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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91113
Folder ID Number: 91113-004

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 4/10/92 - 6/30/92

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine (2 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
02. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
03. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (4 pp.)	4/20/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
04. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Jacques Delors, President of the EC Commission (3 pp.)	5/1/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
05. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers (2 pp.)	5/1/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
06. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Brian Prime Minister Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (3 pp.)	5/1/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
07a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (2 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
07b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (1 pp.)	5/7/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
08a. Memo	Edmund J. Hull to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (1 pp.)	5/8/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
08b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (2 pp.)	5/10/92	(b)(1)	SECRET

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Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 4/10/92 - 6/30/92

Pinksheet Number: cap954

OA/ID Number: 91113-004

Date Closed: 2/9/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey [redacted] (3 pp.)	5/11/92	(b)(1)	C
10. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	5/12/92	(b)(1)	Ø
11. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall of Hungary on June 8, 1992 (2 pp.)	6/8/92	(b)(1)	Ø
12. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	6/9/92	(b)(1)	Ø
13. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	6/10/92	(b)(1)	Ø
14. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	6/11/92	(b)(1)	Ø
15. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	6/11/92	(b)(1)	Ø
16. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan in June 11, 1992 (2 pp.)	6/11/92	(b)(1)	Ø
17. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (6 pp.)	6/20/92	(b)(1)	C
18. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (3 pp.)	6/20/92	(b)(1)	Ø
19. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey, June 23, 1992 (2 pp.)	6/23/92	(b)(1)	Ø

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20. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey, June 23, 1992 (2 pp.)	6/24/92	(b)(1)	S
21. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Nelson Mandela, President of the African National Congress of South Africa on June 26, 1992 (3 pp.)	6/26/92	(b)(1)	S
22. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey (2 pp.)	6/26/92	(b)(1)	S
23. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/27/92	(b)(1)	S
24. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia (3 pp.)	6/27/92	(b)(1)	S
25. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/27/92	(b)(1)	S
26. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/28/92	(b)(1)	S
27. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy (2 pp.)	6/28/92	(b)(1)	S
28. Telcon	Re: Telecon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany of June 28, 1992 [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/28/92	(b)(1)	S
29. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal (2 pp.)	6/28/92	(b)(1)	S

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30. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (3 pp.)	6/28/92	(b)(1)	C
31. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (3 pp.)	6/30/92	(b)(1)	C

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Archivist Note

This memorandum of telephone conversation incorrectly lists April 10, 1991 as the date of the call. This conversation actually took place on April 10, 1992.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Leonid Kravchuk
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns
Interpreter: George Sajewych

DATE, TIME April 10, 1991, 8:05 - 8:13am
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Kravchuk: We are fine. I will inform you of how things are. First, on more optimistic matters. I had a conversation with Boris Yeltsin earlier today. We agreed to sign an agreement tomorrow on the relocation of nuclear warheads. After that formal agreement, concrete work will begin. (S)

The President: Very good. (U)

President Kravchuk: I will give details on this when we meet in Washington. (S)

The President: All right sir. That is good news. (U)

President Kravchuk: Now on the Black Sea fleet -- this has grown more complicated due to the fact that Vice President Rutskoi visited Ukraine without permission. The other thing is that Yeltsin's decree put the Black Sea fleet on Ukrainian soil under Russian jurisdiction. However, under the influence of the realities of life, Yeltsin suspended his decree. I also decided to suspend certain actions of mine and to launch negotiations. (S)

Yeltsin signed a decree naming a Russian delegation to discuss this and I signed a decree naming a Ukrainian delegation. The two delegations will begin work on Monday. (S)

The President: That's encouraging, right? Isn't that a positive development? (S)

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President Kravchuk: Yes, this is the beginning of concrete negotiations. I think they will proceed properly. Earlier today, I had a conversation with Yeltsin about Moldova. The foreign ministers of Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Romania met in Moldova. I believe this was a great success. (S)

The President: Very good, very good. (U)

President Kravchuk: Moldova is proposing that the Ukrainian army should form a barrier between the hostile parties. After decisions are taken, I think Yeltsin, Snegur, the Romanians and I should have consultations to take some practical steps. (S)

These were the most topical issues. I will give you details on them on May 6. I will inform you of the assistance we require from you. I do want to express my gratitude about your announcement to Congress last week. (S)

The President: Leonid, thank you very much. That is good news on the discussions you and Boris Yeltsin had on the first problem, on the Black Sea fleet and on Moldova. That is the way to solve your problems. (S)

Please feel free to give me your ideas in confidence to Ed Hewett and his team going there in a few days. Please tell your Ministers that these three men have my total confidence. If you level with them, tell them what is in your heart, they will tell me and we will be able to guarantee the success of your visit here. (S)

President Kravchuk: Yes, we will do that. (U)

The President: Okay. Thank you for the courtesy of this call. Good luck as you wrestle with these problems. (U)

President Kravchuk: I want to send my best to you and wish you every success in your election campaign. (U)

The President: Thank you sir. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Guillermo Endara of
Panama on April 10, 1992 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Endara of Panama
Interpreter: Patricia Arizu
Notetaker: John McShane/James Waurishuk

DATE, TIME April 10, 1992, 4:22-4:26 p.m., EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Endara: Hello, George, it's so nice to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Well, it's nice to hear your voice. How are you doing? I saw you on television last night, and I just wanted to tell you that we too are very pleased with the verdict against that terrible Noriega. We certainly appreciate your government's help with this trial. I hope this brings a difficult chapter in Panama's history to a close. (Ø)

President Endara: Thank you. I hope you are doing well, and I also saw you on television. Your words were exactly what I felt. We are very happy with the verdict, and we feel that justice has been done. Your justice system is not perfect but it is very close to being perfect, and it certainly showed in this case. (Ø)

The President: Well, the television people are making this out to be unpopular, but I don't think that's the case and I hope the people in Panama are pleased with the results. Is that the case? (Ø)

President Endara: Oh yes, certainly. I have been receiving many faxes and telephone calls from people happy with the result and asking me to declare a national holiday, the "Day of Justice". Of course, I can not do that -- we have a lot of work to do. But there is general happiness here in Panama. (Ø)

You know, there is one thing that I don't think people realize up there. The day of sentencing, July 10th, is the anniversary of what we call "Black Friday" -- a day when Noriega used a lot of force against the people. It is very proper that this is the day (of sentencing). (U)

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The President: Isn't that interesting? I didn't know that. It makes the sentencing doubly good. I hope the judge does what he should and puts him away for a long time. So other than this, how are things going generally? I want to tell you that you are doing a good job turning things around and consolidating democracy in Panama. (C)

President Endara: Things are going very well. We have full democracy now. The people have their rights. We are still experimenting with our democracy, but everything is working fine. I have my problems with Congress and getting things done, but I understand you do as well. (U)

The President: (President laughs) Yes, well I just wanted to wish you well. It's good to have such a great reason to talk with you again. (U)

President Endara: Thank you very much for the call, George. And I wish you well. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Endara: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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2009-0744-MR
SCS 6/18/12

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Alberto Fujimori of Peru on April 20, 1992 (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Alberto Kenyo Fujimori, President of Peru
Interpreter: Lillian Nigaglioni
Notetaker: William T. Pryce/Robert B. Morley

DATE, TIME April 20, 1992, 2:58 - 3:30pm DST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, how are you?

President Fujimori: Good afternoon, Mr. President, it is a pleasure and an honor.

The President: Mr. President, I wanted to speak to you because I have been very concerned about the situation in Peru. We understand you have enormous problems and don't want to complicate things for you, but I don't want any misunderstanding between the United States and Peru at this time.

President Fujimori: I thank you for your personal interest and welcome and appreciate the opportunity to give some details about what is happening in Peru, including some things you might not have found out through normal channels. I'd like to give you a preview of what will happen and some ideas we have.

The President: I would be delighted to hear this from you. We are not without sympathy for your problems and have enormous respect for the progress you have made, but our big concern is the abandoning of democracy. I'm sure that you are aware of how we feel about democracy from your study of our history. I wanted to transmit this concern to you personally.

President Fujimori: Thank you. I want to reconfirm to you the same thing I have told the people of Peru and the international press. This situation is a temporary one. It is a transitory situation that will not last longer than 12 months. I am not going to become a dictator, my intention is to reinforce democracy. I want to democratize our institutions and break the cycle that is sinking Peru. This objective has been pursued for many years, promises have been made but the objective has never been accomplished. The process will terminate in 12 months in general elections in 1993. As I told you in September of 1991,

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it is not my intention to become a dictator but to strengthen democracy. The situation was threatening to undermine our economic policy.

The President: I see. I understand your number one priority was to reintegrate Peru with the IMF, the World bank, and the IDB. The United States and Japan took the lead in forming the support group to achieve this. We want to continue to help with the economic reforms, to cooperate in combatting narcotics, and to help you continue the good work you have begun on combatting terrorism. My basic problem is that your actions make it very difficult if not impossible to continue our programs. We are getting all sorts of threats from Congress to cut off aid to Peru. I would urge you to revert to democracy just as soon as you possibly can.

Is there a way you can take advantage of the presence of the OAS mission, to reach out to various groups in your country, all democratic forces, and come now to a democratic process? That is what we would like to urge you to do, if there is any way you can do that now.

President Fujimori: The OAS mission is arriving this evening in Lima. I am meeting with them tomorrow. Yesterday, no, three days ago, I announced we will be totally open to dialogue with all groups in the country in order to comply with the OAS mandate. We now have a national commission working on this. I think this is the best signal we are sending that we will cooperate with the OAS.

It is my intention to return democratic processes to Peru as soon as possible. As the press has reported, here in Peru we have freedom of the press, freedom of association, and no one is detained except one minister who is facing several charges. We have full liberties. There is total freedom, an excellent atmosphere for further dialogue.

The President: I understand the measures you took are well received by the people of Peru. I've seen strong support for what you feel you had to do. But the point I want to make is that outside Peru, and the OAS delegation will tell you, it is the opposite. There is very little understanding and very little support for the first steps you have taken. Let's hope that with the OAS visit, some accommodation can be reached. You need to get some agreement with the OAS mission.

I know you have relations with a number of countries, not only with the United States. But I felt I had to tell you that under our system, it will be extraordinarily difficult to move forward with normal relations unless this problem is solved and democracy is restored.

President Fujimori: On my behalf you can be assured, Mr. President, that I will make all efforts necessary to secure the success of the OAS mission. We agree on objectives and agree on the necessity to reestablish democracy in Peru. That's what the

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Peruvian people want -- profound reform in Peru. I would ask your help in getting information out on the situation here, that I have enormous support, that the people are challenging the old system, which was not working. This should not be interpreted as a coup like East Germany or the Soviet Union. Eighty or ninety percent of the people support me, and this should be considered.

The people and my government appreciate the support and friendship you have offered during 20 difficult months, but the situation is very special. I hope for your understanding. You should not have the least doubt that we intend to resolve the situation in the shortest possible time. We will democratize the country as soon as possible. I beg your support and hope you will help with the international financial institutions so they will not change their position of support for Peru.

The President: Let us put a lot of hope on the OAS mission for a solution to this situation. But on the face of it, what you have asked of me is not possible for me to do, because democracy has been set back. I have no reason to doubt your commitment to democracy. Let us hope you can reach a clear understanding with the OAS. I have to tell you that, under the status quo, normal relations are impossible for us, so let's hope the mission can change things, so we can put a different light on it.

President Fujimori: I want to give you a preview of our plans, but ask to keep it to yourself. I plan to make an announcement tomorrow over the national media. It has to do with a timetable for further events. First there will be a referendum on measures taken so far. This will be on June 30, 1992. Then a national debate will ensue on September 1, 1992, on amendments to the 1979 constitution. A national referendum will be held November 8 on amendments to the constitution, simultaneously with municipal and regional elections already scheduled. After that, we will select our new Congress on March 1, 1993. This means that within 11 months we will have reestablished total democracy. The people do not want to go back to the situation they had formerly. This way, the people of Peru will have full democracy and full participation in their government.

The President: Thank you for conveying this information to me. We will listen with full attention to your announcement. I know you are very busy, and wish you well, but I hope you do something that continues democracy. This is essential to the support we really want to continue.

President Fujimori: Sir, I would like personally to tell you, I appreciate the opportunity to describe to you and set out in detail what we are planning to do. I feel sure that once I give the timetable to the people and we establish contact with the OAS, we can be back in contact on serious problems such as narcotics and terrorism. You are acquainted with the drug situation. (You are) Not so familiar with terrorism. I want to address these problems in a framework of democracy and with the total support of the people.

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The President: I see. I hope you succeed, I hope your problems are resolved. Thanks very much for taking a call at this time. Good luck.

