

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91116
Folder ID Number: 91116-006

Folder Title:
German Unification (April - May 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Cable	White House to Elysee Palace Re: Message to President Francois Mitterrand from President Bush (7 pp.)	4/17/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Message	Re: Message to President Francois Mitterrand from President Bush (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	4/16/90	(b)(1)	S
01d. Memo	Adrian Basora/Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Letter to Mitterrand (1 pp.)	4/16/90	(b)(1)	S
01e. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport (3 pp.)	4/5/90	(b)(1)	S
01f. Cable	To White House Situation Room (3 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum for the President on the One Plus Three Officials Level Meeting (1 pp.)	4/18/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Officials-Level Meeting of the 'One Plus Three' on German Unification (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (April - May 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap979
OA/ID Number: 91116-006
Date Closed: 2/18/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02c. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum for the President on the One Plus Three Officials Level Meeting (1 pp.)	4/12/90	(b)(1)	S
02d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Officials-Level Meeting of the 'One Plus Three' on German Unification (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	4/28/90	(b)(1)	C
03b. Letter	Prime Minister Lothar De Maiziere to President Bush (2 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9002614
RECEIVED: 04 APR 90 11

TO: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 17 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
NATO

HS

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PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: CABLE TO MITTERRAND FM PRES RE VISIT

ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE

DUE DATE: 07 APR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA
BLACKWILL
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 2/18/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY ✓ DATE 4/17 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 3 OF 3

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

ORIGINAL FILE

PAGE 01 OF 07

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

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FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

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SECTION 01 OF 03

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS
MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

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BEGIN TEXT:

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DEAR FRANCOIS.

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I AM VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR UPCOMING VISIT AND HAVE
BEEN GIVING IT CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT. EACH OF OUR MEETINGS HAS
BEEN HIGHLY STIMULATING AND PRODUCTIVE. AND I WANT OUR TALKS AT
KEY LARGO TO CONTINUE THAT POSITIVE PATTERN.

-
AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF RELATIVELY SMOOTH AND RAPID TRANSITION IN
EUROPE. WE ARE NOW GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF SOME TURBULENCE AND
UNCERTAINTY. IF EVENTS IN LITHUANIA TAKE THE WRONG TURN OR IF
THE SOVIET STANCE ON GERMAN UNIFICATION PROVES INFLEXIBLE, WE
COULD FACE A DIFFICULT PERIOD AHEAD.

-
AT KEY LARGO. I HOPE TO DISCUSS IN DEPTH WITH YOU THE MAIN
CHALLENGES THAT WE FACE AND HOW WE CAN WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN
MEETING THEM. AS YOU KNOW, I AM DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE U. S.
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ROLE IN MAINTAINING EUROPEAN
STABILITY. AND IT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT IN THE PERIOD AHEAD
A STRONG U. S. - FRENCH RELATIONSHIP IS ESSENTIAL TO THAT STABILITY.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED 5/11/05
05-0818-MK KO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 07

MY MOST IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO YOU IS THAT I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD AND WILL REMAIN DEEPLY ENGAGED IN EUROPE AND IN THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN ITS BROADEST SENSE. IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN TALK IN THE U.S. CONGRESS -- AND CONCERN AMONG EUROPEANS -- ABOUT THE EARLY AND COMPLETE DEPARTURE OF AMERICAN TROOPS. YOU SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO KEEP MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT FORCES IN EUROPE. SO LONG AS THEY ARE WANTED, AND THAT A BIPARTISAN MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT OUR CONTINUED MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE CONTINENT.

MY CONCERN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND MY DESIRE TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE COME TOGETHER ON THE QUESTION OF GERMANY. DURING OUR BERMUDA CONVERSATIONS LAST WEEK MARGARET THATCHER PRESENTED FIVE POINTS WITH WHICH I VERY MUCH AGREE: THAT GERMANY SHOULD RETAIN FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO; THAT GERMANY SHOULD REMAIN IN NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURES; THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY SHOULD APPLY IN FULL TO GERMANY (INCLUDING ARTICLES 5 & 6); THAT ALLIED FORCES SHOULD REMAIN IN GERMANY; AND THAT NATO FORCES IN GERMANY SHOULD RETAIN A SENSIBLE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

MANY OF OUR ALLIES, WHO ARE NOT PARTICIPANTS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS, ARE ANXIOUS ABOUT DECISIONS MADE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR WHICH COULD AFFECT THEIR VITAL INTERESTS. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THAT REGULAR NATO CONSULTATIONS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR AND ABOUT THE SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF GERMAN UNIFICATION ARE APPROPRIATE, TO REASSURE OUR ALLIES AND GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS. IN THE SAME WAY, EC MEMBERS WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO TURN NATO INTO A FORUM THAT IS MEANT TO PROVIDE BINDING GUIDANCE FOR U.S., FRENCH, BRITISH, OR GERMAN POSITIONS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR DISCUSSIONS. INSTEAD, IT IS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 07

