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FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91112
Folder ID Number: 91112-008

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 5/3/91 - 7/21/91

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Nelson Mandela of South Africa on May 3, 1991 (3 pp.)	5/3/91	(b)(1)	C
02. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on May 7, 1991 (2 pp.)	5/7/91	(b)(1)	C
03. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt on May 7, 1991 (2 pp.)	5/7/91	(b)(1)	C
04. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union on May 11, 1991 (6 pp.)	5/11/91	(b)(1)	C
05. Telcon	Re: President's Telephone Call to King Fahd (1 pp.)	5/11/91	(b)(1)	C
06. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada on May 15, 1991 (3 pp.)	5/15/91	(b)(1)	C
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (1 pp.)	5/15/91	(b)(1)	C
08. Telcon	Re: Presidential Phone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt (1 pp.)	5/17/91	(b)(1)	C
09. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ante Markovic of Yugoslavia (3 pp.)	5/20/91	(b)(1)	C

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Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 5/3/91 - 7/21/91

Pinksheet Number: cap950

OA/ID Number: 91112-008

Date Closed: 2/5/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	5/24/91	(b)(1)	✓
11. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (1 pp.)	5/24/91	(b)(1)	✓
12. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Gorbachev of the USSR on May 27, 1991 (3 pp.)	5/27/91	(b)(1)	✓
13. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada on May 27, 1991 (5 pp.)	5/27/91	(b)(1)	✓
14. Telcon	Re: President's Telephone Call from Amir of Kuwait (5 pp.)	5/28/91	(b)(1)	✓
15. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of Nicaragua (2 pp.)	5/31/91	(b)(1)	✓
16. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Giulio Andreotti, President of Italy on June 13, 1991 (3 pp.)	6/3/91	(b)(1)	✓
17. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on June 3, 1991 (4 pp.)	6/4/91	(b)(1)	✓
18. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Jorge Serrano of the Republic of Guatemala on June 11, 1991 (6 pp.)	6/11/91	(b)(1)	✓
19. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Jorge Serrano of Guatemala on June 11, 1991 (4 pp.)	6/11/91	(b)(1)	✓

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20a. Memo	William F. Sittmann to R. Blair Downing Re: The President's Telephone Conversation with President Serrano of Guatemala, June 11, 1991 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
20b. Summary	Re: Summary of the President's Telephone Call to President Serrano of the Republic of Guatemala (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
21. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on June 12, 1991 (3 pp.)	6/12/91	(b)(1)	S
22. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on June 13, 1991 (4 pp.)	6/13/91	(b)(1)	S
23. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Cesar Gavaria Trujillo, President of Colombia, June 20, 1991 (2 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S
24. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union (4 pp.)	6/21/91	(b)(1)	S
25. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany on June 24, 1991 (4 pp.)	6/24/91	(b)(1)	S
26. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany, on July 8, 1991 (2 pp.)	7/8/91	(b)(1)	C
27. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt on July 10, 1991 (3 pp.)	7/10/91	(b)(1)	S

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28. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Nelson Mandela, President of the ANC of South Africa (3 pp.)	7/10/91	(b)(1)	✓
29. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on July 10, 1991 [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	7/10/91	(b)(1)	S
30. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand President of France on July 11, 1991 (2 pp.)	7/11/91	(b)(1)	✓
31. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President F.W. de Klerk of South Africa (3 pp.)	7/11/91	(b)(1)	✓
32a. Memo	Robert Morley to William F. Sittmann Re: Telcon with Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico on July 12, 1991 (1 pp.)	7/15/91	(b)(1)	✓
32b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Salinas of Mexico (3 pp.)	7/12/91	(b)(1)	✓
33. Telcon	Re: Telcon with King Hussein of Jordan on July 16, 1991 (2 pp.)	7/16/91	(b)(1)	✓
34. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (1 pp.)	7/21/91	(b)(1)	✓

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3315

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Nelson Mandela of South Africa
on May 3, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Nelson Mandela, African National Congress
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Robert Frasure

DATE, TIME May 3, 1991, 9:00 - 9:10 am EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. Mandela? How are you? (U)

Mr. Mandela: How are you, Mr. President? (U)

The President: I'm fine. It's a beautiful day here. We are going off to our Midwest today to St. Louis. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Before we begin, let me tell you that I have a one-year-old grandson. He runs to the telephone every time it rings and yells: "Bush! Bush!" (U)

The President: That's wonderful. What is his name?

Mr. Mandela: Mbata. And he knows you! (U)

The President: Good. I will send him a note. (U)

Mr. Mandela: You must have seen our set of demands that we made to the government. (U)

The President: Yes, I have seen a summary. (U)

Mr. Mandela: We sent them to Mr. Swing (U)

We have done everything we can to convey our fear to the State President of the effect of violence on the negotiation process.
(Ø)

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2000-0429-F

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We were keen to remove everything which destabilizes the process. I have spoken to de Klerk to warn him on the effect of violence. I have given him concrete examples of the complicity of the police. (Ø)

De Klerk never moved on this issue. We sent him our demands that on May 9 we would halt the talks if the government doesn't respond. There can be no question of talking to the government after that. (Ø)

The President: Oh dear. (U)

Mr. Mandela: We don't have the cooperation of the government on this. (Ø)

There is a wave of violence in Soweto. The government is doing nothing. In the Transvaal since last year ten thousand people have lost their lives. The government has failed to respond. That is why I wanted to contact you. I know you have a genuine interest in the situation. But it appears unless the government... (Ø)

