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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91113
Folder ID Number: 91113-001

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/5/91 - 9/25/91

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (2 pp.)	8/5/91	(b)(1)	C
02. Telcon	Re: Telcon with John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on August 19, 1991 (1 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France on August 19, 1991 (1 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany on August 19, 1991 (1 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan (3 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	C
06. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 19, 1991 (3 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister of Italy Giulio Andreotti (2 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	C
08. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom (2 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/5/91 - 9/25/91

Pinksheet Number: cap951
OA/ID Number: 91113-001
Date Closed: 2/5/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (3 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands (3 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslavakia (3 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	C
13. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Lech Walesa, President of Poland (2 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	C
14. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister of Hungary (5 pp.)	8/19/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Republic of Russia (3 pp.)	8/20/91	(b)(1)	S
16. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Carlos Menem of Argentina on August 20, 1991 (2 pp.)	8/20/91	(b)(1)	C
17. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Republic, USSR (4 pp.)	8/21/91	(b)(1)	S
18a. Telcon	Re: President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major of the United Kingdom (3 pp.)	8/21/91	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
18b. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (2 pp.)	8/21/91	(b)(1)	S
19. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR (3 pp.)	8/21/91	(b)(1)	S
20. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan on August 21, 1991 (2 pp.)	8/21/91	(b)(1)	C
21. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic, USSR (2 pp.)	8/21/91	(b)(1)	S
22. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany (4 pp.)	8/26/91	(b)(1)	C
23. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister of Hungary (3 pp.)	8/26/91	(b)(1)	C
24. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	8/26/91	(b)(1)	C
25. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany, on August 27, 1991 (3 pp.)	8/27/91	(b)(1)	C
26. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Hawke of Australia [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	8/27/91	(b)(1)	C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
27. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Hawke of Australia (1 pp.)	8/27/91	(b)(1)	C
28. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Corazon Aquino of the Phillippines (3 pp.)	8/27/91	(b)(1)	C
29a. Memo	Re: Telcon with Lithuanian President Landsbergis on August 31, 1991 (1 pp.)	9/5/91	(b)(1)	C
29b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Landsbergis of Lithuania (2 pp.)	8/31/91	(b)(1)	C
30. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Latvian President Gorbunovs (2 pp.)	9/2/91	(b)(1)	C
31. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Estonian President Arnold Ruutel (2 pp.)	9/2/91	(b)(1)	C
32. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (3 pp.)	9/5/91	(b)(1)	C
33. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey (3 pp.)	9/9/91	(b)(1)	C
34. Telcon	Re: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on September 14, 1991 (2 pp.)	9/14/91	(b)(1)	S
35. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall of Hungary (5 pp.)	9/20/91	(b)(1)	S
36. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France (4 pp.)	9/24/91	(b)(1)	C

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
37. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic (2 pp.)	9/25/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
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Pinksheet Number: cap951
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FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/1 8/24/09
2000-0429-F

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Cristiani
Notetaker: Robert Morley/James Waurishuk

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 5, 1991, 4:05 - 4:13 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Fred, hello? Sr. Presidente, how are you? (U)

President Cristiani: Hello, how are you, Mr. President? (U)

The President: I'm fine. I'm going off on vacation to Kennebunkport, but before I go I wanted to touch base with some of my friends. I continue to be concerned about El Salvador and how things are going. How did things go at Guadalajara? Did you talk to Castro? Is there anything that we can be doing to stop Cuba's support for the FMLN? (C)

President Cristiani: Yes, well I think in Guadalajara things went well. I did not get to meet with Castro, but Salinas told me he was able to, and he seemed to be very optimistic about the meeting, his meeting with Castro. Castro is also in agreement on bringing about peace. (C)

The President: You mean like cutting off assistance to the FMLN? We don't have any clout with Castro. But we keep worrying. Do you think he is going to stop supplying the FMLN? We want to keep the pressure on him. (C)

President Cristiani: Well, the objective of putting pressure on Castro is good. I told Salinas it would be good for the peace process and that the "Four Friends" need to keep the pressure on. The "Four Friends" were able to get together in Guadalajara ...(Cristiani faded out at this point)...but a pressure cooker effort is necessary to obtain a cease-fire. (C)

The President: I can hardly hear you, this is a terrible connection. Are you optimistic about the future? Do you think things will work out? Is there anything we can do up here to help get Cuba to cut off their assistance? (C)

President Cristiani: I hope for the best. The most important thing that happened (at Guadalajara) was that we agreed to get

the Secretary General personally involved. I think this is the best objective right now. The UN Secretary General's representative will be down here tomorrow for a meeting and I think this will be a worthwhile meeting. Right now we need to speed up the process and increase the pressure on the FMLN to keep them from bringing up new issues during negotiations. It is important to press the Secretary General to keep pressure on the FMLN. (Cristiani fades out during last sentence.) (C)

The President: That's very important. Brent Scowcroft is seeing the Secretary General very soon, and will encourage him in that direction. (C)

President Cristiani: We will push him. We will see how things develop during the next few weeks. (C)

The President: That's what I wanted to know. Brent will take it up with the Secretary General and with (United States Ambassador to the United Nations) Pickering. (C)

President Cristiani: (Portion of Cristiani's statement not understandable, he faded out.)...Salinas was somewhat optimistic when he talked to me last night. (C)

The President: If there is anything I can do, even though I will be on vacation, don't hesitate to call. I was just hoping something had developed with Castro at Guadalajara. (C)

President Cristiani: No, nothing special there, but we'll see how things go (Cristiani fades again). (U)

The President: Yeah, well, good luck. You are fading out, but I think I heard that. All the best to you and your family. (U)

President Cristiani: Thank you for calling me, and the same to you, George. Have a pleasant vacation. Goodbye. (U)

The President: Thanks, and the same to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on August 19, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Major, Prime Minister
Notetaker: David C. Gompert, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 6:42 - 6:48am
Situation Room

The President: Hello John. Troubled Day. (U)

Prime Minister Major: It is very distressing. (U)

The President: We'll have press conference at 7:30. We have no inside info. (U)

Prime Minister Major: We neither. Stephen Wall will talk to Brent. It's all pretty unclear. I spoke to Mitterrand. He has the same view. EC Foreign Ministers meet tomorrow. A European Heads of Government meeting is likely, though I'm not sure what we'll do. (S)

The President: Yanayev was my host when I was in the USSR. He flew with me to Kiev. It looks like he is just a figurehead for the others. (S)

Prime Minister Major: We agree. Do you know what has become of Gorbachev? We tried to get in touch, but it was not possible. (S)

The President: Radios and TVs are down. What will Yeltsin do? (S)

Prime Minister Major: Margaret Thatcher put out a statement. She said people won't give up democracy lightly. Then she was starting to say there should be no cuts in defense spending. Unhelpful. (S)

The President: You handled it well. We don't need to increase defense spending because of this. I have no plans to go to D.C. We'll try to get Strauss there soon I look forward to your visit. (S)

End of Conversation

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2012-2405-MR
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France on August 19, 1991
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Mitterrand Notetaker: David C. Gompert, NSC Staff
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 19, 1991 6:50am Situation Room

The President: Francois, how are you? (U)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. It's good of you to call me. (U)

The President: I wanted to compare notes. There is nothing new. Major said it clearly. (U)

President Mitterrand: I will speak on TV tonight. We need to restate the principles that enabled us to cooperate with Gorbachev. They can't depart from them. (U)

The President: I'll say we have no inside info. We continue to support the process of reform and openness. But let's void statements about rearming. (S)

President Mitterrand: Indeed. Let's not create a perception that all is lost. This coup could fail in a few days or months. It goes against the tide. It's hard to impose by force a regime on a changing nation. It won't work. (S)

It will be difficult, but we don't know for how long. Soviet republics now have elected officials. (S)

We should stick with our principles as our constant. (S)

The President: Agreed. (S)

End of Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany on August 19, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Notetaker: David C. Gompert, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 7:38am
Situation Room

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm back in Bonn because of events in Moscow. Then I'll go back. This is having a tremendous effect. I hope the new rulers will be sensible enough to understand there can be no relapse into early policies. (S)

The President: I agree. I'm gong to have a press conference. I'll say I spoke with you. I will say:

-- We won't retreat from our commitment to our principles.
-- Constitutional treatment is needed.
-- Gorbachev's policies are important. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We all must make the same basic demands. (1) All international agreements observed. (2) The policy of disarmament and arms control must continue. (3) They can only get help if they respect human rights. (4) We all have great respect for Gorbachev. (S)

As a German, we appreciate what he did for us. We should mention that he is in good health. (S)

The President: We are on the same wavelength. (S) Let's stay in touch. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We'll stay in touch. (U)

End of Conversation

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4/7/2014 MM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

6121

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Call to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu Interpreter: Frances Seeds Notetaker: Torkel Patterson
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 19, 1991, 8:50 a.m. - 9:03 a.m. Kennebunkport

The President: Toshiki? Can you hear me alright? Well, I am delighted to speak to you, but I wish it were under different conditions. I just wanted to touch base with you, we have no specific ideas, we do not know where Gorbachev is and we do not know anything except what is in the public domain. My calls to world leaders got interrupted by a press conference which just ended a few minutes ago. If you are interested in it, I am sure your embassy can send you the transcript. I am interested in your views, but with your permission, I will just summarize mine right now. (C)

PM Kaifu: Please do. (U)

The President: We want to handle this in a calm but firm manner and keep insisting that we are committed to reform, glasnost and democracy. We have made the point that the coup is extra-constitutional. We feel that we do not want to send things back to where they were in the Cold War days, so that calls for firm but calm rhetoric. The only thing hopeful so far is that statement by Yanayev that this does not mean the end of reform. (U)

The Soviet new leaders will have some statement about 10:00 our time which is about an hour from now. (U)

I made the point that we could not go forward with financial aid as long as these extra-constitutional actions are taking place. I made the point that we expect them to honor the treaties that were made and indeed the new Soviet leaders have said they will honor existing treaties. The press, typically, asked me who

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controls the nuclear arms and am I using the hot line. I am trying to calm things down and not alarm the American people about any sort of military confrontation. That is about the theme we are taking. (C)

I may go back to Washington for one day to have some meetings there, but I do not want to alter my vacation drastically. I think that would send the wrong message. Frankly, Toshiki, there is not much we can do. (C)

PM Kaifu: George. First of all, I would like to thank you very much for informing me. Of course when I heard about this about noon time, initially we were told this was for health reasons, then martial law. Of course, the expression coup d'etat was not used. We were very concerned there was something very unlawful. I have made a statement to the Japanese public that we would pay extremely close attention to the situation. As you have said George, of course, we do not want to see the relationship go back to the Cold War days. (U)

President Bush: What I would like to do, if you are agreeable, is to announce that you and I have had a good talk and that we see eye to eye on this -- it would be very helpful if you and I could agree that I could do that. (U)

PM Kaifu: Please do. (U)

President Bush: Okay, we will keep you informed and I will let you know if there is anything new or different. There is much at stake. (U)

We are not going to change our views on the Northern Islands. It is important that the Soviets cooperate on the Middle East. We have a lot to solve but we are going to stick to our principles. (U)

PM Kaifu: I, of course, on my side have solidly expressed to the press my concern that Perestroyka and New Thinking continue and we will continue to pay close attention to this situation. (U)

President Bush: That is very good. It is nice to talk to you. I followed your trip to China closely. (U)

PM Kaifu: One thing if I may. I will not bore you with details at this point. When I went to China I expressed to the three leaders that I met that it is very important for the U.S. as well as the international community that China move forward with humanitarian affairs. I said that President Bush has worked very hard granting MFN to China. I told them how you worked to persuade Senators and Representatives. I expressed that it is very important that they move forward for an humanitarian system. (C)

President Bush: Do you think they will do anything? (U)

PM Kaifu: Well with regard to some of the other issues, such as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, they are willing to participate with no conditions. Another issue, the proposed UN treaty on conventional arms tracking -- they said they would study it. (C)

President Bush: I see, well, it was a very good trip. (U)

PM Kaifu: That is right. (U)

President Bush: We are sitting in Kennebunkport looking at a beautiful picture of you and your wife when you were out on our boat. Now we are expecting hurricane winds and we are taking the boats out of the water. I think it will blow by and we will get them back in tomorrow. I am sorry to call so late, get some sleep and we will stay in close touch. (U)

PM Kaifu: Thank you very much and please continue working hard on your side, too. (U)

President Bush: We will. (U)

PM Kaifu: Please let me know when you find out more. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime MInister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 19, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Barry Lowenkron, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 9:09 - 9:18 a.m.
Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Brian? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, George. (U)

The President: Every time I come to Maine, all hell breaks loose. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: It's going to be a tough one today. (C)

The President: I just wanted to touch base. I'm trying to get in touch with all leaders. Most that I've talked to agree that we must play this reasonably cool and stay with our insistence on democratic reforms. The press here are trying to almost put a military confrontation on this thing. They are asking, have you used the hot line, who is controlling the nuclear weapons? I've been saying, look we don't want to set the clock back to the status quo ante. We give Gorbachev credit for the reforms. Our policy will be determined by whether perestroika and the reforms continue. We've got a democratic movement in Russia itself. Francois, I heard from him earlier, said a lot of coups look good in the beginning and then don't work out. I said, well, there's no finality to this coup. We don't know its development. He asked if we were taken by surprise, too, and I said yes, we were, but so was Gorbachev obviously. We've talked to Moscow. Our people are safe. And, Brian, I'd appreciate this staying confidential, but I'm going to go to Washington only to swear in Strauss and send him over. Then, I'll come back. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Today? (U)

The President: I don't know. We have this hurricane to contend with, too. I don't know if I can get there. If it's tomorrow morning, I don't want them to say the wind turned north so we can't go tomorrow. (C)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: What is your best assessment of what happened? (S)

The President: We really don't know. Its the hard liners Pugo, Kryuchov, Yazov, Pavlov. We're not sure where Moiseyev was. The rumor is that he flew down to break the news to Gorbachev. I know those four in there. Yanayev was my host when I was in Moscow and he talked quite reasonably. He appreciated our support for the center. What I was saying was let the people decide. He was quite reasonable when we were talking but is now emerging as a hardline puppet, a token of the right wing. The new leaders apparently will be on television at 10. We don't know; our embassy didn't know a damn thing. We were surprised like everyone else. The press is saying it was an intelligence failure. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: George, one point where you may get some criticism on behalf of all of us. They may say, well, if you people had been more generous in London, maybe this wouldn't have happened. You may remember my turning at lunch to Helmut Kohl and saying to Helmut, who is closest to the situation, remember when we had agreed on what we were going to do? Now, if a month from now, Gorbachev is overthrown and people are complaining that we haven't done enough, is what we're proposing the kind of thing we should do? He said absolutely; there was no second guessing the nature of the decision in London. (S)

The President: It's funny. Our press didn't raise that, but it could happen. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The reason you may remember my exchange with Helmut was because Lubbers interrupted to say that Kohl already answered. And I said, no, he had not. Lubbers said that nobody would be overthrown in a month. And I said how do you know that? Helmut said, no, I spent time with Gorbachev in Kiev. What we're proposing is what he needs and what he wants. (S)

The President: That's an important point, if raised. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: This was raised at luncheon just before we met with Gorbachev. And Helmut reassured us that this is what Gorbachev wanted. I'm grateful to Lubbers for interrupting. (S)

The President: I do remember that. This crowd is pretty hardline. I'll get hit for holding the country too close to Gorbachev. I'll point out that it's a damn good thing because look at the changes that have taken place. And if we had tried to pull the rug out it would have happened sooner. And Brent Scowcroft and others will be arguing that position. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Any doubt in your mind that he was overthrown because he was too close to us? (S)

The President: I don't think there's any doubt. It will be interesting to see what the new leaders say. At first, they said health problems. Maybe that means that Gorbachev's fingernails

wouldn't come out. Even more important is the economic chaos and disorder that goes with it and the economic drift. And I think on the part of these guys, the downgrading of the communist party. These are hardliners and they see the party that was their life's blood, the KGB, that has been the silent hand forever, undermined and threatened as well. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: George, Do you see any significance in the fact that the Union Treaty was to be signed in the next few days? (S)

The President: I don't know. That's a good point. Yeltsin is out there on top of a tank saying this coup must be reversed. You have to give him credit for enormous guts. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You may want your people to look into that. It struck me that Gorbachev coming back to sign that treaty would be the kiss of death. Maybe they moved to make sure that the signing never took place. (S)

