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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91116
Folder ID Number: 91116-003

Folder Title:
German Unification (January - February 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Outline	Re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (3 pp.)	2/9/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Your Discussions with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Your Discussions with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01d. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	2/5/90	(b)(1)	S
01e. Cable	Re: SYG Woerner's Speech in Berlin: Atlantic Alliance and German Unity, Feb. 8, 1990 (7 pp.)	2/8/90	(b)(1)	C
01f. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner at Camp David February 10-11, 1990 (2 pp.)	2/9/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany (1 pp.)	2/12/90	(b)(1)	C
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (January - February 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap976
OA/ID Number: 91116-003
Date Closed: 2/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02c. Cable	Re: Kohl's Trip to Moscow: Press Backgrounder on Plane Home (4 pp.)	2/12/90	(b)(1)	C
02d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany [Released with WHG on 3/23/10] (1 pp.)	2/12/90	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memo	Condoleessa Rice to Robert Gates Re: First Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group (2 pp.)	2/21/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. List	Re: European Steering Group Re: [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	2/21/90	(b)(6)	
04. Outline	Re: Meetings with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	2/23/90	(b)(1)	S

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CHRON FILE

1054

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0233-F13

Q1 3/14/11

February 9, 1990

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

MEETING WITH
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER

DATE: February 10-11, 1990

LOCATION: Camp David

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To exchange views with Secretary General Woerner about the future of Germany and of the North Atlantic Alliance.

II. BACKGROUND

Woerner can provide us with friendly, informed, counsel on crucial issues involving both Germany and the Alliance at a very opportune moment. Despite his rocky experience with West German and CDU domestic infighting, he is a shrewd and well-connected observer of the German scene and his instincts are, as you know, to be supportive of the American role and U.S. leadership. Drawing on the knowledge he gained as the FRG's Defense Minister, Woerner has displayed a good grasp of security realities and Alliance political dynamics.

On Germany, you can reiterate our support for unification, even at an accelerated pace, as well as our reluctance to let the Soviets use Four Power mechanisms to coerce Bonn on the nature of a new Germany or the pace of its creation. This meeting is also an opportunity to reflect on the Soviet attitude toward German unification, in light of the reports on Baker's discussions and Kohl's meetings with Gorbachev this same weekend.

You have welcomed Chancellor Kohl's and Foreign Minister Genscher's commitments to keep a unified Germany as a member of NATO. This past Thursday, February 8, Woerner spoke in Hamburg on the "Atlantic Alliance and German Unity." A copy of the speech is at Tab D, with key passages highlighted. Woerner wants continued German membership in NATO, with a "special military status" for former territory of the GDR or a bar on extending NATO military integration to this area. You will wish to explore these ideas with him further. How does he envision the application of NATO's security guarantee to this region, which will probably include

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Germany's capital. Would this be reserved only to German troops? Is this idea consistent with Genscher's concept for the demilitarization of Germany?

Woerner believes it essential to keep the U.S. troop presence in Germany and a credible NATO nuclear deterrent. On the nuclear issue, his remarks left open the delicate, but critical, questions of whether he thinks we can or should continue to deploy nuclear weapons on German soil, and whether the May Summit agreement to defer the SNF modernization issue, including the Follow-On to Lance decision, until 1992 will hold throughout this German election year. You should encourage him to doubt our ability to keep nuclear weapons elsewhere on the continent if they were forced out of Germany, and consider the damaging effect such denuclearization would have on the U.S. ability to maintain the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe.

Woerner is thinking about the future security structures for Europe. He believes as we do, that NATO, the EC, and the CSCE will all have vital roles to play. He is worried that the rising importance of the Community and the CSCE may make Alliance decisions increasingly irrelevant. He has endorsed your concept, which you outlined last December in Brussels, of embracing the CFE process as a model for the Alliance role in coordinating further reductions and considering new defensive concepts. He has also welcomed your ideas, and those of Secretary Baker, about new political roles for NATO, both in arms control and in addressing regional and transnational problems.

I recommend that you elicit Woerner's reaction to two other ideas we have been thinking about that could invigorate thinking about the Alliance's future. You may wish to consider hosting, here in the United States, a NATO Summit this summer, immediately after the Economic Summit meeting concludes in Houston in July. Evoking the founding of the Alliance here in Washington in 1949, such a meeting could be viewed as a new beginning for the Atlantic Community.

Second, the Alliance could commission a study by a group of 'Wise Men,' as it has done at several crucial points in its history. With the help of leading figures outside government, such as Lord Carrington, this group could be asked to consider the goals and strategy of the Alliance in building upon the revolutionary accomplishments in the East. The study's report would have implications for the nature and possibility of a CFE II, or for the future of nuclear forces. We would naturally seek to assure, in advance, that the report's conclusions were broadly consistent with our own security objectives.

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This Wise Men's report could be commissioned soon and received and suitably endorsed at a July NATO Summit, thus allowing the Allies to take a coordinated position into the CSCE Summit associated with a CFE signing later in the year. Or, on the other hand, the Washington NATO Summit could commission the study -- with the goal of using the process to evade troubling security issues during the CSCE meeting or the runup to the German elections. You may wish to explore these alternatives with Woerner, taking advantage of the more informal setting at Camp David for an in-depth discussion of these ideas.

On other topics, CFE remains an urgent priority. NATO has just put down a series of new positions: your manpower initiative, a compromise proposal on aircraft, and new definitions for helicopters and armored vehicles. The Ottawa conference on Open Skies will help keep the pressure on (in addition to adding momentum to agreement on your Open Skies initiative, which is progressing well).

Allies are also thinking about the nature of a CSCE Summit, having accepted our basic conditions that it be associated with the signing of the CFE treaty, be limited in time, take up your initiative to include standards for free elections, and be viewed as a prelude to, not a replacement for, the major Helsinki review meeting in 1992.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Participants List is attached at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE

Informal meetings, lunch and dinner.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography
Tab D	Woerner's Speech in Hamburg

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CARD 1 OF 7

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER
GERMANY

- I STILL SUPPORT THE CREATION OF A UNIFIED GERMAN NATION, IF THAT IS WHAT THE GERMAN PEOPLE WANT, EVEN AT A FASTER PACE. THAT WILL JUST REALIZE THE GOAL BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE SHARED IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD EVEN SOONER.
- WE WILL RESIST SOVIET USE OF THE FOUR POWERS MECHANISM AS A DEVICE TO THWART GERMAN NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS.
- I WELCOME YOUR SUPPORT, ALONG WITH THAT OF CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, FOR A UNIFIED GERMANY THAT WILL REMAIN A MEMBER OF NATO.
- WHAT KIND OF POSITION, OR BARGAIN, DO YOU EXPECT KOHL WILL FIND IN MOSCOW? HOW DO YOU

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CARD 2 OF 7

FEEL THE SOVIETS WILL TRY TO INFLUENCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW GERMANY?

- COULD YOU EXPLAIN YOUR CONCEPT IN YOUR HAMBURG SPEECH FOR A "SPECIAL MILITARY STATUS" THAT WOULD APPLY TO THE FORMER TERRITORY OF THE GDR IN A NEW, UNIFIED GERMAN STATE?
- HOW DOES YOUR IDEA COMPARE WITH GENSCHER'S THOUGHTS ON THE NEED FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF THIS REGION?

U.S. FORCES IN GERMANY

- I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT YOU SUPPORT THE CONTINUATION OF OUR TROOP PRESENCE IN GERMANY. HOW DO YOU THINK THIS ISSUE WILL PLAY OUT IN THE PERIOD LEADING TO THE ELECTIONS IN THE FRG AT THE END OF THE YEAR?
- IN YOUR HAMBURG SPEECH, YOU SPOKE OF THE NEED TO RETAIN A NUCLEAR DETERRENT IN EUROPE. DO

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YOU AGREE THIS SHOULD INCLUDE U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES IN GERMANY?

