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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91116
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Folder Title:
German Unification (November 1989)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	S
02a. Profile Sheet	Hutchings and Blackwill to Scowcroft Re: Question of German Reunification [Unclassified Upon Removal of Classified Attchments] (1 pp.)	11/20/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Robert Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The German Question (2 pp.)	11/20/89	(b)(1)	S
02c. Outline	Re: Handling the German Question at Malta and Beyond (10 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Profile Sheet	Roy, J. to Hughes Re: Letter to President Re: Situation in West & East Germany (2 pp.)	11/11/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Profile Sheet	Roy, J. to Hughes Re: Letter to President Re: Situation in West & East Germany (1 pp.)	11/24/89	(b)(1)	S
03c. Transmittal Form	Secretariat Staff to Mr. Philip Hughes Re: Letter to the President Re: Situation in Germany and Berlin (1 pp.)	11/24/89	(b)(1)	S
03d. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	C
03e. Message	Re: Unofficial Translation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (November 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap974
OA/ID Number: 91116-001
Date Closed: 2/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04a. Profile Sheet	Scowcroft to President Re: Presidential Telehone Call to Kohl on November 29 (1 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C
04b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C
04c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04d. Cable	Re: Chancellor Kohl to President Bush (8 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C
04e. Memo	Robert Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C
05a. Memo	Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memoranda for Malta/Brussels Trip (1 pp.)	11/29/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Scope Paper -- Maltese Bilateral (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Scope Paper -- Your Bilateral with Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Your Meetings in Brussels with NATO Leaders, December 3-4 (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05e. Memo	Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memoranda for Malta/Brussels Trip (1 pp.)	11/29/89	(b)(1)	
05f. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Scope Paper -- Maltese Bilateral (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05g. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Scope Paper -- Your Bilateral with Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05h. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Your Meetings in Brussels with NATO Leaders, December 3-4 (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06a. Profile Sheet	Scowcroft to President Re: Analysis of USSR Policy Toward Germany in Light of Changes in GDR [German Democratic Republic] & Eastern Europe (1 pp.)	11/29/89	(b)(1)	S
06b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: The Soviets and German Question (3 pp.)	11/29/89	(b)(1)	S
06c. Memo	Condeleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft/Robert Gates Re: Paper on Soviet Policy Toward Germany (1 pp.)	11/29/89	(b)(1)	S
07a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Telephone Call from the President to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, November 17, 1989 (1 pp.)	12/1/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl Helmut Kohl of West Germany (4 pp.)	11/17/89	(b)(1)	C
07c. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to G. Philip Hughes Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl of West Germany (1 pp.)	11/17/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

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APNSA Has Seen
CHRON FILE

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JL 3/30/09

10468

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

November 13, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III

1. Berlin: Soviet Ambassador Welcomes Reform; Warns Against Instability. In his meeting with Ambassador Walters on November 12, Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Kochemassov thanked the Allies for their management of crowd control in Berlin. He agreed both Allied and Soviet interests are served by furthering peaceful, stable reforms in the GDR. Kochemassov described the GDR reform process as irreversible. He reiterated Soviet support for two German states. He also indicated Soviet interest in the Berlin Initiative (outlined by President Reagan in 1987 and endorsed by you at Mainz), but said a formal Soviet reply is not yet ready. Kochemassov expressed concern that the FRG would fail to act with reserve and might embarrass the Soviet Union. While he acknowledged the importance of the U.S. role in Central Europe, Kochemmasov was also making clear that the Soviets expect to have a major say in the future of Berlin and Germany. (S)

2. Bulgarian War Horse Out to Pasture. Todor Zhivkov, Bulgarian leader since 1954, resigned November 10 from his party and government positions. Fifty-three-year old Foreign Minister Mladenov has been named Communist Party General Secretary; the National Assembly will have to vote on Zhivkov's successor as head of the State Council. Mladenov, a pragmatist, had been considered a long-shot contender to replace Zhivkov; there are indications that he owes his new position to Soviet intervention. If so, this will reinforce his natural inclination to follow closely the Soviet lead, as Bulgaria traditionally has done. In this case, this will mean more rapid progress on political and economic reforms, but all proceeding under close government (and party) supervision. Change in Bulgaria will enable us to press more actively for better treatment of the Turkish minority. (C).

3. Lebanon: Syrian Views of Moawad. Ambassador McCarthy now plans to present his credentials -- and your letter -- to Lebanese President Moawad this coming Saturday. As usual, Syria will provide security for the party (for some years, the Syrians have regularly provided security for U.S. Ambassadors travelling in North Lebanon). The Syrian Army Chief of Staff told our Ambassador that while Syria firmly supports President Moawad, it recognizes that over-identification with Syria could hurt Moawad in the Christian enclave. Already, heavy-handed Syrian support for Moawad has occasioned some criticism of Moawad among Christians and could further complicate his efforts at winning support inside the enclave. (S)

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DECL: OADR

CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

Sensitive / NODIS

RECORD ID: 8910472

RECEIVED: 29 DEC 89 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HUTCHINGS
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 20 NOV 89

SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R GERMANY D R

2.

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: QUESTION OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 02 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

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D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLACKWILL

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COMMENTS: _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

APNSA Has Seen

November 20, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: The German Question

Attached at Tab I is the paper you requested on German reunification, prepared by a very restricted interagency group which I co-chaired with Jim Dobbins, Principal DAS at State/EUR. It has been coordinated by that group but at no higher level. Some of its considerations and conclusions will be presented in a briefing for the President on November 21.

Any discussion at Malta of the German Question, including reference to possible Four Power involvement, demands that the processes of inter-German reassociation be thought through to endgame. This paper does that, embedding these processes in the context of our most fundamental national interests in Europe. It also relates our aims and objectives to those of other key players, above all the Germans. (Condi notes that the Soviet section underestimates the importance Gorbachev attaches to stability in Eastern Europe, because of the implications for perestroika.)

The Annex explains briefly Four Power rights regarding the final disposition and boundaries of a reunified Germany. Cutting through the fog of legalese, these rights are as follows. The ultimate disposition of "Germany" and its boundary remain matters for Four Power decision in the context of a Peace Treaty with the representatives of the German people (Germans living in the FRG and the GDR). Under international law, the FRG and the GDR cannot by themselves conclude a treaty or agreement reuniting Germany. The Four Powers could legally veto such an arrangement and indeed would have to sign a Peace Treaty before a reunified Germany could become a legal entity. (The Soviet view is more ambiguous, because the Soviets recognize the full sovereignty of the East German state while noting the continued existence of Four Power rights and responsibilities in the FRG and West Berlin.) Of course, how much Four Power <u>legal</u> rights could be applied in the 1990s if the two Germanys decide to reunify is another matter entirely.

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9/13/10

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Declassify on: OADR

The paper strongly recommends that the United States focus on German national self-determination -- meaning, first, movement in the GDR toward a freely elected government representing the will of its population -- as the mechanism by which the German Question should be answered.

Condi Rice concurs.

Attachment
Tab I Paper on "Handling the German Question"

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Handling the German Question at Malta and Beyond

I. ISSUE

The changes underway in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have brought the "German question" to the top of the international agenda. The GDR's dramatic decision last week, with apparent Soviet encouragement, to open its borders has given further stimulus to speculation about the future of Germany and the prospects for its reunification. Open borders themselves will force changes in the relationship between the two German states. This process will likely accelerate if and when the GDR achieves anything approaching a genuinely representative government.

The Soviet Union seems to be endorsing progress toward democracy in the GDR, while continuing to exclude the possibility of reunification. Although we have no evidence that Gorbachev is considering a new approach embracing, under some condition (e.g., neutralization, demilitarization), some form of reunification, one cannot exclude that the force of events might lead him in this direction. In any case, in the current fluid circumstances the Soviet Union does have new incentives to emphasize Four-Power rights and responsibilities for Germany in order to enhance its influence and future ability to block developments which it opposes.

Western leaders, including Presidents Bush and Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, have put the emphasis on the principle of self-determination, arguing that it is in the first instance up to freely elected representatives of the people of both German states to define the possibilities for a new relationship between them. Such a process cannot begin until the East Germans have freely elected representation. Thus the focus should be on reform in the GDR, rather than reunification.