The President: That's an interesting point and I will put it to our experts. It hasn't been voiced so far but we'll look into it. Give me a holler if you have any more thoughts. I want to reactivate this diplomacy. I was told that EC foreign ministers, -- don't know if that means the whole EC -- will meet, and then maybe to be followed by a meeting of the European heads of state. Major was saying this might take place. I think you and I and Kaifu need to stay in very close touch. Any thoughts you get, give me a holler. And let's not let this interfere with the Mulroney visit. In fact, it's a good reason to put substance into it. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: That's right. Goodbye, George. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister of Italy Giulio Andreotti

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Neil Seidenam
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 10:31 - 10:36 a.m.
Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Giulio, George Bush. Can you hear me? (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, good morning. I hear you very well. (U)

The President: I was calling about the situation in the Soviet Union. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Andreotti: I am very surprised and concerned myself. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, we were surprised also. There was no firm intelligence on this at all. And I think all leaders were surprised, most of all Gorbachev. I had a press conference, Giulio, in which I spelled out the position for the U.S. I hope your embassy will send you a transcript, and I hope that you agree with the line. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Andreotti: I'm sure they will send it to me immediately. I believe they are translating it now. ~~(C)~~

The President: I'd be most interested in your views, but if you have a minute, just let me click off a few points here. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you. (U)

The President: One, we view this as extra-constitutional, outside the constitution. Two, we want to continue to back the hope for perestroika and reform. We don't want to move away from that in any way. And, three, we're trying to keep the tensions down. Our press tried to make it like this will mean that there will be some kind of military confrontation with the West. I'm saying that, no, it won't be like that at all, and we do not expect that changes that have taken place will be reversed whether it's Eastern Europe or arms control. But those are the

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main points that I made. I would welcome any comments by you. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Andreotti: Well, I think these points are very wise and appropriate, Mr. President. I think that there is really a lot to your position in trying to keep the situation tranquil and put at ease and send a message, particularly to the former east bloc countries. ~~(C)~~

The President: Exactly. We will do that, and I'd appreciate as this develops any comments or suggestions as to what we may do. If I get anything new, I will be sure that you know about it. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Andreotti: Very good, Mr. President. As you know, I think, tomorrow is the meeting of the 12 foreign ministers of the EC and we will reflect this position. We will keep you informed as to developments in that quarter. ~~(C)~~

The President: Very good and thank you very much. We will continue to follow this closely. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Major, Prime Minister
Notetaker: David Gompert, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 12:56 - 1:06 p.m.
Air Force One

The President: Hello. We're going to D.C. I'll swear in Strauss. Then I go back to Maine. What is the latest? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Two things. One, Bielecki called me. All is calm, but he is worried. The Soviets have closed the borders. The Poles are very worried. They want the EC to conclude the association agreement as soon as possible. I promised I'd push this idea in the EC as a signal. He asked me to tell you this. (S)

Second is the prospect of Europeans having their own meeting. We need a NATO Ministerial. The sub-plot is for the EC to take the lead. (S)

The President: My only worry about NATO is not to elevate concern about military action. I don't want to look like we need to go to the barricades in NATO. I am worried about the Baltics. Let's be careful not to get drawn in by the Baltic hard-liners. Let me talk to Baker and Brent. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Stephen Wall will talk to Brent Scowcroft. (C)

There are calls in the UK for halting defense cuts. (S)

The President: Let's keep this on a diplomatic plane. We could back Yeltsin's call for constitutional rule. We don't want to look like we're anticipating any military action. Yeltsin wants to involve the UN. What do you think? (S)

Prime Minister Major: I can't see anything practical that the UN can do. It's not likely to be productive, at first blush. As Bob Gates told Stephen Wall, the Soviet people can't hear what we hear from Yeltsin. (S)

The President: It's confusing what Yanayev is saying about the possibility of Gorbachev coming back. (S)

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Prime Minister Major: It's totally disingenuous. (C)

The President: I am sorry about the problem with your Right over defense spending. (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Patricia Arizu
Notetaker: Barry Lowenkron, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 1:51 - 2:02 p.m.
Air Force One

The President: Felipe, how are you? This is George Bush. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I am fine. And you? (U)

The President: Doing fine. I'm very much concerned about events in the Soviet Union. Indeed, I'm about to land in Washington to talk about these matters. What's on your mind? The same thing? ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, as a matter of fact, I was in the countryside myself. I've just returned to the city. We just held an emergency meeting. We think that events are going to turn into a coup plus an "involution." What consequences do you think will come out of this? ~~(S)~~

The President: It's a little early to say. I'm trying to calm down any discussion of military action while encouraging the return to reform. I think it's very early to say what will happen. Yeltsin has strong personal support and I'm hoping that the coup will be reversed, but I'm not sure how that can happen. What we are doing is saying that this is outside the legal process, that it is not a legal step and that we want to see the reforms continue. We are going to support Yeltsin's appeal for the return to the reforms but we are stopping short of trying to answer questions about whether we will take some military action. I think it's very important we not go overboard here. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, this is definitely not the time to try to find any course of military action or foster such a step. This is definitely the time for strong diplomatic action in all fora possible. George, I wanted to tell you that I myself have tried to talk directly to Gorbachev, although I knew it was practically impossible, but I think you should try to get in touch directly. ~~(S)~~

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The President: I think that's a good idea and may just try it when I'm in the White House. John Major also tried to reach Gorbachev and was told no lines were available. I expect I would get the same answer. But I think there is some good symbolism in trying to reach Gorbachev. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, I think that would be a very good gesture because we don't want to have the image of Gorbachev falling right now. We don't want them to think we don't feel anything as far as Gorbachev is concerned and we don't want to destroy his image. (S)

The President: I agree with that. Yeltsin is expressing strong support for Gorbachev, all of which is good. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes. Evidently he wants to recover Gorbachev's image because he wants to restore legality. (S)

The President: This new vice president made some statement a little while ago, saying he hoped he would be able to work with Gorbachev in the future. He says Gorbachev is tired. We are confused as to what that means. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, I think that's what he tried to say, and I think it was a joke, in bad taste and rather cynical as far as remarks go. The last point I want to make is that we have to concentrate on supporting the East European countries. We have to show solidarity with them. (S)

The President: No question about that. I will be talking to a couple of those leaders myself this afternoon or certainly by tomorrow morning. They are concerned. Major has already received a call from the President of Hungary. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, precisely. The European Community will meet tomorrow. We're going to issue a statement indicating respect for the process of reform and also for all the steps that have been adopted in the past. We also hope that there will be some statement of support for Gorbachev, at least so that he can recover his personal freedom. (S)

The President: I hope so too, and we certainly agree with that. Let me discuss the idea of trying to call Gorbachev as an expression of that. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: That's fine, and let's try and keep in touch over the next few days. (C)

The President: OK, let's do it and thanks for the call. We've just landed in DC. I'll go in and go to work. I hope to go back to Maine tomorrow. We have good communications there so if you want to give me a call, do so. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: OK, thank you very much. (U)

The President: Goodbye my friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Barry Lowenkron, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 2:36 - 2:43 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Rudd. How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Rudd: I'm fine George. Yourself? (U)

The President: All right. I'm concerned about what has happened in the Soviet Union, and wanted to touch base with you as the head of the EC. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, we are trying to react as united as possible. Jim Baker had a good discussion with Hans van den Broek and we expect a declaration on behalf of the Council, but I guess you know that already. I support the idea of having a NATO ministers meeting as well on Thursday morning. (S)

The President: I don't want to be the only one against a NATO meeting, but I want to be careful. We don't want to send scary military signals around the world by having a NATO meeting. You know our position is the same as the yours. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: If you like, we can decide that tomorrow. We have an EC meeting tomorrow here in The Hague where we will take a position on the same things you did already, such as suspending aid. We will also discuss the possibility of calling a meeting in the framework of the CSCE. On CSCE, we have this strange conference coming up in a few weeks in Moscow on human rights, which seems silly. Our EC declaration will also deal with the concerns of the central European countries. Every one of them have been calling and asking us to pay attention to their concerns. These are the main points for the moment. We expect the foreign ministers tomorrow will advise us to have a special European Council meeting by the end of next week, say Friday. That is what Major as well as Mitterrand have requested. So for us the question of a NATO Ministerial is a tactical deliberation we can do with or without. (S)

The President: Well, we don't want to be the only ones opposed and Baker is prepared to come over tomorrow night. (S)

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Prime Minister Lubbers: We proposed that he keep in touch with his NATO colleagues so as to avoid any misunderstanding on the scheduling of a NATO meeting. We will ask Hans to coordinate the position with the members on this part of the ocean. We will check with Jim Baker for a yes or a no on the scheduling of a NATO Ministerial. (S)

The President: That's fine. Again we don't want to stand alone. I am very concerned that inadvertently our position in NATO will look like commitments that would be a repeat of Hungary in 1956, or, on the other hand, send a signal of total impotence. We have to be very careful to keep on the political, as opposed to military, side as much as we can. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I agree fully with you and will try to lead the European Community along the same lines as you. (S)

The President: Maybe we could highlight a political strategy at NATO. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Certainly, the NATO position can be in accordance with what you have already said, or with what the European Council will be saying. (S)

The President: I think we are thinking along the same lines. It is important to stay in close touch. I plan to touch base with Eastern European leaders as well. The Polish Prime Minister has called John Major. These leaders are nervous, and we want to reassure them we don't want a return to the status quo ante. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Is there still resistance in the Soviet Union or is it all over already? (S)

The President: We don't know. Yeltsin is making some forthright statements. I don't have any reason to feel it's over in the sense of the people accepting all of this. I think we still should be calling for support for the democratic process and the legal process. What they've done is strictly illegal. There is an urgent message coming to me in 15 minutes from the new Soviet leaders. We will receive the ambassador, not at my level, and he will pass this message to us. I'm interested to know what it will say. The Soviet Vice President made a statement that Gorbachev is tired and sick and he hopes to work with him in the future. Nobody knows what that means. It sounds ridiculous. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I agree. The new leaders are going to face the resistance of some republics, especially the Baltic states. (S)

The President: If it looks like we are prepared to do something in NATO that we really are not prepared to do, such as military action, we can end up inciting violence. This hardliner in Lithuania may end up calling for troops. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I see your point. We can expect that -- at least in the Baltic states, and beyond that in certain republics -- some of these leaders may think that this will be their last chance to declare independence. (S)

The President: Then there could be a big fight and the world will issue a cry: what are we going to do to help these people? But let's stay in touch. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We'll do that and if there is something special in the Soviet message, please let me know so we won't be on the wrong track for our EC meeting tomorrow. Please, use your own channel or tell Jim Baker to let us know. (S)

The President: I'll do that. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Barry Lowenkron, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 3:03 - 3:11 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Ozal: Hello, George, how are you? (U)

The President: Turgut, I'm very concerned and am back in Washington now. (U)

President Ozal: Yes, I heard the news and I thought to myself, it's just like a year ago. (S)

The President: Yes, it's another crisis, isn't it? (S)

President Ozal: A very big crisis. More important than the Gulf crisis. (S)

The President: Well, it is. What is your thinking about it? (S)

President Ozal: I think we have to put pressure on the leaders who seized power. Their behavior at their press conference shows that they are out of step with public opinion in their country. (S)

The President: Well, I agree with you. We have to make very clear to them that this is not acceptable. At the same time, we have to be careful that we don't escalate military pressure. (S)

President Ozal: That is a good point. (U)

The President: Yes, exactly. We must emphasize the political side. We will support reforms and Yeltsin's call to restore Gorbachev. Yeltsin is saying that Gorbachev must be brought back. Unfortunately, this is a pretty tough crowd. Pugo and Kryuchkov are pretty tough people. I don't think we ought to look like we are vacillating in the face of them but we shouldn't be reckless either. (S)

President Ozal: I think it is important to put more pressure on

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their people. If they resist, increase the pressure. (Ø)

The President: Do you think there is going to be a lot of resistance among the people now? (Ø)

President Ozal: I'm not very sure. I saw on CNN that some of the people had climbed on to the tanks. Strikes are being planned. It will not be as easy for the new leaders as they think. (Ø)

The President: Well I think we're looking at this matter the same way. I think we need to step up our condemnation of what went on. I will put out a statement in a couple of hours that further defines our position. (Ø)

President Ozal: Good. We must keep up the pressure. (Ø)

The President: Well, we'll see what happens, but that's what we're going to do. It affects so many other things. It affects the Middle East, Iraq and so many other decisions. (Ø)

President Ozal: I don't think the new leadership is so strong. They won't be able to correct their economic problems. (Ø)

The President: That's right. They think they are going to correct housing and the economy in general. But they can't do that. They are going to fail. (Ø)

President Ozal: They will fail. They cannot turn the clock back. If they try, it could be very bloody. (Ø)

The President: I think that would be terrible. (Ø)

President Ozal: What are the latest developments in the Soviet Union? (Ø)

The President: We have no information at all on Gorbachev or anything of that nature and no information that is not public. This was a big surprise to us like it was to everyone else. (Ø)

President Ozal: Like the Gulf crisis. (Ø)

The President: Yes, it is. I noticed our man Saddam came in and supported the coup publicly. (Ø)

President Ozal: He supported the coup? (Ø)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Ozal: I think Saddam is foolish to support the coup. (Ø)

The President: OK. Well, we'll keep trying to do our best. If you get any suggestions, please call me like we did last year on the Gulf crisis. (Ø)

President Ozal: Thank you for the call. I hope that everything will work out as it did in the Gulf crisis. (Ø)

The President: I hope so, too, and hope it gets resolved and the reform process gets back on track. (Ø)

President Ozal: We have to help them. (Ø)

The President: I don't know what more we can do. (Ø)

President Ozal: I spoke to the Kurdish opposition to Saddam. (Ø)

The President: What do you think we ought to be doing? (Ø)

President Ozal: I think we should help. (Ø)

The President: Well, certainly. But, I don't know what help means. I want to see continued resistance to Saddam Hussein. (Ø)

President Ozal: We sent some foodstuffs. I think they're looking for financial help and additional foodstuff. These are the main items. (Ø)

The President: I see. Well, I will see what we are doing on that. I will raise that question today. I've just gotten back. We should help those who are really hurting. (Ø)

President Ozal: In my opinion there is a lot of anti-Saddam resistance in the North.