- IF THE U.S. IS ASKED TO REMOVE ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM GERMANY, DO YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RETAIN U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES ELSEWHERE ON THE CONTINENT?
- AS YOU CAN IMAGINE, THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF GERMANY WOULD VASTLY COMPLICATE MY ABILITY TO KEEP U.S. TROOPS ON GERMAN TERRITORY, SINCE MY MILITARY COMMANDERS -- AND MUCH OF THE CONGRESS -- BELIEVE WE NEED TO HAVE THIS ULTIMATE DETERRENT PROTECTION FOR OUR SOLDIERS.

FUTURE ROLE OF NATO

- YOUR EMPHASIS, IN HAMBURG, ON THE VITAL ROLES NATO, THE EC, AND THE CSCE ALL WILL PLAY IN THE FUTURE POLITICAL ORDER OF EUROPE SEEMED

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CARD 4 OF 7

JUST RIGHT. HOW DO YOU FORESEE THE RESPECTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THESE ENTITIES IN THE NEW EUROPE?

- HOW DO YOU THINK WE ARE PROGRESSING IN DEVELOPING NEW POLITICAL ROLES FOR NATO?
- I AM CONSIDERING HOSTING A NATO SUMMIT MEETING HERE IN THE UNITED STATES THIS SUMMER, PERHAPS RIGHT AFTER THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN HOUSTON. NATO WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE PLACE WHERE IT WAS FOUNDED TO DECIDE ON A NEW BEGINNING AND ANNOUNCE A NEW, MORE POLITICAL, CHARTER. WHAT IS YOUR INITIAL REACTION TO THIS IDEA?
- I WAS ALSO THINKING OF USING THE OCCASION OF SUCH A SUMMIT TO ENDORSE, OR PERHAPS RECEIVE, THE REPORT OF A GROUP OF 'WISE MEN,' WHO COULD BE ASKED TO STUDY THE FUTURE GOALS AND STRATEGIES OF THE ALLIANCE IN BUILDING ON THE POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS OF 1989. IT COULD BE

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CARD 5 OF 7

HELPFUL TO HAVE A COORDINATED WESTERN POSITION ON FUTURE SECURITY STRUCTURES TO TAKE INTO A POSSIBLE CSCE SUMMIT.

- THE WISE MEN'S GROUP COULD INCLUDE NOTABLE FIGURES LIKE LORD CARRINGTON. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, TAKE AN INTEREST IN THE CONCLUSIONS WE HOPE THEY WOULD REACH. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THIS CONCEPT?
- IF WE PROPOSE A WISE MEN'S STUDY, SHOULD WE USE A NATO SUMMIT TO LAUNCH THE PROJECT, OR TO RECEIVE ITS REPORT? IF WE WOULD RECEIVE THE REPORT, NATO WOULD HAVE TO TAKE STEPS VERY SOON TO GET THIS WORK UNDERWAY.

CFE

- THIS REMAINS AN URGENT PRIORITY FOR ME, AS YOU KNOW. I WAS PLEASED THAT THE ALLIANCE ENDORSED THE MANPOWER INITIATIVE, AS WELL AS

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CARD 6 OF 7

THE NEW IDEAS ON AIRCRAFT. WE ARE PUTTING DOWN NEW PROPOSALS ACROSS THE BOARD. I HOPE THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO MOVE AS WELL.

- HOW DO YOU THINK WE CAN USE THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE TO KEEP UP THE PACE?

CSCE SUMMIT

- YOU DID A GOOD JOB IN BRINGING TOGETHER ALLIED VIEWS ON HOW SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE ORGANIZED.
- WHAT DO YOU THINK SUCH A MEETING SHOULD ACCOMPLISH, BEYOND THE SIGNATURE OF A CFE ACCORD? I DON'T WANT IT TO TURN INTO A GERMAN PEACE CONFERENCE.

OPEN SKIES

- I AM PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE SO FAR IN DEVELOPING A COMMON ALLIED POSITION ON

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CARD 7 OF 7

THE BASIC NATURE OF THE REGIME.
-- WHAT ARE YOUR EXPECTATIONS FOR OTTAWA?

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER

Germany

- I still support the creation of a unified German nation, if that is what the German people want, even at a faster pace. That will just realize the goal both our countries have shared in the postwar period even sooner.
- We will resist Soviet use of the Four Powers mechanism as a device to thwart German national aspirations.
- I welcome your support, along with that of Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher, for a unified Germany that will remain a member of NATO.
- What kind of position, or bargain, do you expect Kohl will find in Moscow? How do you feel the Soviets will try to influence the development of a new Germany?
- Could you explain your concept in your Hamburg speech for a "special military status" that would apply to the former territory of the GDR in a new, unified German state?
- How does your idea compare with Genscher's thoughts on the need for demilitarization of this region?

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U.S. Forces in Germany

- I was glad to hear that you support the continuation of our troop presence in Germany. How do you think this issue will play out in the period leading to the elections in the FRG at the end of the year?

- In your Hamburg speech, you spoke of the need to retain a nuclear deterrent in Europe. Do you agree this should include U.S. nuclear forces in Germany?

- If the U.S. is asked to remove its nuclear weapons from Germany, do you agree with me that it would be difficult to retain U.S. nuclear forces elsewhere on the continent?

- As you can imagine, the denuclearization of Germany would vastly complicate my ability to keep U.S. troops on German territory, since my military commanders -- and much of the Congress -- believe we need to have this ultimate deterrent protection for our soldiers.

Future Role of NATO

- Your emphasis, in Hamburg, on the vital roles NATO, the EC, and the CSCE all will play in the future political order of Europe seemed just right. How do you foresee the respective functions of these entities in the new Europe?

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- How do you think we are progressing in developing new political roles for NATO?
- I am considering hosting a NATO Summit meeting here in the United States this summer, perhaps right after the Economic Summit in Houston. NATO would be returning to the place where it was founded to decide on a new beginning and announce a new, more political, charter. What is your initial reaction to this idea?
- I was also thinking of using the occasion of such a Summit to endorse, or perhaps receive, the report of a group of 'Wise Men,' who could be asked to study the future goals and strategies of the Alliance in building on the political revolutions of 1989. It could be helpful to have a coordinated Western position on future security structures to take into a possible CSCE Summit.
- The Wise Men's group could include notable figures like Lord Carrington. We would, of course, take an interest in the conclusions we hope they would reach. What is your reaction to this concept?
- If we propose a Wise Men's study, should we use a NATO Summit to launch the project, or to receive its report? If we would receive the report, NATO would have to take steps very soon to get this work underway.

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CFE

- This remains an urgent priority for me, as you know. I was pleased that the Alliance endorsed the manpower initiative, as well as the new ideas on aircraft. We are putting down new proposals across the board. I hope the Soviets are ready to move as well.
- How do you think we can use the Ottawa Conference to keep up the pace?

CSCE Summit

- You did a good job in bringing together Allied views on how such a meeting should be organized.
- What do you think such a meeting should accomplish, beyond the signature of a CFE accord? I don't want it to turn into a German peace conference.

Open Skies

- I am pleased with the progress we have made so far in developing a common Allied position on the basic nature of the regime.
- What are your expectations for Ottawa?

