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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91113
Folder ID Number: 91113-002

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 9/27/91 - 12/25/91

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (2 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister John Major of the UK (3 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR (3 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Woerner (2 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Republic of Russia (2 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (1 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	C
07. Telcon	Re: Meeting with Prince Hans Adam of Liechtenstein (2 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	C
08. Telcon	Re: Prime Minister Jim Bolger of New Zealand (2 pp.)	9/28/91	(b)(1)	C
09. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (2 pp.)	9/30/91	(b)(1)	C
10a. Memo	Robert B. Morley to William F. Sittmann Re: Telephone Conversation (1 pp.)	10/2/91	(b)(1)	C

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10b. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	10/1/91	(b)(1)	✓
11. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (3 pp.)	10/5/91	(b)(1)	✓
12. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Republic of Russia (2 pp.)	10/8/91	(b)(1)	✓
13. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (3 pp.)	10/10/91	(b)(1)	✓
14. Telcon	Re: The President's Meeting with Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner (7 pp.)	10/11/91	(b)(1)	✓
15. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister of Portugal (2 pp.)	10/11/91	(b)(1)	✓
16. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan (2 pp.)	10/16/91	(b)(1)	✓
17. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Republic of Russia (2 pp.)	10/25/91	(b)(1)	✓
18. Telcon	Re: Telcon with the Amir of Bahrain on 28 October 1991 (2 pp.)	10/28/91	(b)(1)	✓
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Juan Carlos of Spain (2 pp.)	11/5/91	(b)(1)	✓

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20. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt (3 pp.)	11/7/91	(b)(1)	S
21a. Memo	Robert B. Morley to William F. Sittmann Re: Telephone Conversation with Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela on November 15, 1991 (1 pp.)	11/15/91	(b)(1)	S
21b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela on November 15, 1991 (3 pp.)	11/15/91	(b)(1)	S
22. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe on November 19, 1991 (2 pp.)	11/19/91	(b)(1)	Ø
23. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hassan of Morocco on November 19, 1991 (2 pp.)	11/19/91	(b)(1)	S
24. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Boutros Ghali of Egypt (1 pp.)	11/22/91	(b)(1)	
25. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (3 pp.)	11/25/91	(b)(1)	Ø
26a. Memo	Earl Anthony Wayne to William F. Sittmann Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany (1 pp.)	11/27/91	(b)(1)	Ø
26b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany (2 pp.)	11/26/91	(b)(1)	Ø
27. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands (3 pp.)	11/26/91	(b)(1)	Ø

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28. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR (5 pp.)	11/30/91	(b)(1)	S
29. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Republic of Russia (5 pp.)	11/30/91	(b)(1)	S
30. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (5 pp.)	11/30/91	(b)(1)	C
31. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine on December 3, 1991 (2 pp.)	12/3/91	(b)(1)	C
32a. Memo	Jane E. Holl to William F. Sittmann Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey (1 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	C
32b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey (2 pp.)	12/5/91	(b)(1)	C
33. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Yeltsin of the Republic of Russia (4 pp.)	12/8/91	(b)(1)	C
34. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation between the President and President F.W. de Klerk of South Africa (3 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(1)	C
35. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (4 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1)	S
36. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1)	C

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37. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the FSU (4 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1)	S
38. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany (3 pp.)	12/14/91	(b)(1)	C
39. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Rao of India on December 15, 1991 (1 pp.)	12/15/91	(b)(1)	C
40. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (4 pp.)	12/15/91	(b)(1)	C
41. Memo	Earl Anthony Wayne to William F. Sittmann Re: Telcon with French President Francois Mitterrand (1 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	C
42a. Memo	Tony Wayne to William F. Sittmann Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (1 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	C
42b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	C
43a. Memo	John F. McShane to William F. Sittmann (1 pp.)	12/18/91	(b)(1)	S
43b. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (5 pp.)	12/17/91	(b)(1)	S
44. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan on December 20, 1991 (2 pp.)	12/20/91	(b)(1)	C

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45. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Boris Yeltsin (3 pp.)	12/23/91	(b)(1)	S
46a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to William F. Sittmann Re: Telcon with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (1 pp.)	12/26/91	(b)(1)	S
46b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union (3 pp.)	12/25/91	(b)(1)	S

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Notetaker: Barry Lowenkron

DATE, TIME: September 27, 1991, 7:13-7:20am EDT
AND PLACE: Situation Room

President Mitterrand: I've just seen your Ambassador. (S)

The President: That's why I'm calling, to discuss the steps we're proposing, and to ask you if they cause you any problems. I think they'll be well received. My first point, though, is we don't want to cause any problem for French nuclear forces French forces, and their modernization, are separate from what we're proposing. (S)

President Mitterrand: I understand fully. The Ambassador explained the four points you'll be making today. (S)

The President: We respect the independence of French forces. A second point, I'll be referring to the possibility of a dialogue with the Soviets on nuclear weapons. Following up on your proposal, I wanted you to know that we'll mention you and your idea in the speech. The third point is that we'll keep a U.S. air-based nuclear capability in Europe, which I know you support. I believe the Germans will support this too, but we may need your help on that. (S)

President Mitterrand: On your four points, I told Ambassador Curley that they are fine. Eliminating SNF artillery is good, as is reducing strategic missiles. These are good projects. As for the usefulness of the meeting I proposed, I'd like to know when you think it will be possible to hold such a meeting. I'm not worried about the independence of French nuclear forces -- they're not involved here, and I note that, over the last few years, you and I have developed an atmosphere of mutual trust in this field. (S)

The President: On your idea, I think it is important that we consult among ourselves before we sit down with the Soviets. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, of course. (S)

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The President: We'll move with our proposals now, but there is no timetable set for a meeting on your proposal. We will be guided by your thinking on that. (S)

President Mitterrand: Fine, we will move quickly on this. (S)

The President: On Iraq, I see some progress, but this does not lessen my concern that we will have to take some action if we don't get Iraq to agree to the letter of the law. But, the missile batteries are getting into place, and we'll be ready to go. (S)

President Mitterrand: You don't think that the Iraqis have made sufficient gestures? (S)

The President: I just heard what Mr. Key has said, that there is a problem with food and with getting the documents out, so it is still a little cloudy, and there is a new letter from Iraq -- which France as Security Council President will see -- which contains ambiguous language, and so the jury is still out. (S)

President Mitterrand: Well, fine. We spoke about this the other day. It is not a question of giving into provocation by Saddam, but he has to do what we want. (S)

The President: Nice talking to you. I appreciate your support. I think it will be well received in Europe, around the world, and in the U.S. as a sign that we are moving to a less threatening world.

President Mitterrand: We are in agreement, and we will see how to implement all of this. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister John Major of the UK

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister John Major
Notetaker: Barry F. Lowenkron

DATE, TIME: September 27, 1991, 7:45 - 7:57 am EDT
AND PLACE: Situation Room

The President: I'm calling to see whether you received my letter on the speech that I'll be giving. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I got it 40 minutes ago. It is very bold and decisive. I have a wet towel over my head to absorb the ramifications. It's a very momentous statement. (S)

The President: There are several points that I would like to make. I could not and would not lock British forces into the old argument that they have to be included in our proposals. We will support the difference in these forces. We suggest that you have to do something. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I'm grateful. There are two "knot throgs" that I want to raise with you. The first has to do with nuclear weapons on our ships. The second has to do with present difficulties in Europe on discussions of a common European defense posture, but I must say that your proposal is a good thing. It will be well received in the Alliance, and it will get a warm reception around the world. (S)

The President: We want to capitalize on the changes in the Soviet Union. Some of these ideas are dependent on the Soviets responding to our challenge, but we will be sensitive to your two problems. On the problem of nuclear weapons on your ships I can see you coming in for some unilateral pressure. On the second problem you raised, we will of course consult. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I appreciate that. One or two additional things I would like to raise. Your proposal comes smack on the eve of the Labor Party Conference. This five day conference will have heavy antinuclear tones. I would appreciate it if you would share with us the text of your speech and when exactly you will be delivering it so that we can get our response exactly right. (S)

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The President: I'm inclined to give the speech tonight from the Oval office. It is a prime time slot. I think it will be well received in the United States because it will show that we are not locked into old ideas. We will have a new text in about one hour and then we could get it over to you. But I would ask you to please protect the contents. The Washington Post already has revealed some of my proposals but not all. I would prefer that the speech be closely held. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Indeed it will. I will talk to Steven Wall, and let me assure you that a maximum of only 5 of us will know of the speech. It would also be most helpful if you could say in your statement that we consulted. (S)

The President: Absolutely, I will do anything required to help you. It would be a shame if the Labor Party capitalizes on my initiative. Have Steven Wall call Brent when you get the text. Do not be modest or hesitant about making suggestions. (S)

Prime Minister Major: That is immensely helpful in heading off the Labor attack on nuclear weapons. There can be no political capital out of denuclearization. The problem is, the greater the denuclearization the less danger that the British public perceives in voting for labor. (S)

The President: Do you anticipate getting any problems from predictable sources on the right? (S)

Prime Minister Major: No. The proposals do not affect TRIDENT. There are several sensitive points we would want to look at in detail. One is the issue of a short-range air delivery missile. It would be helpful if NATO would maintain an effective air delivered missile, updated as necessary. I know that the Germans and Belgians have been keen to do this. (S)

The President: We can consult on that and see if my draft text does not touch sufficiently on that. If not, let us know. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Another issue is your proposal for you and the Soviets to take steps to deploy a limited ABM system. We would want to look carefully at it. (S)

The President: Such a system would be used against Third World countries. It's a limited form of SDI, but if you have concerns please shoot us your comments on the draft. (S)

Prime Minister Major: We will be very happy to do that. (U)

The President: We will get it off to you right away. (S)

Prime Minister Major: What time will you be giving your speech? (U)

The President: Either 7 o'clock or 9 pm tonight. Nine is prime time on the West Coast. I was going to do it at Ft. McNair but

that is up in the air. When we send you the text, we will tell you the time. (S)

Prime Minister Major: That is fine but 7 your time will be too late to make the European press. (S)

The President. I know but if I give the speech in the afternoon here it will get print coverage but not much television exposure. I want you to know that I am sensitive to your considerations. We want to do nothing to complicate politics in the UK. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I am grateful. This is a momentous proposal. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR President
Interpreter: Dmitri Zarechnak
Notetaker: Ed A. Hewett, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME September 27, 1991, 9:22 - 9:50 am
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Mikhail, how are you? (U)

President Gorbachev: George, hello. I received your letter. I very much want to talk. (U)

The President: Good. First, I want to extend my cordial best wishes. I would like to go through the talking points and get a reaction to them. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK. In general I discussed them with my colleagues from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and asked them to give me a preliminary analysis. I listened to the experts. (S)

This is a major initiative of the President of the United States. That is my opinion, and that of my closest associates. There is only one thing: you are doing this unilaterally, and you call on us to consider our steps. Is that right? (S)

The President: Yes. Correct. We'll spell out what we do. In some categories, we'll spell out how the Soviet Union could take similar steps. For example, we cancel ICBM's except for single warheads, and would like to say that the Soviet Union is doing the same thing. (S)

On dismantling nuclear warheads, where I propose we open discussions on the safe dismantling of nuclear warheads, on how we might enhance the safety and security of nuclear weapons, and how to improve nuclear command and control. I'd like to say you and I agree that this would be a good thing to do. (S)

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President Gorbachev: George, thank you for those clarifications. Since you're urging that we take steps, I can only give an answer in principle -- since there is much that must be clarified -- and that answer is a positive one. (S)

The President: I understand. How about if I say that I've consulted with Mikhail Gorbachev, and although he has had no time to study my initiative, that I am inclined to believe his response will be positive. (S)

President Gorbachev: I think that will be very good. I wanted to say that since you'll be talking at 8:30 our time, I could go on our news program "Vremia" at 9:00, mention that we've talked, and then on that program give a positive response. (S)

The President: There's just one complication. I won't give the speech now until 8:00 p.m. our time -- 3:00 a.m. your time. I changed that because we wanted to be on prime time so that the majority of the American people could hear it. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK, then I'll respond tomorrow. (S)

The President: Very good. (U)

President Gorbachev: There are certain points on which I have some questions. First, we hope that we will get more detailed information from you on each point. Is that agreed? (S)

The President: Absolutely. (S)

President Gorbachev: Do you have any intention to include other nuclear powers in this process? Are you calling on them to get involved? (S)

The President: I consulted with Major and Mitterand. I haven't asked them to be involved. We will take the lead. It is certainly our intention to consult further with them. (S)

The response from Major and Mitterand, with whom I talked just a few minutes ago, was certainly very positive. But I am not calling on them to do something now. This is more a U.S.-Soviet superpower relationship. (S)

President Gorbachev: That's clear. In connection with your far-reaching proposals, is the question of nuclear testing included? It was one situation when we had many nuclear systems and programs. Not that you are contemplating major reductions, perhaps you consider moves on testing. (S)

The President: We're reluctant on testing. Clearly we will consider the effect of our proposals on testing. We are not talking here about testing, and we will need to be in contact on that. Clearly it will raise the issue in the U.S. and elsewhere. We will need to consult on that. (S)

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President Gorbachev: OK, George. Another point which was not clear to us: does your initiative affect carrier-based arms control and the strategic-based nuclear [naval] fleet? (S)

The President: Carrier based nuclear forces, definitely yes. The strategic fleet is not affected. Land-based navy planes will have their nuclear weapons removed from them and from their bases. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK, thank you. In conclusion, I would like to know your view on the following question. What forum can we use to clarify the points that arise about the U.S. initiative? When you were here, we talked of setting up a group to discuss strategic stability. Maybe that group is the appropriate one to clarify all remaining questions? (S)

The President: That's an interesting idea. I like that. Let me get back to you soon. It should be broader than just military, but obviously the military should be comfortable with this. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK. Thank you. I want again to congratulate you on this major proposal. It is a historic initiative, comparable to Rejkavik. (S)

The President: I also wanted to run it by Yel'tsin. I don't know where he is. He was on vacation, but I don't know where he is now. (S)

We sent him the information. I would like to do the courtesy of calling him. If we miss him, tell him we tried. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK, I'll do that George. I also want to say that I appreciated meeting with Jim and discussing with Brady the U.S. financial system. (S)

The President: Thank you for the courtesy of receiving them. We're urgently trying to follow up on those conversations. (S)

President Gorbachev: Thanks. I sent today information to Major for the G-7, including detailed data on the situation of our balance of payments, debt, and our possibilities. He will be in touch with you to give the information on my behalf. (S)

The President: OK. I look forward to seeing it. I am very pleased at your positive response. (S)

President Gorbachev: I'm sure. I glad to hear of your significant initiative. Raisa sends her best to Barbara. (U)

The President: Thank you and thank you for sending that fascinating tape. I looked at it with interest. Thank you. (U)

President Gorbachev: Thank you for the flag. That, too, is a reflection of that troubled time. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Secretary General of NATO,
Manfred Woerner

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Notetaker: Barry Lowenkron

DATE, TIME September 27, 1991, 11:25-11:37 am EDT
AND PLACE: Situation Room

Secretary General Woerner: I got the President's letter and I like every part of it. I do have some questions. (S)

General Scowcroft: I'm sure you do. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: The first question has to do with SNF. Is the President proposing negotiations, or some kind of commitment by the Soviets to do the same in parallel? You know my views. I do not generally favor negotiations but I have to know your intentions, particularly for tomorrow's Council meeting. (S)

General Scowcroft: No, we are not planning negotiations. This is a unilateral move. Of course, if the Soviets reject our proposals, we may have to reconsider. We did get preliminary support from Gorbachev on the President's proposals. He was very, very pleased with the whole thing and told the President that, while the President could say that the Soviets were still studying the ideas, their initial reaction was to support them. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: I expected nothing less. (S)

General Scowcroft: There will of course be consultations with the Soviets. One of the things that troubles us is the security of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: We had a small consultation in the NAC to discuss the French initiative. (S)

General Scowcroft: Our move is somewhat broader than the French idea. The Soviets don't know how to destroy these weapons, or at least we think they don't know, and we have to engage them as discipline continues to erode in the Soviet armed forces. (S)

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Secretary General Woerner: The Soviet nuclear control is a concern not just to NATO nuclear members but to all members of the Alliance. We will use the NATO liaison to convey these concerns. (S)

General Scowcroft: As the President has said, we will sit down with the Soviets. Gorbachev wants this. We will not simply do a blind or unilateral pullback, and we will keep our allies informed. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: My second question is whether TASM is cancelled and if so, does the option remain to develop another system? (S)

General Scowcroft: We are dropping TASM. It is a terrible program. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: That does not change anything, since TASM was not scheduled to be ready until 1997. To me dropping TASM now is a good idea. I can stop discussions on it in NATO. There are two things that I believe are essential. First, we need to keep air-based nuclear systems in Europe. (S)

General Scowcroft: Absolutely. You have been very helpful in this regard. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: I have made public statements on this need and we will have a good statement coming out of the NPG. The second thing that is essential is that we keep open the option to develop a similar system. (S)

General Scowcroft: That is precisely what we have in mind. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: I have one favor to ask you, if you can convince the President to include in his speech a reference to the NATO Summit. We have to keep NATO wholly involved. We have to demonstrate that NATO is consulting, and that the NATO Summit will deal with these matters. Please consider this. It will be helpful. Everyone is looking to the summit, and we must do something. (S)

General Scowcroft: We can work that in. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: Congratulations again. These proposals will be tremendously helpful. I told Jim Baker and Will Taft that we have to keep the initiative in the nuclear field and you have done so with this proposal. (S)

General Scowcroft: Thank you, you've handled this magnificent. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: Please convey to the President my congratulations and my support. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Republic of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Boris Yeltsin, President of Russian Republic
Interpreter: Dimitri Zarechnak
Notetaker: Nick Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: September 27, 1991, 12:23 - 12:36pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. How are you? (U)

President Yeltsin: I am on vacation and am beginning to feel and look better. (U)

The President: I don't want to interrupt your holiday. I sent you a message yesterday on a proposal I will make on nuclear weapons. I hope you have had a chance to look at it and would encourage your support so that I can mention that when I make the announcement this evening. (U)

I talked to President Gorbachev a little bit ago and I was pleased with his reaction. I just hope you received the message I sent to you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Mr. President. I read your proposal. If you remember, we had mentioned such an initiative when I was in Washington. And I had also mentioned it to Secretary Baker. I understand this proposal covers a broader range of issues. I would not go into great detail now but I appreciate this proposal very highly. I think that it shows a new level of trust between our two countries. I also think this is a very positive reaction to the changes in Russia and the Soviet Union. (U)

I would like to think that your idea is consistent with the present policy of the Russian Federation. I want to assure you that Russia will do everything it can to prompt the USSR to launch a related move to implement this initiative. Also, we have now abolished the Military-Industrial Commission which has been in charge of these issues. The new leaders in the Ministry of Defense are now more civilized and are inclined to agree in general with more cuts in nuclear armaments. They will also listen to what Russia says. I believe the new Minister of

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Defense is in favor of such initiatives. I believe the USSR will proceed along these lines. Your initiative is just a beautiful concept. (S)

The President: Thank you. I just wanted to make sure that you had seen my letter. I am pleased you are enthusiastic. I want you to know that other leaders, France, the UK, are also enthusiastic. (U)

President Yeltsin: I was very happy to see your latest message and initiative and am happy for our two countries. I believe your initiative is a serious step to eliminate totally nuclear weapons. I only hope your next initiative is designed to cease completely nuclear underground testing. I told you in Washington that this was of special importance for Russia. (S)

The President: We'll be talking about that. Thank you very much. Now get your well-deserved rest. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. I congratulate you for this beautiful initiative. Thank you. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Notetaker: Nick Burns

DATE, TIME: September 27, 1991, 12:23 -12:36 pm EDT
AND PLACE: Situation Room

The President: Helmut, how's my friend? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine, George. How are you? (U)

The President: Good, it's going good. I wanted to call you about the letter I sent to you and the announcement I will make today.
(Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I read the letter. Congratulations. It is a major step forward. Thank you on behalf of all Germans. I think this will be good for us all. Now we should all make it clear to Gorbachev and Yeltsin that they have to react. (Ø)

The President: I just talked to Gorbachev to whom I had also sent a letter. He is very, very positive. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Excellent. (Ø)

The President: I wanted to tell you that, obviously, we will need to consult on this deeply with Germany. I wonder now if you have any questions because by the time I give my speech tonight at 8:00 p.m. here, it will be 1:00-2:00 a.m. in the morning. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: No, no. We will of course strongly and warmly welcome this. It will have a big impact here. (Ø)

The President: I do want to be clear about one thing. I feel we must preserve the air launched cruise missile capability, about modernization. We can talk further and consult but I am delighted at your initial response. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Indeed. This is a positive response. (Ø)

The President: Good luck. We still have problems with our friend in Iraq. He never learns his lessons. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. Good luck, George. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prince Hans Adam of
Liechtenstein

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National security Affairs
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European
Affairs (Notetaker)

Prince Hans Adam II
Hans Brunhart, Prime Minister

DATE, TIME September 27, 1991, 3:05 - 3:28 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I am delighted to see you. We have several mutual friends. Claiborne has been for years a friend of the Bush family. My dad served in the Senate with him, though from a different party. How do you see problems in Europe? How do you see things going? (C)

Prime Hans Adam: It is great that Communism waned rather peacefully. It could have been much worse. (C)

The President: Yes. As the matrix of Communism goes, there are bound to be conflicts and disputes. We hope to resolve them peacefully, including through a newly activated UN. Was your speech about self-determination? (C)

Prime Hans Adam: Yes. I thought when the Soviet Union broke apart, ethnic problems would come up. The question is how to channel them -- not through break up, but through some kind of devolution. (C)

The President: But your borders are secure. (U)

Prime Hans Adam: Oh, yes. They have been secure for 600 years and were only challenged by Napoleon and Hitler. (U)

The President: But did Hitler respect the borders? (U)

Prime Hans Adam: Yes, but it was a close thing. According to my father, it was very close. It seemed that Hitler thought that we should come in ourselves. He financed the Nazi party in Liechtenstein, but it fizzled. (U)

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The President: When he met with your dad, did he exact conditions? (U)

Prime Hans Adam: No. There was a British radio station which the Third Reich threatened to bombard, but we came up with a solution, a very English solution, whereby we reinterpreted our treaty with the British postal service. (U)

The President: But all this international change doesn't affect your sovereignty and stability. (U)

Prime Hans Adam: No. There is the question of Switzerland's joining the EC. If so, we'll have to decide whether to follow. We probably will not, but we would need a free trade treaty. It could end our close relationship with Switzerland. (U)

We have another mutual friend, Sadri Aga Khan and Katy. (U)

The President: Yes, he really wants to be UN Secretary General. He has a lot of friends, including the U.S., but he is up against a lot of Africans who feel it is their turn. Sadruddin thinks they'll come around, but it's not a matter of the U.S. just waving its hand and getting its choice. What about Katy? Do you think she wants it? (U)

Prime Hans Adam: No, he told her this was something unique and it would only be four years. He tried to convince her. (U)

The President: I think if it were handed to him with no fight, she would say sure. We are so close, I can't be entirely impartial. There are other candidates: Ghali, Chidzero, and the Ugandan. There are three to four so far, but the Africans haven't coalesced around one. It is too early to see what is going to happen. Boutros' problem is that he isn't considered an African by the Africans. Second, he is Christian, not a Muslim, so it will take a while to sort out. How long will you be in the States? (U)

Prime Hans Adam: I leave tomorrow morning. (U)

The President: For home? (U)

Prime Hans Adam: No. I am going to Buenos Aires. (U)

(closing pleasantries)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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2000-0429-F

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Jim Bolger of New Zealand

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Jim Bolger
Notetaker: Douglas Paal

DATE, TIME Saturday, September 28, 1991 4:27 p.m. EST -
4:31 p.m. EST

AND PLACE: Sea Isle, Georgia

The President placed a call to Prime Minister Bolger in response to Bolger's request.