President Fujimori: Thank you very much, and good by.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Jacques Delors, President of the
EC Commission

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jacques Delors, President of the EC
Commission
Interpreter: Liza Burnham
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 1, 1992, 3:11 - 3:23 pm
AND PLACE: White House

The President: Jacques, how are you? (U)

President Delors: Fine and you? Do you have better news about
Los Angeles and Atlanta? (U)

The President: Yes. Things are calming down a little bit. I
will speak to the nation at 9:00 pm tonight. Things are calming
down, but there has been a terrible kind of rioting, destruction
and anger. But it will calm down. I am prepared to use whatever
force necessary to stop the rioting. Hopefully, it will be quiet
tonight. (U)

President Delors: I hope so, too. (U)

The President: Thank you very much for inquiring. It's a very
difficult time. I'm calling to let you know that I think we are
close to compromise language regarding the Climate Treaty. (C)

President Delors: I made a proposal on this to you at our last
meeting. (C)

The President: Yes, the Chairman may circulate a draft with
compromise language proposing a commitment regarding green house
gases. People see us as having great difficulty on this issue,
which is correct. His language will stretch us to the limit.
But I believe we can live with what I am told the language will
be. I am calling you because I know you want a strong Climate
Change treaty and to have Rio be a success. I know for some
talk of deadlines and targets is essential, but many people also
want the U.S. to participate, which I'd like to be able to do.
However, with this language as I've heard it, I've gone as far as
I can go. This is our bottom line. I really appreciated your
thoughts on this issue when we talked last week. I think this
compromise proposal picks up on your idea. (C)

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President Delors: Your negotiators have put forward this proposal of new wording? (Ø)

The President: No, our negotiators believe the Chairman's compromise wording would be acceptable to us. If the Chairman puts forward the text as we last saw it, we will be able to accept the Chairman's draft. But we cannot accept amendments. I hope we can go down there united in the West. But this language is as much as we can accept. (Ø)

President Delors: I intend to speak with the Secretary General of the conference and to see if we can accept the text. (Ø)

The President: That would be wonderful. If you accept the text, I am sure other European leaders will follow. (Ø)

President Delors: I intend to study the last text you mentioned and talk with the Council of Ministers, and I will see if we can refuse all amendments after our agreement. (Ø)

The President: If you could accept what I am told is a very good Chairman's text without amendment, we'll be on our way to a good Rio meeting. Are there any new developments on the Uruguay Round? (Ø)

President Delors: We have a very serious problem on oilseeds. The Commission is very worried about your decision. It makes it very difficult for me to continue our bilateral discussions with you on the Round. I hope you will not publish your list of goods for retaliation quickly. If it is possible to wait a month, that would be helpful. This decision created a bad mood among the twelve and especially coming just three days after your visit at White House. (Ø)

The President: About oilseeds, after two GATT findings in our favor and no sign of a reasonable response from the EC, we had no choice but to start our process of retaliation. (Ø)

President Delors: But we had no time to offer a proposal so we could reach agreement within GATT. (Ø)

The President: This is not irreversible. There is time to work this out. This is not irreversible. (Ø)

President Delors: That's good. If it is possible for you not to publish your retaliation list right away, then it would be possible to have new discussions in Geneva and to find agreement. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I think some time before the message is published is possible. I will study our regulations and see if we can do it. I think it may be possible. (Ø)

President Delors: Please do. I will study the new language for the Climate Treaty and the Rio conference. I will try to see if

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I can help facilitate your task. I hope you can go to the Rio conference. (Ø)

The President: Yes, my intention is to go if we can get this language agreed. (Ø)

President Delors: That will be very good. Then we will both be there. (Ø)

The President: Thank you very much, Jacques. I also wanted to tell you that I felt very good about our last meeting. I think it was the best meeting we have had yet. (Ø)

President Delors: Thank you. I agree. (Ø)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers
Interpreter: none
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 1, 1992, 3:30 pm
AND PLACE: White House

The President: Ruud, Ruud? How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Ruud here, so sorry for you about L.A.
(U)

The President: Yes, yes, difficult situation. It is causing great grief, concern, and a lot of violence. I think it is calming down a bit though. I very much appreciate your mentioning this point. It is a real trauma. We'll overcome this. We'll get out of this. (U)

Look, I'm calling about this Rio conference. I know you have had great problems with preparations for this conference. I am calling to say two things: first, I know our differences on this, but secondly, I think we can find some compromise language we can agree to which will make the summit a success. I believe the Chairman is going to table a draft, and I understand he's already circulating it informally to delegations to get reactions. From what I have been told, we can live with the Chairman's text. But I wanted to call knowing our great differences on this issue and how high it is on your agenda. This compromise language will stretch us. We can't go beyond it. Some in Congress and elsewhere will see this as a green light to send me all types of legislation. But the U.S. economy must be allowed to move forward. I can't put new limits on it. (C)

From what I'm told, he is circulating this language now. I'm told we can live with the Chairman's text if it stays like it is. This would clear the way for me to go to Rio. I do not want to put you on the spot. But I wanted to call you as an old friend and as President. I recognize our differences, but this looks like a way we can agree on the text. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Is that what he's proposing? (C)

The President: Yes, take a look at it. See if you can support it. (C)

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Prime Minister Lubbers: I will look at it. Have you talked to anyone else? (Ø)

The President: I have only talked to Jacques Delors about this so far. Delors seems to know something about it. I do not want to put words in his mouth, but I had the feeling that this may be something to which he can agree. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: When will this be discussed? (Ø)

The President: Brent is sitting right here, let me ask. He thinks as soon as this afternoon. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Have you had any contact with the Japanese? (Ø)

The President: I went into it with the MITI minister this morning. He sounded positive, and I had the feeling that the Japanese would agree, though the minister hadn't seen the draft language. I hope you will ask your people not to reject it prematurely but to take a look good look at it. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We do approach this issue a little bit differently, but I'll take a look and get comments from our people. I will urge that we not change the text if at all possible. I wish you all the best in all questions. (Ø)

The President: Thanks so much. Sorry to call so late. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: No problem. I wish you best with L.A. Goodbye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Brian Prime Minister Mulroney,
Prime Minister of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Interpreter: none
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 1, 1992, 3:55 pm
AND PLACE: White House

The President: Brian, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: George, how are you doing? (U)

The President: Just calling on the elusive Rio meeting. Brent brought me up to date on our position on a new draft offered by the Chairman of the committee meeting now in New York. I am told we are very close to finding compromise language, if the text is not changed, on the Climate Treaty. I know the completion of that treaty is important to make the Rio summit a success. I'm getting all kinds of pressure on whether to go to Rio. Given the size of the U.S. and all, I know it would disappoint lot of friends (including Kohl) if I didn't go. (Ø)

The Chairman is tabling a draft this afternoon. I am told that the language on the green house gases is acceptable, but it puts me on the line. I think it has been informally circulated. Very candidly, some will interpret this as what I have been resisting -- setting deadlines -- but we think we can live with the language, if it stays the same. If there is no change, I can do what Kohl and others want and go down to Rio. I know that you want a Rio treaty, too. I hope you can ask your negotiators in New York to support the Chairman's proposal or at least resist any criticism of it until you have had a chance to look at it. I haven't actually looked at it yet, but going by what I'm told -- that we can live with the language. I'm going to catch hell from the right wing, but I'm willing to take it. I hope you can support this compromise. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: George, I saw an earlier draft before I left Ottawa. I've been on the road, and I'm in British Columbia now. Maybe something has been updated that I haven't seen. But I very much want to see you there in Rio, and I understand the problems you have. We all have them. I told our Cabinet to look at the proposal and to give the Canadian delegation in New York additional flexibility so that Canada can accept the treaty with

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a softer commitment. They will be ready to help your delegation to wrap up a final package. This is a major compromise for us which will cause me difficulties with the environmentalists. (Ø)

The President: I realize that. I hate to put people in bind. But if people can support this without amendments, we can accept it. I can't burden the economy with expenditures that would slow down economic growth. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: George, we are prepared to work to facilitate a solution. Canada will be involved in the search for compromise. I told them that in an election year the worst thing to happen would be that you don't go, or you go and sign a bad deal, or you go and get ambushed with a different document. Thus I'd rather show some flexibility with the Chairman's draft and acknowledge compromises, and then go down and sign a treaty with you. I will tell the third world countries that it is better to have three quarters of the loaf than none at all. (Ø)

The President: That is very statesmanlike of you. If the statement is as described and it survives the debate without changes, then I'll go. And if they try to change things once we are in Rio, we'll just have to hold our own. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Tell Brent, we'll be flexible. Canada is trying to be helpful on the Chairman's language. Tell your delegation to have a cup of coffee with our delegates. (Ø)

The President: He's here now, I'll tell him right now. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: What is your assessment of the trade mood in D.C. now? (Ø)

The President: I think it is better. I had a good meeting with Cavaco Silva and Delors. And it is improved on Canada; some here have pulled back. On the Uruguay Round, it has been frustrating. I have been down on Delors, but he's been better and even quite cooperative. In fact, our recent meeting was the best we ever had. Incidentally, he (Delors) did say he can urge that the draft Chairman's statement not be altered. I've also been trying to counter those who say its all right to hold back everything on the Round until after our elections. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He (Delors) was very pleased after visit with you. (Ø)

The President: Really? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, he was very hopeful that a Round agreement would be doable on a 90-95% basis, allowing each of us some exemptions for things causing us trouble, for example Canada on dairy, the EC on bananas. (Ø)

The President: Any thoughts on how I should play my policy speech to the nation tonight about the L.A. situation? There is a lot of angst here. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: On the situation? (U)

The President: Yes, the race question and how we can't condone violence. We are sending in federal assets, troops. We certainly can't condone the violence. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I just spoke to 1000 high school students in British Columbia. I told them not to forget the U.S. is greatest democracy in world. Never in history has there been a country with such color blindness. This is an extraordinary achievement. In your remarks, you should accentuate the positive. Yours is the single greatest experiment in the world of such pluralism. It only functions poorly when compared to perfection. Compared to anywhere else in world, it is a magnificent city on the hill, a pillar of democracy and opportunity. Look at what you have achieved. You have a serious problem with race and justice which you must deal with. But don't throw out the baby with the bath water. (Ø)

The President: Yes, that is a good upbeat message. It's a tough problem. I must uphold law and order. I can't condone violence. But the American people saw the film showing the guy beaten up, and they don't like what they saw. I was sickened myself. I can't undermine our system of justice, even if it hands down a screwy decision. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: That is the splendor of democracy. You talked about Delors. Well one of his predecessors Jean Monet said, "Man's greatest accomplishment is to unite with his fellow man." It's not a black and white situation. The judicial system is not perfect. Like in Canada, we had a man who spent 23 years in jail for a crime he did not commit in Winnipeg. He got out of jail because his mother accosted me on the street and I had someone look into it. I think you've got to acknowledge weaknesses, flaws, but also put them into perspective. As long as you have a democracy it will be wrong from time to time. (Ø)

The President: Thanks on the other. I'll tell Brent about getting in touch with the Canadian delegation. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Okay my friend. (U)

The President: Thanks. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 6, 1992, 10:19 - 10:26 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Helmut! How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am surprised we are talking on the phone to each other. I was looking at the program of the ANPA and saw you were on the speaker's list for today. I was there yesterday for about 12 hours and gave a speech. I praised my friend George Bush. I took the floor right after the Democratic candidate. It was funny. Are you going up there? (U)

The President: No. I'll be doing it by television. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That is very smart, very noble. (U)

The President: How are you doing at home? You showed such empathy with me regarding Los Angeles, and I was thinking of you and your strikes. How is it going? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It is a test of strength now. We just have to be determined. The only negative aspect is that parts of our communities and Federal states are not very brave. These situations do come up; we have to get through them. (U)

The President: Exactly. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: By the way, my speech went well. The atmosphere was very good. (U)

The President: Great! I knew you would be well received. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I listened attentively and mentioned the role of the U.S. and the things we could achieve together. We wanted to speak about Rio. Members of my staff say our cooperation is going very well. We want to have a common position on the Convention on Climate Change, and also concerning the Global Environmental Fund of the World Bank. I was thinking it would be useful if Mr. Feiter could come and talk about these issues. He will be in Washington on Monday also to discuss GATT. (U)

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The President: Yes, absolutely! Who will be coming? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Feiter. (C)

The President: Can he talk about Rio, too? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. He is the man responsible in the Chancellery. He can talk about both Rio and GATT. (C)

The President: Great. We will insure that he has a high-level audience. Brent Scowcroft is right here, so we will take care of it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. That is what I was going to ask. We must make some sort of breakthrough. It is important for us to know the U.S. view on the proposal by Delors. Some sort of compromise is necessary. (C)

The President: We agree. I had good talks with Jacques. Good. Thank you. I am going to Los Angeles tonight. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Good luck. (U)

The President: Thanks for your call. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with PResident Turgut Ozal of Turkey
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 7, 1992, 3:34 - 3:46pm
AND PLACE: Westin Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles

The President: Turgut? (U)

President Ozal: Yes, George, How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. I am just calling to check up on my friend. How are you feeling? (U)

President Ozal: Good, George. My temperature is down, and I'm feeling much better. Everything went very well. (U)

The President: What's next? Will you stay in the hospital for a while? (U)

President Ozal: I'll stay another week, then spend a week in the hotel and return to Turkey. (U)

The President: I just wanted you to know I'm thinking of you, and I wanted to check up on how you are doing. Let us know if there is anything we can do to make your stay more pleasant. (U)

President Ozal: Thank you. I am very sorry about the situation in Los Angeles. (U)

The President: I'm out here in Los Angeles right now. It has been a heartache for everyone here, but it is going to get better. Our press has not been helpful. (U)

President Ozal: Everything will go as you wish, George. Semra sends her best wishes. Best wishes from both of us to you and Barbara. (U)

The President: She is up in Maine now, fixing up our house. At least that's one problem I don't have to worry about. Take care, my friend, and give my best to Dr. DeBakey. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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May 8, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: EDMUND J. HULL *[initials]*
SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Shamir of Israel

Ambassador Shoval has conveyed a request from Prime Minister Shamir to speak with the President by telephone to express thanks for the President's National Day message. (Tab B) Shoval knew of no other agenda for the call, but Shamir's aides have told our Ambassador that bilateral relations and the peace process may also come up in general terms.

In his Independence Day statements May 7, Shamir went out of his way to put a good face on U.S.-Israeli relations. He specifically cited the President's national day message as "very good in every respect." In general, Shamir has been accentuating the positive in terms of our bilateral relations to defend himself against Labor's charge that he has mis-managed the U.S. connection. We can assume that Shamir will publicize the fact of this phone call as further evidence that he has good relations with the President.

While the President can basically be in a listening mode, we have supplied brief points on the peace process to emphasize that he is following it carefully. Baker has sent Shamir a message encouraging the Israelis to re-consider their inclination not to participate in the Economic Development and Refugees multilateral working groups. The Israelis object to the presence of diaspora Palestinians in these groups. Shamir may press for another round of bilateral talks in Rome before Israel's elections but the Arabs are opposed lest they boost Likud.

RECOMMENDATION

That you recommend the President take a call from Prime Minister Shamir Sunday or Monday, using the points at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B National Day Message

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Yitzak Shamir, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Bruce Riedel, NSC

DATE, TIME May 10, 1992; 7:05 - 7:08 a.m.
AND PLACE: The White House

President Bush: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: I am fine Mr. President. I am very happy to hear your voice. (U)

President Bush: There is much going on with the elections in both our countries. I have been in Los Angeles. I am glad we could get together on the phone. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: I was very excited by your message to Israel on Independence Day. (U)

President Bush: I am glad to hear that. It was nice of you to call. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: I want to thank you for all you have done for us Mr. President, especially on the immigration of our brothers from Russia and Ethiopia. You are a great humanitarian. (Ø)

President Bush: I am glad you said that. I know there are many strains in our relationship today, but I believe there is much more that is positive. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: We pray for you here in Israel and for your success. We are sure you will get your goal. (Ø)

President Bush: Well thanks for that thought. It is a strange political year here -- not a pleasant one, and your prayers are appreciated. Thank you for calling. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: One more thing, Mr. President. We are dedicated to the peace process. We want to continue the momentum and we want no interruption in the process. (Ø)

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President Bush: That's very good news. We are together on this. Let's get some progress on the substance now! (C)

Prime Minister Shamir: We will get some progress for sure soon. (C)

President Bush: I like that spirit. Let's do it. (C)

Prime Minister Shamir: Thanks for your call, Mr. President, and for the spirit of your message. (U)

President Bush: All the best to you. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: You too. (U)

Goodbyes.

