and a strengthened CSCE. You can then suggest that these measures, rather than constraints on the sovereignty of a united Germany, are the ways to address Soviet security concerns.

De Maiziere will obviously be interested in your meetings with Gorbachev, beyond the readout you gave him in your June 4 letter. You should explain that Gorbachev seemed to agree, in principle, that the Germans have the right to choose their own Alliance arrangements, and he seemed to understand the dangers of "singularizing" Germany. Gorbachev's real concerns seemed to be not so much with German membership in NATO per se as with the broader question of the Soviet security position in Europe after unification. You can reassure De Maiziere that, as you told Gorbachev, we do not wish to isolate the USSR from the new Europe.

Finally, on our bilateral relationship with the GDR, you may want to note your interest in a more active political relationship (symbolized, of course, by this meeting) and expanded commercial and cultural contacts across the board. De Maiziere will be eager to reciprocate. Like Chancellor Kohl, he understands that our intent is not to interfere with unification or prop up a dying regime, but to strengthen our ties with a part of Germany from which we have been cut off for two generations.

One special note, however: If De Maiziere asks you to support quick completion of a trade agreement, and granting of MFN, you should be positive but noncommittal. MFN is linked to GDR settlement of long-standing claims by Jewish organizations seeking payments on behalf of Holocaust victims and survivors. The new GDR government has begun to respond positively, but the claims issues are still unsettled.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The Participants List is at Tab B.

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IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

V. SEQUENCE

Meeting in Oval Office followed by luncheon in the Old Family Dining Room.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING AND LUNCHEON
WITH PRIME MINISTER LOTHAR DE MAIZIERE

- Let me welcome you as the first GDR Prime Minister ever to have visited the U.S. or to have met with an American President and, above all, as head of the first democratically elected government in the history of the GDR.

German Unification

- I want to tell you how much I respect the historic role you have played and how much I appreciate the close cooperation you have developed with Helmut Kohl.
- It is important that you and I work together toward achieving the goal the U.S. has long shared with the German people: German unity in peace and freedom.
- We want the Germans to determine their own future. That is why we support the steps your government and Chancellor Kohl's have taken to achieve unification, and that is why we want the unified Germany to enjoy full sovereignty at the time of unification. Four Power rights should terminate at that time.
- I am glad you stayed firm, in the Two Plus Four, in refusing to separate the internal and external aspects of unification.
- 45 years after the war, there is no reason that a united, democratic Germany should be singled out for special status or subjected to any new discriminatory constraints on its sovereignty.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2008-0687-MR
SCS 5/30/13

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Germany and NATO

- I agree with our Allies that a united Germany's full membership in NATO, including its integrated military structure, is essential for European stability and security.
- Without Germany's full membership in NATO, the Alliance would be seriously, perhaps fatally, undermined as a security organization. Without a strong NATO, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain U.S. military forces in Europe.
- We think those U.S. forces, and NATO's solidarity, are reasons why Europe has enjoyed such an unprecedented period of peace. We don't want to tinker with that, or return to the days of traditional rivalry among the European powers. NATO is a totally defensive organization, with wide public support, that knits these democracies together.
- At the same time, we want NATO to change, to take on new challenges in the new Europe. I have proposed that next month's NATO Summit take steps to transform the Alliance. We would change its political role, its defense plans, and put forward a common position on the future of the CSCE.
- We want CSCE to play a stronger role in the new Europe, in helping build free societies in Eastern Europe, as well as giving those countries -- and the Soviet Union -- a strong voice in the political dialogue in a more integrated Europe.

The Soviet Union and the Two Plus Four

- I had a good discussion with President Gorbachev. There were no breakthroughs, but I think we defused some of the tension about the future of Germany.

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- He expressed his opposition to a united Germany in NATO.
- He seemed to acknowledge, however, that the Germans have the right, as stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act, to choose their own alliance arrangements. And he seemed to agree that Germany should not be "singularized."
- We will have to see, of course, whether this will mean real flexibility in the Soviet position. I did get the sense, though, that his concerns are not so much with Germany itself as with the Soviet security position in Europe after unification.
- We recognize that the Soviet Union has legitimate security concerns. We want to address them and are addressing them. I discussed with President Gorbachev my proposals for a transformed Atlantic Alliance, further negotiations on conventional and nuclear forces, and a stronger role for CSCE.
- We want Mr. Gorbachev to be assured that a united Germany in NATO -- a NATO that is changing -- is no threat to Soviet security. But we cannot allow German sovereignty or European security to be held hostage to Soviet concerns.
- That is why we think the Two Plus Four should concentrate on ending Four Power rights when Germany unites, and stay away from debates about Germany's security arrangements in NATO, including the status of foreign stationed forces in the current FRG and the size of the Bundeswehr.
- I described some of the other highlights of the Summit in my letter to you. Let me just say that we are laying the foundation of an entirely new U.S.-Soviet relationship. I

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told him I had great respect for the changes he has supported or encouraged in Central and Eastern Europe. I believe he knows that the U.S. will not exploit these changes for unilateral advantage or to undermine Soviet security.

- I would be very interested in your impressions of the Summit meeting in Moscow and your discussions with Gorbachev.

Bilateral Relations

- Finally, let me emphasize that we want to strengthen our bilateral relations across the board. We are eager to deepen our ties with a part of Germany from which we have been closed off for two generations.
- I am pleased we will be opening a new diplomatic post in Leipzig this summer.

(If trade is raised:)

- We would like to see stronger economic ties to the GDR, and expanded bilateral trade.
- A trade agreement is a good idea, and I understand you will be working out the issue of claims being made on behalf of victims of the Holocaust.