PM Bolger: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good morning, Mr. Bolger. It is 4:30 in the afternoon here, what time is it there? (U)

PM Bolger: It is 8:15 in the morning on Sunday. (U)

The President: What's up? (U)

PM Bolger: Well you caused a stir yesterday (announcing the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. ships). It was a tremendous announcement. Well done. Thanks for the warning the other day. You went much farther than I anticipated. It was tremendous. (U)

The President: I hope this gives you an opportunity. It is a once in a lifetime opportunity to get back on track, if you agree. (U)

PM Bolger: I agree. It is an opportunity to seize. And I have said so publicly. I am pleased to note that even the anti-nuclear people appreciate that your move was positive. Who knows? They might agree. (U)

The President: You were nice to call. Without sounding egotistical, the initiative was well received. The Russians; President Gorbachev, lots of others have sent in good messages. (U)

If it benefits the people in New Zealand, that would be just great. (U)

PM Bolger: I think so, too. I am very optimistic. I will talk to my cabinet tomorrow morning. I have just arrived yesterday

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morning. As I arrived, I received a call in Auckland from my Ambassador, who said he had received a call from Richard Solomon. He gave us advance word of your announcement. Thank you very much. It was a wonderful gesture to the world, it will be great to seize the opportunity to step forward. (Ø)

The President: Thank you very much. I enjoyed our get together. I do not know the internals down there, but I hope it helps clear the way. (U)

PM Bolger: Just one more thing, Mr. President. When will you have a chance to come down. I hope you will find your way to New Zealand. The trout are still there. (U)

The President: The trout are still there. Thanks a lot. Good bye. (U)

End of Conversation

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE

FROM: ROBERT B. MORLEY

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos
Andres Perez of Venezuela, September 30, 1991

NOTED

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela on September 30, 1991. At Tab I is a transmittal memorandum to the State Department forwarding the telcon to Assistant Secretary Aronson and Ambassadors Skol in Venezuela and Adams in Haiti.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the telcon at Tab A to the State Department.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve KSH Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memorandum to Pearson

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008
By CA NARA, Date 9/24/10

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Carlos Andres Perez of
Venezuela on September 30, 1991 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Lillian Nigalioni
Notetaker: William T. Pryce/Robert B. Morley

DATE, TIME September 30, 1991, 9:39 p.m. - 9:48 p.m. DST
AND PLACE: Air Force One

President Bush: Hello, my friend, this is George Bush calling.
How are you? (U)

President Perez: It is a pleasure to hear your voice again. I
know you are flying. I am very worried about the situation in
Haiti, and about President Aristide. I just heard they have
agreed to take him to the airport. Many people fear he may be
shot. We don't know who is leading the rebellion. I am
coordinating with our Embassy in Haiti to see if we can arrange
to pick him up. But, President Bush, I think the situation is
very grave. We cannot let the coup succeed, or we will have a
repetition of the situation in other countries like in Suriname.
The Foreign Ministers are meeting at the OAS tomorrow to discuss
the situation. We need to think about what we can do at this
time. It is a grave situation. Prime Minister Mulroney called.
He is equally worried. I talked with Mitterrand as well. He
said he is willing to discuss what can be done to end the
coup d'etat. (Ø)

President Bush: I am concerned because we do not have good
information about what is going on. Our Ambassador is consulting
with your Ambassador and that is good. (Ø)

President Perez: Yes, our Ambassadors are in contact. The
Ambassadors of Venezuela, the United States, France, and Canada
have been working together around the clock. I talk to our
Ambassador in Haiti every half hour. (Ø)

President Bush: I understand there was some talk about a flyby
with aircraft, but that doesn't have much appeal if you don't
have a next step. We are not ready to follow up. (Ø)

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President Perez: agree with you, sir. It would be premature and too likely to precipitate unfortunate things. I don't think it would help. They have been talking about a visit to Haiti by the OAS Secretary General, accompanied by some of the Foreign Ministers. This will be discussed tomorrow; I would agree. Our Foreign Minister left for Washington today to participate in tomorrow's OAS meeting. I have instructed him to accompany the OAS Secretary General to Haiti if necessary. (Ø)

President Bush: That might make more sense. And getting the OAS together sounds like a good idea. CAP, what do you understand the position of the regular military forces in Haiti to be. What are they doing? (Ø)

President Perez: It is a very confused situation. The army leadership does not support the coup. We don't know who is leading the rebellious group. We are trying to save Aristide's life. They agreed recently to send him to the airport. I am sending an airplane to bring him to Venezuela. (Ø)

President Bush: Very good. Have you got an airplane there already? (Ø)

President Perez: No. We have one available and will send it when the Ambassador has everything arranged. (Ø)

President Bush: Well, I don't think there is much more we can do tonight. We should talk again tomorrow. The OAS may have something to say. I will be available tomorrow to consult with you again. We need to talk early tomorrow to see what the situation is and what can be done. (Ø)

President Perez: That is a good idea. Maybe we can talk again about 10:00 a.m.? (Ø)

President Bush: I think that will be fine. I am not certain. I don't know what my schedule is, but we'll talk again. A big abrazo. (Ø)

President Perez: Perfect, we'll talk again tomorrow. (U)

President Bush: Okay. Thanks a million. (U)

President Perez: Okay. Until tomorrow. (U)

--- End of Conversation ---

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE

FROM: ROBERT B. MORLEY

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos
Andres Perez of Venezuela, October 1, 1991

NOTED

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela on October 1, 1991. At Tab I is a transmittal memorandum to the State Department forwarding the telcon to Assistant Secretary Aronson and Ambassadors Skol in Venezuela and Adams in Haiti.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the telcon at Tab A to the State Department.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve KW Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memorandum to Pearson

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By SL NARA, Date 11/24/06

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Carlos Andres Perez of
Venezuela on October 1, 1991 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Barbara Phillips
Notetaker: William T. Pryce/Robert B. Morley

DATE, TIME: October 1, 1991, 9:57 a.m. - 10:05 a.m. DST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, CAP, how are you? (U)

President Perez: How are you? (U)

The President: I don't want to take too much of your time. We agreed yesterday that we would talk again today. Things seem to be a little better. I gather they are getting back on track today, and I think the OAS passed a useful resolution condemning the coup and calling for the restoration of Aristide. But, I wanted to know what your last minute thinking is. What do you think of the situation? (Ø)

President Perez: I think the situation is very bad. Aristide arrived this morning very depressed about the future. There is no communication with Haiti. None at all. Everything is cut. The army is in total control of everything. I talked to Aristide. According to the information I got from him, the coup was led by the Minister of Defense. I don't know if a government has been named yet. Many are dead. Something has to be done urgently. I think that the idea of an OAS mission headed by Secretary General Baena Soares is a good one, but it needs to happen very soon. (Ø)

President Bush: We agree with you that it is a good idea. If you think this initiative would help, then we would be supportive. (Ø)

President Perez: I think we also need to be prepared for harder and more severe measures. I am asking my people to be prepared to cut our supply of oil to Haiti. (Ø)

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President Bush: Won't the OAS consider further steps they should take? (C)

President Perez: Yes. The problem is that the meeting of the Foreign Ministers cannot take place until tomorrow. It cannot be held until tomorrow because many Ministers cannot arrive before then. (C)

President Bush: Have you got any suggestions for the United States on measures we can take? (C)

President Perez: I think what we must do is wait for the Foreign Ministers to meet. Then we must propose tough economic sanctions. We should begin with rough economic measures. (C)

President Bush: But this would be done through the OAS. The sanctions would be broadly endorsed. (C)

President Perez: Yes, if possible. I discussed this with Mulroney and Mitterrand, and they agree that it would be useful to consider such measures. But first we must wait and see what the Foreign Ministers decide. If necessary, however, we should act alone. (C)

President Bush: We would support economic sanctions. But, we would want to do it in the broadest possible context. We are sensitive to the use of force in the hemisphere. We have learned many hard lessons. (C)

President Perez: What we could do, perhaps, during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Washington, is form a group consisting of France, Canada, the United States, Venezuela, and possibly Colombia to consider the situation and see what can be done, and perhaps what they suggest. This might help things go faster. (C)

President Bush: Let's proceed that way. I'm at the White House, but I will make sure Brent Scowcroft and Jim Baker know we are prepared to proceed on that basis. We will follow up. (C)

President Perez: Very well. In the meantime, I will speak with President Aristide, and if I learn anything new, I will let you know. I will also have my military people be in touch with Aristide's military advisor, Colonel (name not heard), who is here also, and see what he knows. (C)

President Bush: Stay in close touch. (U)

President Perez: Okay. Good bye now. (U)

--- End of Conversation ---

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ed A. Hewett, Notetaker

Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Peter Afanesenko, Interpreter

DATE, TIME October 5, 1991, 1:30-2:00pm EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Mikhail? (U)

President Gorbachev: Mr. President? Is that you George? (U)

The President: Mikhail, I didn't recognize your voice. (U)

President Gorbachev: We generally say that if someone doesn't
recognize you, you'll be a wealthy man. (U)

The President: I hope so. (U)

President Gorbachev: I'm glad to hear you. All these days,
despite the considerable problems here, I've been looking into
your initiative. I asked Pankin to send a written version of my
proposal -- which I will be announcing in about an hour -- to
Bartholomew. I wanted to give you a brief summary of the primary
points. (Ø)

I emphasize again the importance of this initiative by the
President of the United States. I greet the approach of the
President, focused on nuclear disarmament, unilateral actions,
and an appeal for action. (Ø)

In a concrete sense, in the area of tactical nuclear weapons, we
are reacting adequately to the initiative of the President. At
the same time we are developing initiatives to continue these
trends. (Ø)

We want to fully destroy tactical nuclear weapons on sea forces,
on a mutual basis to withdraw tactical armaments of sea forces,
including bombs. The weapons withdrawn should be stored at bases
in nuclear stockpiles. (Ø)

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I also suggest that the other nuclear powers join the U.S. and the Soviet Union in these far-reaching measures. (Ø)

I want to offer further confirmation for my past support for a speedy ratification of START. Also, in the strategic area I will announce the following initiatives: (Ø)

- Heavy bombers will be taken off alert. Their nuclear arms will be stockpiled. (Ø)
- We will cease the modernization of tactical nuclear missiles for bombers. (Ø)
- We will stop the modernization of mobile, small-size, ICBM's. (Ø)
- We will not increase beyond existing numbers those ICBM's on railroads. (Ø)
- We will not increase the number of ICMB's with MIRVed warheads. (Ø)
- All ICBM's on railroads will be kept in permanent places. (Ø)
- We will take off of alert 530 ICBM's, including 134 MIRVed missiles. (Ø)
- We intend to make deeper cuts than those called for in START, going to 5,000 warheads by the end of the period called for in START, rather than the 6,000 called for in the treaty. (Ø)
- We propose the U.S. begin talks right after ratification of START to radically reduce strategic nuclear armaments, cutting by 50%. (Ø)
- We are ready to discuss with the U.S. side their suggestions for creating a non-nuclear system of strategic defense. We suggest creating a common system for advanced prevention against "eventual" nuclear strikes. (Ø)
- I will today announce another 1-year moratorium on nuclear testing, and invite the other powers to join us. (Ø)
- I will also suggest to elaborate together with the U.S. a plan to stop the production of fissionable materials. (Ø)
- There are other points -- I won't list them all. (U)
- We will reduce our army by 700,000 men. (Ø)
- If you don't mind, I will be ready to suggest a new Summit may be on the horizon to discuss the situation. (Ø)
- Those on the main points. (U)

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The President: Very bold. We'll look at the details when we receive them. I commend you on your forthcoming statement. This is very exciting. We will look carefully at every detail, and then get back to you to tell you our thoughts on all these proposals. (Ø)

President Gorbachev: George, I think our experts have already started their talks. They'll be able to look at the details. (Ø)

New spheres of cooperation are being opened. Some hours ago I talked to Yeltsin. He asked to transmit greetings to you. (Ø)

The President: OK. (U)

President Gorbachev: Regarding general problems, we are in quite an important phase now. The twelve republics have drafted an agreement on economic union. I plan to convene on the 11th a State Council meeting to finalize the agreement. Basically the draft is the one you know -- the Yavlinsky Program. (Ø)

Working with Yeltsin and the experts, we've prepared a new draft of the Union Treaty. It is now being circulated among the republics. There are many nuances here. The pressures are increasing on Yeltsin. I still get significant confirmation that Yeltsin will follow the agreement we reached together. I know of your activities, they have been conveyed. I believe there is a common understanding here. (Ø)

This morning I met with Michel Camdessus, Director of the IMF, and we exchanged letters confirming the Soviet Union as an Associate member. (Ø)

All this means we have a lot to do here. I appreciate the support we are receiving. (Ø)

Now, goodbye. Say hello to Barbara. In a few minutes I'll be speaking on Soviet T.V. (U)

The President: Thanks for the courtesy of this call. Barbara and I are at Camp David. Tomorrow the King of Spain will be here. I will be following the coverage of your speech with great interest. I am sure it will be received well world-wide. Both of us have a responsibility to really do something for the generations that follow us. (Ø)

Barbara just walked out of the room. She sends her very best to Raisa. I'll be in touch. Thanks for the call. (U)

President Gorbachev: OK. All the best... (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the
Republic of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Boris Yeltsin, President
Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko
Notetaker: Ed A. Hewett

DATE, TIME: October 8, 1991, 2:22 - 2:34pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Boris, can you hear me? This is George Bush.
(U)

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, I greet you. (U)

The President: Where did I find you, in Moscow, or are you still
on vacation trying to get some rest? (U)

President Yeltsin: No, I go back to Moscow on the tenth [of
October]. (U)

The President: Good. Take care of yourself. I repeat my offer.
If you need help at any time, specialists, or whatever, I'm glad
to send someone over to you. Or, you're always welcome to come
over here. (S)

One other matter. We had a call to Jim Baker from Bob Strauss,
who met with Silaev today. Strauss told Baker that your
government was undecided on an economic treaty. (S)

Clearly this is an internal matter, not really any of my
business. But I just wanted to share one thought with you. Some
voluntary economic union could be an important step for
clarifying who owns what, and who's in charge, thus facilitating
humanitarian assistance, and any economic investment which might
be forthcoming... (S)

President Yeltsin: I understand your concern, Mr. President.
The treaty is not signed yet. There were two teams which I
called down here twice, and we are continuing to work on our
draft. I called President Gorbachev, and we agreed that on
October 11 we will get together in Moscow, hear reports, and then
Russia will sign the treaty. (S)

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We understand we have the least to gain; as a matter of fact we might even lose something. But we'll sign, because of the bigger political goal -- to save the Union. As President I do have that right, even though it may be tough to get through the Supreme Soviet for approval. We'll sign on the 15th of October. (S)

The President: I was just calling because Secretary Baker had told me of his call from Bob Strauss. Don't let them work you to death when you return. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much for your best wishes. First, we will sign the agreement. Second, after your momentous speech on arms control, I spoke with Gorbachev. We decided to work in a parallel fashion with you to reduce arms. I heard his speech. In fact he sent Defense Minister Shaposhnikov and the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on a special plane to talk to me. (S)

We had a long, detailed conversation on arms control, and on the role of Russia and what we could do. You see, Russia could act as a bloc, to take even more radical cuts in the context if the Soviet cuts. That would enhance your confidence in what we are willing to do, so that other countries would have more confidence in us, and confidence vis-a-vis Russia and the Union's intentions. Russia has an enormous military potential, and could act as a separate bloc. Also Russia could provide an additional measure of verification. Let me assure you, the work is going on, and we are working with Gorbachev. (S)

The President: I understand. I knew you'd be responsive, based on our previous talks. I'm very appreciative of the prompt and positive response Gorbachev made. He told me you had talked on this. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes. Thank you Mr. President for your attention. We in no way want to lose control of the situation. Russia is in favor of shouldering its responsibilities for the good of the state and the country. And even if only eight, or nine, or ten republics sign, the country as a whole would survive. First, we get everyone to sign to the economic union, and then use that as a foundation for a formal political union. (S)

The President: Good luck. We'll be talking to you from time to time. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Thank you, and goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Carlos Andres Perez
President of Venezuela on October 10, 1991
(Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Andres Perez
Interpreter: Lillian Nigaglioni
Notetaker: William T. Pryce/Robert B. Morley

DATE, TIME October 10, 1991, 4:14 -4:28 pm DST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

NOTE: Neither the notetakers nor the interpreter could hear the entire conversation because of technical problems. Parts of some sentences were inaudible.

President Bush: Hello, hello, are you there? This is George Bush. (U)

President Perez: Yes, how are you? (U)

President Bush: It is good to talk to you again. We had a telephone problem here, so the call was delayed. (U)

President Perez: I am very much concerned now about the new situation in Haiti. I think the situation is getting out of hand. We need to consider the problem with objectivity. We may be getting into a situation of chaos. (Ø)

President Bush: What do you suggest we do? (Ø)

President Perez: I am very concerned, sir. There is lots of confusion around the issue of what we should be trying to achieve. Perhaps Aristide is not the best or most desirable person to lead Haiti, but he is the elected President of Haiti, and we have to support him. We cannot let the coup plotters succeed. It is important that we act now, that we make plain they cannot succeed. It would be bad for the region. Bouterse would win in Suriname. It would be a bad example for Peru and spread to Guatemala. (Ø)

President Bush: I agree with you that the coup cannot succeed. But, we cannot do other than support OAS actions. We cannot act independently of them. (Ø)

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President Perez: I am in complete agreement with you, Mr. President. But, we must find a way to be successful in restoring Aristide, he is key. If we want this to be successful, we must give the right signal. (Ø)

President Bush: I can understand that, but the OAS mission came back very discouraged. (Ø)

President Perez: I know what happened with the second mission of the OAS. I repeat, I remain very concerned. I think we have to act now to restore civil authority. We must make sure a civilian regime is created. I am afraid this will not happen, and I am worried about the consequences if it does not happen. I was very worried, for example, when a puppet President was inaugurated this week. They may be having new elections without Aristide's participation. (Ø)

President Bush: I agree with you that we must maintain a position of seeking the return of Aristide to Haiti if possible, but the situation is changing and it may be impossible to do that. It may be impossible to convince people he should return. If he does go back, it will be important that we set conditions on his return. (Ø)

President Perez: I agree with the idea of Aristide's restitution with conditions. We have to set up conditions for his return. It cannot be as it was before. (Ø)

President Bush: So, we agree. It might be best if we just watched the situation, watched it for a while. Thanks for the telephone call. (Ø)

President Perez: I agree fully with you. I won't take any further action until I have consulted with you again. This has been my position throughout this crisis -- that we should talk before we act. But, I want to take a little more time to talk about another issue that is important -- the border crisis between Ecuador and Peru. Both sides have been too excited and should calm down, asked to cooperate to reduce tension. The United Nations address of President Borja was particularly disturbing. Elements of his talk were disturbing. And the press, especially in Ecuador, has made the situation worse. Ecuador should be pressed to leave the base close to the frontier. The Ecuadoran military should draw back from the section in dispute, and they should make no movement in the region. I talked the day before yesterday to the President of Peru, President Fujimori, and to President Borja this morning. I urged restraint. I will call Fujimori again, and urge him not to make any moves that will fuel the dispute. It is dangerous to the peace in the region. However, if you called, if the United States President called, it would be much more effective. (Ø)

President Bush: I would be glad to help out if I can, with a phone call. But, why don't you call first, send me a flash message with the results of your call, and then I will check, and we can decide what to do. That would make more sense. (Ø)

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President Perez: I agree. Thank you. I will let you know when I get a reaction. (Ø)

President Bush: Okay. Sorry about the problem with the telephone. (U)

President Perez: Thanks a lot. As soon as I get a reaction from the call to Peru, I will let you know. (Ø)