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey [redacted] (3 pp.)	5/11/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 4/10/92 - 6/30/92

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 11/6/2013

Date Closed:	2/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91113-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0744-MR (508)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	6/18/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey
(Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Demirel
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Jane Holl

DATE, TIME May 11, 1992, 14:10-14:21pm
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Nice to hear from you. (U)

Prime Minister Demirel: I know you are busy. But I wanted to tell you a few things from this side of the world, from my trip to Central Asia. (Ø)

The President: Yes. Please. (U)

Prime Minister Demirel: I just returned from my trip to Central Asia. I wanted to tell you a couple of things about that. I gave a full report to Ambassador Barkley. I asked him to pass this on to you this afternoon. Foreign Minister Cetin also talked with Secretary Baker. (Ø)

I visited Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and I gave these leaders a two-fold message: First, I told them that they were entering into a open world characterized by democracy and a market economy. Now, they don't have states based on democracy and a market economy. But no matter, I urged them to adjust to the new order. I also assured them that we would always be on their side to help them make the transition. As we discussed in Washington, we can work together in these republics for democracy and private enterprise. They are receptive to our ideas and suggestions. (Ø)

Let me tell you about Kazakhstan. It is very important. I talked to Nazarbayev. He is coming to Washington. He is very anxious that the trip is a success. I found him receptive to your views on nuclear weapons. Nazarbayev told me that Kazakhstan should be treated as a temporary nuclear state. He said they were ready to sign the NPT. They are also ready to fulfill their commitments to SALT and their obligations for reductions of nuclear weapons. But he said that each state

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should dispose of their nuclear weapons individually and not transfer them to Russia for destruction. (Ø)

(b)(1)

They keep an open ear to us. We will continue to talk to them.

(b)(1)

And one more thing, I was in Turkmenistan yesterday for a summit meeting of states from the region, including Iran. Everyone has suspicion and distrust of Iran. (b)(1)

(b)(1) But these countries trust us and we should work together to keep stability in those countries. (Ø)

I just wanted to transmit my views on a large scale and I told Ambassador Barkley he should pass these on. (U)

I owe you gratitude on Nagorno-Karabakh and on Bosnia. I hope that we can end the bloodshed in all places. (U)

The President: Thank you for your views on Nazarbayev. I have a high regard for him. We think he should keep his non-nuclear stance as he promised. We will of course treat him with respect.

(b)(1)

(Ø)

On Nagorno-Karabakh, you got our message I know. But we all must work to restrain forces in Nagorno-Karabakh -- (b)(1)
(b)(1) We're urging restraint all around. I know you're under domestic pressure. But I strongly urge you against using any military intervention. It's a very difficult situation. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: We are patient, and we are telling our people to be patient, and that we can't use arms. I don't think you can settle any problem with arms today. (Ø)

Nazarbayev is a nice fellow, a reasonable man. You can persuade him. You know that he just signed that contract with Chevron. I talked with him at long length. He has a lot of respect for you.

(b)(1)

(Ø)

The President: I share your view. My contacts with Nazarbayev have been good. People here like him. We will work on this over here. And Nagorno-Karabakh, we will work on that, we do need restraint. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Demirel: We will also work with our Azeri brothers. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(U)

The President: That's right. President Ter Petrosyan called me this weekend. I told him that we were looking for restraint and a peaceful solution. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(U)

Prime Minister Demirel: I appreciate that. (U)

The President: Well, I appreciate the phone call. Thank you for the update. We'll stay in touch. It's very important. (U)

Prime Minister Demirel: Let me know if I can do anything. (U)

The President: Thank you sir. Where are you now? (U)

Prime Minister Demirel: In Ankara. (U)

The President: Okay then. Thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Demirel: Thank you and good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Fernando Collor, President of
Brazil (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Fernando Collor, President of Brazil
Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetaker: Robert B. Morley

DATE, TIME May 12, 1992, 9:33 - 9:35am DST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, how are you? This is George Bush.
(U)

President Collor: Fine, thank you. It is good to hear from you.
(U)

The President: Well, listen, I am calling you as I said I would.
We are announcing today that I plan to come down for the UNCED
Conference. I said I would give you advance warning. (Ø)

President Collor: Very good. Thank you very much. Your
presence will mean a lot. We are grateful you have decided to
come. (Ø)

The President: We know this is an important conference, and we
want to do what we can to make it a success, but because this is
a crazy election year up here, I can't stay long. (Ø)

President Collor: I understand. (U)

The President: We will announce the decision later today, so I
would appreciate it if you would say nothing about this for a
couple of hours. (Ø)

President Collor: No, I won't say anything for the next couple
of hours. (Ø)

The President: Secretary General Boutros Ghali is coming in a
few minutes, and we may announce it during the meeting. (Ø)

President Collor: Thanks for letting us know ahead of time. I
appreciate it. (U)

The President: Well, good by and good luck with the conference.
I look forward to seeing you again. (U)

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President Collor: Good by.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall of Hungary on June 8, 1992 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Imre Goldstein
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: June 8, 1992, 1:37 - 1:49 pm
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello! Prime Minister Antall? I'm calling to see how you are feeling -- how your health is -- and to wish you all the best. Mr. Robson just came back and was very appreciative of your seeing him. I was just concerned about your health and wanted to see if there was anything we could do. (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: Mr. President, thank you very much indeed for your inquiry. I am fine. The medical treatment is going on, but it does not prevent me from attending to my duties. I am meeting all my appearances. Quite recently I had an international meeting and gave an address of about one hour. So the treatment doesn't prevent me from performing my duties. (Ø)

The President: That is good news. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Also the physicians have made some encouraging statements. At the same time, I would like to seize the opportunity to raise another matter. What's going on in our neighborhood worries us. We will very strictly observe the embargo, but the conditions and circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina are of great concern to us. I am of the opinion that very determined action is necessary. We must also insure as few loopholes in the embargo as possible. It is also very worrying in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo that Muslims are coming to the foreground. This might result in an endless war. Since we all recognize the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I am sure that determined action is needed. The President of Serbia also announced that military units there no longer belong to Serbia. This is a new situation: they have disassociated themselves from these Serbian troops. I am of the opinion that this matter should also be considered. (Ø)

The President: It is a disturbing situation, which we are following closely. We are honoring the sanctions, too, and are glad that you and others are. When you say "other matters" and "determined action," what are you referring to, my friend? (Ø)

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Prime Minister Antall: What I have in mind is that to pacify the region without military pressure is inconceivable. A very severe warning would be necessary. If these troops firing at Dubrovnik are considered irregular, para-military units, no longer under the control of Serbia, then strict measures have to be used. It is also important that UN peacekeepers should go into areas where there is no war yet -- for example, Vojvodina. (C)

The President: I will certainly consider your views. We had hoped that force would not be needed, that the sanctions would have an effect, but we will consider your views. They are very helpful, because you are right there in the neighborhood. I also understand your point about the irregulars. In any event, good luck and thanks for sharing your views with me. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: The situation really worries us because hundreds of thousands refugees may come to Hungary. We also find it very important to draw the attention of all governments not to violate the sanctions. (C)

The President: Exactly, we agree. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Once again I draw your attention to the presence of Muslims. If they also join in, it might result in an endless war. Once again, let me express my thanks in your personal interest and inquiry, which give me strength in implementing my duties. We also keep our fingers crossed in your election campaign. I assure you we are betting on you. (C)

The President: Thank you for your kind words, which mean a lot to me. I will talk to our top people regarding your views on Yugoslavia. Goodbye, my friend. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Carlos Salinas of Mexico on
June 9, 1992 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Salinas, President of Mexico
Interpreter: None
Notetakers: William T. Pryce and
Robert B. Morley

DATE, TIME June 9, 1992, 3:20 - 3:24pm DST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Carlos? Are you there? (U)

President Salinas: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine. I'm calling on a social matter. I understand from the baseball commissioner that the All Star Game will be played in San Diego on July 14, and you are a baseball fan and might like to go. It would be fun for us to go to the game together. Are you interested? (U)

President Salinas: That is very interesting. Thank you for asking me. I will give a good look at my schedule and think about it and get back to you. (U)

The President: It is on July 14, I think, in San Diego. Maybe we could do something like a quiet lunch ahead of time. I am going as part of the official baseball family, with an old friend, Ted Williams. Now, I am sure I am going and would like you to join me there. (U)

President Salinas: This is very kind of you. I will check my schedule and get back to you soon. How have you been? (U)

The President: These are tough times, but I am doing OK. I understand that we had some good talks on NAFTA last week, progress was made. I remain committed to an agreement. If there is anything you think I should be doing, let me know. (Ø)

President Salinas: Jaime Serra told me that he is optimistic about a quick end to the negotiations. He said we are close now. I suggest Jaime and Carla Hills get together next week, the week of June 15, for a final meeting and a handshake, then we let the lawyers have a month to work out final language. We could then sign an agreement by October 15. We don't want to lose momentum.
(Ø)

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The President: I'll talk to Carla. Did Jaime say Carla is prepared to do that? (U)

President Salinas: Jaime said it is feasible to do that. He is very optimistic after last week's meetings. (Ø)

The President: Let me see what I can do. I will talk to Carla personally. I don't want to disrupt anything she has going, or perhaps make something she is doing unsuccessful. I have Brent, Jim Baker, Nick Brady, Zoellick, Hewett, and Mulford here. Brent says Carla is feeling very upbeat about it. (Ø)

President Salinas: Hopefully, it will work. The momentum is there. (U)

The President: Believe me, no politics will interfere. Nothing is happening in the campaign that will prevent me from going ahead at the first possible opportunity. (Ø)

President Salinas: We are sending to Scowcroft a poll reported in the Los Angeles Times. It reported 60% of Mexican-Americans supported the Free Trade Agreement. Did you see it? It was in the Times about two weeks ago. (Ø)

The President: I didn't see it. In the Los Angeles Times, you say? I don't know how I missed it. (U)

President Salinas: Yes, 60% of Mexican-Americans support the treaty. (Ø)

The President: Thanks, I'll get it and look at it. Well, so long. I hope we get to see you soon. (U)

President Salinas: Best wishes to you and your family. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Constantine Mitsotakis, Prime
Minister of Greece (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Jane E. Holl

DATE, TIME June 10, 1992, 8:39 - 8:45am EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: How are you my friend? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you, I am fine. I am calling you once again on Macedonia. First I want to thank you for all you have done already in delaying the recognition of Skopje and intervening on our behalf with the Moscow. (Ø)

I believe that a fair solution is now at hand and I need your help to see that it succeeds. The Portuguese have begun a new initiative and I want you to know that we look on it favorably. We want the Portuguese to discuss this proposal with Skopje. It offers a chance to settle the problem and accommodate the desires of both sides. (Ø)

Skopje can call itself whatever they want but the rest of the world would recognize it by some other name. But this initiative will not succeed unless you exert your personal influence in Skopje and let the Europeans know before they arrive in Luxembourg on Monday. (Ø)

I am sending my Deputy Foreign Minister to Luxembourg with specific instructions on all points plus an offer to provide \$50 million in help to Skopje. (Ø)

Whatever happens next then will depend on the leadership in Skopje. But I need your support. You are the only one who can have an influence to solve this problem. You know I have tried to be constructive. And now I believe a fair solution is at hand. I am prepared to put the faith of my Government in this solution but I need your full support. (Ø)

The President: Well first let me tell you one, that I appreciate what you have been trying to do to solve this thing, and two, that I'm leaving for Rio tomorrow and I'll have an opportunity to

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discuss this with the other Europeans. Have you raised this proposal with Gligorov? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: No. We have no direct contacts with Skopje, but the Portuguese are in contact with Gligorov and with us. (Ø)

The President: What has been Gligorov's reaction? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I don't know. But if you ask him to accept this formula, he will accept it. This is the only solution now. (Ø)

The President: I respect what you are trying to do. I will talk to my experts. It seems to me that it does offer a good chance to solve this thing. I will take it up with the Europeans, but I want to be sure to talk to my experts, those working on it before I go to Gligorov. Let me get back to you on this. But I will talk to the Europeans leaders in Rio. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you. But please talk to Gligorov. It is a proposal from Europeans friends. It is not a Greek one. You must talk to Gligorov. (Ø)

The President: I think it is a very reasonable proposal, but I must talk to Secretary Baker and others. You are our friend and we want this resolved. But before I tell you that I'll call Gligorov, I must talk to our experts here. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It is a good proposal, it is the breakthrough we've all been waiting for. (Ø)

The President: It sounds encouraging. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: If we succeed, a vote will be taken in Monday in Luxembourg. (Ø)

The President: We will get started on it. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you again for all you have done, my friend. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Give my regards to your wife. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Guillermo Endara of Panama on June 11, 1992 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Endara of Panama
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: John McShane/Robert Morley

DATE, TIME: June 11, 1992, 5:42 - 5:47pm DST
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: Mr. President, can you hear me okay? (U)

President Endara: Yes, Mr. Bush. I can hear you fine. (U)

The President: I am calling to say thank you for a wonderful visit. Please don't worry about that little incident at the Plaza. It was a wonderful visit, and we had a very warm reception. I don't want you to worry about that incident caused by a handful of people. (Ø)

President Endara: Thank you very much. I was worried about what you would think because we appreciate your visit -- we in Panama love you and we are glad that you came. So I thank you very much. (Ø)

The President: Barbara and I have been talking about the visit since we left. It was a wonderful, warm reception and 30 people can't spoil it. I hope that the Panamanian people heard some of my speech at the base because I talked about how much you have done to restore democracy. I want them to know that we had a good visit. So let's not let that incident bother us. I would be delighted to come back to Panama anytime. (Ø)

President Endara: Yes, we heard your speech -- it was broadcast on Panamanian television. It was a wonderful speech, and we thank you very much for your kind words. Everyone heard it, and heard that you were pleased. Give my love to your wife. We would be happy to welcome you back anytime. (Ø)

The President: Well, I want to thank you again, and just one more thing. You don't happen to have the Mayor's number? I am worried about her. She and her people worked so hard, and I want to tell her personally that I think the visit went well. It was a wonderful reception, and I want to give her a call. We are grateful, and I want to thank her. (Ø)

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President Endara: Yes, I will get it for you. Her number is 64-15-46. (U)

The President: Okay. Thank you very much. I will give her a call. It was a wonderful time. We enjoyed it very much. (U)

President Endara: Thank you. You are always welcome to come back anytime. Good bye. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Mayor Mayin Correa of Panama City
on June 11, 1992 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mayor Correa of Panama
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: John McShane/Robert Morley

DATE, TIME: June 11, 1992, 5:57 - 6:00pm DST
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: Hello, how are you? (U)

Mayor Correa: How are you, Mr. President? (Ø)

The President: I am fine. I am calling to tell you, please don't worry about what happened. The reception we had, with all the kids and everyone, was just beautiful and so warm. I know you worked hard on it, and you wanted everything to go just right. I know the majority of Panamanians welcomed us. Don't worry about a handful of students, or troublemakers, or whoever they were. It was a beautiful day. Barbara and I are full of gratitude for the warm reception we received. We had a wonderful visit. (Ø)

Mayor Correa: Thank you, Mr. President. I am glad. We are grateful for what you have done for us. It was a mistake by the police. They got scared and didn't handle the situation well. But we were happy to do the work and to receive you in our country. We love democracy here. We still have some of the Noriega crowd in Panama. Not many, but some. But as you said, the majority was very supportive of your visit. (Ø)