ESSENTIAL FOR THE FOUR WESTERN ALLIES WHO PARTICIPATE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR MEETINGS TO MEET PRIVATELY AND DEVELOP COMMON POSITIONS ON THE KEY ISSUES. OVER THE LAST FOUR DECADES, PRESENTATION OF A SOLID FRONT BY THE U.S., FRANCE, BRITAIN, AND THE FRG HAS SUCCEEDED IN PRESERVING OUR VISION OF A UNITED GERMANY COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY AND FIRMLY TIED TO NATO AND THE EC. WHILE THE SOVIETS MAY NOT LIKE THIS DISPLAY OF OUR SOLIDARITY, THE ANSWER TO SOVIET WEAKNESS IS NOT THE DILUTION OF WESTERN STRENGTH.

BOTH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE STRONG WESTERN DIPLOMATIC POSITION AND TO EASE CONCERNS FROM ALLIES WHO ARE NOT PARTICIPANTS, WE SHOULD BE VERY CLEAR ABOUT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR. THIS GROUP IS SPECIALLY CONSTITUTED BECAUSE OF THE POSTWAR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH THE FOUR VICTORIOUS POWERS ASSUMED FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE AND FOR BERLIN. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS SHOULD BE TO END THIS LEGACY OF WAR AND RESTORE FULL SOVEREIGNTY TO A PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATIC, AND UNITED GERMAN STATE.

I WAS THEREFORE DELIGHTED THAT THE WESTERN OFFICIALS IN THE ONE PLUS THREE MEETING ON APRIL 10 AGREED THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE OVER GERMANY'S RIGHT TO REMAIN A FULL MEMBER OF NATO; SHOULD NOT DECIDE THE FATE OF ALLIED CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR FORCES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CURRENT FRG; SHOULD NOT AGREE ON THE FUTURE SIZE OF A UNITED GERMANY'S ARMED FORCES; AND SHOULD NOT REPLACE THE OLD FOUR POWER RIGHTS WITH NEW DISCRIMINATORY LIMITS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY -- A PRESCRIPTION FOR FUTURE INSTABILITY.

THE SOVIET UNION MAY WELL WANT THE TWO PLUS FOUR TO DECIDE ALL OF THESE MATTERS. TO USE THE TWO PLUS FOUR FORUM TO UNDERMINE GERMAN SECURITY TIES TO THE WEST AND THE COHERENCE OF NATO'S DETERRENT POSTURE. MY OPPOSITION TO THESE POSSIBLE SOVIET AIMS DOES NOT MEAN I AM INSENSITIVE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET UNION OF GERMAN UNITY. THE USSR SHOULD RECEIVE REASONABLE ASSURANCES ABOUT THE MILITARY STATUS OF

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 07

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SECTION 02 OF 03

THE FORMER TERRITORY OF THE GDR IN A UNITED GERMAN STATE. INCLUDING ARRANGEMENTS WITH GERMANY FOR THE CONTINUED, IF TEMPORARY. PRESENCE OF SOVIET FORCES. FURTHER, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER MOSCOW OTHER. LEGITIMATE OPPORTUNITIES TO RAISE ITS SECURITY CONCERNS -- IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AND IN THE UPCOMING TALKS ABOUT U.S. AND SOVIET SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. BUT IN NO

EVENT SHOULD WE ALLOW MOSCOW TO MANIPULATE THE TWO PLUS FOUR MECHANISM IN WAYS THAT COULD FRACTURE WESTERN DEFENSE AND GERMANY'S IRREPLACEABLE PART IN IT.

I HOPE YOU AGREE THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF EUROPE'S FUTURE. I DO NOT FORESEE THAT THE CSCE CAN REPLACE NATO AS THE GUARANTOR OF WESTERN SECURITY AND STABILITY. INDEED. IT IS DIFFICULT TO VISUALIZE HOW A EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT INCLUDING EASTERN EUROPE, AND PERHAPS EVEN THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DETER THREATS TO WESTERN EUROPE.