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Vice President

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State

Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs (Notetaker)

NATO

Manfred Woerner, Secretary General

James Cunningham, Private Office of the Secretary General

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01d. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	2/5/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: German Unification Files
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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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<SUBJ>

SUBJECT: SYG WOERNER'S SPEECH IN BERLIN: ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE AND GERMAN UNITY, FEB. 8, 1990

<TEXT>

BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 00779

MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY - A/S SEITZ AND DAS BOHLEN

STATE FOR EUR/RPM - PLS PASS TO AMBASSADOR TAFT ASAP

STATE PASS USIA

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

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AS AMENDED

2009-0668-MR

32 6/30/09

TAGS: PREL, NATO, GE, US

SUBJECT: SYG WOERNER'S SPEECH IN BERLIN: ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE AND GERMAN UNITY, FEB. 8, 1990

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SPEECH (PREPARED TEXT) MADE BY
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER IN HAMBURG ON
FEBRUARY 8 AT 18:00. COMMENT: IN ITS PRESS HANDOUTS,
WOERNER'S OFFICE IS LABELLING THE SPEECH AS A CALL FOR
"THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE TO URGENTLY DEVELOP A COMMON
CONCEPT FOR GERMAN UNITY." ADDRESSEES WILL NOTE THE
DEGREE TO WHICH, IN DISCUSSING THE NEED FOR SUCH A
CONCEPT, WOERNER PARALLELS THE MAJOR POINTS CONTAINED IN
THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S DECEMBER 12 BERLIN SPEECH ON
THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A FUTURE EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE.
ALSO OF NOTE IS THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIFIC MENTION
OF TWO POSSIBILITIES AS SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS TO TAKE
ACCOUNT OF SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS WITH A UNITED
GERMANY AS A NATO MEMBER: A SPECIAL MILITARY STATUS FOR
EAST GERMAN TERRITORY OR AN AGREEMENT NOT TO EXTEND NATO
MILITARY INTEGRATION TO THAT TERRITORY. END COMMENT.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

UBERSEECLUB, HAMBURG

8TH FEBRUARY 1990

ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND GERMAN UNITY

THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY IS ONE THAT MUST
NOW BE LOOKED AT AFRESH. THE RIGID MILITARY
CONFRONTATION OF PAST DECADES IS INCREASINGLY GIVING WAY
TO A CONCERN FOR ENHANCED SECURITY AND TO THE ACTIVE
PURSUIT OF PEACE USING A COMBINATION OF MILITARY AND
POLITICAL ELEMENTS.

TWO TASKS HAVE TO BE FACED IN THE COMING YEARS:

- THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE, AND
- THE CREATION OF A NEW POLITICAL ORDER IN EUROPE.

BOTH TASKS ARE EQUALLY INDISPENSABLE FOR THE
PRESERVATION AND STRENGTHENING OF PEACE IN THE LONG RUN.

THE ALLIANCE THEREFORE FACES A DUAL CHALLENGE. IT
MUST BE A DRIVING AND GUIDING FORCE IN THE DYNAMIC
PROCESS OF CHANGE FROM THE STATUS QUO, HELPING TO
ESTABLISH A NEW CONTINENTAL ORDER OF PEACE AND FREEDOM.
IN THE SECOND PLACE, IT MUST BE A SOURCE OF STABILITY,
GUARANTEEING SECURITY IN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY IN THE FACE
OF ERRATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND A
DIFFICULT TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE.

THE TASK OF WORKING OUT A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY
EQUATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY OFFERS A HISTORIC
OPPORTUNITY. UNDER PRESSURE FOR COMPREHENSIVE CHANGE IN
ITS SYSTEM THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURS A NEW SECURITY
ORDER. THE BASIC PREMISES OF WESTERN SECURITY AND
STABILITY - THE PRESENCE OF US TROOPS ON THE EUROPEAN
CONTINENT, THE CONTINUATION OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND
AN ULTIMATE NUCLEAR DETERRENT TO UPHOLD PEACE - ARE
TODAY INCREASINGLY ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE SOVIET UNION AS

BEING PREREQUISITES FOR STABILITY AND FUNDAMENTALS OF A FUTURE SECURITY STRUCTURE.

I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO BE IMPORTANT:

- ONLY THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK, THE CONTINUED INTEGRATION OF AMERICA IN OUR SECURITY STRUCTURES, CAN GUARANTEE STABILITY IN THE LONG TERM. THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY IS THE CORNERSTONE OF THE WESTERN SYSTEM THAT WAS CREATED AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR, AND WHICH HAS GIVEN US PEACE. WITHOUT THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF NORTH AMERICA IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO BALANCE THE GERMANS' INTEREST IN UNITY, THEIR NEIGHBOURS' CONCERNS AND THE SOVIET UNION'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS, AND TO REACH A COMMON POSITION.
- THE ALLIANCE, WHICH IS THE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF

BT

#0779

BT

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 USNATO 00779

MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY - A/S SEITZ AND DAS BOHLEN
STATE FOR EUR/RPM - PLS PASS TO AMBASSADOR TAFT ASAP

STATE PASS USIA

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, GE, US

SUBJECT: SYG WOERNER'S SPEECH IN BERLIN: ATLANTIC

THIS TRANSATLANTIC LINK, REMAINS INDISPENSABLE FOR A FUTURE SECURITY SCHEME. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ALLIANCE WILL STILL HAVE THE FUNCTION OF GUIDING THE ONGOING ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.

- THE STARTING POINT FOR THE FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE IS PROVIDED BY THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. INITIAL RESULTS MUST LEAD TO YET FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN FORCE LEVELS AND NEW DEFENSIVE STRUCTURES. THE LATEST US PROPOSAL TO REDUCE AMERICAN AND SOVIET TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO LESS THAN 200,000 SHOWS THE WAY. FUTURE CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE MUST NOT REMAIN A MATTER OF MERE BEAN-COUNTING, HOWEVER. IT MUST NOT MERELY COVER FORCE LEVELS, BUT ALSO BUILD-UP CAPABILITY, LOGISTICS, INFRASTRUCTURE, MODES OF DEPLOYMENT, FORCE STRUCTURES AND EXERCISE PATTERNS, UNDER CONDITIONS OF INCREASED TRANSPARENCY.

- A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY EQUATION MUST ALSO COMPRISE A RESIDUAL NUCLEAR DETERRENT AS AN ULTIMATE GUARANTEE OF PEACE, WITH AGREEMENT ON A MINIMUM LEVEL OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENT. ON THIS POINT, THE MOST RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF SOVIET SPOKESMEN, INCLUDING EVEN GORBACHEV, ARE ENCOURAGING.

- IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING WITH THE EAST - FOR INSTANCE MORE EXCHANGES BETWEEN MILITARY ACADEMIES, RECIPROCAL TROOP VISITS, SEMINARS TO ENHANCE SHARED LEARNING.

- COMPARISON OF NATO WITH THE WARSAW PACT IS ONLY

CONCEIVABLE OR USEFUL IF THE LATTER CHANGES
FUNDAMENTALLY TO BECOME A VOLUNTARY ALLIANCE OF FREE
AND EQUAL PARTNERS. UNTIL THIS HAPPENS THE TWO
CANNOT PROPERLY BE EQUATED, ALTHOUGH THEY OFTEN ARE,
THROUGH THOUGHTLESSNESS OR FOR TRANSPARENT REASONS.
EVEN TO REFER TO BOTH THESE ALLIANCES AS MILITARY
BLOCS IS GROSSLY MISLEADING. THE WARSAW PACT ITSELF
IS NO LONGER A BLOC, LET ALONE NATO. THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE IS A FREE ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC,
SELF-DETERMINING NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD, AND IS
PURELY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. UP TILL NOW THE WARSAW
PACT HAS BEEN A MILITARY ALLIANCE LACKING THE
LEGITIMATION OF A FREE EXPRESSION OF WILL BY THE
PEOPLES INVOLVED. WE HOPE FOR A CHANGE, WHICH WOULD
DECISIVELY IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR FRUITFUL
COOPERATION.

- NEVERTHELESS WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT BECOME
GUARANTORS OF THE WARSAW PACT. WE ARE ARGUING
NEITHER FOR ITS DISSOLUTION NOR FOR ITS
CONTINUATION. ITS FATE WILL BE DETERMINED BY ITS
MEMBERS ALONE EXERCISING FREE CHOICE. THIS MUST
ALSO BE ALLOWED FOR IN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.
- EVEN IF THE WARSAW PACT DOES DISSOLVE ITSELF THAT
IS NO REASON FOR DISBANDING NATO. ON THE CONTRARY
THERE IS EVERY REASON TO ARGUE THAT OUR ROLE AS AN
AGENT OF STABILITY WOULD THEN BECOME EVEN MORE
IMPORTANT.