The President: Well, you were wonderful, and I didn't want you to worry. When I get back to Washington, I am going to tell everyone how wonderful the Panamanians were and how wonderful the Mayor was to us, and about the warmth of the reception we received. So, thanks a lot. (Ø)

Mayor Correa: Thank you for coming to my country. Give Mrs. Bush my best. I have a hat for you and something for Mrs. Bush. I will give them to the Embassy. I hope you enjoy them, and we hope to have you back here again sometime. (Ø)

The President: Wonderful. I'll tell Barbara. Thank you again for your wonderful reception and all your hard work, and God bless you. Good bye. (U)

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Mayor Correa: Okay, have a good trip to Rio. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister
of Japan on June 11, 1992 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan
Notetaker: Torkel Patterson

DATE, TIME June 11, 1992, 8:35 - 8:45pm
AND PLACE: Aboard Air Force One

The Prime Minister telephoned the President concerning the Earth Summit in Rio and the Shin Kanemaru visit. (Ø)

PM Miyazawa: How are you Mr. President? (U)

The President: I'm feeling good on my way to Rio. (U)

PM Miyazawa: Thank you for your hospitality to Mr. Kanemaru the other day. (U)

The President: I enjoyed seeing him. He's a nice man, a tremendous man. (U)

PM Miyazawa: He was very pleased and impressed by the hospitality. He was taken to your private residence and you treated him to tea. And on top of that he got to see Mrs. Bush as well. (U)

Thank you, Mr. President. This will help me a lot. It will consolidate the relationship between Mr. Kanemaru and me. This will be very helpful. (Ø)

The President: Happy to do it. He's a good friend and an excellent man. (U)

PM Miyazawa: I was planning to attend the Rio myself, but now the prospects do not look bright. I'm taking a dim view. We're in the final stages of the PKO bill for U.N. peacekeeping for places such as Cambodia. We're in the final stages and the Communists and Socialists are engaging in delaying tactics. We will be up for 3 nights and 4 days. The vote will be very slow. Each person's vote can take 4 hours. They will table motions. The whole process takes days instead of hours. (U)

It takes 25 hours from Tokyo to Rio. I've got to leave within 10 hours if I'm going to make it, and I don't think that I will. I hope you will understand if I don't show. (U)

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The President: Everybody will understand. I'll miss not seeing you, but everyone will understand. I'll make it clear to everyone, we know that what you are doing is important. (U)

PM Miyazawa: Thank you. Japan will sign two treaties, which I know there are some problems with. Also, Japan will spend between \$7-8 billion over 5 years in ODA. We will announce it shortly. I hope you will understand. (Ø)

The President: I know we have slight differences. We are alone down there, but I can't help it, it is what we have to do. (Ø)

PM Miyazawa: I understand the problems and the position you are taking. I think it is very courageous. We in Japan have a different position, but I do understand what you are doing. I hope there is no misunderstanding between us. (Ø)

The President: I spoke to Prime Minister Major the other day. He has a similar position to yours, but we also understand each other. (Ø)

I'm afraid I'll be attacked. (Ø)

PM Miyazawa: Don't worry, I'm sure you won't be. I had hoped to be of help to you. (U)

The President: I'm so pleased we had this conversation. Don't worry about not coming. I'll tell the Europeans and explain it to them when I see them. (U)

PM Miyazawa: One more thing. I was pleased to hear when you spoke to Kanemaru that you said you would raise the Northern Territories with Yeltsin. (Ø)

The President: I will do this. He knows our position on this. I will repeat it to him. (Ø)

PM Miyazawa: Is Mrs. Bush O.K.? Is she on the plane with you? (U)

The President: Yes, she's right here. She's sending her love watching an old movie. (U)

PM Miyazawa: Please give her my best and enjoy the movie. (U)

The President: Thank you so much for this call. All the best. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (6 pp.)	6/20/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 4/10/92 - 6/30/92

Date Closed: 2/9/2009

OA/ID Number: 91113-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #: 2009-0744-MR (516)

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition: Released in Part

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date: 10/7/2015

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of
Canada, on June 20, 1992 (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Mulroney
Notetaker: Robert Morley and Bill Pryce

DATE, TIME June 20, 1992, 9:40 - 10:07am DST
AND PLACE: Los Angeles

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Hello, George, how are you? (U)

The President: Fine. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I understand you are in California.
(C)

The President: I'm in Orange County. I was just watching Boris
Yeltsin on television, before your Parliament. How did he do?
(C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Fine. He said he was very pleased with
the visit to the United States. Although he hasn't said so
publicly, he told us privately that he was very grateful for all
you did for him. (C)

The President: I'm glad he noticed. We tried very hard to go
the extra mile with him. We did lots of nice personal things for
him. And he had a lot of good things in his pocket. His
proposal to cut back and eliminate SS missiles was great. We
were very pleased. I really think this is good news for the
hemisphere. He was good on substance. He said "I'm getting the
hell kicked out of me back in Moscow by the hard liners." People
were saying he gave away the store and got nothing in return.
But he said what he did was right. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He said I don't give a hell, what I did
was right, and what you were doing together was right. (C)

The President: He made one statement. This is almost a direct
quote. I don't give a god damn about parity, it was right. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, this was his attitude. He was
confident, and didn't seem to give a damn. He not only noticed
all that you did for him during his visit, but he was very happy.

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
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We talked to him three hours and more, Meela and I, at a private dinner. He talked about his visit very candidly, with a deep sense of gratitude, almost with affection. (C)

The President: That was nice. I'm glad he was impressed and noticed all we did for him. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He not only noticed the extra things, but respected them. He was happy and very proud. He said the visit represented an important turning point in your relations. (C)

The President: Good. Well, listen, the real reason for my call is Haiti. We have to do something about the situation there. I am not high on this guy Aristide, but he was elected and should be allowed to go back. 1.4(d)



We think Bazin is the best shot for a settlement. He is a centrist and seems to be a good man. We all got behind Theodore earlier, but that didn't work. People were wondering if I had lost it, supporting a Communist. The situation is becoming almost intolerable. My appeal to you would be to call Aristide and urge him to do something with Bazin, cut a deal with him, get him to support Bazin. I warn you it will be difficult. He will resist. The key thing is if he can be convinced to deal with Bazin. Our people will be working on this. A security mission will be needed, I think, for Haiti as well. If you could call Aristide, that would help. At this juncture, I think that is what is needed. I am also calling CAP about this. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I agree with you that we are running out of time on Haiti. I talked to Aristide at Rio and told him this. I told him the longer a settlement is delayed, the less likely it is he will return. I also visited CAP on the way back from Rio. (C)

The President: Oh? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We had word of a coup attempt. I made a statement on TV, and said that while I was not speaking for the hemisphere, I could say that for Canada, don't expect any trade arrangements if there is a coup. If Mexico was invited to share our prosperity it was because the Mexicans are doing the right things and taking steps for democracy. We want to offer them something in return. But if you guys take steps for a coup against Perez, I said, don't expect aid or trade concessions from the U.S. or Canada. (C)

The President: CAP must have been ecstatic. (C)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: I hit them hard, because the word was the situation was very bad. He was pretty happy. CAP said he had contacts with Aristide, who is very opposed. CAP is skeptical that any compromise is possible. But I'm ready to give it another try. I will call him and put it to him again. In the past I have told him that time is against him, that the more time that passes, the less likely he will ever return. I will use the same argument. It may be unfair, but it is true. I'll go back on Bazin, but if we can't convince him together, have you excluded the idea of cordoning off the place? If something can't be done with Bazin, we have to think of other alternatives. We have to consider cordoning off Haiti, stopping oil. If we could get the OAS sanctions endorsed by the United Nations, and Boutros-Ghali thinks we could, have you thought about a blockade, supported by the United States, Canada, Venezuela and maybe France? This might bring these guys to their senses. (C)

The President: I would have to talk to my people about this. We've considered many things, including that idea. I talked to Colin Powell and Cheney about a blockade. Colin said it would be more difficult than you think. Part of it is the use of lighters. We could stop the tankers, but not the lighters. Maybe if the blockade were supported by four countries, that would change. On the other side is that a blockade would hurt the ordinary people you want to help. But I'd be willing to talk about anything. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Good. We could try to move this along in the UN and see if the UN would support a resolution. Boutros-Ghali said he would support a blockade in support of the return of democracy to Haiti. It would be enforced like Desert Storm, but less strongly. I have written to Mitterand about this idea, and will speak to him again, to see if France would join us. If four or five countries enforced the blockade, it might have an impact. (C)

The President: I will have to talk to the pros. As I said, we have talked about this and identified two problems. It would be hard to stop all the oil going in, and then there is the humanitarian issue. If you are talking to Mitterand, ask him if he will call Aristide and urge him to accept Bazin. I am not talking to him but am talking to CAP later. Have you talked to CAP? (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I raised this with CAP privately. He said he wanted to talk to you. He is favorably disposed. I hope I am interpreting him correctly. My sense on this is like yours. We are getting frustrated. If we can enforce democracy in an area 5000 miles away, it is difficult to understand why we cannot do the same thing in a tiny country close to us. (C)

The President: The trouble is that this guy is not a good man. But he was democratically elected, that is the point. Some of the things he condones are terrible. But 70% of the people support him. But I'll talk to CAP, and you talk to Aristide. On

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the blockade idea, I'll talk to my guys and tell them to consider this if what we are doing now fails. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Maybe we can discuss this further on the margins of Munich, over coffee, you and Francois and I. We could review our options. (Ø)

The President: OK. I hope we have time to get together. I'm sure there will be time. Meetings like that can be an important part of events like the Munich meeting. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Now, I have some news of Bush. Do you want to hear it? (Ø)

The President: Yes, what kind of news? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We had a Gallup poll up here. People were asked who they would vote for President if they were citizens of the United States. Do you want to hear the results? (U)

The President: Yup. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Bush led. As you know, Canadians are a pretty liberal group, and have traditionally tended to vote liberal in this country. They view the Democrats with admiration. But the result was Bush, 47%, Perot, 32% and Clinton 21%. Can you believe that? (U)

The President: I'll settle for that this fall from the U.S. voters. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I think this is what you will get. Don't forget, these are North Americans looking at the race with detachment. They are separated from the heat of the campaign, and I believe they are ahead of the curve. They are not caught up in the campaign. They have a degree of detachment the U.S. voters will not have until they approach the box. (Ø)

The President: The latest news from here is good, too. The Governor here (California) is convinced, from Perot's recent trip here, that he has peaked. Gallop polls are showing this too. His crowds were less than expected, and people are beginning to think he is scary. So the pros think he may have peaked, or will peak soon. All my advisors are saying I should not attack Perot and I find that hard to do. But we'll see. I'll stick to the game plan. The problem is the economy. Sixty percent of the people think it is getting worse, but this will change because it is actually improving. Many think Perot will self-destruct. By fall, many think we will have a normal Republican vs. Democrat race, and Perot will fade. Many see him as dictatorial and unreliable. This thing with the prisoners is an example. He is going to have to back up his statements. But he is still a tough guy. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Mulroney:

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The President: I think that might be helpful. I know Kohl thinks I am dragging my feet on GATT. We don't have much flexibility. We have Dunkel's paper and we can't forget that. I don't want the G-7 meeting to focus on the failure of GATT. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Why not examine my suggestion? You don't put forward enough figures. In comparison to Europe and us, the United States is in good shape. For example, the United Nations decided at Rio that the United States has done more in a practical sense to protect the environment than most other nations. You are the number one country in terms of protecting your own country. You should strut your stuff more. (C)

The President: There might be resentment in Munich if I did this. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney:

1.4(b)

1.4(b)

The President: Ten percent? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney:

1.4(b)

1.4(b)

The President: Thanks. I will be back in Washington tonight, and then on to Camp David. I'm stopping in Texas. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney:

1.4(b)

1.4(b)

The President: I felt comfortable with Sesno. I'm planning to do more of those. I may do something with Barbara Walters along those lines. It's risky, she asks tricky questions, but we're going to give it a whirl. (C)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: Good for you. You and Barbara come across beautifully in direct conversations. Keep doing it. (U)

The President: Listen, I don't want this to be all one-sided. How are your fortunes? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: OK. I was in second place in the NDP. This should get better. I'm still behind the Liberals, but I'll catch them. The economy has turned around, but this is not known. I have more time than you do. I have another year. The constitutional thing is looking better. If a referendum were held in Quebec today, I think Canada would win strongly. (U)

The President: Canada? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Quebec would vote to stay in the union. (U)

The President: Good. I'm glad to hear that. Well, thanks for talking. Good by. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Good by and God bless you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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4878

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela, on June 20, 1992 (✓)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Carlos Andres Perez
Interpreter: Patsy Arizu
Notetaker: Robert Morley and Bill Pryce

DATE, TIME June 20, 1992, 2:27 - 2:42pm DST
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: Hello, CAP. Can you hear me? This is George.
(U)

President Perez: It is great to talk to you again. I can hear you fine. (U)

The President: I'm sorry we didn't get a chance to talk in Rio. I just talked to Brian Mulroney of Canada and he said he had met with you. I hope your domestic situation is OK. We are thinking of you all the time. (✓)

President Perez: Thanks a lot. I wanted to tell you about the conversation Brian and I had. You probably know exactly what I have to say if you have talked to him. I am very concerned about the deterioration and downward trend in Haiti. We should clearly agree on what to do on Haiti. My idea is that the United States, Canada, Venezuela, and perhaps France and Jamaica should set up a working group. The group could meet at the OAS in Washington, study the situation, and agree on definite action. It would include our OAS ambassadors. I see the situation in Haiti getting out of hand. Aristide is letting violence take over with serious consequences for the United States and for Latin America.
(✓)

The President: I agree with what you say. But I think you should call Aristide and try to get him to work with Bazin. Frankly, we always thought Bazin was a good man, but Aristide won't accept him. We have to get Aristide to work with him. I think we should try to change his mind on that. (✓)

President Perez: Yes, I think that the position of Aristide is a very firm one. He does not want to accept Bazin. But I will talk to him later on. I want to see if we could exert some kind of collective pressure on him. (✓)

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The President: We'd like to do that. In our judgment, because of what has happened in Haiti, Aristide should be more flexible. I talked to him in Rio, and he was not responsive. I think the next step is to get everyone to talk to Aristide. Mulroney said he would talk to Mitterand and try to get him to do something. We should exert collective pressure. (Ø)

President Perez: OK. I think the meeting I suggested would allow us to reach agreement on what we should do. (Ø)

The President: It is a good idea. What level were you thinking of? (Ø)

President Perez: I think the group should include our OAS Ambassadors and perhaps personal representatives at a high level. (Ø)

The President: OK. I will implement this idea Monday at our end. But in the meantime, we should make the calls to Aristide, pressing him to work with Bazin. Aristide must be persuaded to be more flexible. We should also talk about the OAS civilian mission to Haiti and a security mission. (Ø)