President Bush: I will be glad to help. Thanks for the phone call. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William H. Taft, IV, Ambassador to NATO
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and Counselor to the Department
Barry F. Lowenkron, Director for European Security Affairs, NSC (notetaker)

Manfred Woerner, Secretary General
John Kriendler, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
Roland Wegener, Head of Private Office
Christine Shelly, Deputy Head of Private Office

DATE, TIME: October 11, 1991, 11:30 -12:00.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Welcome my friend. I am glad that we could have this meeting, and I look to your advice and counsel on what we should do for the summit. I understand we have some problems with some of our European allies. You know our views. We have been consistent all along on the importance of NATO and NATO's role in the great changes underway. (P)

Secretary General Woerner: Let me begin by putting the Rome Summit in a historic context. We face a decisive moment in European history in which the shape of a Euro-atlantic or a Pan-European security structure can take form. The United States is in a position to lead in this endeavor. No other nation in history has found itself in such a powerful position as the U.S. is today. (P)

This summit can achieve the following. It can describe NATO's role within the context of the Euro-Atlantic framework and the transatlantic axis which is fundamental both to European order and to the new world order. We need a new picture of NATO, not as a military alliance confronting the Soviet Union, but as a

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military alliance confronting instability and uncertainty, and as a political alliance gaining in importance for establishing and carrying out this new European and world order. (P)

Regarding Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, their leaders are anxious to see me. Yeltsin wants to see me. The Russians are sorting out their thinking about NATO. Havel, Walesa and the Czech, Polish and Hungarian foreign ministers have all turned to NATO and they expect answers from us. (P)

I need two things from you. I need American input on the summit declaration, and I need your leadership in getting Alliance agreement to upgrade NATO's relations with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe along the lines of the Baker-Genscher initiative. (P)

The President: Do you include the Baltics in these liaison programs? (P)

Secretary General Woerner: Yes, if the Baltics apply they should be welcomed. Landsbergis wanted to come see me at NATO, but because I am here today the Vice President of Lithuania went instead. The French however resist expanding our liaison program. They are isolated. Every other nation wants to formalize, institutionalize and deepen the liaison program with the East as the next step. You are the only one that can help bring the French along. (P)

The President: What do the French really want? I feel comfortable with what Mitterrand is saying, but then we hear divergent French positions. We hear the French questioning whether we are willing to stay the course in Europe. What are your views? (P)

Secretary General Woerner: The French have lost their basic purpose and orientation. They have two old fears. They fear an America that is too strongly involved in Europe or they fear an America that will leave Europe. They were quite comfortable with Yalta. With Europe and Germany divided France could be in a leadership role vis-a-vis Germany. That is all gone now. Moreover, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are looking to Germany not France. The French are looking for a new role. Mitterrand says one thing, Joxe says something else and Dumas and his bureaucracy are the worst, clinging to their classic Gaullist position. The only way to achieve any results is to deal with Mitterrand. I spoke to Kohl and to Mulroney and I will speak to Andreotti. Kohl and Mulroney said they would try to help with Mitterrand. I do not believe we can change Mitterrand's profound attitude, but I think we can get agreement on upgrading or establishing a new quality of relations between the Alliance and the East. Perhaps you can do it along with Kohl. (P)

There is another goal I want to mention, but one which I am less optimistic in achieving. As you know the French have for the first time participated in drafting the new strategy for the Alliance. I would like to see them join the military committee

and the DPC on the Spanish model. I have not been pushing for reintegration of French forces. They will not do that, and we should not even ask. But they could borrow from the Spanish model. (C)

The President: Is the difference between the Spanish and French model the commitment to forces to NATO? (C)

Secretary General Woerner: The Spaniards do not assign their forces to a combined NATO command. The time is not right to push the French to change this policy. If we try we will fail. Kohl promised that he would try with Mitterrand to get France closer militarily to the Alliance. If we do not succeed in this, it is not as important as getting the Summit to endorse qualitatively new relations with the East. If we fail on the military side with the French we should leave the door open and let them know they are welcome. (C)

I see the following coming out of the Summit. First, I see a political declaration which outlines the new security architecture: NATO, the European community the CSCE, and our relations with the East. I want to see NATO give CSCE a new push. Second, I want to see the new strategy which focuses on crisis management and on NATO's ability to deal with instability and risk. Third, I want to see NATO make a statement on the future on arms control that includes a call for ratification of CFE, progress -- if possible -- on CFE 1a, and alliance principles on the future of arms control talks. We should reconfirm NATO's central role in all of these areas. (C)

Secretary Baker: Is it your understanding that the Europeans will work out their security arrangements between now and the two summits? (C)

Secretary General Woerner: No. I think the Europeans are in a big mess. (C)

Secretary Baker: Then there is not much for us to say about it in Rome. (C)

Secretary General Woerner: We can just reconfirm the Copenhagen principles. (C)

Secretary Baker: I think the French will take exception to that. (C)

Secretary General Woerner: The Europeans are trying. You have an Anglo-Italian proposal. Genscher is meeting with Dumas. The Dutch draft has failed. It is a mess. (C)

The President: (to Secretary Baker) Do you have any preliminary consultations set up with your counterparts before the summit? (C)

Secretary Baker: I have nothing in particular scheduled. (U)

Secretary General Woerner: If I could make one more point. We in the west have been spending billions of dollars and DMs to try to help the Soviet Union and the countries in the East. And yet I do not have the one or two or three hundred thousand dollars needed to do what these countries want me to do. There is a tremendous amount of interest in Russia and in Eastern Europe on what NATO is doing. Zagladin said that Russia would like NATO to set up an information agency in Moscow. It has to be possible to get two to three million dollars out of 16 wealthy nations. We need a special fund for these programs. (✓)

The President: Have we had any trouble with our contributions? (✓)

Ambassador Taft: We have been good, but there is an over-all ceiling within the alliance. (✓)

Secretary Baker: I imagine the French don't want to raise it. (✓)

Ambassador Taft: Not just the French, the British too. (✓)

Secretary General Woerner: I am not asking for an increase in the NATO budget. I know I won't get that. But what I would like ~~is~~ is a special fund for Eastern liaison purposes: technical assistance, advisors, seminars, exchanges. (✓)

The President: We will see what we can do. (✓)

Secretary General Woerner: One last point. Zagladin and others have been sounding out our people in NATO on the possibility of Gorbachev coming to Rome. These have not been official requests. But we were told that Gorbachev himself had authorized the question to be asked. My associates have tried to discourage a formal request by saying that Gorbachev could engage the alliance better if he came to Brussels. But I am interested in your reaction. The last time I was here you were negative on the idea. Is your view still the same? (✓)

The President: My view is caution. One question is how do you treat Yeltsin? We don't know how everything will end up in the Soviet Union. Will there be a center, will there be independence or will there be a loose union? In this day and age I don't believe you can have Gorbachev and not Yeltsin. Every time I talk to one of them they say that they have been talking to each other. They need each other, although I think Gorbachev needs Yeltsin more. We will see what happens on the 15th with the economic treaty, but Yeltsin is insistent that he be treated equally on military and political matters. (✓)

Secretary Baker: I totally agree. We cannot invite Gorbachev without inviting Yeltsin. Since Gorbachev has a longstanding invitation to go to Brussels we can take care of the problem that way. ~~8~~ 8

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Secretary Baker: I totally agree. We cannot invite Gorbachev without inviting Yeltsin. Since Gorbachev has a longstanding invitation to go to Brussels we can take care of the problem that way. (Ø)

The President: London was awkward. Also, I understand the Italians would have a problem with Gorbachev attending. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: Yes. (S)

The President: The Italians would feel that Gorbachev's presence would detract from the NATO summit. Gorbachev and Yeltsin are now a team. They remind me of the old Mitterrand/Chirac relationship where one could not go without the other. (S)

Secretary Baker: Manfred, do you detect any difference of opinion on this issue with Chancellor Kohl? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: I don't think there is a difference. I did not have a chance to discuss it with Kohl because the Soviet requests came after I had seen him. (S)

The President: We will try to make a good presentation at the summit. We will try to manage the French. We have a problem on GATT. We have very big difficulties on GATT. I don't want to blame it all on the French, but it is a big problem. We will work the NATO issues and try to smooth out the problems and make sure everything works out right. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: Only you can do it. (S)

The President: We will try our best. Thank you for your leadership. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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Secretary General Woerner: Only you can do it. (C)

The President: We will try our best. Thank you for your leadership. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister of Portugal

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister
Interpreter:
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: October 11, 1991, 11:10 - 11:14 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello. How are you, my friend? (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Fine, thank you and you? (U)

The President: Well, I feel like I'm not a very good friend because I should have called sooner to congratulate you on your stunning victory. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Thank you very much. That is very kind. I knew that you were following the situation in Portugal. (U)

The President: Yes, I was for two reasons. First, I was anxious to see how it would go on the issues and, second, on a personal basis because you are a friend. I was glad to see you prevailed and that you have this clear vote of confidence just before Portugal takes on the Presidency of the EC. I just wanted to call up and wish you well and say well done. (✓)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: It was a good victory. I think it is for the best for Portugal now as we need political stability. Since we are now going to have the Presidency of the Community, it was very, very important to have a majority. You understand I am very pleased. To get a majority is difficult. (✓)

The President: I think it was wonderful. Incidentally, on Angola, we saw Dos Santos and Savimbi and had good talks with both of them. We are grateful for your leadership and I hope that all continues to go well. (✓)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Yes. It is important to keep the pressure on both sides, not only to implement the ceasefire but also to prepare for democracy. It is very important that democracy will be established in Angola. (✓)

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The President: Well, I'll let you go. I just wanted to congratulate you. Jim Baker, our Secretary of State, is here for a meeting and wants to send his best and congratulations. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: I hope that with our new mandate, you will have the chance to visit Portugal. (U)

The President: I hope so, too. Let's try to do that. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Thank you very much. I hope that with the Portuguese Presidency, we can work together to solve the problems that remain to be solved. (U)

The President: There are plenty of problems. I look forward to working with you. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Thank you. I am pleased to hear from you. (U)

The President: OK. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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October 21, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*

FROM: TORHEL PATTERSON *TP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Kaifu of Japan

At Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the
President and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu of October 16, 1991.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab I Sittamnn Memo to Pearson

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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ATTACHMENTS

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu
Interpreter: Ms. Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Torkel Patterson

DATE, TIME: October 16, 1991, 7:38 - 7:49 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Prime Minister Kaifu called the President to advise him of his decision to resign on November 5, 1991.

The President: Toshiki, good morning. (U)

PM Kaifu: Good morning, George. I am calling to say thank you very much for everything, this is why I called you today. (U)

Since I became Prime Minister, a year and a half ago from last summer, I have seen you many times. In the U.S. at Palm Springs, the Houston Summit, at Newport Beach, and Kennebunkport; and at the London Summit. I will never forget you and your family and your consideration towards me. (U)

It is an honor for me that I was able to work with you and consult on SII, Super 301, and assistance to the Soviet Union; I was honored to consult and work with you. (U)

On the basis of my reflection upon the Recruit Scandal, I pursued a political reform bill in the Diet. However, because of my shortage of capability, the bill was unable to pass. There was opposition not only from the opposition parties, but also from the ruling party. I decided to take responsibility and resign on the 5th of November when I complete my term. (U)

The whole nation and the Japanese people are looking forward to your visit and I am also very much looking forward to your visit. Today I was briefed by Vice Foreign Minister Owada and we discussed how we are going to prepare for your visit and make this a great success with an enthusiastic welcome by the Japanese people. (U)

In no matter what capacity, I will remain fully committed to supporting you. Solid Japan-U.S. relations are of the utmost importance. I will also not forget your personal friendship and

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confidence in me and I will work for the cause of the U.S.-Japan relationship. (C)

The President: Toshiki, I am so appreciative of this phone call. It is with personal sadness that I receive this phone call. Leaving out all the politics and all the diplomacy, and I consider you a very good friend. It has been a joy working with you. You have always been honest and straightforward with me. You have always worked to make the U.S.-Japan relationship stronger and I will never forget that. (C)

I hope you know how much I valued the Japanese contribution to the Gulf War, the support you gave there was historically significant and was very reassuring for me on a personal basis. (C)

Yes, I am looking forward to coming to Japan and I hope that you and I will have some time to have a personal visit. I wish you well, and hope that maybe some day history will figure out how we can work together again. (C)

Both you and your wife will always be welcome here, in the Oval Office or maybe some day in Kennebunkport, or anywhere else. You are our friends and we will not forget that. Thank you very much for the call. (C)

PM Kaifu: George, thank you for your heartwarming words. (U)

I am praying for the health of your mother. Some day, if I may take advantage of your kind words, I would like to visit you and your family and your mother at Kennebunkport. My best regards to you and Barbara and best regards to your mother. (C)

One other thing, regards to Ranger and Millie. (U)

The President: I will pass that on. I look forward to seeing you both when we come to Tokyo. (C)

PM Kaifu: Thank you very, very much for your kindness to me, George. (C)

The President: Good bye my friend, see you soon. We will miss you. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Republic of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia
Interpreter: Dimitri Zarechnak
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns

DATE, TIME: October 25, 1991, 10:25 - 10:36am
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Boris, how are you, sir? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: It is good to hear your voice. What's on your mind? (U)

President Yeltsin: I must say that your nuclear initiative has support here, although personally I am not completely satisfied with the position of our side. If we were to fully support the limitations and cutbacks on MIRVs, then the Ukraine and Kazakhstan would be free of nuclear weapons. They would only be in Russia and therefore arms agreements would be easier to verify. I am not losing hope. The discussions here will continue and I will continue to press the line here that your proposal is good and departs from a purely arithmetical strategic parity. That is the first thing. (S)

The second thing, following the tradition between us in talking about very important matters, is that on Monday I will open the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. I will present very serious proposals at that session. Since the coup, we have freed the minefields and changed the structure of the government and system. We have accomplished a lot. But I will announce substantial economic plans and programs and say that we are ready to go quickly to free up prices, all at the same time, privatization, financial and land reform. All this will be done during the next four to five months, maybe six months. It will be a one-time effort. It will increase inflation and lower living standards. But I have a popular mandate and am ready to do this. We'll have results by next year. (S)

So, I am ready to go with these reforms and want to raise up Russia, improve Russia's situation. It will be a one-time, immediate effort. A lot will change with this program and the situation might get more difficult but I think people will

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support it. If you would like, I can send the Foreign Minister of Russia to explain how we plan to implement this program. (S)

The President: First, it sounds like an ambitious program. I congratulate you on a tough decision. Second, I would be delighted to see the Minister to get more information at any time. Third, on the nuclear issue, I appreciate your strong support. We will not be having any major new deals in Madrid. (S)

President Yeltsin: Very good. I am satisfied with this and want to thank you and wish to inform you that Russia is beginning the path to great reforms. (S)

The President: It was thoughtful of you to call. Let me congratulate you again. Thank you very, very much. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. I want you to know that my two weeks of rest have served me well. I am full of energy, playing tennis, and my heart is good. I am fine. (U)

The President: That is wonderful and good luck. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Mr. President and all the best. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with the Amir of Bahrain on 28 October 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Amir of Bahrain
Notetaker: Bruce Riedel

DATE, TIME: October 28, 1991, 2:47 - 2:50 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President initiated the call to the Amir in Hawaii. (U)

The President: Hello, I am just calling to wish you well as you prepare to leave the U.S. I received your letter and appreciate your kind words. I wish you well on the rest of your trip. (U)

The Amir: I am well. Thank you very much for your kindness and hospitality. God bless you and Mrs. Bush and the American people. (U)

The President: When do you leave? (U)

The Amir: In one hour. (U)

The President: You are on to Japan next, I understand. (U)

The Amir: That is right. I am pleased that our countries signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement yesterday. (U)

The President: I am pleased too. Assistant Secretary Clarke has reported the signing to us. I am off tonight to Madrid to start the Middle East Peace Conference. Much is at stake but we should be realistic about our expectations. (U)

The Amir: I hope all will be well. Your leadership has made this possible. (U)

The President: I trust Bahrain will participate in the multilateral talks when they open. (U)

The Amir: Yes. Thank you for all you have done on this. Your leadership will help. (U)

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The President: Did you have a good rest in Hawaii at the Royal Hawaiian? (U) -

The Amir: Yes. Thank you. You are very kind to ask. I hope you will be able to visit us soon in Bahrain. (U)

The President: I hope to do so. As you know I am criticized for devoting too much attention to foreign issues but it is important to visit our friends. I recall my last visit fondly. (U)

The Amir: Thank you for your call. We are very proud of your leadership. (U)

Goodbyes

-- End of Conversation --

NOVEMBER 1991

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Juan Carlos of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Juan Carlos
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME November 5, 1991, 4:22 - 4:25 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Your Majesty, hello. How are you, sir? (U)

King Juan Carlos: Mr. President, I wanted to ring you up since we heard the awful news. The Queen and I wanted to tell you how much we are thinking of you in these moments. (U)

The President: Yes, the house took a tremendous bashing from a freak storm, but we'll figure out how to build it back up again. It's right next to the ocean and the storm was terrible. (U)

King Juan Carlos: Well, the Queen wanted to call Barbara but I said I would ring you up to tell you from both of us how sorry we were to hear the news. (U)

The President: How nice. Please tell the Queen we appreciate her thinking of us, and I must tell you I just finished talking to Jim Baker again and we are still so indebted to you all, not just for dinner, but for the lovely way you responded to conference. We're all singing your praises. (U)

King Juan Carlos: Thank you so much. It has been fantastic for this country to be able to hold such an event. It gave us a spirit of patriotism which has been missing in the last year -- it didn't exist at all. (U)

The President: That's wonderful -- a nice dividend, a nice addition. I'm very pleased. We're now off on our way to Rome tomorrow morning for NATO. It's very sweet of you to call and someday, when the roof is back on and we have walls, we want you and Her Majesty to come see us. I think you would enjoy it. (U)

King Juan Carlos: Whenever you tell me, I'll come. (U)

The President: Thank you so much for the call and special thanks for your hospitality. That dinner was wonderful. I know you have plenty of pictures, but I'll send you some our people have taken. (U)

King Juan Carlos: That's wonderful. Please give our love to Barbara. (U)

The President: I will tell her you called. (U)

King Juan Carlos: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Our best to your family. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
Notetakers: Edmund J. Hull
John Montgomery

DATE, TIME November 7, 1991; 2:06 to 2:13 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Rome, Italy

The President: Hello, Hosni. How are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Hello, George. How are you? (U)

The President: I haven't talked to you in a long time. (U)

President Mubarak: I can't find you these days. Where are you?
(U)

The President: I am in Rome, and I am going to the Netherlands tomorrow. (U)

President Mubarak: I would like to congratulate you on the big effort at the peace conference in Madrid. (U)

The President: I should say thanks to you. You and Egypt did a great job. (U)

President Mubarak: It was you and Baker who did a great job. Nothing would have been possible without you. (U)

The President: We are very pleased with the outcome, but there may be big problems ahead. We are pleased that the Saudis, the Palestinians, Jordanians, you and others are committed to going further. Can you help us get the Syrians to come along? (S)

President Mubarak: We have pressed the Palestinians and Jordanians. We are pushing the Syrians, and we think the Syrians will come around in time. (S)

The President: I hope that is right. (U)

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President Mubarak: I will be seeing them soon. (U)

The President: Who are you seeing? (U)

President Mubarak: The Foreign Minister this weekend and then possibly Assad. (S)

The President: What should I do? (U)

President Mubarak: I will explain your great effort and that there is no hope for any other initiative. (S)

The President: At least they were there (at Madrid). I hope they will come along (in the future). (S)

President Mubarak: I think it will work. They are "auctioneering" like the Israelis. (S)

The President: I am grateful to you. (U)

President Mubarak: George, I would like to remind you about Butros. (S)

The President: We have been voting for him in the preliminary balloting. (S)

President Mubarak: Do what you can to help him. (U)

The President: We have great respect for him. We can support him. We know we can work well with him. What about the change in the Iraqi Defense Minister? (S)

President Mubarak: I think they have problems inside the family. This is going to take some time. (S)

The President: There must be a change of leadership. We must get rid of Saddam and get the Iraqi people back in the world community. I hope you will do what you can to encourage a change. I will be speaking out publicly against the current regime. Maybe you cannot do this, but we hope there is no change that would relieve the pressure, no being nice. (S)

President Mubarak: Yes. How's Barbara? (U)

The President: Fine. Our best to Suzie, the boys and the new bride. We will remember Butros Ghali, and we should stay in touch on Iraq and Libya. We have some problems there, and I realize we have a difference of opinion. The Pan Am 103 investigation is still going on. We will be providing further information. (S)

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President Mubarak: I am trying my best with this man. (Ø)

The President: Don't let him get to you. It's good talking to you. Let's stay in touch by phone. Tell Butros we'll remember him. (Ø)

Good byes.

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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November 15, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE

FROM: ROBERT B. MORLEY

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Carlos Andres Perez,
President of Venezuela on November 15, 1991.