WHILE OUR COUNTRIES HAVE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ABOUT NATO'S POLITICAL MISSION, IT IS CRUCIAL IN MY OPINION FOR THE ALLIANCE TO EXPRESS PUBLICLY A POSITIVE VISION OF WHAT NATO CAN ACCOMPLISH IN THIS TIME OF CHANGE. SUCH A POSITIVE NATO VISION IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT U.S.-FRENCH AGREEMENT CONCERNING HOW THIS SHOULD BE DONE. INDEED, I HOPE FRANCE CAN PLAY AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT PART IN A REINVIGORATED NATO IN THIS NEW AREA. LET ME MAKE MY OWN POSITION CLEAR. NATO, CSCE, AND THE EC SHOULD BE COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYTHING WHICH STRENGTHENS NATO HARMS THE COMMUNITY; NOR DO I THINK THAT A STRONGER EC IS BAD FOR THE ALLIANCE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 07

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BUT IF NATO IS RELEGATED SOLELY TO A NARROW MILITARY FUNCTION, ITS IMPORTANCE AND SUPPORT AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS IS BOUND TO DIMINISH AS THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT RECEDES. TO RETAIN ITS VITALITY, THE ALLIANCE MUST HAVE A VISIBLE POLITICAL MANDATE. AS A PLACE WHERE SIXTEEN DEMOCRATIC STATES CAN EXPRESS VIEWS ON BOTH POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS OF COMMON INTEREST. MOREOVER, NATO IS THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE JUSTIFICATION IN MY COUNTRY FOR THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE. IF NATO IS ALLOWED TO WITHER BECAUSE IT HAS NO MEANINGFUL POLITICAL PLACE IN THE NEW EUROPE, THE BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENT CAN DIE WITH IT.

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I BELIEVE THAT NATO NEEDS AN ENHANCED POLITICAL ROLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET THREAT IS DECLINING. IF YOU AGREE, I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS. TWO NATURAL AREAS WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING IN WHICH NATO COULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE ARE THROUGH CREATION OF AN ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION STAFF, AND DISCUSSION OF ALLIED GOALS IN THE CSCE PROCESS AND THE MEANS OF ATTAINING THEM.

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NATO SHOULD NOT, OF COURSE, BE THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS ON ANY SUBJECT. THE EC COUNCIL HAS MADE REGULAR ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE GOALS ITS MEMBER STATES WILL BRING TO THE PLANNING FOR A CSCE SUMMIT. NATO SHOULD HAVE THE PARALLEL RIGHT TO ARTICULATE THE OBJECTIVES SHARED BY ALL OF ITS MEMBERS, UNDERSTANDING THAT SOME ALLIANCE MEMBERS MAY WISH TO CONSULT ABOUT THEIR VIEWS IN OTHER INSTITUTIONS TOO. THESE ACTIVITIES IN NATO AND THE EC SHOULD MUTUALLY REINFORCE EACH OTHER. NEITHER ORGANIZATION IN MY JUDGMENT SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PRESENT THE OTHER WITH FAITS ACCOMPLIS ON MATTERS WHERE BOTH HAVE A PROPER INTEREST.

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YOU KNOW THAT I AM A STRONG SUPPORTER OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. OUR EFFORT TO DEVELOP CLOSER U.S.-EC TIES REFLECTS OUR RESPECT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 07

FOR DECISIONS OF THE TWELVE TO HANDLE CERTAIN MATTERS THROUGH COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS. THE ENHANCED LINKS THAT WE HAVE IN MIND ARE IN NO WAY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE INCREASED EC INTEGRATION WHICH YOU SEEK -- ON THE CONTRARY. THEY SHOULD SERVE TO ENCOURAGE THIS INTEGRATION. AS HAS ALREADY HAPPENED WITH THE G-24 PROCESS. WHAT WE DO HAVE IN MIND ARE MORE EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL TIES AND DIALOGUE WITH THE COMMUNITY'S STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND WITH THE COMMISSION AT A TIME WHEN THE EC IS EVOLVING RAPIDLY.

RAPID EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WILL MAKE CLOSER U.S.-EC TIES EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. AS THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT BECOMES LESS ACUTE, AMERICANS MUST BE PERSUADED THAT THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS PART OF A BROAD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LINKAGE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONTINENT, INCLUDING A CLOSE CONNECTION WITH THE EC. NOTHING WOULD UNDERMINE U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR TROOP DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE MORE THAN FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES TO COME TO REGARD AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN EUROPE AS MERCENARIES, DIVORCED FROM A LARGER AND INTENSE U.S. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS WESTERN ALLIES. FRANCE'S SUPPORT IN SUSTAINING AND INVIGORATING THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE ACROSS THE BOARD WILL BE CRUCIAL IN THESE CHANGING TIMES.

BEFORE CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU HOW GRATIFYING IT HAS BEEN TO FIND THAT OUR POSITIONS HAVE BEEN SO CLOSE IN CONSIDERING

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FINAL SECTION OF 03

THE FUTURE OF LITHUANIA. WE SHARE A SYMPATHY FOR THE NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE LITHUANIAN PEOPLE, AND NATURALLY OUR COUNTRIES HAVE NEVER RECOGNIZED THE LEGALITY OF LITHUANIA'S FORCED INCORPORATION INTO THE SOVIET UNION. A VIOLENT SOLUTION TO THIS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 07

CRISIS. OR STRANGULATION OF THE LITHUANIA INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT. CANNOT SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO HOPE FOR CONTINUED SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. SOVIET ACTIONS OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS -- INCLUDING THE THREAT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS -- HAVE ONLY EXACERBATED THE ALREADY COMPLEX SITUATION. WE MUST URGE THE SOVIET AND LITHUANIAN LEADERS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTE. AND HOPE THAT PATIENCE -- AND PERSISTENCE -- WILL PAY OFF.