- TO EQUATE THE STATIONING OF SOVIET TROOPS IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WITH THE PRESENCE OF
AMERICAN TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE IS NEITHER
ACCEPTABLE NOR HELPFUL. THE AMERICAN AND CANADIAN
TROOPS ARE HERE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF FREE
PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENTS. THE SAME IS NOT TRUE
OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE -
ON THE CONTRARY, THE FREE GOVERNMENTS OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY HAVE DEMANDED THEIR
WITHDRAWAL. ONCE AGAIN, **THE REMOVAL OF SOVIET
TROOPS CAN AND INDEED WILL LEAD TO THE REDUCTION OF
AMERICAN FORCE LEVELS, BUT NOT TO A COMPLETE US
WITHDRAWAL.** THERE ARE ALSO GEOSTRATEGIC REASONS FOR
THAT. THE CURRENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD
NOT BE USED TO LEGITIMISE THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET
TROOPS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AGAINST THE
WILL OF THE STATIONING COUNTRIES, NOR TO MAKE THEIR
WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONAL ON THAT OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
FORCES.

A FUTURE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ORDER MUST BUILD ON THE
RIGHT OF FREE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES. FROM THE
DEBATE IN THE WEST THE OUTLINES OF A EUROPEAN
ARCHITECTURE FOR PEACE ARE ALREADY VISIBLE. IT IS BASED
ON EXISTING INSTITUTIONS WHICH REPRESENT THE OUTSTANDING
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE POST-WAR PERIOD:

(1) THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WITH ITS

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BT

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 USNATO 00779

MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY - A/S SEITZ AND DAS BOHLEN
STATE FOR EUR/RPM - PLS PASS TO AMBASSADOR TAFT ASAP
STATE PASS USIA

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, GE, US

SUBJECT: SYG WOERNER'S SPEECH IN BERLIN: ATLANTIC

GOAL OF POLITICAL UNION;

(2) THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE;

(3) THE CSCE PROCESS.

IN THIS CONTEXT THE CSCE FRAMEWORK FOR A PAN-EUROPEAN SYSTEM ASSUMES SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE. THE CSCE SYSTEM MUST BE EXTENDED AND DEEPEMED. SUCH AN OVERARCHING STRUCTURE, HOWEVER, CANNOT REPLACE BUT ONLY COMPLEMENT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. HOW SHOULD A BODY OF 35 STATES, WHICH STILL CAN EXERCISE VETO RIGHTS, REALLY GUARANTEE SECURITY. ONLY THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS ABLE TO SUPPLY THE STRUCTURAL BASE FOR THE GROWING EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE, TO OVERCOME CRISES AND CONFLICTS WHICH CAN NEVER BE EXCLUDED, EVEN WITH THE CURRENT CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN LANDSCAPE. THE ALLIANCE IS THE UMBRELLA UNDER WHICH EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IS ABLE TO GROW DYNAMICALLY AND CONTINUALLY. EC AND CSCE WOULD BE OVERBURDENED IF THEY HAD TO CARRY OUT THE TASK OF GUARANTEEING PEACE IN THE FORESEEABLE TIME. THEY DO NOT DISPOSE OF THE NECESSARY STRUCTURE NOR THE CORRESPONDING INSTRUMENTS IN THEIR PRESENT AND FORESEEABLE STATE OF EVOLUTION.

WHETHER WE ARE CONCERNED WITH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OR A PEACEFUL POLITICAL ORDER IN EUROPE, WE INEVITABLY FIND THE GERMAN QUESTION TO BE CENTRAL.

GERMAN UNITY WILL COME. WE, WHO HAVE STRIVEN FOR THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY AND FOR AN END TO THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND OF GERMANY, MUST ACCEPT THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF THE PEOPLES WHO ARE SHAPING THE NEW ORDER IN THE REVOLUTION IN THE EAST. THE TIMETABLE FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GERMAN UNITY WILL NOT SO MUCH BE DETERMINED BY PLANNERS AND GOVERNMENTS AS BY THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE GDR, AS PART OF THE TREMENDOUS RESTRUCTURING OF EUROPE, AND BY THE FREE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE THERE AND IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. WHAT POLITICIANS AND DIPLOMATS CAN DO IS TO RECOGNISE THESE FACTS AND DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK SO THAT THE PROCESS IS SMOOTH AND HARMONIOUS AND AVOIDS CRISES OR ERRATIC DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE ATTENDANT RISKS FOR ALL OF EUROPE.

THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN PLEDGED TO GERMAN UNITY SINCE THE ENTRY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN 1954/55. THIS IS TRUE OF THE THREE WESTERN POWERS AS WELL AS OF ALL THE OTHER ALLIES. THE ALLIANCE IS NOT AN OBSTACLE TO GERMAN UNITY, ANY MORE THAN IT IS TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. IT HELPED TO BRING MORE DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM. IT SEEKS TO OVERCOME THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND EUROPE. IT IS PROMOTING REFORM IN THE EAST.

THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF NATO AND PROGRESS TOWARDS GERMAN UNITY ARE PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE. INDEED I WOULD SAY THEY WERE MUTUALLY DEPENDENT. NOW I HEAR SOMETIMES: IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO ASSUME THAT A REUNIFIED GERMANY COULD EXIST IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. I WOULD CONFRONT THESE VOICES WITH THE INSIGHT DRAWN FROM OUR HISTORIC EXPERIENCE: TO MAKE THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ALLIANCE A SINE QUA NON OF GERMAN UNITY WOULD DEPRIVE BOTH GERMANY AND EUROPE OF A BASIC FORCE FOR STABILITY. ONLY FIRM ANCHORING IN THE WEST CAN PROVIDE THE FUNDAMENTAL STABILITY FOR THE DIFFICULT PROCESS IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED.

A DRIFTING, NEUTRAL GERMANY CANNOT BE A SOLUTION, GIVEN THE COUNTRY'S GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POTENTIAL, AND THIS IS THE VIEW OF ALL THE ALLIES. IT WOULD NOT EVEN BE IN THE ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST OF THE SOVIETS. THE HISTORY OF THE LAST TWO CENTURIES DEMONSTRATES THIS.

THUS THERE IS NO ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO GERMANY REMAINING ANCHORED IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE - AND BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO CONSIDER THE GERMAN QUESTION IN TERMS OF A DYNAMICALLY UNFOLDING FUTURE WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, VIEWING THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AS MERELY STATIC. THE LATTER IS ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME SERIES OF RAPID, INTERDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENTS.

THE SOVIET UNION IS ADAPTING TO THIS MOVEMENT TOWARDS GERMAN UNITY. FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S SPEECH IN BRUSSELS AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S LATEST PRONOUNCEMENTS SHOW THIS. SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS AND THEIR DEFINITION HAVE CHANGED DRAMATICALLY IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS. THE SOVIETS' FORWARD DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE SINCE 1945 SPRANG PARTLY FROM AN EXPANSIONIST

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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 USNATO 00779

MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY - A/S SEITZ AND DAS BOHLEN
STATE FOR EUR/RPM - PLS PASS TO AMBASSADOR TAFT ASAP
STATE PASS USIA

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, GE, US

SUBJECT: SYG WOERNER'S SPEECH IN BERLIN: ATLANTIC
DRIVE FOR WORLD POWER, BUT ALSO FROM A DEEP-SEATED NEED
FOR SECURITY. THAT NEED HAS LOST ITS JUSTIFICATION WITH
THE NOW UNEQUIVOCAL RECOGNITION THAT THERE IS NO THREAT
FROM THE WEST.

AS A RESULT, THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THEIR SECURITY
HAS CHANGED. THEY NO LONGER NEED A WESTERN GLACIS. THE
SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT - AND IS PROBABLY
ALREADY ON THE WAY TO DOING SO - THAT ITS SECURITY WILL
BE ENHANCED RATHER THAN IMPAIRED BY THE LOSS OF ITS
CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN BUFFER ZONE. NEW, STABLE

STRUCTURES AND INCREASED PROSPERITY AS WELL AS NEW AND CLOSER FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WILL ABOVE ALL BENEFIT THE SOVIET REFORM PROCESS.

THE SOVIET UNION'S SECURITY INTERESTS - IN STABILITY, FREEDOM FROM THREAT AND COOPERATION ALONG THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET STATE - WILL BE BETTER SERVED IN THE LONG TERM BY THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS AND THE FURTHER REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES, BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE ALLIANCE AS A COOPERATIVE PARTNER IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PEACE, AND BY THE EXTENSION OF THE CSCE SYSTEM AND THE RESULTING REDUCTION OF CONFRONTATION.