SIGNED

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela on November 15, 1991. At Tab I is a transmittal memorandum to the State Department forwarding the telcon to Assistant Secretary Aronson and Ambassadors Skol in Venezuela and Adams in Haiti.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the telcon at Tab A to the State Department.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memorandum to Pearson

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By GM NARA, Date 9/24/2010

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Carlos Andres Perez, President of
Venezuela on November 15, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Stephanie Van Reigersberg
Notetaker: William T. Pryce/Robert B. Morley

DATE, TIME November 15, 1991, 11:17 - 11:29am EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, how are you my friend? (U)

President Perez: I am fine. It is a joy to hear your voice
again. (U)

The President: I am delighted to hear from you again. How are
things going? (U)

President Perez: There are a lot of problems, but I am
optimistic. We both are accused of travelling too much. (U)

President Bush: I agree with you there. (U)

President Perez: I talked to a New York Times correspondent the
other day. I argued that if ever anything was justified, it was
President Bush's trips. I told the correspondent that you would
be criticized by other countries if you did not travel. (U)

President Bush: Good. That's the way I feel. I am going to do
the Asia trip. I'm just trying to get Congress out of town
first. There are just too many things going on that need
attention. (U)

President Perez: Great. I called you on the following points.
First, on Haiti, the report of Ramirez Ocampo was a good one. I
am calling Aristide, encouraging him to accept what the
Commission says in that report about his behavior. (S)

President Bush: Good. (U)

President Perez: But I believe it is still necessary to exert
pressure on Haiti and the people there to come to terms with
their problems. They must make concessions too. (S)

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President Bush: I'm in agreement, but the situation is more complicated than it seemed at the outset, in view of Aristide's changed standing in Haiti. (S)

President Perez: The Commission says Aristide remains immensely popular in Haiti, but we must take into account the fears many have about his return, especially in the army. (S)

President Bush: Yes, I agree. (U)

President Perez: I will continue to work on this, and have contacts with people connected with the Haitian Armed Forces. I have the clear perception Aristide is aware of the mistakes he has made in the past. (S)

President Bush: That is encouraging. I hope this means he will work to correct them. (S)

President Perez: On another subject, I was very glad to hear that you had accepted the invitation to participate in a meeting with the Andean countries plus Mexico in February. We have to nail down the dates. (S)

President Bush: Yes, we will try to make constructive suggestions on this. We consider the drug summit very important. (S)

President Perez: That is what I wanted to say. I wanted to say also that we ought to create a working group right now so when the meeting occurs, we can have concrete ideas to consider. (S)

President Bush: That is good. We are definitely enthusiastic about the meeting. I look forward to seeing you again. (S)

President Perez: Also, we have an agreement with the United States Navy to install radars here, and are doing all we can to facilitate our joint efforts to control the drug traffic. We have also signed an agreement on shipboarding on the high seas. (S)

President Bush: Sounds good. Sounds like we are making progress, in spite of the problems we had at first. (S)

President Perez: I think so too, and want to keep working together. (S)

President Bush: We certainly want to do that. (U)

President Perez: On another topic, we are really happy about developments in the El Salvador talks and think the decision taken by the FMLN on a ceasefire is very important. We should now exert pressure to reach a definitive agreement. We are even using a sentimental argument with our Latin colleagues, that we should let (UN Secretary General) Perez de Cuellar have one last triumph before he leaves office at the end of the year. (S)

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President Bush: That is a very nice idea. By the way, I wanted to mention that Argentine President Menem is here on a visit. He is making a very good impression on people up here. He is an impressive person. (Z)

President Perez: I think so too. After some impulsive moves at first, he is now headed in the right direction, and has been showing firmness. (Z)

President Bush: Well, thanks so much for calling. It was good to hear your voice again. Thanks for checking in. (U)

President Perez: One last thing. I had a call from Violetta Chamorra. Her grandson (Claudia's son) has leukemia and is at Shelton Hospital in Houston. He needs a bone marrow transplant. It costs \$250,000. I understand that there is a law allowing the United States Government to assist chiefs of state and their children in such matters. I wonder if there is a way to cover grandchildren. (Z)

President Bush: Let me see what we can do. I have heard about the child. But I have never heard of Shelton Hospital in Houston. Are you sure you have the right name? (Z)

President Perez: Children's Hospital. It is Children's Hospital. (Z)

President Bush: Oh, yes, that is an excellent hospital. I don't know off the top of my head anything about the program you mentioned. I will check it out immediately. (Z)

President Perez: Thank you. One last thing. I want to congratulate you effusively for your success in bringing about the meetings in Spain. I think Baker and your whole team did a good job. It was an impressive feat. Although nothing specific resulted, it was a good start. (Z)

President Bush: Thank you very much. Spain did a good job as well, and we hope something comes of it. (Z)

President Perez: Un grand abbraccio. See you soon. (U)

President Bush: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe on November 19, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mugabe
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Mark Johnson

DATE, TIME November 19, 1991, 2:37 - 2:43pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Bush: Hello. How are you? (U)

President Mugabe: I'm well and you? (U)

President Bush: Well Mr. President, it's a beautiful day here, and its good to hear your voice. (U)

President Mugabe: It's night here, about 10:00. (U)

President Bush: Well, what's on your mind? (U)

President Mugabe: May I begin with congratulating you on your success in bringing the Middle East parties together in Madrid. I hope the next stage will show progress. (U)

President Bush: Thank you. We hope so too. We plan to stay engaged. Secretary Baker is here with me now, I'll tell him of your remarks. He worked hard on this as you know. (U)

President Mugabe: I'm sure. Mr. President I would like to emphasize my appeal made about our candidate for UN Secretary General position. If you could please do some work for us and support him, we'd be very grateful. We think he's the best candidate. (U)

President Bush: He's getting good support, not opposed by anyone. It's odd that, just as you phoned, we were talking about how this all evolved. I've got to be honest with you, he's not the only choice. But he's getting good reviews from our bureaucracy and the UN. You see, also, Jim Baker knows him, and has worked with him at the World Bank, so you don't need to sell us on his qualifications. As you know, there is also another strong African candidate, Boutrous Ghali, who is also well known to us. But there's no selling needed of your man's outstanding

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credentials. Let me say I'm not trying to dictate who should be selected because sometimes we get accused of muscling our people into these positions. I'll tell Jim Baker and Tom Pickering about your candidate. Nice talking to you. Enjoyed our visit earlier. (C)

President Mugabe: Thanks a lot for sending us such a good Ambassador. I'll be seeing him tomorrow. (U)

President Bush: Thank you for receiving him. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hassan of Morocco
on November 19, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hassan
Interpreter: Eliza Burnham
Notetakers: Edmund Hull and John Montgomery

DATE, TIME November 19, 1991; 1:30 - 1:42 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello Your Majesty, how are you? (U)

King Hassan: Hello, how are you? (U)

The President: Very good, mon ami. (U)

King Hassan: I am sorry to disturb you now. I had hoped to speak to you last night. King Hussein (of Jordan) called me last night and informed me the Israelis had broken into and set fire to the religious court (building) in Jerusalem. The Israelis burned many papers that were 500 to 800 years old on Jerusalem. It is the Islamic religious court in Jerusalem. As you know, I chair the Jerusalem committee. This is not an Israeli-Arab problem but an Israeli-Muslim problem. This is why I am calling at King Hussein's request. (S)

The President: We are very concerned about reports from Jerusalem about the forced entry into the Islamic court offices by Israeli authorities. We realize how sensitive Jerusalem is for all Muslims and have asked Israel to avoid such provocations. Our embassy has been instructed to get back to me with a report on this. I understand and share your anxieties. I don't know if we can be helpful, but we will try. (S)

King Hassan: Mr. President, I want to stress to you what I told a Jewish group in New York. This is a political problem and should not be turned into a religious problem. If that happens, the consequences could be disastrous. (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

King Hassan: Because there are many Muslims around the world in Africa, Asia, Europe and America, and religion must be kept out. (Ø)

The President: We agree. We don't like this either. I don't know what we can do except make representations to Israel so that this does not happen again. (Ø)

King Hassan: In any event, I will be making a trip to Italy later this month. I will see the Pope on November 28th and will discuss the Jerusalem problem. Besides Jews and Muslims, it also concerns Christians. (Ø)

The President: That is true. I am glad you will be talking to the Holy Father about it. (Ø)

King Hassan: Furthermore, there is a meeting of the OIC in Dakar in December. As I told General Walters, Morocco is not a party to the conflict and cannot be a full participant as such, but as chair of the Jerusalem committee, Morocco has to be a participant at those talks. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I understand. (Ø)

King Hassan: This is why I need the support of friends. The problem can be considered only in the context of the political, economic, social, and regional situation. (Ø)

The President: I see. (Ø)

King Hassan: Mr. President, I wanted to share these concerns with you. (Ø)

The President: I am glad you called. I have talked with General Walters. Did he tell you I met with him yesterday? I awarded him the highest civilian honor: the Medal of Freedom. (U)

King Hassan: I am happy to hear the news. (U)

The President: Thank you for calling. We are very concerned about the incident in Jerusalem. (Ø)

King Hassan: Thank you and give my greetings to Barbara. (U)

The President: I will. We are still reveling in your visit. (U)

Good byes. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Boutros Boutros Ghali of Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Boutros Ghali
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Nancy Bearg Dyke

DATE, TIME November 22, 1991, 12:25 - 12:27pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boutros?

Dr. Ghali: Yes.

The President: How are you? Where are you?

Dr. Ghali: Waiting for a plane at Frankfurt for Caracas for the G-15 meeting. I will represent President Mubarak there.

The President: I wanted to congratulate you on your big, big victory in the UN Security Council (UNSC recommended Ghali as next UN Secretary General). There are going to be great challenges and I wish you well. I know things will go swimmingly in the General Assembly. We respect you very much. You will have the support of the US and my personal support.

Dr. Ghali: I will do whatever should be done for peace and security and reinforcing the UN with your collaboration and blessing.

The President: Brent Scowcroft also sends his best to you. Jim Baker is very pleased. He was here this morning when we met with Shamir. All the US people are just delighted. I hope you get off to a running start, and God bless.

Dr. Ghali: Thank you.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of
Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME November 25, 1991, 5:10 - 5:27 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Brian, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Doing fine, thanks. How are You? (U)

The President: Well, I've just been out West. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Are you back in Washington now? (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Good, I'm in Montreal, and I'm not calling about any substantial policy business policy. I just wanted to take two seconds to pass on, if I could, an outsider's view of what I've been reading about in the U.S. I've been reading about it and thinking about it and worrying about it a little bit, although someone might say why is someone doing so poorly himself in the polls, where does he get the temerity to worry about someone else? (U)

The President: Well, I'm delighted to hear from you. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I want to give you an outsider's view. I was in Paris last week, and the press there was full of it. My own assessment from the outside, George, is first, you are in the strongest position of any freely-elected leader in the world. There is no question about that -- you have both the breadth and the depth. Secondly, any of these kind of apparent missteps that I've been reading about, and I can't comment because I don't really know, but they're minor. They're totally driven by the media, which is simply looking for a fight. They are looking to reduce the odds. I think you have to avoid any precipitous action of any kind. Don't change course and keep the high ground of Presidential moral authority on foreign policy. The high

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ground on moral authority is absolutely indispensable to the well-being of America. Keep domestic policy initiatives oriented to the broad middle-class and any economic initiative focussed on job creation. (Ø)

The most important dimension of the American psyche that I have observed as a student of American politics is that they have pride. Americans have developed a sense of pride in four things: national security, national defense, a growing economy and an admiration for its leader, and you've got all four. (Ø)

The President: It's the lack of a growing economy where they're hitting me. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, but the economy continues to grow. It may not be 3 1/2 percent next year. But it is a growing economy. I think you have got all four, George, and I think, quite frankly it may be presumptuous of me to get into this, but I just wanted to tell you I think you have all four in place. They're trying to stampede you. (Ø)

The President: Yes, they are certainly doing that. It's an unpleasant time as you can imagine. They're hammering away. It's just a lot of election year politics with the democrats feeding in. We just have to get through this period. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The reason I wanted to make sure I gave you a call is that I saw Governor Cuomo, not on Sunday, but the week before on C-Span and this guy, George, is about as thin-skinned as it gets. I couldn't believe what I was seeing. I almost called you that day. This is not a battle-hardened politician. He's a guy, and I say this with respect, but I would have to question his qualifications for the pounding the president of the U.S. must take. It occurred to me as I watched and watched the build-up in the media that those four great elements that I thought Americans take pride in their country, you've got the four. It's when you don't have one, two or three that there is trouble. I just wanted to pass on from the cheap seats that the worst that politicians can do sometimes is act for the sake of acting. (Ø)

The President: I think that's right. We will have a good program based on the latest data come the State of the Union. There aren't a hell of a lot of quick fixes out there for the economy. We're at a low, although it will be up. We have far better unemployment figures coming out of this recession than they had going into the Reagan recession. We're coming out. There are things to be grateful for. But if I try to say these things, its almost like back in the '88 campaign. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If you compare the unemployment rate in France or in Canada or in the UK or in Italy -- anybody but Japan -- you will find that your unemployment rate is at least 4 percentage points below that of major competitors. Remember in Canada today, and I'm sad to tell you this, unemployment is 10.2 percent. In France it is 10.8 percent, in the UK for God's sake

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it was up to 12 percent. It only recently broke the 10 percent mark. So relatively speaking, your position is a very strong one, but the American press does not make comparisons with other economies. (Ø)

The President: But if you say that, you've got to be careful. It's a difficult period here. Fortunately, I have sat through a couple of these and perspective helps. You're really sweet to call about it. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I saw some of this. They get the drumbeat going. They start and it takes on a life of its own, but if you go back to the first principles of politics, the fundamental elements of decision-making of the American psyche, you have the four big ones in place. What they are trying to do is drive off a successful presidency. They want to get you in the mud down with them and wrestle. So, as a friend, I wanted to pass on my own views. (Ø)

The President: How are things going with you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We're actually doing a little better. (Ø)

The President: Well, that's great. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: After a long winter of discontent. We're doing better, but still it's rough as hell out there for me. I'm hanging tough. Our tough policies are starting to pay off. Inflation is down. Next year it should be at 1 1/2 percent. Interest rates are down, but still higher than yours. The policies are starting to pay off, and things should look even better come spring.

The President: Good luck. And thanks for this very helpful call. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Love to Barbara. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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November 27, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: EARL ANTHONY WAYNE *aw*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on November 26, 1991.

Concurrence by: David Gompert *DG*

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *AW*

Disapprove _____

That you sign the memorandum to State at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *21* NARA, Date *9/24/2010*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME November 26, 1991, 11:47 - 11:57 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello. How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Doing quite well, thank you. My son is in the hospital now in rehabilitation, and I think in about 3 months he should completely overcome the effects of the accident. The doctors say there will be no lingering after effects. (U)

The President: Well, that's good news. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Please give my warmest regards to Barbara and tell her it was very kind of her to give us her thoughts. (u)

The President: I will certainly do that. Now, what's on your mind? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I wanted to call you because of the GATT. I must say I am very much concerned about information I received today. I was quite optimistic after the talks you had with Lubbers and Delors. Both Lubbers and Delors agreed that there had been a good rapprochement during the talks. Then I received news yesterday night that Mr. Madigan and Mrs. Hills retreated significantly behind the lines you and others had drawn during the talks in The Hague. Then yesterday night, I was given information that both of your negotiators have left for Washington to celebrate Thanksgiving and said they would come back to the negotiating table only after the 9th of December. George, let me say very frankly that opens up a gap we cannot have. I think we should really use every minute now. I'm very much personally involved in all this, and I really want to see GATT succeed. But I must say I wonder what we can do in order to make the best use of the time left to us. (P)

The President: First, I had heard that the EC negotiators were complaining that our people had backed away from positions taken at The Hague. You ought to know, however, that our negotiators are saying the same thing about their EC counterparts. I'm very

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glad that you're engaged on this, and certainly I intend to stay engaged because if we don't, it just won't work out. Let me tell you where I think things stand. Agricultural subsidies do remain the chief stumbling block. Both the U.S. and the EC have moved, I think, but we believe the current EC offer on export subsidies will not satisfy either our own Congress or a bunch of other countries who are concerned about this. You know who they are. Our position and the position of many of these countries is that what is needed is a 35% cut measured in tonnage. Now recently Ruud Lubbers wrote me that EC further movement in agriculture would require U.S. flexibility in other areas: market access, intellectual property and services. So what we're going to do now is to send to Lubbers and Delors, and I'll be glad to send you a copy as well, some significant proposals to resolve the non-agricultural issues. This is responsive to Ruud's request, and I hope it will enable them to meet our essential need for a 35% reduction in export subsidies. Now that's where we are, and we will get that message off. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I suggest that you send a copy of the letter that you send to Delors and Lubbers to me. Then I'll look at that and see what we can do. George, I have what may strike you as a somewhat crazy idea. Please give it thought to see if it makes sense. I would suggest the following: do you have a close collaborator in the White House who is really an expert on these matters, who is really competent, because then I would suggest that this expert get in contact by telephone with my expert here in the Chancellery and that they discuss the matter on the telephone once I have your letter. Would that be OK? (U)

The President: Yes, that would be fine. If you could give me the name of your expert, we will have someone here contact him. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: And I would suggest that they get into very, very discreet contact by telephone. What I want to avoid at all costs, George, is creating an impression that I'm interfering in negotiations with the EC. (U)

The President: We understand that and, frankly, we wouldn't be this far along without your involvement. We will protect that very carefully. Ask Peter Hartmann to contact Brent, and we'll set this up very quietly. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. The expert on our side will be Dr. Seiders. But, as you suggest, Peter Hartmann will get in contact with Brent. (U)

The President: Thank you very much, Helmut. Thank you for this constructive call. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bye-bye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME November 26, 1991, 6:07 - 6:18 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Ruud, how are you? I'm sorry to be calling you so late. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Oh, it's not late. It's only just after midnight. I just returned from Brussels where I was meeting with all the other Christian Democratic leaders from the Community. I talked to Helmut Kohl there, who told me that you and he had talked earlier in the day about the Uruguay Round. (Ø)

The President: Yes, we had a good talk, and I think that it's important that you, Jacques Delors and I stay in close touch on this. I have heard that some of your negotiators are concerned about positions taken by ours. I want you to know that I've received the same complaints from our people. I doubt whether it's useful to go over all those debates. But I want you to know that I am committed to press forward. (Ø)

Let me turn to your recent letter. First, I noted that you said if the EC is going to go substantially further in the area of agriculture than it has done, it must at least be certain that the U.S. will be flexible in other areas. This is very logical. We think we have been flexible in the three other key sectors. I am talking about intellectual property, market access and services. But, I am willing to go further if it will help you get some more flexibility in agriculture. I am going to send you and Jacques a paper containing proposed solutions in the other sectors. I won't go over the details here, but let me give you a flavor. (Ø)

On intellectual property -- let me tell you that some of this language is from our experts so I can't go into the details -- but my understanding is that we only have two issues left to resolve. So, we are proposing an arrangement to protect both non-generic wine appellations and distilled spirits. This would cover such things as Bordeaux or Scotch whiskey. We would leave the door open to future negotiations to protect semi-generic

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appellations like Burgundy. In return, the EC will need to recognize our U.S. contractual provisions permitting both corporations and individuals to exercise copyrights. I know that wine appellations are particularly important for the French, so we hope that this concession will facilitate movement on the agriculture front. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Good, that's very good. May I offer a few comments here? (U)

The President: Well, I have a number of additional points, but why don't you go ahead. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I don't want to get too technical here, but I do have a few points that I want to make. First, we do need to clarify the "peace clause" that I mentioned to you when you were here and the issue of whether we are talking about a review clause or a continuation clause for the agreement. I want to send you some ideas on these subjects. Also, we still have open the question of the volume of tonnage to be reduced in agriculture, the base years, and there is the very difficult issue of rebalancing which must be addressed. I feel strongly that we need to come to agreement on all of the issues, but let me make a procedural suggestion. I suggest that Bob Zoellick, your Sherpa, come over early to meet with me in order to work out some proposals or ideas which can bridge the existing gaps. (Ø)

The President: That's an interesting idea, Ruud. Let me talk to Secretary Baker about it. The only problem I see off hand is that he doesn't have the expertise on all of these issues. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Well, why don't you think about it and check into the possibility. Let's also, the two of us, talk on the telephone. We could try to strike a deal ourselves. (Ø)

The President: Well, Ruud, you know that I'm no expert in all of these subjects. I can't really talk details. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Frankly, George, I'm no expert either. But let me tell you Jacques Delors finds himself in a very difficult position as head of the Commission, especially being French and given his aspirations. He and I have talked, and he has asked me to take on the responsibility of trying to work these problems out. I am prepared to do that either directly with you or with your representative, if you want to send somebody to talk with me. (Ø)

The President: Good. I'll think about that and get back to you. I wanted to make a couple of additional points which I would like you to note down. With respect to market access, I offered at The Hague to move on peak tariffs, and you said you could accept tariff elimination in selected areas. We are prepared to reduce peak tariffs on items of strong interest to the EC, such as ceramics and glassware, by 50% across the board and to reduce peak textile tariffs on items where the EC is the principal supplier by at least 33%. In return, we need the EC to accept

our tariff elimination proposals, that is "Zero-for-Zero", particularly on wood, paper, electronics, and non-ferrous metals. But this is something our negotiators can talk about. (P)

On services, we both have problems in three sensitive sectors: basic telecommunications, maritime, and audio-visual. Since Frans Andriessen did not like our ideas for a maximalist approach, we are working on a narrower approach to meet both of our needs in these areas. Our paper will also include a suggestion on how we might reach agreement in a fourth area: government procurement. (P)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Let's do it this way, George. You send me your paper, and I'll send you some ideas on the "peace clause" and continuation. And, you consider sending somebody over to meet with me. (P)

The President: Yes. We do need more from you on the "peace clause". I wasn't completely sure what you meant by that and to which areas you wanted it to apply. (P)

Prime Minister Lubbers: OK. I'll get that to you quickly. (U)

The President: Good. We'll be back in touch soon. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: OK. Goodbye. (U)

The President: Bye bye. (U)

--End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mikhail Gorbachev, President of USSR
Interpreter: Dimitri Zarechnak
Notetaker: Ed A. Hewett

DATE, TIME November 30, 1991, 9:01 - 9:37am
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello. (U)

President Gorbachev: Hello, George. I am glad to hear your familiar voice on the phone.