President Perez: I agree we should move flexibly on this. But first we need to establish a common position. I will talk to Aristide this afternoon, and also talk to Jamaica. Aristide is going to Jamiaca now. (Ø)

The President: I should tell you that up here, we are getting tired of Aristide and his inflexibility. Bazin is a good man. He is willing to work to resolve the situation. I know Aristide has problems, but there comes a time when he has to be more flexible or we can no longer support him in all this. He has got to be more flexible. (Ø)

President Perez: Sure, of course. It is a complex situation in Haiti. I agree with what you say. It is necessary to move Haiti along for the sake of Haiti and for the sake of Latin America. (Ø)

I have other ideas on important matters, but I understand you are on Air Force One, and have a host of problems to deal with. They are problems I follow with a great deal of interest. Instead of talking about it, I am going to write you a letter on the other issues. We have already dealt with the urgent subject of Haiti, and agreed to meetings which should have results. (Ø)

I also wanted to tell you how intelligently you dealt with the situation at Rio de Janeiro. (Ø)

The President: Well, thanks. I appreciate those thoughts. If there is any way I can help you, by demonstrating our support for your democracy, just let me know. If Aristide shows any flexibility, give me a call. We will set up the working group next week as you suggested. (Ø)

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President Perez: Magnificent. I wish you all success in your own situation. I'm sure you will win. But things are happening rapidly in the world. (U)

The President: They sure are. It is a crazy political year up here. (U)

President Perez: Good by. I hope to see you soon. (U)

The President: Good by. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey,
June 23, 1992

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Jane E. Holl

DATE, TIME June 23, 1992, 3:09 - 3:13pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Suleyman. I just wanted to talk to you about Provide Comfort II. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: Provide Comfort II is going very well. It has passed from our government last night to the Parliament. They will discuss it on Friday. There will be no trouble; no reason to worry. I am able to explain the whole thing to Parliament and to explain it to the whole people. They are with us and they understand the reasons. (Ø)

The President: Well, I'm extremely glad to hear that. Saddam cannot be allowed to continue to threaten the people. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: We know that and you should have no worry. Everything will go well. (Ø)

The President: I am very glad to hear that. On Cyprus, I am following that process very closely. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: I am as well. The talks in New York went well. They will recess until July 7. I talked to Mitsotakis and we are going to give support to get a just and fair solution. We discussed this with Mr. Mitsotakis. We are improving our relations. Denktash will be coming to Ankara for an operation and I will see him and we will encourage him. (Ø)

The President: We have heard that Mitsotakis was very pleased at his talks with you. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: Yes, I am pleased too. I think the whole thing was placed on a very friendly basis -- we had a good talk about our other disputes, not just Cyprus. But we will continue to help you with the new world order. (Ø)

The President: I am thrilled that you are so confident on Provide Comfort II. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Demirel: I have prepared public opinion here. The conditions when it started have changed. We understand the situation very well. As we see, we need to show power in Bosnia and Karabakh and I think we understand the value of the situation in Northern Iraq. We do need the power there too. (Ø)

I am trying to get support from not only my coalition partners but from the other parties too. The public consensus will support it. Don't have any worry. How is the election going? (Ø)

The President: Well you know our convention is not until August, so it's a long haul; we'll have a tough fight. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: We are keeping our fingers crossed for you and we are praying for you. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey,
June 23, 1992

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Jane E. Holl

DATE, TIME: June 24, 1992, 3:09 - 3:13pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Suleyman. I just wanted to talk to you about Provide Comfort II. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: Provide Comfort II is going very well. It has passed from our government last night to the Parliament. They will discuss it on Friday. There will be no trouble; no reason to worry. I am able to explain the whole thing to Parliament and to explain it to the whole people. They are with us and they understand the reasons. (Ø)

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The President: We have heard that Mitsotakis was very pleased at his talks with you. (Ø)

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I am trying to get support from not only my coalition partners but from the other parties too. The public consensus will support it. Don't have any worry. How is the election going? (Ø)

The President: Well you know our convention is not until August, so it's a long haul; we'll have a tough fight. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: We are keeping our fingers crossed for you and we are praying for you. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0742-MR
JL 11/21/11

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Nelson Mandela, President of the African National Congress of South Africa on June 26, 1992

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Nelson Mandela, President of the ANC
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: John M. Ordway

DATE, TIME June 26, 1992, 10:14 - 10:28 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned Nelson Mandela concerning the situation in South Africa. (✓)

The President: Hello, Mr. Mandela. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Good day, Mr. President. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Mr. Mandela: How are you? (U)

The President: I know you have been calling. I'm sorry I didn't have time to take the call. I've been running around as busy as a chicken with its neck cut off. (U)

Mr. Mandela: I know. Thank you very much for this opportunity. (U)

The President: What's on your mind? (U)

Mr. Mandela: I want to brief you on the present situation. (U)

I have asked the Secretary General to call a special session of the Security Council so I can brief them on what is going on in the country. I have gone out of my way to seek to find compromises to get the peace process going. But we have been disappointed by the failure of negotiations on the constitution, and the current violence that has cost more than 50 lives. I thought you should know why I have thought to approach the Secretary General. I thought that if I didn't explain it carefully to you, it wouldn't have a chance of success. (✓)

The President: I'll talk to Secretary Baker about this. The UN has been very wary of things like this. What has been the reaction from the Secretary General? (✓)

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Mr. Mandela: The Secretary General was very kind but diplomatic. I think he was conveying what you are saying now. He prefers that I write a letter which the Security Council might make public. He was not very keen, but was very nice. He is not very keen on summoning the Security Council itself. (Ø)

The President: Let us talk about it. We have had several requests to convene the Security Council -- not as urgent as yours. But the UN has been reluctant to get involved in internal affairs. I'll talk about it with Baker. But I would be reluctant to push Boutros Ghali. (Ø)

What can we do to help you to get over the hurdles? (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: I have been pressing Ambassador Swing. (Ø)

The President: I heard about your meeting with Swing. But you did not request any specific action, did you? (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: I don't know when you got a report. We just met yesterday. (U)

The President: He sent a cable to the State Department. I got a general briefing this morning. But I'll get the full report. (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: I think the Secretary General might be more willing if it became clear that I had your support. I am keen that the UN should be aware of what is going on, but I don't want to compromise his position. (Ø)

The President: Are you going to have a talk with de Klerk? (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: I have asked for a meeting to present our demands, which would let us continue the discussions. De Klerk said he wanted a two-day meeting, but after I return from Dakar and the OAU summit. But we can't discuss anything with him until they have addressed the issues which we have raised. We have discussed with de Klerk these issues for two years, and they haven't produced any fruit. Until they respond to our demands it won't serve any purpose to discuss with them. We are prepared to go back to CODESA when they address these problems. (Ø)

Our demands are very reasonable. We want to introduce democracy, which he is against despite the rhetoric. We want a constitution-making body elected by the masses of the people. He says he wants it, but has turned down every proposal. We say we want a constitution adopted by a 2/3 vote -- which is 67 percent; he says 75 percent. We have already made a compromise twice. All the constitutions in the past of this country have been adopted by a simple majority. This is the first time they have suggested a larger majority. To allay what is the concern of the minority whites we went to 70 percent. But this is a problem, since we have a constituency which wants a 51 percent majority.

(Ø)

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The President: We are disappointed since we felt there was good progress, and felt that de Klerk was the most reasonable interlocutor possible at this point in South Africa's history. De Klerk assures me every time we talk that he wants to follow through. (Ø)

We will think about the UN Security Council request, and I'll review the report from Bill Swing, who has my full confidence. He is a good man. (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: A lovely man. (U)

The President: I will look at this, and get back to you. But I don't want to say that we will override the Secretary General. (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: I don't want you to do that. (U)

The President: Maybe I could call him after I get briefed up on this. (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: Thank you. (U)

The President: This is very important. I remember your triumphant visit here. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Thank you. (U)

The President: I know you have troubles, and I wish you didn't. I haven't talked to the Buthelezi people lately, but I know they have problems too. (Ø)

If there is some way to help, we will want to do so. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Please give my regards to Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President: Thank you. She is doing well. You have had the flu. How are you doing? (U)

Mr. Mandela: Much better, thank you. (U)

The President: You should take it easy. I'm no spring chicken, and you're older than I am. I just had a birthday, my 68th. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Please give my regards to your sister. (U)

The President: That is very timely that you mentioned that. We are having a wedding this weekend -- my daughter is getting married. I will pass on your regards. Nancy never got over the courtesy you extended to her. You have a big fan in her. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Thank you very much. That's the kind of thing that keeps me going. (U)

The President: I know. I really enjoy the personal touch, which keeps me going. (U)

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-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon With Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Jane E. Holl

DATE, TIME: June 26, 1992, 6:50 - 6:58pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Prime Minister Demirel: Hello, Mr President. I just wanted to call and inform you that Provide Hope II [sic] has been approved for extension for six more months. (S)

The President: Well, that is very good news. (U)

Prime Minister Demirel: The vote was 228-134. (U)

The President: Well, that is a wonderful victory for you and for us all. (S)

Prime Minister Demirel: You were worried and I told you not to worry. (U)

The President: Well, I am delighted. Listen, while I have you on the telephone. I want to discuss this situation in Bosnia. We are very worried. We are going to start some consultations. We are worried about the whole situation. (S)

Prime Minister Demirel: We would appreciate your efforts. We had a meeting in Istanbul. All the leaders were there...Yeltsin, and others. We discussed Bosnia. Everyone discussed their problems. I met with the Armenian leader and the Azeri leader and they discussed their problem. Mr. Yeltsin met with Kravchuk and the leader of Moldova and Romania and they discussed the problem in Moldova. We are trying to support your efforts for the new order and to bring peace to all these troubled areas. (S)

The President: I read that the Conference was taking place and I think that we need more of these opportunities to meet. (U)

Prime Minister Demirel: In Bosnia, everybody thinks something needs to be done. (S)

The President: We have to get that airport open and get some humanitarian aid in. (S)

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Prime Minister Demirel: The Albanian leader is a very good man. He is concerned about the Kosovo. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I know him. I like him. I know that the Albanians are concerned about Kosovo. But I don't think Milosevic can take on much more. He has his hands full. That wouldn't be wise. But I wanted you to know that we think something should be done and we will be in consultation with you. We're just trying to bring humanitarian aid in. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: I will be happy to do anything and we will support you. We will do anything to help you bring peace to the world. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
23. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/27/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 4/10/92 - 6/30/92

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By gn (NLGB) on 9/26/13

Date Closed: 2/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91113-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 09-0742-MR(523)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/21/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0742-MR
JR 11/21/11

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Barry F. Lowenkron

DATE, TIME: June 27, 1992, 8:12 - 8:23am
AND PLACE: Camp David



The President: Good morning, Brian. How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Fine George, yourself? (U)

The President: Fine. Where are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'm here in Ottawa. (U)

The President: I'm calling you on Yugoslavia. Jim Baker talked to Douglas Hurd. We are increasingly concerned about the situation. If you've got a minute, I'd like to go over a few points with you. The situation in Sarajevo is awful. I don't know how bad it is, but reports coming out of the city indicate they are being deliberately starved. So, in our view, we have got to do something collectively. I am concerned. I had a briefing yesterday from Colin Powell and Dick Cheney. It is a tough military situation, with snipers in the mountains and all around the airport. But we ought to start moving. The first step is a UN Security Council resolution to use all appropriate means and to implement the relief effort. Butros spoke out on this yesterday. I think he talked about a 48 hour period, but I'm not sure. France and Italy are far out in front on this.

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As far as U.S. troops are concerned, they don't want them. But, we want to support any military action -- probably air and transport -- to get relief into Sarajevo. I've been holding back, waiting for the EC, but not much has happened. This is my first call. We need to think through how to do it. We've got two carrier groups in the Mediterranean. We're starting to consult on how to move forward. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Your assessment is right on. There are two particular reasons why I am concerned. We have almost 1,500 Canadian troops assigned to the UN there. The head is a Canadian General. He is having a hell of a lot of trouble going even one

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or two kilometers. People are being picked off -- let me clarify, there have been no murders, but lots of shots from snipers on the hills. The situation is getting critical. The cruelty unimaginable. (S)

The President: It seems almost built-in. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You know, Mila was born in Sarajevo, so I have a little first hand knowledge about the racial and ethnic difficulties. So we have to begin -- undercover of the UN -- to come together again like we did before. With your military assets, we will look to you to lead this international effort, and Canada will vigorously support it. (S)

The President: The next action will be in the UN. Baker is prepared to go to Europe. We thought the French were leaning back, but apparently not, although I haven't talked to Mitterrand yet. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: This is a welcome change. When I talked to Mitterrand six weeks ago, he told me that France's association with the Serbs went back to World War II when they were allies against the Croats, so France was reluctant to do anything against Serbia. He was surprisingly vigorous on that view. But, in light of the atrocities shown daily on television, he seems to have changed his mind. (S)

The President: Have you spoken to him recently? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: No, just briefly at Rio. It was short and sweet. What's your time frame? (S)

The President: Early next week, we will start with action in the UN, then discuss among ourselves our roles. But, the first step is to get the UN out in front again, then to have consultations. I am still concerned about putting U.S. forces in. It's because all of them have said it would be counterproductive. But we have all these other assets we can use. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: From what we can see, these are the traditional, old snipers in the hills, yet now with heavy artillery. (S)

The President: Yes, and shoulder fired missiles. Well lets stay in touch, but I did want to begin the consult. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: By the way George, Mila and I give you and Barbara a "10" on the ABC appearance. That's the way to go. Barbara's comments on Ross Perot were lethal. (S)

The President: She is pretty good. If it is true that Perot didn't do this, okay. But, he did call me, only it was a year before the incident took place. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He is like a rock star. He will flare out. What he said on "Larry King Live" last night was incredible

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Prime Minister Mulroney: He is like a rock star. He will flare out. What he said on "Larry King Live" last night was incredible -- "I have all this information on the Republican Party, and when the time is right, I'll release it." (S)

The President: Yes, reminds me of, "I have in my hand the list." Well, our love to Mila. I know this must hurt her. Tell her Barbara and I love her. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Thank you George, our love to Barbara. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia
Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko
Notetaker: Jane E. Holl

DATE, TIME: June 27, 1992, 10:05 - 10:28am
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Good morning George. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

President Yeltsin: Not so good. These past ten days have been tense. But first, I want to thank you once again for the warm welcome for me and my delegation and best wishes to Barbara too. (Ø)

Let me tell you what has happened since I saw you last. I have decided to structure our relations with Ukraine. We have met with Kravchuk at Sochi, a Black Sea resort. I should say that we have settled virtually all questions and we have signed an agreement. I think it is a very good thing. It has settled down the people and everybody now knows there will be no problem with Ukraine. (Ø)