Given the centrality of the "German question" not just for the future shape of Europe but for the development of transatlantic political, economic and security cooperation, the intense focus on this issue among government and among publics will continue in the coming weeks. There will be a particularly intense scrutiny over how the issue is handled by both sides at the upcoming meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev in Malta. At this meeting Gorbachev may do little more than repeat and elaborate on the themes contained in his recent message to President Bush on the subject. As noted above, however, we cannot exclude some more ambitious initiative. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for the U.S. Government's thinking about the future of Germany, both in terms of managing the current debate, and establishing our longer term approach to this issue.

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2008-0720-MR
6/18/10

II. INTERESTS OF THE AFFECTED GOVERNMENTS

U.S. Interests

The highest priority U.S. interest with respect to Germany is to assure that the political, economic and security ties which link the FRG to its Western partners be maintained and strengthened. Any new arrangements between the two German states must not weaken these links. The U.S. also has an interest in promoting economic reform and democratization within the GDR. Finally, the United States also has an interest to ensure the continued process of reform throughout the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Destabilizing developments within Germany could represent a threat to this process; thus the United States has an interest in assuring that whatever new relationship develops between the two German states occurs peacefully and in a manner which clearly does not threaten the interests of other European governments.

The United States has supported the objective of German reunfication by reason of treaty commitment, principle, and policy. Along with the UK, France and the Federal Republic, the USG signed an agreement which went into effect in May 1955 committing us to support "the aim of a reunified Germany enjoying a liberal democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the European community." We support the principle of self-determination. Finally, our policy of support for reunification has been an important bond with the West German people, allowing them to strengthen their Western links while maintaining their commitment to eventual reunification. The closer the prospect of reunification comes, the more important it will be to ensure that the Germans perceive no incompatibility between strong and intensifying Western cooperation and the achievement of their aspirations to overcome the division of Germany.

Soviet Interests

Because they are constantly undergoing self-criticism and redefinition, Soviet interests are perhaps the hardest to define. Gorbachev's concentration is not Eastern Europe; it is perestroyka and the Soviet Union's own social, economic, and political problems. Over the past year, Gorbachev has been clear that he will support East European change and sacrifice traditional Soviet interests in the region in order to stimulate and protect Soviet perestroyka.

A few months ago, Soviet interests were defined in terms of buffer states, the leading role of fraternal communist parties, post-war security and economic arrangements, and the maintenance of an outer empire. Today, Gorbachev has redefined

Soviet interests in ways which diminish large portions of the Soviet Union's security apparatus and cast doubt on the strength of its security ties to its Warsaw Pact allies. Over time, it is conceivable that the USSR could move to the point where even the Warsaw Treaty Organization itself was no longer the sine qua non of its East European policy.

Nonetheless, Gorbachev clearly wants to preserve the maximum possible Soviet influence over the process and the outcome of German unity. For nearly 45 years the Soviet Union could count on control of the issue through its control of the GDR. That instrument has now slipped from Gorbachev's hands, due in no small measure to his own reforms. Now, Gorbachev may resort to the Four Powers and a proposed peace treaty as the next best guarantee that Soviet interests will be protected.

French and United Kingdom Interests

Polling data suggest that both the British and French publics support German reunification. The political classes and the governments have been more reserved. France bears the longest running historical antipathy toward a unified Germany and suffers most from proximity. Memory and experience have made the French political class especially reserved on the issue.

On the other hand, France has had the most extensive post-war collaborative arrangements with West Germany of any ally. This broadly-based, practical experience with Germans has boosted French public support for German unification. Nevertheless, France has an interest in a continuing U.S. role and through European economic and political integration in securing Germany to the West (Franco-German ties may be insufficient for the job).

President Mitterrand has placed great stock in intensifying French/West German ties (military, economic and commercial), even at the expense of certain degrees of French sovereignty. In a recent statement, Mitterrand left no doubt of his firm support for reunification if the German people wanted it:

> "What counts most (about reunification) are the wishes and determination of the people, and that events should happen at some point ... now or later in such a way that Germans will form a single people living in a single state. If this is what (the Germans) want and they can bring it off, France will adjust its policy so as to be able to act for the best in Europe's interest and in its own interest."

The UK, in contrast, has been more reluctant to cede any sovereignty in order to draw the FRG into greater Western interdependency. In part, this is explicable by

the English Channel and a greater degree of British insularity. But it is also the consequence of a sharp personality clash between Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher and the almost total absence of productive communications between them. The British will remain concerned with the disproportionate political and economic weight of Germany within existing -- and probably future -- European institutions. The British may also worry that preoccupation by the U.S. with Germany would weaken the special US-UK relationship.

Interests of Other (Non-German) Europeans

Western Allies. Most of our Alliance partners share a residual concern for a unified Germany spawned of their own wartime experiences. Many would prefer the status quo; i.e., two Germanies, but they are unable and unwilling to impede unification. They share France's basic desire to draw Germany into a web of "Community" and bilateral ties and, already dwarfed by their larger European partners, are less concerned than France or the UK with Germany's potential economic and political muscle.

Eastern Europe. Two clashing memories, centuries of German expansionism and wartime occupation on the one hand and the post-war West German economic miracle on the other, create a relationship of great complexity.

In Poland, for example, where emotions run closest to the surface, two Germanys are clearly preferred to one and the unsettled Polish/German border creates a special worry, but there is also stark recognition that closer cooperation with West Germany is Poland's best hope for the future. The Hungarians, by contrast, view unification with relative equanimity. To the extent that East Europeans will express a view, we would expect them to support dilution of German strength within an enlarged European Community.

West German Interests. West Germans greet the concept of a united Germany with nervousness and ambiguity. There is popular support for East German self-determination and, if the East chooses, eventual unification. But West Germans want it to happen at little risk to their western ties and with even less sacrifice of their current economic condition. Yet, the emotional reaction to the opening of the inner-German borders is a genuine reflection of the strong sense of communion which persists between the two Germanies. Consequently, West Germans will be unstinting in their support for the Eastern refugees, even though West Germans will not tolerate the reunification of Germany on the territory of the FRG.

The FRG Government probably prefers a return to stable conditions in the GDR and the creation of a political and economic climate which encourages East Germans to stay home and build a reformed GDR which may, with time, reunite with West Germany. But the FRG cannot afford to fall behind the reform demands of the GDR public. Thus, Chancellor Kohl has called for free elections in the GDR as the quid pro quo for new West German economic assistance, a demand which only a few weeks ago would have been ridiculed as patently radical.

Bonn's is a coalition government, and the "German Question" is its most sensitive issue. The parties and personalities making up the government do not trust each other, and they are not fully open with each other. This, plus natural caution and uncertainty over next steps, makes meaningful consultation, let along long-range contingency planning between Bonn and its key allies difficult.

East German Interests. There are two sharply divergent interests: one held by the regime, the other by its people. Egon Krenz may, of necessity, prove to be a genuine reformer, but there can be little doubt each concession is grudgingly given to stem the human flow, reinstitute order, resume economic growth and retain party power. There seems, as yet, to be little commitment to the final goals of reform: transformation of the GDR's political and economic systems. Events of the past two weeks raise strong possibilities that the party may itself be transformed by a grass roots revolt. Already four of Krenz's original eleven Politburo appointees have been forced out by their local party. The future of the SED is a large question mark.

On the other hand, the East German people are increasingly identifying reform and their future with free elections and elimination of the Communist Party from its leading role. Economics and free movement have been the principal motivators for reform, with unification avoided -- or rejected -- as an objective. The explanation in part lies in a residual national pride and consciousness built up in the GDR over forty years. It is impossible to measure whether this sense of sovereignty is enough to legitimize and sustain a separate GDR; clearly some harbor a strong preference for elements of the GDR's stronger social system. We should not rule out the possibility that the East German people, once they are allowed true self-determination, may decide that they have a separate identity after all and do not wish to unite politically with an FRG that would dominate the politics of a united Germany.

III. RANGE OF OUTCOMES

The GDR merely by opening its borders will force some readjustments in relations between the two German states. The process of reform in the GDR will accelerate that development. There are broadly speaking three theoretical outcomes for the process. These outcomes need not be seen as discrete scenarios, however. They form a continuum along which events might progress for years, even decades to come. Whatever the outcome, at each step of the way it will be important to ensure that Germany's political, economic and security ties with the West will be maintained.