The President: You have a good point there. We'll be talking about that this afternoon and I'll find out what we are doing and what we can do. It was nice talking to you. (Ø)

President Ozal: Goodbye.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Vaclav Havel, President
Interpreter: Lisa Valyiova
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 4:20 - 4:34 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, can you hear me? I wanted to call because I know you are especially concerned because of your proximity and history with the Soviet Union. First, I want to say that you are very much in our minds as we try to handle this situation. I want to get your suggestions, but before doing that I'd like to go over one or two points if that is agreeable. (C)

President Havel: Yes, of course, that is perfectly acceptable. (U)

The President: As of now, we see no Soviet threat to the security of Czechoslovakia nor do we believe they will want to give you any trouble because they have plenty of their own. The Soviets also know that creating problems for you would produce an even stronger western reaction. But we will keep a close eye on the situation and keep you continuously informed from this end. We might be bold enough to suggest that you help keep your people calm, as I am trying to do here, and avoid any actions that could be used against the reformers there in the Soviet Union. For our part, we will be putting out a statement, yet another statement, today talking about the need for the reform, and our support for the reforms, and for openness and perestroika and for abiding within the law in the Soviet Union. But I'd be very interested in your views. (C)

President Havel: Well, first of all I would like to thank you for calling me. Our people are condemning this coup and are getting ready for demonstrations because they think it is similar to 1968. It is exactly the same, identical scenario that was used in Czechoslovakia in 1968. On the other hand, in our society there is some kind of nervousness whether this will affect us or whether this will threaten us here in Czechoslovakia. I personally am convinced that the Soviets will not push into or expand into Europe. On the other hand, I understand the nervousness which is prevailing in Hungary, in Poland and in Czechoslovakia. It is also possibly the fear of an

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enormous influx of refugees. We are taking all kinds of security measures and we also have plans for an alternative. But, at any rate, the most important for us here politically is to have the support of the western countries which will calm our inhabitants. It might even be enough if I were to say publicly that I had received a telephone call from President Bush, and in that way have a certain calming effect on people. (C)

The President: I would be delighted for you to do that and would like your permission to do that here, because we do want to show our commitment to your country. (C)

President Havel: I would be very glad, Mr. President, if you were to mention this and if you were to mention the democratic progress and attitudes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are developments which cannot be reversed any longer. They cannot turn the clock back. I would like to add to this that the development toward emancipation and self-determination in the Soviet Union -- that, too, is irreversible. This coup will simply complicate things, delay matters, create no end of conflict, but it will not reverse the general development. (C)

The President: I am inclined to agree. We are trying to figure out the best way to support Gorbachev and Yeltsin. (C)

President Havel: Yeltsin is the only man who is elected freely by tens of millions of inhabitants of the Soviet Union, and that is a really good argument. (C)

The President: Yes, very good. (U)

President Havel: And with respect to the new government, the new people in power, as they said today, they wish to dismiss the legitimately elected parliament and legitimately elected leadership of people as it stands now. I know Mr. Yanayev personally, and I know him to be a man who is totally gray and without expression -- very jovial, but I think a puppet of the KGB and of the army. (C)

The President: I met him over there and must say that I liked him, but I have the same general opinion. Well, I'm glad to have had this conversation. I would welcome any further ideas on your part that we might say or that we might do. In the meantime, I will proudly mention this telephone call and certainly reiterate our strong support for the irreversible democracy that the eastern European countries now have. (C)

President Havel: I would like to thank you for that, Mr. President, on behalf of all our citizens, who will find mention of this to calm them and encourage them. (C)

The President: All right, sir. Please call if you have any problems and I will gladly receive your phone call. (C)

President Havel: Thank you. I will take advantage of this opportunity if there is anything urgent and will call you. (C)

The President: Thank you and goodbye. (U)

President Havel: Thank you and please greet Barbara. (U)

The President: I'll tell her. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Lech Walesa, President of Poland

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Lech Walesa, President
Interpreter: Val Chlebowsky
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 4:45 - 4:54 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Walesa: This is the President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Walesa. (U)

The President: How are you, my friend? I'm just calling up to talk to you about events in the Soviet Union. (C)

President Walesa: Yes, we are worried about the situation. Actually, we are worried about the reforms in the central European countries. (C)

The President: May I make a few talking points here and then ask you for your views? (C)

President Walesa: Yes, by all means. (U)

The President: First, as I say, you are very much on our minds as we wrestle with the situation over here. We have convened our experts and at this point we see no Soviet threat to your security, nor do we believe that they are going to want to give you any trouble, what with all the trouble that they've got themselves. And I think the Soviets know that creating problems for you would produce an even stronger western reaction. We have had a message from the self-appointed president of the Soviet Union making some commitment to reform and democracy inside the Soviet Union, but we are not impressed. We are going to keep a close eye on the situation and certainly we will keep you informed. We don't know anything more than you, I'm sure, right now. If there is anything we can do in helping you to keep your people calm and avoid actions that could be used against the reformers in the Soviet Union, I would like to know what that is, but it is very important that the people there in Poland remain calm. Of course, if you want to make this telephone call public, expressing the U.S.'s keen interest in the reforms inside Poland and our commitment to help with those reforms, please do that. I'd like to mention the call here. I think that might help calm

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some troubled waters. But how do you see the matter from your vantage point, Mr. President, my friend? (C)

President Walesa: Mr. President, thank you very much. It is very important that you have called me here. Of course, we realize that there is no physical danger on the part of the Soviets for us right now. We will have problems with our reforms, especially economic reforms. Of course, we wanted very much for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to be united with the rest of Europe. That would be one guarantee of these changes. (C)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Walesa: We do have some problems with that, but that is absolutely necessary and that would be a guarantee of the irreversibility of these reforms. Of course, we are ready to defend ourselves and we will defend ourselves. We will not surrender. I am convinced that the reforms in the Soviet Union will prevail too. We are afraid of one thing in the Soviet Union -- anarchy. When I talked to you, sir, before, I said that most probably a lot of people will flee the Soviet Union through Poland. That's one area where we expect the most problems. Of course, we have many agricultural products, but there is no money. We have nowhere to sell it. We expect that the rest of Europe will cooperate with us on this matter. Today that would help the Soviet reforms also. (C)

The President: I see. (U)

President Walesa: We certainly hope that the NATO alliance will get stronger and that it will provide some balance in that respect. The U.S. presence in that alliance will also act as a stabilizing factor. Of course, I would like to make this conversation public because it's important to us. (C)

The President: OK. Let's stay in touch, and if we learn anything that has an effect on you, good or bad, I will be in touch with you. (C)

President Walesa: Mr. President, thank you very much indeed, and please could you help us unite with the rest of Europe. (C)

The President: I think you'll find a receptive Europe when the EC meets tomorrow in the ministerial. I hope you will. I think you'll find more receptivity now. Yes, the answer is we will try to help. (C)

President Walesa: Mr. President, thank you very much from the bottom of my heart and on behalf of the Polish nation. (C)

The President: Thank you. Goodbye and good luck. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister of Hungary

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Pat Austin
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 19, 1991, 6:02 - 6:32 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. Prime Minister, can you hear me all right? (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Yes. (U)

The President: Well, this is George Bush and I just wanted to check in with you on this very disturbing situation in the Soviet Union.
(C)

Prime Minister Antall: Thank you very much, Mr. President for your interest. We, too, are very anxious and we consider this to be a very difficult situation. (C)

The President: Well, it is. I'd like to run down a couple of talking points, if that is agreeable to you, and then ask for your opinions. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: Yes. (U)

The President: First, I know you are concerned because of your own proximity and your history, and I want you to know that you are very much in our minds as we try to do whatever we can from way over here in the United States. Right now, we do not believe that there is a Soviet threat to your own security. We believe that the Soviets will not want to give you any trouble. They have plenty of their own. The Soviets also know that creating problems for you would produce an even stronger reaction in the West. But we are going to keep a close eye on the situation and continue to keep you informed from this end on anything that will affect your interests. I'm sure the people there are nervous, and I would hope that you, and if we can help in any way, that we can help calm the people and avoid any actions that could be used against the reformers in the Soviet Union. And if it would help you in any way, I have no problem with your making public the fact that I called and indeed I'd like to tell our press people

here to put out the fact that I talked to you to express our keen interest in all of this. I'm anxious to get your views. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your interest. Let me begin right at the end. I'm very happy that you telephoned, Mr. President, and I think it's very important that we publicize. This in itself would be of great assistance if it is publicized in the U.S. and if we, too, publicize it. (C)

The President: Then we will go ahead and do that before I leave the office tonight. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: Thank you. Another thing I would like to thank you for is that, despite the fact that you are at a distance, you are looking at our problem up close. At this moment in time, we, too, feel that there is not a direct threat from the Soviet Union. We think that this is proof of justification for the haste with which Hungary eliminated the Warsaw Treaty, dissolved the COMECON, and worked with such haste to withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary. It would have been horrible if this had taken place under the former situation. This is why we were the ones who last June, almost on our own, initiated a very quick dissolution. And we are seeing now how careful German policy is on this matter and how nervous Polish policy is. All the more so since there are significant numbers of Soviet troops in these two countries. The Polish have proposed that, together with Czechoslovakia, the three of us hold a consultation and we are going to do this. (S)

The other is that, yes, there is a certain amount of nervousness among the people in Hungary, too. Others are thinking of activating certain communist forces, which includes looking for a certain amount of support from China in a situation like this. And this is why it is extremely important that we calm the Hungarian people. I made a statement to this effect tonight on television; and I stressed to Chancellor Kohl when we spoke this afternoon, before he held his press conference, that it would have been very important to have emphasized NATO's accord regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, the lack of a joint position on this issue had a very bad effect in central Europe. It didn't put enough pressure on the Serbian communist nationalist forces. As I emphasized, Serbia was of value from the point of view of a model. I think that Serbia was a testing ground. And there was cooperation between the Russians and the Serbians in military circles. It is very important precisely for this reason that the issue of Yugoslavia not be neglected at this time because it is possible that they will take advantage of the crisis among the Russians. It would be very important to have a statement which also includes Yugoslavia, because these orthodox communist forces tend to reinforce one another. It would be very important to get a message to Yugoslavia, and it would also be extremely important that the French and the British make a statement regarding Serbia. (S)

The other issue, regarding the Soviet Union, is that among the other member republics there should be a statement issued on Russia and the Ukraine with an emphasis on them. If we want to give one last minute chance to the forces of reform and to Gorbachev, it can only be through Yeltsin at this point. (S)

The President: Right, I agree. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: There are military forces that stand alongside Yeltsin. As long as he is free to move about, he is the only one who can be a crystallizing point. One thing, I know this is a very difficult, difficult issue, but I think of major assistance would be if the West were to issue a statement recognizing the Baltic republics and we, too, could do that. The other issue to be raised is what type of immediate economic sanctions could be brought into play. In the Soviet Union, the only way results can be achieved is through social demagoguery, so in the first period of time they are going to throw food on the market. And it is only through this that it will become possible to indicate to the Soviet leaders that they will not be able to produce the food supplies. They will not be able to give food to the people if they become isolated. So very, very clear economic and financial measures would be necessary. This is what perhaps these leaders might understand. (S)

Obviously this whole action is not the work of Yanayev, who is playing the part of a marionette here. Obviously it is within the army, the KGB and the party apparatus that are cooperating now. The way I see it, within a day or two, the first step will be to officially remove Gorbachev from the party, and in the days to come they will convene their parliament, the Supreme Soviet, and there they will try to legalize Gorbachev's removal. The fact that the statement made this evening to the effect that Gorbachev was ill and after getting well might be able to return, is an indication that this action is not yet completed. I don't think the army will be united against Gorbachev. This, however, contains a danger of civil war as well as the possibility that they will try to seek some compromise with the forces of reform. And therefore it would be very important to emphasize that the West would only consider a freely and openly elected leader to be a partner to them as well as the freely elected presidents of the republics. (S)

It would be very important to make a statement, or at least to find the means of establishing contact with China. We have seen that the very few conservative forces within Hungary have been supported by China most recently, and a cooperation between the Soviet Union and China would be very worrisome indeed. So we would recommend pressure on China and possibly as regards the Baltic republics to consider and publicize the prospect of their recognition as autonomous republics if it becomes impossible to work together with the Soviet Union. (S)

And it would also be something that we'll be very grateful for if it were emphasized through NATO that this region of the world is

not a matter of indifference -- Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary -- and if the whole area were to be treated in keeping with the Paris Charter. If you remember what I said in the speech I made at the Paris Summit before the signing of the Charter, I mentioned the fact that there are armies that could potentially put an end to the process of democratization taking place in this region of the world. I would like to have a picture of Yazov and the way he looked at me when I said that. (Laughter.) I think it would have been important to recognize earlier that Shevardnadze's and Yakovlev's separations were all messages from Gorbachev. They were explicit in saying the messages that Gorbachev himself was unable to say. For the moment, what we don't know is whether his trip to the Crimean peninsula was voluntary, since this was a verbatim repeat of the scenario that took place when Khrushchev was ousted from power and Brezhnev was put in his place. This is what I can say for the moment and would be grateful for a few words from you. (S)

The President: I think these are all very important comments. I do see difficulty in instantly recognizing the independence of the Baltic states. We will continue to reiterate, however, our conviction that the Baltic states should be treated differently, because we never recognized their incorporation into the Soviet Union. But I think it's important that we do nothing to encourage the Baltics to go into military action unless of course the whole West was prepared to help them, and that would mean that we would be in a war with Soviet troops. I would like to try to avoid military confrontation if we possibly can. I will be putting out a statement this evening supporting Yeltsin's call, a call for the restoration of legally elected organs of power and a call for the reaffirmation of the post of USSR President Gorbachev. I will also say that we are going to base our policy on reform in the Soviet Union continuing -- including, of course, democracy and peaceful reconciliation between the center and the republics. Like you, we will support all the constitutionally elected leaders and state our opposition to the use of force or intimidation, or suppression of the right to free speech. I also will point out that we oppose the use of force in the Baltic states or as a matter of fact in any of the republics. Then we will call for the Soviets to abide by their treaties and commitments, including the Charter of Paris commitments, so we will be avoiding lending legitimacy or any support to this coup. Another point is I think it would be a big mistake on our part to make this an East-West confrontation. We want to see Europe give more support to the eastern European countries; support in making clear that they are not floating around without the support of Europe and, of course, of the United States. Just for the hell of it, I placed a phone call to Gorbachev, and they told me that they would get back to the operator in five minutes and that was about two hours ago. But I did that because I want the leaders there to understand that we still feel that Gorbachev is the due process head of the Soviet Union. But in any event, this matter is developing, and if I see anything at all that adversely affects Hungary, I will be sure to contact you, with your permission. (S)

Prime Minister Antall: I'd be very grateful. I, too, had not thought of recognizing the Baltic states as instantly but rather as a prospect to be raised if things go that far. (S)

The President: OK, I've enjoyed this conversaition. I respect what you are doing there, and I hope that we can be helpful. (S)

Prime Minister Antall: Thank you very much, and let's hope that everything will be successful. Please don't neglect the economic and financial issue regarding the Soviet Union. With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to call you if we get somewhere with our neighboring countries. (S)

The President: I would appreciate it very much and thank you, sir. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Goodnight. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Republic of Russia, USSR
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Boris Yeltsin Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko Notetaker: Beth Sanner
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 20, 1991, 8:18 - 8:35am The Oval Office

The President: Just checking up to see how things are going from your end. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good morning. (U)

The President: Good morning. I just wanted a first hand report on the situation from your end. (U)

President Yeltsin: The situation is very complex. A group of eight individuals essentially put together an anti-constitutional coup. President Gorbachev is located in Farps in the Crimea. He is absolutely blocked, no way of reaching him. (S)

President Yanayev is using the pretext that Gorbachev is ill, but this is not confirmed. Essentially a committee of eight people has taken over the presidency and established a state of emergency in Russian territory, and the Baltics. Troops have been brought up to Moscow, not only in the city, but in Moscow district and surrounding towns. And by issuing decision 1 and 2 the group has exposed itself as no more than a right-wing junta. I appeared before the people and soldiers and I said that actions of the Committee were unconstitutional, illegal, and have no force on Russian territory. (S)

The building of the Supreme Soviet and the office of the President is surrounded and I expect a storming of the building at any moment. We have been here 24 hours. We won't leave. I have appealed to 100,000 people standing outside to defend the legally elected government. (S)

Basically this is a right-wing coup, each member of the group is well known. They want to take over the democratically elected leadership of Russia, Leningrad, Moscow, and other cities. This morning I gave Lukyanov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, ten demands, the first of which is to meet with Gorbachev. (S)

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Mr. President, it would be good if you yourself could demand to speak on the phone with Gorbachev and to rally world leaders to the fact that the situation here is critical. We've also announced a strike and practically all factories and plants are at a standstill. We will continue demanding this until the Committee is thrown out and tried in court. We are not losing any hope or faith unless they resort to the most extreme and bloody measures. Of course a wounded animal is the most dangerous thing and we have no assurances that they won't resort to extreme measures. (S)

The President: You have our full support for the return of Gorbachev and the legitimate government. We will reiterate that early today. I tried to place a call to Gorbachev yesterday and couldn't get through. But I like the idea of saying publically that I want to talk to him. I would be perfectly ... (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, thanks for saying that. If Gorbachev is sick then we should demand international doctors, like the WHO, examine him. (S)

The President: We saw that you made that suggestion. I agree that it is a good idea. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, we have changes happening so fast that we should talk at the end of the day tomorrow. Things are literally changing hour by hour. (S)

The President: I'm happy to do that. I hope that the lines will not be cut off. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Mr. President. I do appreciate your attention and support. The Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev has flown to the UN to report to the Secretary General. (S)

The President: I suggest that I call you at 5:00 tomorrow your time. You can try to call here. I'll try to call you, but if I can't get through, you try here. The number is... (S)

President Yeltsin: Understood (U)

The President: I would be prepared to call Yanayev, but I don't want to do anything to legitimize the regime. What is your thought on that. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, absolutely, you should not do that. An official call from you would legitimize them. We tried to send a group to the Crimea to meet with Gorbachev but he is surrounded by three circles of armed guards and KGB. (S)

The President: We'll keep trying to reach him. We're not hopeful but it legitimizes the Gorbachev regime. (S)

President Yeltsin: Mr. President. Thanks so much, these are very good positive steps. They will help all of us here. (S)