Next, I have had a call to Shevardnadze and asked him to discuss South Ossetia. The situation is that hundreds of people are dying. We have no territorial interests in that region. Russia has no territorial interests in that region, and that area would like to have autonomy. There are hundreds of thousands of refugees. We have signed an agreement and a communique. And I am worried about the possibility of using UN peacekeepers in that region. (Ø)

There was agreement by eleven heads of state. We have signed an agreement. But four met: Russian, Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania to discuss the situation. We have discussed a lot of questions and talked about a cease fire and corridor for disengagement of forces. There is an army there. It takes time to withdraw it. The 14th Army is in the region. For the time being the 14th Army is being involved in the conflict. There is shelling, and they have to reply. (Ø)

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I would like to point out that Russia has no territorial claims. We have discussed with Ukraine how to get a ceasefire and we have the same view. I have talked to Snegur and Iliescu for a ceasefire to stop the casualties. Zhelev is supplying military equipment to Moldova. Maybe there should be some kind of western influence on your side on Romania to stop the bloodshed in the region. (S)

As far as the internal situation inside Russia is concerned. It is not dangerous, but these red and browns have made a lot of noise. But they do not have a lot of force to do anything. (S)

I met today with U.S. bankers led by Gerry Corrigan. We met with a lot of Russians and offered reforms as far as Russian banking is concerned. They have done a very good job and we will fight to implement the recommendations they have made. We have decided to create a Russo-American investment company. (S)

So George, these are the latest events since we returned. (U)

The President: You have been very busy. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well it was eleven days. (U)

The President: You should know that the decks are cleared to get a vote on the Freedom Support Act in the Senate. (S)

Boris, let me go over some points on Sarajevo and the situation in Yugoslavia. We're on the brink of mass starvation. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children may die. The UN so far has called for a benign environment, but that may never come because Serbian gunmen are still firing away. (S)

The EC is talking right now and we're all beginning to think that military action may be needed for a humanitarian effort. The Secretary General made a statement yesterday that within 48 hours he would go back to the Security Council to get a resolution for appropriate means to carry out that mission. Our sole focus would be to make sure that the relief effort is no longer blocked. (S)

If we go to the UN, I hope you will be able to support us in preventing mass starvation in Sarajevo. We're not speaking of any resolution to change or sort out the political situation in Bosnia. Depending on what happens at the UN and our discussion with the EC, Jim Baker is ready to go to Europe to talk about what we're prepared to do. (S)

I know that what I'm talking about might pose problems for you and if Jim's coming helps, we're prepared to do that. The main thing is that we have to figure out how to stop starvation and get help into Sarajevo. That's what it's all about. (S)

We will not pull any surprises. We will work closely with your people here and with the UN. The European leaders have changed and are prepared to tell Serbia to comply with the UN demands or

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else we'll do whatever it takes to bring in the relief effort.
(S)

I know that because of historic relations with Serbia the French have held one view, but now I'm told that the French have now changed their position and want to move forward. That's what I am told; I don't know for certain -- that's what's in the papers and what's happened in the EC right now. (S)

I hope we can all be together at the UN. That's the main reason I am calling. We'll be in touch with your representatives. (S)

President Yeltsin: I got your point George. Thank you for your kind words. As for Serbia, you have probably heard that we have had Parliamentary opposition. I saw a couple of slogans in Canada calling for Yeltsin to help Serbia. But the Russian President has his own policy. As we have agreed. Our delegation has voted in support at the Security Council. We're not going to back out. We will support any additional moves and measures. Both in the humanitarian and in the military. When Baker will be in Europe, if there is a need for Kozyrev to meet him, just let us know. (S)

Even though this stance could be difficult politically for me, we will support it because hundreds of thousands of people are starving. (S)

The President: That's wonderful. I'm grateful that once again we will be standing together. (S)

President Yeltsin: That is the only way, George. I have come to the U.S. with that attitude and it was reinforced there. The only way is for us to stand together. The whole world needs it.
(S)

And one more thing. Today. I haven't forgotten what today is. All my best wishes to you, Barbara, and Dorothy for her wedding.
(U)

The President: How sweet of you. Thank you. I am at Camp David and guests will be arriving in a couple of hours. Good-bye and thanks a lot. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Major, Prime Minister
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Barry F. Lowenkron

DATE, TIME: June 27, 1992, 11:16 a.m. -- 11:27 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello John, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Fine George. I'm sorry to have been so elusive. I understand it's an important day for you. (U)

The President: Well, I'm on the tennis court. The bride to be is on the one next to mine. It's a beautiful summer day. Listen, I hate to confound your busy schedule but I'm anxious to know about your meeting. Jim Baker talked to Douglas Hurd. I talked to Yeltsin for about 30 minutes, although I haven't talked to other European leaders yet. I'm calling because we're just being dragged along, hoping for a cease fire to take effect which is not happening. So we need a more forward leaning position, including the use of military support by air. I'm not eager to see forces go in on the ground. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Well, we did have a lengthy and acrimonious discussion over this, with the outcome the following. The member states will transport material to a common site, most probably an airport in Italy. In addition we decided not to allow Yugoslavia to participate in any international organization, including the CSCE. There were other views on delivering supplies without a cease fire. Italy was the most hardheaded, the French less so. We're more cautious. It's the responsibility of the UN, not the EC, and without full knowledge of what others are prepared to do we should be careful about how to proceed including the use of the military. I'm not excited about it. (S)

The President: I'm not either. But there is a humanitarian need. We've got to get the UN going. We need a resolution to authorize whatever is necessary. We may be farther out in front on this than you. But, we're reluctant dragons. I'm reluctant to use U.S. troops. I'm proposing to go with supplying air power, for the lift and cover. (S)

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Prime Minister Major: Yes, an airlift, and the possibility of airdropping supplies if we can pinpoint where to drop them. (S)

The President: We talked about this. Colin Powell and Dick Cheney were more pessimistic than I would have thought. They said an air drop would be random and scattered. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I see. Have you thought of what kind of resolution you want? (S)

The President: Probably one that authorizes all appropriate measures to launch and implement the relief operation and keep it going, although I haven't talked to Butros Ghali on this. But if we don't, then we're back to square one. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I see. The phrase, "all appropriate measures" does keep all of our options open. (S)

The President: Yes it does. None of us are enthusiastic about use of force. I hope we can get together on this, and I recognize your concerns which we generally share. Jim Baker is prepared to go to Europe, but I'm not sure it's necessary given the change in the EC. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, there has been a change in the EC because of the change on the ground. I've just looked at Hurd whose sitting across the room and he sees no need for Jim to come over, but we would rather talk to him about GATT. (S)

The President: OK. Yeltsin is on board completely, despite opposition. I would have thought he might have some problems, but he supports us on this completely. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I don't know what "appropriate means" means? What are the number of troops? Where would they come from? What would they do? (S)

The President: We don't know either. The Italians are supportive, the French are more forward leaning. How about the Dutch? Our military people are not talking about a lot of forces, but an aggressive force if need be. Brian Mulroney supports us and the idea of going to the UN. (S)

Prime Minister Major: We need to share with you and with the UN our military analysis before another UN resolution. (S)

The President: Maybe, yes. (U)

Our planners should talk to yours, perhaps tomorrow? (U)

The President: Who would you get? (U)

Prime Minister Major: We'll get our military to be in touch. (U)

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The President: Good, and have Stephen Wall and Brent Scowcroft talk.

Prime Minister Major: Yes. Our military planners are not keen. I spoke to Dick Vincent and he asked me if I had seen a map of the Sarajevo airport. I told him I had not. He told me to look at it, that it was a dead ringer for Dien Bien Phu.

The President: Our military guys may be talking to your guys already. That is what they did too, they showed me a map of the airport surrounded by hills full of crazy bastards who would rather die than compromise.

Prime Minister Major: We'll get the Serbs to back off initially, then an international organization like the Red Cross will deliver the supplies. Soon snipers will start shooting at them, and we'll have to send troops to protect them. Step by step we'll be dragged into an even bigger operation. That is our nightmare.

The President: Maybe we can tailor the resolution so we deliver the aid and haul ass out of there -- although that might be too easy. But, let's Brent and Stephen talk tomorrow.

Prime Minister Major: Fine.

The President: OK

Prime Minister Major: Congratulations, and good luck with the wedding.

The President: Thank you, bye.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
26. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/28/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 4/10/92 - 6/30/92

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By gn (NLGB) on 9/26/13

Date Closed: 2/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91113-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 09-0742-MR(526)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/21/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0742-MR
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands
Interpreter: No
Notetaker: Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME June 28, 1992, 7:58-8:11 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David



The President: Ruud, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Fine and you, George? (U)

The President: I am calling on the situation in Sarajevo. As you know we haven't been out front on this, but now we are very concerned. It sounds like the same is true for the EC from reading my morning papers on your meeting. I talked to Yeltsin and Major briefly yesterday. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, we discussed this yesterday. People here are much more motivated than a few months ago. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

We came to the common position that we should organize our humanitarian aid and that we want the Security Council of the UN to do the most to give the possibility of action. Of course, this would be working with the U.S. I think Jim Baker's statement before the (EC) Council met made clear that the U.S. would not stand by. Then as you have heard, Mitterrand went to Bosnia. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

The President: We think we have got to act now. We have the feeling that we should take this into the UN and get a resolution that authorizes the use of all necessary means and of course tying this only to the humanitarian assistance situation.

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John Major is very hesitant and worried about a situation like Dien Bien Phu. We would be willing to do all possible on the air side -- airlift support, open the airport and if needed provide air cover. I wanted to get a sense of how forward-leaning you are. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Very much. Mitterrand did not want to get involved precisely because of the Dien Bien Phu example, but

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

The problem now is to do this the right way. (S)

The President: The next step is to go to the U.N. I am reluctant to put U.S. troops in. I don't think the parties want us to do so. But we have an enormous ability to support in the air transport area and to provide air cover, if needed. We also have a carrier tank force in the Mediterranean. But the first step is to act in the U.N., and I think Boutros Ghali is taking the same line on this. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Plus, George, this can have a good effect by showing the U.S. and Europe acting together. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

It will be good to have the U.S. defending the same idea as Europe, and maybe we can involve NATO in some way. (S)

The President: Yes, Jim Baker was thinking of perhaps coming to Europe. I do not know if it will happen for this, but perhaps for a GATT Ministerial. We'd like to try to do something on GATT before Munich. If he does, maybe he can meet on this, too. Are there any changes on GATT? (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, Major and Kohl were active on this in Lisbon. Things changed a little for the good. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

But Jim Baker, who seems to be taking the lead now, is so close that it is not impossible to find agreement. So we should take advantage of the opportunity of Jim being in Europe. Maybe if an agreement was reached and the conclusion reported to governments, people wouldn't say "no".

(b)(1)

(S)

The President: You have been wonderful and I know people think we have been tough. But we want an agreement. (S)

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Prime Minister Lubbers: The problem has been on both sides. I'd say the chances of agreement are still less than 50 percent, something like 40 percent. But with luck and courage, it could happen, especially if we can get people ^{(b)(1)} to act with the authority they already have and then report back. (Ø)

The President: Many Thanks. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: All best wishes. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526
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JL 11/21/11

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Andreotti
Interpreter: Sim Smiley
Notetaker: Tony Wayne

DATE, TIME: June 28, 1992, 8:46 - 8:55 am EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President Hello. How are you Giulio? (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Fine and you. Today in Rome we are changing Prime Ministers. There will be a new cabinet with the same four parties, but this time the Prime Minister will be a Socialist Giuliamo. I think you met him when he was Minister of the Treasury. (U)

The President: Yes, I remember. I wanted to touch base with you, if it is still appropriate given the change of Prime Ministers, on Bosnia. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes it is. (U)

The President: The urgency is a bit diminished I gather since I talked to John Major and Ruud Lubbers. I understand the EC believes we must lean forward and use force if needed to get the aid into Bosnia. The U.S. feels the same way. We must go to the UN and get this authorized. I am reluctant to use U.S. troops, however. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: We discussed this yesterday at the European Council in Lisbon. We agreed on a proposal to open up Sarajevo airport to let the humanitarian aid flow to the city. Should the need arise to support this with military force, we are in favor. This morning President Mitterrand flew to Sarajevo airport. (Ø)

The President: Did he actually land? (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, under the protection of UN forces. Now he is in the town. His presence there might lead to political results. In any case, tomorrow the Security Council will examine the situation. We are ready to support authorization for the use of force. (Ø)

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The President: That's good. The U.S. is ready to support that too. I hope Mitterrand can have good effects, especially since France was initially so hesitant on Serbia. Maybe because of France's past position it is in a good position now to talk with both sides. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, we hope so. In any case, we have the government of Bosnia asking us to free the airport so we are not forcing our way into a country. The key is to push the Serbs back. (Ø)

The President: If Mitterrand has landed at the airport, it is hard to say the airport isn't free, though we certainly still think it is dangerous. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Mitterrand landed with a helicopter and thus needed less assistance and he was surrounded by UN troops. Tomorrow we can see if there is any progress. I'm sure he will call you to provide a personal readout. (Ø)

The President: That will be wonderful. I appreciate Italy's leadership on this, and I will miss dealing with you personally unless the clock turns back in some way. I hope we will continue to have contact in some manner. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you very much. All my best wishes to your wife and family. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Good bye. (U)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
28. Telcon	Re: Telecon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany of June 28, 1992 [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	6/28/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 4/10/92 - 6/30/92

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By 31 (NLGB) on 6/20/13

Date Closed: 2/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91113-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 09-0742-MR(528)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/21/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0742-MR
3 11/21/11

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of
Germany on June 28, 1992

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME June 28, 1992, 2:00-2:16 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David



The President telephoned Chancellor Kohl concerning the present situation in Sarajevo. (S)

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good evening, George. (U)

The President: I'm calling to get your thinking on Sarajevo. Judging from your summit in Lisbon, the thinking of a lot of us is closer now. We think we need to go to the UN for a new resolution and then to go forward. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm totally in agreement. (U)

The President: I don't know what Francois Mitterrand found, but I think what we need is a rather restricted set of goals -- to open the airport and to get the goods into the people and that's it. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I do not know the results of Francois Mitterrand's visit in Sarajevo. I think we may hear from him during the night. Last night, we talked in Lisbon. We agreed that it is crucial that the airport be opened so food can be brought in and that this will be difficult to accomplish because of the geographic situation. It reminds the French of Dien Bien Phu. He felt one couldn't do anything beyond that unless the situation was totally desperate. (b)(1)

(b)(1) He feels the UN should adopt a resolution and soon. So, in principle I think there is no difference between us -- I mean in the view of Europe and the United States. (S)

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The President: I'm glad we are together. The question is what kind of force, is required. My instinct is that neither side will welcome U.S. ground troops. I'm thinking that we can provide air support and possibly air cover. We have substantial assets in the region, as you know. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That is how I see it, too. In addition, there is the possibility of a sea blockade. (S)