- o A two-state solution, with more open borders, improved communications, and closely tied economic systems, perhaps with the GDR holding a unique status within the EC. This could come about because, through a referendum, or whatever means, the East German people resolved in favor of a separate existence and the West Germans accommodated them.

- o Some form of confederation in which the constituent parts of a united German state ceded some powers to a central government but less than what is normally associated with the concept of full national sovereignty. The central government might, for example, lack full powers in foreign policy and defense. Powers ceded to the central government might include such areas as transportation, banking and commerce.

- o A united, federal Germany perhaps along the lines of the current Federal Republic (which has a highly federal constitution). This would presumably come about by a referendum on unification by a freely elected GDR parliament.

While it may seem logical to assume that a reunited Germany or a democratic GDR might wish the Soviets to withdraw their troops, that may not necessarily be the case. Possibly, a situation in and around Germany analogous to our retention of a base on Cuban soil at Guantanamo Bay would lead to a continued Soviet military presence. We mention this point not to make a suggestion, but to stress that there is a broad range of possible outcomes and we should not assume that what seems incompatible may always be so.

Needless to say, there is a multiplicity of points at which the process could go off track. This paper tries to make the process as predictable as possible, but the process will be inherently unpredictable. Therefore, it

is important to seek agreement on fundamentals among our allies and a clear understanding by the Soviets of our views.

IV. THE PROCESS

There are several dynamics which will determine how the evolution toward a new arrangement for Germany will occur. First, the situation in the GDR and, second, the interaction between the two German states. Beyond this core is a series of expanding circles, which will involve an increasing number of states. First, the Four Powers, which retain legal responsibility for determining the postwar disposition of Germany (See Annex). Beyond this core group are Germany's neighbors and those countries within the Alliances on both East and West. Ultimately, there is the CSCE group of 35 nations.

The impetus for change is clearly coming from the bottom up--from the people of the GDR, in the first instance. The next phase is likely to see continued ferment in the GDR combined with increased interaction between the GDR and FRG. There will be a natural temptation on the part of some to seek to pre-empt or channel these changes by some top-down initiative, most likely by calls in the Four-Power realm--for example, a Soviet initiative for a Four-Power conference or similar calls by politicians in the FRG, the U.S. or elsewhere to show initiative through such a conference.

The problem with emphasis on a Four-Power arrangement is that it would put the onus on us to come up with the new architecture. It would also legitimize a Soviet role and veto, and it would set us up as a possible obstacle to German interests.

Clearly, as events develop in Germany and as the outlines of a new relationship between the two German states emerge, based on the results of democratization in the GDR and on discussions between it and the FRG, it will be necessary to involve all those other interested parties. There will be a formal, as well as a practical necessity to secure a Four-Power endorsement to the arrangements between the German states, if they go beyond mere discussions. There will be discussions in both Alliances, and it may become desirable to bless any arrangements through some CSCE document. At the moment, however, neither the people of the GDR nor the government of the FRG is talking about reunification (although leading FRG politicians to the left and right of Kohl are doing so). In both the GDR among the people and in the FRG in the government the emphasis has been on democratization, and this is where we should keep our emphasis as well.

V. MANAGING THE DIALOGUE

While we keep the emphasis in our public statements on the issue of self determination, we do need to intensify more far-reaching consultations--initially, with the FRG, the British and the French--about what the future of Germany might hold. Additionally, we should undertake a quiet dialogue with the Soviet Union on the future of Germany, to establish some rules of the road so that change can be managed peacefully and without alarming either side through misperceptions of actions and motives.

The need is obvious. Already there are voices, for example, to the right and left of Chancellor Kohl calling for some high visibility, Four-Power diplomatic initiative to address the German question. We can anticipate such appeals in our country, and we can hypothesize that Gorbachev might seize the issue to regain influence over the situation. There is a danger of becoming engaged in this kind of approach before a consensus has developed in Germany and before Germany's neighbors have had a chance to take it on board. In such a case, we would find ourselves torn apart by conflicting aims in the Germanys, among the Allies and with the Soviets.

VI. WHAT TO SAY AT MALTA AND BEYOND

In the near term, we need to enunciate publicly a credible, sustainable US approach to this issue. We need to conduct a dialogue with the USSR, responding to Gorbachev's recent message expressing concern about destabilization, and to be prepared to discuss this and related questions with him at Malta.

We should also intensify our dialogue with the FRG, our Allies and NATO. Recent telephone calls from the President to his counterparts in Europe, Gorbachev's own message, Genscher's upcoming visit to Washington, the Malta meeting itself and the NATO ministerial will provide venues and channels for these early contacts.

Articulating a Policy. We should stick to the basic principles involved, putting our emphasis on the need for democratization in the GDR and on self determination. It is not for us to dictate a settlement to the Germans. We should continue to make clear our support for the process of reform in the GDR leading to free elections and a pluralistic democratic system. We should also make clear that if the German people seek unity through peaceful means and on the basis of Western values, we believe Germany's neighbors, including the Soviet Union, need not be concerned by such a prospect.

With respect to the Soviet Union, we need continually to reassure it that we are not seeking to destabilize the situation in the GDR or the Warsaw Pact, that we do not seek unilateral advantage, and that we are behaving with restraint and are urging others to do so. At the same time, we must be on guard for possible Soviet initiatives, especially of a Four-Power nature.

There is still a role for Four-Power diplomacy, for example in putting forward our proposal on aviation and other activities with respect to Berlin (the "Berlin Initiative"). But this would be the wrong time to highlight a putative Four-Power role in the German question. We should deflect any broad proposals from Gorbachev which would shift the focus away from the German people and their exercise of self determination to a forum which excludes their representatives.

Thus, if Gorbachev produced a modest and specific Four-Power proposal, we would react cautiously and indicate our need to consult with allies. If he proposes something grandiose, we would respond negatively. The President should use the Malta meeting to reassure Gorbachev, to ascertain his intentions, and to show him the limits of our tolerance for any policy he may have in mind.

Beyond Malta, we need to intensify our dialogue with the FRG and our core allies. Our objective should not be to design a blueprint, let alone a timetable, for German developments. Rather, we seek to draw up agreed guidelines. A basic principle is that nothing should detract from the continued growth of collaborative Western ties. Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly emphasized his priorities in this regard. Now we must begin to see how we can formulate ways to ensure this objective. Genscher's visit and the Quad meeting on the margins of the NATO ministerial next month will provide occasion to launch this discussion. There will be general language on these issues in the NATO communique, but at this stage we should focus on consultations within the Quad framework, as opposed to the broader NATO context.

VII. A New U.S. Policy Toward the GDR

Finally, assuming the regime does not back-pedal from the steps so far announced and promised, we should move to expand our own relations with the GDR. If the new permanent travel legislation, when promulgated, leaves the borders open, we should consider a Jackson-Vanik waiver on MFN for the GDR. (This should, however, also be contingent on settlement of unresolved claims issues.) An early senior-level visit to East Berlin (e.g. by Eagleburger, Kimmitt or Seitz) would reinforce our

interest in improved relations, launch serious talks to remove old bilateral obstacles and open the way for still higher level contacts, for example a visit by Secretary Baker next year.

Assuming reform continues, we could consider an economic package along the lines of that extended to Poland and Hungary. While we proceed, we should keep in close touch with FRG leaders, and we should allow the FRG to bear the burden of any economic assistance. Even a modest US participation, however, would have great symbolic importance and would underscore our interest in a truly reformed GDR. Genuine reform in the GDR is in fact a sine qua non for solution of the "German Question," and we can do our part to encourage such reform. Our involvement would underscore our role in the larger German question, and expansion of the multilateral approach used for Poland and Hungary would put the question of reform in the GDR in a larger European context.

ANNEX: FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN GERMANY

In agreements concluded during and immediately after the Second World War, the US, UK and the USSR (and later France) agreed that Germany, as part of its unconditional surrender, would be occupied by the Four Powers. The wartime allies divided Germany into three and, with the addition of France, later four zones. The Soviets occupied what is now the GDR. The former British, French and American zones now comprise the FRG.

