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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91116
Folder ID Number: 91116-005

Folder Title:
German Unification (March - April 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: The First Round of Two Plus Four Deliberations on German Unification (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany (1 pp.)	3/19/90	(b)(1)	C
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Your Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl, March 15, 1990 (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02d. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	3/15/90	(b)(1)	C
02e. Talking Points	Re: Kohl - POTUS Call: Possible Points To Make (2 pp.)	3/19/90	(b)(1)	C
02f. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, March 20, 1990 (1 pp.)	3/19/90	(b)(1)	C

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (March - April 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap978
OA/ID Number: 91116-005
Date Closed: 2/18/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03a. Outline	Re: Meetings with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (5 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meetings with Prime Minister Mazowiecki of Poland (10 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03c. Report	Re: Tadeusz Mazowiecki [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	3/13/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
03d. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	C
03e. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	S
03f. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	C
03g. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	S
03h. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	C
03i. Report	Re: Jan Kinast [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
03j. Memo	Lawrence S. Eagleburger to POTUS Re: Official Visit of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, March 20 - 23, 1990 (6 pp.)	3/19/90	(b)(1)	S
03k. Letter	President George Bush to Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki (2 pp.)	3/13/90	(b)(1)	

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03l. Letter	Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to President George Bush (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03m. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meetings with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland, March 21, 1990 (1 pp.)	3/19/90	(b)(1)	S
04a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany (1 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	C
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04c. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	C
04d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, March 23, 1990 (1 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	C
05a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: SPD Thinking on a United Germany in NATO (1 pp.)	3/26/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Cable	Re: Lafontaine Working Group... (3 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	C
05c. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: SPD Thinking on a United Germany in NATO (1 pp.)	3/23/90	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Your Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl, March 25, 1990 (3 pp.)	3/16/90	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to William F. Sittman Re: Memoranda of Conversations with Prime Minister Mazowiecki of Poland (1 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1)	S
06b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (4 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
06c. Memcon	Re: Expanded Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (3 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
06d. Memcon	Re: Follow-up Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (4 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	S
07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: German Unification: Economic Impact (4 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1)	C
07b. Memo	Meg Lundsager to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memo to the President on German Economic and Monetary Union (1 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	C
08a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	4/3/90	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08c. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport (3 pp.)	4/5/90	(b)(1)	S
09b. Memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport (1 pp.)	3/7/90	(b)(1)	S
09c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2084

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2009-0665-MR
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BJS*

SUBJECT: The First Round of Two Plus Four Deliberations on German Unification

The first round of the Two Plus Four discussions on the external aspects of the establishment of German unity were held March 14 in Bonn. Those talks were preceded by a meeting of the One Plus Three (the FRG, UK, France and ourselves) the previous day in Paris. The initial round of the Two Plus Four decided a number of procedural questions and agreed to invite Poland to discussions related to issues of its border. The Soviets were generally cooperative in resolving the procedural matters and did not seek to introduce Moscow's substantive concerns on European security into the deliberations. Moscow did lay down several markers that it would seek as broad an agenda as possible within the Two Plus Four and that it will continue to claim the right to have a say in when and how German unification takes place.

The March 13 meeting of the One Plus Three in Paris produced agreement that the Two Plus Four must discuss and decide the legal issues associated with Four Power rights and responsibilities; determine the united Germany's borders; and find a legal form of final settlement. But beyond that rather narrow set of issues, significant differences emerged among the One Plus Three on how to react to the Polish border question; the form of a final settlement; the role of consultations within NATO as the Two Plus Four proceeds; the desirability of establishing common positions among the Allies in advance of the Two Plus Four; and the range of substantive issues that should be discussed within the Two Plus Four. While the British, French and West Germans did not break ranks in the first Two Plus Four meeting, the depth of the differences is great and we face a very tough task in holding the Western side together.

Poland has become by far the most emotional and divisive issue among the Allies. On the eve of the March 13 One Plus Three consultations, Mitterrand publicly distanced himself from Kohl by insisting that Germany sign a treaty with Poland confirming the border before unification takes place. Mrs. Thatcher, while reserving on the timing of an agreement, had been equally vocal

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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about the need to solve the border issue expeditiously. The French thus came to the One Plus Three ready to propose that a meeting of the Two Plus Four take place in Warsaw to take up the question of the borders -- an idea for which the British showed sympathy. The Germans made it clear, as Kohl did in his phone call to you, that they would not go to Warsaw. While the British and French did not insist on a Warsaw meeting, they stressed their view that the "poisonous" issue of the border had to be dealt with and dealt with swiftly.

Fortunately, within the Two Plus Four the Allies did not embarrass the Germans by supporting the Soviets who took up the French proposal regarding a meeting in Warsaw. Rather, the careful formula which emerged from the Two Plus Four -- that Poland would be invited at an undetermined time to an unspecified place -- was adopted. Though Allied solidarity survived intact this time, there can be little doubt that until the Polish border issue is resolved, the British and French will find themselves closer to the Soviet position on Poland than to Kohl and ourselves.

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A second emotional issue, the form of final settlement, also threatens Alliance unity in the Two Plus Four. The question of whether the termination of Four Power rights takes place in the form of a peace treaty or a peace settlement -- or, in fact, whether the word "peace" should be included at all in describing the ~~settlement~~, is a matter of great importance to Bonn, the UK and the Soviet Union. This is more than an issue of semantics. For Bonn, a peace treaty would be a source of ~~distraction~~, reminding the world of the German defeat in 1945 and somehow implying that the war is not over. The FRG argues that we have been at peace for 45 years and that the final act removing the last vestiges of occupation should take account of that fact. We have tended to support the Germans but have not laid down a formal position.

This discussion of this issue led to an acrimonious exchange between the Soviets and the Germans. While the Soviets did not insist on the word treaty, they made clear that the word "peace" -- clarifying that the final document signifies an end to World War II -- was not negotiable. The Soviet representative said that Moscow believes the termination of Four Power rights and responsibilities is inextricably linked to the signing of a peace document.

Another troubling sign of Alliance disunity concerns the desirability of consultation with the other NATO allies. As you know, the Ottawa decision upset the smaller Allies and we have worked hard to repair the damage. The FRG and the British agree with us that all the NATO Allies must be kept apprised of the progress of the Two Plus Four. The French, however, have made clear that they will resist any attempt to "synchronize" consultations in NATO with the meetings of the Two Plus Four. Paris is determined to drive home the point that the NATO Council is not "directing" the activities of the four Western Allies. When the FRG and US political directors agreed to go to NATO for

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informal consultations after the first meeting of the Two Plus Four, the French reluctantly agreed but stated that this should not become a regular pattern. The French permanent representative at NATO, upon announcement of the prospective briefing, went to great lengths to emphasize its informal nature and to downplay its significance.

Obviously, French resistance to the involvement of NATO in the Two Plus Four talks is a potentially serious problem for us. This is especially so given the parallel French willingness to discuss European security matters, including German membership in NATO, freely with the Soviets in the Two Plus Four. In fact, Paris is resistant even to regular consultations among the four Western participants in the Two Plus Four, saying that we should not appear to be "ganging up on the Soviets." While we do want to be sensitive to potential Soviet feelings of isolation, we must not sacrifice Alliance unity in the most important deliberations of the post-war period.

This last point concerning the role of the Alliance and solidarity among the Western four is especially worrisome because we are somewhat isolated in our desire to limit the scope of security discussions in the Two Plus Four. As you know, the British and French are less willing than we to allow the FRG to dictate the pace and nature of German unification. They see their Four Power rights as leverage over that process and are inclined to include a broad range of issues in the deliberations of the Two Plus Four. It has been our position that profound security questions such as German membership in NATO; the status of stationed forces in Germany; and the issue of nuclear weapons on German soil should be matters for the sovereign united Germany to decide, and not for the Two Plus Four forum.

In short, we will have to try hard with London, Paris and Bonn and within NATO to persuade our Allies to support our effort to narrow the scope of the Two Plus Four against a Soviet preference for the broadest possible agenda. We will need at the same time to concentrate on the bilateral U.S.-Soviet relationship as a means to achieve Soviet acquiescence to our bottom line -- full membership for Germany in NATO. Perhaps within the context of a hugely successful U.S.-Soviet Summit, Gorbachev can be convinced to back off his currently very hard line about Germany's security future. We have our work cut out for us.

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PAGES 3

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FROM - LOCATION:

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM / BOB GATES

TO - LOCATION - TIME OF RECEIPT:

1. GENERAL SCOWCROFT /

2. _____

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INFORMATION ADDRESSEES - LOCATION - TIME OF RECEIPT:

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS - REMARKS:

#2084 THE FIRST ROUND OF TWO PLUS FOUR DELIBERATIONS
ON GERMAN UNIFICATION.

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 2/18/09

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>BS NOTED</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 19, 1990

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

1990 MAR 19 PM 10:13 2132

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FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call To Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany

DATE: March 20, 1990

PURPOSE: To consult with Kohl before the arrival of Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki, as agreed in your March 15 telephone conversation with Kohl.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open line

INTERPRETER: To be supplied by State Department

PHONE NUMBER: WHCA Head of State circuit -- Bonn

CONTACT: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIME: 8:30 a.m. EST, March 20, 1990

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. GDR elections
2. Mazowiecki visit
 - a) border issue
 - b) Two Plus Four
3. Next steps on the border issue
4. NATO

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Previous Telephone Conversations with Kohl

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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POINTS TO MADE FOR TELEPHONE CALL TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

- We are delighted with the results of GDR elections. This is a great day for Germany -- and for us.
- Congratulations on your success! A large part of the credit goes to you for the CDU's impressive victory on Sunday.
- What do you expect next? Will there be a new Government soon, and a quicker pace of unification?

MAZOWIECKI VISIT

- Helmut, we agreed to talk before Mazowiecki arrives. I want to be sure we are on the same wavelength.
- We have a pretty good idea of what is on his mind. He will certainly want to draw me out on the border issue and may well ask for a larger Polish role in the Two Plus Four.
- I want you to know that I will stand with you on these issues, in my private meetings with Mazowiecki as well as in my public remarks.
- Let me tell you what I intend to say to Mazowiecki.
- On the border issue, I plan to repeat what I said in our joint press conference: "The U.S. respects the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act regarding the inviolability of current borders in Europe. And the U.S. formally recognizes the current German-Polish border."
- I will remind him of your initiative, which will lead to a

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treaty, fixing the current border, between a future all-German government and Poland.

- I will tell him that you have repeatedly assured me -- and that I believe you -- that the current GDR-Polish border should be the permanent German-Polish border.
- On Two Plus Four, I will tell Mazowiecki that I am pleased at the March 14 decision to invite Poland to Two Plus Four deliberations when the issue of Polish borders is discussed.
- I will explain that we see the Two Plus Four as a process to deal with Four Power rights and responsibilities in Berlin and Germany as a whole -- not as a forum to decide the future of European security, and not a place to debate Germany's membership in NATO.
- If he asks, I will say that we will not support Warsaw as a site for any Two Plus Four talks. I will remind him that members of the Two Plus Four agreed March 14 that talks would be held alternatively in the FRG and the GDR.
- I will assure Mazowiecki that we want to intensify our bilateral discussions with Poland as Two Plus Four proceeds, but I will not agree to any expansion of the Polish role in the Two Plus Four process, on the grounds that while Two Plus Four may discuss other security issues, decisions will be made in other forums (e.g. CFE) where Poland will have a voice.
- My aim, Helmut, is to assure Mazowiecki that we are

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sensitive to Polish concerns, but to do so in such a way that your position is in no way undermined. You can rest assured there will be no surprises on our side. But is there anything else you think I could say to help calm Polish anxieties?

- Is there anything in what I have said that would cause you problems?

NEXT STEPS ON THE BORDER ISSUE

- It would help me as I prepare for Mazowiecki's arrival to know your thinking about the timing of the steps you outlined in your resolution approved by the Bundestag.
- Now that the GDR elections are over, how soon do you see a new GDR parliament and government able to adopt, with you, a common declaration on the Polish border?
- Early steps in that direction by the GDR would help reduce the level of Polish concern. It would also make it harder for the Soviets to manipulate the border issue, as they are already trying to do.

NATO

- I heard you were great at NATO in Brussels. I also appreciate your Government's willingness to join us in briefing NATO after the Two Plus Four meeting.
- Above all, I appreciate your firmness on a united Germany remaining a full member of NATO. The idea is even gaining acceptance among the East Europeans.

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-- I took note of what you said when you called last week about NATO membership being an important issue in the FRG. We need to continue holding firm. This is vitally important for European stability and for the U.S.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Your Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl,
March 15, 1990

Kohl's underlying purpose in calling was to try to persuade you not to sign up to a formulation Mazowiecki will likely press on you when he visits March 21: namely, a public statement saying, in effect, that Kohl has not gone far enough to satisfy Polish concerns over the border issue. Prime Minister Thatcher did just that when Mazowiecki visited London February 12-13, agreeing that Poland was entitled to a treaty guaranteeing its current borders. President Mitterrand went further when Mazowiecki and Jaruzelski visited Paris March 9, agreeing with the Poles that there should be a treaty "as soon as possible by the group of six [i.e. the Two Plus Four] with Poland taking part in the work."

Kohl's position, which he reiterated in his phone call, is that soon after the March 18 elections in the GDR, the West German Bundestag and the new East German parliament should issue (along with the FRG and GDR governments) common declarations stipulating that an all-German government, once it exists, will immediately conclude a treaty with Poland reaffirming the inviolability of the current border. In short, he has now gone as far as Thatcher went last month, but he continues to resist the Polish call (supported by Mitterrand) that a treaty should be concluded before unification.

As you know, the Polish American Congress asked you on March 14 to issue a joint statement on the border when Mazowiecki visits. That is precisely the kind of step Kohl wants to head off.

On the Two Plus Four and Poland's involvement in it, Kohl did not address with you some important shifts that have taken place since Camp David. He reiterated his view that the Poles should be "consulted" on the border question but failed to mention that Genscher and Dumas, in their March 13 joint statement, said it was "the views of their governments" that Poland should "participate" in Two Plus Four meetings when the border issue is discussed. A statement released after the first Two Plus Four discussions in Bonn March 14 said, more vaguely, that Poland should be "invited as soon as questions which particularly concern its borders are discussed." In his phone call, Kohl did not say how and when Poland should be involved, though he did imply that there should be no "two plus five." Kohl also made

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AS AMENDED
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

the point very strongly that there should be no Two Plus Four discussions in Warsaw -- an idea that Jaruzelski and Mazowiecki proposed in Paris and which Dumas supported in his March 12 letter to Jim Baker. Kohl said this was "non-negotiable."

The question of Polish involvement, of course, has direct relevance to your meetings with Mazowiecki, particularly in that the Poles have now said that they should participate not only when the border is discussed but also in the broader security discussions in Two Plus Four. We need to know precisely where Kohl stands on Polish participation in Two Plus Four before Mazowiecki arrives, and whether Kohl has any problem with your assuring Mazowiecki that Poland will participate when the border issue is discussed.

Another point worth noting is Kohl's warning that NATO membership will be a "very important point" in the internal FRG debate. His observation about favorable GDR attitudes toward NATO membership, while encouraging, will not be decisive. The issue will be decided by the political parties and their leaders, including Genscher, in the FRG.

Kohl also alluded to the question of a new constitution for a united Germany. Kohl's preference, to which he has now committed himself in a strong and public way, is for unification to come about via Article 23 of the FRG Constitution (the "Basic Law"). This route would have the GDR, either as a whole or through its individual Laender, simply opting to join the FRG. The new Germany, then, would continue on the same legal basis (with some amendments to the Constitution) and without the need for reopening questions of Germany's NATO membership. It would also be the surest way for Helmut Kohl to emerge as Chancellor of the unified Germany.

For these same domestic reasons, the Social Democrats favor unification via Article 146 -- leading to negotiations between the two German states toward unification on a new basis, with a new Constitution and with a new debate over Germany's membership in NATO. It is also the route that maximizes SPD influence in the process, particularly given the strength of the East German SPD. Genscher has spoken positively about the Article 23 route but has not formally endorsed it, presumably to preserve his option of switching sides -- or even of ultimately jumping over to join a future SPD-led all-German government.

Internal politics also bear on Kohl's opposition to reparations and concern about the German minority in Poland. Both issues are important to the political right in Germany, and thus to Kohl's reelection prospects. Fortunately, these are matters on which we have no need to take sides publicly.