The President: I'm calling on a matter of some concern regarding Ukraine. I have read statements on the Soviet side that concerned me, and I'm sure you're concerned. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, I am glad that you initiated the conversation. I regard this as a continuation of our discussion in Madrid. (S)

The President: I would like to run through some talking points I've worked out with Jim Baker and Brent Scowcroft, and get your reaction. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK, I'm ready to listen and take notes. (S)

The President: First, I want to commend you on mediating the Azerbaijan-Armenia dispute. It is very good, and we commend you for that. (S)

President Gorbachev: We will try to take precisely that approach to end that conflict. But it is hard to expect immediate results. The differences are large. (S)

The President: I know. Now, on the Ukraine. Everything points to an overwhelming vote supporting independence. Worldwide this will be a powerful signal, really a celebration of the new atmosphere created when the attempted coup was put down. (S)

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You know our tradition as a democratic nation. We must support the Ukrainian people. But we want to do so in a way that encourages a peaceful transition to a new order, built on a productive relationship with the center, and a friendly Ukrainian-Russian relationship. We don't want to inadvertently create difficulties for you or Yeltsin. (S)

But if the referendum turns out as anticipated, then the only question is when and how we and other countries recognize Ukrainian independence. (S)

It would seem to us that recognizing Ukrainian independence could well bring them back into the union treaty process. When you remove any question about accepting their sovereignty, then they can participate without concern that doing so somehow signals their lack of independence. (S)

Look, if we move towards recognition, I would need to be clear that arrangements are made providing for the following points:

- collective, central control over nuclear weapons;
- a non-nuclear Ukraine, which is signatory to the NPT (the Non-Proliferation Treaty);
- respect for human rights, with equal rights for minorities; and
- the implementation of existing treaties (the START and CFE treaties). (S)

We will also continue to urge the Ukrainian government to implement market reforms, and to accept responsibility for its share of the Soviet Union's debt. (S)

I am asking Jim Baker to send a special emissary to Kiev to begin discussions on these points and others. We want a cooperative relationship with Ukraine. This emissary's discussions will help us determine our next steps. (S)

We will be making a statement shortly after the referendum that explains our approach. The statement will also note our desire to work closely with you and President Yeltsin. Obviously we will not say that we are recognizing Ukraine until these matters are worked out. (S)

I have not yet talked to Yeltsin. Clearly I want to do that. I am also consulting with NATO allies on our approach to the new situation. (S)

These are the key points. I'd like to get your reaction. Ambassador Strauss conveyed Shevardnadze's concerns here. I hope what I've said allayed those concerns. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK, George. I'll try to say something. What we are discussing is of key importance, not only for our relations, but also for the future of the union. It is something of interest not only for people here, but also in Europe and the entire world. Above all, it involves the fate of the union. (S)

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I won't hide that the leak from the White House saying that serious consideration was being given to recognizing the independence of the Ukraine by the U.S. -- especially because that leak came on the eve of the referendum -- that this was taken negatively. It appears that the U.S. is not only trying to influence events, but to interfere. (S)

Second, the majority of the republics have declared independence. That does not prevent them from participating in the formation of a new Union of Sovereign states. In fact, sovereignty gives them the freedom to participate. (S)

Thus the referendum does not automatically mean that Ukraine has broken ranks with the Soviet Union, that this is the end of Ukraine's relationship with the Union.

We want very much that in this subtle and important question, there is no rush. I would like to recall the situation in Yugoslavia, which has led to the current state of affairs. But, George, the current situation is even more complicated than that of Yugoslavia. If someone in Ukraine says that they are seceding from the Union, and someone says they are supporting them, then it would mean that 12 million Russians and members of other peoples become citizens of a foreign country. Crimea has already stated that if Ukraine distances itself from the Union, then Crimea will act to review the status of Crimea in Ukraine. The question of Donetsk will also emerge. (S)

We must all act -- and I hope for understanding from you on this, because it is important what position the President of the United States takes -- act in a way that does not push developments in the wrong direction. Bear in mind the advice of those who want the process to develop naturally. Time is needed for that. (S)

Here Yeltsin has forces pushing for an independent Russia, and toward a return of all Russian lands, including those now in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and others. If this process unfolds, that would be a catastrophe for Russia, Ukraine, and the rest of the world. (S)

Thus I would recall our last talk in Madrid, where we discussed the general interest of the U.S., and Europe in the retention of a reformed, democratizing Union. (S)

Those are the thoughts I wanted to outline to you. I just talked to Yeltsin. We will be paying close attention to the referendum in Ukraine. Possibly after the referendum I will arrange a meeting between the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine. So, I urge you to be very prudent and balanced, taking steps without haste, and to cooperate. (S)

The President: First of all, I want to cooperate. We are welcoming independence to guard against radical elements in Russia and Ukraine. I want to support the reasoned position you've outlined to work with the parties. (S)

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Mikhail, if the referendum goes as expected, what will you and Yeltsin say about independence -- not recognition -- but independence? (S)

President Gorbachev: We will say what I already said, and I hope Yeltsin says. Independence strengthens the sovereignty of Ukraine, and gives the possibility for free dialogue with other republics to discuss further cooperation, including political and economic union -- a political union including defense. (S)

We cannot agree with separatists who like to use the vote for independence as a vote for secession, for breaking with the union. Every state of the U.S. is sovereign, but we deal with the United States as a strong state. (S)

The President: Very true. The recognition of the aspirations of Ukrainians to be independent will pave the way to resolve these thorny issues standing in the way of political and economic reform. (S)

Mikhail, believe me, I am not trying to embarrass you or Yeltsin, and I'm not trying to mingle in your internal affairs. I want to make another point once again. I do not want to inadvertently play into the hands of radicals in Russia or Ukraine. (S)

I will closely consult with you and with the Russian Republic. Jim Baker will stay in close consultation with Eduard. We will work hand-in-hand to cooperate on borders, nuclear weapons, and center-republic relations. I just wanted to personally discuss this with you. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yesterday I had a meeting of the Political-Consultative Council. Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Popov, Sobchak, Yavlinsky, Petrakov, Bakatin, and Yegor Yakovlev were there -- a well-seasoned team of reform-oriented people steeled by experience. (S)

The main question was that of political union. All of them spoke. We met from 3:00 to 9:00 at night. Everyone said that political union is vital, essential. Without it, the result could be a catastrophe for the Soviet Union, you, and for the world. (S)

All the members of the council agreed to do all possible to speed up that process, to urge politicians to move to signing of the treaty. I tell you so that you have an idea what we discuss among ourselves, how we all think. (S)

The President: I needn't tell you we have great respect for those names here. They are steeled by their trials, and that makes an impression on us. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, I highly value this call, and our direct, friendly conversation. I am deeply convinced that our cooperation and interaction with the U.S. Administration -- which

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is only possible with a renewed union -- is vitally necessary. It is very important for the entire world. (S)

The President: We are following events closely. I am always available, as is Jim Baker, any time. Now I'll try to call Yeltsin. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK, George. I shake your hand. I and my colleagues wish you and your associates the best. Heartfelt greetings from Raisa to you and Barbara. (U)

The President: I'm under a little pressure at home. I can't understand what you have been through, but people are piling on me, so I can understand a little of what you're experiencing. So, I wish you success. (S)

President Gorbachev: Thanks, and goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of
Republic of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Boris Yeltsin, President of Republic of
Russia
Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetaker: Ed A. Hewett

DATE, TIME November 30, 1991, 9:42 - 10:19am
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Yeltsin: Hello? (U)

The President: Boris? Can you hear me? (U)

President Yeltsin: I hear you Mr. President. I'm happy to hear
your voice. (U)

The President: First, I want to convey my personal greeting.
Then I want to give you comments on Ukraine so that there are no
differences between us on this. (U)

President Yeltsin: First Mr. President I want to ask, did you
see Kozyrev, and did he pass my letter to you? (U)

The President: We had a very good visit. I've studied the
letter, spelling out your aspirations for Russia. I appreciate
very much that detailed account. (U)

President Yeltsin: I want to again confirm that we have made a
final decision that on December 16 we will take major steps in
the reform. We will boldly start the reform by freeing up most
prices. (U)

The President: That is a very courageous step. I also noticed
you felt you'd be able to create an economic community with equal
rights for the Ukraine and other republics, and a political
union... (U)

President Yeltsin: OK, let's talk about Ukraine. (U)

The President: Let me walk through the talking points, and then
I would welcome your response and critique. (U)

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President Yeltsin: Please. (U)

The President: First, with relation to your response to Sunday's referendum. We think there will be a strong vote for independence. This will be a powerful signal from the people of Ukraine, and really a celebration of the new atmosphere you created when you led the forces that put down the attempted coup. (S)

I hope you understand that as a democratic nation, we must support the will of the Ukrainian people. But we want to do so in a way that encourages a peaceful transition to a new order, built on a strong, friendly, Ukrainian-Russian relationship. (S)

My visit with Kozyrev was very good. I assured him we don't want to support interactions that play into the hands of radicals in Russia or Ukraine. (S)

We do think it would be a mistake to take actions that would appear to resist, or somehow punish through economic sanctions, this vote for independence. We feel Ukrainian independence is inevitable, and we regard it as a tribute to the defeat of the coup in which you played such a pivotal role. We also think that the priority should be on making sure that independence advances the cause of peace, freedom, and democracy in Ukraine, and in Russia. (S)

As we move towards recognition I want to be sure that the arrangements which emerge provide for:

- collective, central control over nuclear weapons;
- a non-nuclear Ukraine, which is signatory to the NPT;
- respect for human rights, with equal rights for minorities; and
- implementation of existing treaties (START, CFE).

I have asked Jim Baker to send a special emissary to Kiev to begin discussions with the Ukrainian leadership. (S)

I placed calls to you and to Gorbachev, and I just hung up with Gorbachev. He says you intend to sit down with the newly-elected leadership soon. (S)

But we will be making a statement after the referendum that explains our approach. The statement will also note our desire to work closely with you and President Gorbachev. It will not be recognition, but rather a statement about independence. (S)

We are also consulting with NATO allies to coordinate our approach to this new situation. (S)

We believe that the links between Russia and Ukraine are strong. A declaration of independence will not change that. (S)

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Those are the main points. I am most anxious to get your very frank views on the U.S. position, but mainly about how things will work out. (S)

President Yeltsin: I understand, Mr. President, your concerns over the situation now with our union. Right now the draft union treaty has only seven states ready to sign up -- five islamic and two slavic (Byelorussia and Russia). That concerns me a great deal. (S)

I will be very frank with you, as always. I believe that if Ukraine won't be in the union, then this will be a rather weak union. I told Gorbachev today, and I said yesterday in a newspaper interview, that if Ukraine will not join the Union, then that is a problem for Russia. (S)

Gorbachev is always telling me that he'll get together with Ukrainian leaders and they will sign the agreement. But if the referendum shows that the majority of the people of Ukraine are for independence, then that means that Ukrainians will not sign the treaty now in preparation for a Union of Sovereign States. (S)

That would dramatically change the balance in the Union between slavic and islamic nations. We can't have a situation where Russia and Byelorussia have two votes as slavic states against five for the Islamic nations. (S)

Moreover, after Russia, Ukraine is the largest state, and we've had good relations. We don't want to lose those good relations; we want them to develop. (S)

I told Gorbachev that I can't imagine a union without Ukraine. Of course it is still early today to reach conclusions without the results of the referendum. (S)

I agree that the U.S. -- which has always supported human rights, the right to self-determination of people, and democracy -- the U.S. cannot simply disregard the desires of a large people for independence. The process we followed in the Baltics where Russia, and then the U.S., recognized independence -- when the Baltics logically asked for U.S. support -- supported democratic processes. (S)

I think the new Ukrainian president will not begin negotiations with Gorbachev, but will begin talks with Russia. (S)

On nuclear weapons, I agree that this is a truly necessary condition. All four conditions -- I won't list them now, but I remember them -- are important. But at the same time Russia cannot place similar requirements vis-a-vis Ukraine in the current context. (S)

If Russia, after the referendum (if it is a positive outcome) does not recognize the independence of Ukraine, it will make

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relations with Ukraine difficult. It will also create new pressures from extremists if we do not recognize. (S)

So we believe it is more proper, if people vote say 70% for independence, that Russia should recognize the independence of Ukraine, whether or not they've signed the political union treaty. (S)

The President: Right away? (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, we need to do it immediately. Otherwise our position is unnecessarily unclear, specially since we are approaching the new year and a new reform. Gorbachev does not know about this. He still thinks Ukraine will sign. (S)

We will meet with the new president of Ukraine in the beginning of December to discuss the principles of relations between Russia and Ukraine. We need to discuss:

- central control of strategic nuclear weapons.
- the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory, even though this will cost R25 billion and require several years.

They have very modern installations there -- large silos. (S)

Of course we'll talk about Ukrainian acceptance of all international agreements regarding nuclear weapons. We also want to have an agreement between ourselves on the size of military forces or national guards. (S)

When I was in Germany I talked with Kohl about the possibility that perhaps the U.S., Germany, and France, along with the remainder of the G-7, could urge Ukraine to come to an agreement along these lines. But now I think that is totally useless; it would only strengthen extremist groups. (S)

If we don't recognize the independence of Ukraine, even with conditions -- and the conditions you list are necessary -- that would have a very negative effect on democracy. It would cause an uprising in extremist forces, especially since Ukraine is willing to recognize all international agreements regarding human rights. (S)

But you are right: we cannot lose ties between Russia and Ukraine. I am now thinking very hard with a very narrow circle of key advisors on how to preserve the union, but also how not to lose relations with Ukraine. Our relations with Ukraine are more significant than those with central Asian republics, which we feed all the time. On the other hand, we can't forget the Islamic fundamentalist factor. (S)

In this difficult situation, it is not easy to come up with an optimal solution. In any event we need to await the results of the referendum. We do need to recognize the independence of Ukraine. (S)

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I am asking you, Mr. President, not to reveal the content of this discussion until the results of the referendum are published.

(S)

The President: I give you my pledge. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK. Are you satisfied with my explanation of Russia's position? (S)

The President: Yes. I assure you that we do not want to play into the hands of extremists in Russia or anywhere else. (S)

President Yeltsin: Of course. (U)

The President: I appreciate this. We should stay in close touch. (S)

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, I am glad to be in contact by phone. I assure you that right now we are beginning a serious reform which will radicalize Russia, and make Russia the engine which will pull other republics along the democratic path. It begins December 16, and will be very difficult. There will be critical moments where people could be out in the streets. I hope we can count on the support of the G-7 during these critical moments. (S)

I also want to say that I met with Gorbachev and leaders of the union government on the budget, since the budget is on the verge of collapse. The union has no money to pay for the army, science, culture, or for others. Russia, on the other hand, has a budget surplus. So only Russia can save the entire country. (S)

We have agreed to create a consolidated Union/Russia budget. All republics have agreed to guarantee a credit which only Russia will give to the Union. In this way we can support the Soviet Union so we won't be bankrupt in our obligations to the rest of the world. So Russia will transmit R60 billion to the union budget. But all must fully understand that we cannot always be so altruistic. (S)

So in 1992 all republics must be responsible for their own affairs. The transition to reform must be very severe and realistic. We cannot allow a deficit of more than 4%-5% of the budget. (S)

I was glad to talk to you on this. We'll continue this practice of mutual consultations. (S)

The President: We certainly will, and thank you. Goodby, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, and I wish the American people success. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Barry Lowenkron, Notetaker

Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada

DATE, TIME November 30, 1991, 2:07 - 2:31pm EST
AND PLACE: Camp David and the Prime Minister's Residence

The President: Brian, hi. I'm sorry to bother you on a Saturday afternoon. What are you up to? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: A bit of fund raising George. I'll be going across the country next week so we can pay our bills and get the party ready for the next elections. (U)

The President: That doesn't sound like a lot of fun, but a pain in the neck. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes it is. The days are long and hard, but we've got to raise dough for the party, and get it ready.
(U)

The President: How are you doing? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Surprisingly well. Last night in Toronto 1,700 people paid \$500 a plate; tomorrow in Montreal we'll have 2,000 people at \$500 a plate. (U)

The President: Damn good. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes it is. (U)

The President: Brian, I'm calling you up to talk about Ukraine. I had a 45 minute phone call with Yeltsin and a 30 minute phone call with Gorbachev. Jim Baker is here with me at Camp David. I wanted to talk about our response to what seems to us as shaping up to be an overwhelming vote tomorrow for independence. I want us to stay as close as possible on this issue and to support one another. As leaders of democratic nations we should support

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Ukraine. I know you have a domestic concern as well; so do we. It's not as intense as yours is, but we do have one. (Ø)

It seems to us that we shouldn't rush into formal recognition without some assurances from the Ukrainian leaders on issues of importance to us. Gorbachev almost pleaded with me on this; and Yeltsin agreed with us on our approach. There are important issues out there: control over nuclear weapons, Ukrainian support for the NPT, for CSCE principles, for human rights including protection of minorities, for respect of existing treaties and borders. The minorities problem is very important. We'll continue to urge the Ukrainians to move toward market reforms and to assume their share of the Soviet debt, although I don't think there will be as big a problem there. The NAC will meet next week to work out a common approach. Jim will be sending a special envoy next week to Ukraine. Gorbachev and Yeltsin said they had no problem with that. The envoy will report back and then we'll decide how best to proceed. Regarding "recognition" per se, we're not talking about a long delay. We want to give Ukraine and Russia a chance to sort things out. Gorbachev and Yeltsin will meet with the Ukrainian leaders -- most likely Kravchuk -- soon. Yeltsin is pretty sure that Ukraine will not want to stay in the Union in the way Gorbachev wants them to. I don't know where you stand. (Ø)

At the same time, Yeltsin didn't want us to do something that would appeal to the radicals. Gorbachev took the same line. Yeltsin agreed that our points were valid points. I expect Gorbachev and Yeltsin will agree to Ukrainian independence. And I just wanted to tell you of these calls. There was a story in The New York Times that said the Soviets were upset that we were interfering. Gorbachev raised the story, about leaks from the White House which were not helpful, and that seemed to imply negative interference. But, Gorbachev's mood was pleasant, and he does like our four points. What's your thinking? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You're right. It is a political problem for us. We have a large Ukrainian constituency in Canada -- most of which is heavily concentrated in the Western provinces. Last September, when I was out there attending festivities on the 100th anniversary of Ukrainian immigration to Canada, they wanted me to recognize Ukraine -- well before the referendum. I'd like to do nothing harmful to Gorbachev, even though we all sense it's a lost cause regarding holding the Union together. (Ø)

The President: It seems so. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Its almost a personal thing -- to help Gorbachev. I feel the same way as I did when we had to deal with the Baltics. We don't want to do anything disruptive. It's a matter of semantics -- of wording -- but our approach is not far off from yours. We'll recognize or acknowledge the independence of Ukraine, then we'll negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations. (Ø)

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The President: That's what we're going to do. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: In these negotiations we'll raise issues such as CSCE, human rights, protection of minorities. We had a debate on this in the Cabinet. Some were pushing to accept independence and be done with it, even anticipating the difficulties this would cause. I suggested a more moderate way. (Ø)

The President: I know that Jim has spoken to Barbara {McDougall} on this, and I'm pleased. It is a domestic issue. But it's more. Who the hell are we to come out against self-determination? We'll negotiate formal recognition. We'll give Gorbachev and Yeltsin a chance to work out their problems. We had a good meeting with the Russian foreign minister Kozyrev. He's a reasonable fellow, a good guy. He stressed moderation, and cooperation. Shevardnadze told Strauss that he feared the military might do something if Ukraine jumped off for immediate independence. I think we can help the situation by stating our principles. (Ø)

Gorbachev and Yeltsin will meet with Kravchuk soon after the referendum. Gorbachev said he and Yeltsin would meet with Kravchuk; Yeltsin just said that he would meet with him, so there's an interesting nuance for you. Yeltsin said that Ukraine would not want to stay in the Union, but would develop links to the economic union. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: What did Gorbachev say? (U)

The President: He wants to try to keep Ukraine in. He's not as negative as Yeltsin is about the prospects for doing this. He said that independence would strengthen Ukraine's hand, that he did not oppose independence, but that he was opposed to total separation. He drew a parallel to the situation in the United States with the Federal Government and the States. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Did Gorbachev talk to you about his long-term prospects?