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, Secretary of State

Nicholas Brady, Secretary of Treasury

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Richard C. Barkley, Ambassador to the GDR

James Dobbins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Robert Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC Staff

Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

GDR

Lothar De Maiziere, Prime Minister

Mrs. Sylvia Schultz, Head of the Office of the Prime Minister

Dr. Fritz Holzwarth, Political Counselor to the Prime Minister

Mr. Thilo Steinbach, Director for Foreign Policy and International Security Questions in the Office of the Prime Minister

Mr. Matthias Gehler, Spokesman of the Government of the GDR

Mr. Norbert Reemer, Minister Counselor of the GDR Embassy

Joachim Keitz, Interpreter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Report	Re: Lothar de Maiziere [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	6/1/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (June 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 12/2/2016

Date Closed:	2/18/2009	OA/ID Number:	91116-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2012-1442-MR(502.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Lothar DE MAIZIERE
(Phonetic: duh mahzeeAIR)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Prime Minister (since April 1990)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

Lothar de Maiziere is East Germany's first, and probably its last, democratically elected premier. His Christian Democratic Union (CDU)—the largest of the three parties in the center-right Alliance for Germany—won a landslide victory in the March 1990 national election and leads a broad-based coalition government with the liberal League of Free Democrats and the Social Democratic Party. An attorney who earned widespread respect for his strong reformist credentials, de Maiziere had never held a high party or government post before his election to the CDU chairmanship in November 1989. Before the national election, de Maiziere had served since late November as Deputy Premier for Church Affairs in Communist Premier Hans Modrow's interim government. (b)(3)



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1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Although de Maiziere realizes that the politically and economically weaker GDR has few cards to play in unification negotiations and that he will remain dependent on the West German CDU for support, he will resist being bullied into policies he considers detrimental to vital East German interests. A lawyer who during the early 1980s became known for defending political dissidents, conscientious objectors, and the Lutheran Church, he is well acquainted with the role of advocate for the underdog. (b)(3)


Unification Issues

Under enormous public pressure to quickly improve the faltering GDR economy, de Maiziere is particularly concerned with ensuring that East Germans do not foot the full bill for unification. He strongly supported swift establishment of a German economic and monetary union that will convert East German marks to Deutschmarks for wages, salaries, pensions, and small savings deposits at a 1:1 rate. He has called for market reforms, including privatization of state-owned enterprises; implementation of EC investment regulations; and introduction of collective bargaining, worker codetermination, and job retraining programs. Despite his public commitment to market economics, de Maiziere continues to advocate interventionist policies, including rent and food subsidies and protective measures for some vulnerable industries. (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)

(cont.)
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A senior Lutheran layman with strong antimilitary, pacifist convictions, de Maiziere supports membership of a united Germany in NATO only if the Alliance abandons the doctrines of forward defense and flexible response and asserts a more political, rather than military, character. He also views German NATO membership only as a transitional step toward the dissolution of the alliances and the creation of a Pan-European security system. Sympathetic to Soviet security interests, de Maiziere recognizes that Soviet forces will remain in East Germany for at least a transitional period, and he opposes stationing NATO troops in what is now the GDR. He has also repeatedly stated that the Oder-Neisse line must be recognized as the final border between Poland and a united Germany. ^{(b)(3)}

De Maiziere's Future

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Nevertheless, de Maiziere is likely to remain eastern Germany's most prominent political figure for at least the next few years. Recognizing his local popularity, East and West German CDU politicians will want him to remain politically active long enough for the party to cement its foothold in eastern Germany. East German CDUers are probably also counting on his prominence to help keep West German leaders from dominating a united CDU organization. ^{(b)(3)}

Career and Personal Data

De Maiziere was born on 2 March 1940 into a family of French Huguenot extraction. He joined the CDU in 1956. He originally aspired to be a musician and played the viola in the East Berlin Radio Symphony Orchestra during the 1960s, but a nerve disease, which affected his left arm, ended his musical career. De Maiziere began studying law by correspondence from Humboldt University in East Berlin in 1969 and earned his degree in 1975. Long active in church affairs, he became a member of the Federal Evangelical Synod, the East German Lutheran Church's highest governing body, in 1985 and was elected its vice president a year later. He became vice president of the GDR Lawyers Association in 1987. De Maiziere resigned his positions in the Synod and the Lawyers Association after his election to the CDU chairmanship. ^{(b)(3)}

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

He does not speak English. De Maiziere is the nephew of Gen. Ulrich de Maiziere, once Inspector General of the West German Armed Forces. He enjoys classical music and continues to play the viola. ^{(b)(3)}
 He and his wife, Ilse, have three daughters. ^{(b)(3)}

1 June 1990

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4546

June 8, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT HUTCHINGS/PHILIP ZELIKOW *PH*
SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Prime Minister
De Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic,
on Monday, June 11

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum for the President on his meeting and luncheon with Prime Minister De Maiziere on Monday, June 11 from 11:30am until 1:15pm in the Oval Office and Residence.

Secretary Brady would like to participate in this meeting. Since financial or economic issues are not expected to play an important part in the discussion, we have not included him in our list of participants at Tab B. If Secretary Brady is included, one of the U.S. or GDR participants will need to be stricken, or the meeting will need to be moved to the Cabinet Room.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By 31 NARA, Date 12/17/09

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004697
RECEIVED: 12 JUN 90 09

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: HUTCHINGS

DOC DATE: 12 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY D R
GERMAN UNIFICATION
CSCE

EUROPE EAST
USSR
MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR PRES MTG W/ PM DE MZAIZIERE

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/18/09

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [Signature]

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[Signature]
Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmannh

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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4697

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 14, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: The President's Meetings with Prime Minister
Lothar de Maiziere of the German Democratic
Republic

At Tabs I and II are the memoranda of conversations for the President's June 11, 1990, meetings with Prime Minister de Maiziere.