Kohl will surely want to return to these issues when you call early next week. We will update you in our briefing memorandum for that call.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF ~~TELEPHONE~~ CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl
of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME March 15, 1990, 8:37 - 9:01 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl ~~initiated~~ the call. (U)

The President: ~~Helmut!~~ Wie geht's? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well. It's good to hear your voice. George, I had my ~~last~~ meetings in the GDR yesterday. 300,000 were there. I ~~don't~~ think I will see that again. I had one million in the ~~audience~~ in all six public events. (U)

I don't know how ~~the~~ elections will turn out. The situation is very vague. I ~~hope~~ the result will bring about a reasonable coalition. The ~~GDR~~ still has to bear the consequences of 40 years of Communist rule, with its snooping, spying, and blackmailing. ~~There~~ was just another case of someone blackmailed at age 16, when ~~he~~ was still a student. It is very difficult to pass judgment in ~~a~~ situation like that. (U)

Otherwise, things ~~are~~ going well. Best regards to Barbara from Hannelore. (U)

Let me just make a few remarks regarding the overall development of Two Plus Four. First, I hope that the GDR will bring about a new government very soon -- by Easter at the latest. Then, we will work hard to ~~bring~~ about a monetary union. We must stop the exodus, and this ~~is~~ only possible through monetary union. Since January 140,000 people have left the GDR for the FRG. It is difficult under ~~these~~ conditions to build up the country. I hope we will make a ~~smooth~~ settlement and resolve the problems with our neighbors. It will remain my objective, as I told you at Camp David, that ~~under~~ no circumstances will we make a fait accompli. The security and foreign policy issues must be settled first. Only then will we take decisions here. I am not hectic, as the New Yorker ~~described~~ me, but the population here and in the GDR want movement. If they don't get it, they will run around the situation. (U)

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Concerning the Two Plus Four, as we discussed at Camp David, I completely agree that the Poles should be consulted in all those areas that affect them. It was correct what the Ministers agreed at Ottawa -- two on our side and four on the other. Regarding the border issue, we have taken an important step forward. After the Volkskammer has been constituted, we will very quickly -- not in a matter of months, but weeks -- make common declarations between the Volkskammer and the Bundestag. We will state once again, with the support of the two governments, that we wish to enter into obligations that an all-German government will immediately conclude an internationally binding treaty. The Poles are now making further demands. They want a sort of agreement before that; but this, under international law, would not be legally binding. The other solution is much stronger. I was amazed to hear something else floating around. This is non-negotiable for me: that the Two Plus Four discussions about the border should take place in Warsaw. If this happened, we could go to "Yalta" right away. I won't do that. I would like the border issue to run smoothly. The Left here raises it all the time. These are the same people who want a new constitution. That would mean, if we change the Basic Law, that NATO membership would have to be renegotiated. They want us out of NATO. They want the U.S. out. And they want neutrality. Membership in NATO will be a very important point. We will fight that through. It is interesting that there is a positive echo in the GDR. I wanted to say all this by way of briefing you. Once I have new developments, I will call again. (e)

The President: I have a question. Did you say that the concept of a united Germany fully in NATO is gaining popularity in the GDR? (e)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I saw that in the public events at which I was speaking. People there are badly informed. I have tried to explain the situation. Last night I told 100,000 in Leipzig that the main advantages of what we have achieved goes to the citizens of the GDR. It is important to tell them that, because they were in the same square where the demonstrations took place in September, October, and November. The second remark I made was that our gratitude goes to our partners in the Alliance -- first and foremost to the United States. I said that without them I would not be here today. It is a pity you weren't there, George. The people applauded enormously. Then the third point I made was that it is thanks to Gorbachev's perestroika that these new developments were possible. Again they applauded. Fourth, I said I was grateful to the reform movements in Hungary, Poland, and now Czechoslovakia. The actions of Hungary particularly made possible the events of last year [in the GDR]. People applauded again. I said that the Poles need not be concerned. A unified Germany would give guarantees on the Oder-Neisse border. The last point I made was that a reunified Germany will be a part of the European Community and NATO. People applauded that, too. This is my five point program, and this is what the people want. (e)

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The President: That is all very good. I appreciate your bringing me up to date. The Polish border question, as you know better than I, is still very sensitive. We will be meeting next week with the Prime Minister of Poland. I will discuss what you have told me with our top people. If there are any questions, I will call you back. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I will be pleased to hear from you. It would be good if you could call before Mazowiecki comes. When does he arrive? ~~(C)~~

The President: Next week. I believe it is in the middle of the week. The idea of a meeting in Warsaw -- this is the first I have heard of it. We're not pushing that. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Let me say once again, very clearly: I am determined in these next weeks to give, from the federal government and the Bundestag, a very clear declaration and very clear assurances. I predict that the same will be done by the newly elected government and parliament in the GDR. In November, the Poles were quite satisfied. Now they want to put us in the situation of concluding a treaty, but we do not have a mandate to do that. I don't understand why they insist. It is a very strange thing to doubt declarations made by two governments. ~~(C)~~

At no time did I link reparations or ethnic minorities to a treaty on the border. I only wish that what the Poles have already declared be declared once again at the time of unification and a treaty, so that the subject of reparations can also be dealt with once and for all. The President of the Polish Parliament (not Mazowiecki -- he didn't say this) again spoke about billions in reparations. The Israelis have also mentioned billions in the event of unification. This is an extremely difficult situation domestically. People here say it is almost 50 years after the war. They cannot understand. People here also think back to their old home towns. This is a second problem in Poland -- which Mazowiecki can solve very easily, if he only states again, when unification occurs, that the rights of minorities in Poland will be respected. He is a very respectable man, a man of integrity. There are 500,000 Germans there. They should stay and be a pillar of the bridge that links Poles and Germans. I sense, quite frankly, that the problem is not with Mazowiecki. Jaruzelski's remarks in Paris, their tenor and tone, were not favorable for unification. I would be grateful if we could talk again next week. ~~(C)~~

The President: Okay. I will call. I think we are on the same wavelength, but I will talk to my people and will call you. I understand the sensitivities and stand by my position at Camp David. ~~(C)~~

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Chancellor Kohl: I know, I know. You adhere to the position you took. I am not taking issue with that at all. If all our partners were as reliable as the President of the United States of America, I would have considerably fewer problems. I do think there are dividends that will arise out of this very close relationship. Remember the observation I made about people in the GDR? The set great store on the West and do not want neutralization. They feel a part of central Europe, which we are. *let*

The President: Okay. This has been a good conversation. I'll be back in touch early next week. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I hope you are not having too much work. (U)

The President: No. It's beautiful here. You ought to be here. We could go for a long walk. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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March 19, 1990

Kohl-POTUS Call:
Possible Points to Make

(1) GDR Elections: Congratulate. Seek Kohl's views on what the GDR elections mean for the pace of unification.

(2) Poland: M's Visit

- o M. will certainly want to discuss unification. We believe he may raise the idea of a 2+4 meeting in Warsaw and will want to discuss security issues other than the borders.
- o I'll stand with you against a Warsaw meeting if that's your preference. As for Polish involvement on other security issues in the 2+4, I'll seek to discourage the idea. I'll explain that the 2+4 may discuss a number of security issues, but decisions will be made elsewhere (e.g., CFE), where Poland can participate.
- o But we must recognize that the Soviets, and perhaps even some of our Western allies, will continue to champion Polish concerns -- unless the FRG can get firmly ahead of them.
- o Your recent statements and the 2+4 agreement to involve Poland on the border issue should help.
- o But it could prove very useful if you determined the GDR elections gave you a reason for taking a step now toward a German-Polish treaty on the border.
 - I recognize a treaty can only be completed by a unified Germany.
 - Perhaps, it's possible, however, to have joint FRG-GDR discussions or even negotiations on border treaty issues after the new GDR government is formed.
 - If you proposed this now, you could get credit as a leader of all of Germany.
- o If this idea doesn't appeal to you, perhaps you could consider something else, whether in substance or form, that would help further calm Polish anxieties.
- o I know M. will press hard. It's an emotional issue and difficult for a new democratic government that's also pushing through a tough economic plan.
- o We don't want to give the Soviets an opening to manipulate the Polish issue, as they're already doing.

(3) NATO: Consultations and Substance

- o I heard you were great at NATO in Brussels.
- o We also appreciate the FRG's willingness to join us in briefing NATO after the 2+4 meeting.
- o The French have been very negative on NATO briefings. Perhaps we both can work on them.
- o Also appreciate your firmness on a united Germany in NATO. Really important -- for European stability and the U.S.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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March 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the
Federal Republic of Germany, March 20, 1990

At Tab I is a Telephone Call Proposal for the President's call to Kohl at 8:30 a.m. March 20. The talking points outline what the President plans to tell Mazowiecki on the border issue and Two Plus Four, and ask Kohl his intended next steps on the border issue now that the GDR elections have been held. We have also attached proposed talking points prepared by Bob Zoellick. They track with ours but go farther than we think wise in pressing Kohl to take additional steps to resolve the border issue.

We recommend that the call be placed promptly at 8:30 a.m., as Kohl has an appointment at 9:00 a.m. our time.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Previous Telephone Conversation with Kohl
Tab II Zoellick's Proposed Talking Points

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

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March 20, 1990

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI OF POLAND

DATE: March 21, 1990

LOCATION: Oval Office/Cabinet Room

TIME: 10:30 - 11:30 a.m. EST

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

I. PURPOSE

To reassure Mazowiecki of your understanding for Poland's concerns about German unification without undermining Chancellor Kohl, and to reaffirm your strong support for Poland's economic reforms and transition to democracy.

II. BACKGROUND

✓ Mazowiecki's preoccupation is with Germany, most immediately with the border issue. On the latter, he is likely to urge you to put more pressure on Kohl to meet Polish concerns, as Thatcher did during Mazowiecki's visit to London in mid-February and as Mitterrand did when Mazowiecki and Jaruzelski visited Paris March 9. Your overriding aim should be to avoid doing or saying anything that would undercut Chancellor Kohl on the border issue. You should also try to ensure that the border issue does not dominate your meetings.

why?? I do not believe it would be wise to take up Kohl's offer, made in your March 20 telephone conversation, that you could tell Mazowiecki that the Chancellor is ready now to work out the text of an eventual treaty on the German-Polish border. As the Poles almost surely would leak the news, we could end up in the middle of a public back and forth between the FRG and Poland. We should leave it to Chancellor Kohl to decide when, and in what fashion, he might want to raise the issue directly with Mazowiecki.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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The Poles are somewhat mollified at having been invited to participate in the Two Plus Four when the issue of the Polish border is discussed, and they have given credit to the U.S. for bringing Kohl to agree. They gave a muted welcome to Kohl's Bundestag initiative -- that the two German parliaments should pass common declarations, calling for a treaty fixing the current border to be concluded between a future all-German government and Poland. But the Poles are pressing for even earlier conclusion of a treaty to settle the border issue. As Mazowiecki made clear in his February 21 letter to you, the Poles want a treaty, legally fixing the existing Polish-German border, to be initialed by the two German governments now and signed by a future all-German government at the moment of unification.

discuss

In your joint press conference with Kohl at Camp David last month, you reaffirmed that the U.S. respects the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act regarding the inviolability of current borders in Europe, and that the U.S. formally recognizes the current German-Polish border. Mazowiecki may urge you to go further, by endorsing his call for immediate conclusion of a German-Polish treaty on the border issue or by aligning yourself more closely with the Polish cause. You should resist.

Kohl is under considerable pressure -- from the French, the British, and the Soviets, as well as from within the Federal Republic. Kohl also told you at Camp David that he felt the Poles wanted an early treaty as leverage to secure other concessions from Germany, such as economic support possibly linked to the question of war reparations. Kohl's fears may have some basis. To avoid undermining Kohl on this vital issue, you should stick with the assurances you gave in your March 13 reply to Mazowiecki's letter -- in which you reaffirmed U.S. recognition of the permanence of the existing Polish-German border and expressed full confidence that the border issue will be settled to Poland's satisfaction.

Similarly, you should resist Mazowiecki's likely insistence on a broader Polish role in Two Plus Four than has so far been offered. He may ask that Poland have a seat at the table as a full participant in border discussions. He will

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probably repeat that Warsaw should be a site of such discussions, a proposal that Kohl said was "non-negotiable." And Mazowiecki may restate the Polish position that Poland should be involved not only when the border issue is addressed but also in the broader security talks at Two Plus Four. The Poles, for example, would like to use the Two Plus Four in order to put restrictions on the size of a united Germany's armed forces.

You should restate what the U.S., the FRG, and the other participants at Two Plus Four have agreed to: that Poland will be invited to deliberations of the Two Plus Four when ~~the question of the Polish border is discussed~~. While ~~taking credit for helping achieve~~ this result, you will need to avoid further elaboration, since the exact modalities of Poland's participation have not been determined by the members of the Two Plus Four. You can reassure Mazowiecki that the Two Plus Four will not decide the future of European security, but only those issues relating directly to ~~Four Power rights~~ and responsibilities. In short, your ~~best approach is this:~~ having been assured that they will be invited to the Two Plus Four when the border issue is discussed, the Poles should now turn their attention to working constructively -- including in this meeting with you -- to help shape the new Europe.

*Brut
2+4
Downs*

You could then sound Mazowiecki out on his views of the future of Europe, Poland's place in the new Europe, and the role of NATO and the U.S. in assuring peace and stability. Mazowiecki will be more receptive than Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel to your explanation of the need for Germany's remaining a full member of NATO, including its military structure, and the need for a continued strong U.S. military presence in Europe and Germany. In this context, you could thank Mazowiecki for Poland's support for German membership in NATO at the March 17 meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers.

There is no doubt about Polish fears of a united Germany. You can point to full German membership in NATO, including its military structures, as the best assurance for continued European stability. The Poles may now be realizing that a united Germany, if unconstrained by NATO's military structure, would be free to develop a national defense posture and reconstitute a national military planning and command structure -- a German General Staff -- that now does not exist because of the Bundeswehr's integration into NATO.

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You would not want to discuss the issue on those terms, but you can make the point indirectly by stressing the current integration of Germany's forces in NATO. You can also emphasize that the CSCE cannot replace NATO in providing a real deterrent to block aggression in Europe.

It will also be important, particularly in your public remarks, to use this visit to reaffirm your strong engagement in Eastern Europe. In addition to projecting the role we have already played in supporting Poland's economic recovery and democratic transition, you will be introducing to Mazowiecki the U.S. members of the Board of the Polish-American Enterprise Fund after the conclusion of your expanded meeting with the Prime Minister. This will be followed by a brief ceremony in the Roosevelt Room, where you and Mazowiecki will sign a U.S.-Polish Business and Economic Agreement. After these meetings, we will also be announcing the application of "Brady Plan" measures to reduce the Polish commercial debt. (Nick Brady wanted this to be seen as a consequence of a direct request from Mazowiecki, rather than our own initiative.)

Mazowiecki will express his gratitude for the assistance we have provided, but the Poles have been quick to ask for more. Mazowiecki may pursue the extensive new shopping list he handed to Larry Eagleburger when Larry was in Warsaw in late February. You should deflect this request, focusing instead on financial aid already provided or in the pipeline. He may press for a substantial relaxation of restrictions on exports to Poland of high technology goods, a goal that we are actively pursuing with our COCOM partners. He may also raise opening a West Coast consulate and the lifting of diplomatic travel restrictions, two other requests which you can now grant.

Mazowiecki and his key economic advisors deserve great credit for introducing a bold and unprecedented economic reform program that aims at moving Poland quickly to a full market economy. The severe austerity program implemented on January 1 has already brought inflation under control, and with a surprising degree of public support. The price has been economic dislocations and rising unemployment, as expected. And tougher steps are still to come: the planned elimination of subsidies to inefficient firms has fueled concerns about unemployment on a massive scale. Walesa himself has been increasingly critical of the high costs of

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reform, saying in a March 15 press conference that "the honeymoon is over" for the government.

Mazowiecki has proved himself a true statesman in this difficult period, establishing good relations with Jaruzelski and with Moscow while maintaining and even strengthening his credibility at home. Your meetings will give an important boost to Mazowiecki, who seems destined to have a longer tenure than initially thought as Poland's Prime Minister.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The lists of participants are at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

- Oval Office Meeting: Open photo, writing pool
- Cabinet Room Meeting: White House photographer
- Oval Office Meeting with Enterprise Board
Members: Open photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Oval Office meeting followed by expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room. After official meetings, return to Oval Office for brief meeting with U.S. members of the Board of the Polish-American Enterprise Fund.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants Lists
Tab C	Biographies
Tab D	Secretary Baker's Memorandum
Tab E	Exchange of Letters with Mazowiecki

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETINGS WITH
PRIME MINISTER MAZOWIECKI OF POLAND

- I am delighted to welcome you to the White House. Our first meeting is long overdue.
- Through our correspondence, I feel we know one another already. And of course you know the special bond I feel with Poland.
- We have important matters to talk about. I understand your concerns and want to discuss them -- among friends.