IN ADDITION, SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE DEVISED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS WITH A UNITED GERMANY AS A MEMBER OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

A COMPONENT OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT COULD BE A SPECIAL MILITARY STATUS FOR THE TERRITORY OF THE GDR, OR PERHAPS AN AGREEMENT NOT TO EXTEND MILITARY INTEGRATION TO THAT TERRITORY. THESE ARE JUST TWO POSSIBILITIES OUT OF MANY WHICH COULD BE CONCEIVED. GERMAN UNITY AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITHIN A SECURITY ARCHITECTURE WHICH WOULD PRESERVE EUROPEAN STABILITY IN THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS OF OTHER STATES.

THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE MUST AS A MATTER OF URGENCY INCORPORATE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS INTO A COMMON CONCEPT FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS GERMAN UNITY.

THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE CSCE SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AS A FRAMEWORK FOR GERMAN AND EUROPEAN UNITY. OMISSION OF ANY OF THESE STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS WOULD DISRUPT THE BALANCE WHICH IS SO VITAL FOR THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND EUROPE. THE SOVIET UNION CAN BE SURE THAT WE TAKEN THEIR IDEAS SERIOUSLY, AND MORE: WE WILL RESPECT THEIR LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS.

END TEXT.

KORNBLUM

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SECTION: 01 OF 04

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1054

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 9, 1990

2/9/90
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Brent -- As we
discussed, I have
included the NATO
Summit and Wise Men
ideas in the
memo to the
President.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/JOHN GORDON (ACTING)

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with NATO Secretary
General Manfred Woerner at Camp David
February 10-11, 1990

Bob Blackwill

As you know, Woerner's visit is an excellent opportunity for in-depth discussions on both the future of Germany and the future of NATO. On Germany, Woerner can help us project the likely next steps on the road to unification and think about key decisions that lie ahead, as well as reflecting on the news from Moscow. One key question that is already upon us, of course, is the issue of Germany's role in the Alliance.

Woerner wants Germany to stay in NATO, and outlined his ideas on how to do this in a speech in Hamburg yesterday (attached at Tab D). Paralleling Genscher, he has suggested a special military status for former territory of the GDR, or an agreement not to extend NATO military integration to that territory. We should invite an elaboration of these ideas, including how the Allies can guarantee the security of Germany's eastern half (including its likely capital) under possible demilitarization scenarios. Woerner sees the U.S. presence in Germany and the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent as essential, and we will seek his insights as to how to preserve these goals in the changing German political climate.

Aside from his homeland, Woerner will be preoccupied with thoughts about the future role of NATO in the new Europe. He is worried about NATO being marginalized by burgeoning activity in the Community and the CSCE. You know our current line -- to emphasize the Alliance's new political role and talk about arms control verification and possible out-of-area interests. We recommend that you float two new ideas with him. First, the NATO Wise Men's study. You are familiar with the concept, and we think the time is right. Second, a NATO Summit, preferably here in Washington just after we conclude the G-7 Summit in Houston. This Summit could receive the Wise Men's report and ~~offer~~ ^{offer} ideas for NATO's new political charter -- specifically the goals and strategy the Alliance should set for itself to build on the revolutionary accomplishments of 1989, with implications for

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both SNF arms control and the nature of a possible CFE II. These Summit decisions would help us bring a unified Western approach into the CSCE Summit in the fall.

Alternatively, the Summit could describe the problem and commission the Wise Men's study. This might be a way to try to kick the issues down the road beyond the CSCE Summit and the German elections. However, we think the Allies should take a common position into the CSCE Summit and we prefer to have Woerner and NATO commission the study right away, reserving the maximum fanfare at a NATO Summit for the report's conclusions, which we hope to help shape, rather than just celebrate the creation of the Group. You and the President could explore both of these alternatives with Woerner, who will probably have some good advice on the best way to proceed.

The memo to the President at Tab I includes the Wise Men and NATO Summit ideas.

Heather Wilson concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum to the President attached at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography
Tab D	Woerner's Speech in Hamburg

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

1132

February 12, 1990

2

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany

DATE: February 13, 1990

PURPOSE: To receive Chancellor Kohl's call and a readout from his meetings in Moscow.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open line

INTERPRETER: To be supplied by State Department

PHONE NUMBER: WHCA Head of State circuit -- Bonn

CONTACT: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIME: 1:45 p.m. EST February 13, 1990

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Kohl's talks with Gorbachev on German unification
2. GDR Prime Minister Modrow's February 13-14 "working visit" to Bonn

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Press Backgrounder on Kohl's Trip to Moscow

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By 32 NARA, Date 3/23/10

POINTS TO BE MADE

- I am delighted with the way your Moscow visit turned out. I congratulate you for handling these delicate matters so skillfully.
- I hope you heard what I said at my press conference yesterday.
- In November and December, we were all saying that German unification should come gradually and step by step. Now that the process is moving much more rapidly, I thought it important to say publicly that we support this accelerated pace of unification.
- I also wanted to make it clear publicly that I support your position that a unified Germany should be a member of NATO.
- In that context, it is useful to hold out the possibility of creating special security arrangements for what is now GDR territory.

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RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE
RUFHPPP/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHEB/AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN 5605
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6701
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 9197
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD//
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: KOHL'S TRIP TO MOSCOW: PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON
PLANE HOME

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

NO QUESTION OF LIFE IN NATO MEMBERSHIP;
NOT THE SOLUTION OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION WOULD PROCEED QUICKLY;
TROOPS IN GERMANY BUT UNDERSCORED THAT CONSEQUENCES FOR
SOVIET SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES WOULD HAVE TO BE
CONSIDERED;

2. (U) [REDACTED] THAT "THERE IS NO LONGER ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY OR THE GDR [REDACTED] OF THE [REDACTED] OF THE [REDACTED] THE GERMANS, AND THAT THEY THEMSELVES MUST DECIDE IN WHAT FORM OF STATE, IN WHAT TIME PERIOD, WITH WHAT SPEED, AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS THEY WISH TO BRING THIS UNITY ABOUT."

3. (U) EARLIER, GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT HISTORY WOULD DEAL WITH THE GERMAN QUESTION "AND NOW IT HAS GONE TO WORK ON IT WITH UNEXPECTED RAPIDITY." GORBACHEV, (THE STORY SAID) HAD [REDACTED] OF GERMAN

4. (U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION~~ 11-2-60
OF CONDITIONS. INSTEAD, HE SPOKE ONLY OF "REALITIES" ON
THE BASIS OF WHICH UNIFICATION MUST TAKE PLACE. THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT, AND THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION
RESPECTED.

5. (U) INSTEAD OF POSING CONDITIONS, GORBACHEV MADE A WISH TO KEEP TALKING, TO MEET MORE FREQUENTLY, IN ORDER THAT THE COURSE OF EVENTS COULD BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL. HE LEFT OPEN WHAT FORM THE CONSULTATIONS -- WHICH HAD NOW BEEN AGREED ON BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN GOVERNMENTS AND THE FOUR ALLIED VICTOR POWERS -- WOULD TAKE.

6. (U) FOR GORBACHEV, ACCORDING TO KOHL, THE QUESTION OF
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 04611

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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GE, GC

SUBJECT: KOHL'S TRIP TO MOSCOW: PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON
PLANE HOME

GERMAN NEUTRALITY WAS NOT ON HIS AGENDA (KEIN THEMA), SINCE GORBACHEV KNEW THAT, AS FAR AS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WAS CONCERNED, THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY FOR A UNIFIED GERMANY. GORBACHEV CALLED FOR MUTUAL REFLECTION ON THE QUESTION OF THE ALLIANCES. HE LEFT OPEN WHAT THE SOLUTION SHOULD BE.

THAT A UNIFIED GERMANY COULD BELONG TO NATO, THAT THE
MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BEING EXTENDED
TO THE PRESENT TERRITORY OF THE GDR EVIDENTLY
PART OF THIS ON-GOING DISCUSSION.