The FRG was founded with the approval of the three Western Allies on September 21, 1949. As of May 5, 1955, the Western Allies ended the occupation regime in the FRG, carefully reserving their rights with respect to Germany as a whole, a peace treaty, the setting of Germany's ultimate boundaries and Berlin.

A parallel process took place in the Soviet zone. On October 7, 1949, the Soviets authorized the establishment of the GDR. The Soviet Union formally granted full sovereignty to the GDR on March 25, 1954.

None of the parties involved has ever reached a peace settlement with or regarding Germany. The three Western Allies stated in 1954 in the Convention on Relations with the FRG that their essential aim was to have a "unified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution." This has been their consistent position.

In 1954, the western Allies also signed a Settlement Convention with the FRG which set forth two important reservations with respect to FRG sovereignty. In this convention the parties agreed that the three Powers would continue to regulate all air traffic to and from Berlin and that they would continue to exercise control with respect to the use by Soviet aircraft of FRG airspace.

The 1950 FRG constitution, the Basic Law, provides in its preamble that the entire German people must strive for the freedom and unity of Germany through self-determination. While the FRG and GDR have extensive relations, the FRG does not recognize the existence of a foreign German state. Nevertheless, on December 21, 1972, in the wake of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, the FRG and GDR signed a treaty recognizing the "inviolability" of each other's borders and exchanging permanent missions, which operate, in effect, as embassies. Both countries also joined the United Nations on September 18, 1973.

The FRG joined NATO on May 6, 1955, and the GDR joined the Warsaw Pact on May 24, 1955. The three western Allies continue to station troops in their respective former zones of occupation in the FRG. These troops are stationed pursuant to a Status of Forces Agreement between the western Allies and the FRG and are not in the FRG as occupation troops. The Soviets station troops in the GDR pursuant to a host country agreement.

SELECTED DOCUMENTS RELEVANT TO ALLIED RIGHTS

London Protocol

The "Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of the "Greater Berlin Area," the so-called "London Protocol," divided Germany into U.S., British and Soviet occupation zones within her boundaries of December 31, 1937, prior to the annexation of Austria and Hitler's other territorial expansions. The Protocol, signed September 14, 1944, was amended on July 26, 1945, to provide for a French occupation zone. See Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TISA) 3071.

1945 Allied Declaration

On June 5, 1945, the U.S., U.K., France and the U.S.S.R. issued in Berlin the "Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers." See Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, Department of State Publication 9446 at 33. In the Declaration, the four powers assumed supreme authority over Germany and expressly eschewed any interest in annexing Germany. The four powers also declared that "hereafter (they would) determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory." The Declaration set forth the measures the Allies would undertake in ruling Germany, including the stationing of Allied troops and Germany's complete disarmament and demilitarization.

Potsdam Protocol

The "Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference" of August 1, 1945, elaborated in considerable detail how the U.S., the U.K. and the USSR wished occupied Germany to be governed, focusing heavily on denazification and reparations. See Documents on Germany at 54. At Potsdam the three heads of government also agreed that their foreign ministers should meet within a month as a council to consider, inter alia, the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany. Despite the establishment of the Foreign Ministers Council, the three, and later when France was added, the four powers never reached agreement on a peace treaty with Germany.

FRG and Allied Declarations on Reunifications

In 1950, both the Western Allies and the FRG proposed in separate declarations an all-German election, which could have formed the basis of a reunited Germany and a peace settlement. See "Declaration by the FRG Proposing All-German Elections for a National Constituent Assembly" of March 22, 1950, and "Declaration by the Western Foreign Ministers Proposing German Reunification Through Establishment of a Freely-Elected All-German Government" of May 14, 1950, in Documents on Germany at 313. The Soviets countered with a proposal for a constituent council made up of representatives from the FRG and GDR. Proposals and counter-proposals followed in the 1950's without progress being made.

Allied Relations Convention with FRG

The three Western Allies terminated the occupation regime in the FRG in the "Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany," of May 26, 1952, as Amended by Schedule I of the "Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime in Germany," of October 23, 1954. See Documents on Germany at 425. In Article 2 of this convention the western Allies expressly retained the rights and responsibilities "relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement." The three western powers stated in Article 7 that it was their essential aim to have a peace settlement for the whole of Germany based on a "unified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution."

Allied Settlement Convention with FRG

Concurrently with the Relations Convention the western Allies concluded the "Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and Occupation" of May 26, 1952, as amended by Schedule I of the "Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime in Germany" of October 23, 1954. See Documents on Germany at 430. The provisions in the agreement on civil aviation are of particular importance. The agreement specifies that the western Allies would continue to regulate all air traffic to and from Berlin and would continue to exercise control over all Soviet aircraft using FRG air space.

Allied Declaration on Berlin

The three western Allies granted the West Berlin authorities substantial authority to govern the internal affairs of the western sectors of Berlin in the "Declaration on Berlin" of May 5, 1955. See Hendry and Wood, The Legal Status of Berlin, at 332. The Declaration provides that the three powers would normally confine the exercise of their authority to Allied security and immunities, disarmament and demilitarization, foreign relations, satisfaction of occupation costs and police matters.

Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin

The "Quadripartite Agreement" of September 3, 1971, did not alter the legal status of Germany or Berlin, but dramatically altered the political landscape by removing Berlin as a source of tension between the superpowers. See, Documents on Germany at 1135. The four powers agreed in the text not to unilaterally change the "situation which has developed in the area" and facilitated major practical improvements in such areas as communications and transportation.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909093
RECEIVED: 11 NOV 89 16

CHRON FILE

TO: HUGHES

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 24 NOV 89
SOURCE REF: 8926296

KEYWORDS: USSR
HS

GERMANY F R

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RE SITUATION IN WEST & EAST GERMANY

ACTION: OBE PER RICE DUE DATE: 15 NOV 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF: 8909009 8909102

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
JR 3/24/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGAD CLOSED BY: NSMDC DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	RICE	X	89111116	PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
001	STATE	Z	89111319	PENDING STATE RECOMS
002		Z	89112417	RECD STATE COMMENTS
002		X	89112417	ANSWERED VIA STATE 369390
002	RICE	X	89112417	ANY ACTION NECESSARY
002		X	89112708	PRES NOTED SUMMARY OF LTR
002		X	89112709	OBE PER RICE

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909093
RECEIVED: 11 NOV 89 16

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FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 24 NOV 89
SOURCE REF: 8926296

KEYWORDS: USSR
HS

GERMANY F R

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RE SITUATION IN WEST & EAST GERMANY

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY DUE DATE: 15 NOV 89 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF: 8909009 8909102

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
~~RICE~~		BLACKWILL
		DEAL
		HUTCHINGS
		KANTER
		RODMAN

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REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
JL 3/24/10

OBE

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSGAD CLOSED BY: DOC 2 OF 2

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SECRET
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8926296

Date November 24, 1989

For: Mr. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By JL NARA, Date 3/24/10

Reference:

To: President Bush From: Mikhail Gorbachev

Date: 11 November 1989 Subject:

Letter to the President re: Situation in Germany and Berlin

Referral Dated: Undated ID# 8909093 (if any)

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State

Action Taken:

_____ A draft reply is attached.

_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.

_____ A translation is attached.

_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

_____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.

_____ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.

X Other (see remarks).

Remarks:
Response was sent November 17 via State 369390 (NODIS channel.)

for Director
Secretariat Staff

SECRET
(Classification)
DECL:OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8909093

REFERRAL

DATE: 13 NOV 89

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT 8926296

SOURCE: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

89 NOV 13 11:11 PM

DATE: 11 NOV 89

SUBJ: UNDATED LTR TO PRES RE SITUATION IN GERMANY & BERLIN

REQUIRED ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS

DUEDATE: 15 NOV 89

COMMENT: CLOSE HOLD -- RECEIVED IN NSC ON 11 NOV

FOR GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

Rec'd in Exec Sec'y 11/13 at 1:14 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

Chairman Gorbachev of the USSR - Received November 13, 1989

Chairman Gorbachev informs you of his message to Chancellor Kohl concerning the potentially "chaotic situation...with unforeseeable consequences", which could emerge from the rallies in East and West Berlin. He urged Kohl to prevent any complications or destabilization of the current situation. He requests that you issue appropriate instructions to U.S. Embassy Berlin. He does not want there to be any "undermining (of) the current dynamic processes of democratization" since the potential for world-wide destabilization exists.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0841-F
3/7/03

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Unofficial translation

9093

In view of the rather extreme situation obtaining at this point in connection with the events in the GDR, its capital and West Berlin, and noting a cardinal and, in my view, a correct and promising nature of the decisions being taken by the new GDR leadership, I have just sent a verbal message to Chancellor Kohl of the FRG about whose contents I deem it necessary to inform you as well.