The President: No. Yeltsin came on strong. He said that 60 billion rubles were transferred to the central government -- saying, in effect, that the Center was dependent on him. But, Gorbachev has a good team: he's got the two Yakovlevs, Yavlinsky, Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze was a little alarmed about the prospects for independence. If Russia recognizes Ukrainian independence, the Center will probably follow suit. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Did Yeltsin say when? (Ø)

The President: I gather fairly quickly. Yeltsin will do his own thing. There's no agreement between him and Gorbachev on this. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Will you be saying something tomorrow? (U)

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The President: We've got a statement ready. I can put Jim on the phone to talk to you about it. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Fine, but before you do let me say that we will proceed carefully on this. One final thing, I want to raise a "boot-leg issue" with you. It has to do with GATT, Article XI and our marketing boards. These boards are restrictive, but they apply only to Canadians -- they do not affect U.S.-Canadian trade. They do not keep U.S. products out of the market. It's a pain we inflict upon ourselves. Most of our dairy producers are in Quebec -- 64 out of 75 constituencies are affected. If we lose these marketing boards we'll be in serious shape. Last week I saw Jacques Delors and he told me that the EC and U.S. could work out an understanding that would not force Canada to dismantle these boards. (Ø)

The President: I have to admit I'm not aware of the problem. I haven't been briefed. We've got two people going over tomorrow to see Lubbers -- Zoellick and Katz. Lubbers is a good man who's trying his very best. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I agree. George, I'm not asking for restrictive trade practices or for a freebie. This is about trade within Canada. Canada is a big country with a small population. We've got to save our dairy industry. The Canadian consumers are paying for it. This is pretty high stakes for me. Yesterday the papers here carried a story about this -- I can have Derek give Brent a copy -- the Separatists in Quebec are licking their chops. If the marketing boards go under then the Separatists can accuse the Federal Government of being unable to protect Quebec's farmers under the GATT. Jacques Delors said he had no problem. I really appreciate your help. (Ø)

The President: I'll get my guys to look into it before they go over. Who's pushing this? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I understand that the Americans are -- they feel we might as well clear the decks of all barriers to trade. Delors said he can tell you that he had no problem with these boards. (Ø)

The President: OK. We'll look into it. Do you want to talk to Jim now? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Sure. (U)

Secretary Baker: Mr. Prime Minister how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Not bad for an old Tory. (U)

Secretary Baker: You're doing terrific. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Will you be issuing your statement tomorrow? (U)

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Secretary Baker: No. Probably on Monday. The vote count won't be complete until tomorrow morning, and maybe not even then. We'll issue the statement Monday afternoon or Tuesday, probably Monday afternoon. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I told George that we're not far from your position. I resisted calls to go farther. We'll recognize independence but negotiate diplomatic relations. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Did you see Kozyrev? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Barbara {McDougall} did. (U)

Secretary Baker: His message was a good one. He said that if we wanted to help the moderates we shouldn't say no, but we shouldn't say yes right away either. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We'll recognize Ukrainian independence, but we'll set out four conditions: nuclear weapons, human rights, minorities, and CSCE principles. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: That's fine. We're approaching it a little differently. We're not going to set down conditions. Our message is that we're going to welcome independence, but we'll send an emissary. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Will it be high-level? (Ø)

Secretary Baker: No. It'll be low profile. Our Assistant Secretary for European Affairs will go out with a lower ranking foreign service officer, and he will leave him there. We'll begin negotiations on that basis. But we will continue to work through NATO. We'll look good and responsible if we can get a NATO position on this. You know there will be a NAC ministerial on the nineteenth of December. The Germans want to establish diplomatic relations at the CSCE Ministerial January 30, but I don't know if they can hold out that long. But, it's best to coordinate our approach. It's good substantively, and will play well domestically in our capitals. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: It will also help Gorbachev. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Yes it will. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Well thank you Jim. (U)

Secretary Baker: Thank you Prime Minister, all the best. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Leonid Kravchuk of
Ukraine on December 3, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Leonid Kravchuk, President of Ukraine
Interpreter: George Sajewich
Notetaker: Ed Hewett

DATE, TIME December 3, 1991, 6:59 - 7:09am
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Can you hear me Mr. President? (U)

President Kravchuk: I can hear you Mr. President. (U)

The President: I'm calling to congratulate you on your landslide
victory and the overwhelming results of the referendum. (U)

President Kravchuk: I am grateful to you Mr. President. 90.3%
of the voters approved independence of Ukraine. I recall our
discussions in the White House about the future of Ukraine, and
of the referendum. (e)

I must tell you that not even a single district in Ukraine came
in below 50% support for Ukrainian independence. And these
elections were held under the eye of international observers,
including observers from the U.S. (U)

The President: Congratulations on all of that. (U)

We issued a statement yesterday congratulating Ukraine on the
election results. We sent a copy to Oudovenko at the U.N. I
welcome any comments from you on the statement which expresses
the policy of the U.S. on Ukraine. (U)

In the next few days I will be sending Assistant Secretary of
State for Europe Thomas Niles as a special emissary to consult on
U.S.-Ukrainian relations. If you are not too busy, I hope you
will be able to receive him. (e)

After Niles returns, I would like for Jim Baker to travel to Kiev
and Moscow to continue the discussions which Niles began. (e)

President Kravchuk: That's great. I will be very glad to
receive Deputy Secretary of State Niles in order to talk about

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all of the problems of mutual interest between us. And later on we will be very glad to receive Mr. Baker for more detailed discussions to define our position on U.S.-Ukrainian relations, in particular on such issues as disarmament and human rights. We want to discuss all issues which need to be resolved so that we can be accepted in the international community. (C)

The President: Great. Those are precisely the issues I wanted to discuss. Obviously implementing independence will require resolution of some complex issues between Ukraine, Russia -- on economics, defense, and related issues. Obviously you want a peaceful resolution of those issues. (C)

I really just wanted to call to see if you could receive Assistant Secretary Niles and Secretary Baker, and to wish you the best, the very best, as you set out to implement your program. (U)

President Kravchuk: Thank you, Mr. President. I want to say that I talked with Boris Yeltsin. He said that, after results of the referendum, Russia will recognize Ukraine as an independent state. This Saturday I will meet with Mr. Yeltsin in Minsk along with Shushkevich to discuss all issues of our policy, and the priority considerations in relations with the Russian republic. (C)

The President: Very important. That's wonderful. (U)

President Kravchuk: Thank you once again for the talk, and for your wish to get to know Ukraine better. I am looking forward to the visit of the Assistant Secretary and Secretary of State. I will be very glad to meet with them. (U)

The President: Good luck. Thank you. Congratulations again on the wonderful display of democracy and your wonderful victory. (U)

President Kravchuk: Thank you again. I have to tell you that I am being inaugurated on Thursday. (U)

The President: Good luck. (U)

President Kravchuk: All the best. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 16, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: JANE E. HOLDEN

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on December 5, 1991, between the President and Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey.

Concurrence by: David Gompert

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Sitmann's memo to Pearson
Tab A Telcon

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008
By 61 NARA, Date 9/24/2010

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9139

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Jane E. Holl

DATE, TIME: December 5, 1991, 8:00 - 8:10 am
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you? I just wanted to call and congratulate you on your election and discuss a few things if you have time. (U)

Prime Minister Demirel: Thank you, Mr. President, I'm very happy to hear from you. (U)

The President: Well, a lot has happened since we last met in Istanbul. You've had elections. And I want to tell you, from our view here, I want to congratulate you on the smooth transition and to congratulate you on your new position. In these times of so much change, your experience will serve you well. (U)

I'd like to take up a couple of issues, if you have a moment: specifically, the extension of Provide Comfort II, and the endless discussions on Cyprus. But first I want you to know that the United States greatly values its relationship with Turkey, and we have been expanding that relationship. We look forward to working with you and your government both to broaden and to deepen the historic ties that bind our two countries together.
(C)

On Provide Comfort, as you know, we've begun discussions with you and our French and British allies regarding this operation to extend it for an additional six months. This operation has been key as a demonstration of what we see as genuine humanitarian concern as well as an invaluable deterrent to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. We believe that Provide Comfort forces keep the pressure on that man, and their continued presence throughout the winter, we believe, will prevent refugee flows which would be catastrophic, as I'm sure you would agree. We think Turkish cooperation is of urgent importance to the success of this

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operation, and I feel confident you will give this issue careful consideration. (Ø)

Then, if I might turn to the Cyprus issue, after which I'd like to hear your thoughts. On Cyprus, I know you share my view that this problem has plagued your relations with Greece -- and at times your relations with other European countries -- for far too long. And so the UNSYG's efforts again to find a framework for agreement has yielded what we think are excellent results. We still have confidence in the UN role. We have felt that the situation had never been closer to a lasting settlement. An agreement would be good for Turkey as well as for the Turkish Cypriots. I know it would be good for Turkey internationally -- you would have to determine the domestic side, but I know the international results would be very good for Turkey. And I want you to know that we're available for discussions. I continue to believe that with good faith efforts on the part of all the parties, the high-level meeting that we've been talking about can still be held sometime early in the next year. (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: First, Mr. President, it's very kind of you to call with these messages. I will give very deep consideration to what you have said. We are just getting started here -- we're just beginning to talk. On the first issue you raise, I will have to get more information. But I want you to be assured that we will keep our relations between us the same. We'll keep our relations intact. They're very good relations -- important to Turkey and important to the United States. In the next couple of weeks, I'll give due consideration to what you have said. (Ø)

The President: Well, please make it a favorable consideration. But I really called, the main purpose, is to pledge to you our cooperation from here. You know our top team -- Scowcroft and Baker and my top experts -- we have a lot to work in common with you and we intend to work closely with your government, as I said, to move our relationship forward. I agree that it's an important one. I'm thinking of issues such as trade and in Europe. I understand that you are still in transition. Where did I reach you, in Ankara? (Ø)

Prime Minister Demirel: Yes, I'm in Ankara. I will go shortly to southern Turkey to survey the situation there. And we will get back to you in the next couple of weeks. But we're just getting started. Don't worry Mr. President, we will do the right thing. Thank you for calling me. (Ø)

The President: Well, we should stay in touch. Good luck to you.
(U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Yeltsin of the Republic of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Boris Yeltsin, President of Russian Republic
Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko
Notetaker: Ed Hewett

DATE, TIME: December 8, 1991, 1:08 - 1:36pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris, how are you, sir? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Mr. President, very fine to welcome you. Mr. President, just as we had agreed that when extraordinary events took place, we would inform each other, I inform you and you inform me. Today, a very important event took place in our country, and I wanted to inform you myself before you learned about it from the press. (U)

The President: All right, thank you. (U)

President Yeltsin: We got together today, Mr. President, the leaders of the three states -- Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Russia. We gathered and after many lengthy discussions that lasted about two days agreed that the system in place and the Union Treaty everyone is pushing us to sign does not satisfy us. And that is why we got together and literally a few minutes ago signed a joint agreement. Mr. President, we, the leaders of the three states -- Byelorussia, Ukraine and Russia -- noting negotiations to the new treaty are at a standstill, have seen objective reasons that the formation of independent states has become reality. Also noting that the rather short-sighted policy of the center has brought us to economic and political crisis -- affecting all means of production and various layers of society -- we, the community of independent states of Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Russia, have signed an accord. This accord, consisting of 16 articles, is basically a creation of commonwealth or group of independent states. (U)

Mr. President, this accord creates a so-called commonwealth of states, including an article that this is an open commonwealth, open to all states, including all the former members of the union. (U)

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The President: I see. (U)

President Yeltsin: The members of this commonwealth have a goal for strengthening international peace and security. They also guarantee all international obligations under agreements and treaties signed by the former Union, including foreign debt. We are also for the unitary control of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. (C)

This accord was signed by the heads of all states involved -- Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Russia. (C)

The President: Okay. (U)

President Yeltsin: The room from which I am calling also contains the President of Ukraine and Chairman of Supreme Soviet of Byelorussia. I also just finished speaking with President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. I read to him the full text of the accord, including all 16 articles. He is fully in accord with all of our actions and he wants to sign the accord. He is about to fly to the Minsk airport to sign it. (C)

President Bush: I see. (U)

President Yeltsin: This is very serious. These four states form 90% of the national product of the Soviet Union. This is an attempt, a step, to maintain a commonwealth, but to free us from the global center which had issued commands for over 70 years. This is a very serious step, and we hope, we are sure, we are certain, that this is the only way out of the critical situation we find ourselves in. (C)

The President: Boris, are you... (U)

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, I must tell you confidentially, President Gorbachev does not know these results. He knew that we were to meet -- in fact, I told him myself we would meet. Surely we will immediately send him the text of our accord as certainly he will have to make decisions at his level. Mr. President, I was extremely, extremely frank with you today. We four states feel there is only one possible way out of this critical situation. We don't want to do anything secretly -- we will give a statement immediately to the press. We are hoping for your understanding. (C)

The President: Well, Boris, I appreciate your call and your frankness. We will look immediately at the 16 points. What do you think the center's reaction will be? (C)

President Yeltsin: First of all, I talked with Minister of Defense Shaposhnikov. I want to read the 6th article of the agreement. As a matter of fact, Shaposhnikov fully agreed and supported our position. (C)

I am now reading Article 6:

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"The member countries of the commonwealth will cooperate for international security and peace, as well as arms control and reduction of armaments and expenditures for defense. They will aim for arms control, including complete elimination of nuclear arms and complete disarmament under strict international controls." (Ø)

The President: Uh huh. (U)

President Yeltsin: "They will respect each other's attempts to create non-nuclear states/nuclear free zones and/or neutral states." (U)

The President: I see. (U)

President Yeltsin: Please note well the next paragraph, Mr. President (and I urge the interpreter to translate this precisely):

"The states will keep and support united command over common military and strategic space. They will work out, develop, and codify unitary command over the military, will provide for single control of nuclear weapons, and will work out all procedural sides of this." (Ø)

Dear George, I am finished. This is extremely, extremely important. Because of the tradition between us, I couldn't even wait ten minutes to call you. (U)

The President: First, I am very grateful to you. Second, we will study the 16 points with great interest as soon as we receive them. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: I am sending them immediately. (U)

The President: We will owe you a reaction -- we will get back to you. We are grateful for your exceptional courtesy. (U)

President Yeltsin: I am very satisfied. This is really, really hot off the press -- this is the latest information. To be frank, even Gorbachev doesn't know, although we shall inform him right away. (Ø)

The President: Thank you again for this special courtesy to the United States. We will work with you and others as this develops. Of course, we hope this whole evolution is a peaceful process. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, absolutely. (U)

The President: Please pay my respects to the other two presidents, and Nazarbayev when you see him. (U)

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, thank you for all your understanding of our position and your support. For the situation we are in, we could not do so otherwise. (Ø)

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President Bush: We certainly want to study this carefully. We realize this must be sorted out by participants, not outside parties like the United States. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: We guarantee this, Mr. President. (U)

President Bush: Well, good luck, and thank you for your call. We are interested in the reaction from the center and other republics. Time will tell, I guess. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: I'm sure all other republics will understand and join us very soon. (Ø)

The President: Thank you again for your call after such an historic happening. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between the President
and President F.W. de Klerk of South Africa

PARTICIPANTS: The President
F.W. de Klerk, President of South Africa
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Walter H. Kansteiner

DATE, TIME December 11, 1991, 1:10 - 1:40 pm EST
AND PLACE: The Situation Room

The President: Hello, Mr. President I'd like to bring you up to date on the Mandela visit and check in with you. (U)

President de Klerk: Thank you. You must be getting ready for your campaign. (U)

The President: It's not yet officially off and running. We probably won't really get started until February. (U)

President de Klerk: Well we are certainly holding thumbs up for you over here. Your victory would assure global security, and I want you to know that we're behind you all the way. (U)

The President: Thank you, I appreciate that. You know we have some difficult economic problems and that's always complicated for an incumbent. (U)

I'd like to give you a readout on the Mandela visit. I want to stay close and discuss these things with you and share our information. (U)

Mandela is optimistic on the negotiating proces. He perceives the parties moving closer together. He filled us in on the Convention that is starting soon. (U)

There were also a couple of specifics I'd like to mention:

Mandela is concerned about the violence and thinks the government can do more to stop it. And he talked about political prisoners, but I understand there are to be some releases? (U)

President de Klerk: Yes, we've had a breakthrough on the Bops prisoners. All but one are released. I don't want to claim public credit, but we pushed very hard behind the scenes. (U)

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The President: That's very encouraging. On economic issues, I think Mr. Mandela believes that free enterprise is the right way to go, but he's reluctant to send the right signals. We told him that a commitment to free markets is crucial, and Western investment was not going to flow until the ANC was clear and serious on this. (Ø)

President de Klerk: We appreciate that message. The ANC is playing a double game. They are sometimes pragmatic, but they must live up to the expectations that they have created among their followers. (Ø)

On political developments we are making headway with the December 20 meeting. I feel this process is on track but we can't allow the authority of government to be undermined while the negotiations are in progress. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. (U)

President de Klerk: So I share his optimism on our progress. Things are moving into place. (U)

The President: He did mention that there is a difference in terminology "transitional" and "interim." Different terms but similar structure. (U)

President de Klerk: Yes. We favor "transitional." But whichever, you must not have unconstitutional government. We cannot suspend the present constitution without having a new one. So if we go with the transitional arrangements, we'll need to implement the changes even if they require changes in the present constitution. (Ø)

The President: Well good luck, Mr. President. If there's anything we can do please call it to my attention. (Ø)

President de Klerk: I am concerned with an impression that might be in your Administration. And that is our urgent need for access to an IMF facility. It might appear we don't need it, but we cannot have political transformation without the underpinnings of a strong economy. What we need is to remove restrictions on the financial side; we are in dire need of some assurances if and when we go to the IMF. We need to know if you will be willing to support us. Perhaps some assurances, a letter, or whatever. Then we can take steps to stimulate our economy and put money into housing, education and health. (Ø)

We can't wait a year or 18 months -- which is when we'll probably go into a balance of payments deficit. We need assurances on this soon if we are to move on with our social spending. We need to know the IMF will be there and support us (Ø)

The President: O.K. We'll look into it and I'll talk with the Secretary of the Treasury. (Ø)

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President de Klerk: One other issue I thought we'd talk about is the problem the ANC has with the SACP. The SACP believes that the Marxist system in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was Marxism applied incorrectly; that Marxism is still the answer. Of course, this is difficult for the ANC because the SACP has so many of its members as leaders of the ANC. (Ø)

The President: That's regrettable. Who took Slovo's place, a young fellow? (Ø)

President de Klerk: Yes. Chris Hani. He's capable and not to be disregarded. He's the lynch-pin between the ANC and SACP. He runs the MK, the military part of the ANC. (Ø)

What is your assessment of the Russian situation? (U)

The President: We don't have a clear picture yet. We don't think we should shape the answer. We are concerned with the nuclear safety question. (Ø)

Gorbachev will find it difficult to hold on with this Commonwealth. (Ø)

President de Klerk: Do you think the USSR will be replaced by that? (Ø)

The President: It's heading that way. (Ø)

President de Klerk: Thank you on your positive attitude on the missile problem. As you know, we have a positive attitude on using our technology for peaceful technology only. We want to be part and apply to the MTCR. I believe our technical experts will be meeting. (Ø)

The President: Yes, they ought to be good talks, in January or February, I believe. I think the technical experts can make a lot of progress. (Ø)

I remain respectful of all that you have done and what you are doing now. We want to be helpful so let me know if there's something I can do. (Ø)

President de Klerk: Well thank you. The IMF thing is very important to us. (Ø)

The media could be on to this call, is it all right if we set it straight with a statement without getting specific? (U)

The President: I have no objections at all. (U)

Merry Christmas to you and your wife. (U)

President de Klerk: Merry Christmas. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin
Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME December 13, 1991; 10:49 - 11:15am
AND PLACE Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, I wanted to give you a brief run-down on events here. The Parliaments of Ukraine, Byelorussia and Russia yesterday all ratified the commonwealth accords. And, in addition, in Ashkabad yesterday, the leaders of the five Central Asian republics met. And they decided to join the commonwealth and agreed to sign the document with us on December 21 in Alma Ata. (S)

I also met yesterday with the Moldovan President Snegur. He also wants to join us and sign the accord. The President of Armenia, Mr. Ter-Petrosian, who had broken with the union, will also sign the agreement. (S)

So, the way it works out is that on either December 20, 21 or 22 ten independent states will sign the accord together. In addition, I met with the Army General Staff, the security forces, the internal security forces. They all support our decision. Today all is very calm in Moscow. (S)

I talk to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev every day to carry through the transition calmly with no disturbances. What will happen by the end of December, early January is that we will have a complete commonwealth of independent states and the structures of the center will cease to exist. We are treating Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev with the greatest respect and warmly. It is up to him to decide his own fate. (S)

Mr. President, we have also taken all the necessary legal steps to move to the market. We will free all prices on January 2 and we may be in a tough spot on food supplies in January. The EC has decided to take quick measures to help us on food, especially Russia. I would like to ask you personally to see if you could

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help us with food so there will be no disturbances with our population. (S)

I ask you not to be concerned about nuclear arms. We discussed all issues with Defense Minister Shaposhnikov. With Kazakhstan joining the commonwealth, we will have all four republics with nuclear republics in one commonwealth. And so we will have a unified strategic military command. (S)

The President: That is very interesting. What determinations have been made about the rest of the Soviet armed forces scattered in the rest of the republics? (S)

President Yeltsin: Really the only aspect that remains is the ground troops because we consider that the aviation, navy and rocket forces are under the strategic command. Basically, we will have a unitary command for ground forces except for Ukraine which wants its own. But Ukraine will have one on the basis of agreed upon numbers which will be worked out. (S)

The President: Boris, what do you think Gorbachev will do? The American position is to let the democratic and reform leaders, and that includes both of you, to sort out these matters without the U.S. across the ocean involved. (S)

President Yeltsin: I met him yesterday. He said he is essentially not averse to agreeing to the decision of the ten. He is taking reality into consideration. In accordance with the 1922 treaty, we can now say that the ten independent republics will sign the accord and that their decision is final. So, the central organs will simply cease to exist. (S)

We will have a Council of Presidents of the ten and a Council of Heads of Government as coordinating functions to decide on common issues. There will be a defense union with one common head. It will be something like the British Commonwealth. (S)

Mikhail Sergeyevich is thinking of his own plans. It would be inappropriate to hint what he should do. We are treating him with respect. We do not want to force the issue and want him to come to his own decision. We will not have the position of President of the Commonwealth. We will all be equals. The all-union Soviet organs will be moved to Russia. They will become Russian institutions. Intelligence, security and the like will all become part of Russia. (S)

The President: Boris, on the food situation, Jim Baker will be coming and I will pass this urgent request on to him. He will discuss it with you. He is leaving tomorrow. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, at 10:00 a.m. on Monday. We will have a big meeting. If he had your guidance on Monday, we could get into details on distribution and use Soviet military transport to assist us. This is what we agreed to do with Germany and with the EC. (S)

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The President: One thing. We announced yesterday that we will host a Coordinating Conference in January. Jim Baker will explain it to you and discuss it on Monday. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes. Very good. I know about the conference. I do not know if the participation is of donors or includes us. (S)

The President: No, it is to coordinate the whole thing. It will be a broad coordinating meeting to ensure maximum efficiency of distribution and that everyone's interests are being taken into consideration. Jim Baker will talk to you about the requirements you may have and then we will have the coordinating meeting with donors. But it will not be a pledging conference but a coordinating one to ensure no duplication of efforts. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I understand. We will discuss the details with Jim Baker and the type of food needed. (S)

The President: Let me make a personal observation. We have worked closely with you and with Gorbachev over the years as all this has evolved. We have a high regard for him and for Shevardnadze and the reformers and history will show they did a great deal. So, we have been saying that the republics and the center must decide on how things evolve. But we made sure that the U.S. treated these people with respect and with friendship. I am interested to hear you say you have a close relationship with Gorbachev. As this evolution takes place, I hope it will be in a friendly manner. The U.S. will not make statements saying that anybody should be kicked out. (S)