RECOMMENDATION

That the memoranda of conversations at Tabs I and II be filed for the record.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Meeting
with de Maiziere in the Cabinet Room on June 11, 1990

Tab II Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Lunch
with de Maiziere on June 11, 1990

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By *ji* NARA, Date *12/17/09*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Lothar de
Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
Richard C. Barkley, Ambassador to the GDR
James Dobbins, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director for European
Political Affairs, NSC Staff
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Lothar de Maiziere, Prime Minister
Sylvia Schultz, Head of the Office of
the Prime Minister
Fritz Holzwarth, Political Counselor to
the Prime Minister
Thilo Steinbach, Director for Foreign
Policy, Office of the Prime Minister
Matthias Gehler, Government Spokesman
Norbert Reemer, Minister Counselor of the
Embassy of the GDR to the U.S.
Joachim Keitz, Interpreter

DATE, TIME June 11, 1990, 11:36 a.m. - 12:08 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room (U)

The President: Let me welcome you all to the White House. The Prime Minister was just saying that this meeting is an historic first. We feel the same way, and we couldn't be more pleased that you are here. Our plan is to meet here until noon and then have an informal luncheon. I want to say how much I respect the historic role you have played, Mr. Prime Minister, and how much I appreciate the close cooperation you have developed with the Federal Chancellor. I would also add that is important that you and I work together to achieve the goal of German unity in peace and freedom. (U)

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Prime Minister de Maiziere: Mr. President, it is a great privilege to be here in the White House, where so many European personages in history have come. It is a great day for us. If we think back one year, no one would have dreamt of any of this. Only Herr Reemer has been here before. The rest of us are all newcomers, but we have been given a clearcut and unambiguous mission by our people -- as you said, German unification in peace and German unification in a unifying Europe. Those of us who have lived in Communism for 40 years should also take our brothers and sisters into the new Europe. This is particularly essential to achieving our goal. (U)

Let me express my profound gratitude to you for your letter, which I received one day after your meetings, briefing me on your meetings with President Gorbachev. It was very useful to me for our meetings in Moscow of the members of the Warsaw Pact. I am ready to brief you, if that would be useful. We made it crystal clear in Moscow that all six wanted change -- not revitalization of the military aspects but a strengthening of the political dimension. Developments in the Warsaw Pact could take us in the direction that the Pact won't survive very long. The Hungarian and Czechoslovak representatives especially said that following a transitional period, they don't want this alliance. Afterwards, it will be necessary to establish new structures, because singularization and marginalization of individual countries would make them become more attached once again to this "flagship," so to say. Therefore it is important for Western Europe to open to Eastern Europe at all levels -- economically, through the EC, and also building common security structures. All participants in the Moscow summit favored the CSCE process -- not in a way that CSCE should replace efforts at European unification made so far, but as a kind of umbrella. All made it clear that socialism as it has existed has failed and is now on the road to complete downfall. It has failed economically and as a method of administration, and its values have proved not bearable. This means defeat: all of see that very clearly. But there is a danger of portraying this as a defeat for the other side. (S)

The President: That's a good point. (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: 40 years of socialism has also changed the people. Defeat means a certain loss in life for many people. We need to recover our own souls and let them catch up. I believe the subtle and cautious policies pursued by the U.S. and especially by you, Mr. President, clearly led toward a new partnership. (S)

The President: Let me make a few comments on what you have said. We made very clear to President Gorbachev that singularization, singling our for special status, of a united Germany would be very bad. I believe he understands -- maybe you have insights into this -- that a united Germany has earned its place and that we shouldn't write the past into the present. I told Gorbachev that we were sensitive to their concerns but that a united Germany is no threat to them and that a united Germany in NATO would be stabilizing. He agrees, by the way, that the U.S. role

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in Europe is stabilizing. So we don't want singularization. Second, we agree that new structures should be developed. We believe that NATO with a broader role would strengthen security and also help in other ways. I told President Mitterrand, for example, that it had a role to play in verification and stabilization measures. I don't know if Gorbachev agreed, but he sat where you are sitting, and I told him that a united Germany should be in NATO but that Germany should decide. I thought he agreed, but then he said a few words to his foreign minister and pulled back. We see utility for CSCE. It is unwieldy, but it provides a home for a lot of countries, including the U.S. (S)

Let me refer to one thing you said. I agree we shouldn't talk of winners and losers. Everyone has a level of pride; this applies to Gorbachev and the Soviet people. I tried to convince them of the reality that a united Germany in NATO would not be a threat to their security, that we could go forward from there. A lot of what he wants is economic. But we've got to keep working to convince him. (S)

I made a point to him that NATO is a defensive organization which has wide public support. I mentioned new challenges that it should take on. We will have a NATO Summit in early July, and we will be talking about steps to transform the Alliance. We have talked about a new political role and a changed threat. Out of that we want to develop a common position on CSCE. As we do, we hope it will be of some comfort to the other side, so they will not be suspicious of our intentions. I mentioned we believe the CSCE has a role to play in helping the countries of central and eastern Europe build free societies and giving the Soviets and the East Europeans a role in the new Europe. (S)

Let me, with your permission, mention the Two Plus Four process. We don't believe it should have a broader role, or try to solve everything connected with the "German Question." These are just some observations. I am fascinated with the meetings you had in Moscow, and I understand your point that we should not talk about victory and defeat, especially with a Soviet Union that is trying to reform. We will conduct ourselves accordingly. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Let me briefly comment. In the plenary at the Warsaw Pact Summit, Gorbachev said his assumption was that stability in Europe could come only with a U.S. presence. But he also said the stability and the balance of forces had to be defined, and that stability and balance were not only a matter of counting missiles. In addition to our public and plenary meetings, I had a private talk with Gorbachev. I felt he still assumes that the Soviet nationalities and peoples will have trouble accepting full German membership in NATO unless certain elements are added. For example, he has talked about a treaty for the continuing presence of Soviet troops in the GDR. (S)

Secretary Baker: Did he have in mind a treaty between the two pacts or between Germany and the Soviet Union? (S)

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Prime Minister de Maiziere: He appeared to prefer a treaty between the two pacts, but his suggestions were a bit vague. But if a solution were hammered out, I would propose a treaty, because the unification of Germany should be accompanied by the end of allied rights. We should have a new legal basis, rather than one as a result of the Second World War. So this would strengthen our position and help the Soviet Union retain its position as a big power, a great power. He said he would leave it to German imagination to work out. (S)