According to the reports that are reaching us, a rally is going to take place today in West Berlin with the participation of officials from the FRG and West Berlin. Concurrently, another rally is scheduled to be held in the GDR capital. Given the present virtual openness and mass flows of people in both directions, there is a possibility that a chaotic situation may emerge with unforeseeable consequences.

I have urged Chancellor Kohl to take the necessary and most urgent measures to prevent a complication and a destabilization of the situation.

Our Ambassador in Berlin has been instructed to immediately contact representatives of the three powers' administration in West Berlin. I hope that you, for your part, will also issue appropriate instructions to your representative so that developments do not take an undesirable turn.

On the whole, I believe it useful to emphasize the depth and seriousness of the changes presently taking place in the GDR. But when statements are made in the FRG designed to stir up emotions, in the spirit of implacable rejection of the post-war realities, that is, the existence of two German states, then such manifestations of political extremism can only be seen as aimed at undermining the current dynamic processes of democratization and renewal of all aspects of the society's life. And, looking ahead, this can bring about a destabilization of the situation not only in Central Europe, but on a larger scale.

I wish to express the hope for the understanding of all this on your part.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909519
RECEIVED: 27 NOV 89 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 28 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R
EUROPE EAST

TELCALL

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: PRES TELEPHONE CALL TO KOHL ON NOV 29

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 30 NOV 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLACKWILL
		HUTCHINGS
		RICE

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3/24/10

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSJWD DOC 2 OF 2

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 28, 1989

call completed 9:13 AM 11-29-89

1989 NOV 28 PM 9:58

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl

Attached at Tab I are recommended talking points for the extended November 29 telephone call you agreed with Chancellor Kohl you would have. The points cover the Malta meeting, changes in Eastern Europe, and the German question, reflecting the points made in Chancellor Kohl's November 28 message to you.

Attachments
Tab I Points to be Made
Tab II Chancellor Kohl's message of November 28

all this material not used

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By JL NARA, Date 3/24/10

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

-- Thank you for your message of November 28. It is helpful in preparing for some of the major issues that will arise in my meetings with Gorbachev.

-- It is immensely reassuring to confirm once again that we are thinking very much along the same lines.

-- There are some delicate issues, especially on the German Question. I want to be sure that whatever I say is based on our common approach.

-- Let me lay out for you some of the points I plan to make and some of the issues I expect he will raise.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

-- I plan to lay out my own vision of U.S.-Soviet relations -- where they are now, and where I would like them to go.

-- I will explain what I mean by moving "beyond containment."

-- We now have an opportunity to move toward an entirely new kind of relationship of enduring cooperation, in which the Soviet Union is fully integrated into the international community of states.

-- We want to end the cycle of cooperation and conflict -- good times followed by bad -- that have burdened U.S.-Soviet relations for forty years.

-- I will tell him that perestroika and "new thinking" give us a chance to succeed where our predecessors have failed.

o Perestroika can create the openness inside the USSR that makes it a good and reliable partner.

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- o "New thinking" has meant willingness on Moscow's part to address some of the root causes of East-West conflict.

-- This does not mean that the Soviet Union has to become like us for relations to improve. We have strong ties with many states whose politics are quite different from ours.

-- I will assure him that the U.S. wants perestroika to succeed and that we believe it can succeed.

-- As you noted in your message, Gorbachev will want to know what the U.S. is prepared to do to help. I will hear him out and see what can be done to facilitate trade and investment, bearing in mind there are economic and strategic obstacles.

-- I will explore his thinking on Soviet economic reform and what role he would like to see the USSR play in the international financial institutions.

-- There will also be a lot to discuss on regional issues. In addition to many particular points, I will raise with him our general concerns over Soviet behavior.

-- I will tell him that we need to move beyond crisis management and begin a true process of crisis prevention.

EASTERN EUROPE

-- On Eastern Europe, I want to stress that Western and Soviet interests are not incompatible. In many ways they coincide.

-- I will reassure him that neither we nor our Allies will exploit problems for unilateral advantage. We share his interest in peaceful, orderly change.

-- As you put it, we approach Eastern Europe "not as an adversary seeking to gain advantage, but as a nation offering support."

-- As you requested, I will convey to Gorbachev that you and I share these perspectives and hope that he can agree with the approach of "stability through reform."

-- I will note in particular, as the EC did at its latest summit, that we do not seek to dismember the Warsaw Pact.

-- And I will say that what has been happening, due in large part to perestroika and Soviet "new thinking," shows the way to a better future for all of us.

-- I will of course want to hear his views of these changes, and how he relates them to Soviet policy and interests.

THE GERMAN QUESTION

-- This is probably the most delicate issue we will touch on. Your message was very helpful, and I would welcome any other ideas you have.

-- I certainly won't be drawn into any "understanding" with Gorbachev on change in the GDR or the future of Germany.

-- My stress will be on self-determination, first of all in the GDR. The GDR needs free elections, so that the people there can express themselves on their own future.

-- I will assure him there is no blueprint or timetable for German reunification.

-- And I will stress my complete confidence in you and your government and people. Gorbachev needs to hear very clearly that the Federal Republic has the full understanding and support of its Allies, beginning with the United States.

-- You said in your message that you urged that there be no U.S.-Soviet commitments over the heads of the German people. I can assure you of that and more: I will express my full support for you and for the Federal Republic.

ARMS CONTROL

-- As you know, we are working hard to ensure that this does not become an arms control meeting.

-- We will not be drawn into the details of ongoing negotiations, and we certainly will not make any unilateral deals over the heads of our allies. No surprises!

-- I do want to talk with him about our general approach and philosophy -- where we want to go, and why, and where we do not want to go.

  - o We want to keep the spotlight on our CFE proposal and not be pulled into some new gambit.
  - o On the strategic side, we will focus on ways to restructure our forces that strengthen stability at lower levels.

-- I will project the agenda you outlined in your message. It is our common agenda.

-- I will express concern at the continuing Soviet strategic modernization program and stress my determination to keep our own strategic deterrent up to date.

-- I will press hard on eliminating chemical weapons.

-- And I will stress again the need for a demilitarization of Soviet policy in all areas: this is the key to moving "beyond containment" to fundamentally new U.S.-Soviet, and East-West, relationship.

-- Of course, you and I will have a chance to discuss these matters over dinner in Brussels.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Cable	Re: Chancellor Kohl to President Bush (8 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: German Unification Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: German Unification (November 1989)

Date Closed:	2/17/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91116-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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9519

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 28, 1989

11/28/89
1845
Brent -
We kept this philosophical in substance as much as possible.
RB Blackwill

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl

At Tab I are proposed talking points for the President's long call to Kohl on November 29. They cover the Malta meeting, change in Eastern Europe, and the German question, reflecting the points made in Chancellor Kohl's November 28 message to the President (Tab II).

Condi Rice concurs. in draft

Dinner is set for 8:30 P.M.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Tab I talking points for the President's use in his telephone conversation with Kohl.

Approve RB Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Points to be Made
Tab II Chancellor Kohl's message of November 28

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By JL NARA, Date 3/24/10

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

9644

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2

November 29, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Memoranda for Malta/Brussels Trip

Attached for your signature (Tabs A, B, and C) are three additional memoranda for the President -- on the Malta and Kohl bilaterals and the NATO meeting -- submitted by our European Directorate for the President's visit to Malta and Brussels. Although drafted as "Scope Papers", we first learned of their existence after 9 p.m. this evening, by which time the President's briefing books had been completely finalized. They are first-rate and certainly merit the President's attention, though there is some duplication of other briefing book material. Since there is no artful way to incorporate them in the briefing books we have prepared, you may want to initial them and let Jim Cicconi provide them individually to the President.