The President: Yes, a possibility. We have to get our military people to see if it is feasible. We are looking at it now and talking with the British. If the UN thinks it will be useful, let's try it. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. (U)

The President: You know my military is not enthusiastic about this at all, but they realize that we might have to pitch in and help resolve this. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I think we can reach agreement on what to do. (U)

The President: I'm glad we are thinking alike. I know this case poses a special problem for Germany. We are not enthusiastic about military support, but we have to act. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Stay in touch with me. I'll be here all week until the Munich Summit. (U)

The President: Good, I will. I'm looking forward to seeing you in Munich. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I thought Jim Baker might be coming over here. (U)

The President: Well, we thought he might come over for this, but now I'm not sure. But we would like to have one more ministerial meeting on GATT before Munich. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That is how I see it. I'd be very happy if say on Thursday or Friday Jim could go to Brussels via Paris. I think it would be good if he could first stop and see Francois Mitterrand. If he plans to do this he should call me in Monday or Tuesday and then I could talk to Francois again. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We truly must make progress on GATT. I talked to Jacques Delors. He is in a better position as his term was extended on Saturday. I had a long talk with Francois on Saturday saying that we must try to move GATT forward. And in the communique we issued in Lisbon the EC stated that we want the Uruguay Round to be successful. And in all issues, agriculture and the other points as well. And, George, as I told Jim on the phone, I'm quite sure it will be helpful for the U.S. election if we have an agreement. (S)

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The President: No question about that. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'd really like to help, and if Jim is going he can call me. (U)

The President: I know that on some points we are inflexible and cannot move too far from Dunkel. It's true that we have pressure from our groups, but also from the Cairns group who support Dunkel. But I gather from Jim and others that we are not too far apart. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I agree and I think we need to make that visible. But we shouldn't try to deal with this at Munich. (U)

The President: I agree. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Please George, tell Jim that I hope he goes. It is important that we talk before he goes. And, I'll talk to you this week, too. I'm not negotiating. That is the Commission's business. But I can help behind the scenes. (U)

The President: I appreciate all your help. And I agree that we cannot spend our time in Munich nit-picking GATT or getting bogged down in it. We cannot let the Summit be diminished by this. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: And you know, George, I want to be sure that you return to the U.S. looking good. As my friend, I want you to win re-election. (U)

The President: That's wonderful. It's a bit better now. This Perot thing is under better control, and I'm less worried. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I'm quite sure you will win. You know in Munich we have a private talk on my views on that. And let me repeat what I said to Jim, "Anything I can do to help, let me know." (U)

The President: I really appreciate that, and I will pass on to Jim your message about GATT. Jim will be in contact with you if he goes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Best wishes to Barbara. (U)

The President: Thanks. It's a beautiful day here in Camp David. Where are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: At home. And my congratulations for your daughter. You can tell her something special for us. We were married 30 years ago yesterday. (U)

The President: That's great. Thanks. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0742-MR
Z 11/21/11

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva of Portugal
Interpreter: No
Notetaker: Anthony Wayne

DATE, TIME: June 28, 1992, 2:22 - 2:33 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Anibal, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: How are you, George? It's a great pleasure to talk to you. (U)

The President: I understand that you led the EC meeting to a conclusion that we should be doing more now on Bosnia. Our view is that we should go to the U.N., and we are willing to play our part. (S)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: The summit reached unanimity on sending a strong delegation to ask the Security Council for stronger action on Bosnia. I am sure the U.S. and the EC can press for more action, including military action if needed. (S)

The President: We are prepared for a resolution that authorizes whatever means are necessary to open the airport and get the food in. But we are reluctant to put ground forces in. Of course, there is plenty we can do to support this with our air assets and other forces in the area. (S)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: I decided to make this an important topic yesterday and to try to force a decision. (U)

The President: You weren't expecting U.S. ground forces were you? (S)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: No. The problem we faced was that France was prepared to send ground forces, but the U.K. was not enthusiastic. We decided to have the WEU study means of action to support the UN. We are giving priority to peaceful means, but we could support military means. First, the U.N. has to decide to act, but the WEU could be available to support it. (S)

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The President: I think there will have to be some ground forces as well as air transport and air cover. Some are also talking of a naval blockade. If military action is needed because the Serbs don't respect the ceasefire, then we will need peacemaking forces. The UN forces in place are not prepared for a peacemaking mission. We might have to force open the airport and protect the air corridors. But we want to avoid a situation like Vietnam where we get bogged down in a guerrilla war. (S)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Yes, we are looking at a limited operation around the airport. If you are looking to Europe, there are those who are prepared to act with their NATO forces. Some may be prepared to send in ground troops. Italy and France were very strong in the Council, for example. There was some difficulty with the U.K., but I just heard Hurd on the TV and he said the U.K. was prepared to provide air support. It was just too difficult for all of us to explain why we were not doing more. (S)

The President: Yes. We are proud of your leadership, and we are doing the right thing. Our military people have their doubts about this. They are talking to the British military today. But be assured that we will support the U.N. resolution. (S)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: The EC is now ready to act. The situation was so bad that there was tremendous pressure to act. The Serbs and even the others just do not want to respect a ceasefire, so there was a great deal of pressure to act. Jim Baker put a lot of pressure on us too during the Lisbon meeting on Russian aid. Now, of course, we each have our own pressures. Mitterrand, for example, didn't inform us before that he was going to Bosnia. (S)

The President: Not even a mention? (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: No, he left the conference at 4:30, and we only knew when he got to the airport and was about to leave. He never raised it at the table. But the French pressed strongly for EC action. We decided not to recognize Serbia as the successor state to Yugoslavia and to suspend them from international organizations. This is pretty strong action, but it is time for even more. We asked France and the U.K. as permanent members of the Security Council to support military action if needed. (S)

The President: We will be there in the U.N. to support you. It was good to talk with you. (S)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: It was a great pleasure for me. It is time for the EC and the U.S. to go and do something together to solve this problem. (S)

The President: Well, congratulations on your leadership in this. Goodbye for now. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0742-MR

31 11/21/11

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Miyazawa of Japan
(Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Miyazawa
Notetaker: Torkel Patterson

DATE, TIME: Sunday, June 28, 1992, 9:02 - 9:11pm
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: How are you Kiichi? (U)

PM Miyazawa: I'm fine sir; may I congratulate you for the wedding of your daughter, Dorothy, at Camp David today? How was it? (U)

The President: Thank you for asking. It was beautiful, the weather was beautiful, it was a very special day. (U)

Kiichi, I am looking forward to our meeting next week. I also want to thank you for receiving Larry Eagleburger so graciously and for responding initially to my letter. (Ø)

PM Miyazawa: You're welcome, Mr. President, I'm trying to prepare for my visit to see you later this week. (Ø)

The President: I understand from Larry that you are considering a large stimulus package. (Ø)

PM Miyazawa: Yes, I am. (Ø)

The President: I am very pleased to hear that. (Ø)

I know that you are considering implementing such a package in September, and I've heard from press reports that at least some advisors recommend that it be about eight trillion yen. That would be great if it could be that large. I hope that would be. (Ø)

I understand completely that you do not want to appear under pressure from the West in developing this package. (Ø)

I want you to know that we strongly support your desire to stimulate growth and hope that some kind of statement could be made soon, preferably even before you leave Tokyo, or in Washington or Munich. (Ø)

Your announcement would really make a difference for all of us.
(✓)

PM Miyazawa: I have thought so too, George, and you know, I've already done it. We did it by having the LDP do it. They urged me to do it on Friday, which will make it easier for me. I didn't say the exact magnitude, or when, but I did say it would be such and such and soon. I will do it in September or October. (✓)

There has been talk of 8 trillion yen, but it may not be quite that much. It will be something comparable to what I did in 1987 at the Plaza Accords with Jim Baker when I was Finance Minister and we jointly did something worth about \$50 billion. This will be something quite similar but not quite done in an identical manner. (✓)

The President: How was it done in 1987? (✓)

PM Miyazawa: Well it was after the Plaza Accords when our economy was in terrible shape. Jim Baker and I consulted and I took to the Finance Ministry a package that was about \$50 billion. This will be about the same nature and size. Don't worry about us doing this under pressure. I've done this under the LDP. And we've already said that we will do this and that. You're right that we do need an announcement, but we did it already. That's the way this thing was done. (✓)

The President: We're trying to move our own economy, too. The sooner the better on any announcement, Kiichi. I look forward to seeing you next week. (✓)

PM Miyazawa: Don't worry, George. I have an election that makes it easier. What you and I can do is jointly say that Japan is willing to take supplementary measures of substantial magnitude for growth. Or we can make our own individual statements. (✓)

The President: We'll have a quiet time up at Camp David. After some business in Washington we'll go up for a tour and a little supper. Hopefully it will be enjoyable. Then we'll go hear the singer, Pavarotti. (✓)

PM Miyazawa: That would be wonderful. (U)

Mr. President, one more thing that I will do is to ensure you that Japan is sincerely implementing the things that we agreed to in January. I can show you some progress, but there hasn't been a lot of time for some of these measures. And Japan is ready to do additional economic stimulus in the fall. Anything else I should do? (✓)

The President: That sounds wonderful. You know there is one more thing. That is this SSC or SuperCollider. (✓)

PM Miyazawa: You're having trouble with your Congress. (✓)

The President: Yes, with one house of the Congress, but I'm confident we'll be able to work it through the other and get it restored. (C)

There won't be any attempt to embarrass you. (C)

PM Miyazawa: We've got a working group underway now and still waiting for its findings. (C)

The President: I look forward to welcoming you to Washington.

PM: Thank you very much for the call and my best to Barbara. (C)

The President: I will. Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Jun-1992 07:20 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

(WHSR_ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT: PR LDP ANNOUNCES NEW EMERGENCY ECONOMIC

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INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1246
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 9725
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4671
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5342
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0180
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 7451
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0142
RUESKA/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0837
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6801

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PROGRAM, BUT KEY SPECIFICS ARE LEFT
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TREASURY PASS TO TEMPLEMAN, AND BYRNE
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STATE PASS TO FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD - ATTN: FREEMAN
AND MORTON
PASS CEA FOR COUNCIL MEMBER - PAUL WONNACOTT
PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BANK NY FOR B. ENNIS
PASS USDOC FOR 6420/TD/TIA/OFITI/ITSD/HFSCHULTZ
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, JA
SUBJECT: LDP ANNOUNCES NEW EMERGENCY ECONOMIC
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REF: TOKYO 10102

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

1. SUMMARY: THE GOVERNING LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) FORMALLY ANNOUNCED A NEW FIVE-POINT "URGENT" ECONOMIC PACKAGE ON JUNE 27, IN ORDER TO ADDRESS ITS CONCERNS ABOUT SLUGGISH BUSINESS ACTIVITY BEFORE UPPER HOUSE ELECTIONS IN LATE JULY AND TO MEET JAPAN'S COMMITMENT OF REAL GNP GROWTH OF 3.5 PERCENT IN FY 92. HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS RESERVED FINAL JUDGEMENT UNTIL SEPTEMBER ON THE TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION AND THE OVERALL SCALE OF FISCAL

ULUS. IN ANNOUNCING THE PACKAGE, LDP POLICY AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL CHAIRMAN MORI SAID THAT THE OVERALL SCALE OF THE PACKAGE WOULD AMOUNT FROM YEN 6 TO 7 TRILLION, AND IT WILL BE DEVELOPED IN OR AROUND LATE SEPTEMBER, BUT THESE SPECIFICS WERE POINTEDLY NOT INCLUDED IN THE FORMAL REPORT. CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY KATO ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING (JUNE 29) THAT PRESIDENT BUSH CALLED PRIME MINISTER MIYAZAWA TO DISCUSS THE REPORT. IN RESPONSE, THE PRIME MINISTER REPORTEDLY WAS UNSPECIFIC ON THE SIZE AND TIMING QUESTIONS. KATO SAID THAT IN HIS MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND ELSEWHERE THE PRIME MINISTER WILL CONTINUE TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING ON THESE QUESTIONS. THESE EVENTS HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON DOMESTIC FINANCIAL MARKETS TODAY. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

THE LDP SUBMITS ITS ECONOMIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

2. IN ANNOUNCING THE PACKAGE ON JUNE 27, LDP POLICY AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL CHAIRMAN MORI TOLD REPORTERS THAT IN THE LDP'S VIEW ITS OVERALL SCALE WOULD AMOUNT TO "MORE THAN YEN 6 TRILLION AND NEAR YEN 7 TRILLION." THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO 1.3 TO 1.5 PERCENT OF NOMINAL GNP. THE CHAIRMAN SAID THAT THE LDP EXPECTED A "LARGE-SCALE" SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET WOULD BE INCLUDED IN A POLICY PROPOSAL TO BE FINALIZED IN OR AROUND SEPTEMBER. MORI SUBMITTED THE PARTY'S FORMAL

|| MIYAZAWA MAY NOT
COMMIT TO SIZE
AND TIMING.

|| NO IMPACT ON
MARKETS

1 CY RECOMMENDATIONS TODAY (JUNE 29) TO PRIME
MINSISTER MIYAZAWA, WHICH DID NOT TOUCH SPECIFICALLY
ON EITHER OF THESE KEY POINTS (SEE DETAILS OF REPORT
AND FINATT'S INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF ITS PREAMBLE
BELOW). IN RESPONSE, MIYAZAWA INDICATED THAT HE WOULD
EXPRESS, IN HIS UPCOMING OVERSEAS MEETINGS, THE GOJ'S
INTENTION OF COMPILING ANOTHER ECONOMIC STIMULUS
PACKAGE CENTERING ON A "LARGE-SCALE" SUPPLEMENTAL
BUDGET, ALONG THE LINES SET FORTH IN THE LDP REPORT.
MIYAZAWA SAID THAT THE FINAL SIZE AND TIMING OF THE
PACKAGE WILL BE DEVELOPED IN OR AROUND SEPTEMBER,
AFTER FURTHER EXAMINING DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS.

3. MORI'S STATEMENT THAT THE LDP ENVISIONED A PACKAGE
TOTTALLING FROM YEN 6 TO 7 TRILLION WAS WIDELY
REPORTED. THE SUBSTITUTION OF MORI'S ORAL STATEMENT

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PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BANK NY FOR B. ENNIS
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FOR THE FORMAL INCLUSION OF THESE FIGURES IN THE
REPORT CLEARLY WAS THE RESULT OF COMPROMISE WITH THE
FINANCE MINISTRY (SEE REFTTEL), WHICH OPPOSED SETTING
THE SIZE OF THE STIMULUS PACKAGE AT THIS TIME. MRI
INDICATED TODAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD POSED NO
OBJECTION TO THE YEN 6-7 TRILLION FORMULATION WHEN
INFORMED (ON JUNE 27) IN ADVANCE BY MORI OF HIS
INTENTION TO SAY AS MUCH

4. IF THE CREDIBILITY OF MORI'S STATEMENT IS
REINFORCED AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS DO NOT DRASTICALLY
IMPROVE, THE YEN 6 TO 7 TRILLION RANGE MIGHT BECOME A
DE FACTO FLOOR (RATHER THAN THE YEN 3 TO 5 TRILLION
YEN SUM FORMERLY CONSIDERED LIKELY) FOR THE STIMULUS
ACKAGE. LDP VICE PRESIDENT KANEMARU SAID ON SATURDAY
THAT THE PACKAGE SHOULD BE AS HIGH AS YEN 10 TRILLION,
IF THAT IS WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE JAPAN'S PUBLIC
C COMMITMENT TO FY 92 REAL GNP GROWTH OF 3.5 PCT.