THE POLISH BORDER

- I want to assure you that the United States supports Poland's right to exist behind secure and legally-defined borders.
- I am absolutely convinced that the process of German unification -- when it is finished -- will create a single German state within the current borders of the FRG and the GDR.
- As you know, on March 8, Chancellor Kohl took a positive step and presented a draft resolution, which the Bundestag overwhelmingly adopted, proposing that as soon as possible after the East German elections, both parliaments and governments make an identical declaration renouncing any territorial claims against Poland "now or in the future."
- The resolution also calls for a treaty, fixing the current border, to be concluded between a future all-German government and Poland.

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- The inviolability of existing European borders also has been affirmed by all who are signatories to the Helsinki Final Act.
- And, of course, I have repeatedly made clear that the United States recognizes the legitimacy of the current Polish-German border.
- Finally, Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly assured me -- as recently as yesterday -- of the permanence of the current GDR-Polish border. I believe him.
- (SECURITY GUARANTEES -- IF ASKED) We are still examining the question, but our initial reaction is that a combination of CSCE language and the binding nature of a Polish-German Treaty would offer sufficient guarantees. A return to the notion of collective security guarantees would not be wise, given our experiences earlier this century with the League of Nations.

TWO PLUS FOUR

- I am pleased with the decision of the Two Plus Four, taken on March 14, to invite Poland to its deliberations when the question of Polish borders is discussed.
- This process should also help to assure the Polish people that their borders are fully recognized by the international community.
- I want to be clear with you about how we see the Two Plus Four.

- The Two Plus Four is designed to deal with the external aspects of German unity -- specifically with the residual post-war rights and responsibilities that the Four Powers retain in Berlin and Germany as a whole.
- It is not a forum to decide the future of European security, including the size of the Bundeswehr. That is a subject for the next phase of CFE in which Poland will participate. The United States will resist efforts to make the Two Plus Four do more than it should.
- Many new security questions do arise as a result of the unification of Germany: for instance, what to do about the former territory of the GDR and the Soviet troops that are stationed there.
- We will need to find creative solutions to these and other unprecedented problems. We need a process that works constructively, and which does not lead to divisiveness.
- But we very much want to intensify our bilateral discussions with you as Two Plus Four proceeds. You can be assured we will stay in the closest possible touch.
- There will not be a new Yalta. We will not agree to any decisions affecting Poland's vital interests without Poland's involvement.
- (WARSAW AS A SITE FOR TWO PLUS FOUR -- IF RAISED) The Two Plus Four meeting on March 14 decided that talks would be held alternatively in the FRG and the GDR. We

therefore could not support the suggestion that Warsaw be the site of Two Plus Four discussions.

GERMANY: INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

- The FRG has been a good and democratic ally for four decades and we must work together -- all of us -- to create conditions in which German democracy can continue to flourish.
- The March 18 election in the GDR, and the very strong showing of the East German Christian Democratic Union, will pave the way for early unification. It is not the speed but the content of unification that matters.

GERMANY AND NATO

- We support Germany's continued full membership in NATO, including its military structures. We believe that a united Germany cut adrift from its Allies would be a recipe for instability in Europe. We also believe that there should be no extension of NATO forces eastward.
- We are certain that if Germany is free to choose its alliances -- it will choose to remain embedded in the Western alliance.
- NATO is an indispensable element of our partnership with Europe and a key to preserving stability in Europe in this time of sweeping changes. It is the mechanism that keeps U.S. troops in Europe. It built the secure environment in which democratic forces in Eastern Europe were able to prevail.

- As I said last December, "the U.S. will maintain significant military forces in Europe as long as our Allies desire our presence as part of a common security effort." Our allies and friends in Europe, perhaps even Moscow, all want us to stay.
- NATO provides a successful structure for the tight integration of the military planning of its member states, including the German armed forces, within the framework of a defensive alliance.
- It is not for us to decide what will become of the Warsaw Pact. As the governments of Eastern Europe move to democracy, each of you will freely choose your own security arrangements including the issue of Soviet troops on your soil.
- We think it a grave mistake to regard NATO and the Warsaw Pact as two sides of the same coin or to ignore the role of NATO and the U.S. military presence in preserving peace and stability in all of Europe. I therefore would welcome the strong support of Poland concerning continued full German membership in NATO.
- Those of us who remember another Europe -- one in which a "collective security" arrangement, like the League of Nations, had no teeth, and no combined military organization really able to prevent aggression -- do not want to repeat that mistake.

- Nor can we rely only on the balance of conventional armies to prevent war. Nuclear deterrence has been one of the reasons for the long period of peace in Europe.
- In short, NATO should not be a victim of its own success. It must be a central pillar for a Europe whole and free.
- The United States supports the growth of all-European structures -- particularly the CSCE. But the CSCE cannot substitute for NATO in guaranteeing European stability.

ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

- The U.S. commitment to Europe, including U.S. stationed forces, is essential to maintaining stability -- especially in this period of rapid and unpredictable change.
- Reaching a CFE agreement in 1990 is one of my top foreign policy priorities.
- I am delighted that the 23 members of the Vienna negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe accepted the NATO initiative, which I proposed in my State of the Union address on January 31, to resolve the issue of manpower.
- This is an important breakthrough, which removes a major obstacle to the early conclusion of a CFE treaty.
- We would welcome withdrawals of Soviet troops even below this figure. Nothing in our proposal would prevent this.
- We appreciate the steps Poland has taken to adopt a defensive military doctrine and to adjust its military structure toward defense purposes. This sets a good example for all CSCE members. We also want to continue U.S.-Polish military-to-military contacts.

- (RESTRICTIONS ON THE BUNDESWEHR -- IF RAISED) We regard the manpower issue at CFE as settled at Ottawa. Trying to introduce new elements into CFE now would jeopardize early conclusion of a CFE Treaty. And the size of the Bundeswehr is not a topic for discussion at Two Plus Four. This is a topic for future conventional arms control discussions, after a CFE treaty is signed.

CSCE

- We attach special importance to the CSCE process in this period of change in Europe.
- We want to continue strengthening the process at the upcoming Bonn and Copenhagen conferences.
- o A major focus for us at the Bonn conference will be a U.S. proposal for a set of principles to guide the transition from command to market-based economies.
 - o At Copenhagen we will seek additional support for my proposal on free elections which we tabled, at last June's human rights meeting in Paris.
- We can agree in principle to a CSCE Summit this year, provided the signing of a CFE agreement is part of any such heads-of-government meeting.
- o A Summit should review substantive progress in each of the three CSCE baskets, including, we hope, a commitment to the principle of free elections.
 - o Any CSCE Summit this year should be short, carefully prepared and preliminary to -- not a replacement for -- the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference.

- We do not want the CSCE Summit to be centered on Germany, or to be a meeting which tries to undermine Germany's full membership in NATO.
- By the same token, we do not believe CSCE can be converted into some kind of system of collective security. We are convinced that NATO will continue to serve as the ultimate guarantor of security and thus contribute to peace and stability for all of Europe.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

- We are very encouraged by your economic stabilization program. It was right to tackle hyperinflation right from the start.
- I understand that the Polish zloty is holding firm without having to draw on the money in the \$1 billion stabilization fund. This was the intent from the beginning -- that the existence of the fund would give Poles confidence in the zloty. And this is why we were so determined to call on our economic partners to follow our lead in creating the fund.
- I know unemployment is rising and will cause political problems, but I hope the Polish people know that shifting workers out of unprofitable industries is the only way to create a more productive economy.
- The next step will be to ensure the rapid development of a vigorous private sector to absorb unemployment and increase production. The privatization of state industries will be very important, as will attracting foreign investment.

- With the selection of the U.S. members of the Board, the Polish-American Enterprise Fund will soon be fully operational. It comes at a good time to give new financial backing for the development of your private sector.
- I understand the World Bank has just approved loans for \$360 million and plans a total of \$2.5 billion over the next couple of years. The IMF has also begun to disburse new assistance, which will amount to several hundred million dollars.
- This morning, we will be signing a U.S.-Polish Business and Economic Agreement. This will be very important in attracting investment and trade to Poland.
- (BRADY PLAN) Secretary Brady tells me that he believes the international debt strategy for reducing commercial bank debt can be applied to Poland. Since you have a solid IMF program in place, we are prepared to approach other governments, whose banks hold most of the bank claims, as well as our banks and the international financial institutions about your candidacy for debt reduction under the Brady Plan. We are also willing to work with you to develop your proposals.
- (NEW AID -- IF ASKED) We will look at your requests, but there is \$800 million of U.S. assistance already provided or in the pipeline. Rather than plan for new aid, we believe that we should concentrate on making the best use of assistance already in train -- from the U.S., the other G-24 countries, the World Bank, and the IMF.

EXPORT CONTROLS

- We are working with our partners in COCOM to reduce significantly the number of controlled technologies and hope this will be achieved by June.
- We have given your Government a proposal for safeguards against the military use of controlled goods. A critical element is the political and legal commitment to prevent diversions to prohibited end-users. I understand you will send a delegation to Washington to discuss these safeguards.
- We want to work with you so that you have access to the kinds of technology necessary for Poland's growth and development.

OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES: NEW INITIATIVES

- Let me mention two other areas in which we want to move our relationship ahead. First we are delighted to accept your request to open a consulate on the West Coast and, second, we want to lift diplomatic travel restrictions on both sides. We appreciate the assurances you have given us and are glad to move forward on these issues.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN OVAL OFFICE MEETING

U.S.

The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Poland

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime Minister's Office
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS FOR OVAL OFFICE MEETING WITH
ENTERPRISE FUND BOARD MEMBERS

U.S.

The President

Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President
for European and Soviet Affairs

Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Enterprise Board Members

John P. Birkelund, CEO, Dillon, Read & Co. (Chairman)

Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic & International Studies

Nicholas Rey, Managing Director, Bear, Stearns and Co.

Poland

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister

Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime Minister's Office

Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE CABINET ROOM

U.S.

The President
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President
for European and Soviet Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
John R. Davis, Jr., Ambassador to Poland
Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Poland

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
Marek Dabrowski, Secretary of State, Ministry of Finance
Jan Majewski, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Dariusz Ledworowski, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations
Malgorzata Niezabitowska, Under Secretary of State and
Government Press Spokeswoman, Cabinet Office
Waldemar Kuczynski, Under Secretary of State, Cabinet Office
Jan Kinast, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the United
States
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime Minister's Office
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

ma

DOOR

Seitz

Davis

Kuczynski

Zoellick

Ledworowski

Sununu

Dabrowski

Eagleburger

Mazowiecki

The President

The Cabinet Room

Majewski

Brady

Niezabitowska

Scowcroft

Kinast

Gates

Wojtkowski

Blackwill

DOOR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Report	Re: Tadeusz Mazowiecki [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	3/13/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: German Unification Files

Subseries: Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: German Unification (March - April 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 11/4/16

Date Closed:	2/18/2009	OA/ID Number:	91116-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2012-0294-MR(503.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Tadeusz MAZOWIECKI
(Phonetic: mahzohvYETSskee)

POLAND

Premier (since August 1989)

Addressed as: Mr. Premier

Tadeusz Mazowiecki is asserting Poland's newfound independence, working to protect Polish interests as Germany proceeds with reunification, and struggling to restore economic health to the country. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)



Mazowiecki is seen by most Poles as morally above reproach. In recent public opinion polls, he was voted both the most popular and most trustworthy politician in Poland today, above even Solidarity Union Chairman Lech Walesa. Mazowiecki recently showed that he commands the support of the Sejm (legislature) by convincing Solidarity deputies to table a bill calling for the transfer of the assets of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland Party (SDRP—formerly the Communist Party) to the state. Instead, to the satisfaction of most of the deputies (including the SDRP faction), he established a special commission to investigate the legal status of the party's holdings on a case-by-case basis. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

The German Question

Mazowiecki has intensified his efforts to publicize Polish demands that Germany recognize Poland's western border as inviolable. In February 1990 he sent letters to President George Bush and the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France requesting that Poles take part in the "two-plus-four" negotiations on German reunification. Mazowiecki indirectly rejected West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's recent agreement for an East-West German parliamentary declaration recognizing Poland's border. Instead, he wants the two German states and the WWII victors to sign a peace treaty before unification proceeds and definitively enshrines the postwar frontier. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Mazowiecki's Credentials

Before becoming Premier, Mazowiecki played a less prominent role in Solidarity than did other union officials and intellectuals and his selection surprised almost everyone. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Mazowiecki has a solid reputation as an opposition figure. A founder of Solidarity's weekly newspaper, he was its editor from 1981 until he became Premier. He has been a close adviser to Walesa since Solidarity emerged in 1980. During 1961-68 he was a deputy in the

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

(cont.)

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-0294-MK
9/17/2014 MM

Sejm and a member of a small parliamentary group that voiced the frustrations of the unrepresented majority of society. Among other things, he spoke out strongly against Communist control of the education system, censorship of the arts, and harsh police measures taken against marchers protesting that censorship. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Career and Personal Data

The son of a physician, Mazowiecki was born on 17 April 1927. In 1957 he founded and edited the liberal Catholic monthly *Wież*, which has an excellent reputation among the country's intellectuals. It was one of the first Polish publications to discuss the Holocaust and antisemitism among Poles, and it pioneered in attempts to build better relations between Poland and West Germany. For many years *Wież* was one of Poland's only publications open to independent writing. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Involved in student and labor unrest in 1968 and 1970, Mazowiecki was active until the government suppressed him in 1976 for speaking out in favor of free trade unions. In the late 1970s he organized the Flying University of academics who gave lectures outside the Communist education system. Since 1980 he has been an adviser to the Solidarity National Consultative Commission. He was interned with Walesa in the early 1980s and was harassed by security forces in 1986. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Mazowiecki is the author of several books on politics and philosophy and on Christian-Marxist dialogue. He has traveled widely and is well connected to international Christian Democratic figures. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

He likes to visit Laski, a

Franciscan-run institute for blind children. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Twice a widower, he has raised his three sons alone since his second wife's death in 1970. 1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

13 March 1990

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (March - April 1990)

Date Closed: 2/18/2009 **OA/ID Number:** 91116-005

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

AR Case #:

AR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

Appeal Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

Disposition Date:

MR Case #:

MR Disposition:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (March - April 1990)

Date Closed: 2/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 91116-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03f. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (March - April 1990)

Date Closed: 2/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 91116-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03g. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (March - April 1990)

Date Closed:	2/18/2009	OA/ID Number:	91116-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03h. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (March - April 1990)

Date Closed: 2/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 91116-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03i. Report	Re: Jan Kinast [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (March - April 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 11/4/16

Date Closed:	2/18/2009	OA/ID Number:	91116-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2012-0294-MR(503.08)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Jan KINAST
(Phonetic: KEE-nahst)


POLAND

*Ambassador to the United States
(since March 1988)*

Addressed as: Mr. Ambassador

With over 20 years of experience in US affairs, career diplomat Jan Kinast is the Foreign Ministry's leading specialist on the United States, having previously served as a press affairs officer at the Embassy in Washington during 1964-68 and later as deputy director (1971-74) and director (1973-77, 1981-84) of Department III (North and South America) in the Foreign Ministry. A member of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) until its dissolution in January 1990,

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)



Before his current assignment, Kinast was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for three years.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Kinast was born on 23 January 1928 in Warsaw. He was interned by the Nazis at concentration camps in Auschwitz, Flossenbürg, and Dachau during 1944-45. After the war he studied law at Warsaw University, earning a master's degree in 1950. Active in the Polish youth movement from 1945 until 1962, Kinast worked for the youth press during 1950-58 and was director of the Youth Publishing House from 1958 until 1962. He served as deputy commander of the Polish Scout Union during the early 1960s. Kinast joined the foreign service in 1962. He was Ambassador to Brazil during 1977-81. In 1987 he was closely involved in bilateral sessions with US diplomats on the lifting of US sanctions and an agreement to exchange ambassadors.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

Kinast speaks English and some Portuguese. His wife, Krystyna, was born on 4 March 1930 in Stanislawow. The Kinasts have a daughter, Ewa, born in 1953.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

LDA M 90-11963
14 March 1990

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

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
2012-0294-MR
9/17/2014 MM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1990

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lawrence S. Eagleburger  Acting

SUBJECT: Official Visit of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, March 20-23, 1990

I. SETTING

- o The formation of the Solidarity government in September 1989 marks the second occasion in 200 years that Poland has had the opportunity to pursue its national interests independent of foreign domination.
- o Memories of the inter-war government's failure to retain Poland's independence, the breakdown of European security arrangements in 1939, and Poland's exclusion from war-time and post-war conferences all help to animate Mazowiecki's foreign policy agenda.
- o Although domestic economic and political issues remain of critical importance to the success of his government in the first six months, Mazowiecki has made foreign policy his highest priority.
- o Mazowiecki's first foreign policy efforts were directed at stimulating the pace of European integration. In January, he presented a plan for strengthening the structure of CSCE through the creation of a permanent council. In his approach to European integration Mazowiecki has consistently called for a "political" rather than geographical concept of Europe, an approach which the Poles say is designed to enhance a U.S. role in a post-alliance Europe.