FRANCOIS. THERE IS NO LEADER IN EUROPE TODAY WHOM I RESPECT MORE. I THEREFORE LOOK FORWARD TO OUR DISCUSSIONS IN FLORIDA WITH GREAT ANTICIPATION AND OPTIMISM.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

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MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

VIA BLUE CHANNEL

Dear Francois:

I am very much looking forward to your upcoming visit and have been giving it considerable thought. Each of our meetings has been highly stimulating and productive, and I want our talks at Key Largo to continue that positive pattern.

After several months of relatively smooth and rapid transition in Europe, we are now going through a period of some turbulence and uncertainty. If events in Lithuania take the wrong turn or if the Soviet stance on German unification proves inflexible, we could face a difficult period ahead.

At Key Largo, I hope to discuss in depth with you the main challenges that we face and how we can work closely together in meeting them. As you know, I am deeply committed to the U.S. political, economic and military role in maintaining European stability. And it is absolutely clear that in the period ahead a strong U.S.-French relationship is essential to that stability.

My most important message to you is that I am confident that the United States should and will remain deeply engaged in Europe and in the transatlantic alliance in its broadest sense. In recent months there has been talk in the U.S. Congress -- and concern among Europeans -- about the early and complete departure of American troops. You should be in no doubt that the United States intends to keep militarily significant forces in Europe, so long as they are wanted, and that a bipartisan majority of the American people will support our continued military presence on the continent.

My concern about the future of European security and my desire to make effective use of the North Atlantic Alliance come together on the question of Germany. During our Bermuda conversations last week Margaret Thatcher presented five points with which I very much agree: that Germany should retain full membership in NATO; that Germany should remain in NATO's integrated military structures; that the North Atlantic Treaty should apply in full to Germany (including Articles 5 & 6); that Allied forces should remain in Germany; and that NATO forces in Germany should retain a sensible mix of nuclear and conventional forces.

Many of our Allies, who are not participants in the Two Plus Four process, are anxious about decisions made in the Two Plus Four which could affect their vital interests. Therefore, I believe that regular NATO consultations about the activities of the Two

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Plus Four and about the security consequences of German unification are appropriate, to reassure our Allies and guarantee the success of our efforts. In the same way, EC members will want to discuss the economic consequences of these developments.

We have no desire to turn NATO into a forum that is meant to provide binding guidance for U.S., French, British, or German positions in the Two Plus Four discussions. Instead, it is essential for the four Western Allies who participate in the Two Plus Four meetings to meet privately and develop common positions on the key issues. Over the last four decades, presentation of a solid front by the U.S., France, Britain, and the FRG has succeeded in preserving our vision of a united Germany committed to democracy and firmly tied to NATO and the EC. While the Soviets may not like this display of our solidarity, the answer to Soviet weakness is not the dilution of Western strength.

Both to take advantage of the strong Western diplomatic position and to ease concerns from Allies who are not participants, we should be very clear about the objectives of the Two Plus Four. This group is specially constituted because of the postwar rights and responsibilities which the Four victorious Powers assumed for Germany as a whole and for Berlin. The main purpose of the Two Plus Four process should be to end this legacy of war and restore full sovereignty to a peaceful, democratic, and united German state.

I was therefore delighted that the Western officials in the One Plus Three meeting on April 10 agreed that the Two Plus Four should not negotiate over Germany's right to remain a full member of NATO; should not decide the fate of Allied conventional or nuclear forces on the territory of the current FRG; should not agree on the future size of a united Germany's armed forces; and should not replace the old Four Power rights with new discriminatory limits on German sovereignty -- a prescription for future instability.

The Soviet Union may well want the Two Plus Four to decide all of these matters, to use the Two Plus Four forum to undermine German security ties to the West and the coherence of NATO's deterrent posture. My opposition to these possible Soviet aims does not mean I am insensitive to President Gorbachev's concerns about the implications for the Soviet Union of German unity. The USSR should receive reasonable assurances about the military status of the former territory of the GDR in a united German state, including arrangements with Germany for the continued, if temporary, presence of Soviet forces. Further, we should be prepared to offer Moscow other, legitimate opportunities to raise its security concerns -- in the conventional arms control negotiations in Vienna and in the upcoming talks about U.S. and Soviet short-range nuclear missile systems in Europe. But in no

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event should we allow Moscow to manipulate the Two Plus Four mechanism in ways that could fracture Western defense and Germany's irreplaceable part in it.

