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2009-0275-S

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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91116
Folder ID Number: 91116-002

Folder Title:
German Unification (December 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Mitterrand, the Germans and U.S. -EC Cooperation (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Scope Paper - Your Meeting with President Mitterrand on December 16, 1989, at St. Martin (3 pp.)	12/15/89	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe (4 pp.)	12/22/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe [Released with WHG on 3/23/10] (1 pp.)	12/19/89	(b)(1)	S
03c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe (1 pp.)	12/22/89	(b)(1)	S
03d. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe [Released with WHG on 3/23/10] (1 pp.)	12/19	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (December 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap975
OA/ID Number: 91116-002
Date Closed: 2/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8910482
RECEIVED: 04 JAN 90 13

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 14 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EC
GERMANY F R

FRANCE

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: MITTERRAND / GERMANS & US - EC COOPERATION

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 08 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLACKWILL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 2/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSBTM

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 8910482

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 90010417 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

001

X 90010417 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 2/17/09

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CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10482

12/14/89

1655

Brent --

Baker will probably
be sending in some thoughts
on this subject. I wanted
therefore to get the attached
to you.

BS Blackill

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~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVETHE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

-OA Has Seen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Mitterrand, the Germans and U.S.-EC Cooperation

In addition to the briefing book you are receiving separately, I wanted to give you some final thoughts on handling Mitterrand's increasing concerns about German reunification. It is likely that Mitterrand has concluded that the reemergence in spades of the German Question has made U.S.-French cooperation more important than at any time in the post-war period. He has made clear in a variety of public statements and at two NATO Summit meetings that the United States has an indispensable role in managing the future of Europe.

Thus, we are in a good position to seek Mitterrand's agreement to what we now want out of the U.S.-French relationship. This brings me to Jim Baker's Tuesday speech in Berlin. In that speech, Jim proposed "that the United States and the European Community work together to achieve, whether it's in treaty or some other form, a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultative links." This, of course, followed up on similar comments you made at your Boston University commencement speech and subsequently in Europe.

The issue of U.S. ties to the European Community has a long and bitter history in U.S.-French relations. De Gaulle wanted no American role in European integration and Henry Kissinger's attempt in 1973 to strengthen U.S. ties with the Community triggered a poisonous year of recrimination with France.

The question before us now is whether Mitterrand is sufficiently worried about the future of Germany that he will support enhanced U.S.-EC cooperation, both as a counterweight to Bonn and as a further means to try to ensure continued U.S. involvement in Europe.

I recommend that you raise Jim's suggestion in your private meeting with Mitterrand and ask him for his reaction. It would be a mistake in my judgement to press Mitterrand on the matter since he is probably not had time to digest the implications of our proposal.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0669-MR
JL 8/26/10

December 15, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT:

Scope Paper - Your Meeting with President
Mitterrand on December 16, 1989, at St. Martin

Setting: Mitterrand will be coming to this meeting with you from perhaps his most intense period ever of European diplomacy. With his domestic political standing at a high level, Mitterrand's Presidency of the EC has coincided with the extraordinary acceleration of changes in Eastern Europe since last spring. He has provided the steadiest policy by a European leader during these six months of turbulence on the Continent. His long Presidential and political experience, his acute sense of history, and his solid domestic base equip Mitterrand with unique assets for leadership within Europe -- and for partnership with you in managing the historic transition now under way.

Mitterrand saw Gorbachev in Kiev on December 6, a meeting at which he seemed to agree with Gorbachev on the need, for now, of two German states (text of Mitterrand/Gorbachev press conference is at Tab A). He then presided over the generally successful EC summit in Strasbourg December 8 and 9. (Text of his press conference following the Strasbourg meeting is at Tab B). He is scheduled to visit East Berlin on December 20. The future of Germany, of Eastern Europe, and of the Soviet Union will be foremost on his mind, although he will also be very concerned about Lebanon.

When you agreed to meet in the Caribbean, you suggested a broad-ranging discussion about the future of Europe. Nothing could be more timely, and no French President since the war would have been a more useful interlocutor. His gesture of coming to the Caribbean to make it easier for you to see him on French soil would have been unthinkable for most of his predecessors.