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-2-

- o Soon after the Ottawa summit, the Poles began a major diplomatic offensive aimed at:
 - Securing a role for Poland in the Two Plus Four talks, and
 - Ensuring that the process of German unification includes a legal affirmation of Poland's borders.
- o Mazowiecki has staked considerable prestige on his offensive which addresses a fundamental theme in Poland's body politic: "The Yalta syndrome." Solidarity's parliamentary leader Bronislaw Geremek has noted that Poland's exclusions from the Yalta and Potsdam agreements are not just historical facts, they are "a present symbol of Poland's weakness."
- o Although the Bonn decision to include Poland in the talks concerning borders does not completely satisfy their demands, it is understood in Poland as a major triumph for Mazowiecki's foreign policy.
 - Nevertheless, there are signs the Poles may press to be included in broader security discussions.
- o Poland has also been active in the U.N. in creating a new foreign policy approach which will be pursued unencumbered by the policies of the past.
 - The Poles refused to support the Nicaraguan resolution on U.S. action in Panama. They also sided with the United States when they supported a U.S. resolution on Cuba.
- o Mazowiecki continues to enjoy enormous popularity despite an economic program that has caused considerable hardship for the Polish people (though it has curbed inflation).

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-3-

- o Nevertheless, there are signs of fractures within the Solidarity coalition, a development that could undermine the exceptional Polish economic reform effort.
 - In recent weeks there have been signs of increased friction between Mazowiecki and Walesa.
- o Poland will soon hold state and municipal elections which will sweep out of office over 100,000 former communist officials.
 - The Poles are also planning to rewrite their constitution within the next year. This may result in new parliamentary elections by early 1991. Mazowiecki has argued for a slower approach, saying that "we cannot spend all our time holding elections."
- o Mazowiecki has moved slowly to purge the bureaucracy of former communists. Foreign Minister Skubiszewski has said: "We don't want to appoint ambassadors who do not know what a diplomatic note is."
 - During his visit, Mazowiecki will introduce to you his choice to replace Ambassador Kinast as the new Polish Ambassador to Washington, noted journalist (and main author of Walesa's speech to Congress) Kazimierz Dziwanowski.
- o Although he often appears tired and fragile in public, Mazowiecki is proving to be a very tough and strong leader. Nevertheless, the German border issue complicates an already tough task of leading a major economic overhaul and building a democracy.
- o Finally, one cannot underestimate the precedential effect of the Polish economic reforms. Soviets -- from Gorbachev to ministry bureaucrats -- have said they are watching the Polish program closely to see if it will strengthen the hand of Soviet reformers. The price of a Polish failure would be high and would reach well beyond Poland.

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2. WHERE DOES OUR RELATIONSHIP STAND?

- o There is an enormous reservoir of good will toward the United States in Poland. Poles credit U.S. foreign policy, culminating in your July visit to Warsaw, as a major factor in achieving their democratic transition.
- o The Poles are also giving the United States credit (along with France) for Kohl's decision to address the border issue in advance of a unified Germany.
- o The Poles are deeply grateful for the role the United States has played in encouraging Western assistance. They regard our support for the creation of the \$1 billion stabilization fund, and our \$200 million grant to that fund, as crucial to the success of their economic program.

3. WHAT DOES MAZOWIECKI WANT?

- o The Poles regard the visit as an important affirmation of Poland's new independence. They wish to deepen the relationship with the United States across the board, including strengthening the U.S. commercial, cultural and political presence in Poland.
- o Mazowiecki hopes that his visit will usher in a new era in official relations. He wants to make clear that Poland has made a fundamental break with the past 45 years, and that there is no turning back.
 - The Poles consider Mazowiecki's scheduled meetings with Judge Webster and Secretary Cheney to be part of this process.

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- o Although the border issue will not dominate the three day visit to Washington, it will remain the most important substantive element of the visit.
 - Mazowiecki will seek to elicit a restatement of strong U.S. support for Poland's western border and would like as well an endorsement by the United States of the need for a legal affirmation of the current border as part of the process of unification.
 - The Poles are concerned that the Soviet Union not be seen as the guarantor of Poland's borders and will seek a strong U.S. affirmation in order to counter such an impression.
- o Mazowiecki will also seek assurances that the United States intends to remain in Europe.
 - The Poles have called for Germany to maintain NATO membership which they see as the key to continued U.S. engagement in Europe.
- o Mazowiecki is unlikely to make any broad request for further assistance. He will express appreciation for the role the United States has played, especially in helping to organize the stabilization fund and in establishing the Enterprise Fund. Nonetheless, he will probably:
 - Note that he hopes Poland will receive the full amount of what has been promised. There have been press reports in Poland (which are incorrect) indicating that U.S. assistance earmarked for Poland is being diverted to other countries.
 - Ask that the U.S. government do all it can to find ways of reducing Poland's debt by leading a "Brady Plan" commercial debt reduction effort.
 - Raise some specific financial issues, including concerns that USG-imposed reserve requirements on commercial bank lending to Poland are discouraging the banks from expanding activities in Poland.

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- o Finally, although the Poles have prepared considerably for the visit and are becoming adept at how to approach the agenda of senior level meetings, it is still possible that Mazowiecki will bring up "surprise" issues which would be more appropriately handled at a working level.

4. OUR AGENDA

- o We want to show our support for Mazowiecki and demonstrate that we recognize that a new era of official Polish-U.S. ties is underway.
- o On German unification, we want to show that we fully understand the Polish position, especially the historical context of their concerns about big power conferences.
 - Nonetheless, we will need to avoid allowing an atmosphere to develop which would complicate our relations with the Germans.
 - We will want Mazowiecki to understand our concern that the Two Plus Four process develop in a way which encourages German support and which ensures continued support in Germany for NATO membership and for the presence of U.S. military forces.
- o We will also want Mazowiecki to be sensitive to the problem of pressing excessive demands which would only complicate the Two Plus Four process.
- o Finally, we want to make clear our strong support for Mazowiecki's economic policies in Poland, which have involved considerable courage on his part.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1990

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you very much for your letter of February 21, which I have read very carefully. I appreciate the depth of your concerns about the process of German unification and the legal status of the Polish-German border.

During the weekend of February 24-25, I discussed these matters at some length with Chancellor Kohl. I explained to the Chancellor the U.S. position that the present Western frontier of Poland should be the permanent border. I also made this point publicly at our joint press conference on February 25.


Like all states, Poland has a fundamental right to exist behind secure and legally-defined borders. This is a right to which the U.S. is fully committed. I am absolutely convinced that this problem can and will be solved.

As you know, on March 8 Chancellor Kohl presented to the Bundestag a draft resolution proposing that as soon as possible after the East German elections, both parliaments and governments make an identical declaration renouncing any territorial claims against Poland "now or in the future." In reaffirming the inviolability of the current Polish-German border, the resolution also calls for a treaty between a future all-German government and the Polish Government. I welcome, as I hope you do, the Chancellor's initiative as a positive and important step toward settling the border question on a legal and permanent basis.

Let me also address the concerns you expressed about the Two Plus Four process. As you know, Two Plus Four brings together the two German states with the four nations that retain residual post-War rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole. It will decide only those questions which derive directly from post-War rights and responsibilities, and which must be decided in order to restore full sovereign authority to the united German state over its territory, including Berlin. You may be assured that the United States will not be a party to any decisions which affect the vital interests of Poland or any other country without their involvement.

We should continue to stay in close touch on these matters. I very much look forward to welcoming you to Washington later this month and to the opportunity for further discussion on these and other issues of importance to our two nations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "G" and a stylized "Bush".

His Excellency
Tadeusz Mazowiecki
Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland
Warsaw

Dear Mr. President,

The unification of the German nation in a single State opens up a new period in the history of Europe. We cannot possibly enter that period with the security of all the States on the continent, particularly the neighbours of Germany, in their current borders, unassured.

According to the Ottawa statement of Feb. 13, 1990, the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will meet with the Foreign Ministers of the French Republic, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in order to discuss the various external aspects of the establishment of German unity, including the issues of security of the neighbouring States.

Poland welcomed the fact that the questions of the security of the neighbouring States had been referred to in the statement by the six Foreign Ministers.

The fact that the security of Germany's neighbours has been raised has two consequences: a substantive and a procedural one. Each of them is important.

Firstly, as regards the substantive aspect, the Ottawa communique means that the unification of the two German States and the attainment of constitutional unity by the German nation shall leave intact the security of the States adjacent to the unifying (and subsequently unified) German States. In other words, the unification shall in no way impair the present nor future security of the neighbours, particularly with respect to their territorial security and the permanence of their borders.

His Excellency
Mr. George H. Bush
President of the
United States of America
Washington, DC

These are extremely important issues. It is of vital concern for Poland to see an end to any equivocation with respect to the Polish-German border along the Odra-Lusatian Nysa rivers. A future treaty of peace has repeatedly been emphasized in the Federal Republic of Germany as the exclusive instrument by which that border could be settled. However, the legal and political reality is that despite the lack of peace settlement the Odra-Lusatian Nysa border has become part of the European order. Whoever questions that border in one form or another, or puts to question its permanent character - thereby defies the security and cooperation in Europe. I declare Poland's readiness to take part in the work on the peace treaty and her readiness to sign it. However, for reasons beyond Poland's control, work on the peace treaty is not envisaged at all at present or is being postponed until an unidentified point in time after German unification, thus giving some forces the opportunity to continuously consider the Polish-German border an open question. We cannot allow such state of affairs to persist after Germany is unified.

The German Democratic Republic has recognized the Odra-Lusatian Nysa border as the Polish-German state frontier (Zgorzelec Agreement of July 6, 1950). The Federal Republic of Germany has stated that the relevant line constitutes the western state border of the Republic of Poland (The Treaty of Warsaw, of Dec. 7, 1970). Therefore, if one acts in good faith, nothing can obstruct the present Polish-German borderline from becoming reaffirmed by a treaty concluded at the very beginning of the unification process. It is an essential issue for Poland as a neighbour of the German nation.

Secondly, by pointing to the security issues of the neighbouring States, the Ottawa communique indicates that in the discussions between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, there is room for the participation by the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned and adjacent to one or both German States.

The latter implication of the relevant clause in the Ottawa statement deserves closer elaboration.

The present international relationships in Europe are becoming increasingly democratic, with all the European States having the possibility to speak and take part in the conferences or other meetings where their interests, particularly the vital ones, are discussed. It is unthinkable today (and impracticable) for any European State, especially any of the six which adopted the Ottawa statement, to seek to exclude the voice of the neighbours of the German States from the discussion on these neighbours' security. The Polish Government did not allege and is not alleging the existence of such intentions on the part of any of the six States; it attaches great importance to having the best possible relations with each of these States.

Indeed, to exclude the voice of the neighbouring States concerned and to shut them off from the relevant stage of the discussion on the aspects of the German unification which affect the security of the neighbouring States - would be tantamount to a repetition of the Yalta formula of 1945. It would, indeed, mean discussing and deciding by some States about vital interests of others in the absence of the latter.

In view of the foregoing considerations, guided by her own interest as well as that of European cooperation, and by the desire for the best possible relations with her German neighbour - Poland states as follows:

- 1) We believe that the point of departure to the German unification is the final elimination of all doubt or equivocation with respect to the present course, delimitation and demarcation of the Polish-German border along the Odra-Lusatian Nysa rivers. The issue should never re-emerge; the elimination of doubt or equivocation will be equivalent to peace settlement and will have full effect in German law and that of other States. Poland proposes to conclude, at the outset of the unification, a treaty containing provisions to that effect and reaffirming the final and permanent status of the existing Polish-German

border. That border should not be changed in any way. The text of the treaty will be initialled by the two German States and Poland as a result of the discussions indicated by the Ottawa communique. The treaty will be signed by the unified German State and Poland upon the establishment of that unified German State. Poland will submit a draft of such a treaty.

2) Poland considers it indispensable to have a part in the discussion on the external aspects of the German unification in order to present her standpoint on the security issues, particularly those relating to the border and the proposed treaty. Poland makes it clear that she is not seeking a status identical with that of any of the Four Powers nor any of the two German States.

We believe that the discussion on the security issues of the neighbouring States should be held at an early stage of the conference as its separate part.

In conclusion, I wish to state as follows:

The prospect of the unification of the German nation in one State opens up a new chapter in the postwar history of Europe. Poland welcomes every form of national self-determination. The unification of Germany and its external aspects constitute an important part of the peace settlement on our continent. Every State concerned has the right to take part in that settlement. One such State is Poland. Our right stems from the imperatives of international morality, the international law, our historical experience of the last fifty years and our present legal and political situation.

I wish to inform you, Mr. President, that identical letters are being sent to the leaders of the French Republic, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

/-/ Tadeusz Mazowiecki

~~SECRET~~

1933

March 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: The President's Meetings with Prime Minister
Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland, March 21, 1990

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meetings with Mazowiecki. Given Mazowiecki's preoccupation, our most urgent priority is to strike a careful balance in assuring Mazowiecki that the U.S. is sensitive to his concerns while not doing or saying anything that would undercut Chancellor Kohl.

Concurrences by: Tim Deal, Arnold Kenter

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants Lists
Tab C	Biographies
Tab D	Secretary Baker's Memorandum
Tab E	Exchange of Letters with Mazowiecki

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 22, 1990

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CHRON FILE

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany

DATE: March 23, 1990

PURPOSE: To debrief Kohl on Mazowiecki's visit and clear up any misunderstanding about Kohl's offer to work out a text with Mazowiecki.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open line

INTERPRETER: To be supplied by State Department

PHONE NUMBER: WHCA Head of State circuit -- To Chancellor Kohl's residence in Ludwigshafen

CONTACT: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIME: 3:00 p.m. EST, March 23, 1990

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: In your March 20 telephone conversation with Kohl, he offered to work out with Mazowiecki "an eventual text" and suggested you might raise this confidentially during the visit. We all understood Kohl to mean the text of a German-Polish treaty on the border, but Horst Teltschik told us March 21 that the Chancellor was referring to the text of a common declaration that would be issued by the parliaments of the FRG and the GDR. The attached talking points seek to clarify the matter and inform Kohl exactly what was said about this during your meetings with Mazowiecki. They also give a general debrief on the Mazowiecki visit.

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PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/26/24

Attachments

Tab A Points to be made
Tab B Memorandum of your March 20 Telephone Conversation with Kohl

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CALL TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

- As I promised when we spoke on Tuesday, I wanted to give you a readout of my meetings with Mazowiecki.
 - I like the man. He is serious and honest -- a man of real integrity. There is no question that he is a Polish patriot in the best sense of the term. *Kohl agrees*
 - The public side of the visit went very well. We had some things to offer on the economic side -- including a signing ceremony for a new Business and Economic Agreement -- that took some of the pressure off the border issue.
 - He conducted himself very well in his public remarks. He made his points on the border and Two Plus Four, but in a restrained way.
 - So I'm quite satisfied that we were able to project U.S. understanding for Polish concerns without signalling in any way that the President of the United States was trying to pressure Chancellor Kohl. *① Yes, he agrees*
Thank you *same impression here*
②
- PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH MAZOWIECKI
- In my two private meetings with Mazowiecki, he focused mainly on the border issue. It was the matter of a German-Polish treaty on the border, rather than the Polish role in Two Plus Four, that was the issue for him. *③ sharp contrast to impression with Mikhailov*

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- You know his position. He wants a treaty written and initialed before unification and then signed by an all-German government as soon as one exists.
- I took the positions that I outlined to you in our last telephone conversation. I explained your position and your initiatives, including why you cannot take a position now for an all-German government that does not exist.
- I also told him several times that I believed you -- that he should trust you when you say the current GDR-Polish border should be the permanent German-Polish border.
- He didn't dispute that. He said he, too, believed you, but that he worried about the position a united Germany would take. That is why he wants assurances -- and wants a treaty -- before unification.

MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE "TEXT"

- In this context, Helmut, it seems that I misunderstood you when you said I might raise with Mazowiecki the idea that you and he could, confidentially, work out an "eventual text."
- I understood you to mean the text of an eventual German-Polish treaty. But Horst Teltschik has told us you were referring to the text of the common declaration you propose the two German parliaments to issue. Is that right?