~~SECRET~~

The President: I will do all I can to keep the European countries on board - all of them. I talked to a number of leaders yesterday, are very supportive of the position you outlined and the position I outlined to them. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thanks very much. (U)

The President: Good luck and congratulations on your courage and commitment. We sympathize and pray with you. All the American people support you. What you're doing is absolutely right. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President Carlos Menem of Argentina on August 20, 1991 (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Carlos Menem, President of Argentina Interpreter: Barbara Phillips Notetakers: Robert Morley, James Waurishuk
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 20, 1991, 6:02 - 6:13 P.M., EDT Kennebunkport

The President: Carlos, hello, are you there? How are you? (U)

President Menem: Hello George, how are you? I am worried about what is happening in the Soviet Union. (C)

The President: I am concerned too. I have been in a plane for the last hour, so I may not have the latest on what is happening. (C)

President Menem: I just returned from Brazil. I met with President Collor. We made a joint statement about our concern over the future of the democratic system in the Soviet Union. We have spoken out. What else can we do? (C)

The President: Well, in the first place, the statements you have made are very good. I talked with Yeltsin earlier today for 25 minutes. He asked that we demand that Gorbachev be released and be given a medical examination if the coup plotters continue to say he is sick. I told him we will not recognize the coup leaders as legitimate and we are saying over and over again that what they have done is against the law. Yeltsin said there are one hundred thousand people in the streets and the strikes he has called for are beginning to be effective. But I think we have to watch the situation there, insist on the restitution of constitutional government, and not conduct normal relations with the Soviet government until the situation clears up. I am also concerned about the Baltic republics. The coup leaders may use force to hit hard at the Baltic governments. (C)

President Menem: We will also follow the situation very closely, George. I heard that shots were fired in Moscow. Maybe this is only the beginning. We are not going to recognize the present government. We are going to insist on the return of democracy. But I want to know, George, when you call for the liberty of Gorbachev, do you mean he has to be restored as President? (C)

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The President: Yes, that is what I mean. He is the constitutional leader of the Soviet Union. The coup leaders have said they will work with him, but Yanayev is acting as if he were Head of State. Gorbachev is, legally, not him. I have tried to call Gorbachev twice, but have been unsuccessful. (Ø)

President Menem: Finally, George, I would like to know if I can make this conversation public in Argentina? (Ø)

The President: Yes, of course. I would welcome that. I would like to make it public up here as well. I think we are both looking at the situation in the same way, and will say so. (Ø)

President Menem: Good. I am going to make it known to the press, and would like you to do the same in the United States. If you can think of anything we can do to help, just give me a phone call and we will do it. (Ø)

The President: Good. Statements from you and other leaders are important to the cause of democracy in the Soviet Union. If you talk to any of the other leaders in the region, please tell them to speak out with the same determination you and I have. Your support is important. (Ø)

President Menem: Good, George. I will get in touch with the other Presidents in the region and let them know about our conversation. Please accept my best wishes for you and your family. (Ø)

The President: Thanks. The same to all your family. Barbara is with me now, and she appreciates your thoughts. I am on vacation now in Kennebunkport, and will be here until the first week in September. I will be following the situation from here. Please call me if you need to discuss this further. Just give me a call. (Ø)

President Menem: Okay, thank you very much. As always, I have the greatest affection for you and wish you the very best. (Ø)

The President: One last thing. Be sure to practice up on your tennis so we can play this fall. (U)

President Menem: Okay, thank you. I want to congratulate you. Your football team won against our team in Italy today. (U)

The President: Oh, really? Great. Good-bye, now. We'll be talking to you soon. (U)

President Menem: So long. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Republic, USSR
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Boris Yeltsin, President Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko Notetaker: Beth Sanner (NSC Staff)
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 21, 1991, 8:30 - 9:05am Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Boris, how are you doing today? (U)

President Yeltsin: Well I've spent the last 2 days sitting in the Parliament building without leaving the premises. Mr. President, I want to tell you I had discussions with Kryuchkov and the military and the forces were stopped. Tens of thousands of people stopped them from storming the building. (S)

This morning the Russian Supreme Soviet was in session and unanimously decided to categorically say the coup attempt is illegal and will not have any affect on Russian territory. The Supreme Soviet supported all decrees and decisions I have made as President of Russia. They also gave me additional powers to see to it that if local authorities support the junta, they can be removed from office. (S)

Overnight an agreement was reached between me and Kryuchkov that we would fly together to where Gorbachev is being held. But the Supreme Soviet, for safety reasons, will not allow me to leave. Prime Minister Silayev and Vice President Rutskoy have been sent instead, also Primakov and Bakatin are on their way there. (S)

Unfortunately, forty minutes before our group departed, 5 of the junta including Yazov flew out before us. What they want to do is intercept Gorbachev and either force him to sign a paper or take him to points unknown. (S)

What I'm trying to do is work with Kravchuk (head of Ukraine) to intercept them and have them land in Simferopol' in the Crimea and not let them get to him (Gorbachev) first. Now there are three aircraft flying in that direction, trying to get there first. (S)

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The danger of the siege remains as before. The group commander of the air assault troops refused to follow orders of the Ministry of Defense and has decided to come over to the Russian side. Following my order, he has left Moscow with his forces and gone back to base. Our group headed by my Deputy Prime Minister is located in the geographical center of Russia, so in the event that I am taken, Russian leadership will continue. (S)

Also last evening, Kravchuk and Nazarbayev reported that they too decided not to fulfill decisions by the junta. Tens of thousands of Muscovites continue to surround the RSFSR building. And, based on my order, all forces and tanks are moving out to the periphery of Moscow. However, there remain KGB spetznaz forces not following my orders and still capable of attack. This is the situation at this hour. (S)

The President: Can I ask some questions? Will Kravchuk cooperate with you in seeing that the five coup members will not meet with Gorbachev? (S)

President Yeltsin: I'm not sure. Kravchuk said he would do everything possible, however, those planes are jam-packed with security forces. He promised that air traffic controllers in Ukraine would make them land in Simferopol' and not where Gorbachev is. But I'm not sure because there are other technical problems. (S)

The President: Can anyone in the USSR get in touch with Gorbachev? (S)

President Yeltsin: No, because even I have tried several times today. You need a special switching device. We are told by operators that we can't get through not even to any of his assistants. Either we can't get through or they are blocking us. Through Gorbachev's guards we have determined that Gorbachev is quite healthy and determined not to sign any documents that would give his power to anyone. If we can't intercept the group in the Crimea we will attempt to intercept when they return to Moscow. We are ready to do this. I can't give you the details about it over this phone. (S)

The President: I understand. What has happened to the other three coup members. (S)

President Yeltsin: Lukyanov for one is backtracking and making it appear that he never was with the group in the first place and is fully supporting constitutional measures. Those three remaining in Moscow remain to continue managing the coup in Moscow. Pavlov is in bed in the hospital. (S)

The President: Is it a real sickness? (S)

President Yeltsin: No, a diplomatic sickness. (S)

The President: Is Bessmertnykh back in office? (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, but he is maintaining quiet neutrality. (S)

The President: We are anxious to do anything helpful, not counterproductive. Do you have any suggestions? (S)

President Yeltsin: Unfortunately, other than propagandizing our plight and moral support and statements I can't see anything for you, technical or any other way, to help us at this point. The main task now is on 26 August when there will be a USSR Supreme Soviet session. We will try to get a resolution saying that the Committee's takeover is an illegal act. We are working with each of the deputies to guarantee such a vote. The group would then be found to be outside of the law and could be tried. (S)

The President: Are you confident of this now? (S)

President Yeltsin: Well the other side is working hard to lobby people's deputies. We have a lot of delegates from Russia and are trying to influence as much as possible. (S)

The President: I'm glad the democratic process is working. Whatever we can do I will do it. I made a strong statement yesterday in support of you efforts. (U)

President Yeltsin: I thank you very much for that. Yes I did hear of your big statement yesterday. Please don't view this an interference in our internal affairs, this is an important statement by the American President in support of the Soviet people. (U)

The President: What about the Baltic states? (S)

President Yeltsin: As far as the Baltics are concerned, 30 Spetznaz aircraft are being sent. They are beginning to take over a number of sites and locations. What we're trying to do is lobby the commander of the Spetznaz forces to come over to our side and not send troops there. We are now holding discussions with him. If we convince him, he will withdraw forces. He reports to Yazov, the Minister of Defense. (S)

The President: Good luck to you. If you want to call again we can set a time. I will make another statement today. We will mention the call if you think this would be helpful. (U)

President Yeltsin: I thank you very much for your support and kind words. I told the Supreme Soviet of this and it was received well. I think we should talk again tomorrow. (U)

The President: OK, we'll schedule a call for the same time, 8:30 our time. Will it help today if I mention this call? (U)

President Yeltsin: No, no, no, this will not hurt at all. This is excellent. We have some way of getting the information out. We will try to get your statement out to the people. People understand what you are saying and are receiving it well. (U)

The President: People are supporting you. I will tell them again today. Any word of Moiseyev? (S)

President Yeltsin: He is working. He is continuing to carry out orders of the Minister of Defense and our attempts to lobby him have been fruitless. (S)

Thank you very much again. (U)

The President: We will keep supporting you. People throughout the world are supporting you, except Iraq, Libya, and Cuba, crazy little renegade countries. People are supporting you more than you can understand. (S)

President Yeltsin: I will do everything I can to save democracy in Russia and throughout the USSR. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6346

September 2, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: BETH SANNER

SUBJECT: Downgrading the Classification of Presidential Telcons with PM Mulroney and PM Major on August 21

I have determined as the originator of these telcons (PRS log 6346), that the classification for my memorandum to the Executive Secretary dated August 28, 1991 and both Memorandum of Telephone Conversations should be downgraded from Secret to Confidential.

cc Burns
ExecSec
Ficklin
Kay
Sanner

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2012-2265-MR
4/9/2014 MM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Major
Notetaker: Beth Sanner, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 21, 1991, 10:00 a.m. - 10:14 a.m.
Kennebuckport, Maine

Prime Minister Major: Good afternoon. (U)

The President: John. Good morning, how are you? I'm going by your time since the events over where you are are controlling the world. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I always forget time there. (U)

The President: Nothing particularly new, except I had an interesting 35 minute phone call with Yeltsin this morning. I talked a few minutes ago to him, thought I could fill it in for you. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I haven't spoken with Yeltsin today. (U)

The President: Yeltsin is more confident now, but he's not declaring victory. He's been in the Parliament for the last two days, there are still some tanks around. Tens of thousands of people were out there. The Supreme Soviet met today and unanimously labeled the coup illegal. There will be a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and they are lobbying the delegates to declare the coup illegal. As you know there are still hard-liners in that organization. That meeting is on the 26th. (C)

Overnight Yeltsin had a meeting with Kruychkov. They agreed to fly out to meet Gorbachev, but the Supreme Soviet would not allow it because of safety reasons. They are sending their Prime Minister, Primakov, and Bakatin, who are all pro-Yeltsin, to the Crimea to see him. Unfortunately 40 minutes before, the junta, led by Yazov, headed out and will try to force Gorbachev to sign something or take him away. Kravchuk is trying to deflect them. Nazarbayev and Kravchuk are behind Yeltsin. It is a race or a game to see Gorbachev. (C)

Yeltsin told me that the danger of a siege remains. The commander of the air assault troops has come over to Yeltsin and

is withdrawing to base. The Deputy Prime Minister has been deployed to the center of Russia in case anything happens to him. Kravchuk and Nazarbayev refused to obey the coup last night. Yeltsin is also in touch with KGB chairman Kruychkov. The big question is whether Kravchuk can stop them. (C)

We heard that Thatcher called Reagan, because they have "been in it together since the beginning." I'll speak to Reagan in the hospital and keep him informed. He is going into the hospital. We don't need any outside contacts at this point. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'm not surprised. (U)

The President: I'll try to see if we can be helpful, maybe Reagan can be helpful. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We can try. I'm sorry about that. Its a problem we're having here. (C)

The President: Yeltsin said he was given a special switching device to get calls into Gorbachev, but couldn't get through, the operators wouldn't let him through. Guards say that Gorbachev is healthy. This is good news. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That's very good news. (U)

The President: Of course he's been wrong on things before, the five minutes thing. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Absolutely, even if that was an error in translation, and we don't believe it was. I just spoke with Embassy Moscow. There are some contradictions with what Yeltsin told you. They heard that coup leaders were headed for Kirghizia. There are also rumors that some of the 8 have been arrested. A chap called Filiov went with Kruychkov to see Gorbachev. However, I think what you heard from Yeltsin is likely to be correct. (C)

The President: I think so. He said his people had gone down there. That Lukyanov was backtracking. Pavlov is in his hospital bed, a diplomatic illness. I asked if Bessmertnykh was back. I said he was a career man. Yeltsin seemed to scoff at this. I'm wondering when the diplomatic stuff will resume. He said we are going out again this morning in support of the government and constitution. He mentioned the 26 August Supreme Soviet meeting. It sounds like politics is normal there, they are lobbying the delegates. But the other side is lobbying too. (C)

Prime Minister Major: The politics are very intense, too. If and when Gorbachev returns to Moscow the politics between Yeltsin and Gorbachev will be intense. We met with Kagalovski, an economic advisor to Yeltsin, this morning and he had 3 basic messages. First that he was very grateful for our support. Second, do not underestimate the value of moral support as the messages from Western capitals are getting through. And third

that the events are moving in favor of the republics, not the union. Yeltsin will have the upper hand. (C)

The President: That seems clear. I talked to Ambassador Strauss, who talked with Braithwaite who said they were sending people down to the Crimea to meet with Gorbachev. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I spoke with the Embassy just 5 minutes ago. Ambassador Braithwaite will be staying in Moscow. Jeff Morel is at the airport and will be heading to the Crimea with parliamentarians from US, Germany, France, and possibly the European Commission. Whether they have taken off I don't know, I've asked Ambassador Braithwaite to contact me when he returns from the airport. (C)

The President: Our man missed the plane I think. Yeltsin is trying to gain control of the airport so when the coup group return he can take control of them. (C)

Yeltsin said that 30 planes of Spetznaz troops were going to the Baltics. He is trying to get them on his side. Whether they are going to or not is not sure. He's trying to woo the leader and get him not to send them into the Baltics. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I have just had a note handed to me. Tass is reporting "committee of eight disbanded." Those who gave it to Tass I don't know. (C)

The President: What does that mean? It looks like things are going in the right direction and we do not want to declare victory yet. We don't want to undermine Yeltsin and want to be careful of Gorbachev's position. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Alas. We need to be very careful about Gorbachev. Yeltsin's position has been remarkably strengthened. ... Gorbachev may be in a difficult position indeed. (C)

The President: No? At least they are staying together. Out of this we may have a different looking Soviet Union. But out of this Gorbachev's power will be retained. (C)

Prime Minister Major: He was amazingly brave over the last 48 hours. These have been a momentous couple of days, no? (C)

The President: Amazing. Holler if you hear any more. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Mulroney
Notetaker: Beth Sanner, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 21, 1991, 2:17 p.m. - 2:22 p.m.
Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Brian? Pretty nice developments. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Well congratulations to you on quarterbacking quite a thing. (U)

The President: I don't know about quarterbacking, but the results are very encouraging. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I can tell you my Mother turned 79 today. She saw you on TV outside the house. She told me she saw President Bush say he talked to President Gorbachev. She said she couldn't have had a nicer birthday present. (U)

The President: Isn't that sweet? It was a very emotional call. Gorbachev was very upbeat, grateful, and friendly on the line. Same 'ole Gorby. Problems still exist, for sure. There are rumors all over the place. We don't really know how many of the rumors are true. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: What did he have to say to you George? (U)

The President: He's in control, and has placed Moiseyev in control of the military. Yazov is doing what Gorbachev wants, pulling forces back from Moscow. You know, Yakovlev called Baker in Brussels to say that Yazov had committed suicide, but Gorbachev didn't seem to know anything about that. He said that he understood that five of the coup plotters were coming to see him, and I don't know if they made it. Gorbachev's guards remained loyal to him throughout this episode. He felt that it was over, and that he had to go back to Moscow and take care of things. He said it was a victory for democracy and reform. If his caution was caused by balancing on a tightrope then he will not have to worry about the rightwing hardliners for now. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yeltsin played a fantastic role. (Ø)