Attachments
Tab A Malta Memo
Tab B Kohl Memo
Tab C NATO Meeting Memo

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0670-MR
9/21/10

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/26/24

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Scope Paper -- Maltese Bilateral

Setting: The arrangements for your meeting with Prime Minister Fenech Adami have been bumpy because of his insistence on an office meeting and the controversy over the parliamentary ban on port visits by nuclear-armed ships. Fenech Adami, having taken personal charge of the nuclear issue, is under fire from his opposition and has issued an inaccurate statement that you gave him assurances in your November 27 telephone call. We, in turn, issued a public statement that "no assurances have been given in any form," in order to protect our global policy of neither confirming nor denying nuclear weapons aboard U.S. Naval vessels.

Tenor and Objectives: Fenech Adami's election in 1987 ended 16 years of Labor rule in Malta. Although his Nationalist Party holds but a one-vote parliamentary majority and is bound by a Constitutional requirement of non-alignment, Fenech Adami has redirected Maltese policy toward Europe and the West. He seeks Malta's admission to the EC, Western investment, and tangible signs of cooperation with the U.S. In that regard, he has requested that we provide Malta with aircraft and patrol boats for coastal surveillance, seeing these as a symbolic as well as a practical sign of stronger U.S. ties. With Ambassador Novetzke's encouragement, we are trying to find ways to meet this request, if possible in time for you to make an announcement in Malta.

The nuclear issue, which is extremely sensitive in Malta, arose when the Maltese asked us to take note of their parliament's resolution banning port calls by nuclear-armed ships. We simply acknowledged receipt of the Maltese request, orally explained our "neither confirm nor deny" policy to the Prime Minister, and filed a routine request for clearance, which was granted. Fenech Adami has been unwilling to state publicly that this is the position we took and he explicitly accepted. The Maltese have also presented us with a $700,000 bill for costs related to the visit.

Despite these current difficulties, hosting your meeting with Gorbachev provides needed vindication at home for the Nationalist Party's pro-Western orientation. It is in our interest, too, that Fenech Adami be seen as a leader who enjoys international trust and confidence -- in contrast to the pro-Libyan, anti-Western posturing of Labor Party leaders Dom Mintoff and Mifsud Bonnici.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Scope Paper -- Your Bilateral with Chancellor Kohl

Setting: Chancellor Kohl's preoccupation between now and December 1990 will be to get reelected. Although economically and politically, things could hardly be better for Germans, Kohl faces a tough battle with an electorate now preoccupied with the German Question. After his free fall in the polls last spring, Kohl rebounded during the summer. In recent weeks, though, criticism that he was trailing events in the GDR led him to go to Berlin, where he called much more aggressively than Genscher for "German unity."

Kohl's November 28 message to you, followed by your November 29 telephone conversation, demonstrated just how close your views and his are on the major East-West issues. His approach toward German reunification, though just as ambitious as Genscher's, is much more firmly rooted in the Western security system and a strong U.S. tie. Your meeting will be in opportunity to reaffirm your firm support for Kohl, particularly for his strongly Atlanticist approach to the German Question. Strong U.S. and Allied support, in turn, will help Kohl avoid a bidding war with Genscher on the subject.

Tenor and Objectives: While we, and Kohl, have been saying that we have no blueprint for German reunification, he is responding to domestic pressures to provide just that -- as in his November 28 Bundestag speech. Thus, while Bonn politicians blame others for harping on reunification, they themselves are talking about little else. It is not that the West German populace demands reunification now but that it needs -- in true Germanic fashion -- to try to create predictability out of a spontaneously evolving situation between the two Germanys. Alongside hopes for realizing the long-deferred goal of German reunification are fears of millions of refugees fleeing chaos in the GDR. So far, Genscher has been more successful than Kohl in satisfying these competing demands.

Kohl's relations with Genscher had been deteriorating for some time but took a sharp turn for the worse after the November 10 debacle in Berlin, when Kohl was booed and Genscher cheered (by a largely SPD crowd) before the Wall. Kohl's efforts to recover from this humiliation may be carrying him too far out front on the German Question. The ten-point agenda he proposed in his Bundestag speech, for example, calls for free elections in the GDR, leading "very soon" to new "confederative structures" between the two Germanys and ultimately to reunification.

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Genscher, as you saw in your meeting with him on November 21, will not be easily outflanked on the German Question. His goal is of course German reunification, but on different terms than Kohl, or the U.S., would like to see. His vision is of a "Europe for the Europeans": he seeks a diminished role for NATO and the U.S. within the context of a comprehensive arms reductions regime, which in turn will free the FRG to take the lead in promoting a new European order. As you will recall, Genscher leaves immediately after Brussels for a visit to Moscow.

Despite Genscher's personal popularity, he needs Kohl as much as Kohl needs him. His Free Democratic Party still hovers just above the five percent margin needed to remain in parliament (and hence in government), and his political advantage remains as part of the present coalition rather than with the SPD. Thus we can expect continuing divisions within the Bonn coalition, as well as criticism from the opposition, on the German Question.

The border issue is a case in point. Although the recent Bundestag resolution renouncing territorial claims against Poland "now and in the future" passed by a wide margin, some of Kohl's CDU deputies abstained (not wishing to foreclose the possibility of a future "greater Germany"). This issue is likely to intensify, with the Republikaner and others calling for reunification within the 1937 borders -- i.e., including a huge chunk of western Poland and a small part of the USSR.

For all his political difficulties, Kohl's attitude on the German issue -- his strong support for NATO and EC integration, as well as his reassurances at the EC summit in Paris -- deserves our backing. He is a bulwark of Atlanticism at a time when the heady events in the GDR cause some in the FRG to slip their Western moorings.

Your private meeting will bolster Kohl at home. He will want to demonstrate that he was consulted before and after Malta and received special treatment at Brussels. He will also project himself as an influential partner in securing progress on arms control without diminishing the U.S. security commitment, and in winning Allied confidence on the German Question. In supporting Kohl in this way, you can use your meeting to encourage him to continue defining German interests in strongly Atlanticist terms.

One disquieting note: in a November 28 briefing to the U.S., UK, and French ambassadors, Horst Teltschik said that Kohl had consulted with the Soviets beforehand on his Bundestag speech and also (quoting Ambassador Walters' reporting cable) "all possible questions, including a peace treaty, a four-power conference, and the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact." If accurate, this report would have Kohl consulting more closely with the Soviets than with us. In a friendly way, you might ask Kohl and Teltschik about the nature of these discussions.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Your Meetings in Brussels with NATO Leaders, December 3-4

You will arrive in Brussels amid massive publicity about your meetings with President Gorbachev, and the remarks made at the Sunday afternoon press conferences. The immediate focus will be on your intention to brief Allied leaders on your discussions in Malta. However, this meeting of the North Atlantic Council will probably be turned to a larger purpose: a wide-ranging exchange of views about the future of Europe.

The opportunities are manifest. We are witnessing the transformation of almost every state in Eastern Europe into more democratic societies, dominated by pluralistic political systems matched to decentralized economies. We are on the verge of realizing an end to the artificial division of Europe, with the East-West military confrontation of forty years transfigured beyond recognition. The ingredients for lasting stability are now present, and with it the hope for a more unified and safer Europe than we have ever known, at least in this century.

The risks are less apparent, if only because we have experienced such a break with the past that this year's experience can hardly be projected into the next. Yet if the Soviet Union stagnates in a frustrating, seemingly endless, struggle to reform its society from above while preserving central control, and Eastern European states revert to a historical pattern of fractious and unstable internal politics, persistent economic weakness, and bitter national rivalries, the outlook begins to darken. Add a renascent Germany reclaiming its national identity and influence in the East, and a Western alliance that could be ever more hollow as its members declare victory and shed their share of the common burdens, and we can see the potential for instability on a scale not seen since the aftermath of World War II.

You have the opportunity to spotlight the key elements in avoiding such a downward path, managing peaceful change and realizing the historic opportunities. They are:

-- **The Soviet leadership deserves our strong support** for their reform efforts and for their statesmanlike tolerance for self-determination in Eastern Europe.