HOWEVER, ACCEPT THE SITUATION. HE SAID THAT MANY IDEAS "DID NOT MAKE SENSE" BUT HE POSED NO OBSTACLES.

7. (U) GORBACHEV [REDACTED] WHEN HE SAID THAT IT [REDACTED] DISCUSSED [REDACTED] THE MODALITIES OF UNIFICATION. GORBACHEV WAS AWARE THAT EVENTS IN GERMANY ARE MOVING AT A BREAKNECK PACE.

8. (U) ~~FORCIBLY DID NOT WANT TO GO TO GERMANY MONETARY AND ECONOMIC UNION. HE WAS FAVORED IT.~~ HE KNOWS THAT NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PLACE QUICKLY. HE SEEMED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THIS STEP -- WHICH WOULD MEAN A REALIZATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF UNIFICATION -- MUST TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE CSCE SUMMIT. KOHL SAID THAT BRINGING IN LEGAL SYSTEMS AND THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS -- PENSIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION -- WOULD TAKE LONGER. THIS (MONETARY AND ECONOMIC UNION) WOULD BE A BRIDGE TO THE CSCE SUMMIT.

9. (U) GORBACHEV WAS AS AWARE AS KOHL THAT THE DESIRED PARALLELISM BETWEEN GERMAN AND EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED, BECAUSE THE GDR IS AT THE END OF ITS TETHER. THEREFORE THE [REDACTED]

DISCOURSE BY: GORBACHEV HAD NO ILLUSIONS ON THE STATE OF THE GDR.

10. (U) [REDACTED] PRESENCE OF [REDACTED] THE GDR, BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A PRESENCE EXISTED AND GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOVIET SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES. THE TROOPS WERE FINANCED BY THE GDR. HERE CLARIFICATION WOULD BE NECESSARY; HOWEVER, GORBACHEV [REDACTED] OF THE TROOP PRESENCE AND THE ALLIANCES [REDACTED]

UNIFICATION COULD TAKE THE STANCE. THE TONE WAS JOVIAL. HE DID NOT TAKE A CRITICAL KOHL SAID THAT THE FRG

11. (U) KOHL AND GENSCHER WERE INFORMED BEFORE THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW.

THREE-PAGE [REDACTED] GENSCHER HAD LAID THE BASIS FOR THE PRESENTATION TO THE SOVIETS IN WASHINGTON WITH BAKER: CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES AND THE FOUR POWERS, AND THE CSCE CONFERENCE AS THE GOAL. HERE HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE CONVERSATIONS SHOULD NOT MAKE DECISION "ABOUT GERMANY."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 BONN 04611

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GE, GC

SUBJECT: KOHL'S TRIP TO MOSCOW: PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON PLANE HOME

12. (U) THE SOVIET UNION MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WISHED THE GERMAN PROCESS TO CONNECT WITH DISARMAMENT, INTO WHICH THE FORCES OF THE FRG AND THEN THE UNITED GERMANY COULD BE BROUGHT. THERE WAS [REDACTED] AND SOVIET TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE [REDACTED] TO 195,000 MEN OR LESS, THE [REDACTED] LONGER THAN THOSE OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IN THE CORE OF EUROPE.

13. (U) SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT THE STATIONING OF WESTERN TROOPS ARE NOT PREDOMINANTLY ABOUT HOW LONG THEY CAN STAY. RATHER, THEY DEPEND ON OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, SUCH AS LOGISTICAL ONES. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS ACCOUNT OF THE BACKGROUNDER, GENSCHER [REDACTED] GERMAN-SOVIET STATIONING AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE A FORMAL DOCUMENT OF THE FOUR POWERS OR THE ALLIANCES. (COMMENT: IN THE BRIEFING GIVEN US BY THE CHANCELLERY, IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT THE JOURNALISTS HAD "GONE TOO FAR" IN INTERPRETING GENSCHER.)

14. (U) THE [REDACTED] FOUR POWERS ARE TO BEGIN [REDACTED] GENSCHER SPOKE ABOUT THIS WITH THE [REDACTED] BRITISH AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS IN OTTAWA. FOLLOWING HIS EARLIER CONVERSATIONS WITH BAKER, DUMAS AND HURD, GENSCHER NO LONGER EXPECTS BRITISH OPPOSITION OVER THE PROCEDURE AND GOAL. NOW DISCUSSIONS BY FOREIGN [REDACTED] FOLLOWED BY ONE OR MORE CONFERENCES [REDACTED] MINISTERS, CAN TAKE PLACE [REDACTED] CONFERENCE -- ASSUMING THAT THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS HAS NOT FALLEN TO FIVE BY THAT TIME. [REDACTED] CONFERENCE IS FORESEEN [REDACTED] INTEREST.

15. (U) THE FOUR POWERS AND BONN AND EAST BERLIN SHOULD AGREE TO A SORT OF [REDACTED] WHICH EXTINGUISHES THE RIGHTS OF THE VICTORS. BUT THE FORM -- TREATY OR AGREEMENT -- SHOULD NOT BE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE. FOR BONN THE ESSENTIAL POINT IS TO FIND A MEANS OF MAKING A PEACE TREATY -- WHICH UNDER THE PROVISION OF THE 1953 LONDON AGREEMENT COULD LEAD TO MASSIVE REPARATIONS PAYMENTS TO MANY COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. THE [REDACTED] INTO ACCO [REDACTED] AGREEMENT REACHED AMONG THE [REDACTED] WITHOUT GIVING INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES SUCH AS MALTA THE CHANCE TO POSE CONDITIONS FOR GERMAN UNITY.

16. (U) THE SOVIETS WILL USE THEIR WEIGHT AS ONE OF THE FOUR POWERS. GENSCHER SAID TO SHEVARDNALZE THAT THE

SOVEREIGN GERMAN STATES -- SUCH AS DID NOT EXIST WHEN THE
CONTROL COMMISSION WAS SET UP -- WERE TAKING

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN DESTINY. THE FOUR POWERS
SHOULD HAVE A SAY, AND NOT BE PRESENTED WITH ANYTHING ON A
TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS. THE GERMANS WANT THE AGREEMENT
OF THE FOUR POWERS.

17. (U) WHY DID THE SOVIETS AGREE TO GERMAN UNIFICATION?

KOHL AND GENSCHER REGARD IT AS CERTAIN THAT GORBACHEV

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GE, GC

SUBJECT: KOHL'S TRIP TO MOSCOW: PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON
PLANE HOME

~~REALIZES THAT GERMAN UNITY CAN NO LONGER BE PREVENTED:~~
GORBACHEV CAN GET RID OF THE COSTLY BURDEN OF THE GDR, IF
IT IS GUARANTEED THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE ~~ECONOMY~~
~~ECONOMY~~ ~~WILL BE~~ ~~THE BURDEN OF THE GDR~~
~~ECONOMY~~ SO MOSCOW WILL NOT HAVE TO PAY, AND IF IT IS
CLEAR THAT BONN WILL MAINTAIN THE FLOW OF CONSIGNMENTS
FROM THE GDR TO THE SOVIET UNION.

18. (U) KOHL GUARANTEED, THAT WEST GERMAN FIRMS HAD, FOR
EXAMPLE, SENT FARM MACHINES TO THE GDR, SO THAT THE SOVIET
UNION DID NOT HAVE TO ENDURE ANY DELAYS. THE ~~POLITICAL~~
COSTS FOR MOSCOW CAN BE LIMITED, IF A TREATY WOULD PROVIDE
FOR THE CONTINUED STATIONING OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE GDR
FOR SOME TIME AND WOULD PREVENT THE EXPANSION OF NATO
FORCES TO THE ODER OR EVEN INTO HUNGARY AND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE CSCE OR VARIOUS OTHER FORUMS CAN
NEGOTIATE THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCES, ALTHOUGH KOHL AND
GENSCHER -- AS WELL AS THEIR DIALOGUE PARTNERS IN THE EAST
AND THE ALLIES IN THE WEST -- ARE STILL SILENT OVER THOSE
FORUMS. THIS ~~SILENCE~~ INDICATES THAT THIS IS THE POINT
(THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCES) WHICH IS NOW BEING WORKED ON
WITH THE GREATEST EFFORT, ON BOTH SIDES.