The President: Let me return to this to be sure I understand. I understand there was a GDR paper. Our view is that the Two Plus Four should terminate these Four Power rights. The Two Plus Four ought not to decide alliances or other security relations, which have a bearing on other states, including the NATO allies. A settlement shouldn't address these issues, because of the danger of singularization. I don't know whether you agree. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I consider the situation in a very similar way as you, Mr. President, but I can see a problem. If German unification is of importance to other countries, we should be able to play a certain bridge function. NATO has a kind of enemy stereotype, not only for politicians but also for publics. A change in NATO, as you said in your nine-point proposal, which we read with the greatest interest.... If NATO remained as it is now but changed its name, that would not be a serious proposal. Anxiety has been signalled to us by the Poles, Czechs, etc. So a gesture should be made by NATO to address those deeply rooted fears and anxieties. I also feel, like you, that Two Plus Four should result in the abrogation of Four Power rights and that alliance relations should be decided by European states on the basis of sovereignty. That is not the view of President Gorbachev. He would like a move-for-move deal. I don't have a model in my mind. (S)

The President: I believe we can allay some Soviet fears by stressing Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the political side. The idea of a name change is not ridiculous at all. We had a discussion about that just recently. I believe we can do our best to reassure the Soviet Union and others in the Warsaw Pact to show that we are not a great threat, no threat at all, to democratic Poland, Hungary, and so on. (S)

Secretary Baker: I want to ask what Gorbachev meant by "move-for-move." Was he referring to levels of forces in central Europe or something more? (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: He was talking about troop strength, but first of all, he is looking for a recipe to bring a message to his own people and his own military. If he abandons rights, he would like to assure them he is getting something in return as regards the Soviet place in Europe. For all the Soviet Union's economic problems, economic assistance alone will not be sufficient to pacify his population. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4697

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Richard C. Barkley, Ambassador to the GDR
James Dobbins, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC Staff
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Lothar de Maiziere, Prime Minister
Sylvia Schultz, Head of the Office of the Prime Minister
Fritz Holzwarth, Political Counselor to the Prime Minister
Thilo Steinbach, Director for Foreign Policy, Office of the Prime Minister
Matthias Gehler, Government Spokesman
Norbert Reemer, Minister Counselor of the Embassy of the GDR to the U.S.
Joachim Keitz, Interpreter

DATE, TIME June 11, 1990, 12:20 - 1:03 p.m.
AND PLACE: Old Family Dining Room (U)

The President: Did you give a speech in New York or were you just there on a visit? (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I was visiting. I have an appointment with the UN Secretary General tomorrow. (U)

The President: He is a good man. We like him. (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Tonight I will give a lecture at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. (U)

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The President: You mentioned your meeting in Moscow with other leaders of Eastern Europe. There are differences, though. Hungary seems to want to move away sooner. (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Our joint declaration was the lowest common denominator. Hungary would like to quit the Warsaw Pact very soon. The same goes for Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria is different; it has a number of motivations. The Poles think of German unification in terms of their own security. (Ø)

The President: Are they still worried? I thought they understood that a unified would recognize the border. (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I don't think policy-makers are so concerned, but they have to take into consideration the general public. It is a question of the best approach. The Poles favor a bilateral treaty, which would be initialed now and signed later. (Ø)

The President: Are you comfortable with your formulation on that point -- that the two German parliaments and Governments issue a declaration now, and then sign a treaty later? (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I cannot see the unambiguous pluses or minuses of either procedure. The outcome will be identical. The difference is related to the mass media. I would like an approach that could eliminate differences. (Ø)

The President: I thought the Poles had been reassured. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: They still would like to move faster than the Chancellor would. There are issues besides the border issue. There is also Article 116. (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: This is a decisive problem. The Poles have a right to secure borders, but they do not have the right to determine the Constitution of a united Germany. There is Article 116, which says that those who were at one time German citizens have the right to claim German citizenship. The Poles fear that Germans living there have not only a claim to citizenship but also to certain territory. Something can be done, because Article 23 of the Federal Constitution, covering this possibility, will be deleted after unification. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: The Poles have the additional concern that they fear all those eligible will claim German citizenship because of the better pension benefits. (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I feel they are also not secure about their eastern border. When they talk about western border, they mean all borders. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Mr. President, the next meeting of the Two Plus Four will be in Berlin. Then we will meet in Paris in July, and the Poles will attend. (Ø)

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The President: May I make a comment on "parallelism"? We think it would be bad, when discussing troop limits, to draw a parallel between U.S. troops and Soviet troops. If ours are not wanted, they will be out. The difference is that theirs are not wanted. We have to make sure this issue doesn't come up of equating our troops with theirs. It worries me that Gorbachev, not wanting to be seen in defeat, might call for equal cuts in U.S. and Soviet forces. If you believe stability is best kept by U.S. troops remaining, I hope you can help. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Gorbachev made us understand that he continues to base his calculations on some form of parallelism. He agrees that U.S. troops are important for the security of Europe as a whole, but he says why shouldn't it be the same way for Soviet troops! (S)

The President: The answer is that they're not wanted, but we must be careful telling him that. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: The Soviet troop presence is highly differentiated. In Hungary they are a result of Stalinism, but in the GDR it is on the basis of World War II. Gorbachev stressed this. He also mentioned tremendous unemployment in the USSR. They are having problems with troops withdrawn from Afghanistan, and on top of this they face withdrawals from the GDR. (S)

Secretary Baker: Mr. President, may I pick up on what you said in the Cabinet Room concerning Two Plus Four? We think it very important as a matter of German sovereignty to refer political-military issues to the proper fora. For example, force levels in central Europe should be referred to Vienna. A security role for CSCE should be referred to the CSCE process. When we come to Berlin in a week and a half, I hope we can convince your Government to get unification done and then get to these other issues in the appropriate fora. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: There is no need to convince me! (S)

Secretary Baker: We are working on your foreign minister through you. (S)