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The President: Yes, he did. Gorbachev was very grateful for the statements from the West. I didn't know if he had been held incommunicado, or if he had gotten any news. He was a confident and ebullient person ... I played it a little short outside. They asked me "are you declaring the coup over?" I said I'm not declaring anything. We've had people here, I haven't even seen the TV. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Can we safely release this to the media without it bouncing back on us? (C)

The President: I just said that this is what I was told by Gorbachev. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Did he say when he was going back to Moscow, George? (C)

The President: Tonight or tomorrow morning. I think tomorrow morning. After I had the press conference I took the gang out for a stormy boat ride. When we returned, I stepped on to the pier, and they told me "a head of state is on the line," and I asked which head-of-state, and they said that they couldn't tell us on this phone. Later, they told me it was Gorbachev. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I don't want to needlessly intrude, but how did you put your call through to Gorbachev? (C)

The President: I don't know. We placed this call this morning, and then they told us that they had put it through. Scowcroft told the operator to put it through to us. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'll give it a shot. May I go through your switchboard if we can't get through? We'll try to get some good words through. (C)

The President: Go ahead and try. The more contacts he has with the West, the better. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Again, I thought you quarterbacked it skillfully. Best to your family. (U)

The President: Bye.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Mikhail Gorbachev, President of USSR Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko Notetaker: Beth Sanner (NSC Staff)
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 21, 1991, 12:19 - 12:31pm Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Oh my God, that's wonderful. Mikhail! (U)

President Gorbachev: My dearest George. I'm so happy to hear your voice again. (U)

The President: My God I'm glad to hear you. How are you doing? (U)

President Gorbachev: Mr. President, the adventurers have not succeeded. I have been here four days. They tried to pressure me, using every method. They had me blocked by sea and land. My guards protected me, we withstood the challenge. ~~(S)~~

The President: Where are you now? (U)

President Gorbachev: I'm in the Crimea. It's only been one hour since I have assumed Presidential powers. I have maintained full contact with the Republic leaders and handed over the Ministry of Defense to Moiseyev. He is to follow my orders only. Troops are to move out of the city or back to where they are normally based. ~~(S)~~

The President: That's good. (U)

President Gorbachev: Everything we've done together to improve cooperation with the republics has worked beautifully. All of them have taken positions of principle. The greatest opponent of these illegal acts was Yeltsin, the Supreme Soviet, Kravchuk, Nazarbayev, and K... ~~(S)~~

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The President: Well I was damned worried about it. (U)

President Gorbachev: You know this was a terrible tragedy. It showed that the adventurers won't succeed. The society is different now. Things like this won't work. (S)

The President: Where are the adventurers? (U)

President Gorbachev: Some are coming this way to me. I don't know what they are bearing in their hands. The next two days I must make all these crucial decisions. (S)

The President: Have you talked to Yeltsin yet? (S)

President Gorbachev: He was the first one. (S)

The President: I don't know what news you've been getting, but we've been supporting Yeltsin and you as President of the USSR. (S)

President Gorbachev: I have to congratulate you and the position you took from the first minute. You have been stalwart. Thanks for taking off from your vacation. You affected everyone with your strong statements, except Qadhafi. (S)

The President: Don't know what news you got in the last few days. (U)

President Gorbachev: I was cut off completely. (S)

The President: Were you filled in just now? (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, everything started with me now. (S)

The President: When are you going back to Moscow? (S)

President Gorbachev: Either tonight or early tomorrow morning. (S)

The President: Good luck. If I can say or do anything I will be available night or day. Don't hesitate to call. (U)

President Gorbachev: Yes, George, absolutely. I will have the need to talk to you. I have to go back to take some urgent, necessary steps and then we will have some matters to discuss with you. (S)

The President: I'm happy that you are safe and back. Barbara is here and sends her love to Raisa. (U)

President Gorbachev: George, thank you and Barb both for your position of principle, but also for your humanity and friendship. (U)

The President: Just glad you're well. I want to say to the press and the world that we've had this conversation. (U)

President Gorbachev: Yes, I'd only be thankful to you for that. (U)

The President: I'll get that message out to the whole world now. Bless you and your family. (U)

President Gorbachev: We want to keep going ahead with you. We will not falter because of what happened. One thing is that this was prevented by democracy. This is a guarantee for us. We will keep working in the country and out to keep cooperation going. ~~(S)~~

The President: Sounds like the same old Mikhail Gorbachev, one full of life and confidence. Once you get back we'll talk about what to work on since our talks in Moscow. ~~(S)~~

President Gorbachev: OK, George. Please proceed on this basis. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan on August 21, 1991
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan Interpreter: Frances Seeds Notetaker: Torkel Patterson
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 21, 1991, 7:00 - 7:10pm EDT Kennebunkport, Maine

The President telephoned Prime Minister Kaifu concerning the Soviet Union situation. (U)

The President: How are you Toshiki? (U)

PM Kaifu: I am doing very well. (U)

The President: Well, I placed this call to you originally before I talked to Gorbachev, but I have since talked with Gorbachev. I had simply wanted to bring you up to date on a call I had with Yeltsin, but that is outdated now by the fast moving news. (U)

All in all, I think it is good news today. I had a very good talk with Gorbachev. He was upbeat and quite encouraged about this. (U)

I think this is a good bet. When he goes back he will not have to worry about his military right or his KGB right, if it all works out the way he and Yeltsin think it will. (C)

I know you have a lot at stake in how this all works out, that's why I placed this call. I can at least say I think it is very good news. (U)

PM Kaifu: Thank you very much. I would like to express my appreciation for your leadership and also for the public support you helped generate throughout the world in bringing this coup to a possible end. I am happy to share this joyful sentiment with you at this moment. (U)

The President: Toshiki, we want you to feel included. We feel Japan is very important and a key player when we have a crisis of this nature. (U)

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PM Kaifu: I would like to say, George, that I did speak directly to Yeltsin this morning, Japan time, and I had told him to continue his present actions. I lauded his actions up to date, working very hard to bring an end to this situation. (C)

The President: Thank you and we will stay in touch on this and any other problem. I am delighted it has worked out this way and I know you are too. Again, please don't hesitate to contact me. (U)

PM Kaifu: I will also call you up to keep in touch with you regarding this and any other problems. (U)

The President: Good Luck, my friend. (U)

PM Kaifu: Thank you George.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic, USSR

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Boris Yeltsin, President
Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko
Notetaker: Ed A. Hewett (NSC Staff)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 21, 1991, 9:20 - 9:31pm
Kennebunkport, Maine

President Yeltsin: Good morning, Mr. President. I'm calling from the House of the Supreme Soviet. (U)

President Bush: I'm delighted. (U)

President Yeltsin: As we agreed, I'm reporting on the latest events. (U)

President Bush: Please do. (U)

President Yeltsin: Russian Prime Minister Silayev and Vice President Rutskoy have brought President Gorbachev back to Moscow unharmed and in good health. I am also reporting to you that Defense Minister Yazov, Prime Minister Pavlov, and KGB Chairman Kryuchkov have been taken into custody... ~~(S)~~

President Bush: Isn't that interesting. (U)

President Yeltsin: ...and, upon my order, with legal sanction, the prosecuting Attorney General of the Soviet Union has begun a case against all conspirators. ~~(S)~~

President Bush: I see. (U)

President Yeltsin: I want to congratulate you with the fact that in our country democracy has won a great victory. We must work together so that this will never repeat itself. Thank you very, very much for your tremendous help and support for us in the eyes of the whole world. I congratulate you myself and thank the American people. (U)

President Bush: My friend, your stock is sky-high over here. You displayed respect for law and stood for democratic principles. Congratulations. You were the ones on the front

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line, who stood on the barricades - all we did was support you. You brought Gorbachev back intact. You restored him to power. You have won a lot of friends around the world. We support and congratulate you on your courage and what you've done. If you will not accept some advice from a friend - get some rest, get some sleep. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. Well, Mr. President, I want to say that victory triumphed. Thank you for your kind words and support during these past 72 hours. The Russian people deserve the victory and can be proud. There are no more barricades. The bad guys can't get to the barricades. It has been a great day for democracy. Now I will get some sleep. (U)

President Bush: It is a wonderful day for the world. My heartfelt congratulations to you and all who stood with you. It was a wonderful example to the world. God bless you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Mr. President. We will maintain and be in contact. We have received tremendous moral support from you the last several days. (U)

President Bush: Thank you. Now get some rest. We will be in touch and are thinking of you. Boris, one more question - is General Moiseyev behaving? ~~(S)~~

President Yeltsin: No, he is not. Basically, no. We are not holding him under guard. That is for President Gorbachev to decide. My orders were for Yazov, Pavlov, and Kryuchkov only. ~~(S)~~

President Bush: Goodbye and congratulations. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 26, 1991, 8:28 - 8:51 a.m.
Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Hello. How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good, thanks. I am glad to hear your voice. I wanted to call briefly to discuss the present situation and also talk to you about an appointment. It seems the situation in Moscow is rather ambiguous. Obviously if individual republics gain their sovereignty and independence, I assume it will be a lot more difficult to talk with them. I am a little afraid that in the end there will be all sorts of discussions about borders -- for example, Moldavia's relationship to Romania -- which is why I tend to be rather careful and not to advance too quickly but to look at the situation carefully. I must say I am not quite sure about the real situation with Gorbachev. I don't know whether it is indeed the case that Yeltsin wants to assume his position or whether the secession of the Russian Republic is definite and absolute. Therefore, it is difficult and also ambiguous during this situation of transition. It is of the utmost importance that we remain in the closest possible contact. If you agree, I suggest we call at regular intervals in the next few days. What are your views? (C)

The President: I agree that we should stay in closest possible touch. Second, we have been taking a cautious line because, like you, we don't know yet how it will work out between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The more immediate question for you and me is the recognition of the Baltic states. I don't know what you are going to do, but I am thinking about it right now. Incidentally, Brian Mulroney is visiting me now. I know we will have a Sherpa's meeting and also a meeting of finance ministers. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: It is a good thing that the Sherpas meet there to discuss in a calm and relaxed atmosphere all aspects of the situation, although it is even more complicated now to talk about possible aid when we don't know the set-up. (C)

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The President: That's why I urge caution. I agree that we should take stock of the situation before writing large checks. It is good to discuss the situation, but I told our Sherpa I want no commitments by the U.S. until we can sort out the situation. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That's exactly my position. I am ready to help, but I must know for what. I must say the picture is rather unclear as far as reforms are concerned. It was much clearer in London. (C)

The President: Exactly! That is my view. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We must look very carefully at what the next few days bring. It is good to let the meetings go forward, but we should be very cautious and not pin enormous hopes on these meetings. That could give rise to false expectations. On the second question you mentioned, the Baltic states, I do think we will see a climax during this week. Tomorrow the three foreign ministers of the Balts will meet with their EC counterparts. I think probably this week we will see a majority of the EC members opt for recognition. That corresponds to my view, although it is very clear to me that will give rise to enormous economic problems. I also foresee the enormous psychological effect this will have on the situation in Yugoslavia. (C)

The President: Yep. Helmut, has France recognized Baltic independence? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think I can see a lot of movement in that direction. Francois in this matter has enormous problems on the domestic front. I think, if you agree, it would be a good idea for me to call again at 3:00 p.m. our time, that is 9:00 your time because I think by that time I will have more information from Paris. (C)

The President: That is OK with me. I don't know what we will do today. The same pressures you referred to in France are also present in Canada and here, too. If you are certain the EC will not go off individually and recognize the Balts today, it will give me more time. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I cannot guarantee that. I can try to gather a little more information in the next three hours and relay the information back to the White House. (C)

The President: That would be very helpful. I don't have to do anything before 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, let's do it that way. Either I will call personally or one of my staff will call your staff. (U)

The President: Good. Antall of Hungary is calling me probably to say that he will recognize. Kaifu is also calling. I think they will do the same. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: George, if we are both in agreement, we can call each other later. If we are in agreement, maybe we can announce recognition later today together. (C)

The President: Good. Mulroney is here. I think he will recognize later today. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'll call again in two to three hours. (C)

The President: OK. If we are not here, Brent Scowcroft will be here. We're going out on a boat. If the connection is not good, Brent Scowcroft can receive your call. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: OK, that is no problem. George, one further important point: I am thinking about perhaps coming to see you for 3 to 4 hours, because I will be in California in September to give a talk at the University of California. I have been promising them to come for years, but you know how it is. I keep on promising... (C)

The President: Exactly. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I feel greatly honored. I will be there only briefly, but I also promised Ron Reagan that I would come and see him. So I thought I might leave at night on 16 September and make a special stop in Washington to see you, if that is agreeable. (C)

The President: The only thing that wouldn't be agreeable is if I am out of town. The door is wide open to you. I think I'll be in Washington then. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'll tell my people to get to your people and agree on dates. So, if it is possible for us to meet for 3 or 4 hours, I will be looking forward to seeing you again. There is a lot to discuss. Besides, it doesn't make a very good impression if I stop in the U.S. without seeing you. (C)

The President: I just checked my schedule. I will be in Washington on the 16th so perhaps we could have supper that night. We'll work out something. Brian Mulroney wants to say a quick hello. He's sitting here looking good. (C)

(Pause while connection is broken)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Brian. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Here I am down in Kennebunkport defending your interests. As soon as George Bush said I would talk, you slammed down the phone and hung up. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: It's not true. My suspicion is that you don't know how to operate the instrument. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: It's a little too complicated for a Canadian. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I hope you have a splendid time. Please give our best to your children. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Will do. I look forward to seeing you and Hannelore soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister of Hungary

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Interpreter: Pat Austin
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 26, 1991, 9:00 - 9:13 a.m.
Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Hello, Mr. Prime Minister. How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Good. The reason I wanted to speak to you was to give you some information. People I have commissioned have just gone from one to the other of the Baltic capitals. In 10 minutes, I am going to announce to the parliament that Hungary has taken the first step toward the recognition of their sovereignty. I notified the Soviet Union on Saturday that we are planning to take these steps and our parliament will elaborate on them. The other thing is that I find the situation in Yugoslavia extremely serious. (C)

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, you say first steps toward recognition. Exactly what does that mean? (C)

Prime Minister Antall: It means that in September, the foreign ministers of the three Baltic states are coming to Hungary. Next week, the parliament will pass a resolution in which parliament will authorize the government to begin negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations. So for all practical purposes, what we will announce is pretty close to what has been said by the U.S. since the three Baltic states have declared their independence and since Yeltsin has accepted that. We are not using the term recognition, but will simply take these steps. (C)

The President: That is very interesting. We may do the same very soon. I just haven't made a decision. You are very courteous to call. We should stay in touch. It is quite likely that the U.S. will recognize independence in a more formal way though of course, as you know, we have never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: This we did in our statement on Saturday. (C)

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The President: One other point that concerns me is borders. Lithuania, for example, has quite different borders than it did at the time of incorporation. We, for one, do not want to get into border disputes in all of this. I am sure Hungary doesn't either. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: I think this transitional period will be sufficiently long that we can express how we want it to be worked out. (C)

The President: I appreciate your call very much, my friend. Incidentally, the Prime Minister of Canada is here with me. I think they will be moving in this direction soon, too. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: I would like to pass on best wishes to him, too. I would also like to say once again, I think the situation in Yugoslavia is very, very serious. Yugoslavia is on our border. It looks like river traffic on the Danube will be held up because of the fighting. I think it would be very, very important -- and I spoke to a number of Yugoslav figures about this -- to put pressure, the same kind of sanctions we talked about at the time of the Soviet coup, on the Serbian Communist leaders in order to prevent a catastrophe. (C)

The President: If you have one minute, Brian Mulroney would like to say hello. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Yes. I would like to ask you, Mr. President, to have your military attache visit the border area. (C)

The President: Yes. Here's the Prime Minister. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Hello, Prime Minister, how are you? I am visiting President Bush and wanted to take the opportunity to express the hope you will visit Canada at an early opportunity. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: Thank you very much. I heard we wouldn't be able to coordinate a visit in October when I am in New York, but following that, I would love to come. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I look forward to that and hope to see you soon. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Together with the governments of Europe and President Bush, I really hope you could be of assistance in the Baltic states and Yugoslavia. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, Prime Minister. What do you see in the next few days regarding Yugoslavia? (C)

Prime Minister Antall: Civil war, villages being depopulated and villages surrounded, 10,000 refugees. The situation in eastern Croatia is extremely serious. You can hear cannon fire and

mortar fire from our border. We need to take a hard, firm stand against the Serbian national communists. Thank you. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister. See you soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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24. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	8/26/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/5/91 - 9/25/91