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-- **There are very serious uncertainties about what lies ahead for the Soviet Union.** We harbor real doubts about whether the economic reforms adopted to date go far enough to revive the flagging Soviet economy. With continued economic stagnation, the outlook for the nationalities question and political reform in general remains quite cloudy.

-- **The countries of Eastern Europe need our assistance and encouragement** in creating new societies, overcoming the division of Europe. We must be actively engaged. We cannot afford to see democratic experiments falter, descending into unstable authoritarianism and prolonged economic malaise. Our efforts to preserve stability can reassure Moscow as well.

-- **Western integration and coordination will be crucial.** We must use the Alliance and the CFE process for organizing our collective approach to European security. On the economic and political side, a strong EC and effective G-24 can play a vital role. The Alliance can take on a broader political agenda and the EC can offer economic incentives as we reach out to the East.

-- **The U.S. commitment to European stability and to the deterrence of war is undiminished.** We will maintain forward deployed nuclear and conventional forces in Europe to back up that commitment as long as they are desired by our allies.

-- **The German people should set the course for the evolution of Germany**, starting with the establishment of representative government in the German Democratic Republic. We are not afraid of a new Germany that is part of the commonwealth of free nations, firmly tied to Western values.

You have a separate memorandum from me about your dinner with Chancellor Kohl, but that discussion, your meetings with Martens and Delors, and your brief bilateral with Secretary General Woerner all offer opportunities to stress these themes before your presentations to the North Atlantic Council. All of these ideas are important for the meeting with Kohl. For Martens, I suggest you emphasize Alliance solidarity in changing our defense posture. For Delors, the importance you attach to the EC and greater European integration will be welcome, but you should encourage him to comment on the EC's future relationship to Eastern Europe. With Woerner, a brief preview of these key themes will be his cue for his handling of the meeting and of the subsequent press conference.

Your first presentation at NATO, in the morning, will principally describe your discussions with Gorbachev. Andreotti and Mulroney will discuss their meetings with him as well.

Your intervention in the afternoon will help structure a broad discussion of the future of Europe. It will emphasize key ideas about the opportunities before us and the key choices we face. It will touch upon our support for German self-determination, underscore the continuing vitality of the Alliance, and urge accelerated progress in CFE -- noting the importance of CFE as an organizing instrument for adjustments in Allied force posture.

9644

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 29, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Memoranda for Malta/Brussels Trip

Attached for your signature (Tabs A, B, and C) are three additional memoranda for the President -- on the Malta and Kohl bilaterals and the NATO meeting -- submitted by our European Directorate for the President's visit to Malta and Brussels. Although drafted as "Scope Papers", we first learned of their existence after 9 p.m. this evening, by which time the President's briefing books had been completely finalized. They are first-rate and certainly merit the President's attention, though there is some duplication of other briefing book material. Since there is no artful way to incorporate them in the briefing books we have prepared, you may want to initial them and let Jim Cicconi provide them individually to the President.

Attachments
Tab A Malta Memo
Tab B Kohl Memo
Tab C NATO Meeting Memo

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2009-0690-MR
EO 9/21/09

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 2/26/24

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Scope Paper -- Maltese Bilateral

Setting: The arrangements for your meeting with Prime Minister Fenech Adami have been bumpy because of his insistence on an office meeting and the controversy over the parliamentary ban on port visits by nuclear-armed ships. Fenech Adami, having taken personal charge of the nuclear issue, is under fire from his opposition and has issued an inaccurate statement that you gave him assurances in your November 27 telephone call. We, in turn, issued a public statement that "no assurances have been given in any form," in order to protect our global policy of neither confirming nor denying nuclear weapons aboard U.S. Naval vessels.

Tenor and Objectives: Fenech Adami's election in 1987 ended 16 years of Labor rule in Malta. Although his Nationalist Party holds but a one-vote parliamentary majority and is bound by a Constitutional requirement of non-alignment, Fenech Adami has redirected Maltese policy toward Europe and the West. He seeks Malta's admission to the EC, Western investment, and tangible signs of cooperation with the U.S. In that regard, he has requested that we provide Malta with aircraft and patrol boats for coastal surveillance, seeing these as a symbolic as well as a practical sign of stronger U.S. ties. With Ambassador Novetzke's encouragement, we are trying to find ways to meet this request, if possible in time for you to make an announcement in Malta.

The nuclear issue, which is extremely sensitive in Malta, arose when the Maltese asked us to take note of their parliament's resolution banning port calls by nuclear-armed ships. We simply acknowledged receipt of the Maltese request, orally explained our "neither confirm nor deny" policy to the Prime Minister, and filed a routine request for clearance, which was granted. Fenech Adami has been unwilling to state publicly that this is the position we took and he explicitly accepted. The Maltese have also presented us with a $700,000 bill for costs related to the visit.

Despite these current difficulties, hosting your meeting with Gorbachev provides needed vindication at home for the Nationalist Party's pro-Western orientation. It is in our interest, too, that Fenech Adami be seen as a leader who enjoys international trust and confidence -- in contrast to the pro-Libyan, anti-Western posturing of Labor Party leaders Dom Mintoff and Mifsud Bonnici.

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Declassify on: OADR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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SUBJECT: Scope Paper -- Your Bilateral with Chancellor Kohl

Setting: Chancellor Kohl's preoccupation between now and December 1990 will be to get reelected. Although economically and politically, things could hardly be better for Germans, Kohl faces a tough battle with an electorate now preoccupied with the German Question. After his free fall in the polls last spring, Kohl rebounded during the summer. In recent weeks, though, criticism that he was trailing events in the GDR led him to go to Berlin, where he called much more aggressively than Genscher for "German unity."

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WHITE HOUSE

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909642
RECEIVED: 29 NOV 89 20

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 29 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
GERMANY F R
EUROPE EAST
GERMANY D R

2

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF USSR POLICY TWD GERMANY IN LIGHT OF CHANGES IN GDR & EASTERN EUROPE

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 02 DEC 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RICE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
3/24/10

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGAD CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 2 OF 2

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

12/5/89

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1989 NOV 30 AM 8:33

November 29, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: The Soviets and the German Question

This paper responds to your request for further analysis of the Soviet Union's policy toward Germany in light of changes in the GDR and Eastern Europe.

Soviet policy toward Germany is -- like everything else -- in a state of flux. The Soviets have lost control of their policy toward Eastern Europe and are largely reacting to events on a day to day basis. Gorbachev foresaw neither the pace nor the direction of change there and is increasingly powerless to do anything about it. The threat of the use of Soviet military power to reverse events increasingly lacks credibility and no one knows where Moscow's tolerance will end.

The Soviet reaction to events in the GDR is the clearest indication to date that Moscow has come to believe that peaceful economic and political change is the only alternative to a popular explosion. Earlier Gorbachev probably hoped that reform in these countries would take place within the boundaries of a single party system -- a kind of mirror of Soviet perestroika. But he was mistaken.

The GDR is not Poland or Hungary and the likelihood of a non-communist East Germany has reopened the long dormant core issue of Soviet security -- the German question. If the communists lose power in the GDR, the rationale for a divided Germany goes away. Yet the reunification of Germany would rip the heart out of the Soviet security system since East Germany and the 390,000 Soviet forces based on its territory constitute the fulcrum of the Warsaw Pact.

Gorbachev's communication to you on the issue of German reunification was unequivocal -- he emphasized the "political realities of the postwar era, namely the existence of two German states."

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526
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The reunification of Germany conjures up deeply held memories and residual fears of repeated German invasions of Russia and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's worst nightmare is a reunified Germany allied with NATO or, alternatively, nominally allied with the West and heavily militarized. The Warsaw Pact, having lost its East German anchor, would quickly disintegrate and the Soviet line of defense would begin at the Ukranian border. A companion fear is that this reunified Germany would be able to dominate East-Central Europe economically, including a weak Soviet Union. No Soviet leader can allow German reunification on these terms: The gains of World War II achieved at the cost of 20 million lives would be gone.