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that
Not, big misunderstanding
(over)

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- Just so there will be no further missed signals, let me tell you exactly what I told Mazowiecki on this.
- I asked whether he thought it would be useful if I asked you to consider working out with him the text of a treaty. I didn't say that you have mentioned the idea. And I asked him to keep the idea confidential.
- Mazowiecki said that his first reaction was positive but that he wanted to study the idea.
- That came up in my meeting with Mazowiecki on Wednesday. When we met again yesterday -- after we learned from Horst that there had been this misunderstanding -- I didn't return to the subject. Neither did he.
- My inclination is to let the matter drop. If Mazowiecki comes back to me with a position, I will relay it to you and then leave the matter in your hands. *He should have called me - I would have told him "No treaty before unity" - But if both Gorts, both parts, not reasonable to say we might change our mind.*
- FINAL REMARKS
- All in all, the visit went well. I think it served the purpose of reassuring the Poles that they weren't being excluded. I can't say that I changed Mazowiecki's position on the border issue, though.
- Let me just make a one final observation. Mazowiecki struck me as quite sincere in wanting a reconciliation between the Poles and the Germans. This, along with the confidence he expressed in you, is something to build on.

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Gonzales here yes'day

" said in his

HK " very helpful - very grateful

most difficult

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME March 20, 1990, 8:31 - 8:59 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President initiated the call at 8:31 a.m. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? I called to congratulate you. You're a hell of a campaigner! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for the congratulations. It was a hard, tough time, but it was worth it. You have to bear in mind that these people [in the GDR] are in a very difficult time. The last free elections were 50 years ago. Since 1961, when the Wall went up, there have been virtually no communications with the world outside. The parties lack everything -- staff, experience, everything. They have to start from scratch. And there is even more work ahead. The most difficult problem is the lack of an experienced staff. That means twice the work for me. But I am very happy with the results. (U)

George, the most important thing for you in Washington is that before the elections everyone predicted that everyone would vote on the Left, but the results proved them wrong. The workers voted for us. If we act reasonably, in five years or so the country will have a good economy. The results are very important for the NATO question as well. I will now find totally different support than if the Left had won. So I am happy. Thank you very, very sincerely for all your help. I remember with deep gratitude the letter you sent before my trip to Moscow, and also Secretary Baker's help in Moscow. ~~(U)~~

The President: We're very proud of you. Some press reports here say the Socialists in the GDR are adopting the position that this is all because of Helmut Kohl and are trying to take away the victory from the people. Let me just make a couple of comments about the border and the upcoming visit by Mazowiecki. ~~(U)~~

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Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I would like to hear them. When is he coming? ~~(C)~~

The President: He'll be here tomorrow. There will be a big state dinner. There will be great interest here. I want to be sure we are on the same wavelength. He may well ask for a larger Polish role in the Two Plus Four process. That is why I wanted to talk with you. On the border issue, I will repeat what I said in our joint press conference: "The U.S. respects the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act regarding the inviolability of current borders in Europe. And the U.S. formally recognizes the current German-Polish border." I feel compelled to repeat that with this man here. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: George, that is fine. I completely agree. (U)

The President: I will remind him of your initiative, which will lead to a treaty, fixing the current border, between a future all-German government and Poland. I will tell him that you have repeatedly assured me -- and that I believe you -- that the current GDR-Polish border should be the permanent German-Polish border. ~~(C)~~

On Two Plus Four, I will tell him that I am pleased at the March 14 decision to invite Poland to its deliberations when the issue of Polish borders is discussed. I will remind him that we see the Two Plus Four as a process to deal with Four Power rights and responsibilities in Berlin and Germany as a whole -- not as a forum to decide the future of European security or to debate Germany's membership in NATO. If he asks, I will say that we will not support Warsaw as a site for any Two Plus Four talks, reminding him that members of the Two Plus Four agreed March 14 that talks would be held alternately in the FRG and the GDR. I will offer him intensified bilateral discussions as Two Plus Four proceeds, but I will not agree to any expanding of the Polish role in the Two Plus Four process, on the grounds that while Two Plus Four may discuss other security issues -- discuss them -- decisions will be made in other forums. I'm thinking of CFE, where Poland will have a voice. ~~(C)~~

I know I can assure him we are sensitive to Polish concerns, but I will do so in such a way that your position is not undermined. I want to stop here. I have a few other points I'd like to make, but I want to be sure that what I have said is compatible with your position. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: George, the first thing: I'm very grateful for the spirit of friendship in all that you have said. Everything you have said is absolutely okay with me. I agree with everything you have said concerning Two Plus Four. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me add a couple of remarks on Two Plus Four. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Just a few remarks: if you think it useful, if you want to reassure Mazowiecki, you can report to him that we have discussed the issue extensively on the phone and at Camp David. Please tell him I want to help him be successful, but I also have to be sure I am successful with my policies in my own country. I don't usually say that publicly, but the election results also have a bearing on these questions. I am firmly determined to accept the Oder-Neisse border. I am not hiding anything from here; there is no secrecy. ~~(C)~~

It is true this is a bitter burden of history, but now is the time to settle the issue definitely for the future. An all-German government and parliament must, under international law, make the final settlement. I understand the Poles. They want to know what will occur from now until then, because I don't know how long it will take -- perhaps one year, perhaps two years. This was the idea, which has become easier now after the elections. The GDR parliament and ours will have the same majority. ~~(C)~~

The President: Now that the GDR elections are over, how soon do you see a new GDR parliament and government able to adopt with you a common declaration on the Polish border? ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: At the latest, May or June, our parliament and theirs could take steps. ~~(C)~~

The President: That would be very reassuring. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: This is the earliest I could enter into a commitment. If you like, I could explain the timetable. They will need until mid-April to set up parliament. There is a legal time frame. Then the government can take office, and there are also the Easter holidays. Very quickly the government will have to take a number of priority decisions. They will need to take them if they want to be into the Deutsche Mark system by mid-year. They also have to take basic decisions regarding the social market economy; that will be mid-May. So I see that government in a position to act by the last two weeks of May, or perhaps the last week of May. ~~(C)~~

My idea is to pass declarations at the same time in the GDR and the FRG. Then the governments of the GDR and the FRG would both write letters to Mazowiecki. For example, I could write to Mazowiecki and would convey the decision and confirm once again that I recognize him as Prime Minister. Let me make a further remark, which I am not making publicly: I am ready and willing to agree on an eventual text with Mazowiecki. That is something I am not able to make public, but it may be useful to you. So until June, he can have all these assurances. ~~(C)~~

The President: I would only say that the sooner there can be some of these assurances, the better. The Soviets seem to be trying to stir up trouble on this border issue. Once the two parliaments have acted and the results are conveyed to the Poles, it will reduce the pressures on this issue enormously. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: George, just to make clear: what I said is a promise I can keep. ~~(C)~~

The President: But you cannot communicate that to Poland -- the idea of a text? ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, yes. That's possible. I wanted to wait until you had seen Mazowiecki before doing anything on that. ~~(C)~~

The President: Should I mention this to Mazowiecki or not? I want to do whatever you want on this. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: If you think it would be useful, and if he does not make it public -- and reassures you that he will not -- then tell him I would like to proceed in that direction. ~~(C)~~

The President: Good. Helmut, I heard you were magnificent at NATO in Brussels -- a command performance. I also appreciate your Government's willingness to join us in briefing NATO after the Two Plus Four meeting. Above all, your firm stand on a united Germany remaining a full member of NATO is great. The idea is even gaining acceptance among the East Europeans. I noticed the positive comments by Havel, for example. You mentioned last time that NATO membership would be an important issue in the FRG. We need to continue holding firm. This is vitally important for European security and stability and for the U.S. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: This, after all, is the main issue with the Poles. I want to get along well with them. The Polish Foreign Minister, whom I consider a very intelligent and able man, recently said he, too, wanted Germany to remain a member of NATO. This will also be of benefit to his country. But it is necessary, all the more necessary, that we all come to a mutually satisfactory settlement. It would be very beneficial if Mazowiecki could help me. I would like to help him, too. ~~(C)~~

The President: We will do our best, and then debrief after the meetings. Then I'll be meeting with Thatcher and Mitterrand and will want to stay in close touch with you. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. I think together we will make it successful. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2241

March 22, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
 FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*
 SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the
 Federal Republic of Germany, March 23, 1990

Horst Teltschik confirmed that Kohl will be ready to receive the President's call at 3:00 p.m. our time, March 23. We have provided talking points (Tab A) for the President's use in debriefing Kohl on the Mazowiecki visit.

As Bob Blackwill explained to you this morning, there was a misunderstanding regarding Kohl's offer, in his March 20 telephone conversation with the President (Tab B), to work out with Mazowiecki "an eventual text" and that the President could raise the idea confidentially with Mazowiecki. We all understood this to mean the eventual text of a treaty, but Horst Teltschik told Bob that Kohl was referring to the text of the common resolutions to be passed by both German parliaments. We have described this misunderstanding in the text of the Telephone Call Proposal and provided talking points to clarify the matter with Kohl.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
 Tab A Points to be Made
 Tab B MEMCON of the President's March 20 Call to Kohl

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THE PRESIDENT HAS ~~SEEN~~ 2205

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 26, 1990

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: SPD Thinking on a United Germany in NATO

You asked whether the Social Democrats oppose a unified Germany in NATO.

The most recent official SPD statement (Tab A), issued March 20, is "Progress 90," a proposed disarmament program for a future SPD Government. It was prepared by a working group of the SPD's Left wing under the direction of Oskar Lafontaine, the Party's prospective Chancellor-candidate in the next elections. The 12-point plan calls for removal of all nuclear and chemical weapons from German soil, abolition of the NATO strategies of nuclear deterrence and forward defense, and dissolution of the "military blocs" and their replacement by a new and undefined "European Security System." Although the timing of these measures is not specified, the report calls for the first steps to be taken from the moment of German unification.

"Progress 90" does not represent the formal position of the SPD. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt, SPD chairman and still an influential party elder, said on March 15 that a united Germany has to be in NATO; and Horst Ehmke, Deputy Chairman of the SPD Parliamentary Group, said at a March 7 Washington press conference that "we do not want to leave NATO nor do we propose its dissolution."

But even those in the SPD who support a united Germany in NATO want the Alliance transformed into a more political organization and eventually replaced by a new "European Security System" springing from the CSCE process. And the kind of NATO the SPD has in mind is one in which the strategic underpinnings of nuclear deterrence, flexible response, and forward defense have been substantially stripped away.

Attachment

Tab A SPD Report on "Progress 90"

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-01-14 ME
@ 11/11

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<ORIG>FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6158

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE

RUFHPPP/FRG COLLECTIVE

RUFHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 9733

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: LAFONTAINE WORKING GROUP ANNOUNCES 12-POINT

- DISARMAMENT PROGRAM - CALLS FOR ULTIMATE
- DISSOLUTION OF MILITARY BLOCS, INTERIM CHANGES IN
- NATO STRATEGY

<TEXT>BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 09527

USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL; VIENNA FOR CSBMS DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, KCFE, GE

SUBJECT: LAFONTAINE WORKING GROUP ANNOUNCES 12-POINT

- DISARMAMENT PROGRAM - CALLS FOR ULTIMATE
- DISSOLUTION OF MILITARY BLOCS, INTERIM CHANGES IN
- NATO STRATEGY

REF: BONN 004950

1. (U) "FORTSCHRITT 90," AN SPD SECURITY POLICY WORKING GROUP HEADED BY SPD CHANCELLOR CANDIDATE OSKAR LAFONTAINE, PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MARCH 20 A PROPOSED 12-POINT DISARMAMENT PROGRAM FOR A FUTURE SPD GOVERNMENT (INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION AT PARA 5 BELOW). THE PLAN CLOSELY PARALLELS THE SPD'S "PROPOSAL ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY IN 1990" (REF) INTRODUCED IN THE BUNDESTAG JANUARY 31, AND PARTS OF LAFONTAINE'S EARLIER 10-POINT PLAN. MOST NOTABLE AMONG THE MEASURES LISTED IN THE "FORTSCHRITT 90" PLAN WERE:

- ACROSS-THE-BOARD CHANGES IN NATO STRATEGY, INCLUDING ABANDONMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENSE;
- ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT OF THE MILITARY BLOCS BY A EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM;
- REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM GERMAN SOIL AND ABOLITION OF LOW-LEVEL FLYING;
- CONTEMPORANEOUS UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM;

2. (C) THE LAST POINT ABOVE, THE TIMING QUESTION, IS A NEW AND PARTICULARLY TROUBLESOME ELEMENT. IT APPEARS DESIGNED TO SERVE EITHER ONE OR BOTH OF LAFONTAINE'S OFT-REPEATED OBJECTIVES: PUTTING THE BRAKES ON UNIFICATION AND ACCELERATING ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW SECURITY ORDER. ADOPTION OF SUCH A LINKAGE IN THE SPD PARTY PLATFORM COULD SERVE TO FOCUS THE UPCOMING NATIONAL ELECTION ON GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. ALSO, IT FEEDS THE PERCEPTION THAT NATO IS OBSOLETE AND THAT A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER IS IMMINENT.

3. (C) THE "FORTSCHRITT 90" PLAN REPRESENTS THE PROPOSED PROGRAM OF THE SPD'S LEFT WING AND WE MUST ASSUME REFLECTS LAFONTAINE'S PERSONAL VIEWS. OTHER THAN THE LINKAGE BETWEEN UNIFICATION AND A NEW SECURITY ORDER, THE PROGRAM

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INCLUDES LITTLE THAT HAS NOT BEEN SAID BEFORE. WHILE AN SPD CALL FOR REVAMPING NATO STRATEGY IS NOT NEW, THE "FORTSCHRITT 90" PLAN CLEARLY CONTEMPLATES REJECTION OF KEY ELEMENTS OF WESTERN STRATEGY WHICH HAVE PROVEN EFFECTIVE. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT YET PARTY POLICY, WE NONETHELESS FIND THE PLAN WORRISOME. IT APPEARS INCONSISTENT WITH RECENT CLAIMS BY SENIOR SPD SECURITY POLICY THINKERS THAT A CONSENSUS IS DEVELOPING WITHIN THE PARTY -- INCLUDING LAFONTAINE -- ON AN INTERIM SECURITY POLICY WHICH FORESEES A UNIFIED GERMANY AS A MEMBER OF NATO DURING A (CONCEIVABLY LONG) TRANSITION PERIOD UNTIL A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE IS ESTABLISHED.

4. (U) PRESS REACTION MARCH 22 TO THE "FORTSCHRITT 90" PROGRAM REPORTS SHARP CRITICISM OF THE PLAN BY THE GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. ACCORDING TO THE "FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG" AND "DIE WELT," AN MOD SPOKESMAN CALLED THE PLAN A DANGER TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE FRG, AND SAID IT WOULD LEAD TO DANGEROUS ISOLATION. THE SPOKESMAN ALSO NOTED THAT THE PROGRAM NOT ONLY PUTS THE SPD ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE FRG'S WESTERN PARTNERS, BUT PUTS

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 09527

USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL; VIENNA FOR CSBMS DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, KCFE, GE

SUBJECT: LAFONTAINE WORKING GROUP ANNOUNCES 12-POINT

- DISARMAMENT PROGRAM - CALLS FOR ULTIMATE
- DISSOLUTION OF MILITARY BLOCS, INTERIM CHANGES IN
- NATO STRATEGY

IT IN CONFLICT WITH THE "IMPORTANT DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT" IN EASTERN EUROPE AS WELL. THE "FAZ" NOTES THAT THE MAJORITY OF WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDING THE RECENT PACT MEETING IN PRAGUE EXPRESSLY INDICATED THAT GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS DESIRABLE.

5. (U) INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF "FORTSCHRITT 90'S" PROPOSED 12-POINT DISARMAMENT PROGRAM FOR A FUTURE SPD GOVERNMENT:

THE SPD WORKING GROUP "FORTSCHRITT 90" HAS DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING DISARMAMENT DEMANDS FOR AN SPD GOVERNMENT PROGRAM:

- 1) WE WILL HALT ARMS PROGRAMS SUCH AS "JAEGER 90" AND OTHER LARGE WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
- 2) WE WILL TERMINATE MILITARY LOW-LEVEL FLYING. ✓
- 3) WE WILL LIMIT THE BASIC MILITARY DRAFT SERVICE PERIOD TO A MAXIMUM OF 12 MONTHS.
- 4) WE WILL DRASTICALLY REDUCE THE NUMBER OF (MILITARY) MANEUVERS.
- 5) WE WILL NOT APPROVE EXPORT OF WEAPONS AND ARMS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AREAS OF TENSION, MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN WHICH HUMAN RIGHTS ARE BEING VIOLATED. ONLY ARMS EXPORTS TO WESTERN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES (OECD) WILL BE PERMITTED; THEIR ULTIMATE DESTINATION MUST BE ASCERTAINED.
- 6) AT NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES (CFE) AND AT THE PLANNED CSCE CONFERENCE, WE WANT TO ACHIEVE A DRASTIC REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AND STRICTLY DEFENSIVE STRUCTURAL CHANGES. THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE BUNDESWEHR WILL BE REDUCED BY ONE-HALF. FOR A UNIFIED GERMANY WE ARE STRIVING FOR FURTHER DRASTIC REDUCTION IN

GERMAN FORCES INTERWOVEN IN A EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM.