President Yeltsin: I do guarantee, I promise you personally, Mr. President, that everything will happen in a good and decent way. We will treat Gorbachev and Shevardnadze with great respect. Everything will be calm and gradual with no radical measures. (S)

The President: Wonderful. I am glad to hear that. We won't try to stand in the way of progress and cannot do that. We will support democracy and reform that you represent. I am reassured by the rest and wish you a Merry Christmas over there. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you. I want everything to go in a smooth and peaceful manner. (U)

The President: All right. Jim Baker is looking forward to seeing you and best of luck to you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. If any changes occur here, I will call you. (U)

The President: You have been generous in keeping me informed. On the press, I'll say that you called to fill us in of recent developments and leave it there. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Mr. President. I fully agree. (U)

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The President: All right, sir. Good luck. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
36. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 9/27/91 - 12/25/91

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 11/23/2015

Date Closed:	2/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91113-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0745-MR(535)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	12/22/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of
The Netherlands

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME December 13, 1991, 1:50 - 2:14 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello. Ruud, how are you, sir? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Good. Thank you so much for your
letter. (U)

The President: Well, I am delighted to hear from you. I am a
little worried, as I know you are, too. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Do you have a few minutes? (U)


The President: Yes. I want very much first to say we are very
grateful to you. I wish there was more enthusiasm over where we
stand, but I want to make it clear that we wouldn't be this far
along if you hadn't stepped in and taken the ball. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: Which one was that, Ruud? (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: Yes. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



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
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1.4(b);
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
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
The President: Which questions? (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: It was 1986-88. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)




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
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1.4(b); 1.4(d)




The President: I understand your point on that. I think the bottom line is going to be how many tons of wheat exports the EC will be subsidizing at the end of the period. And how we get there really is secondary. (Ø)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: What they would say is that EC subsidized exports have been goosed up in anticipation over the last couple of years. That is the argument that would be used by those who think it should go down more. (Ø)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: That will be him and MacSharry talking about it and coming back to you? (Ø)


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
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1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: So that's a next step, right? (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: What would be wrong, Ruud, with trying one more time with having MacSharry and our man Madigan sit down again. They made a little progress. Would that be constructive after you get the new position? (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Could be. (U)

The President: It's so technical that it really needs those who know it. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Maybe. That could be an idea. (U)

The President: I'd feel very comfortable authorizing him to do whatever he had to do to make this deal. It's not worth spending a lot of time going back and forth. If Madigan gets satisfaction as a result of this next consultation, I think we'd have something we could sign off on. Obviously, I'd like to know what it is. (Ø)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: I know they say we're very iron-willed here, but a lot of people in this so-called Cairns Group worried we will "sell out" because we want a deal. It's not just us or hiding behind Australia and other countries. I think we have to consider this because of the way we are negotiating. There's a lot of other interests at stake here. (Ø)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



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1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: That's encouraging. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: It can come out with real progress for us as well. (Ø)

The President: I'm sure they're going to encourage you in your efforts. (Ø)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: You think he might be more agreeable to some of these details? How will we leave it? That you call after this weekend? (Ø)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: That would be very good. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: You've been magnificent. Maybe one more consultation between those two would work it out. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the FSU (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
Interpreter: Dimitri Zarechnak
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: December 13, 1991, 3:37 - 4:11pm
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Mikhail, this is George Bush. Can you hear me?
(U)

President Gorbachev: Good day, George. Or good evening since it is evening here. (U)

The President: I've been thinking of you. I had a call from Boris Yeltsin today. And I asked Jim Baker to ask Shevardnadze if we should talk. I wanted to get an update from your side. I just wanted to pass along the message that we are not trying to influence events there in any way. I am thinking of you professionally and personally. I wondered what you could say to shed light on what is for us a confusing situation. (S)

President Gorbachev: The situation has become difficult and complicated. This was unexpected for me. Perhaps it was not unexpected for others, but it was for me. (S)

On November 25 we agreed on a draft union treaty. We signed a State Council resolution -- Yeltsin and me and others. There were eight republics, except for Ukraine. We sent the draft to the Supreme Soviets of the republics for ratification. We published it for general discussion among the people and sent it to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin participated at all stages in cooperating with me. Then he changed course radically by turning up in Minsk. For two days, I had no contact from him. The situation had changed. He made no attempt to contact me and so this was an unexpected change for me. (S)

I had tried to get the treaty process going. I have to say that I had information on the readiness of the Supreme Soviets of the republics to approve the union treaty. A positive outcome was being prepared by the Russian parliament, but all of a sudden

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Yeltsin made a change. In politics anything can happen especially when one deals with such politicians. And they say now that the process is at a dead end but I don't understand what they are talking about because everyone had agreed except for Ukraine. (S)

Okay, so Ukraine wanted to become independent. But it had indicated it could be part of the economic and defense treaty -- that is what Kravchuk indicated to me and what he is indicating now by his actions. So what is different? Ukraine could have been part of some of the union treaties. (S)

The process is pointed in a different direction now. So what do I think of this? We are politicians. We deal with realities and have to act accordingly. The new process is continuing and has begun to justify some of my fears. And so things are not going forward smoothly. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has limited the rights on citizenship. On foreign policy, they are talking only about consultation, not coordination. There are also illegal aspects--there is an effort to destroy the all-union parliament with negative and illegal measures. (S)

I have taken the following position. The situation in general is very difficult. Since the process is going on, it should proceed within the framework of the constitution. I will abide by the decisions of the republics. The Minsk statement was published in an impromptu fashion and there are many things that are not clear. The country was a whole and now could break into pieces. I want the other republics to participate in the process; otherwise it would be against the constitution. I want the concept of the commonwealth to acquire more meaning. So far my former colleagues have a dim idea of the commonwealth. Their experts are asking mine for help. My most serious comments are how will the commonwealth function and act? (S)

Many questions are unclear, including whether the commonwealth will be a subject of international law. For us and for the U.S. this raises questions about their statement. Who will take up the obligations of the USSR on START, on CFE and on other treaties? Who will take up the obligations of the USSR on thousands of economic treaties? If the commonwealth is not a subject of international law, what will become of the Security Council seat? All this looks like the work of amateurs. I am working on the process, trying to get this out of a primitive situation. (S)

They have refused my role. I understand this situation, even if I don't share the approach. Yesterday I gave a quick and negative statement. Today there was a positive result with the Russian and Byelorussian Supreme Soviets. Their deputies will be reinstated in the all-union Supreme Soviet. Otherwise it would be an unconstitutional act. This morning, I talked to Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk about the armed forces and what Kravchuk's unconsidered actions have led to. Yeltsin confirmed he will do nothing to undermine the unity of the armed forces. Kravchuk promised he would not violate agreements and would

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remain in accord with the defense agreement. His actions were not thought through and I sent two Generals to see him. The situation in general, George, on the armed forces and strategic weapons is under control. There is no danger here. (S)

Right now I am using my role as President and as a politician to get the process moving to a constructive and legal basis. We need fast decisions in this country now. How do I see my role in the future? If the commonwealth is an amorphous organization with no mechanism for foreign policy and defense and economic interaction, then I do not see any role for myself. Now as I see the situation -- and I think the commonwealth was a mistake -- we must have greater coordination among the republics; otherwise we will not get out of the situation, the mudslide that we are in. (S)

I speak with Boris Yeltsin regularly. I spoke with him two to three times today. We discuss specific political issues and I express my thoughts to him. I will meet with the Asian republics in the next few days. This is the situation here. I am doing what I can to move the process forward in a constructive vein. The situation is very tense. Society can bear no more difficulties. (S)

How do I see the role of the U.S. and the West? In the political realm, we need to stimulate the process of making the commonwealth come alive with real institutions. There must be some kind of state council, a parliament, economic organization to agree on economic policy, a unified military command. Otherwise, there will be a negative effect on our domestic and foreign policy. (S)

In economics, I would like to count on your direct attention to the following. We have two real dangers. First, I do not want to scare you about the situation but we need your immediate help to normalize the situation. Second, the transition to the market and to freeing prices will be very difficult and could produce a severe social reaction. You must understand our situation now, George. Only two percent of our products are bought and sold at the market. To think that the market can regulate everything tomorrow is an illusion. (S)

So I am suggesting to the republics that they take steps to stimulate producers, farmers, traders and even state enterprises. Before making the transition to free prices, we must take steps to protect the poorest part of our population. A threat exists in the productive sector because a disruption in economic ties will lead to a decline in production in January and February. There might not be a sufficient amount of goods despite the freeing of prices. We need financial aid for more goods and aid to convert the ruble and open the country to foreign capital. If we apply this set of political and economic measures gradually, we might avert a negative reaction in the transition to free prices. These are briefly the steps we need to take and we can discuss them in more detail when Jim Baker is here. (S)

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The President: I appreciate your full explanation. Jim Baker is prepared to discuss these issues in detail. I know it is an extraordinarily difficult situation. Do not hesitate to call me if you need to. I recognize the state of flux and transition. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, I think Jim Baker's Princeton speech should not have been made, especially the point that the USSR had ceased to exist. We must all be more careful during these times. The main thing is to avoid confrontation. (S)

The President: Let me be clear that I want to avoid confrontation. I don't want to interfere. I accept your criticism. I do not think Jim said it quite that way -- he said only "the USSR as we have known it" would be very different. That is a constructive suggestion that I will pass to him. (S)

President Gorbachev: I think we had a friendly conversation, at least I hope so. (U)

The President: Absolutely. (U)

President Gorbachev: There is journalism and there is politics and we know the difference. (U)

The President: Thank you very, very much. My best to Raisa during the holidays ahead. I will be in close touch with Jim on the trip. I invite you to call me at any time day or night. (U)

President Gorbachev: Thank you, George. Please give my and Raisa Maximovna's best to you and Barbara. If necessary, I will call you. The main thing is to keep the situation from getting worse in order to maintain the things we did together for Europe and the world. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Interpreter: Erika Konuk
Notetakers: Tony Wayne/Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: December 14, 1991, 4:05 - 4:19 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Helmut, how are you? I hope I'm not disturbing you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well. I am at my party convention. We are having a meeting with journalists, however, so it's no problem to talk with you. This is the first time that we've met in one of the new states, in Dresden. If you remember, this is where I gave my famous speech two years ago. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I remember that well. Let me first offer my congratulations on the success at Maastricht. I was very happy that you were able to reach agreement, and I know that a lot of the credit goes to you. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, George. It was a very great day, and most people haven't yet realized how great it was. Within six years, Europe will be completely changed, and, of course, we will be working together with the United States. (Ø)

The President: I'm calling you on that darned Uruguay Round. I know you got my letter on this. It was extremely blunt, but I think the situation called for it. I don't know how you feel, but I am very discouraged at this moment. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I have read your letter and initiated all kinds of activities. On Monday, I'm sending a number of my staff members to various cities and capitals, and I will take the matter into my own hands. (Ø)

The President: Let me take a moment and give you the consensus of our feeling here. Now I know that there is a different perspective on your side. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Of course. (U)

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The President: We got a letter from Lubbers saying that if we showed flexibility on the non-agricultural subjects then the EC could show flexibility on agriculture. So we went forward and offered a number of flexible ideas in the non-agricultural area. Let's be very frank. I don't think the EC has shown the flexibility needed to move toward agreement on agriculture. As I believe Ruud will tell you, we've tried to be flexible even in agriculture. We made some serious efforts on market access and internal supports, but it looks like the EC has even gone backwards. Without going into detail, let me give you my bottom line. We really need a commitment to substantial volume reduction in subsidized exports. If we don't get that, our Congress will argue that the EC is offering nothing that wouldn't come anyway with CAP reform. So that's the key point. (Ø)

I'm appealing that the EC make a serious effort and not just for us, but for the many others also, the Cairns Group and others. The last point is that the key EC commissioners are meeting this weekend with Delors, but they need direction from the top political leadership of the Community. I have talked with Ruud, and he promised to help with Delors. And I also told Lubbers that I would send our agricultural secretary on short notice to try to wrap things up. I am very pleased with what you said about sending your people, but what I really need is movement on the volume of subsidized exports. That is my bottom line. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. Are you finished? (U)

The President: I don't want to take any more of your time, but I am prepared to answer any questions that you have. And again, I am encouraged that you said you would send your people to work on this. That is what we need to do now to solve the problem. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I will do the following. Feiter has talked to some of your staffers. I don't recall the name. (Ø)

The President: I don't, either, but I have a report from General Scowcroft. Not very positive. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I will have him call General Scowcroft. Can he reach him in the office tomorrow? (Ø)

The President: You can reach him either at home or in the office with the same number. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: If Feiter calls Scowcroft at 9:00 U.S. time, they can discuss the details, and then I can pick up the action on Monday. (Ø)

The President: We have some problems on the Feiter position, but it's very technical. I'll have Scowcroft talk to him tomorrow at 9:00 a.m. U.S. time. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Will he be in the office? (U)

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The President: The same number will get him in his home or in the office. But one more question, Helmut. How is your son?
(U)

Chancellor Kohl: He will be coming home from the hospital on Tuesday. Then he will have eight weeks of rehabilitation, but he will completely recover. This is the best Christmas present that we could have. (U)

The President: Wonderful. I hope you, Hannelore, and your family have a wonderful Christmas. Barbara sends her best wishes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Give Barbara our best regards, and since I'm always concerned that the President of the United States not suffer from hunger, I have a package on the way to you. (U)

The President: Wonderful. I hope I know what it is. Good bye.
(U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Rao of India on
December 15, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The Vice President
Prime Minister Narashima Rao
Notetaker: Bruce Riedel

DATE, TIME December 15, 1991; 9:45 - 9:49 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Vice President's Residence

The Vice President: Hello Mr. Prime Minister, this is Vice
President Dan Quayle. (U)

Prime Minister Rao: How are you? (U)

The Vice President: I am doing fine and feel well. Tomorrow is
a big day at the United Nations. I want to make one last appeal
to you on behalf of President Bush to ask you to support repeal
of the Zionism is Racism resolution. India, a great country and
the largest democracy in the world, can play a key role. I just
hope you can help the other democracies in the world on this
important issue. (Ø)

Prime Minister Rao: Thank you for calling. I will certainly
consider the President's appeal. We are making our final
decision even now on how to proceed on this issue. (Ø)

Vice President: Then this call is a timely one. Let me tell you
that many in the U.S. and in the world are watching this closely.
Please let India stand with the democracies on this issue. (Ø)

Prime Minister Rao: We will make the right decision, you can be
sure. (Ø)

Vice President: Anything else I can do for you today? (U)

Prime Minister Rao: Please convey my greetings to the President.
(U)

The Vice President: I will do so. I was glad to meet you this
past spring even if it had to be under tragic circumstances. (U)

--Goodbyes--

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President
Interpreter: Carol Wolter
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: December 15, 1991, 12:01 - 12:22 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Francois, how are you? (U)

President Mitterrand: It's a pleasure to talk with you. Where are you now George? (U)

The President: I'm up in Camp David, but in two hours I am going back to Washington. (U)

President Mitterrand: I hope you are resting. (U)

The President: Yes and you? (U)

President Mitterrand: I am in Paris now, but I spent 24 hours in the country. There are several reasons I want to talk to you. First, we have had no opportunity to talk since Maastricht summit. On the side of the 12 things are going as well as possible. Even though the UK could not associate itself with two of our decisions, its stayed to work with us and will continue to do so. Second, I am concerned about your initiative on Soviet assistance. Up until now, we have agreed to coordinate aid in the G-7, and we had asked Germany to organize or to take the leadership for assistance for the purpose of coordinating. So it seems that the initiative by your country is causing a bit of confusion. (U)

I also wanted to raise two other issues. On Yugoslavia, we in the EC are going to recognize the two republics, but this will be based on a series of strict international conditions. On Libya, I think its time that we talk again in the coming days either by phone or by writing. Now on assistance to the Soviet Union, what are you going to do? (U)

The President: Would you like me to speak now? (U)

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President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: We certainly don't have all of the answers on this. Our proposal is to call a group together to coordinate what already has been agreed. This is not a pledging session but would look at humanitarian and other assistance. Jim Baker is there now. He intends to talk about nuclear matters as well as get a sense of their military and economic planning. He will brief Roland and others this Thursday and Friday in Brussels. I know you were in touch with Gorbachev. I spoke to Yeltsin and Gorbachev at the end of the week. Yeltsin believes he has a commonwealth going. Gorbachev is resigned to the situation and depressed, but he wants to see if he can help assure a smooth transition. So we have Baker going to talk with a lot of them, and then he will brief Roland and the others and me. Then, we will try to see that we are all coordinating our aid well. We need to be sure there is a proportionate distribution of food and medicine among the republics. (✓)

President Mitterrand: Exactly, we need to see that it gets to those concerned. In Maastricht, we planned to organize an entire logistic train with experts. We need to make sure that the aid reaches the people who need it. It is getting to the cities but not necessarily to those in need. We need to follow the goods from their departure point to their arrival point. I will ask Dumas to discuss this with Baker and see if we can see have a common point of view. (✓)

The President: What is your view of Gorbachev's ability to survive at this point in history? (✓)

President Mitterrand: I don't think he will survive on the political level for long, but he will try, by conviction and self interest, to maintain a continuing unity among the republics with a federal or confederal authority over them. But it will be very difficult to succeed. All of the republics are nationalistic and living for their self existence. However, I think they will quickly come to see that they need to get together. They have three centuries of shared economic relations and government. I'm talking about since Peter the Great and Catherine the Second, not Stalin. So I think he will be seen on the one hand as the man who freed people from tyranny and on the other as the one who tried to form a confederal system. But I don't think he will have any true power for long. (✓)

The President: He kept saying to me that change must be constitutional and legal. And, he made disparaging remarks about who can be trusted among his colleagues. (✓)

President Mitterrand: Yes. I also continued to be interested in the nuclear issue. There are two aspects to this. First, on the civilian side, there are power plants which are very dangerous. They require international experts to help. Secondly, on the military side, the UK the former Soviet republics and we are agreed to have a meeting to discuss the specific nuclear issue. This will not be about disarmament. I know you have reservations

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about this. We don't want to eliminate the Germans, Italians or others. But its not our fault that they don't have nuclear weapons, and we can not let those nations which don't have nuclear weapons limit what we can say about them. I don't need an answer now. Please think about this. These are my thoughts, but right now this is not going anywhere. (Ø)

On Yugoslavia, we are getting to the point of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia. It is true that the Germans are pushing hard for recognition. We have no reason to oppose this in principal, but recognition must be predicated on respect for international law, for the rights of minorities, etc. (Ø)

The President: Do you think the Germans will go ahead and recognize in any case? (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes. This is a very strong desire on their part. They accelerated the trend more than was needed. It bothers Perez de Cuellar, the EC negotiators, and Vance and Peter Carrington. But we are working for a common opinion in the EC with the Germans and others. As you may know, there is a meeting of the 12 foreign ministers tomorrow to talk about this. (Ø)

The President: Our position is close to that of France on this. We support Perez de Cuellar, Carrington and Vance in their reservations. They all believe that recognition will kill the efforts for peacekeeping and peacemaking that are underway now. So we are close to you on this. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes. We will inform you after the meeting of the results. But we can't even fool ourselves for a minute. The Germans and then Italians and others have decided to go forward to recognize regardless. (Ø)

On Libya, I think it would be good for our experts to talk soon. We are getting a better idea of how we should be acting. (Ø)

The President: Good. I am troubled by Libya. It is a very clear case. The American people are troubled and want a response. I want to solve this as quickly as possible. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: The main point for now is Yugoslavia and the conference which you called on Soviet assistance. It seems a bit useless as it adds on to procedures we already have in place. (Ø)

The President: We feel we must respond to the critical need for humanitarian and in other help in former Soviet Union. The conference is simply an effort to avoid duplication and lack of coordination. I understand we have been in touch with the Germans, and I believe they agreed this can complement the more operational role of the G-7 on this. We are not trying to usurp the role of others. So let us have Jim and Roland talk. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I want you to know that Europe is making a great effort in this field. Lets speak again, if

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needed. There is no rest for us given the international situation. (Ø)

The President: I didn't mention at the start your role in Maastricht. I issued a strong statement of support. I know that your role was key in making it all possible. On Libya yes, I agree our experts should talk. On Yugoslavia, we remain worried that early recognition will cause problems. I also know we have differences on the Uruguay Round. We are working hard to work them out. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: On Yugoslavia, we like you are very prudent and reserved, but I don't want the 12 to split. We are looking for a middle path. Well have a good Sunday and evening. (Ø)

The President: The same to you. I hope to see you soon. Warmest regards. (U)

President Mitterrand: Thanks. I hope to see you soon too. Best wishes. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

9135

December 16, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: EARL ANTHONY WAYNE *EAW*

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Francois Mitterrand

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Mitterrand on December 15, 1991.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *ED* Disapprove _____

That you sign the memorandum to State at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 91 NARA, Date 12/4/06

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9167

December 16, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: TONY WAYNE *TW*
SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Lubbers on December 16, 1991.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record. */m*

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you sign the memorandum to State at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *01* NARA, Date *9/24/2006*

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
42b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 9/27/91 - 12/25/91

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 11/23/2015

Date Closed:	2/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91113-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0745-MR(541.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	12/22/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9167



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Tony Wayne

DATE, TIME December 16, 1991, 4:05 - 4:17 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Ruud. (U)


Prime Minister Lubbers: Hello, George. Here I am again. (U)

The President: How's the master negotiator? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: No, I'm not a master. (U)

The President: Yes, you're the only guy who knows what he's doing. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: Well, I think, given the nature of this, that is probably the best thing to do because I think it really needs the technical experts like Madigan to be involved. Now, of course, we always welcome you here. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: What is your thinking? (U)

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1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: I think on this one it is best to go with Madigan first. All it will take him is a phone call to me and if he is satisfied and if he says let's go. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: Well, I haven't seen it. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: Let me get a hold of him and see. I'm sure that this is what we want to do. Had Delors actually sent the letter? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, this afternoon, I think about 10-11:00 in the morning U.S. time. (U)

The President: It must be coming in right this minute. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: What is the substance? (U)

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
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
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1.4(b); 1.4(d)




The President: Do you think it's worth getting Madigan over there based on Delors' letter? (S)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: Well, let me get a hold of Madigan right away. I've talked to Helmut Kohl and John Major, and both want to be helpful. They are very respectful of what you're trying to do. I talked to Mitterrand, but he didn't want to talk about the Uruguay Round. (S)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



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1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: I think this is encouraging. I am grateful to you. What is the best for you on timing? What place and time are best for you? (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I would say Wednesday or Thursday of this week. It's Monday now, isn't it? If we could make that, it is the best. (C)

The President: Is it best in The Hague? (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: The Hague or Brussels. The distances here are small, so that I could fly as well to Geneva. Also, psychologically what he (Madigan) likes the most. He is most welcome in The Hague, and MacSharry is most welcome as well. (C)

The President: Let me get right back to you, and once again, I'm grateful to you. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9414

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION .