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By MM on 11/13/2018

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan

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2009-0632-MR
2/5/2016 MM

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu
Interpreter: Mrs. Gregg
Notetaker: Torkel Patterson

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 26, 1991, 9:22 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.
Kennebunkport, Maine

Prime Minister Kaifu called the President to discuss the Soviet crisis and diplomatic recognition of the Baltic countries. (U)

The President: Hello, Toshiki? (U)

PM Kaifu: Yes, this is Toshiki speaking. (U)

The President: Good, how are you? What is on your mind today? I am anxious to talk to you. I think it must be the Soviets and the Baltic States. (U)

PM Kaifu: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: I wanted to know what you are calling about, the Soviet Union and the Baltics? Go ahead my friend. (U)

PM Kaifu: George, I called because I thought it was very important for our two countries to be acting concertedly with each other at this critical juncture regarding the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The situation taking place is moving toward the democratization process, and I highly value the positive situation. [redacted] 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: [redacted] 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

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1.4(b); 1.4(d) [redacted]

At this Sherpa meeting they will have a discussion of where things stand. Speaking for the U.S., we are not prepared to enter into big financial commitments or new financial arrangements with the Soviet Union until we know more. (C)

I just got off the phone with Chancellor Kohl and he tells me that he feels we know even less now than we did when we met in London. Kohl was quoted in the New York Times as favoring immediate financial aid. But he told me that is not his position, that we need to know more about what is going on there. (C)

Now there is one other question related to this and that is the recognition of the Baltic states. (U)

PM Kaifu: You mean the Baltic Republics? (U)

The President: Yes. We are coming under increasing domestic and international political pressure to recognize the Baltics. The European Foreign Ministers, Kohl tells me, are meeting tomorrow to discuss this question. With me here in Kennebunkport is your friend Brian Mulroney of Canada. Canada may feel that they should go ahead, maybe today, with this recognition. We too are thinking about it in the next few days. I am interested to know what the Japanese position is on this. (C)

PM Kaifu: Today at the Diet session, although they were having budget committee meetings, I made it clear that we support the peaceful independence of the Baltic Republics, that we should recognize the free will of the people there and that it should be done. (U)

The President: But you have not gone forward with formal recognition yet, is that correct? (U)

PM Kaifu: What I said is that we will be recognizing these three republics after they accomplish their independence in a peaceful manner. (U)

The President: We may move on this in the next day. I think Brian Mulroney may move as soon as today. (C)

One other point, Toshiki, is on the financial side of things. Some are saying if Japan, Canada, and the U.S. had been more forthcoming with money that this coup might not have taken place. I say that is ridiculous. (C)

PM Kaifu: You quoted what Chancellor Kohl told you a few minutes ago. I have read in the newspapers that Chancellor Kohl has been insisting that since Japan and the U.S. have the wealth, they should make more financial contribution to the Soviet Union; but because you have mentioned what he told you I have a better idea of what he is thinking about. (C)

One thing I would like to mention is regarding the upcoming Sherpa meeting of the G-7. I had discussions last night with the key ministers of our country. We have agreed that the upcoming meeting should be one of essentially an information-gathering meeting, rather than a decision-making meeting. Based upon that I have instructed Deputy Foreign Minister Watanabe to keep in close communications with Mr. Zoellick, your Undersecretary of State. (C)

The President: I agree totally with what you have just said. It should be an information meeting and our hands should not be tied by someone else. We will support fully the Japanese position at the Sherpa meetings. The same should be true, I think you would agree, when the Finance Ministers' Deputies get together. (C)

PM Kaifu: I completely agree with you and I will give instructions accordingly. (U)

Just another thing I would like you to know. It is about the overall relationship between Japan and the USSR. The present situation seems to be working favorably for the relationship between Japan and the USSR. From that perspective I am sending my other Deputy Foreign Minister Saito to Moscow tomorrow. If possible I would like him to take my personal message with him to Gorbachev and Yeltsin. (C)

The President: I think it is a very good start, and I hope he gets to see them. (U)

PM Kaifu: I do not know if he will succeed in meeting the two Presidents, but I have given him instructions to get as much information as possible about the present situation in the Soviet Union. (C)

The President: I agree we must watch, be cautious, stay in close communication, say the right things about democracy and not doing something that inadvertently would contribute to anarchy over there. That is why we have been a little cautious about the Baltics and declaring Yeltsin the winner and having Gorbachev discharged. (C)

PM Kaifu: Well, I share your concern, George. (U)

The President: Well, unless you have other items, I think we are on the same wavelength. I think Brian Mulroney would like to say hello if you have an extra minute. (U)

PM Kaifu: Is Brian there then? (U)

The President: Here is the Prime Minister of Canada. Thank you so much for calling, please call at any time. (U)

PM Kaifu: Good bye, George. (U)

----------END OF CONVERSATION----------

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2012-2265-MR
4/7/2014 MM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany, on August 27, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 27, 1991, 11:04 - 11:14 a.m.
Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, George. It's good to hear your voice. I hope you caught a big fish yesterday. (U)

The President: Not bad. Not bad. Are you on vacation, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I am back in my office. Unfortunately, I have to go back to work. I don't feel like it. George, I called you simply to say that we have a meeting of the EC foreign ministers at this very moment in The Hague. I take it that they will decide to recognize the independence of the Baltic states. That is the formal decision that we intend to take tomorrow morning in our cabinet. (C)

The President: That's very interesting. I'm not surprised and most countries are doing this. Undoubtedly, the U.S. will do that fairly soon. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: My intention was to tell you beforehand of the decision. (C)

The President: That's very considerate. I wish we knew a little more about what affect this will have on the other republics. I wish we knew more about control of territory and who we're dealing with on these security matters, but we don't so we will have to make decisions with less information than I like. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, George, my tendency is very obvious. I will tell all the other republics that they should try to find a reasonable solution within the union, that they should stay together with Gorbachev. The news we heard was that the advisor to Yeltsin declared first of all that Yeltsin did not have the intention to stand as a candidate against Gorbachev. He made a statement on behalf of Yeltsin. Their intention was to cooperate

closely with Gorbachev. That is something that I told Yeltsin on the phone, too. I believe that the Balkanization of the Soviet Union would be catastrophic. The Baltics are a special case because of the Hitler-Stalin pact, but the idea that the Ukraine would try to separate is altogether different. (C)

The President: They have declared their independence or cited their desire for independence. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think the question of what they really mean -- whether they are claiming that as part of a federation. (C)

The President: Well, I think the jury is still out on that one. But I think basically your point of not suggesting that everybody leave at once, or suggesting that there needs to be some cooperation with the center, is a good point. Apparently Gorbachev told the meeting this morning keep the union or I'll resign. He may resign. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I at least hope that he remains in office. (C)

The President: I think we do, too. It's hard to know. It seems like his power is curtailed. Ambassador Strauss is sitting here with me. He just got back from Moscow. We're just beginning to talk about the situation there. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: In any case, we should remain in contact, George. (U)

The President: Absolutely, and on this Sherpa meeting, we've instructed our Sherpa that for the U.S. at least there will be no commitments at this point. I hope Germany feels the same way. I think you told me yesterday that you did. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: What we have to do right now is learn more before we can take a decision. (C)

The President: We need to talk after the meeting. I'm very interested in what they all think and what they conclude. As far as the U.S. goes, I still feel they need to get on with these reforms. Otherwise, we'll be right back where we were at the G-7 in London. The money going in there won't help except possibly for food aid. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I agree and I said that in a public statement today. We can only provide help for self-help. (C)

The President: I totally agree. You're very thoughtful, and I appreciate your call. It is important that Germany and the U.S., you and I, stay in close touch on all of this. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'll be keeping in touch with you, George, perhaps next week. (C)

The President: OK. Have a good day and thanks for calling. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, give my greetings to Bob Strauss. I'm a long-standing admirer of his. I think it was a great idea of yours to send him to Moscow. (U)

The President: I'll tell him. He appreciates it very much. Our love to Hannelore. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: And to Barbara. (U)

The President: Helmut, Dick Cheney is sitting here and he sends his best also. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
26. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Hawke of Australia [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	8/27/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/5/91 - 9/25/91

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 11/13/2018

Date Closed:	2/5/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91113-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0632-MR(505)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	2/5/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
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Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



6342

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Hawke of Australia
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Prime Minister Robert Hawke Notetaker: Peter Watson
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 27, 1991, 9:10 p.m. - 9:24 p.m. Kennebunkport, Maine

The President called Prime Minister Hawke to discuss the Soviet crisis and diplomatic recognition of the Baltic Republics. (U)

The President: Hello, Bob? (U)

PM Hawke: Hello. (U)

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0632-MR
2/5/2016 MM

The President: Hello, how are you? (U)

PM Hawke: I am well, thanks George. (U)

The President: I just called because I have talked to Dan Quayle and he told me about your call to him. Thank you for that, I got the message, I understand perfectly Australia's position on the Baltics and we ourselves will probably move on that soon. I am waiting for one or two more things. I just do not want to move when things are still unclear. I am also waiting to talk to Gorbachev again. Thank you for your call to Dan. (C)

PM Hawke: No problem. Things are certainly moving with dramatic speed in the Soviet Union. Right now the question is how much of the Soviet Union is going to be left. Power seems to be moving from the center to the Republics. The issue of great concern to us is what, if any, authority will be left in the Soviet Union if it all dissolves. (C)

The President: Exactly right, I do not know either. We have held back on the Baltics because other Republics are demanding freedom. We want to be sure the center has the opportunity to move. I hope they will agree to turn loose the Baltics. But our decision probably will not happen before the end of the week. Yeltsin would like to have us move now. (C)

PM Hawke: What is interesting is that in his speech today, Gorbachev did not make any mention of succession. We feel that the Baltics satisfy guidelines of international law for recognition. We intrinsically felt it was the right thing to do.

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We have a very large number of people of Baltic origin and it is a matter of great, passionate concern to them. We thought we ought to be on the front of the list in their recognition. We are certain that the process which will eventuate is irreversible. (C)

The President: It is a good thing. The European Community will do so soon. Major will be in Maine tomorrow. After I have heard from him, I also expect to hear from Gorbachev and I think we will do the same thing at the end of the week. (C)

PM Hawke: 1.4(b); 1.4(d) [redacted]

The President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d) [redacted] He was a great hero of the people. He is not a humble man or a man of moderation. (C)

PM Hawke: I think you are going to start to see some concern from the Republics about the Yeltsin-led Russia. The question of how that is sorted out will be important as to how they continue their reformation, and also how we channel economic assistance. (C)

The President: Also, we do not know who we are dealing with. (C)

PM Hawke: Well, the area where we can definitely lend a hand with is in the area of know how, technical assistance, and management training. We will try to provide help in that respect. Fundamentally, there is going to be an emergence of people who will need the understanding of decision making in a market oriented economy. (C)

The President: I think that is a good way to do it; we will not send money until we see reforms. (C)

PM Hawke: George, on Yugoslavia. In the last week, with the drama of the Soviet Union, that tragedy has been put to one side. The rate of killing is escalating. The Europeans, with best will of the world, have not succeeded in a peaceful resolution. We have a quarter of a million people from parts of Yugoslavia. I do not know what you are thinking about that, but I think we may have to do something through the United Nations to address the situation. (C)

The President: I do not think we can solve it or you can solve it. We hoped the European Community could solve the problem, but perhaps we should work through the UN. (C)

PM Hawke: I think it may have to go to the UN. We are going to see additional fighting on the southern flank. It could be very brutal. (C)

The President: Nice talking to you, I just wanted to touch base to be sure we see things eye to eye, I think we do. (U)

PM Hawke: A few more things. Finally, we are looking very much forward to your visit. I hope that is on track. We understand you are looking at the first week in December, is that right? (U)

The President: Yes, we are working out the details, I know I am coming, so batten down the hatches. (U)

PM Hawke: I hope you can make it three days, Australia is a great country and would be difficult to justify your visit in less than three days. A second thing, I spoke with Sembler and your people, it would be very important, George, if you could agree to a meeting with our farmers representatives. If you could meet them and listen to what they have to say, it would be very helpful to diffuse a larger protest, for example. Third, not the least important thing, with great regret I cannot get an honest answer as to what your golf handicap is. (C)

The President: Well, I cannot discuss that without diminishing national security. (U)

PM Hawke: Your Vice President would not give me a straight answer. (U)

The President: Well, it depends on where we are playing. I'm pretty bad. I played with Arnold Palmer up here; I'm just hopeless in the game, but I love playing. (U)

PM Hawke: George, I would like to close on a serious note. Thank you for the assistance with our agricultural delegation that came to the U.S. This enabled them to talk about the Export Enhancement Program. We still have problems on this issue. One thing to mention, could you look at the idea of a possible moratorium between the U.S. and the EC on not going into any area that is not previously corrupted by subsidized sales. This would be very helpful. (C)

The President: Let me talk to my people and I will see what I can do about that. (U)

PM Hawke: I appreciate the call and look forward to seeing you. (U)

The President: Good bye Bob. (U)

END OF CONVERSATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6342 Add-on

September 3, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: DOUGLAS PAAL

FROM: PETER WATSON

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Hawke of Australia

At Tab A is a portion of the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Hawke of Australia to be sent to Department of Agriculture.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the portion of the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab I Sittmann/Nelson Memo
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
Cap 6/1/09

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Hawke of Australia
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Prime Minister Robert Hawke Notetaker: Peter Watson
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 27, 1991, 9:10 p.m. - 9:24 p.m. Kennebunkport, Maine

. . . .

PM Hawke: George, I would like to close on a serious note. Thank you for the assistance with our agricultural delegation that came to the U.S. This enabled them to talk about the Export Enhancement Program. We still have problems on this issue. One thing to mention, could you look at the idea of a possible moratorium between the U.S. and the EC on not going into any area that is not previously corrupted by subsidized sales. This would be very helpful. (C)

The President: Let me talk to my people and I will see what I can do about that. (U)

PM Hawke: I appreciate the call and look forward to seeing you. (U)

The President: Good bye Bob. (U)

END OF CONVERSATION

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2009-0632-MR
2/5/2016 MM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2012-2265-MR
4/7/2014 MM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Corazon Aquino Notetaker: Peter Watson
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 27, 1991, 9:39 p.m. - 9:55 p.m. Kennebunkport, Maine

The President called President Aquino to congratulate her on recent signing of base agreements and to discuss events in the Soviet Union. (C)

The President: Hello? (U)

President Aquino: Hello Mr. President. (U)

The President: How are you? I am delighted to hear from you. (U)

President Aquino: You are looking well, I have seen you on the TV and you look good. (U)

The President: Well, thank you. We are having a good vacation although it has been interrupted by Soviet matters, as everyone's has been. Well, I am delighted we have been able to successfully complete the Treaty. (U)

President Aquino: Yes, we finally signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, but we are facing an uphill battle in the Senate. I have asked your Ambassador to talk to our Senators and hopefully address their concerns. (C)

The President: Is he starting to do that? (U)

President Aquino: Yes, he has talked to three Senators. I need 16 to ratify the Treaty. Two have asked me if there was something we can do about debt relief. I wanted to pass this on to you to let you know we would like to get some help in that regard. (C)

The President: We can certainly talk about that. Have you got some formal request on that? (C)

President Aquino: I have spoken to your Ambassador on this. Our Secretary of Finance is preparing some materials and they will be

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passed on to me. Perhaps he could forward it to you or the Secretary of the Treasury so that we can get help in this regard. (C)

The President: Let me take a look, I will see Secretary Brady soon. I do not know ... I do not want to say something without knowing more details. (C)

President Aquino: Because of Mount Pinatubo we need the help, debt relief. The eruption .... (U)

The President: It has been bad? (U)

President Aquino: Yes, mud flows are causing havoc especially in the agricultural lands. Ash has spewed out of the volcano and with the rains, all of this has been flowing into the agricultural areas, it has destroyed bridges and made roads impassable. (U)

The President: We will look at the proposal as soon as it comes in. I am pleased about the Treaty. I want you to know, we will stand by every commitment in it. I am convinced it will lead to strengthening in our relationship. (C)

President Aquino: I was on TV and talked about the Treaty, the friendship portion is something I highly regard. And in this regard, I am hoping that by working with your Ambassador he can really help me in this by explaining to the Senators what they ought to expect in the future -- because they will have to address their constituents. (C)