5 CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY KATO ALSO REVEALED TODAY
THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD CALLED THE PRIME MINISTER

SLY AFTER 10 AM (LOCAL TIME) THIS MORNING TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE LDP'S ECONOMIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS. KATO WAS UNABLE TO CHARACTERIZE THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S EXPLANATION, WHICH REPORTEDLY OMITTED SPECIFICS ON THE PACKAGE'S OVERALL SIZE AND TIMING. HOWEVER, THE EVENING EDITION OF THE NIKKEI NEWSPAPER (JUNE 29) QUOTED TREASURY SECRETARY BRADY AS WELCOMING THE LDP'S INTENTION TO INTRODUCE A SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET TO ACHIEVE JAPAN'S 3.5 PCT REAL GNP GROWTH TARGET.

6. THE STOCK MARKET'S REACTION TODAY TO THE NEWS ON THE STIMULATIVE PACKAGE WAS TEPID. ACCORDING TO ONE ANALYST THIS INDICATED THAT DOUBTS REMAIN AS TO WHAT A FINAL PACKAGE MAY LOOK LIKE, WHICH WILL NOT BE REVEALED AT LEAST UNTIL SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER. IN INITIAL REACTIONS YESTERDAY (6/28) TO THE LDP REPORT, FINANCIAL MARKET ANALYSTS QUOTED IN THE NIKKEI NEWSPAPER DOUBTED THAT THE LDP ANNOUNCEMENT WAS ENOUGH TO RESTORE BUYING INTEREST AMONG DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS. THESE ANALYSTS WERE HOPEFUL THAT SOME MONETARY EASING WOULD QUICKLY FOLLOW THE GOJ'S EVENTUAL FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE SIZE OF THE FISCAL COMPONENTS OF A STIMULATIVE PACKAGE.

7. FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS TODAY (6/29) BORE THESE REACTIONS OUT. ON VERY THIN VOLUME (150 MILLION \$ ES), THE NIKKEI 225 AVERAGE WAS DOWN 0.4 PCT TO 141, THE FOURTH NEW LOW FOR 1992 REGISTERED IN THE LAST SIX TRADING SESSIONS. LONG AND SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES EDGED SLIGHTLY UPWARD (THE UNCONDITIONAL OVERNIGHT CALL MONEY RATE WAS UP 3 BASIS POINTS OVER THE PREVIOUS TRADING DAY, TO 4.78 PCT; THE BENCHMARK NO. 129 JGB WAS UP 2 BASIS POINTS, TO 5.29 PCT).

DETAILS OF THE LDP PLAN: NO PERSONAL INCOME TAX CUTS,
NO RECOMMENDATIONS ON FINANCING

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8. IN A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES ON JUNE 26, PRIME MINISTER MIYAZAWA WAS NEGATIVE IN RESPONSE TO APPEALS FOR A PERSONAL INCOME TAX CUT, AND NO SUCH CUTS WERE ENDORSED BY THE LDP REPORT. JSP CHAIRMAN TANABE ASKED MIYAZAWA TO IMPLEMENT YEN 1 TRILLION IN PERSONAL INCOME TAX CUTS AND ANOTHER YEN 0.5 TRILLION CUT IN THE LOCAL INHABITANTS TAX (LOCAL INCOME TAX). OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES ALSO REQUESTED SIMILAR MEASURES. THE PRIME MINISTER STRESSED THE DIFFICULTY OF FINANCING PERSONAL INCOME TAX CUTS.

-
9. FINANCING THE STIMULUS PACKAGE: ALTHOUGH THE LDP PACKAGE OMITS THE FINANCING QUESTION, FINANCING FOR ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT SPENDING AND LARGER PUBLIC LOANS MAY NOT BE SO DIFFICULT. ADDITIONAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT OUTLAYS WILL LIKELY BE FULLY FUNDED BY ISSUANCE OF CONSTRUCTION BOND ISSUES. INCREASED PUBLIC LENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THROUGH GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, WILL BE FINANCED BY THE CONTINUING LARGE EXCESS INFLOWS TO THE POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM. IF TAX REVENUE GROWTH CONTINUES TO BE WEAK, HOWEVER, MOF MAY FACE A TOUGH QUESTION OF HOW TO FINANCE NON-INVESTMENT SPENDING. MOF OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO LEAK THEIR REACTION TO THE PRESS THAT FY 92 TAX REVENUES MAY FALL SHORT BY YEN 1 TO 2 TRILLION FROM THE PROJECTED YEN 62.5 TRILLION TOTAL FOR FY 92.

-
10. PROVIDED BELOW IS AN INFORMAL FINATT SUMMARY TRANSLATION OF THE LDP PLAN'S FIVE MAIN COMPONENTS, AND A SUMMARY TRANSLATION OF THE REPORT'S PREAMBLE.

(1) FLEXIBLE MANAGEMENT OF FISCAL POLICY, INCLUDING A LARGE-SCALE SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET

-
- (A) IMPROVEMENT OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUCH AREAS AS WASTE DISPOSAL, SEWERS, PARKS, AND AIRPORTS THROUGH AN UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT OF PUBLIC WORKS SPENDING.

-
- (B) AN ADDITIONAL YEN 50 TO 100 BILLION WILL BE SPENT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FACILITIES.

-
- (C) AN ADDITIONAL YEN 1 TRILLION IN LOANS TO BE PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS.

-
- (D) STUDY OF EXPANSION OF CEILINGS ON BORROWING FOR INDIVIDUAL FOR LOANS FROM THE GOVERNMENT-
AFFILIATED HOUSING LOAN CORPORATION, TO ENCOURAGE

DATE HOUSING CONSTRUCTION.

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(E) A NEW FUND WILL BE CREATED FOR PRESERVING THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND TO FINANCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS AT FORMER SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS.

(F) EARLY RECONSTRUCTION OF AREAS DAMAGED BY
SASTERS (TYPHOONS, ETC.) WITHIN JAPAN.

(2) PROMOTION OF PRIVATE PLANT AND EQUIPMENT
INVESTMENT

(A) MONETARY AND TAX MEASURES WILL BE CONSIDERED
TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE PLANT AND EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT
RELATED TO ENERGY-SAVING AND LABOR-SAVING FACILITIES.

(B) REQUESTS WILL BE MADE TO PUBLIC UTILITY
COMPANIES, SUCH AS ELECTRIC POWER GENERATING FIRMS, TO
SMOOTHLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR INVESTMENT (SIC).

(3) FLEXIBLE MANAGEMENT OF MONETARY POLICY

(A) REQUESTS WILL BE MADE TO PRIVATE FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS TO EXPAND THEIR LENDING AND IMPROVE
LENDING CONDITIONS (SIC).

(4) REVITALIZATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS

(A) IN ORDER TO REVIVE CAPITAL MARKETS, REVISION

C. SECURITIES-RELATED TAXES WILL BE STUDIED.

-
- (B) IN ORDER TO REALIZE TREASURY SHAREHOLDING (A CORPORATION'S PURCHASE OF ITS OWN SHARES), EARLY REVISION OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE WILL BE CARRIED OUT, AND THE EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP SYSTEM WILL BE PROMOTED.

(5) OTHERS

-
- (A) FURTHER FRONT-LOADING OF INDEPENDENTLY-FINANCED LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS, BY UTILIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT BONDS.

-
- (B) PROMOTION OF ACCELERATION OF INVESTMENT PROJECTS BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.

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INFORMAL FINATT TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF PREAMBLE TO THE

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LDP'S JUNE 27 REPORT:

THIRD BASIC PLAN FOR EMERGENCY OVERALL ECONOMIC POLICY

JUNE 27, 1992

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC

PARTY

- INDICATIONS OF A BUSINESS SLUMP IN JAPAN, DUE TO WEAKENING GROWTH IN BUSINESS PLANT AND EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT, AND THE INVENTORY ADJUSTMENT ACCOMPANYING THE ECONOMIC DECELERATION, ARE WORSENING. IF JAPAN'S ECONOMY WORSENS FURTHER THAN AT PRESENT, IT WILL HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECTS FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, AND MAY AFFECT THE BASIS FOR OUR LIVING STANDARD.

F THIS REASON, WITH DUE CONCERN SO AS NO TO

G RATE A SECOND ROUND OF ASSET INFLATION, WE EARLIER DECIDED ON THE PACKAGE OF EMERGENCY ECONOMIC MEASURES

W H INCLUDED CONSIDERABLE FRONT-LOADING OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC WORKS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' SELF-FINANCED PUBLIC INVESTMENT; EXPANSION OF INVESTMENT BY THE ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION AND OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES; AND, THE FLEXIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY POLICY. WE SUBSEQUENTLY PUT FORWARD A SECOND PLAN IN ORDER TO PROMOTE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' SELF-FINANCED PUBLIC INVESTMENT, BY FACILITATING ADVANCE PROCUREMENT OF LAND FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THESE POLICIES, AND THE ENVIRONMENT FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY IS NOW BEGINNING TO BE PREPARED.

- HOWEVER, TODAY AS THESE MEASURES ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, WE HAVE NOT COME TO THE POINT WHERE THE UNEASINESS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE ECONOMY HAS BEEN WIPED OUT. WHILE WE ARE AIMING FOR DOMESTIC DEMAND-LED REAL GNP GROWTH OF 3.5% IN FY 1992, WE SHOULD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE STRIVE FOR FORMULATION OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES INCLUDING A SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET, AND ATTEMPT DOMESTIC DEMAND-LED ECONOMIC RECOVERY. AT THAT JUNCTURE, ABOVE ALL, WE SHOULD POSITIVELY CARRY OUT FURTHER EXPANSION OF PUBLIC WORKS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE RELATED TO THE PEOPLE'S QUALITY OF LIFE; MEASURES TO AID SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZE BUSINESS; PROMOTEMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; POLICIES TO ATTRACTIONALIZE PRIVATE PLANT AND EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT; AND, IMPORT PROMOTION, STRIVING TO GIVE IMPETUS TO A FUNDAMENTALLY FLEXIBLE FISCAL POLICY POSTURE.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, French President
Interpreter: Carol Wolters
Notetaker: Anthony Wayne

DATE, TIME: June 30, 1992, 11:40 - 11:49 a.m.
AND PLACE: The White House

The President: Francois, comment allez-vous?

President Mitterrand: Fine and you, George?

The President: I am calling you on a couple of matters. First, on the situation in Bosnia. Congratulations on your visit to Sarajevo. It took courage and what we call guts. From the TV reporter, your visit seemed to give hope to many of the citizens there. What are your impressions? (Ø)

President Mitterrand: First, Sarajevo is a city being destroyed. The suffering is great. People are firing at all times on civilians and on buildings. When I was there Sunday, there was a lot of firing, but I was told that this was less than usual. Because of the decisions taken by the U.N., and improvements in the situation, I was able to see and speak with a number of officials and diplomats who told me that the Serbians were willing to pull out of the airport. This is a first step at least. (Ø)

(The President was disconnected during Mitterrand's comments.)

The President: I am very sorry about the disconnection. I didn't get to hear all of your impressions. (U)

President Mitterrand: It's okay. In summary, when it comes to Bosnia and Sarajevo, now the U.N. controls the airport so assistance can get in. (U)

The President: Do you think they can keep it open? We were prepared to do more in the U.N., but maybe that is not needed now given what you did and other developments. (Ø)

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President Mitterrand: For the present, Sarajevo seems to be much better off but for the war in general, we are far from the end of it. I think we will only be able to end it by organizing an international conference such as you have set up for the Middle East. (Ø)

The President: That's interesting. But do you feel that there is now no need for another U.N. resolution? (Ø)

President Mitterrand: As far as another resolution is concerned, let's speak about that Sunday night. The situation is changing given all that has been done in the U.N. and the threats of action that have been made, particularly yours. Why don't we discuss this at dinner on Sunday? (Ø)

The President: Good. We'll talk about that Sunday. We have a lot of items to discuss on our agenda. I did want to mention one point on GATT. When I talked with Helmut over the weekend, he mentioned that he had had a long talk with you in Lisbon about the Uruguay Round. I know the Danish vote created new sensitivities and that you have concerns about your farmers' reaction to a U.S. EC agreement on agriculture. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it is true. We all have our difficulties, and the farmers are not the most willing partners. (U)

The President: Exactly. (U)

President Mitterrand: Helmut Kohl told me that Jim Baker might be coming to Europe this week. If he does, I'd be happy to invite him to stop here and to see me. (Ø)

The President: Well, we had not exactly decided yet if he would go. But if there is a way it can be helpful, he will definitely come. We were considering the possibility of another ministerial meeting in Brussels on the Round. It is definitely worth one more try before Munich. Helmut feels strongly that the Round should not dominate or diminish the Summit, and we certainly do not want to do anything that could harm the Summit. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I am ready to meet with Secretary Baker when he comes, especially since Helmut Kohl suggested it and is so interested. (Ø)

The President: Good, I'll talk to Jim. I think it is worth doing and especially going on to Brussels for serious talks with the Commission. We need progress in agriculture but also in all the areas, including services and market access. (Ø)

Francois Mitterrand: Yes, and in any case you can be assured that we in France want to see the negotiations succeed. They are essential for starting up commerce again. But I do not know if we can find a basis for agreement. All sides have been keeping their basic agenda from the others. This makes it hard. (Ø)

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The President: But I gather from my talks with Helmut that he thinks we are close. We agree, and think it is worth a try. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I'll be available in Paris to meet with Secretary Baker. (Ø)

The President: I hope it works out for you to come to Camp David. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes, me, too. I hope you are doing well.

The President: Yes, I am in good shape physically. Politically, I am not doing as well. It's tough here. My health is fine, but this is a strange political year. We can talk more on Sunday. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it is a difficult political year. I'll see you Sunday. Oh, I wanted to mention that if I didn't take your call on Saturday, it was because I had already started my trip to Sarajevo. (U)

The President: We understood, and it took courage to do what you did. You have my full admiration. (U)

President Mitterrand: You did much more during the war. (Ø)

The President: I don't know about that. I'll see you Sunday. (U)

Mitterrand: A bientot. (U)

The President: A bientot. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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