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir
Notetaker: Richard Haass

DATE, TIME December 16, 1991, 5:11 p.m. - 5:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Shamir initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: How are you? I am very pleased with the way it went in New York. It is a great achievement for you. We had a lot of help. The vote was overwhelming. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: All of our people remember your speech. (U)

The President: Our people worked hard but had tremendous help. I am so pleased for Israel. This removed a scar that should not have ever been there. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: We are so very grateful. I want personally to express our thanks and appreciation. (U)

The President: Thank you. It was a team effort. I'd like to say publicly that you called to express your appreciation to the United States. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you again and God bless you. (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9199

December 18, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

FROM: JOHN F. MCSHANE *JMC*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Carlos Andres Perez

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela on December 17, 1991. At Tab I is a transmittal memorandum to the State Department forwarding the telcon to Assistant Secretary Aronson and Ambassadors Skol in Venezuela and Adams in Haiti.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the telcon at Tab A to the State Department.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *✓* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memorandum to Pearson

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CE1 NARA, Date 9/24/2010

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela on December 17, 1991 (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela
Interpreter: Stephanie Van Reigersberg
Notetaker: John F. McShane

DATE, TIME: December 17, 1991, 3:21 - 3:55pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: CAP, how are you? (S)

President Perez: What a pleasure to hear from you, Mr. President. (S)

The President: How are you doing? (S)

President Perez: I'm fine, thank you. I was waiting to call you about the situation in Haiti until I had a clear picture of the situation there. Now I can give a definitive picture. (S)

The President: Please do. (S)

President Perez: I think we have reached a decisive moment and there is a great risk of violence exploding if a decision is not taken quickly. After all the work your people have done, and Aronson has done extraordinary work on the issue for several weeks--without the work of the United States we would have failed--now we have reached a difficulty that I think requires your (personal) intervention to resolve. (S)

The President: Okay. (S)

President Perez: First, I want to tell you that Aristide has changed a great deal during his stay here in Caracas. He recognizes his mistakes of the past and is no longer an intransigent man. (S)

However, we still have one big difficulty in choosing a new Prime Minister. Despite all the efforts of your Ambassador and Aronson, the whole process has become stuck. The problem is that despite the fact that Bazin is the most competent person in Haiti, he is not the appropriate choice for Prime Minister. (S)

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The fact that he went on TV after the coup in support of it and his enmity toward Aristide have undercut his possibilities. It really is impossible for Aristide to accept him and even more impossible for the friends of Aristide in Haiti to accept him. And if we continue to insist on him we will be wasting our time completely. (S)

The case of Victor Benoit as the Prime Minister does not seem possible either--although he has support from 47 people in the lower house, he has the support of only 12 of 29 in the upper house. (S)

In my talks with the OAS Commission and its Chairman, Ramirez Ocampo, we concluded that we have to go back to Rene Theodore who was under consideration at the outset. (S)

At the beginning Aristide would not accept Theodore because Theodore was head of the Communist Party--and Aristide thought it (putting Theodore's name forward) was a trap to show that he was being intransigent. So we have convinced Aristide to accept Theodore and Ramirez Ocampo is prepared to ask the Congress to propose him to Aristide. (S)

The President: You're talking of Theodore? (S)

President Perez: Yes, Theodore. The problem is that your Ambassador Adams keeps on insisting that Bazin must be the candidate because he is the only one the Army will accept. I spoke with Adams at great length on Saturday and I realized that he is extremely tough, and does not want to accept anyone except Bazin. (S)

He keeps saying that Bazin is the only person that the Army will accept but this position is not acceptable because we cannot let the Army dictate the entire process. The problem is that we cannot just go on talking--as I know you know, two of Aristide's supporters were killed on Sunday and they set fire to Aristide's house and Aristide's mother's house. (S)

My proposal is that the OAS go immediately to Port-au-Prince and stay there until a solution is made because a catastrophe is impending. The chairman of the OAS Commission--Ramirez Ocampo--agrees with this solution and is only awaiting your opinion before going. He also understands that there is no time to waste and that the situation is very dangerous. (S)

Finally, I would like to say to you, Mr. President, with all sincerity, that this is indeed the best solution. I'm sure Aronson would agree with me. I think that he has worked so well. I think that perhaps Ambassador Adams has a different position. (S)

The President: Well, let me make a couple of comments. First, we are grateful to you for your leadership and interest in getting a solution. We totally agree on the urgency of getting this situation solved now. (S)

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And we agree that after we reach agreement on a Prime Minister the OAS should go right away. But it is fundamental that the Prime Minister be acceptable to the Army as well as the Parliament. (S)

You are right that we strongly support Bazin as the most able man and the only person with the capacity to ensure the military and the opposition. Clearly we need a Prime Minister who can assure that if Aristide comes back there won't be another coup within a matter of days. Thus our preference is to propose Bazin and get Aristide to compromise. Even though he supported the coup and--what was the second thing you mentioned--and that there is enmity between him and Aristide, in spite of that he is still our first choice. (S)

However, on Theodore we have problems with his Communist past, but understand he may have changed his stripes. He reportedly now talks free-market economics and privatization. But we don't believe that he has support in the rank and file of the army even though he stood up to Aristide on human rights abuses. (S)

But, we are not going to stand in the way of Theodore if he has wide spread support, and we have assurances from somewhere that he will have the support of the Congress and the military so that there won't be another coup three days later. I don't think you want a Prime Minister who will be gone in two or three days. (S)

My question to you, CAP, my friend, is how can we demonstrate that Theodore has that support? (S)

President Perez: Mr. President, I agree with you that the best solution was to have Bazin as Prime Minister. He is the only Haitian I know who has clear ideas about the situation there and what to do about it. I've spoken to him various times in the past. I had a long conversation with Aristide the day of his inauguration and that day urged him to work closely with Bazin. I got President Carter to do the same, but unfortunately we didn't succeed. (S)

And then there developed a profound dislike between the two men. (S)

I think you will recall that in Caracas I told you that it was too bad that Bazin wouldn't win because it would be better for him to win, but now my dear friend, we are confronting realities and must address them. I wouldn't be pressing you if I thought there was another way out. (S)

On Theodore, I am basing my arguments on the same information that Aronson has. Of course I don't have the information to guarantee that the military will accept him but Aronson did include him two weeks ago among the people the Army might accept. (S)

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The person who was against him was Aristide. Aristide was against him because he was a Communist, and it hasn't been easy to get Aristide to accept him. Ramirez Ocampo does think he will get the necessary support. (S)

The President: From both the Congress and the Army? (S)

President Perez: Yes, but of course we need strong support from you, and someone to adopt a very strong position there--either Adams or someone you would send down there to push the army. (S)

I want to tell you that I found Adams tough, inflexible, stubborn. I talked with him at Aronson's suggestion but I couldn't change his position by a millimeter. I know that he had a tough job. I don't know if you want to send someone else like Mr. Kozak who worked on the Panama problem to help Adams carry out the new demarche. I'm convinced this is a very tough job. (S)

The President: But CAP, do you see the job as trying to get the OAS to convince the Congress and the Army to accept Theodore? Is that the next step? (S)

President Perez: The next step is that the OAS Commission--Mr. Ramirez Ocampo--would leave tomorrow. He is ready to do this. And then the Commission begins by dealing with Congress first--and the Congress would exert pressure on the Army which at one point in the past did not object to Theodore. Although I'm still convinced strong pressure needs to be put on the Armed Forces. (S)

Then I think the success of the enterprise depends on actions of a group led by you, the Canadians, and Venezuela. (S)

The President: Let me get Scowcroft to check with Aronson--Baker is out of town--if Theodore is acceptable to the military and Parliament, we will reluctantly go along. (S)

President Perez: Magnificent, Mr. President. That is all I could ask for. That's all I wanted to ask for. I will talk with Aronson. I get along with him well. (S)

The President: That's fine, but I'm not sure what the next step is. If we have to sell the military on Theodore that could be difficult. (S)

President Perez: Mr. President, you have done things much more difficult.

The President: Let us get back to Aronson. Are you in Caracas? Aronson will call. (S)

President Perez: Yes, I'm here in Caracas. (S)

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The President: My bottom line is that, if Theodore is acceptable to the army and Congress, we will reluctantly go along with the deal. I find it difficult to go along with a Communist. Let's hope like hell he isn't one. (S)

President Perez: It's even harder for Father Aristide. (S)

The President: Of course, as you know, we think he is a difficult person. What is important for us is the principle. A democratically elected leader should not be thrown out, but this political leader doesn't inspire great confidence. (S)

President Perez: We agree on that, Mr. President, although I assure you I have engaged in a serious teaching exercise here in Caracas that was difficult but very successful and he has learned alot. (S)

The President: Yes, let me get working on this up here now and we'll get back to you soon. (S)

President Perez: George, let me wish you and Barbara a very Merry Christmas. (S)

The President: Feliz Navidad. (S)

President Perez: Merry Christmas and see you soon. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister
of Japan on December 20, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Torkel Patterson, NSC

DATE, TIME: December 20, 1991, 7:30 am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello Kiichi. How are you?

PM Miyazawa: Yes Sir, Mr. President. How are you?

The President: Very glad to hear from you sir. I'm looking forward to my visit. I think it is an important time. I want to talk politician to politician if I may.

PM Miyazawa: Which we are.

The President: Yes, we are, aren't we? You know there's a bad economic mood here in this country with our economy struggling and its threatening my efforts to take a firm stand against protectionism here.

Perhaps Mike Armacost has told you, I'm sending a small team ahead with a message relative to the trade side.

PM Miyazawa: Oh, you are?

The President: Yes, I hope you'll be able to give them a little of your time. Its important. Baker's right hand man, Zoellick and others will be there so there can be no disconnect on the trip.

PM Miyazawa: Yes, I'll be happy to receive them.

The President: I know it's a bad time but we'll try to work it so it's most convenient for you.

PM Miyazawa: It's alright.

The President: Zoellick knows my heartbeat on this one. I hope you get some rest over the holiday season.

PM Miyazawa: I'm looking forward to seeing you.

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The President: Same to you, wishing you well. American people wish you the best. We're working hard for a successful trip.

PM Miyazawa: I wish you well. Merry Christmas in the meantime.

The President: Thank you. Thank you sir for taking my call.

PM Miyazawa: Thank you Mr. President. Have a long, nice trip and we will extend the red carpet for you when you get to Japan.

The President: Goodbye.

PM Miyazawa: Goodbye.

---- End of Conversation ----

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS THE PRESIDENT
 PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
 INTERPRETER: DMITRI ZARECHNAK
 NOTETAKER: NICHOLAS BURNS, NSC STAFF

DATE, TIME December 23, 1991, 8:08 a.m. - 8:31 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. Merry Christmas. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Mr. President. I also wish you a Merry Christmas and a good new year. I would like to inform you about the results of the Alma Ata agreements. (U)

The President: I am anxious to hear about it, Boris. Thank you, sir. (U)

President Yeltsin: In the first place, eleven heads of state met in Alma Ata, and there were heads of government as well. So, out of the fifteen republics, only the three Baltic states and Georgia were absent. And though Gamsakhurdiya wants to join, we will not accept him because of the human rights situation -- he has violated human rights in Georgia and persecuted minority groups. (S)

We worked through Saturday and adopted a number of serious documents. The first of them is the Alma Ata declaration. This declaration contains provisions on respect for human rights, basic human freedoms, the territorial integrity of all states, and responsibility for preserving the civil peace. There are general provisions signifying agreed upon international principles to establish a commonwealth of independent states. As a protocol to the December 8 Minsk documents, it states that eight new independent states have joined the three original members. So, all eleven republics recognized the fundamental principles of the documents. (S)

The agreement also adopts the establishment of coordinated authorities. The supreme body will be the Council of Heads of State. We also established a Council of Heads of Government. We agreed that the heads of state will meet on December 30 in Minsk to decide on joint instruments for the commonwealth. (S)

There is a short protocol which reads (Yeltsin proceeded to read the protocol): Proceeding from the Minsk agreement and the Alma Ata Declaration, the unified military command will be preserved as will the unique strategic space. Unified control of nuclear forces and their command is given to Marshal Shaposhnikov until

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military reform issues are decided. Specific military reform proposals must be made by December 30. (S)

The next document also discusses nuclear weapons. It is a long, two and a half page document so I will not read it to you. It says that all eleven will join together to maintain all the arms control treaties signed by the USSR. This document, however, was signed only by the four heads of state of republics with nuclear weapons. It reaffirmed the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons. It agreed that only the Russian President will control the nuclear button after consultations with the three others. The President of Russia will make the nuclear decision through the Commander-in-Chief. The President of the Union will pass his responsibility in this area to the President of Russia and will resign on December 25. He will do this in the presence of Shaposhnikov. (S)

The Ukraine and Byelorussia commit to be non-nuclear states. They agree to eliminate all strategic weapons on their territory and all tactical nuclear weapons by July 1, 1992. There will be some strategic weapons maintained in Kazakhstan. Other weapons will be brought to Russia for destruction. The START treaty will be submitted for ratification in the four parliaments of the nuclear states on the same day and it will be ratified per international standards. I believe that this is one of the most important aspects internationally -- that the nuclear weapons will be controlled in only one place. (S)

The President: I agree with that. (U)

President Yeltsin: It was also decided in the Council of Heads of State that every state should resolve its UN membership issue independently. At the same time, it was agreed and signed by all heads of state, including Ukraine and Byelorussia, that the legal successor for the UNSC seat should be Russia. I would ask you, Mr. President, to use your authority to support this decision so that Russia can inherit the Soviet seat at the UNSC. (S)

All eleven heads of state made a joint decision on remuneration for Gorbachev in the future. This will include money, medical insurance and treatment, a country house, guards and transportation. All this will be provided by the government of Russia. Gorbachev is satisfied. As we agreed with you, we are thus trying to show respect for him. I repeat that he is satisfied and I have already signed the decree on all these matters. After President Gorbachev announces his resignation on December 25, nuclear control will be passed to the President of Russia in the presence of Shaposhnikov. There will be no single second break in control of the button. (S)

The President: Very good. (U)

President Yeltsin: All processes are peaceful. There will be no disturbances and our Alma Ata meeting was held in a general atmosphere of mutual understanding. I would like to assure you--we will have no explosive processes here. The past union will

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make the transition to a commonwealth of independent nations. Together with Gorbachev, we have signed the decrees that all central authority will cease functioning as of January 2. (U)

That is what I wanted to say to you, Mr. President. Also, I would ask you to step up your food contributions. The situation is dramatic. (U)

The President: First, let me thank you for this thorough and timely and essentially encouraging report. We will be consulting on the UN issue as soon as I talk to Jim Baker. I hear your appeal on food. We will try to do everything we can and move as fast as possible. (U)

Because of our respect for Gorbachev and the history of our relations with him, I appreciate on a personal basis the arrangements for him. You didn't mention the economic reform plan, but we are obviously interested in that. I would like to commend you on the way you have led the peaceful evolution of the commonwealth. Let me say, in particular, that I am interested in and pleased by the way the nuclear question has been handled. The whole world is interested in that. (U)

But, in any event, thank you for this call. I will not comment on each point. We want to help with the republics as they become independent and begin to set their own destinies. As you know, Jim Baker is just back. I saw him briefly yesterday and will share this call with him. I will be sure the U.S. Government is well coordinated on all these developments. (U)

And now if it is not presumptuous, I would like to conclude with some personal advice. You have been working very hard and travelling a lot. Please take care of your health. I want to wish you well and urge you to take care of yourself and don't get too tired. So, good luck. (U)

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, thank you very much for your understanding and generosity. I believe, Mr. President, that it will not take too long for the U.S. to recognize the independence of Russia. I also believe that, at some point, there is a need for a meeting between us. (U)

The President: That would be very constructive, to answer in principle. Of course we would want to do that. On recognition, we will move rapidly and I will discuss this with Jim Baker today. Good luck to you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much for your attention. We should keep each other updated on the evolution of the situation. Thank you for your personal involvement and all the best for a Merry Christmas to you, your family and your colleagues. (U)

The President: Thank you. Over and out. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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December 26, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Gorbachev on December 25, 1991.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 81 NARA, Date 9/24/2010

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/26

Bill Sittmann

Given the nature of this conversation, I don't believe it should be circulated interagency.

But I would suggest sending it to Baker and Cheney -- eyes only.

Mick

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Interpreter: Dmitri Zarechnak
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: December 25, 1991, 10:03 - 10:25 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Mikhail. (U)

President Gorbachev: George, my dear friend. It is good to hear your voice. (U)

The President: I greet you on this momentous day, this historic day. I appreciate your calling me. (U)

President Gorbachev: Let me begin by saying something pleasant to you: Merry Christmas to you, Barbara and your family. I had been thinking about when to make my statement, Tuesday or today. I finally decided to do it today, at the end of the day. So let me say first Merry Christmas and very best wishes. (U)

Well, let me say that in about two hours I will speak on Moscow TV and will make a short statement about my decision. I have sent a letter to you, George. I hope you will receive it shortly. I said in the letter a most important thing. And I would like to reaffirm to you that I greatly value what we did working together with you, first as Vice President and then as President of the United States. I hope that all leaders of the Commonwealth and, above all, Russia understand what kind of assets we have accrued between the leaders of our two countries. I hope they understand their responsibility to preserve and expand this important source of capital. (U)

The debate in our union on what kind of state to create took a different track from what I thought right. But let me say that I will use my political authority and role to make sure that this new commonwealth will be effective. I am pleased that already at Alma-Ata the leaders of the commonwealth worked out important nuclear and strategic agreements. I hope that in Minsk they will

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take decisions on other questions to assure a mechanism of cooperation among republics. (S)

George, let me say something to you that I regard as very important. (U)

The President: Okay. (U)

President Gorbachev: Of course, it is necessary to move to recognize all of these countries. But I would like you to bear in mind the importance for the future of the commonwealth that the process of disintegration and destruction does not grow worse. So, helping the process of cooperation among republics is our common duty. I would really like to emphasize this to you. (S)

Now, about Russia--this is the second most important emphasis in our conversations. I have here on my desk a decree of the President of the USSR on my resignation. I will also resign my duties as Commander-in-Chief and will transfer authority to use the nuclear weapons to the President of the Russian Federation. So I am conducting affairs until the completion of the constitutional process. I can assure you that everything is under strict control. As soon as I announce my resignation, I will put these decrees into effect. There will be no disconnection. You can have a very quiet Christmas evening. Again, about Russia, let me say we should all do our best to support it. I will do this to support Russia. But our partners should do this too and should play a role to help and support it. (S)

As for me, I do not intend to hide in the taiga, in the woods. I will be active politically, in political life. My main intention is to help all the processes here begun by Perestroika and New Thinking in world affairs. Your people, the press here, have been asking me about my personal relationship with you. I want you to know at this historic time that I value greatly our cooperation together, our partnership and friendship. Our roles may change but I want to assure you that what we have developed will not change. Raisa and I send to you and Barbara our very best wishes. (S)

The President: Mikhail, let me say first how grateful I am for this call. I listened to your presentation with great interest. We will stay involved, particularly with the Russian republic whose enormous problems could get worse this winter. I am delighted you won't plan to hide in the woods and that you will be active politically. I have total confidence that will benefit the new commonwealth. (S)

I have written you a letter to be posted today. And in it I express the conviction that what you have done will live in history and be fully appreciated by historians. (S)

I appreciate your comments on nuclear weapons. This is of vital significance internationally and I commend you and the leaders of

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the republics for what has been a great process. I note with interest that the constitutional responsibilities on this issue have been passed to Boris Yeltsin. I assure you we will have good cooperation on this. (P)

And now, Mikhail, on the personal side. I have noticed the wonderfully strong statements from you on your relationships with me and Jim Baker. I appreciate them very much since it is exactly the way I feel. You found me at Camp David with Barbara and three of our kids and grandchildren. One of our kids is in Florida and the other with family in Virginia. (P)

The horseshoe pit where you threw that ringer is still in good shape. That reminds me that in my letter to you, I say that I hope our paths will cross soon again. You are most welcome in the U.S. Perhaps we could even meet here at Camp David when you have straightened out your affairs. Our friendship is as strong as ever and will continue to be as events unfold. There is no question about that. (P)

I will, of course, deal with respect, and openly with the leaders of the Russian republic and the other republics. We will move forward with recognition and respect for the sovereignty that each has. We will be working with them on a wide array of issues. None will interfere with my desire to stay in touch and I welcome suggestions from you whatever your new role may be. But I do want to keep intact the friendships that Barbara and I value very, very much. (P)

And so at this special time of year and at this historic time, We salute you and thank you for what you have done for world peace. Thank you very much. (U)

President Gorbachev: Thank you, George. I was glad to hear all of this today. I am saying good bye and shaking your hands. You have said to me many important things and I appreciate it. (U)

The President: All the best to you, Mikhail. (U)

President Gorbachev: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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