The President: Are you worried about the vote? (U)

President Aquino: I am not confident about the 16 votes I need. If I could have some debt relief I could probably get two Senators, and possibly more. Right now I am sure of 12 or 13 votes. (C)

The President: Let us see what we can do when we get some specifics. About the Soviet Union, what is your view? (U)

President Aquino: We are very happy to see the events in the Soviet Union, we are glad for the people. Our people power movement has brought about very significant results. You know we started the people power. (U)

The President: You were the initiators of people power. I think this is a very big thing, but there are still a lot of details to be sorted out. The rush to independence, I can understand, but there has to be some order as this great big union dissolves. We have to define what it means. (C)

President Aquino: We know how difficult transition is from dictatorship to democracy. We are all looking to the U.S. to help democracy in the respective countries that want democracy. (U)

The President: The U.S. will do what it can. Have you recognized the Baltics yet? (C)

President Aquino: It has not been recommended to me yet. My priorities have been on the treaty and its ratification. I am speaking to some Senators and pushing them for ratification and have asked for their help. A crucial point would be the debt relief. (C)

The President: Okay, I can look into it. It has been very nice talking to you. (U)

President Aquino: Thank you, give my best to Bar and I hope everything is well with you both. (U)

The President: Everything is fine. We are very lucky John Major is coming up tomorrow, then we will go back to Washington in another five days. (U)

President Aquino: Thank you and I hope to be hearing from you again soon. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

END OF CONVERSATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6503

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 5, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN SIGNED

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Telcon with Lithuanian President Landsbergis on August 31, 1991

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Vytautas Landsbergis of Lithuania on August 31, 1991.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab I Bill Sittmann's memo to Robert Pearson
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By ko NARA, Date 7/10/09

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Landsbergis of Lithuania (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Vytautas Landsbergis
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Arunas Pemkus

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 31, 1991, 1:07 - 1:13pm
Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Hello, Mr. President. How are you, sir? (U)

President Landsbergis: Hello, Mr. President. I am waiting for word from you. (U)

The President: I'm calling because I want you to know that I will make an important announcement on Monday. I think it will please you very much. (U)

President Landsbergis: I am very happy to hear that. (U)

The President: I hope that we have been doing work behind the scenes that will help you. We have a good team on this and we remain fully committed to your independence. I would appreciate your not saying publicly exactly what I intend to do but I did want you to know about it. ~~(C)~~

President Landsbergis: It is very nice from your side to call me. (U)

The President: I appreciated your comments on television. I know how anxious people are for this and how anxious you must be. I am too. Your comments were very helpful. ~~(C)~~

President Landsbergis: We trust in you and the U.S. at this very hard moment. ~~(C)~~

The President: I am grateful for that. I do not plan to call the other leaders today but may do so on Monday. I wanted you to know about my planned announcement. ~~(C)~~

President Landsbergis: Thank you. Can I inform my people of your information? ~~(C)~~

The President: Please hold off on an explicit announcement. You could say that I called and that you and I had a satisfactory

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call. That would leave me some room. Please use your own judgment but it would be better for me if you just said that. ~~(C)~~

President Landsbergis: I will just say to my people that we talked and you will have an important announcement on Monday. ~~(C)~~

The President: That is fine. Say you expect an announcement from us. That's good. These are fascinating times and I want you to know that we are with you. ~~(C)~~

President Landsbergis: These are great times here. (U)

The President: All right, sir. It is good to talk to you and best of luck. (U)

President Landsbergis: Good health to you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: We will not waver on our course. I would like to salute the great courage that you and the Lithuanian people have shown. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6504

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Latvian President Gorbunovs (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Anatoliy Gorbunovs
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Maija Lelis

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 2, 1991, 9:07 - 9am : 12pm
Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Hello, Mr. President. I am calling to tell you that in one hour we will go ahead with formal recognition of Latvia and the other Baltic states. This is good timing and I believe that we are going in the right direction. I just wanted you to know that. We have been working behind the scenes trying to get positive statements from the center. I believe we heard one yesterday. And I hope that will bring good news. I know that you have been waiting for a long time. I think our own policy is headed in the right direction. We never wavered in our support for your independence and our respect for those who have been fighting for it for a long, long time. (Ø)

President Gorbunovs: Mr. President, permit me to express my gratitude that you have taken this step and that diplomatic relations between Latvia and the U.S. will be re-established. I believe that your long-standing democratic tradition will help us to establish our own democracy. (U)

The President: I hope that it has that effect. I think people understand why we needed a few more days. I have tried to work on the inside to speed up your independence. (Ø)

President Gorbunovs: I agree with that completely. (U)

The President: Good luck. Best of luck to you. I look forward to working with you en route to total and complete independence for Latvia. I will send a representative in the near future to discuss these details with you. (Ø)

President Gorbunovs: Thank you. We look forward to that. We will do all within our powers to build a secure future. I hope that we will build a good and peaceful one. (U)

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The President: Well, good luck. I have great respect for you and the people of Latvia. I trust things will go well in the days and weeks ahead. (U)

President Gorbunovs: Thank you. I wish you success in everything. (U)

The President: Thank you very much, sir. I will make that announcement in about forty-five minutes. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Estonian President Arnold Ruutel (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Arnold Ruutel
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Irene Andersen

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 2, 1991, 9:24 - 9:33am
Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Mr. President, I am calling to say that in a few minutes I will make an announcement on the Baltics. I am very pleased that this announcement will be made. I have been working with the Soviets behind the scenes and would like you to know that I am very happy to make this announcement. It will be on television in about thirty minutes. So, I am very happy to talk to you. (C)

President Ruutel: I would like to thank you for your continued support and for this important decision. This is a most important step to assure our new independence. It is very important that the U.S. has made this decision and it will help to avoid any possible violence against the Baltic states. (C)

Considering the changing and complicated situation in Moscow, Mr. President, I would like to make one more request. I have been informed that neither the USSR nor Gorbachev himself have decided to recognize Baltic independence. Perhaps you could use your influence to convince the Soviets to make this decision. I personally would be very grateful for this step. As I have met with many different countries, I have asked them to accept us in the UN and other international organizations. Mr. President, I hope we can count on your support for this. (C)

The President: I would like to send an envoy to discuss these details. And one of the reasons I took some time on this is that I tried hard to get the Soviets to permit independence. I told Soviet leaders that the best thing they could do for relations with the U.S. would be to give the Balts their independence. I think Gorbachev's statement is a step in the right direction but it does not go far enough. The Congress of People's Deputies should act fully. But on your other questions, my representative will be there soon to talk to you and your people about where we go from here. (C)

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President Ruutel: I am very grateful and will be waiting for him. (U)

The President: Good luck and wait for the announcement. (U)

President Ruutel: Thank you personally from me and on behalf of the Estonian people for your great support. We are ready to receive your envoy. (U)

The President: Good luck to you and the wonderful people of Estonia. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela on September 5, 1991 (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg
Notetaker: William T. Pryce/Robert B. Morley

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 5, 1991, 6:25 - 6:34 p.m. DST
Oval Office

President Perez: Hello? (U)

The President: How are you my friend? (U)

President Perez: Fine. It is such a pleasure to hear from you. It has been a long time. (U)

The President: It has been too darn long. I'm glad to hear your voice again. What can I do for you? (U)

President Perez: A lot of things have happened since we last talked. Fortunately, it seems as though many things are coming together. I am calling about El Salvador. I have been dealing with this matter with the Secretary General in an ongoing fashion. I am pressuring the Secretary General and also representatives of the FMLN. I think, thanks to pressure on the FMLN and the agreement of the Four Friends, the FMLN is going to New York in a more reasonable frame of mind. (C)

The President: Good. (U)

President Perez: I think that they will not insist on having on the agenda the merging of the two armies, which was just impossible. But they will bring it up in the talks. It is a way for them to overcome the situation they have created for themselves. They are also ready to agree to what I call an armed peace, an armistice before the formal cease-fire. Progress also hinges on the Constitutional Assembly or Congress of El Salvador implementing the constitutional changes agreed to in Mexico. In general, I think we are getting closer to rapprochement, reaching agreement, because the FMLN are talking more of the political process and participating in elections. (C)

I've tried but couldn't talk to President Cristiani. I couldn't get through to him. I want to talk to him and get his views on what has happened. (C)

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The President: What views of his are you especially interested in getting? Certainly he is going to think that the news about not joining the two armies is a good idea. (Ø)

President Perez: True. That point was absolutely inadmissable. (Ø)

The President: This is certainly good news. I hope everything moves forward quickly. (Ø)

President Perez: So do I. There is another thing I wanted to raise. I have been talking to the President of the IDB, Enrique Iglesias, about my concerns about the Enterprise for the Americas and the multilateral investment fund. I am in agreement with him and want to support him. I have written letters to the Europeans to get them to fill the fund to $1.5 billion. I have written to the French, the Swedes, the Germans, the Italians and the Spanish, on the assumption the United States is also writing to the Europeans. (Ø)

The President: True. Letters have gone out to the Group of Seven. I hope we will get a favorable response. (Ø)

President Perez: I have also sent letters to the Group of Seven. (Ø)

The President: Good. (U)

President Perez: I will give a copy of our letter to your Ambassador and ask him to send it to you. I think my Minister of the Presidency has already sent a copy of it to General Scowcroft. (Ø)

The President: Good. If you have sent it to Scowcroft, I will get it tomorrow if he got it. I hope that the Europeans, with their renewed interest in developments in Eastern Europe, especially the Baltics, won't have a reduced interest on this. (Ø)

President Perez: There are always problems as one looks to the future. But I am optimistic, all of Latin America is optimistic about what is happening, about the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. (Ø)

The President: Wonderful. We are going to keep fighting for it. (Ø)

President Perez: I think Gorbachev is better off with the Baltics issue behind him. There was no other solution besides independence. (Ø)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Perez: I have been following with great interest your position with respect to the USSR, and am pleased with your attitude toward the crisis. It was always the correct one. (Ø)

The President: Thanks for the kind words. These are important times we are living through. There are very important changes taking place, that history will take note of. I think when we see the history books in twenty years, then it will be clear that these are very important times. (Ø)

President Perez: I agree. I hope to see you at the United Nations General Assembly. (U)

The President: I am looking forward to it very much. I'll buy you a glass of beer. (U)

President Perez: Thank you. (U)

The President: Thanks for calling, see you in New York. (U)

President Perez: See you soon. (U)

The President: So long. (U)

--- End of Conversation ---

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Jane Holl, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 9, 1991, 6:39 - 6:49 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: Hey, Turgut, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you, George. (U)

The President: Where did I get you. Are you in Ankara? (U)

President Ozal: No, in Marmaris. (U)

The President: Oh, you are lucky. Have you got one minute to let me tell you what the problem is? (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes. (U)

The President: OK, I'm calling about the question of Cyprus. Let me go through a couple of points. I know this is late, but evidently the preparations for the Cyprus meeting that you proposed have stalled out in discussions between the UN negotiator and Denktash and, as I understand it, the two were discussing a draft framework agreement which embodies compromises that Turkey could accept and other parties. This was the way it was explained to me. (Ø)

President Ozal: I think the main point, as I understand it, is the Turkish Cypriots would like to see the other side accept political equality and also security measures. As far as I understand, the UN representative did not answer them. (Ø)

The President: Well, here's the problem. We think that there is real danger that the entire enterprise could be jeopardized if Denktash rejects what has already been worked out in Ankara. I think all other parties have been flexible and so our position is that the UN draft is fair. It promises the Turkish Cypriots the kind of partnership that we all felt was needed and we've all gone out -- including yourself -- on the limb here. I'm wondering if we can just keep this man at the table. An agreement would be good for Turkey, the Alliance, U.S.-Turkish

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relations and clearly for Cyprus. I hate to see the talks derailed. I would like you to talk to Denktash and get him to sit there and try to work this matter out. (Ø)

President Ozal: I'll do my best. Unfortunately, tomorrow afternoon the Prime Minister is going to Paris. He is going to meet Mr. Mitsotakis. Can I answer you after he talks to Mitsotakis? (Ø)

The President: If you would let me know. But the big thing is to keep Denktash talking. (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes. I'm going to invite him to Turkey. He asked to talk to me. Then I will invite him and try to get him to the table. He's not an easy man. (Ø)

The President: I understand that. Please tell Yilmaz -- give him my warm personal regards -- and if you agree, you might also tell him that I called to ask the two of you to help. I don't want Yilmaz to think I'm going around him. I called for you and for him. I'd appreciate it if you would tell him that. (Ø)

President Ozal: George, one more point I want to make. We are coming to an election on the 20th. It will be an earlier election than we had estimated. This was decided just last month. Let's assume we are going... (Ø)

(break in telephone conversation)

President Ozal: We were cut. (U)

The President: I got cut off when you were talking about elections. (Ø)

President Ozal: You see, the elections will be on the 20th. There may be a problem during the election campaign, but may I suggest the following. I am going to talk to Yilmaz who is going to talk to Mitsotakis in Paris the day after tomorrow. I'll also call Denktash from my place here and try to talk. I will suggest Yilmaz also make some pressure and we will do our best. I will know after I talk to Denktash and Mitsotakis. I'll answer you then. (Ø)

The President: Thank you very much. Thank you for trying. (Ø)

President Ozal: Another point. May be you can help us. At the end of this month, there is a European meeting, a meeting of the Turkish European Community Association. If you help us on this matter, which they should start some new programs with Turkey that they propose, but Greece is blocking this and if you put some pressure, maybe that will help us in the election. They are going to make this new program with Turkey. Not membership, just a funding program. We've been waiting almost one and a half years. (Ø)

The President: Let me see if we can help, because, you know, our position is that we think Turkey should be a full member. (C)

President Ozal: If you are willing, it may help us in the election. (C)

The President: We will try hard on that. We'll intervene as best we can. (C)

President Ozal: Thank you. (U)

The President: It's been nice talking to you. (U)

President Ozal: Everything is all right. We will work hard. Don't worry. (C)

The President: Some time when we get some time, let's talk about Iraq. (C)

President Ozal: Yes, there are problems. (U)

The President: Yes. We'll talk. May be next week we can have a conversation. (U)

President Ozal: OK. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on September 14, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft
King Fahd
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Bruce Riedel, NSC

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 14, 1991; 10:05 -10:14 a.m.
Oval Office

President Bush: Hello, Your Majesty how are you? (U)

King Fahd: Thank you for calling me. I was very pleased to watch you on television on Wednesday (sic). Your comments on Israel were very good. (C)

President Bush: I am glad you thought it was constructive. We will win this fight. (C)

King Fahd: I am sure you are right. Things are going well on the peace process. All the stones have been turned including on the Palestinians, the Syrians, the Arabs and the Israelis. We will do all we can to make the conference a success. (C)

President Bush: Thank you for your kind remarks. I am calling today to discuss Iraq. Saddam continues to prevent the U.N. from carrying out its mandate to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. He is thumbing his nose at the U.N. resolutions. We must see the WMD destroyed. As you know, Saddam has hidden missiles and unconventional weapons from the U.N. He has even welded back together missile equipment he claimed to have destroyed. We have a great deal of information on this which our Ambassador has been instructed to put at your disposal. (S)

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Iraq now refuses to allow the U.N. to bring in German helicopters to assist the inspections. This directly violates UNSCR 707 which requires Iraq to allow in U.N. helicopters. We cannot let this stand. We have prepared a moderate but forceful course of action to ensure Iraqi compliance and the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. ~~(S)~~

My request to you is that you receive my Ambassador who is fully prepared to discuss my thinking on this issue. I do not want to discuss the details on the phone, but the Ambassador is fully prepared to discuss our plans and, of course, to hear your thinking. ~~(S)~~

King Fahd: I will receive the Ambassador as soon as possible. Our response will be a practical one. ~~(S)~~

President Bush: Great. We cannot let Saddam get away with this. ~~(C)~~

King Fahd: Absolutely true, I am fully with you. ~~(C)~~

I see that your medical report was positive and we are always happy to see you play golf on TV. After my operation perhaps we can play golf together. (U)

President Bush: That would be fun. (U)

King Fahd: I will be delighted to play golf with you when I visit Washington. (U)

Good byes.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall of Hungary

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Laszlo Szimonisz
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 20, 1991, 12:59 - 1:29 p.m.
Aboard Air Force One EDT