7) WE WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

8) IN REDUCING THE MILITARY PRESENCE, REGIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS MUST BE CONSIDERED. THEREFORE, TROOP REDUCTIONS IN ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND DENSELY POPULATED AREAS SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY. RELOCATION OF ARMED FORCES FROM DENSELY POPULATED AREAS TO ECONOMICALLY DEPRESSED REGIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT. WHERE MILITARY BASES ARE CLOSED DOWN IN ECONOMICALLY DEPRESSED AREAS, REGIONAL POLITICAL MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN FOR ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING OF THOSE AREAS. EARLY CONVERSION OF ARMS ENTERPRISES TO CIVIL PRODUCTION IS COMPLETELY UP TO THE INDUSTRIES INVOLVED.

9) WE WANT TO ABOLISH THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. NATO MUST GIVE UP THE STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENSE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND NUCLEAR FIRST-USE. WE ULTIMATELY SEEK THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM GERMAN TERRITORY.

10) THE MILITARY BLOCS HAVE LOST THEIR FUNCTION. WE ARE STRIVING FOR THEIR DISSOLUTION. OUR AIM IS AN AGREEMENT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 09527

USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL; VIENNA FOR CSBMS DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, KCFE, GE

SUBJECT: LAFONTAINE WORKING GROUP ANNOUNCES 12-POINT

- DISARMAMENT PROGRAM - CALLS FOR ULTIMATE

- DISSOLUTION OF MILITARY BLOCS, INTERIM CHANGES IN

- NATO STRATEGY

FOR CREATION OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM WHICH WILL REPLACE THE EXISTING MILITARY ALLIANCES.

11) THE PROCESS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION MUST TAKE PLACE IN CONNECTION WITH DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM CAN BE BUILT PROGRESSIVELY. THE COMPLETION OF FEDERAL UNITY MUST TAKE PLACE PARALLEL TO THE FOUNDATION OF THE FIRST STEP OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM, IN WHICH FORCES OF THE EUROPEAN STATES INVOLVED WILL BE COMBINED.

12) THE SPD WILL REDUCE THE FIRST DEFENSE BUDGET FOR WHICH IT IS RESPONSIBLE BY ABOUT 5 BILLION DM. FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE BUDGET WILL, AMONG OTHER THINGS, BE REACHED THROUGH REDUCTION OF THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE BUNDESWEHR. FUNDS THEREBY RELEASED WILL BE USED FOR REGIONAL SUPPORT OF AFFECTED REGIONS, ELIMINATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT, HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, AND AID TO THE THIRD WORLD AS WELL AS AID FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN THE GDR AND IN REFORMING COUNTRIES IN EASTERN EUROPE.

END TEXT.

WALTERS

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<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03 <SSN> 9527 <TOR> 900322142325 MSG000259424605

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 23, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: SPD Thinking on a United Germany in NATO

The President asked (Tab II) whether the Social Democrats oppose a unified Germany in NATO. Your response (Tab I) explains the current state of the SPD debate on the issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A SPD Report on "Progress 90"

Tab II. Your Memorandum for the President dated March 16, 1990

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

March 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *Rg for*

SUBJECT:

Your Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl,
March 15, 1990

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

Kohl's underlying purpose in calling was to try to persuade you not to sign up to a formulation Mazowiecki will likely press on you when he visits March 21: namely, a public statement saying, in effect, that Kohl has not gone far enough to satisfy Polish concerns over the border issue. Prime Minister Thatcher did just that when Mazowiecki visited London February 12-13, agreeing that Poland was entitled to a treaty guaranteeing its current borders. President Mitterrand went further when Mazowiecki and Jaruzelski visited Paris March 9, agreeing with the Poles that there should be a treaty "as soon as possible by the group of six [i.e. the Two Plus Four] with Poland taking part in the work."

Kohl's position, which he reiterated in his phone call, is that soon after the March 18 elections in the GDR, the West German Bundestag and the new East German parliament issue (along with the FRG and GDR governments) common declarations stipulating that an all-German government will immediately conclude a treaty with Poland reaffirming the inviolability of the current border. In short, he has now gone as far as Thatcher went last month, but he continues to resist the Polish call (supported by Mitterrand) that a treaty should be concluded right away.

As you know, the Polish American Congress asked you on March 14 to issue a joint statement on the border when Mazowiecki visits. That is precisely the kind of step Kohl wants to head off.

On the Two Plus Four and Poland's involvement in it, Kohl did not address with you some important shifts that have taken place since Camp David. He reiterated his view that the Poles should be "consulted" on the border question but failed to mention that Genscher and Dumas, in their March 13 joint statement, said it was "the views of their governments" that Poland should "participate" in Two Plus Four meetings when the border issue is discussed. A statement released after the first Two Plus Four discussions in Bonn March 14 said, more vaguely, that Poland should be "invited as soon as questions which particularly concern its borders are discussed." In his phone call, Kohl did not say how and when Poland should be involved, though he did imply that there should be no "two plus five." Kohl also made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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the point very strongly that there should be no Two Plus Four discussions in Warsaw -- an idea that the Jaruzelski and Mazowiecki proposed in Paris and which Dumas supported in his March 12 letter to Jim Baker. Kohl said this was "non-negotiable."

The question of Polish involvement, of course, has direct relevance to your meetings with Mazowiecki, particularly in that the Poles have now said that they should participate not only when the border is discussed but also in the broader security discussions in Two Plus Four. We need to know precisely where Kohl stands on Polish participation in Two Plus Four before Mazowiecki arrives, and whether Kohl has any problem with your assuring Mazowiecki that Poland will participate when the border issue is discussed. //

Another point worth noting is Kohl's warning that NATO membership will be a "very important point" in the internal FRG debate. His observation about favorable GDR attitudes toward NATO membership, while encouraging, will not be decisive. The issue will be decided by the political parties and their leaders, including Genscher, in the FRG.

Kohl also alluded to the question of a new constitution for a united Germany. Kohl's preference, to which he has now committed himself in a strong and public way, is for unification to come about via Article 23 of the FRG Constitution (the "Basic Law"). This route would have the GDR, either as a whole or through its individual Laender, simply opting to join the FRG. The new Germany, then, would continue on the same legal basis (with some amendments to the Constitution) and without the need for reopening questions of Germany's NATO membership. It would also be the surest way for Helmut Kohl to emerge as Chancellor of the unified Germany.

For these same domestic reasons, the Social Democrats favor unification via Article 146 -- leading to negotiations between the two German states toward unification on a new basis, with a new Constitution and with a new debate over Germany's membership in NATO. It is also the route that maximizes SPD influence in the process, particularly given the strength of the East German SPD. Genscher has spoken positively about the Article 23 route but has not formally endorsed it, presumably to preserve his option of switching sides -- or even of ultimately jumping over to join a future SPD-led all-German government.

Internal politics also bear on Kohl's opposition to reparations and concern about the German minority in Poland. Both issues are important to the political right in Germany, and thus to Kohl's reelection prospects. Fortunately, these are matters on which we have no need to take sides publicly.

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Kohl will surely want to return to these issues when you call early next week. We will update you in our briefing memorandum for that call.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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2224

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April 3, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZ 18*
SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations with Prime Minister
Mazowiecki of Poland

At Tabs I through III are the memoranda of conversations for the President's meetings with Mazowiecki: one-on-one and expanded on March 21, and the follow-up meeting on March 22.

AAB
Adrian Basora concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached memoranda of conversations be filed for the record.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation for Oval Office Meeting,
March 21, 1990
Tab II Memorandum of Conversation for Expanded Meeting,
March 21, 1990
Tab III Memorandum of Conversation for Follow-up Meeting,
March 22, 1990

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By *36* NARA, Date *12/28/09*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Poland
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime
Minister's Office
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

DATE, TIME March 21, 1990, 10:30 - 11:20 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Following the arrival ceremony, the President and Prime Minister Mazowiecki began their one-on-one meeting at 10:30 a.m. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: There is one problem I have not been able to clear up. (U)

The President: What? (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Smoking. (U)

The President: (Describes Mrs. Bush.) First, let me welcome you. After our meeting and the expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room, I will be introducing you to the U.S. members of the Polish-American Enterprise Board and then we will sign the U.S.-Polish Business and Economic Agreement. If you have any private subject, this is a good time to discuss it. Then we can join our colleagues. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I want to thank you for an open, warm, friendly welcome. I value it. I believe there has been an enormous acceleration of history in Europe. Its speed is surprising us all. (U)

The President: Absolutely. No one here has predicted the pace. We thought Poland would be first, but no one predicted the pace of change. (U)

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Prime Minister Mazowiecki: My first topic is German unification. Reconciliation with Germany is an historic task for us. We must take it on because soon we will be neighbors of such a Germany. We must be forward-looking, not concentrate on our traumas. We also must reconcile with the Russians. I must convince them that a non-Communist government could still be a friendly government with normal relations. So we have two reconciliations. (Ø)

But concerning the border: thank you for your statement with Kohl and for including us in the Two Plus Four talks. The Polish people are paranoid about agreements being made over their heads. (Ø)

The President: There is similar thinking in this country on Yalta. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: It is crucial to us to insure that our western territories are not just a gift from Stalin -- that they are guaranteed by all the powers, not just in a unilateral act by one. That is why we want to be in the meeting and want a recognition of that border by treaty. We welcome progress in that direction, but declarations are just declarations, and we need a treaty. We need a treaty worked out prior to unification and signed afterwards. Why before? Because after, we fear a sense of strength of a new Germany. I believe Kohl sincerely, but I worry about subsequent statements. (Ø)

The President: We may have a slight difference -- not on substance, but about Kohl. I am convinced he is not stalling because he thinks a unified Germany would be less willing to cooperate. He is not trying to find a way out of adequate guarantees. He has big political problems, though less severe after the GDR elections. That is why he is dragging his feet. He has taken steps: the Bundestag resolution renouncing territorial claims "now and in the future" and calling for a treaty. (Ø)

I see your concerns. Confidentially, what if I could get Kohl to agree with you on a text of a treaty now? Don't answer now, and please keep it confidential. If that would help move the process, I would try it. I don't think I am naive about Kohl. I am convinced he has no secret agenda. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Basically, I am convinced it is not a game, but I worry about excessive references to his right wing. I, too, have a right wing. I cannot accept all his arguments about not doing what is necessary. (Ø)

The President: But he has moved. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Yes. (U)

The President: Do the GDR elections make Kohl's problem easier or harder? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: They should make it easier. It was a big victory, but I would fear that a big victory would make unification by Article 23 more likely. We all should insure that a unified Germany should not have that in its Constitution. (Ø)

The President: Doesn't that have to come from a unified Germany? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Yes. Going back to your words, my first reaction is positive, but I must study the idea. But I think a treaty should be initialed before unification. Why not? (Ø)

The President: Because neither is a legal entity. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: But they could initial it. (Ø)

The President: Kohl has proposed that the two German parliaments pass common resolutions and that an all-German Government conclude a treaty with Poland. Your idea is to write and initial the treaty before unification and sign afterwards. But think about my proposal. Be assured we are playing no games. We are solid on things. You know of our good relations with Germany and Kohl. We trust Kohl, but I realize you can't make policy on individuals. But we have no reason to be suspicious. Kohl is sensitive about having to do continued penance for Nazi sins. But I also recognize Polish concerns about the past and sympathize with their emotions. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Regarding unification itself, we do not share the view that Germany should be neutral. We believe Germany should be incorporated into a European framework. (Ø)

The President: We think Germany should stay in NATO. I have a selling job with Gorbachev -- I like him -- to convince him to have Germany in an expanded role for NATO. We don't want to withdraw from Europe and come home. We see the U.S. playing a positive role. We see the U.S. as a stabilizer. If we aren't wanted in Europe, I will have our troops out the next day. But I think that is not the wise way to proceed. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: We don't believe in a neutral Germany. But we have to do something in a way that Gorbachev can survive. I feel a NATO solution is not acceptable to Gorbachev.

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I may be wrong. Maybe forces of both could remain in Germany.
(C)

The President: You may be right about that. I can't see with great clarity future events in the Soviet Union. We see irreversibility in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but not in the Soviet Union. While there is a mood for pulling back, we should take advantage of it. It might not always be so. I want him to accept the idea there need not be a parity of forces. (C)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: 195,000? (C)

The President: For now, but I don't think we should reduce equally, because we think we are a stabilizing force. But if Europeans don't think so, we will be out of there. (C)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I understand. (U)

The President: We mustn't impose on our colleagues in the other room. We can talk again this evening briefly, and perhaps we could have another private meeting tomorrow. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I would like to continue. We have much to discuss. (Gives plaque to the President.) (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Expanded Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
John R. Davis, Jr., Ambassador to Poland
Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Poland
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
Marek Dabrowski, Secretary of State
Jan Majewski, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dariusz Ledworowski, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
Margorzata Niezabitowska, Under Secretary of State and Government Press Spokeswoman
Waldemar Kuczynski, Under Secretary of State, Cabinet Office
Jan Kinast, Ambassador to the U.S.
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime Minister's Office
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

DATE, TIME March 21, 1990, 11:22 - 11:35 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room

Following their Oval Office meeting, the President and Prime Minister Mazowiecki began their expanded meeting at 11:22 a.m.
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The President: May I say an official welcome. We have had a long, good discussion, including on the border. We will continue tomorrow. Here, I would like to ask the Prime Minister if there is anything he particularly wishes to say before we move on. Welcome to Washington. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Thank you for the invitation, which is of great importance to us. I am happy we can continue our conversation tomorrow. (U)

The President: We could discuss economic issues if you wish. We have Secretary Brady and Larry Eagleburger here. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Concerning the economy, you know how hard a program we have taken. It is linked to our political reform. There is a junction between democracy and a free market economy. These must be taken together. Thank you for all you and your Congress have done to help us. We are not requesting more. We hope what has so far been arranged could be quickly implemented. We hope the Polish-U.S. Enterprise Fund can be quickly implemented and then spread efficiently over the years. (Ø)

The second question is difficult, but we must raise it. We need help on our indebtedness, which is a noose around our economic neck. We need to find a way out. We hope we can get reduced interest rates on our debts, as well as some degree of forgiveness. In the 1950s, this was done for Germany as part of the London Treaty. We know that this can't be fixed during this visit. But we want to begin the intellectual process today to relieve this debt in the Paris Club. (Ø)

The President: Secretary Brady and I have discussed how we can help reduce commercial bank debt. We believe the Brady Plan is applicable to Poland because of the steps you have taken, including a solid IMF program. We are prepared to approach others to pursue the application of the Brady Plan for Poland. We now have good common ground to work together on your debt. We hope you can discuss this later with Secretary Brady. Larry Eagleburger can discuss export controls with you. We are working with our COCOM partners to reduce controls and be more flexible vis-a-vis Poland. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I also touched on the question of the Enterprise Fund. It is important for us if it could be spread over time, with front-loading in the early years. That would give a big boost to the private sector in Poland. (Ø)

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Secretary Brady: There will be \$60 million in 1990, which is how Congress appropriated it. If the \$60 million in 1990 is used up, we could go back to Congress for more. But there are only seven months left in 1990. (Ø)

The President: We are running out of time, but I wanted to tell you we are delighted to accept this request for a Polish consulate on the West Coast. On diplomatic travel restrictions, we will lift those; that matter is also totally resolved. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: We are delighted. We will lift restrictions on our end. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Follow-up Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Christopher Perzanowski, Interpreter

Poland
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime
Minister's Office
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

DATE, TIME March 22, 1990, 10:00 - 10:30 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

As agreed in their March 21 Oval Office meeting, the President and Prime Minister Mazowiecki held a follow-up meeting, which began at 10:00 a.m. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Thank you for a magnificent evening.
(U)

The President: I worried that it was late for you. But I liked the spirit of the dinner. It was palpable. You stayed awake during the piano recital. That was heroic. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I love Gershwin and Chopin. I thought during the recital that we politicians do many things, but Chopin goes on. (U)

The President: What would you like to finish up on -- overall security arrangements, the border? How do you see longer term security arrangements, following a settlement [of the issue of German unification]. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Yesterday we discussed a Council for European Cooperation -- an expanded CSCE. History moves so fast that some institution like this is needed. We should not leave Helsinki II without something like this, providing collective

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security in Europe for the longer term. To us an essential point is as follows: we are between a unifying Germany and a Soviet Union having a variety of unpredictable processes. I want to ensure that U.S. policy envisages a strong Poland -- not on a German or a Soviet scale, but as a big, stable factor between Germany and the Soviet Union. Poland could serve as a basic factor for a new democratic order in Europe. With American support, this role could grow. (Ø)