The President: I'll work on mine if you'll work on yours. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: At the Moscow talks, the main reason given for maintaining the political structure of the Warsaw Pact was that it has a mandate at Vienna as negotiator. For example, should the Hungarians leave the Pact, who would be their negotiator? In future negotiations, CSCE should be added. A Warsaw Pact committee was appointed to revise the treaty. The word revise is very important: it includes everything from the continuing existence of the Pact to the possibility of leaving. Hungary made it clear that it should take effect by January 1991 and that by 1992 at the latest, Hungary would no longer be a member. We raised the question of what the new structure should

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be later. Warsaw Pact members should be integrated into an all-European solution. (S)

Secretary Baker: Mr. Prime Minister, are you supportive of the suggestion your foreign minister made in Copenhagen that a special zone should be created in central Europe? (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I never support plans or programs of which I am informed through the press. (S)

The President: Another question: how did you find Gorbachev? Was he confident? After his very successful visit, he went back to face problems like Yeltsin's comments. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I had the impression that he viewed the Summit as very successful. He said it marked the transition from confrontation to partnership. In this context, he gave us a quite optimistic view, but that doesn't change his domestic problems. Hundreds of thousands are leaving the Party, which is fragmenting into particular groups. The Party Congress in early July will be very important, because there is no integrative structure in the Soviet Union except the Party. There is no Church, as in Poland. The Soviet Union has no experience with multiparty democracy. He fears this might collapse. And there is also the economy. (S)

The President: Have you met Yeltsin? (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: No. I have the impression he is pursuing a Greater Russian line. (S)

The President: It will be interesting to see how he handles the federation meeting. On Lithuania, Gorbachev talked about the right to secede but also about his obligation to uphold the Constitution. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: It will be important to create a new kind of liberal federation, because too early a dispersal would add to his difficulties. There are the exaggerated centralistic structures of the past that pose a problem. A balancing of interests is essential. (S)

Secretary Baker: Can you share with us your timetable for unification and all-German elections? (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: We must reach an agreement with our coalition partners. After the Economic and Monetary Union takes effect, we will discuss it. The Social Democratic Party is thinking of a longer period. A two thirds majority in parliament is required, because this means changing the Constitution. However, we feel the timing should not be determined by wishes but by objective criteria. There will be an additional, complicated discussion on the State Treaty about the conditions under which the various States of the GDR can accede through Article 23. We also need good results of the Two Plus Four. An early announcement of a deadline might bring pressure to bear on

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the negotiations when pressure is not the best means. (S)

Secretary Baker: Is there a possibility of all-German elections before 1 February? (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I wouldn't rule it out. (U)

The President: Are the people enthusiastic? (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: There are differences. Some want it tomorrow, others would prefer more time. After the past six months, we no longer dare to indulge in prognostication. (U)

The President: Do you have other meetings this afternoon with our officials? (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: We will meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as with trade and industry leaders. I will also give a talk at Georgetown tonight and will visit the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. (S)

Secretary Baker: Are you suffering from jet lag? (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I was warned beforehand, but I didn't feel anything. (U)

The President: May I suggest that we have our coffee in the other room and have eight minutes of music to relax, because we have a distinguished musician in our midst. (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Thank you very much. This is really a treat. Last night I met Mr. Perlman. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HUTCHINGS
BLACKWILL

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 28 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
ANSA

NATO

PERSONS: LANXADE, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MTG W/ ADM LANXADE ON 29 JUN RE NATO

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 02 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/18/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: LMS

LOG # 5232

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Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
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West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>54.6/30</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
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90 JUN 28 P 8: 53
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A = Action	<u>I</u> = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 28, 1990

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Admiral Lanxade, June 29, 1990

We have not yet received the promised long reply from Mitterrand to the President's message and draft declaration. We will send you an assessment as soon as we have received and reviewed the French position.

Your meeting with Lanxade (who will be accompanied by Andreani) will be an important eleventh-hour opportunity to push our conviction that NATO must change in important ways to retain its relevance and public acceptance. There is a contradiction in French thinking about NATO which Mitterrand and the MOD increasingly recognize but which the Quai does not: on the one hand, the belief that a united Germany will face growing public pressures for withdrawal from NATO, and on the other, resistance to any fundamental change in the way NATO does business. This latter view is conditioned, in part, by the beliefs (a) that NATO will remain at base an American enterprise and hence not fully compatible with French aspirations to European leadership and (b) that Congressional and public pressures here will lead inevitably to a U.S. retreat from Europe, regardless of the words and deeds of this Administration.

You can help shift French thinking by stressing that NATO can and must change -- precisely to fend off those domestic pressures in Germany. And it is this same process of transforming NATO that will help the President fend off public pressures here -- which the French need to understand can be done -- and set in place policies that will be sustainable into the next century. Finally, this transformation will also address French concerns about the specific gravity of U.S. influence at NATO -- particularly if France joins actively in the process.

Although Lanxade privately has expressed much the same view as ours about NATO, in his meeting with you he will faithfully mirror Mitterrand's position. We do not know precisely what that position will be, but we have heard that Mitterrand objects to the President's approach on at least two grounds.

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First, the French feel that we and the Germans are overly preoccupied with Soviet security concerns and hence too eager to meet them. Here you could rehearse the discussions the President had with Gorbachev, who made it plain that Soviet acceptance of a united Germany in NATO will hinge in part on Moscow's perception of its security position in Europe after unification. To the extent we can meet legitimate Soviet concerns, we have a better chance of managing the unification process through to a successful conclusion. You should also note that many of our initiatives are aimed not at Moscow but at the new democracies in central and eastern Europe, who are looking for answers to their security dilemmas.

Second, we understand that Mitterrand objects to the idea of a multinational corps, which of course would expose the French as the only ones not participating. Should Lanxade broach the topic, we suggest that you note that France, through the Franco-German brigade, is also pursuing a multinational option, which we support. The President has suggested another multinational option, which would be a basis for American forces to stay in Germany. Through both these options, we would wind up with a goal we and France share -- having French and American forces stationed in a united Germany.