Tenor and Objectives: Mitterrand shares your vision of a new European order on Western terms, and his views on how to achieve this new order are in most respects similar to yours. As you know, he favors continued deepening of EC integration as the primary means of reinforcing Germany's anchor to the West and of solidifying France's leadership role in the new Europe; but he has also spoken in favor of an important continuing role for NATO.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Mitterrand was shocked that Kohl put forward his ten point plan for German reunification, which downplayed both NATO and the EC, with no consultation with Paris. (The same was, of course, true of us; Horst Teltschick told Vernon Walters and the French Ambassador in Bonn that Kohl had, however, discussed his ten points in advance and in detail with Gorbachev.) Many in the French Government worry that the close postwar Franco-German relationship will suffer as Bonn becomes ever more preoccupied with the GDR and reunification.

Mitterrand's statements about the possibility of German reunification have become more cautious as events in the GDR threaten to spin out of control and deep post-war French concerns about Germany are now near the surface among France's political elite. This is not a new concern for Mitterrand. In 1979 he said in public that German reunification was neither possible nor desirable. Nevertheless, he regards Mrs. Thatcher's crude public opposition to German reunification as a mistake which could push the Germans in a dangerous direction. Finally, although Mitterrand has profound doubts about the advisability of early German reunification, if it appears that it will occur nonetheless rapidly, he will ensure that France is not a begrudging participant in the process.

Despite Mitterrand's close personal bond with you and his similarity of strategic view, not all that we hear from the French government is helpful. The French bureaucracy has moved less rapidly than we would like in reaching common ground on CFE negotiating positions. On Open Skies, the French desire for linkage with CFE, and for inclusion (from the start) of the neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe, is impeding progress. In our efforts at closer partnership with the EC, we occasionally get hints of French distrust or desire to keep some distance. For example, the French have moved slowly on their contribution to the \$1 billion stabilization fund for Poland, reportedly partly out of fear that the Europeans might not have sufficient say on management of the fund. While Mitterrand is unlikely to raise specific issues like this one, the St. Martin visit may be an ideal opportunity for a general discussion of your interest in close US-EC partnership.

As indicated, Mitterrand saw Gorbachev on December 6 and will undoubtedly wish to compare notes with you on your Malta meeting. He is likely to express concern that the speed of events in Eastern Europe, and particularly in East Germany, could pose a threat to Gorbachev's position and to perestroika. Mitterrand will of course also be interested in hearing your reasons for deciding to send Larry Eagleburger and me to Peking, and about the results.

On the issue of strategic trade, Mitterrand may stress the need to accelerate the "streamlining" process in COCOM. The French have supported our efforts throughout the 80's to tighten the embargo and stop illegal diversions. But they join the Germans, British and others in believing that the U.S. is moving too

slowly in reducing the list of controlled items. He may warn of the possible collapse of the existing consensus on strategic trade -- and the risk of more illegal diversions -- unless the U.S. commits itself to genuine liberalization in COCOM. You may wish to take this opportunity to indicate your readiness to review our policy in COCOM to meet these concerns.

Other issues which may arise in your St. Martin meeting are Lebanon; the Middle East peace process; Cambodia; anti-narcotics cooperation; the French proposal for a North-South summit; the Nicaraguan elections; and a Helsinki II CSCE Summit in 1990, an idea he endorsed in Kiev with Gorbachev.

Attachments

Tab A Mitterrand/Gorbachev Press Interview
Tab B Mitterrand Press Conference

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 22 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST

EUROPE WEST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: US DIPLOMACY FOR NEW EUROPE

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 22 DEC 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 2/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSRLG

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DOC 2 OF 2

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CHRON FILE

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526
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1989 DEC 22 PM 8 32

December 22, 1989

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe

Historians are likely to view 1989 as a year, like 1848, which transformed a continent. The past is irretrievably gone, but the future remains cloudy. The eroding Soviet political and military presence and influence in Central and Eastern Europe, and the prospect of a reunited Germany eighty million strong, are rapidly changing European politics. Our diplomatic approach will need to change too, acquiring new intensity and suppleness. No other nation can undertake the singular American role in this dangerous period.