The President: I could say something to the press about this, I would be delighted to say Poland has this useful and unique role. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I would really appreciate that. (Ø)

The President: I want to assure you that I will handle the Soviets in a way which doesn't complicate life for Poland. I want to reduce tensions and solve problems with the Soviet Union, not create problems which would add to German tensions and thus affect Poland. I think Gorbachev realizes this as well. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Thank you. We want to get both those relationships free of associations with the past. I want to get Soviet forces out of Poland. With a reduction to 195,000, I would hope to have them out. (Ø)

The President: We aren't saying everyone must leave now. I just want to delink after the 195. We are there to stabilize. But I can't go out and say we think Soviet troops should stay. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: No, of course not. (U)

The President: U.S. forces wouldn't remain to threaten anyone. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: We have made clear that we plan to talk about it with Gorbachev. We just don't want to be ostentatious about it. (Ø)

The President: (Side conversation about broccoli.) (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: The press tries to get differences between us on the German issue. I told them the differences were minimal. We will continue to press for a treaty before unification, because we fear afterwards it would slow down. We would like your support with Kohl. I think his worries are excessive. (Ø)

The President: If he would agree, that would be final. But I am not sure we are in total agreement. If there is content to a

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treaty, isn't that better than two treaties by states which won't exist? You have pulled Kohl a long way. I just can't go out and put public pressure on him. I trust Kohl. A contented unified Germany -- frankly, under Kohl -- is easier to deal with on a number of issues. I will tell Kohl your position. I am just not as concerned on this point as you. I think resolutions followed by an early treaty -- which we would press for -- would be okay. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I understand. But this concern is across Europe, not just with us. (S)

The President: Yes, I know -- especially in France, though Mitterrand is very close to Kohl. I know your concerns are broadly shared. A philosophical question: how long does Germany have to do penance? (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: It is not a question of penance. It is a credibility that Germany has changed. I told Kohl: don't let yourself be overtaken by the SPD. It sounds different to Poles when you say, "I can speak for the FRG and will support that in a unified Germany" than if he says "I speak for the FRG and what comes after has to be decided then." (S)

The President: But you got him off that. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: But it came hard. (S)

The President: I think Kohl is for real. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: West Germany has undergone a deep democratization process. East Germany has not. It moved from one totalitarian system directly to another. What kind of influence will they exert? (S)

The President: Do you worry more about East Germany or the Republikaner? (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I don't think there is a current threat. It is leaving something that in the future could be returned to -- that is our fear. (S)

The President: One short point: on Two Plus Four, we have a narrow view of it as dealing with Four Power legal and other responsibilities, not with Europe as a whole. We don't see it as an exclusionary body with a broad mandate. The Soviets were anxious to get it going, but Britain and France like it also. (S)

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What is the rest of your schedule? (Discussion of remainder of visit.) (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I thank you for a very warm and magnificent reception. (U)

The President: We have only respect and friendship for you and your people. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1990

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: German Unification: Economic Impact *4-15*

German unification could have profound, but probably positive, economic implications for Europe, the U.S., and the rest of the world. In the case of the U.S., Federal Reserve staff, for example, have estimated that, over the next one to three years, the U.S. GNP would grow slightly more rapidly than its trend, U.S. inflation would be slightly higher than otherwise, and the U.S. current account deficit would fall due to faster growth in Germany generating more exports from the U.S. After that, these economic variables would return to their trend lines. Other analysts have made similar estimates.

But there is considerable uncertainty about such forecasts. They depend critically on confidence in the Germans' ability to pursue a cautious mix of economic policies as the two economies merge. The most worrisome factor is the increase in world interest rates generated by unification and its effects on world growth.

The remainder of this paper, which draws on informal consultations with Federal Reserve staff and a senior West German Finance Ministry representative, describes West German plans for economic unification, outlines in greater detail the major effects of this process on the German and world economies, and notes other external factors which could offset -- or exacerbate -- the economic impact of the unification process. John Taylor of the CEA has reviewed the paper and concurs in the assessment and conclusions.

FRG Intentions

The West German authorities are moving rapidly toward German economic and monetary union (GEMU) this summer -- probably by July 1. While the FRG has not yet announced the details, it has made some specific commitments regarding the conversion rate of ostmarks (East Germany Marks) into deutschmarks (DM) for small

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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savings accounts and cash. The conversion rate will influence the flow of East Germans into West Germany: if the rate is favorable to East Germany, such as one to one, East Germans will stay put; but if the rate is several ostmarks to one deutschmark, East German incomes will remain far below those in West Germany and economic incentives to move west will persist.

Effects of Economic and Monetary Union

1. Economic Expansion

Unification will clearly generate an economic expansion in West and ultimately East Germany. The West German government projects a one-half to one percent increase in the rate of growth this year to 3.5 to 4 percent, which is high by German standards. Strong consumer demand in the GDR is already evident and will cause increased production in the FRG, as well as additional imports from Europe and other countries. Investment should also increase for the modernization of the East German industrial base. This investment boom could be sustained well into the 1990s and, in fact, must be sustained to bring productivity of the GDR into line with the FRG. Finally, the West German fiscal deficit will certainly increase, as government expenditures necessarily rise without a fully offsetting increase in taxes. Officially, the FRG is committed to further tax reform (cuts) for business; privately, West German economists are predicting some tax increases to fund additional social and other costs arising from unification.

2. Trade Flows

This stronger growth and need for imports will help other European countries and the U.S. reduce trade deficits with the FRG. The U.S. should benefit from higher exports to the rest of Europe as exportable goods from the FRG move east, bringing an additional reduction in our global trade deficit, which some fear will not fall further without a substantial slowdown in the U.S. or a large decline in the foreign exchange value of the dollar.

3. Inflation and Interest Rates

A major -- and worrisome -- unknown is the impact on prices from unification. If monetary union occurs at an exchange rate favorable to the GDR, the large increase in liquidity in a united Germany could be inflationary. However, a number of factors should limit this:

- First, East Germans hold most of their limited wealth in cash or bank deposits and while they will increase spending on consumer goods, they will not wish to be without any savings at all (the FRG may offer attractive savings instruments to absorb some of this liquidity).

- Second, these price rises should be a one-time adjustment to reflect the changing supply and demand situation in a unified economy. They need not lead to sustained inflation, and given the reputation of the Bundesbank (the FRG's central bank) as the anti-inflation bulwark of the Western world, most likely will not produce sustained inflation. This will, of course, be a difficult task for the Bundesbank. It will have to determine the difference between a "temporary" (lasting perhaps 1-2 years) price adjustment and a more fearful emergence of true inflation.

An increase in interest rates -- which has already occurred for long-term securities -- is due to several factors. Economic expansion typically brings with it higher interest rates, as investment increases the demand for capital, and in this case, as the West German government borrows more to finance its deficit (predicted to rise from 2 to 3% of GNP compared with our rate of 3% in FY 89). Market expectations of this increased demand for capital and government borrowing explain the increase in long rates that we have already seen. The emergence of higher inflation also drives up interest rates. The degree to which this increase in interest rates in Germany affects the rest of the world depends on exchange rates. Two possibilities are:

- Without any change in exchange rates, higher interest rates would be transmitted to the rest of Europe and to a lesser extent to the U.S. In addition, should the Bundesbank implement a highly restrictive monetary policy as a means of clamping down on inflation, interest rates would rise significantly and in this case probably lead to slower growth in Europe and the United States. The rise in these rates would offset some of the expansionary benefits described above.
- Alternatively, if the FRG's partners in the European Monetary System (EMS) allow the DM to appreciate against the other currencies in the system, the pressure on German interest rates would be eased. The higher DM would generate more imports and fewer exports for Germany with most of the adjustment coming from the other EMS countries. Inflationary pressures would ease, with interest rates conceivably declining as a result. Under these conditions, German monetary policy could be less restrictive. Such an approach would facilitate attaining the goal to which the West Germans are committed, namely the increase in living standards in the East. Furthermore, this approach of DM revaluation, higher imports, and fewer exports will generate demand in the rest of Europe and the world, thus leading to a net expansion of output, even if interest rates remain somewhat higher than they would be otherwise.

Many factors are contributing to the complexity of this process and have not been touched upon here. For example, while at a one-to-one conversion rate a number of East German industries will remain competitive, unemployment in the GDR can be expected to increase as the most inefficient factories are shut down. In addition, a one-to-one rate will still leave wages in the GDR below West German wages. These developments will increase pressures on the West German government for unemployment and income supports, increasing the FRG fiscal deficit and keeping pressure on monetary policy and interest rates. Thus there is a fine line between the two scenarios discussed above, and German policy making will be extremely difficult, made more so by the problem of obtaining timely and accurate data on the East German economic situation.

Many additional factors, some external to Germany, such as French willingness to allow the DM to be revalued within the European Monetary System, are difficult to assess at this time and could cause very different results. Another example is the financial market uncertainty now generated in the world by the large decline in the Tokyo stock market since the beginning of this year (close to \$1 trillion in paper losses). That is helping keep upward pressure on interest rates in Japan and elsewhere. If world interest rates continue to trend upwards, the expansionary effects of German unification may be partially or fully offset. Thus economic policy making continues to be difficult for all countries, not just a unified Germany.

Conclusion

Given the many uncertainties about German economic unification, we will need to keep a close eye on developments and remind the German authorities not to lose sight of her economic partners' interest as they plot their historic course. Unfortunately, the Germans have made it clear in any number of fora that economic and monetary union is their own show and that consultations with allies will have little impact on their plans. Therefore, if unification leads to unexpected changes in the European and world economies, this German attitude could stymie timely and coordinated G-7 policy actions.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Apr-1990 08:41 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Timothy E. Deal
(DEAL)

SUBJECT:

Germany; NSR

Florence: there are a couple of items that I hope you could check:

-- (1) We sent to you on Friday a memo for the President on the economic implications of German unification. It pointed out that for the U.S. unification probably is a net good. It also explained that the conversion rate between the East German Mark and the deutschmark used by the West German authorities would have an important effect on whether East Germans stay put or seek to move West. Since the President is meeting Genscher tomorrow, this memo might be useful. There is nothing in the present briefing materials on this point.

-- (2) We are still waiting word on the infamous NSR on Economic Policy toward Latin America. The General was going to talk to Brady once again. That matter is becoming more urgent now. First, as you may know, Sen. Mitchell wrote to Secretary Baker and threatened to hold up emergency aid for Panama and Nicaragua since "...the Administration has provided no overall or long-term view of how foreign aid requests are affordable in relation to other spending plans; nor is there a clear explanation of the relationship between this request and our overall national security objectives." He repeated that message last night on McNeil-Lehrer. The NSR would help -- at least in part -- to respond to such charges. Second, movement on the Latin American NSR will allow us to proceed on the NSR (or EPC?) study of U.S. international economic policy objectives for the '90s. We have the draft terms of reference for this study, which is likely to become another wrestling match with Brady & Co. Among other things, the draft specifically calls for a review of our foreign assistance objectives, i.e. the very question posed by Sen. Mitchell.

CC: Wilma G. Hall
CC: Dona F. Proctor

(HALL)
(PROCTOR)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *u*
FROM: MEG LUNDSAGER *f*
SUBJECT: Memo to the President on German Economic and
Monetary Union

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President outlining the most likely economic effects of German Economic and Monetary Union. Our basic conclusion is that unification will have a beneficial impact on a united Germany, Europe, and the U.S. provided that German monetary policy does not become overly restrictive in reaction to rising interest rates in Germany. John Taylor of the CEA has reviewed this paper and concurs in the analysis.

Concurrence by: Robert Blackwill *B*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1990

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DATE: April 4, 1990

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 10:00 - 10:30 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To strengthen the U.S.-FRG consensus on the essentials of German unification, including a narrow agenda at Two Plus Four, and on NATO's remaining the pillar of European security in the new Europe.

II. BACKGROUND

As in your Camp David meeting with Chancellor Kohl, it will be important in your meeting with Genscher to nail down agreement on the key elements of German unification:

- full membership in NATO by a united Germany, including continued integration of German forces in the NATO command.
- the continued presence in a united Germany of stationed U.S. forces and U.S. nuclear weapons.
- management of the Two Plus Four negotiations so as to minimize Soviet ability to constrain or dilute Germany's membership in NATO.

Although our views and Genscher's are fairly close on Two Plus Four, you should be conscious of differences between Genscher and Kohl that could be divisive as these talks enter their decisive phase. In his meeting with Jim Baker at Windhoek on March 21, for example, Genscher supported the Polish call for a border treaty to be drafted and initialed by the two Germanies now and signed later by an all-German government -- an idea that Kohl emphatically ruled out during your March 23 telephone conversation. You will therefore need to be careful to avoid giving Genscher the impression that you prefer his approach over Kohl's.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Having lost the initiative to Chancellor Kohl on German unification, particularly after the CDU's impressive showing in the March 18 GDR elections, Genscher also sees the Two Plus Four talks as a means of reasserting his influence on the security dimensions of unification. (If Kohl is to be the Chancellor who unites Germany, Genscher wants to be the Foreign Minister who unites Europe.) He favors an accelerated timetable for Two Plus Four at the Ministerial level -- where he, not Kohl, will have the dominant role. He may also be susceptible to Soviet calls for broadening the scope of Two Plus Four to include security issues that we want to exclude: Germany's membership in NATO, stationed U.S. forces, constraints on German forces, limitations on nuclear weapons, and others.

Genscher's view of the new European security order is not far from that of the opposition Social Democrats. It envisions a much broader role for CSCE as the basis for a new system of "collective security" in a substantially denuclearized and demilitarized Europe, with NATO becoming more "political." Genscher made all these points in his March 23 speech to the Western European Union, saying explicitly that the "Alliances must be transferred into a union of common collective security." And he argues in private that elements of this new security order need to be implemented now in order to give Moscow the reassurance it needs to accept a united Germany in NATO.

Genscher's meeting with you should be seen in the context of this strategy. In addition to conveying his thinking on German unification on the eve of Shevardnadze's visit, Genscher will want to project his views on the future shape of European security. He may press you for specific commitments on Two Plus Four, arms control, and an expanded role for the CSCE. In deflecting these efforts, you should return the discussion to the fundamentals of European security -- a strong NATO, with Germany as a full member, and a continuing strong role for U.S. conventional and nuclear forces.

Genscher may press, for example, for a U.S. commitment to begin CFE II negotiations immediately upon completion of CFE I. You should tell him that these issues are being considered in the Government, and ask him to describe what he thinks the goals should be in follow-on conventional arms control talks. You may want to stress, however, that our first task is to get the work done now in CFE I.

If Genscher raises the future of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, you should hear out what he has to say, while limiting your own comments to a general endorsement of the continued need to keep a substantial U.S. nuclear presence in Europe. As we draw down our conventional forces, it is even more important to retain our nuclear deterrent as a

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guarantee against any uncertainty about the strength of our conventional defenses as a symbol of the fundamental linkage between U.S. security and the defense of Europe. You should remain noncommittal, though, about the future of the Lance short-range missile system or any new U.S. move on SNF. We are considering options for a broad SNF initiative which you might announce by the end of April. However, we will want to discuss this idea with Kohl before we explore it with Genscher.

At the same time, you will need to assure Genscher that we, too, are conscious of the need to meet Soviet security concerns. NATO should evolve to take on new political tasks, but not in the process cede its security role to some ill-defined and untested "European Security System." We also want to strengthen the CSCE process and have advanced specific proposals toward that end. But CSCE cannot replace NATO as a security organization.

Genscher will also want to hear your views on Lithuania and its impact on U.S.-Soviet relations and would welcome a readout of your discussions with Mazowiecki on the border issue. He may also want to discuss COCOM. Last week, the Germans presented us with a paper calling for dismantlement of most export controls for the GDR. We are studying the proposal and believe we can support a large part of it.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and meeting in the Oval Office.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography
Tab D	Secretary Baker's Memorandum

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

- It is hard to believe how fast events have moved since you were here last November, just before my Malta meeting with Gorbachev.
- The pace of change is unsettling sometimes, but we have made our position clear: we support German unification and we support the leaders of the Federal Republic.
- It is vital that we stay close together as we proceed through this delicate process.

TWO PLUS FOUR

- We are satisfied with the way the Two Plus Four process is going. But it's going to get harder to manage. We will need to stay in close touch at every step of the way.
- I appreciate your support for keeping the Allies fully consulted. The Alliance is a strong asset in managing the Two Plus Four process and achieving German unification.
- We need to insist on a narrow agenda at Two Plus Four. This is not a forum for negotiating Germany's membership in NATO or the Western troop presence in Germany. Two Plus Four should not place new limits on German sovereignty.
- We must maintain the distinction between internal aspects of German unity, which are for the two Germanies to decide, and the external issues that arise from German unification.