In a recent conversation, Lanxade expressed the hope that the U.S. would not compel France to respond at the London Summit to appeals for France to reintegrate itself in the NATO command structure. It would be helpful for you to repeat what the President wrote in his letter to Mitterrand: that he is sensitive to France's special role within the Alliance and yet also hopes that France will contribute to the review of Alliance military strategy. Paragraph 17 of the draft Declaration was drafted so that France can take part in this review in whatever manner it considers appropriate. We hope that Lanxade will give some indication of how the French plan to play.

Attachment
Tab I Lanxade Biography

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	1/3/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (June 1990)

Date Closed: 2/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 91116-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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4741

June 14, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*

Interesting
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Natl Sec Advisor
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SUBJECT: French Views on NATO

I was in Paris last week to take part in an NDU-CREST conference on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but I also had the opportunity to talk to a few interesting local folks on current NATO issues. Thierry de Montbrial spoke at a dinner I went to. I had lunch with Marc de Brichambaut, who is roughly Chevenement's Wolfowitz at the MOD. I had breakfast with Jean-Louis Gergorin.

Thierry's was a rather cynical performance. He criticized Americans for being too "sentimental:" We were asking the Europeans to ask us to stay. He blurted out: "We will not ask you to stay." He agreed that Western strategy for the foreseeable future should focus on "European construction" and the Atlantic Alliance, together. But his enthusiasm seemed under control.

De Brichambaut and Gergorin were much more constructive. Bob Ellsworth had seen them both recently and had asked them what French officials had in mind these days when they told Americans that NATO had to be "restructured." Was this a polite brushoff, or were there some French ideas? (Ellsworth wrote you recently passing on the answers he got, at Tab I).

First of all, de Brichambaut told me, it meant changes in Alliance military strategy in light of the revolution in the East. He hoped for close UK-French bilateral consultation on these issues, because (of course) of the awkwardness (to the French) of the NATO forums.

Second, however, he endorsed the idea (which he had mentioned to Ellsworth) of an EC caucus in the NAC, provided the EC came around to such an idea.

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Beyond this, of a more practical nature, was his indication that France is now prepared to reach more public arrangements with NATO in the logistical area on the things it now does quietly.

Gergorin endorsed these ideas. He suggested a joint U.S.-French task force, perhaps composed of outsiders as well as insiders, to review all these ideas. ~~General~~ ^{Admiral} Lanxade was the key figure on the French side.

Gergorin also commented that the idea of a multinational corps in NATO was laughable. It reminded everyone of the MLF embarrassment of the mid-60's. (Chevenement has already criticized it publicly as unworkable.)

As you know from my earlier paper in March (Tab II), and the discussion we had at a beer and pretzel session, I see merit in coopting the French if at all possible.

NATO has to adapt to both revolutions -- the one in Western Europe as well as the one in Eastern Europe. The revolution in Eastern Europe threatens to undermine public support for defense and for NATO; the revolution in Western Europe -- if we could harness it to NATO -- could be NATO's salvation and an important way to make it "relevant" to the changes in Europe. An EC caucus in the NAC would reflect the big change since 1949 that there is now a European pillar, at least politically.

A "constitutional" restructuring of the Alliance that made NATO more acceptable in French eyes would be a coup for the West and for the President. Such a shift in French policy would also have its healthy impact in Germany. The French can sometimes be difficult on security issues, but when they're good they're very good... I think they can be coopted, and I think you should pursue this with Lanxade.

BK for

Concurrence/Comment by: Bob Blackwill, Arnie Kanter

*Best move
would it
work?*

Attachments

Tab I Ellsworth Letter dated
May 23, 1990
Tab II Memorandum dated May 26, 1990

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ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
2001 L STREET, N.W., SUITE 801
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
202/628-1144

May 23, 1990

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent,

In Paris on Monday and yesterday, I took the opportunity (inspired partly by our mutual friend Peter Rodman) to visit with a couple of my friends who are French Mandarins, if that captures the cultural tone. De Brichambaut is in the MOD and Gergorin is in industry, but remains a darling of the French political class.

I asked them if they thought there were some way to get beyond the French telling us they would come back into a "New NATO" and we saying, What about a French SACEUR?

It seems that several papers are being written on this sort of issue. De Brichambaut is writing one for his boss and several people are writing papers in the Quai. In addition, President Mitterand is said to be thinking hard about these things, especially since his Key Largo meeting with President Bush.

There are essentially two alternative lines of thought being set forth in some of the papers.

One is called the Dark, or Realistic, alternative and it goes like this. The new Germany will be bigger, more eastern, more German and more neutralist than the FRG -- and much less responsive to American influence. The likelihood is that Germany will soon be nuclear-weapon-free, with very limited foreign or even German military forces: in effect a free floating, happy giant.

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
May 23, 1990
Page 2

But after five years, when Germany wakes up to the Russians, watch out. Already there have been a few mistakes made in arms control negotiations, going back at least to the INF outcome.

If American influence in Germany will be modest, French influence will be even less, and France should do nothing that would tend to get it entangled in any further arms control negotiations, especially nuclear negotiations -- or that would tend to make France responsible for German errors.

As for French -- and European -- security architecture, Paris should use a somewhat enhanced WEU, plus substantially enhanced bi-lateral relations with the U.S. and the U.K., always keeping everything open for Germany but avoiding the risks of entanglement.

The alternative line of thought is called Constrictive Commitment, and would involve getting more deeply engaged in a modified NATO. (But with the clear understanding that Paris would retain its autonomy of decision-making on the possible use of its nuclear forces just as we always have.) There would be a much larger political role for the NATO Council through the development of an EC caucus, on the model of the EC caucus in the UNGA. Militarily, the SACEUR should be a U.S. officer but -- in light of the probable diminution of the U.S. nuclear presence in Germany -- the SACEUR's role would probably be somewhat diminished. There would be, however, a broad and active coordination among European and U.S. Chiefs of Staff, perhaps using the institution of SHAPE. If the NPG begins to lose its steam (thought to be the case already), there should be closer consultation among U.S., British and French nuclear planners. Everything should be open to the Germans.