I hope you agree that the North Atlantic Alliance is an essential component of Europe's future. I do not foresee that the CSCE can replace NATO as the guarantor of Western security and stability. Indeed, it is difficult to visualize how a European collective security arrangement including Eastern Europe, and perhaps even the Soviet Union, would have the capability to deter threats to Western Europe.

While our countries have somewhat different perspectives about NATO's political mission, it is crucial in my opinion for the Alliance to express publicly a positive vision of what NATO can accomplish in this time of change. Such a positive NATO vision is impossible without U.S.-French agreement concerning how this should be done. Indeed, I hope France can play an even more important part in a reinvigorated NATO in this new era. Let me make my own position clear. NATO, CSCE, and the EC should be complementary institutions. I do not believe that anything which strengthens NATO harms the Community; nor do I think that a stronger EC is bad for the Alliance.

But if NATO is relegated solely to a narrow military function, its importance and support among Western publics is bound to diminish as the Soviet military threat recedes. To retain its vitality, the Alliance must have a visible political mandate, as a place where sixteen democratic states can express views on both political and security questions of common interest. Moreover, NATO is the only plausible justification in my country for the American military presence in Europe. If NATO is allowed to wither because it has no meaningful political place in the new Europe, the basis for a long-term U.S. military commitment can die with it.

I believe that NATO needs an enhanced political role in order to maintain public support at a time when the Soviet threat is declining. If you agree, I would welcome your views on the best way to do this. Two natural areas we have been considering in which NATO could play an active role in the immediate future are through creation of an arms control verification staff, and discussion of Allied goals in the CSCE process and the means of attaining them.

NATO should not, of course, be the exclusive forum for political consultations on any subject. The EC Council has made regular announcements about the goals its member states will bring to the planning for a CSCE Summit. NATO should have the parallel right to articulate the objectives shared by all of its members, understanding that some Alliance members may wish to consult

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about their views in other institutions too. These activities in NATO and the EC should mutually reinforce each other. Neither organization in my judgment should attempt to present the other with faits accomplis on matters where both have a proper interest.

You know that I am a strong supporter of European integration. Our effort to develop closer U.S.-EC ties reflects our respect for decisions of the Twelve to handle certain matters through community institutions. The enhanced links that we have in mind are in no way incompatible with the increased EC integration which you seek -- on the contrary, they should serve to encourage this integration, as has already happened with the G-24 process. What we do have in mind are more effective institutional ties and dialogue with the Community's structure of political consultation and with the Commission at a time when the EC is evolving rapidly.

Rapid European integration will make closer U.S.-EC ties even more important. As the Soviet military threat becomes less acute, Americans must be persuaded that the U.S. military presence in Europe is part of a broad political and economic linkage between the United States and the continent, including a close connection with the EC. Nothing would undermine U.S. public support for our troop deployment in Europe more than for the people of the United States to come to regard American soldiers in Europe as mercenaries, divorced from a larger and intense U.S. political and economic relationship with its Western Allies. France's support in sustaining and invigorating the U.S. relationship with Europe across the board will be crucial in these changing times.

Before closing, I would like to tell you how gratifying it has been to find that our positions have been so close in considering the future of Lithuania. We share a sympathy for the national aspirations of the Lithuanian people, and naturally our countries have never recognized the legality of Lithuania's forced incorporation into the Soviet Union. A violent solution to this crisis, or strangulation of the Lithuania independence movement, cannot serve the interests of those who hope for continued Soviet political and economic reform. Soviet actions over the last few days -- including the threat of economic sanctions -- have only exacerbated the already complex situation. We must urge the Soviet and Lithuanian leaders to seek a peaceful settlement of their dispute, and hope that patience -- and persistence -- will pay off.

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

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Francois, there is no leader in Europe today whom I respect more. I therefore look forward to our discussions in Florida with great anticipation and optimism.

Sincerely,

George

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1990 APR 16 PM 8:09

April 16, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to President Mitterrand

Purpose

To send a message to Mitterrand laying out your thinking in advance of the April 19 Key Largo meeting.

Background

As you will recall from my recent memo on "Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport" (Tab B), we are concerned about the divergences of view that have come to the fore in U.S.-French relations over the past few months. With those difficulties in mind, I believe it would be useful to send a message to Mitterrand today setting out your views on the main issues, so as to give him time to reflect before April 19.