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- And we shouldn't rush too fast toward a whole series of meetings. This would make it harder to keep these broader security issues off the agenda.
- How do you see the timing of next steps? How soon do you expect a new GDR government to be in place, and how do you see unification proceeding after that?

BORDER ISSUE -- MAZOWIECKI VISIT

- As you know, Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki was here two weeks ago. I thought the visit went well. We were able to project our understanding for Polish concerns without in any way signalling that we were exerting pressure on the FRG.
- He reiterated his position on the border issue: that there should be a treaty drafted and initialed before unification and signed by an all-German government as soon as one exists.
- I explained the steps Chancellor Kohl and you have taken and told him I supported them. I called Helmut several times to make sure we were on the same wavelength.
- I also did my best to convince Mazowiecki that we have great trust in Chancellor Kohl and you, and that the Poles should trust you when you say the existing GDR-Polish border should be the permanent German-Polish border.
- We are trying hard to keep the border issue from becoming a divisive factor among the Allies at Two Plus Four. It is important for the U.S. and the FRG in particular stay together on this.

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GERMANY IN NATO

- I appreciate your strong commitment to Germany's remaining a full member of NATO, including its integrated military structure.
- We need to remain absolutely firm on this. You know as well as I what this means for Germany's place in Europe and for the U.S. ability to remain a European power.
- President Havel and Prime Minister Mazowiecki both agreed that NATO should remain and that Germany should stay in NATO. Their foreign ministers, along with the Hungarian, said so at the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meeting a few weeks ago. Chancellor Vranitzky told me the same thing.
- We have a hard selling job to do with the Soviets, but I hope we can bring them around to our point of view. I worry that they may try to place constraints on Germany's role in NATO. We must resist. There are other ways of meeting legitimate Soviet security concerns, as we are doing.

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

- We need to continue pushing hard for a CFE agreement as soon as possible. We should keep the pressure on these negotiations. One way of doing that is to make it clear that there will be no CSCE Summit without a CFE Treaty ready to sign.
- There are important issues NATO will need to address in the next couple of years: force levels, nuclear strategy, and

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how to transform the Alliance to reflect a changing security environment.

- We fully agree that NATO has to come to grips with these issues to remain a vibrant and sustainable Alliance.
- However, we have to remain firm on the fundamentals: the maintenance of strong conventional forces, including U.S. stationed forces, and of a viable and credible nuclear deterrent. There is no substitute to NATO for keeping the peace and preserving stability in Europe.
- In short, NATO should not be a victim of its own success. It must be a central pillar of stability and security in the new Europe.
- The United States supports the growth of all-European structures -- particularly the CSCE. But the CSCE cannot substitute for NATO in guaranteeing European security.
- (CFE II -- IF RAISED) We are considering options for follow-on negotiations on conventional forces, but now the most pressing issue is concluding a CFE I agreement as soon as possible.
- (SNF -- IF RAISED) We have to be absolutely firm on the need for a substantial U.S. nuclear deterrent in Europe. We are considering various options for the future. I would welcome your views.

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CSCE

- We attach special importance, as you do, to the CSCE process in this period of change in Europe.
- We want to continue strengthening the process at the Bonn and Copenhagen conferences.
 - o At the Bonn conference, as you know, we are pursuing our proposal for a set of principles to guide the transition from command to market-based economies.
 - o At Copenhagen we will seek additional support for my proposal on free elections which we tabled, at last June's human rights meeting in Paris. There has been an encouraging response from the East Europeans.
- We can agree in principle to a CSCE Summit this year, provided the signing of a CFE agreement is part of any such heads-of-government meeting.
 - o A Summit should review substantive progress in each of the three CSCE baskets, including, we hope, a commitment to the principle of free elections.
 - o Any CSCE Summit this year should be short, carefully prepared and preliminary to -- not a replacement for -- the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference.
- We do not want the CSCE Summit to be centered on Germany, or to be a meeting which tries to undermine Germany's full membership in NATO.

LITHUANIA

- We are all concerned about Lithuania. We are doing all we can to avoid inflaming the situation or to narrow

SECRET

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Gorbachev's options. We know he faces real internal pressure and want to help him find a way out.

- Our focus, as you know, has been on peaceful change.
- If Moscow uses brute force to suppress the Lithuanians, we would all be compelled to respond. East-West relations would suffer.
- We want as much as you do to avoid that. That is why we are trying to convey to Gorbachev -- in a nonthreatening way -- the high costs of military action in Lithuania, and to keep all his peaceful options open.

COCOM (IF RAISED)

- We have just completed our strategic threat assessment and our study on the prospects of illegal diversions from Eastern Europe. On the basis of these studies, we will begin to formulate our proposal for presentation at COCOM's High Level Meeting in early June. We will be consulting with you along the way.
- We are studying carefully your proposal to eliminate export controls on most goods and technologies destined for the GDR. We fully understand the thrust of your proposal, and we support it.
 - o We may have some suggestions on those items that you intend to keep under control, at least during the transition period.
 - o I understand that you have already discussed this issue with Secretary Baker.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft,

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs

Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President
for European and Soviet Affairs

Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State

Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs

Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

Federal Republic of Germany

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister

Dieter Kastrup, Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Frank Elbe, Chief of the Foreign Minister's Staff

Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.

Perry Notbohm, Interpreter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (March - April 1990)

Date Closed: 2/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 91116-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

(TAB D WILL COME FROM STATE LATER TODAY)

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9001654
RECEIVED: 02 MAR 90 11

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 05 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REVIVING THE SPIRIT OF KENNEBUNKPORT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 06 MAR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA

BLACKWILL

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/18/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 4 OF 4

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GRAND FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1654 - Redo

2009-0604-MR

11/4/11

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN April 5, 1990

*interesting to
will need to
meet well
on this
pre-Florida*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*
SUBJECT: Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport

It seems clear from recent French behavior that memories of Kennebunkport have faded, and that we have begun a new and very different phase in French-US relations with serious ramifications for NATO.

Not surprisingly, current French foreign policy thinking is focussed overwhelmingly on Germany. Rapid reunification is taken as a given, and the French Government has repeatedly expressed public support for it. In private however, the French show great uncertainty and apprehension about Germany's future path. French leaders show signs of insecurity -- even a sense of inferiority -- in the face of what they see as a politically triumphant economic powerhouse of nearly 80 million people just across the Rhine. Gone is the comfortable vision of a Europe co-managed by equals in Paris and Bonn, with German moderate economic advantage offset by France's nuclear capability and its essential strategic role in the face of a strong Warsaw Pact.

One logical option for the French would be to rely somewhat more on the U.S. and NATO in dealing with the German issue. Instead, however, recent months have seen a reversion to the traditional French downplaying of NATO, along with a disturbing tendency to keep the U.S. at arm's length. The French have consistently fought against any steps that seem to reinforce NATO's role during this time of change. For example, France has:

- argued strenuously against NATO efforts to establish a common Western position for a CSCE Summit (although the EC has been regularly announcing substantive positions on the future of CSCE);
- tried to keep us from organizing regular consultations in NATO about the Two Plus Four talks on Germany;
- balked at US efforts to establish agreement among the Four Western participants in the Two Plus Four discussions about the positions we will assert there; and

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

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- sought to frustrate any attempt to carve out new political roles for NATO, even on innocuous issues such as NATO sharing of future Open Skies data, establishing a NATO arms control verification staff, or expanding NATO's environmental programs.

Although we have had problems with the French at NATO over the years, Will Taft believes the current French negativism is different. It is not based on any clear concept. There is, instead, simply a dogged resistance by France to any hint of a healthy political role for NATO, without much clue as to how this fits into a large strategic vision.

The French understand, of course, that the future of NATO is linked to the future of the U.S. military presence in Europe. However, the U.S. seems strikingly absent from longer-term French calculations on Europe. So convinced are some French leaders that the U.S. will rapidly withdraw its forces from Europe that they are thinking, and at times acting, almost as if we were already gone.

To be sure, most French foreign policy makers and analysts are quick to assure us that France is anxious to see the U.S. maintain its troops in Europe, and that they believe NATO can play a useful role in the transitional phase to a new security order in Europe. But they are then quick to turn to talk of the rapid emergence of a new Europe in which the U.S. military role will be sharply diminished and NATO will become marginal or disappear. One top advisor to Defense Minister Chevenement recently speculated that the most the U.S. could expect to retain in Germany would be a "symbolic" presence of 20-30,000 troops (with no nuclear weapons).

A full explanation of why Paris has tended to downplay Washington in the last two or three months would of course involve other factors, including deeply entrenched French concerns about a dominant or overly unilateral U.S. role in Europe. Also, there is some evidence that the French see the U.S. as neglecting Paris in favor of Bonn and Moscow.

Your meeting with Mitterrand on April 19 will hopefully help clear the air. Substantively, the key to success in drawing Paris closer to us is to convince Mitterrand and his inner circle that:

1. The U.S. is essential to successful handling of the German question, both now and for the long term, and we are willing to work closely with Paris in dealing with Germany.
2. The U.S. is both determined and able to keep a substantial military presence in Europe.
3. Continued U.S. engagement requires that NATO be kept vigorous for the foreseeable future, and that the U.S. have more effective linkage to the EC, so as to keep close to a rapidly evolving European Community.

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4. The U.S. does not demand a 13th seat at the EC table, however, and does not wish to retard EC integration; quite the contrary, a better-constructed set of US-EC links should serve to encourage further integration.

5. You and your top advisors see a special relationship with France as an essential ingredient of U.S. policy in Europe, and we want closer consultation with France -- genuine consultation, not unilateral dicta in either direction -- to achieve what are largely shared objectives in Europe.

6. There will obviously be times when we need to focus special attention on Kohl or Thatcher; this too serves mutual French and U.S. objectives, and should not cast any doubt on the importance you attach to having a very close relationship with Mitterrand and with France.

As German unification moves forward and the Two Plus Four talks get underway, relations with Paris and London -- both of which are suspicious of Kohl's intentions and Germany's power -- will be difficult and critical. Your personal relationship with Mitterrand will be a key to successful management of the German question and ultimately of our European policy as a whole.

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1654

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 7, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AAB*

SUBJECT: Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport

In view of the critical role that the President will need to play if we are to recapture some of the closer cooperation with Mitterrand that seemed to be emerging last spring, I have converted my recent cable from Paris into a memo for the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-06-04-MR
② 1/4/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Reviving the Spirit of Kennebunkport

It seems clear from recent French behavior that memories of Kennebunkport have faded, and that we have begun a new and very different phase in French-US relations.

Not surprisingly, current French foreign policy thinking is focussed overwhelmingly on Germany. Rapid reunification is taken as a given, and the French Government has repeatedly expressed public support for it. In private however, the French show great uncertainty and apprehension about Germany's future path. French leaders show signs of insecurity -- even a sense of inferiority -- in the face of what they see as a politically triumphant economic powerhouse of nearly 80 million people just across the Rhine. Gone is the comfortable vision of a Europe co-managed by equals in Paris and Bonn, with German moderate economic advantage offset by France's nuclear capability and its essential strategic role in the face of a strong Warsaw Pact.

The Paris-Bonn axis has been a central tenet of French policy since the days of De Gaulle and Adenauer. It has worked well for France and, until recently, seemed likely to help ensure President Mitterrand's place in history. Now, the French see the spectre of an integrated EC increasingly dominated by a united Germany or, worse still, of a "neutral" Germany no longer anchored firmly in the West and Mitterrand is insecure about his relationship with Kohl. So far, however, no clear alternative policy approach has emerged, although the historic French instinct to cultivate the Russians, the British and even the Poles as counterweights to Germany has begun to reassert itself. There are also signs that the U.S. occupies a shrinking European role in French thinking.

One logical option for the French would be to rely somewhat more on the U.S. and NATO in dealing with the German issue. Instead, however, recent months have seen a reversion to the traditional

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-06-04-MR
2011/11/11

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

French downplaying of NATO, along with a disturbing tendency to keep the U.S. at arm's length. Indeed, the U.S. seems strikingly absent from longer-term French calculations on Europe. So convinced are some French leaders that the U.S. will rapidly withdraw its forces from Europe that they are thinking, and at times acting, almost as if we were already gone.

To be sure, most French foreign policy makers and analysts are quick to assure us that France is anxious to see the U.S. maintain its troops in Europe, and that they believe NATO can play a useful role in the transitional phase to a new security order in Europe. But they are then quick to turn to talk of the rapid emergence of a new Europe in which the U.S. military role will be sharply diminished and NATO will become marginal or disappear. One top advisor to Defense Minister Chevenement recently speculated that the most the U.S. could expect to retain in Germany would be a "symbolic" presence of 20-30,000 troops (with no nuclear arms). Furthermore, he is convinced that, should the NATO integrated command survive, we would soon face pressure to have a German general replace an American as SACEUR.

There is another factor leading Mitterrand and his top advisers to look less to Washington in dealing with the uncertain and worrisome future they foresee. The near euphoria in Paris right after Kennebunkport was based in part on French hopes for a special relationship between Mitterrand and yourself, somewhat analogous to the Thatcher-Reagan link. Although Mitterrand continues to hold you in high esteem, there is evidence that he and his closest associates see the U.S. as downplaying Paris in favor of Bonn and Moscow. Mitterrand was sensitive to the turndown of his invitation to Bregancon for just after Malta, and to the fact that it was Kohl, not himself, with whom you met first right after seeing Gorbachev. Other minor incidents seem to have been perceived as slights both at the Presidential and foreign minister level. Though no one incident has been major in itself, their accumulation may also be a factor toward distancing, given the extreme sensitivities that characterize French pride.

A full explanation of why Paris has tended to downplay Washington in the last two or three months would of course involve many factors, including deeply entrenched French attitudes about NATO and traditional concerns about a dominant or overly unilateral U.S. role in Europe. Some of these attitudes will be difficult to deal with, but I believe that the time has come for some renewed personal stroking of Mitterrand.

A personal meeting between you and Mitterrand in the near future could go a long way toward clearing the air. And, in your conversations with Mitterrand, it will be important to get into greater detail on the specifics of key policy issues. To the extent that the two of you agree, such discussions will thus serve to lock in Mitterrand's subordinates. Otherwise, they tend to go on with their own agendas on the specifics, while claiming that they are operating within the general principles that you and Mitterrand have agreed on.

We will also need to work on Roland Dumas and Jacques Attali, who remain Mitterrand's two closest foreign policy associates. Although neither is a particular friend of the U.S., both place high importance on the personal dimension of diplomacy. Dumas, by far the more pragmatic of the two, would probably respond well to additional personal attention and very careful handling by Jim Baker, plus an occasional gesture from you when the situation permits. Attali is coming to Washington on March 8 and I will see whether we can get any further with him in the light of his very different world view (with little place for the U.S. in Europe).

We also plan to try to develop better channels to Elysee Chief of Staff Bianco and to Diplomatic Adviser Vedrine, both of whom have a good sense of European issues and are close to Mitterrand, and to Elysee military advisor Admiral Lanxade, who is reportedly influential on strategic issues.

Substantively, the key to success in drawing Paris closer to us is to convince Mitterrand and his inner circle that:

1. The U.S. is essential to successful handling of the German question, both now and for the long term, and we are willing to work closely with Paris in dealing with Germany.
2. The U.S. is both determined and able to keep a substantial military presence in Europe.
3. Continued U.S. engagement requires that NATO be kept vigorous for the foreseeable future, and that we also have the incentive of more effective linkage to the EC, so as to keep close to a rapidly evolving European Community.
4. The U.S. does not demand a 13th seat at the table, however, and does not wish to retard EC integration; quite the contrary, we strongly favor it, and a better-constructed set of US-EC links should encourage further EC integration (the G-24 process is one good example of this).

5. You and your top advisors see a special relationship with France as an essential ingredient of U.S. policy in Europe, and we want closer consultation with France -- genuine consultation, not unilateral dicta in either direction -- to achieve what are largely shared objectives in Europe.

6. There will obviously be times when we need to focus special attention on Kohl or Thatcher; this too serves mutual French-U.S. objectives, and should not cast any doubt on the importance you attach to having a very close relationship with Mitterrand and with France.

Persuading Mitterrand and his top advisers of the above will not be easy, and even if we do there is no guarantee that French European policy will be to our liking in all respects. With a reasonable effort on our part, however, it may be possible to get Mitterrand to institute a less negative policy regarding NATO and regarding closer U.S.-EC links.

As German reunification moves forward and the two-plus-four talks get underway, relations with Paris and London -- both of whom are suspicious of Kohl's intentions and Germany's power -- will be difficult and critical. Your personal relationship with Mitterrand may well be a key to successful management of the German question and ultimately of our European policy as a whole. If things develop well this spring, we would recommend a State visit by Mitterrand in October.