The best outcome for Moscow would be the continued existence of two viable German states. The GDR would reform politically and economically, maintain its identity and develop closer economic and political ties with FRG. The continued existence of two German states would allow the GDR to anchor the Warsaw Pact, keeping the Soviet security system nominally in tact. At the same time, Moscow would enjoy not only the benefits of direct economic cooperation with the FRG but the contribution of an improved East German economy to COMECON.

The problem for Moscow now is to design a new policy to promote a favorable outcome when Soviet control over events in Eastern Europe is weak. The Soviets can still use force to stop unwelcomed events. Were there instability and violence in the GDR, the Soviets would most certainly act to protect the 390,000 Soviet troops stationed there. But short of that, it is hard to imagine a pretext for the use of Soviet force which would not discredit perestroika. Even a Soviet response to instability in the GDR carries risks for Gorbachev since the use of force, whatever its rationale, would destroy the chances for full Soviet economic and political rapprochement with the FRG.

Moscow's most likely diplomatic approach is to try and blunt the impact of change in the GDR by solidifying international support for two German states. Betting that there is little true enthusiasm for German reunification in the West -- particularly in France and Britain -- the Soviets would take every opportunity to stabilize the existing system of alliances while holding out the "common European home" as the promised end-point. While Soviet rhetoric might continue to call for the dissolution of blocs, we could expect a constant stream of new proposals for alliance to alliance talks and negotiations. Gorbachev might even use the CFE process, with its timetable for partial withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet forces, to give the Soviet presence a longer life in Europe than it might have if pressures for Soviet withdrawal grow from the populations of Eastern Europe. Finally, we could expect Soviet efforts to strengthen the CSCE's role in inter-German affairs and European security in order to draw upon the angst of smaller European states about a stronger Germany. But like Gorbachev's earlier tactics toward Eastern Europe, this policy is likely to fail too.

There is currently no evidence of panic in Moscow on the German issue but if the Soviets begin to see their influence over European affairs deteriorating more rapidly, Gorbachev could revert to Soviet calls from the 1950s for a general treaty on collective security in Europe or a German peace treaty. The goal would be to regain control of the pace and form of German reunification. The Soviets might count on the British and French as natural allies in delaying German reunification or pushing it toward confederation.

Gorbachev will come to Malta with these issues uppermost in his mind. There is, to date, no evidence that the Soviets have worked out a new policy toward Eastern Europe or Germany. As one Soviet commentator recently remarked, the Soviets have decided that their security interests are not served by the Brezhnev doctrine's emphasis on preservation of the leading role of the Party in Eastern Europe. They have not, however, defined a new set of limits. Reformers in Eastern Europe seem to believe that membership in the Warsaw Pact is Moscow's last line in the sand. But reform in the GDR and the attendant spectre of German reunification call even that requirement into question. That is why the German question is -- in a way that it has not been for many years -- high on the Soviet security agenda and they are clearly uncertain about how best to protect their interests over the long-term.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9642

November 29, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT/ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: Paper on Soviet Policy Toward Germany

You asked that we do a brief paper for the President on Soviet policy toward Germany. The paper, in the form of a Memorandum for the President, is at Tab I. We recommend that it be placed in the Briefing Book.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to President

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By ZL NARA, Date 3/24/10

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Declassify on: OADR

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CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 1, 1989

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MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from the President to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, November 17, 1989 (U)

Distribution of the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation must be handled via NODIS channels and at the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. If the item is to be sent to Embassy Bonn, it should be sent to the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By ZT NARA, Date 3/29/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WASHINGTON 9280

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call From Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Interpreter: Gisela Mercuse
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 17, 1989, 7:55 - 8:15 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: In my talks with [new East German leader] Krenz, I raised the issues of free elections, free trade unions, and freedom of the press. I suggested that we in the FRG will give comprehensive assistance under the condition that these reforms, which the people are expecting, will be carried out. If they do not carry them out, the government will fall. There will be more movement on Saturday and Sunday. I expect more than a million people will visit the FRG. I hope that the opening of the border has had the consequence that travellers do not have to stay but can return to an improving home. (C)

In view of world political developments, we will do nothing that will destabilize the situation in the GDR. I had a long conversation with Gorbachev. Of course, the Soviets are concerned. I told Gorbachev that if Krenz does not carry out reforms as in Poland and Hungary, the system will fail. (C)

The President: Thank you for your support in your public comments. It is important that Germans see that they have the support and sympathy of their Allies. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Tomorrow night at the EC meeting, I will report on Poland, Hungary, and the GDR. I will put in an urgent plea to support the American initiative for Poland. I will pledge that if the U.S. is willing to put up $250 million for stabilization, we will put up the same amount. All in all, that amounts to $500 million as a stabilizing measure. I do hope that others will be able to put up the remainder. (C)

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The President: Let me say that we appreciate the FRG's stand and your stand personally. In spite of Congressional posturing, the U.S. will stay calm and support reforms in just the way you talk about. The euphoric excitement in the U.S. runs the risk of forcing unforeseen action in the USSR or the GDR that would be very bad. We will not be making exhortations about unification or setting any timetables. We will not exacerbate the problem by having the President of the United States posturing on the Berlin Wall. (C)

The Walesa visit went well. He was reasonable, and relatively pleased about the Congressional aid package. I have followed up on giving the IMF a push in its negotiations with Poland. It will be difficult to reach a conclusion by the end of November -- which is your timetable -- but may be possible in December. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: If negotiations are completed by mid-December, that would be acceptable, but it cannot be later than that. (C)

The President: We will push and encourage others to do the same. You might tell the EC that we have talked and push others to help. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I had hoped we might get together as you prepare for Malta, but unfortunately I cannot come before your meeting. What about our meeting in Spain, even for two hours? (C)

The President: We are in a tight time frame. I would value your judgment and would like to get together. I gather you cannot come to Camp David. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I have an enormous problem with freeing myself for two days. With the developing situation, I would like to stay here. There is also a budget debate in our parliament. You have a Naval base [in Spain]. Perhaps you could make a stopover. (C)

The President: Here is my point: I am absolutely determined to get advice and suggestions from you personally before I meet with Gorbachev. That is very important, because of the German Question. I understand your logistical problems. I want to suggest that after Genscher is here, you and I set aside an hour or more next weekend to talk by phone. Maybe we can have secure communications, so that I can understand every nuance of the German Question. I will be available for as much time as possible. Input from the FRG, from Chancellor Kohl, to Gorbachev is more important than at any other time or for any other meeting. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We should try to arrange that. Perhaps Monday we should have a long conversation. (C)

The President: That would be good if we cannot figure out another way. I think there are nuances of difference in the Alliance. I want to understand them. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That is true. (U)

The President: I will have proper consultations. More important than large consultations, I need to understand Germany. Woerner has invited us to come to Brussels. I will do that. You and I could have a separate breakfast -- or supper if we get in early. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: When will you arrive? (C)

The President: Sunday night, maybe in time for dinner. Maybe you would buy me dinner. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I would be able to do that. We can arrange that, either on December 3 or December 4. (C)

The President: Or before the meeting, for two hours over breakfast. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That is possible. Let us envisage having breakfast on the 4th. (C)

The President: Let's do it. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We can talk about it. (U)

The President: It is important, so that I do not miss the nuance of Germany's or Kohl's positions. After Genscher is here to see Jim Baker, we can talk. Brent can also talk to Teltschik. If there is any disconnect, I may request that our top people get together. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me make a suggestion. Genscher will be in Washington on Tuesday. The second part of the week I will send a personal memorandum of my position. I will call you on November 27 for an extensive discussion, and we will meet before the conference in Brussels. (C)

The President: We will get back to you on which time is better. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: All right. Let's envisage a meeting on the 3rd. Next week you will receive a paper from me. (C)

The President: Let me make one personal comment. When you told me that you thanked the American people for their steadfastness, I passed that along and it was received warmly. I want to thank you for that comment. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It was only natural. (U)

The President: If anything comes up that is unforeseen, call me or I will call you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I will do so. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9280

November 17, 1989

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl of West Germany

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the Department of State transmitting the Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.

Concurrences by: Condoleezza Rice CR, Robert D. Blackwill RDB

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve APK Disapprove _____

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.

Attachments
Tab I Hughes Memorandum for Roy
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By JL NARA, Date 3/24/10

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