As you will see from the attached CIA report (Tab C), under the new circumstances emerging in Europe Mitterrand himself may already be thinking in terms of a closer alliance with the U.S.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the letter at ~~Tab A to M~~ Mitterrand, for transmission through White House channels.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mitterrand
Tab B Memo on Revising the Spirit of Kennebunkport
Tab C CIA Report

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0063-MR

01 9/17/10/4/24/12

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2614 Redo

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 16, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: *AAB* ADRIAN BASORA/PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Mitterrand

We believe the President should send Mitterrand before the Florida meeting a thoughtful and substantive letter that would signify the importance he attaches to the U.S.-French relationship and to the upcoming talks in Key Largo. The letter should implicitly deal with our concerns about emerging U.S.-French differences and suggest positions -- especially on Germany and NATO's future -- that can help take us through the difficult period ahead.

We have drafted such a letter, to be sent through White House channels, for your review and the President's. The draft, which has been cleared by Bob Zoellick for Secretary Baker, is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to President
Tab A Draft Message to Mitterrand
Tab B Memo on Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport
Tab C CIA Report

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0663-MR

01 9/17/10/4/24/12

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~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1654 - Redo

April 5, 1990

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0664-MR
SCS 1/4/11

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport

It seems clear from recent French behavior that memories of Kennebunkport have faded, and that we have begun a new and very different phase in French-US relations with serious ramifications for NATO.

Not surprisingly, current French foreign policy thinking is focussed overwhelmingly on Germany. Rapid reunification is taken as a given, and the French Government has repeatedly expressed public support for it. In private however, the French show great uncertainty and apprehension about Germany's future path. French leaders show signs of insecurity -- even a sense of inferiority -- in the face of what they see as a politically triumphant economic powerhouse of nearly 80 million people just across the Rhine. Gone is the comfortable vision of a Europe co-managed by equals in Paris and Bonn, with German moderate economic advantage offset by France's nuclear capability and its essential strategic role in the face of a strong Warsaw Pact.

One logical option for the French would be to rely somewhat more on the U.S. and NATO in dealing with the German issue. Instead, however, recent months have seen a reversion to the traditional French downplaying of NATO, along with a disturbing tendency to keep the U.S. at arm's length. The French have consistently fought against any steps that seem to reinforce NATO's role during this time of change. For example, France has:

- argued strenuously against NATO efforts to establish a common Western position for a CSCE Summit (although the EC has been regularly announcing substantive positions on the future of CSCE);
- tried to keep us from organizing regular consultations in NATO about the Two Plus Four talks on Germany;
- balked at US efforts to establish agreement among the Four Western participants in the Two Plus Four discussions about the positions we will assert there; and

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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-- sought to frustrate any attempt to carve out new political roles for NATO, even on innocuous issues such as NATO sharing of future Open Skies data, establishing a NATO arms control verification staff, or expanding NATO's environmental programs.

Although we have had problems with the French at NATO over the years, Will Taft believes the current French negativism is different. It is not based on any clear concept. There is, instead, simply a dogged resistance by France to any hint of a healthy political role for NATO, without much clue as to how this fits into a large strategic vision.

The French understand, of course, that the future of NATO is linked to the future of the U.S. military presence in Europe. However, the U.S. seems strikingly absent from longer-term French calculations on Europe. So convinced are some French leaders that the U.S. will rapidly withdraw its forces from Europe that they are thinking, and at times acting, almost as if we were already gone.

To be sure, most French foreign policy makers and analysts are quick to assure us that France is anxious to see the U.S. maintain its troops in Europe, and that they believe NATO can play a useful role in the transitional phase to a new security order in Europe. But they are then quick to turn to talk of the rapid emergence of a new Europe in which the U.S. military role will be sharply diminished and NATO will become marginal or disappear. One top advisor to Defense Minister Chevenement recently speculated that the most the U.S. could expect to retain in Germany would be a "symbolic" presence of 20-30,000 troops (with no nuclear weapons).

A full explanation of why Paris has tended to downplay Washington in the last two or three months would of course involve other factors, including deeply entrenched French concerns about a dominant or overly unilateral U.S. role in Europe. Also, there is some evidence that the French see the U.S. as neglecting Paris in favor of Bonn and Moscow.

Your meeting with Mitterrand on April 19 will hopefully help clear the air. Substantively, the key to success in drawing Paris closer to us is to convince Mitterrand and his inner circle that:

1. The U.S. is essential to successful handling of the German question, both now and for the long term, and we are willing to work closely with Paris in dealing with Germany.
2. The U.S. is both determined and able to keep a substantial military presence in Europe.
3. Continued U.S. engagement requires that NATO be kept vigorous for the foreseeable future, and that the U.S. have more effective linkage to the EC, so as to keep close to a rapidly evolving European Community.

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4. The U.S. does not demand a 13th seat at the EC table, however, and does not wish to retard EC integration; quite the contrary, a better-constructed set of US-EC links should serve to encourage further integration.

5. You and your top advisors see a special relationship with France as an essential ingredient of U.S. policy in Europe, and we want closer consultation with France -- genuine consultation, not unilateral dicta in either direction -- to achieve what are largely shared objectives in Europe.