The President: Mr. Prime Minister. This is George Bush. How are you, sir? (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Good afternoon, Mr. President. Thank you, I am very well. The reason I called you is because we take an extremely dire view of the situation that is evolving in Yugoslavia, right in our neighborhood. Since dawn today, there has been an offensive that has been widening in Croatia, both from the south and from the east. The tanks of the Yugoslav People's Army are coming against Croatia from the direction of Bosnia, and we are also expecting air attacks to commence against Croatia. Prime Minister Markovic has been totally isolated and is in a minority position within his government. The same way with President Mesic, who is Commander in Chief of the Army, but has lost his control. It appears that the army and Serbian guerrillas are operating totally on their own and without political control. For all practical purposes, the attempts at a cease-fire by Lord Carrington have been totally void. It is not working. This could be the last major attempt by the Yugoslav Army, because its reserves are dwindling. The budget that is for the army is about to be completely depleted. They are working on their last reserves in ordnance as well as in feeding their troops. This is their only opportunity to succeed -- by attempting a Blitzkrieg against Croatia. The question is whether the Croatians would be able to resist until this Blitzkrieg is finished. On the Adriatic Sea and along their borders of Croatia, there continues to be conflagration. This touches us completely and directly, and there have been several violations of our sovereignty along our border in the last several days. We have approximately 30,000 refugees in this area from Yugoslavia now, of which only 10 percent are actually Hungarians. 90 percent are Croatians. The number of soldiers has also increased. They are going to be disarmed, and we have to treat them separately from the civilians. (S)

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It appears that the time has come, and we don't see any other alternative that we would have but a common statement. The strongest pressure must be exercised, but the type of proclamation that would carry validity would require a statement that the U.S. backs the European Community. This should include the countries from around the region and perhaps even the Soviet Union, the Ukraine and Japan also. Until now, we have resisted acknowledging the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, together with the Austrians and the Italians, because we feel that these countries that I have mentioned earlier have very little influence on the Serbs. Only Anglo-Saxon countries -- Great Britain and the United States as well as France -- could put some pressure to which the Serbs would listen. ~~(S)~~

Until there is a common stand against them, the Serb communist leaders will perceive that they have an opportunity to act. I personally visited Yugoslavia two weeks ago and spoke with Prime Minister Markovic and also with leaders of Croatia and Slovenia. It appears that the army and the Serb Chetniks cannot be controlled. They are trying to create a Greater Serbia, which poses an incredible danger and could serve as a destabilizing factor for the entire Balkan region. The highest prestige in front of these Serb generals today even still belongs to the Russians. They have the highest influence over them. This is why I feel it would be very important, Mr. President, if you could gather Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin together and convince them to exert influence over the Serbian situation. Since yesterday, the Russians are not shipping any more weapons to the Yugoslav army. But it must be made very clear to them that we have the same forces operating in Serbia, the same kind of forces that have brought about the coup d'etat in the Soviet Union. We back the United Nations, a convocation of the Security Council. We have also informed them that we back the Canadian initiative. Prime Minister Markovic himself has accepted the theory of internationalizing this problem. He cannot himself rule and he cannot overcome this situation by himself. In northern Serbia and the Vojvodina we have one half million ethnic Hungarians, and in Croatia and in Slovenia we also have 50,000 each. If would be very difficult for us to acknowledge the independence of Croatia and Slovenia because immediately the Serbians would wreak vengeance on Hungarians in their territory. Thousands of Hungarians are called into the reserves from the Serbian part of Yugoslavia. ~~(S)~~

Above all, Mr. President, I would like to ask you that the problem be treated as one of the most important problems in eastern and central Europe and a problem that touches on all of Europe. And if we cannot stop the onslaught of Serbia to take over this area, we could be expected to face 100,000 refugees. The Serbian democratic forces also need encouragement. In Belgrade and in other areas of the republic there are people who would support a democratic initiative, but they are also under tremendous pressure. The Adriatic oil pipeline has been sealed off by the Serbs. We still have some reserves, but should it continue, Czechoslovakia as well as Hungary would reach a critical point. ~~(S)~~

One more thing I'd like to point out, Mr. President: according to our most recent reports, there is a possibility that Slovakia will declare its independence next week. We still feel, and I'd like to emphasize, that in Yugoslavia we still feel that the best would be to have a commonwealth of sovereign nations, but more and more this has become a fiction rather than a reality. If we cannot take some definite steps at once, it is highly likely that very soon they will take this step towards independence in Czechoslovakia. There we will not have this sort of civil war, because the Czechs will not be fighting like the Serbs. They will give up Slovakia, counting on the fact that this would make their own economic resurgence much faster. But I believe we could have some serious disagreement with Slovakia between the federalists and the nationalists. We also have, close to the Hungarian border, about 800,000 ethnic Hungarians. Some of the nationalists in Slovakia, on the one hand, are extreme left, and the other side are extreme right. Potentially they have been under a certain amount of Soviet influence in the past. The reason I mention the situation of Czechoslovakia, Mr. President, is because I feel that this will culminate next week. ~~(S)~~

In Hungary the situation is calm. We have taken precautions to take a large number of refugees, but in the border areas, the population is restless. For this reason, I have personally visited the border area. I was within three feet of the border with Yugoslavia. In Hungary, the situation is still stable, but we could face very serious energy-related as well as financial problems. And I see that in Yugoslavia if the world cannot take a unified step in order to contain it, then it would open the door to further destabilization in the entire area. So this is why I have called you, Mr. President, to mention all of this to you and to request that the U.S., together with Great Britain and supporting the UN, in this offer a very severe and stern warning. I would be extremely grateful to have that meeting on October 4 with you, Mr. President, when I would be able to see you when I come from New York to Washington. Please excuse the long details, Mr. President, but I felt it was extremely critical that I warn you of all the details so that you would be fully apprised of the situation and why we feel it is so serious. Hungary, of course, continues to be a stable country. But I have not called you to tell you about my own internal problems. Our political parties have pretty much the same viewpoint and are united on this subject. Perhaps we have a few emotional differences, but the government holds the whole situation strongly under control. Economic and business life goes on. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, let me say, in the first place, I got all that message loud and clear and, yes, I look forward to seeing you in our October 4 meeting. As far as I'm concerned, that is a deal, and I will look forward to seeing you then. We understand your position on not recognizing Slovenian or Croatian independence, and we agree that this could lead to a serious escalation. I understand what you want is a statement from the United Kingdom, possibly joined by the Soviet Union. I would like to know whether that is accurate and what you think such a

statement should say. I was a little unclear on what you think is best there. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: First of all, Western Europe should take a unified position, and that still has not taken place yet. I would feel that perhaps the United States and Great Britain, even the G-7 together as the major powers, should make a separate statement. The reason the Soviet Union should be drawn into this is because the Serbian generals still pay some attention to what the Russians have to say. So I stress the importance of a unified proclamation condemning the situation and issuing a warning to the Serbians signed by the United States, by the Soviet Union and the Western European countries, bringing to attention the potential sanctions that could be instituted against Serbia and saying the world is not interested in cooperating with a country that engages in such activities. It would be very important to have some sort of West European armistice force or supervisory group to observe the activities, including the border areas with Yugoslavia. I would feel very strongly that the great powers, the signatories to this declaration, should also threaten the possibility of recognizing the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. This would be a detriment to the courage of the Serbians, and perhaps they would hold back their troops. But this would only have teeth if the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union would be signatories to such a statement. I have mentioned this to Chancellor Kohl and said it would not be a good idea for us in Hungary or even the Italians, Austrians or Germans on their own, because this would give an excuse for Serb historical reminiscence, that we are ganging up on them. (S)

The President: I think I understand more clearly what you are talking about. I'm on an airplane now out in our Midwest and I will be back in Washington this afternoon, but we will give some very serious thought to these constructive suggestions. As you know, we have been supportive of the EC initiative, feeling that if they can solve this problem under the able leadership of Lord Carrington, that would be the best, but I gather you feel that is not going to be successful. (C)

Prime Minister Antall: Yes. Completely, Mr. President. I have also talked with Mrs. Thatcher in Tokyo for an hour and a half and she is fully cognizant of the Yugoslavian situation. I think we might consider her as a possibility for a good will mission as the individual who would be able to handle this on behalf of the interested parties. (S)

The President: That's a suggestion, but to be candid, before we could be enthusiastic, I would want to be sure that the Prime Minister of the UK, the very able John Major, agrees to that. (S)

Prime Minister Antall: I have met with Mr. Major in Paris recently, but I have not mentioned this particular issue to him. (C)

The President: OK. We will keep that in mind and begin to do a little diplomatic work now. I appreciate your phone call. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Antall: Please, I ask you, Mr. President, for a very swift response in this, because they are moving 25 to 30 kilometers a day and can become extremely problematic in a very short time. I would like to also express my solidarity with your problem in the Middle East. ~~(S)~~

The President: Thank you for the phone call. We will get right to work on it. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Antall: Thank you and goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President
Interpreter: Carol Wolter
Notetaker: Tony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 24, 1991, 12:52 - 1:05 p.m.
Waldorf Astoria, New York

The President: Francois! (U)

President Mitterrand: Hello. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

President Mitterrand: How are you? (U)

The President: Tres bien. (U)

President Mitterrand: I've very pleased to hear you. (U)

The President: It's nice to hear your voice. (U)

President Mitterrand: I have three issues to talk to you about. I don't want to take up too much of your time so I want to start right away with these issues. First of all about Iraq, what is the situation? We have been told that the letter expected from Iraq to our Ambassador, since we have the chairmanship (of the Security Council) right now, saying that resolution 687 and 707 would be fully implemented but this letter has still not arrived. Do you have news on your side? (C)

The President: We have not seen any such letter. Jim Baker, who sends his best regards, is sitting here with me and neither of us has heard about the arrival of any such letter. The state of play is getting increasingly worrisome because the Iraqis have grabbed another group of the UN inspectors. They apparently are holding those inspectors and apparently not releasing the documents or permitting them to have access to the documents that relate to nuclear weapons. (C)

President Mitterrand: For the time being, therefore, their mission has been frozen, blocked. (C)

The President: True. (U)

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President Mitterrand: But we can't leave things as they are now. ~~(C)~~

The President: No, exactly. We are beginning to talk to others and decide what the United States can do. There are two options, one of which is to escort helicopters and to have gun ships along to be sure that the helicopters have access to what they want. The other plan, which might go along afterward or at the same time, would be targeting certain of their nuclear-related facilities and just saying we are going to hit these facilities until you (Iraq) tell us you are going to comply with the resolutions. ~~(S)~~

President Mitterrand: Yes. That is an approach. What do the others say? ~~(C)~~

The President: We haven't really begun consulting on that yet. As I say, I'm going back to Washington tomorrow and having a meeting with several of our top people to decide what we recommend. In the meantime, Jim Baker is staying up here to talk to some of the others, but we have no definite conclusion from any of the other countries yet. ~~(C)~~

President Mitterrand: I don't think we should wait more than 2 or 3 days. Otherwise, Saddam Hussein will believe he can do anything he wants. ~~(C)~~

The President: That is generally our idea. There is one item which complicates and that is that the Saudis have requested Patriot batteries. Those batteries will not be in place for a few days. ~~(C)~~

President Mitterrand: Yes, that's normal for the execution. It will take time, but for the warning to Iraq, we must proceed quickly. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think that is a good suggestion. We've been talking with our people to get their thinking about when to issue a warning, and I think you have a very good point there. ~~(C)~~

President Mitterrand: So, perhaps we can talk again or at least have our direct staff talk to each other because I think this is a very serious matter. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think that's fine. Either you and I or Jim can handle it here at the UN with Roland. ~~(U)~~

President Mitterrand: Fine. The other issue deals with Yugoslavia. As you know, among the five (permanent members of the Security Council) things are going well. The non-aligned countries are naturally less satisfied because they fear that we will get involved in their domestic problems. But I think you might agree with two points. First of all, it would be good for the Security Council to give its support to any measure which could protect the observers of the Community. I hope that the

text will include a paragraph on that particular issue. Second, we have to decide, of course, but I think everyone is ready to agree that there will be an embargo placed on weapons. (S)

The President: Absolutely. (U)

President Mitterrand: That's a very important issues. Otherwise, we might see some of your European friends providing weapons to different camps. This could have negative effects on the climate which exists among the allies. I'm just coming back from a three-day trip to Germany. We've settled a lot of points. I think that our two countries - France and Germany - have really gotten involved well in this matter. This is not an easy matter because historically the Croatians have always had the support of the Germans or the Austrians. Serbia was the traditional ally of the French and British. So I think it's not a good thing to wake up those old memories. But we agreed with Kohl and the German President. (C)

The President: Jim tells me that we three, the U.S., France and England, are in agreement on what is going on at the UN. And yes, on the embargo, we are with you on that 100 percent. (C)

President Mitterrand: Fine. Thank you. The third issue I want to talk about doesn't warrant a lot of debate. It is the issue of Zaire. As you know, coordination between our military and yours and our diplomats and yours is going well. But we have to take certain precautions. I am sending certain assets to be able to evacuate the French and, if need be, the Belgians. We have 4,500 French citizens in Kinshasa but it's only a matter of helping them get across the river and then they can go into the Congo and there they would be fully protected. In the same way, we can do everything necessary in order to protect your citizens. So we can be of mutual assistance, and I wanted to tell you we are fully ready to do so. (C)

The President: That's good, Francois, and I understand we are working together on transport and things of that nature. You have a lot of expertise in the region, and I appreciate your concern for our citizens because we are working closely to be sure that proper evacuation plans are in place. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes. You can be helpful to us with your air force, although we do have certain aircraft there and in proximity to the Congo. We have bases in Gabon and Central Africa, so we can be useful to you if need be. So that, dear friend, is what I wanted to tell you. (C)

The President: This is a great coincidence. I told Roland, n· to whom I was sitting at lunch, that I was going to call you s I'm delighted to hear from you. (U)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. I will instruct my close staff, in other words, Admiral Lanxade and Mr. Dumas, to remai: in close contact with your staff because these are serious situations that could deteriorate. (C)

The President: We will be in very close touch. Jim Baker and Brent Scowcroft are right here and I will fill them in on the conversation. I agree with you on Iraq. We need to make a statement soon. ~~(C)~~

President Mitterrand: How's your health? (U)

The President: Well, I'm very lucky. It's good. (U)

President Mitterrand: See you soon and my regards to your spouse. (U)

The President: Au revoir. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Boris Yeltsin, President of Russian Republic
Interpreter: Peter Afansenko
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 25, 1991, 7:47 - 7:57 a.m.
Oval Office

The President: Boris, President Yeltsin. This is George Bush. How are you, sir? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Mr. President. It is nice to hear your voice. (U)

The President: This is a personal call, it is entirely personal. (U)

President Yeltsin: I understand. (U)

The President: I have been reading in the papers that you may require some medical attention. I would like to offer you the best hospital facilities in Washington D.C. if that would have any appeal to you. And if there is anything that is required, consultations, heart specialists, we could call in the best people in the U.S. I think we have the best treatment in the world here. This offer comes from my heart and, I am sure, the hearts of the American people. ~~(S)~~

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, thank you. I am very grateful. Thank you for your personal attention to me. I don't know how to find the words to thank you. We had a tough mission to Nagorno-Karabakh but we brought the two sides to the table and signed a protocol. I am taking a rest of ten days. The doctors are looking me over and I am under observation. If things don't get better, perhaps I could take you up on your offer after consulting with my doctors. ~~(S)~~

The President: No problem. I wish you well. I hope the rest will take care of it. But if our specialists can do anything, please be our guest at Walter Reed or Bethesda or any other institution in the U.S. It is important for us that you remain in good health. On a very personal basis, I want to make sure that you have the very best care. ~~(S)~~

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President Yeltsin: Mr. President, I don't know how to thank you. I am touched and never expected to hear this human touch and response from you. I want to thank you very much. Mr. President, I will, of course, accept your offer if it becomes necessary. ~~(S)~~

I want you to know that Gorbachev and I are working decisively on reform and democratization and in a very friendly fashion. We call each other nearly every day. We are working very closely together. ~~(S)~~

The President: That is very good. It has been nice talking to you. Maybe I will just say that we had a friendly call and leave out the substance. ~~(S)~~

President Yeltsin: We will say we talked about the situation in general but it is best not to talk about the substance. We should leave it out so not to worry people too much. ~~(S)~~

The President: Okay. That is the way we will handle it. ~~(S)~~

President Yeltsin: Thank you from the bottom of my heart. (U)