On the best way to proceed, it is clear that Mitterand is thought to be too reactive a politician ever to put forward anything along these lines. If the U.S. wants to put forward a new proposal, though, Mitterand could be enlisted as a strong supporter if such proposal were explained to him well ahead of its being made public. He would be greatly flattered, for example, if

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
May 23, 1990
Page 3

President Bush called him and said he was sending a high-level emissary over to Paris to consult, on President Bush's behalf, on a new proposal for NATO. (It would be a nice touch, though not essential, if such emissary were to be fluent in French.)

The NATO Summit (in early July?) could issue a mandate to the NATO Perm Reps to work out the details in time for a NATO Revision Summit in December or January.

Hope this may be helpful to you, Brent. Keep up the good work. Your exquisitely good judgment, and that of President Bush, and the sound instincts of both of you, are serving all of us with excellent results.

As ever,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'B. Scowcroft', written in a cursive style.

bcc: Mr. Peter W. Rodman

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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March 26, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *pmr*

SUBJECT: NATO as a "Political" Organization

*Provocative
we need a
beer & pretzel
session on this.*

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Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

The notion that NATO should evolve into a "political" rather than "military" organization is a cliché of the current period. It is either a truism (since the military confrontation is indeed easing) or else escapism, since it implies an aversion to addressing continuing needs of security. Facile repetition of the cliché only encourages Europeans to put NATO way down on their list below a number of other institutions doing Europe's "political" business (EC, CSCE, Council of Europe, EBRD), most of which have the appeal of having their center of gravity in Europe itself.

NATO's center of gravity, of course, is not in Europe but somewhere in the Atlantic. This, I believe, is the deeper problem. Even for Europeans who take security seriously (especially the French), the problem is less an aversion to the link with the United States than aversion to the American structural preponderance within the Alliance. In its organization and procedures, it continues to reflect "America plus all the rest" rather than the more equal partnership of "America plus Europe" that 20 years of European integration would logically and politically warrant. Gimmicks such as forming a NATO verification staff or pushing NATO toward out-of-area discussions thus miss the point. NATO, in my view, will simply not hack it as a "political" organization in the new era unless its own arrangements are better adapted to reflect the real new transatlantic balance.

Today's new uncertainties about NATO's future, therefore, warrant a fresh look at building a "European pillar" within the Alliance, as indeed the President foresaw in his BU speech.

"Dumbbellism" and Its Difficulties

The long-standing objections and obstacles to "dumbbellism" have not disappeared; nor is it an accident that European integration has not advanced very far in the defense field. There is the

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concern that it would weaken the American link as well as the grip on Germany. There is the desire of smaller countries (Italy, Benelux) not to be dominated by their European neighbors. There are the German and British desires to preserve their special bilateral links to us. Today, moreover, the receding of the Soviet threat may sap any new defense exertions such as a European enterprise in this area.

But there is another possibility. SDI and then Reykjavik spurred serious Europeans to expand their own cooperation. The French push to revive the Western European Union; expanded French-German cooperation; an informal "cabal" (for a time) of the French, British, and Germans; new elaborations of French strategic doctrine -- all reflected a new felt need to assert more influence over defense decisions as well as to respond to new uncertainties about extended deterrence. The key question now is whether more recent events -- CFE and the perception of the beginning of U.S. troop withdrawal; the yearning to seize more control over Europe's unfolding destiny; the greater plausibility of Western Europe as a strategic power in light of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and weakening of the Soviet Union (on top of START and British/French nuclear modernization) -- might not give fresh impetus to European security cooperation.

The value of a European pillar would be manifold, both as a hedge against worst-case outcomes and as a new concept for the Alliance in new conditions. For one thing, it is in the strategic interest of the West as a whole to ensure that, if there is an American pull-back from Europe, the West Europeans fill the vacuum -- and in present circumstances this is easier for them to accomplish by strengthening cohesion than by increasing forces. But the immediate benefit to the Alliance would be that "Europeanizing" our allies' defense effort may be the only way to sustain public support for it in a new age of seductive calls for a "European peace order."

The Institutional Confusion

Another obstacle to a European pillar is Europe's institutional confusion -- the lack of "interoperability" among NATO, the EC, and the WEU:

- The EC is strengthening its political cooperation but may be distracted and diluted after 1992 by the task of absorbing the East Europeans. This being said, the EC remains the West European institution with the most political impetus.
- The WEU has at present little more than symbolic significance. Yet, the French had hopes for it as a system parallel to the EC.

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- The proliferation of bilateral and trilateral relations among Europeans (French-German; French-Spanish-Italian in the Western Med; possible UK-French) may complicate the matter further -- or else seem to obviate the need for a wider institution.
- NATO's Eurogroup could perhaps become the nucleus of a European entity within the Alliance, though it may never overcome its Uncle Tom image.

Ad hoc arrangements may sometimes work, such as the WEU's Persian Gulf activity in parallel with us a few years ago. But I fear that the present situation -- in particular, our desire to preserve NATO -- calls for something more durable.

Where to Go?

Personally, I suspect there will be a renewed effort within Europe to construct new arrangements in the defense field, in parallel with EC-92. The French will want new ways to harness the Germans; the British, if they're smart, will want the same -- and this should cause less heartburn in Number 10 than social charters and monetary unions. Already, Bundeswehr planners are reportedly expressing interest in strengthening French-German cooperation, as a response to expectations of U.S. troop reductions.

If the foregoing analysis makes sense, then the first requirement for us is a declaratory policy that endorses European defense cooperation -- as we have done in the recent past, but now keyed to today's new conditions. We should talk up our willingness to consider a "constitutional" shift within the Alliance, to reflect the new transatlantic balance, to harness the new positive force of West European unity, and to give Western defense solidarity a firmer popular basis in Europe.

Second, if some of the smaller European countries come to us pleading for continued American leadership, we should mobilize them to plead that case in European circles. Serious Europeans who care about both defense and the European identity (e., the French) know full well that no rational European defense system is possible without the intimate link with the U.S. that the Alliance will continue to provide. The 1987 Platform of the WEU, in fact, states the point eloquently.