6. There will obviously be times when we need to focus special attention on Kohl or Thatcher; this too serves mutual French and U.S. objectives, and should not cast any doubt on the importance you attach to having a very close relationship with Mitterrand and with France.

As German unification moves forward and the Two Plus Four talks get underway, relations with Paris and London -- both of which are suspicious of Kohl's intentions and Germany's power -- will be difficult and critical. Your personal relationship with Mitterrand will be a key to successful management of the German question and ultimately of our European policy as a whole.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01f. Cable	To White House Situation Room (3 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (April - May 1990)

Date Closed:	2/18/2009	OA/ID Number:	91116-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9002854
RECEIVED: 12 APR 90 10

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICE
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 18 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMAN UNIFICATION
FRANCE

GREAT BRITAIN
AP

PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: RPT TO PRES ON APR 11 ONE PLUS THREE MTG RE GERMAN UNIFICATION PRIOR
MTG W/ MITTERRAND

ACTION: OBE PER SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 16 APR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RICE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 2/10/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 2 OF 2

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RECORD ID: 9002854

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
002 SCOWCROFT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90041307 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
Z 90041912 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
X 90042412 OBE PER SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 2/18/09

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2854

April 18, 1990

Nat'l Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President on the One Plus Three
Officials Level Meeting

The memorandum from you to the President reports on the April 11 meeting of the One Plus Three on German unification. We thought that it might be helpful as he prepares to meet with Mitterrand. We have updated it to reflect the fact that the President has already met with Thatcher.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to President

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By *no* NARA, Date *1/15/10*

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0603-MR
Q1 9/17/10

2854

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Officials-Level Meeting of the 'One Plus Three' on
German Unification

The April 11 talks on German unification at the official level of the One Plus Three (UK, France, US and FRG) were more harmonious than the discussions within this group last month. The most important breakthrough is an emerging Allied consensus on the agenda for the Two Plus Four talks. As you know, we have been concerned that the British and the French would want to address a broad range of issues in the Two Plus Four. Our view is that the Two Plus Four mandate should be limited to the devolution of Four Power rights and responsibilities and that most issues concerning the future security status of the united Germany should be left for the sovereign German state to decide in consultation with its Allies.

We came out of this meeting with a tentative consensus behind a strategy for limiting the agenda of the Two Plus Four. The Allies now seem to accept the principle that the Two Plus Four deliberations should not result in new constraints on a united Germany -- a step that would single Germany out and cause resentment there in the long-term. Thus, while all agreed that we could not refuse to discuss the security arrangements of a united Germany should the Soviets raise them, there was support for simply referring the most sensitive issues to other existing and future negotiations. If, for instance, the Soviets argue for constraints on the size of the Bundeswehr or on Western stationed forces, the Allies are prepared to answer that these issues should be dealt with in post-CFE conventional arms control talks. Similarly, the issue of nuclear weapons on German soil should be referred to future U.S.-Soviet SNF negotiations.

This strategy would allow us to limit the scope of the Two Plus Four while responding to Soviet concerns about the security implications of German unification. If we are able to maintain Allied consensus for this approach, the problems of managing the Two Plus Four will ease considerably. The Soviets will continue to push for the broader agenda -- trying to brandish their residual Four Power rights as a veto on Germany's role in NATO's defense arrangements. But Western cohesion would go a long way toward defeating this Soviet tactic.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

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We should not take the Western consensus for granted, however. You will need to emphasize with Mitterrand, as you did with Thatcher, the importance of cohesion among the four Western participants as we enter the first substantive Two Plus Four discussions at the official level at the end of the month. The French were far more cooperative this time but they remain the ally most likely to break ranks if the Soviets try to widen the agenda in the Two Plus Four. You will need to reinforce the theme with Mitterrand that the Two Plus Four must avoid decisions that would singularize Germany.

Another contentious issue -- the Polish border -- was handled more smoothly this time as well. Though the British and French continue to be uneasy about Kohl's reluctance to give firm guarantees to the Poles, Bonn's concessions over the last month -- including the planned parallel parliamentary declarations of the FRG and GDR parliaments -- have eased tensions. The decision to invite Poland to the Two Plus Four when appropriate is also beginning to defuse this issue. There seems to be greater willingness -- at least for the time being -- to give the Germans a chance to begin discussions with the Poles before the issue is taken up in the Two Plus Four.

In spite of the generally favorable outcome at this most recent meeting, it did underscore once again a number of alliance management concerns. Clearly, the United States will have to take the lead in defending in practice and principle regular and full-ranging consultations with those NATO Allies not participating in the Two Plus Four -- a matter that appears to be an afterthought for the British and the Germans and that continues to be an anathema for the French.