You have laid the groundwork by forcefully articulating our goals for the future of Europe and of Germany. The components of our approach -- active support for democratic change in Eastern Europe, the search for a new security environment through the CFE process, the continuation of nuclear deterrence, and an American partnership with a more united continent -- are welcome in Europe. U.S. objectives have become, by and large, the Alliance's objectives. Now, having set the agenda, we need to use our policy instruments to help make these things happen, to remain, as you have said, a "European Power."

As the confrontation with the Warsaw Pact fades, there is a natural tendency to understate the new political and economic forces that are being unleashed. When the democratic revolutionaries of 1848 were at the peak of their success, cowing kings and toppling princes, they thought the remaking of society would overshadow the old diplomatic rivalries. Victor Hugo speaking for the firebrands in Paris, put it best when he said that: "We are a predestined generation. We have bigger and more frightening tasks than our ancestors. We have not time to hate each other." Just as this hope was romantic and wrong then, it is romantic and wrong now. The outlines of ancient European antagonisms are already beginning to emerge.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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The most important element of the current period is the Soviet Union's retreat from Eastern Europe, a reversal unrivaled in the history of the U.S.S.R. since the Soviets made peace with the Germans in 1918. Moscow's policy toward Eastern Europe is in a shambles and Gorbachev finds himself unable to shape the sweeping political events there. The Soviets have attempted to make a virtue of necessity -- encouraging reform in hopes of maintaining influence in Eastern Europe by diplomatic means rather than by coercion.

But this tactic cannot mask the fact that the Soviet leadership faces a deadly set of circumstances in the coming years -- political and economic chaos at home; diminishing influence in Eastern Europe; and the looming prospect of German reunification. The Politburo is now -- and will continue to be -- insecure and nervous about the course of events in Europe. No one can predict how Moscow will adapt to this tumultuous environment. Given the significant Soviet military presence in Europe -- a presence that will be maintained in any event by virtue of geography -- Moscow's unpredictability carries significant dangers for the West. Not surprisingly, Gorbachev now so worries about the Germans that he wants the United States to play an active and moderating role in Europe well into the next century.

The revival of the German question will be no less a critical factor in the 1990's than the Soviet Union's decline, including for Gorbachev's grip on power and for perestroika. West Germany enters this decade wielding economic power unrivaled on the Continent and with the potential to dominate the monetary and macroeconomic policies of a more united EC. The Germans can use that economic clout to renew their historic political influence on a fragmented Eastern Europe. The spectre of German power, particularly if the two Germanys reunify, will lead Britain and France to seek new political arrangements to protect their interests. Italy will push hard for recognition as a major actor, aligning and realigning itself to serve that goal. The smaller Allies will be inclined to revert to the 19th century diplomatic pattern of cutting the best deals they can.

Increasingly because of the German problem, the Soviets are pushing -- successfully -- for the widest possible diplomatic engagement in Europe and the West Europeans are reciprocating. In the last two weeks, as well as meeting with you, Gorbachev also hosted Mitterrand in Kiev and Genscher in Moscow. Moscow requested, and achieved, the reactivation of Four-Power mechanisms at a level and intensity unknown in two decades. Shevardnadze just held an unprecedented meeting with NATO Secretary General Woerner. Mitterrand, at his joint press conference in Kiev, referred to a return to more active Franco-Soviets bilateral relations. The FRG Ambassador at the CFE talks now consults as intensively with the Eastern Europeans as with his NATO counterparts. Kohl had more consultation with Gorbachev than with you before presenting his ten-point plan for

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reunification, and Mitterrand and Kohl are both visiting East Germany this week.