Third, we should encourage the West Europeans to sort out their institutional confusion. Perhaps the WEU can serve a "bridging" function between the EC and NATO, acting as the defense caucus within the EC and as the European caucus within the Alliance.

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This would require a constitutional change in the EC as well as in NATO, but we shouldn't shy away from suggesting it if it's a logical solution.

Fourth, we should use CFE to help us shape such a pattern of allied consultation. NATO is right now proving its worth as the most logical and natural forum for our collective CFE deliberations. But, so far, these have followed the traditional pattern of the U.S. vetting its initiatives. As CFE shifts from U.S. and Soviet cuts to broader issues of national and stationed forces, there will be less room for U.S. unilateralism and more need for a more equal -- and better institutionalized -- U.S.-European give-and-take. The WEU could help the Europeans shape their own policies, within the Alliance framework. If we are creative, we can establish a new pattern of collaboration that has broader, and lasting, political significance.

Fifth, as this develops, the day may finally dawn for Henry's pet idea of a European SACEUR, in partnership with CINCEUR, to reflect co-management of the defense of Europe. Or perhaps a European CINC of all European forces in the Alliance.

Sixth, the WEU could perhaps throw some kind of umbrella over the East Europeans, solving the riddle of what to do with the Warsaw Pact orphans now looking for a home. (This, of course, is an issue in itself. I think NATO should articulate some general principle that Soviet reintervention in "neutral" Eastern Europe would constitute a threat to the West. But the WEU could work directly with East Europeans on other aspects of their self-defense.)

Many of the above ideas will make us nervous, as they amount to a dilution of American control over Alliance policy. My thesis, however, is that this is already happening. Either we will see a further enervation of NATO, accompanied by further European escapism about security, or we will see some form of institutionalizing -- within the Alliance -- the new transatlantic balance that already exists. Serious Americans and serious Europeans should move fast and think boldly, or else NATO, the WEU, and all serious Western defense efforts could fall victim to the seductive silliness of the "European peace order."

We have been lucky so far (i.e., the GDR election). But the centrifugal forces in the West will grow stronger -- what with

The WEU could also coordinate European efforts in CFE verification (as well as out-of-area efforts like the Gulf). It is probably a more acceptable candidate for these tasks than NATO itself.

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trade squabbles, burdensharing debates, Soviet blandishments, and every country's hunger for a peace dividend. One of the most powerful forces at work now is Western Europe's growing sense of control over its own destiny. We must harness this before it runs away from us.

Comment by: Bob Blackwill and Arnie Kanter *plm for* They disagree with parts of the analysis herein and several of the conclusions.

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NSC/S PROFILE

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RECORD ID: 9004741
RECEIVED: 13 JUN 90 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RODMAN

DOC DATE: 14 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON NATO

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 16 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RODMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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NSC CHRON
RODMAN

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/18/90

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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Encl. Views on NATO
National Security Council
The White House

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Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>W</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>N</u>

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COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 14

To: Bob Gates

From: Peter Rodman

This is what

Adrian Basora referred
to at yesterday's
staff meeting.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Jun-1990 12:18 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Adrian A. Basora
(BASORA)

SUBJECT:

Visit by Admiral Lanxade

Please pass to General Scowcroft:

There has been informal discussion of a possible visit to Washington by Admiral Lanxade before the NATO Summit in order to coordinate U.S. and French positions as closely as possible in advance. Given his growing influence with Mitterrand, and his relatively positive attitudes towards NATO and towards the U.S., we believe such a visit could prove very useful. Attali's upcoming visit is not a substitute.

Although much of the discussion with Lanxade can be handled by Bob Blackwill, he should also have a meeting with you. Given the schedule of our NATO Summit preparations, the week of June 25 would be the best time for him to come. If you agree, we will informally propose to him that he come to Washington that week and set up a meeting with you via Florence.

Bob Blackwill concurs.

Approve

Disapprove

CC: Robert Blackwill
CC: Philip Zelikow
CC: Mary Kay Stults

(BLACKWILL)
(ZELIKOW)
(STULTS)

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2009-0661-MR
mm 2/5/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

05-Apr-1990 08:11 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Adrian A. Basora
(BASORA)

SUBJECT:

Views of Admiral Lanxade

Please pass to General Scowcroft for his 14:00 meeting with Vice Admiral Lanxade:

During a dinner/discussion that Bob Blackwill and I attended with the Admiral last night, he lived up to his advance reviews as a very thoughtful, clear-sighted man whose strategic goals match ours closely. As with many top French military officers:

- He is very comfortable with Americans.
- He understands the need for, and strongly desires, a continued U.S. military presence in Europe (but seems at least half convinced that, in practice, U.S. troops may be totally withdrawn very rapidly).
- He understands the importance of NATO in this regard, and does not appear to have the instinctive animosity towards NATO that is so deeply ingrained in most Quai D'Orsay diplomats.
- He is quite frank and straightforward.

I suggest you stress that we are determined to maintain a militarily significant level of U.S. forces in Europe over the long term and that the U.S. public will support this; that France must support NATO's political role in Europe; and that CSCE cannot replace NATO as the West's principal political forum for discussion of East-West issues.

In addition to his comments in the group discussion, Lanxade told us in private that he felt the Elysee-NSC relationship was not what it ought to be. He said the following: ^{1.4(d)}

recent French-U.S. frictions are based largely on differences between the State Department and the Quai D'Orsay, not differences in the thinking of our two

Presidents; it is important that the Key Largo agenda be focussed on the key strategic issues, and not on peripherals or on minor points of difference.

I asked Lanxade if he wanted to raise these issues with you. He said yes, and we agreed that it might be better that he not be accompanied so as to be entirely free to speak frankly. As you agreed with Bob, I will serve as interpreter. (He understands English well, but is more comfortable speaking in French.)

Bob Blackwill concurs.

CC: Robert Blackwill
CC: Mary Kay Stults
CC: Philip Zelikow

(BLACKWILL)
(STULTS)
(ZELIKOW)