We will also need to press the Germans to consult fully with us as they work out the details of their security future. The FRG's representative was evasive when asked about ongoing internal discussions led by Genscher on security issues. The Germans were not ready to agree that NATO's collective defense obligation (Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty) would apply to all of a united Germany and they were particularly unforthcoming when the British sought a commitment to continue to base Western nuclear weapons on German soil. As Bonn deliberates, it is important to impress upon the FRG that issues that go to the core of NATO strategy and the U.S. military presence in Europe should not be decided without advance consultation with the Allies.

The first Two Plus Four at the Ministerial level will likely be held in Bonn on May 3.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

2854

April 12, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President on the One Plus Three
Officials Level Meeting

The memorandum from you to the President reports on the April 11 meeting of the One Plus Three on German unification. We thought that it might be helpful as he prepares to meet with Thatcher and then with Mitterrand.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (E) September 11, 2006
By *110* NARA, Date *1/5/10*

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~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526 2854
2009-06103-MR
9/17/10

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Officials-Level Meeting of the 'One Plus Three' on German Unification

The April 11 talks on German unification at the official level of the One Plus Three (UK, France, US and FRG) were more harmonious than the discussions within this group last month. The most important breakthrough is an emerging Allied consensus on the agenda for the Two Plus Four talks. As you know, we have been concerned that the British and the French would want to address a broad range of issues in the Two Plus Four. Our view is that the Two Plus Four mandate should be limited to the devolution of Four Power rights and responsibilities and that most issues concerning the future security status of the united Germany should be left for the sovereign German state to decide in consultation with its Allies.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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SECRET

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We will also need to press the Germans to consult fully with us as they work out the details of their security future. The FRG's representative was evasive when asked about ongoing internal discussions led by Genscher on security issues. The Germans were not ready to agree that NATO's collective defense obligation (Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty) would apply to all of a united Germany and they were particularly unforthcoming when the British sought a commitment to continue to base Western nuclear weapons on German soil. As Bonn deliberates, it is important to impress upon the FRG that issues that go to the core of NATO strategy and the U.S. military presence in Europe should not be decided without advance consultation with the Allies.

The first Two Plus Four at the Ministerial level will likely be held in Bonn on May 5.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

BB

3434 f

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

One of Zoellick's assistants called us and dictated this from Zoellick for you. mk/5:15 p.m. 30 Apr

CHRON FILE

The following statement is from the meeting Zoellick and Rice just attended in Berlin. Was released in German.

2

"In accordance with the Ottawa Statement of 13 Feb 1990, the talks at the level of officials among representatives of the GDR, the FRG, France, the UK, the USSR and the US continued in Berlin on 30 April 1990. Participants held further discussions on procedural questions and on the agenda of future talks, which will be submitted to the Foreign Ministers for approval. They focused on preparations for the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the six states on 5 May in Bonn. The subsequent meeting of Foreign Ministers at a date yet to be fixed will be at the invitation of the GDR in Berlin. They noted that, at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 5 May in Bonn, the Ministers will take up the modalities of Poland's invitation regarding questions which particularly concerns its borders. It was agreed that the remaining contents of the meeting at the level of officials in Berlin would be kept confidential."

Brent / B.S.

From Bladwell
1752

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003561
RECEIVED: 04 MAY 90 14

ERON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: VAN ERON
SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 04 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS

GERMANY D R

PERSONS: DE MAIZIERE, LOTHAR

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY FOR MAY 4

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 08 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON LOGREF: 9003550

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/18/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJRP

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE

3561

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

CS

**Prime Minister De Maiziere - April 28, 1990
(Received May 4)**

PM De Maiziere acknowledges your congratulatory letter upon his election. He will work to reunite Germany and promote stability, peace, democracy and freedom in Europe. He appreciates your support and that of the American people.

NOTED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By HO NARA, Date 1/15/10

The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the German Democratic Republic

1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

2021 232-3134

The Honorable
Joseph V. Reed, Jr.
Chief of Protocol
Department of State

April 30, 1990

Dear Mr. Reed,

I permit myself to transmit to you the text of a response telegram to the President of the United States of America, George Bush, requesting you to forward it to the addressee on April 28, 1990:

"The President of the
United States of America
His Excellency
George Bush
Washington, D.C.

I thank you most cordially for the congratulations you extended on my election as Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic.

My Government is well aware of its great responsibility vis-a-vis the German people and its neighbours.

It will work for a United Germany which will promote stability in Europe and make a positive contribution to establishing a Pan-European order of peace, democracy and freedom.

I very much appreciate the support that you and the citizens of your country render to us in our efforts.

Lothar De Maiziere
Prime Minister of the
German Democratic Republic"

Please accept, Dear Mr. Reed, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. Herder', written in a cursive style.

Dr. Gerhard Herder