19. (2) COMMENT: WE STRESS THAT THE ABOVE IS MERELY A
SUMMARY OF THE PRESS ACCOUNT OF THE BACKGROUND BRIEFING
GIVEN ON THE PLANE RIDE BACK FROM MOSCOW, AND IS THEREFORE
NOT AUTHORITATIVE. IN ITS GENERAL OUTLINES, HOWEVER, IT
IS BY AND LARGE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE WERE TOLD AT THE
CHANCELLERY. AN ACCOUNT OF THE CHANCELLERY BRIEFING
FOLLOWS BY SEPTTEL.
WALTERS

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 04<SSN> 4611<STOR> 900212081105 MSG000256119065
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

1132

February 12, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of the
Federal Republic of Germany

SIGNED

We understand that Chancellor Kohl will call the President at 1:45 p.m. EST February 13. Although the purpose will be to hear Kohl's readout from his meetings in Moscow and his ongoing discussions with GDR Prime Minister Modrow in Bonn, we have provided brief talking points for the President's use. We have also attached Embassy Bonn's summation (Tab B) of a Frankfurter Allgemeine story based on a backgrounder given to the travelling German press on Kohl's return flight from Moscow. This will give the President a preview of what Kohl is likely to tell him.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Press Backgrounder on Kohl's Trip to Moscow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By *je* NARA, Date 3/23/10

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA

LOG # 1132

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOS CP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>Dg 2/12</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>

90 FEB 12 P 7. 59

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sunt

WWD

COMMENTS

Telephone Ca
on Feb. 13

- Cicconi has his
copies & BS/RMG
have their copies
- VP ~~to~~ does not
have copies
- I made the copies
for us & Cof S

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9001361
RECEIVED: 21 FEB 90 10

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: RICE
BLACKWILL
KANTER

DOC DATE: 21 FEB 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST

EUROPE WEST

PERSONS:

6
2

SUBJECT: FIRST MTG OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY STEERING GRP

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 24 FEB 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
KANTER
RICE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 2/17/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1361

February 21, 1990

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: First Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group

You may want to start by explaining that the President asked that this group be created to coordinate the various policy challenges before us regarding the extraordinary changes occurring in Europe. The group will need to provide oversight and direct policy formulation on both near-term and longer-term issues. This meeting will give you an opportunity to catalogue the tremendous amount of work to be done. We recommend that you commission a series of papers (listed below) for circulation to the group.

Near-Term

I. Kohl

(1) You may want to start by describing the objectives for the Kohl visit and invite comment. This is a little sensitive since you do not want to set a precedent of broad interagency coordination of the President's meetings.

The objectives for the Kohl visit are ^{four} three:

① Obtain Kohl's agreement not to alter Germany's full security commitment to NATO (including U.S. forces and nuclear weapons and Germany's participation in the integrated military command).

② Begin to forge a strategy with the Germans for European security after Germany is unified. (What role will CSCE play?; German thinking on CFE II)

③ Kohl's thinking - post 18 March
[Begin to develop a strategy for the Six-Power talks]

(2) [Six-Power Talks]

You should turn to Bob Zoellick who as you agreed will give a vanilla account of U.S. thinking on the Six-Power framework.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2000-0733-F14

21 5/10/11; 7/11/13

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Longer-term

Alliance Issues

NATO

What does it mean to infuse NATO with greater political content? (Commission State paper)

What will be the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe once Germany is unified?: FOTL; Artillery; TASM; SLCM. (Commission DOD/State paper)

Role of remaining forces? Military strategy for forces there.
What are options for the deployment of reduced and restructured U.S. troops in post-CFE I Europe? (Commission DOD paper)

Should the U.S. propose a broad strategy review within the Alliance of NATO's role in the 1990s? (Commission State/DOD paper)

Arms Control

CFE II

When? Who will participate? What are the objectives of these new negotiations? (Arnie Kanter will coordinate preparation of paper)

SNF

What should our approach be to SNF negotiations in the changed circumstances? (Arnie Kanter will coordinate paper)

CSCE

What are our long-term objectives in the CSCE? How much and what kind of institutionalization do we favor? (Commission State paper)

EC

What is the status of our efforts to intensify U.S.-EC cooperation? (Call on Zoellick)

Papers should be completed and ready for circulation to the group members by Monday, March 12.

Demunification

→ *What must Bonn take up? Legal requirements? Technical arrangements flowing out of 4 Power devolution*

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~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. List	Re: European Steering Group Re: [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	2/21/90	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (January - February 1990)

Date Closed: 2/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91116-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
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C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

EUROPEAN STEERING GROUP
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1990
3:00PM-4:00PM

WHITE HOUSE

Andy Card (Invited)
Robert Gates

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Carnes Lord

NSC

Robert Blackwill
Condi Rice

STATE

Robert Zoellick
Raymond Seitz
Dennis Ross

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Stephen Hadley

JCS

Robert Herres
David Jeremiah
Howard Graves

CIA

Richard Kerr
(NO +1)

Closed under Deed
of Gift Restrictions

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Outline	Re: Meetings with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	2/23/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: German Unification Files

Subseries: Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: German Unification (January - February 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By 32 (NLGB) on 3/31/11

Date Closed:	2/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91116-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	09-0668-MR(503)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/13/2009

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1352

MEETINGS WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

DATE: February 24-25, 1990

LOCATION: Camp David

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To get past (b)(1) and engage him instead in a precise and extended discussion of the future of Germany and the U.S. role in Europe; specifically:

- to discuss Kohl's plans for the imminent unification of Germany;
- to emphasize the importance of full NATO membership for a united Germany; and
- to begin to develop a common strategy with Kohl for the eventual Two Plus Four discussions on the external aspects of the establishment of German unity.

II. BACKGROUND

The "German question" is being resolved with extraordinary speed, thanks to the virtual collapse of the GDR; Soviet incapacity to stop unification; and the acquiescence -- steeped in resignation -- of the other European allies. Kohl will seek "instant unification" after the March 18 elections in the GDR, hoping that a provision of the FRG's constitution will be used by the component states of the former GDR simply to declare that they are now part of the FRG.

The principal objective of the United States is a united Germany fully in NATO, subordinating its forces to the integrated NATO military command, willing to host American forces, and to maintain U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil. This effort, in turn, must be shielded as much as possible from Soviet and German opposition attempts to water down Germany's future role in NATO.

There are, therefore, two key goals for your meeting with Kohl:

- First, a Kohl commitment to full German membership in NATO, including continued integration of German forces in the NATO command.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

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7009-0668-11K
32 5/13/09

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- **Second, agreement on how to manage the Two Plus Four negotiations on Germany to minimize Soviet ability to weaken Germany's membership in NATO.**

Kohl and his circle are worried about the effect of unification on the governing coalition's hold on power. The region encompassed by today's GDR has, throughout modern German history, been a stronghold of the Left in German politics. There is also now considerable speculation in Bonn that the FRG's general elections, expected in December of this year, will be postponed to become all-German elections early next year. There is a real danger that the inclusion of millions of new, predominantly left-leaning, East German voters could throw Kohl's governing coalition into opposition.

Kohl is thus playing out his historical role with both eyes riveted on his own election prospects. The effect of this domestic debate within the FRG concerning the external aspects of unification will be to drive German opinion to the left and to strengthen the opposition parties' influence in the domestic debate. The SPD will respond to Moscow's preferences (and those of the SPD's sister party in the GDR) by moving still more to the left, toward a Germany completely out of NATO. This will drive Genscher further left (in search of the new middle ground), which in turn will pull Kohl in the same direction. Kohl would then face a situation in which Moscow, the GDR, the opposition SPD and Greens, and his own Foreign Minister are all calling for a loosening of Germany's ties to NATO. Although Moscow has very little real leverage on Germany's future in NATO, the Soviets could join with Genscher and the German opposition in arguing to an emotional German electorate that a weaker form of association with NATO is a small price to pay for German unity.