The EC's political role is growing rapidly as well. Discussions among West European leaders are continuous and largely independent of us. There have been two EC summits since mid-November. EC Foreign Ministers and their staffs meet twenty to thirty times a year. A generation of West European diplomats has emerged, habituated to constant interaction with their colleagues, whom they have known well and worked with for years. A good illustration of this new kind of diplomatic relationship is COMEU, an electronic communications network linking the EC capitals for daily faxing and exchanges of cables, position papers, and other information on foreign policy problems of common interest, totaling thousands of messages each year. In your pre-Malta telephone calls to NATO leaders, you witnessed just how much of their own thinking had been influenced by the November 18 EC Summit in Paris. And as we move toward 1992, the Community's economic decisions will have decisive consequences for the United States.

You have already devoted much time and effort this year to cultivating our European relationships. We will need to maintain this degree of commitment at all levels, and expand it. NATO is still irreplaceable, but the EC -- with which our enhanced dialogue is promising but still embryonic -- will become ever more important to us as time passes.

The United States is at a strategic crossroads in Europe. We will either find a way to keep up with the intensifying pace of diplomatic interaction on the Continent or we will drift away from the inner workings and direction of European politics. This may cause us, in turn, to fall prey at home to a new form of isolationism -- detachment by default rather than by choice. That could be tragic for European stability and for America's world leadership role, which would diminish greatly if our partnership with Europe waned.

No issue will test our real influence and diplomatic skills more than the potential reunification of Germany. A French diplomat expressed to an American colleague recently a oft repeated refrain in the past century. "The Germans are the only people who are never satisfied with what they have on the Continent. They always need more. It will never end." The U.S. must not be seen as opposing the aspirations of the German people for national unity. We want to tie the Germans to the West, not create new sources of resentment like those of the 1920s. Yet we can accept the eventual goal of reunification while at the same time using our diplomacy skillfully to try to keep the process gradual and carefully managed.

We must also play an active role in an entirely new situation in Eastern Europe. With the virtual collapse of Communist rule in

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Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, a power vacuum is developing. This presents both risks -- of a Federal Republic willingly drawn in to fill the void, and in the process slipping from its western moorings -- and opportunities for a much more robust and a constructive U.S. role in the center of Europe.

The opportunities can only be exploited if we follow through systematically on your policy goals. NATO and nuclear deterrence must be kept vital in these new circumstances. Your four points on German reunification must be reinforced and translated into a program for consultations associated with the "step by step" process we envision. We should strengthen our resources, human and financial, to engage Eastern Europe more actively and update our policies to reflect the rapidly evolving situation there. Our objective of partnership with a stronger EC also needs to be manifested in concrete actions. And we must stay in closest possible touch with Gorbachev and his colleagues as events in Europe plunge on.

The key in the period ahead will be our ability to: 1) manage those elements of our European policies that are still inherently bloc to bloc (especially the military competition and arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union); while 2) we engage fully in a complex European diplomatic environment which reflects the return, after half a century, of a shifting search for a classical balance of power on the Continent. Twentieth century history gives no encouragement to those who believe the Europeans can achieve and sustain this balance of power and keep the peace without the United States.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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12/19/89
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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW Z

SUBJECT: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe

Brent --
I hope you like
this memo. We over
here believe it's
important.

RB Blackwill

I attach for your review a memorandum to the President on the challenges to U.S. diplomacy of present events in Europe.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By ji NARA, Date 3/23/10

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 22, 1989

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0669-MR
JL 8/26/10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe

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As the confrontation with the Warsaw Pact fades, there is a natural tendency to understate the new political and economic forces that are being unleashed. When the democratic revolutionaries of 1848 were at the peak of their success, cowering kings and toppling princes, they thought the remaking of society would overshadow the old diplomatic rivalries. Victor Hugo speaking for the firebrands in Paris, put it best when he said that: "We are a predestined generation. We have bigger and more frightening tasks than our ancestors. We have not time to hate each other." Just as this hope was romantic and wrong then, it is romantic and wrong now. The outlines of ancient European antagonisms are already beginning to emerge.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW Z

SUBJECT: U.S. Diplomacy for the New Europe

I attach for your review a memorandum to the President on the challenges to U.S. diplomacy of present events in Europe.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

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Tab I Memorandum to the President

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By 32 NARA, Date 3/23/10

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