Kohl's heart is in the right place, but he wants to be the Chancellor who united Germany. All else will become for him secondary and negotiable. While Kohl is quick to denounce calls for neutrality, he has not been nearly as clear in describing just what he has in mind for Germany's future commitment to NATO. **The time has come for an honest and unadorned talk with Kohl about his bottom-line on security issues, despite the difficulty of pinning the Chancellor down.** If there are hidden differences with Bonn on the central elements of Western security, and especially Germany's relationship to NATO, we need to know now.

The most important pledge that Kohl can make to you this weekend is that he will not allow Germany's indispensable role in NATO to be weakened in any way. Germany is NATO's fulcrum and if -- as some in the SPD and even in Kohl's own party are hinting -- it opts for a weaker form of NATO association, perhaps withdrawing from the integrated military command as the French did under De Gaulle, NATO

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3.

will be finished as a viable security institution. | (b) (1)
(b) (1)

(b) (1) As you told Woerner at Camp David, in such a circumstance the smaller Allies would run from NATO and head for the hills. Chancellery advisers are also actively considering Soviet-style concepts (dating back to the 1950s) for the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and replacing the Alliances with ill-defined, and toothless, all-European security guarantees.

Despite Kohl's difficult domestic position, your unwavering support for the Chancellor and for German unity over the last few months has placed you in a strong position to influence his thinking on the end-game that is now upon us. Our position is strengthened by growing tension between the FRG and other Western allies, | (b) (1)
(b) (1)

Now, at Camp David, you can take advantage of your standing with the Chancellor to cement a historic bargain: Kohl's pledge not to alter the form and substance of Germany's security commitments to NATO in exchange for a U.S. promise that the Two Plus Four process will not interfere with German unity. You could also raise the possibility of a 'Wise Men's Study' on the Alliance's future that would be endorsed at a NATO Summit meeting in the U.S. in July. Such a Summit could involve the rest of the Allies in backing a commitment to continued full German membership in NATO and allow Kohl to cite this support in his domestic debate. In addition, you could invite Kohl to return to Washington later this year after the process of German unification is down the road to address a joint session of Congress and highlight both enduring U.S.-German ties and the decisive American role in the historic accomplishment of German unification.

In addition to the fundamental commitment of the FRG to full membership in NATO, including its military structures, the continued presence of American nuclear weapons on German soil may come up. Funding for the Follow-On-To-Lance (FOTL) program will probably be cancelled by Congress this spring. The U.S. government needs a few more weeks to decide how to use this likely cancellation in a way that would help Kohl politically, and consult Mrs. Thatcher, Mitterrand, and the rest of NATO. So you should probably not raise the issue with the Chancellor this weekend. If the Chancellor brings up SNF, you might reply that funding for Follow-On-To-Lance will be a tough fight for us on the Hill and ask Kohl what he thinks about the prospects for FOTL deployment in Germany.

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Beyond the immediate issue of the Follow-On-To-Lance, however, Kohl should understand that, if the FRG pushes out all American nuclear weapons from Germany, it would be hard for the U.S. to persuade other countries on the continent to accept an American nuclear presence. That situation, in turn, would promptly jeopardize the U.S. troop presence in Europe itself because the Hill, and many senior defense officials, would demand that U.S. troops in Europe be protected by a nuclear deterrent based there.

Your meeting with Kohl is also an important first step in forging a strategy with the Chancellor for the upcoming Two Plus Four talks on the external aspects of the establishment of German unity. The agenda should include the devolution of historic Four Power rights and responsibilities for Germany and Berlin to allow the full restoration of sovereignty to the new German state. Secretary Baker's February 19 letter to NATO Foreign Ministers (attached at Tab D) emphasized that the Two Plus Four forum would address the Four Power rights left from the early postwar period, with no mention of using this forum to discuss new limits on German sovereignty, foreign military presence, or the united Germany's role in NATO, which are just the issues the Soviets will want to raise.

The Two Plus Four will be expected to discuss the borders of a united Germany, as part of the legal responsibility for the recreation of "Germany as a whole." The Poles are therefore demanding to participate in the Two Plus Four process, to get definitive assurances that Germany will respect the current border between Poland and the GDR, the Oder-Neisse line. Kohl has assured both the Soviets and the Poles privately that they should not worry about this issue, but he has taken care not to make flat public statements (as Genscher has) declaring the border issue settled for fear of alienating a crucial right-wing constituency that might otherwise vote for the extreme nationalist Republikaner party and undermine Kohl's election prospects. You should note the need to reassure the Poles in a way that respects Kohl's domestic political sensitivities and does not expand participation in the Two Plus Four mechanism.

As to the timing of the Two Plus Four talks, Kohl and Genscher have not provided clear statements of what they envision, but both have indicated their general expectation that the two Germanies would negotiate their future, arriving at the terms for unification. Then the Germans would invite the Four Powers to bless these arrangements and join them in negotiating the end to Four Power rights and responsibilities. Genscher may prefer an early convening of the Two Plus Four meeting, since it will place him in the spotlight in this election year as the decisive spokesman for Germany's future. |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

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(b) (1)

The Soviets, meanwhile, have said they prefer a Two Plus Four process which would begin soon, running parallel to unification efforts, with the Four Powers agreeing on and having a veto over Germany's fundamental security arrangements for the future. Teltschik told Dick Walters on February 21 that the Chancellor will want our help in persuading London and Paris to be more sympathetic to German unification.

We have not yet articulated precisely our preferred sequence of Two Plus Four events. You should assure Kohl of our support for letting the Germans act first to decide on their future, before beginning substantive Two Plus Four discussions. Kohl suggested to you on the phone that this may mean trying to hold off substantive Two Plus Four negotiation on Germany until the summer. Ideally, the Two Plus Four ministerial conference, when it occurs, will actually be a "One Plus Four" with only one German government at the table, since a GDR government dominated by the leftist SPD will be against continued FRG membership in NATO. |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

Finally, you and Kohl need to have an honest discussion of how to approach the Soviet Union at this critical time. Kohl is rightly worried about the effect of German reunification on Gorbachev's political position at home. This is a domestic issue in the Soviet Union where memories and fears of Germany still run deep. Gorbachev -- who has to date avoided drawing a line in the sand on the terms of Germany unity -- may be forced to do so as the Two Plus Four Talks approach. In a lengthy interview (attached at Tab E with key passages highlighted), Gorbachev details the postwar history of Soviet efforts to neutralize Germany, and appears to state that, as the Warsaw Pact disintegrates, NATO must fall apart as well: "Violation of the military-strategic balance of these two international organizations is impermissible."

The temptation for the Chancellor will be to assuage Gorbachev's difficulties and boost Kohl's domestic political prospects with concessions on Germany's membership in NATO. The Soviets will, of course, do all that they can to make the most of their minimal leverage -- with sometimes threatening and sometimes conciliatory behavior toward Bonn.

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6

You should try to get Kohl to agree that Germany's full commitment to NATO cannot be compromised even for the admirable goal of keeping Gorbachev in power. Whatever the effect of such concessions on Gorbachev's fate, the future of Europe and the U.S. role in it now hangs in the balance.

Rather, the key is to find other ways to assuage Soviet concerns:

- push forward hard the entire agenda of US-Soviet relations, including the economic dimension, which in Moscow's eyes will be the best evidence that they remain a superpower;
- in that regard, ensure that Gorbachev and outside observers consider the U.S.-Soviet Summit here in June to be the most productive of the post-war period;
- sign a START accord this year;
- sign a CFE agreement this year; and
- hold a CSCE Summit associated with the CFE signing to allow the Soviets to discuss European political developments in a larger framework to which they belong.

In the final analysis, Soviet leverage to influence the fate of Germany is marginal, however much Moscow complains. Stalin and his successors set as their principal goal for European security in the postwar era the fracturing of the FRG's ties to NATO. Adenauer said no. The West did not give in to Moscow's demands when the Soviets were strong; hopefully Kohl will agree at Camp David that we should certainly not do so now when the Soviet Union is weak.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Attached at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by meeting with Chancellor Kohl.

Attachments

Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Biographies (Kohl and Teltschik)
Tab D	Baker's Letter to NATO Foreign Ministers dated Feb 19
Tab E	Interview with Gorbachev dated Feb 20

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