The President: I appreciate your call. And I want to be helpful. I am concerned about the violence. It scares us to death as we contemplate the future of South Africa. There must be a way to contain it, to bring it to a halt. (Ø)

As you know, we have called on the government to fulfill its responsibilities to maintain law and order. We have emphasized the need for the impartiality of the police. But more needs to be done. (Ø)

I will be meeting with Buthelezi in June and urge him to do more. I will convey your concerns to the government so de Klerk knows how strongly I feel. I will contact him soon on the May 9 problem. (Ø)

You know there is supposed to be a conference on violence. Maybe there could be some kind of impartial national commission with people on it like Tutu whom everyone respects or Judge Goldstone, a name I don't know but he was suggested to me. (Ø)

I will contact de Klerk. But I do hope that a break-off of the talks can be averted. If that happens, it would be a terrible signal to the world. (Ø)

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Mr. Mandela: Thank you, Mr. President. I am happy to hear of your response. We started this process but we can only do our best. But it will be difficult if the other side doesn't cooperate. (Ø)

The President: I would appeal to you not to break it off. I will try to ameliorate the situation. I will call de Klerk and tell him that I stand with you on your concern about the violence. We need to get a process going on ending the violence. I would hate to see the peace process stopped. I will try to do what I can. (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: Thank you, Mr. President, for your help. (U)

The President: You know our last phone call they tried to make it as if there was some big division between us. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Yes, I know. Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on May 7, 1991 (2 pp.)	5/7/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 5/3/91 - 7/21/91

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ji (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(849)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



3456

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia on May 7, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Notetaker: John Montgomery

DATE, TIME May 7, 1991, 4:52 p.m. - 5:03 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office



The President: Your Majesty, how are you? I just wanted to call and thank you for your inquiry about my health and your kind words. And also for the beautiful flowers. As you probably have seen on TV, I am back at work and feeling fine. They've discovered why I am having this heart problem, it has to do with my thyroid. Once the thyroid is cured, my heart will be good forever. (U)

King Fahd: Thank God for that. (U)

The President: How is your health? (U)

King Fahd: I am fine, Mr. President. Actually, my health was affected by your health and I was very worried about you and followed the reports closely with anxiety. (U)

The President: I would like to raise one question of business with you, your Majesty, if I may? (U)

King Fahd: That would please me. (U)

The President: I saw Bandar today and told him I am very pleased that the relationship between the Kingdom and us has grown and told him to tell you that I am determined to keep it that way. But at the same time and in the spirit of frankness, which I hope you will understand, I must tell you I am concerned about recent developments. I don't want to talk about that on the telephone, but I did ask Ambassador Bandar to convey some sensitive matters directly and personally to you. He tells me he is leaving tonight and I would simply appeal to you to give these matters your personal and urgent attention. (C)

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King Fahd: The Ambassador did call me Mr. President and tell me he was leaving Washington this evening and I assure you I will consider these matters. (C)

The President: While I have you on the phone your Majesty, may I ask you your up-to-date opinion on Iraq? This man Saddam is still there and we are very disappointed but wonder if you see any chance they will put him out? (C)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

The President: That will be good. We are doing much for the Kurds but I don't want our troops to get permanently involved. (C)

King Fahd: We all share this opinion and I am certain the outcome will be exactly what you wish and that would be in the interests of the Iraqi people and the whole world. (U)

The President: I will look forward to talking to Prince Bandar when he returns and once again I want to thank you for your very kind words and friendship. (U)

King Fahd: Mr. President, I would ask one request of you. (U)

The President: Please, Please. (U)

King Fahd: My request is please do not exert yourself. God will be with you, I said a prayer directly to God for your good health. (U)

The President: Thank you. I will take your advice for a little while anyway. (U)

King Fahd: God willing, God be with you and give you good health. Good bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Hosni Mubarak,
President of Egypt on May 7, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt
Notetaker: John Montgomery

DATE, TIME May 7, 1991, 10:50 - 10:53am EDT
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Hosni. (U)

President Mubarak: Hello George, so pleased to hear about your good health. (U)

The President: Thank you for your nice message. I am calling to thank you and to tell you, my good friend, that I feel good but am a little tired. I am sitting here in my office with Brent Scowcroft. They got me off coffee but the heart is perfect. I am grateful for your message. (U)

President Mubarak: I am so pleased to hear that everything is going well. (U)

The President: I wish we could get this Saddam Hussein thing laid to rest and there is a lot of difficulty with this Kurdish situation. We will continue our policy and have spent lots of money but I don't want to bog down our forces. What do you think about this? (U)

President Mubarak: This will all take some time but you are doing the right thing encircling him. (U)

The President: Listen Hosni, Jim Baker is coming back to push the peace process. You have been very helpful with your message to Shamir and sending El Baz to Damascus and all that. We want to pitch in now with as much extra effort as we can to keep Syria in and the PLO out. I wanted to thank you for all your efforts. I may call you after Jim gets there to talk again. (U)

President Mubarak: Okay. I will look for him. How is Barbara? (U)

The President: She is fine. Hello to Suzie. How are your sons? Are they both home or still in England? (U)

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President Mubarak: One is still in London and following all the news about you. (U)

The President: Tell him I am calling you from the office and everything is well here. (U)

Good byes.

-- End of Conversation --

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OZAL

MAY 7 - PRES CALL TO TURKISH PRESIDENT OZAL AT 1811
TERMINATED 1818 - MONITORED BY NICK BURNS
PRES AT WH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3546

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the
Soviet Union on May 11, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
Interpreter: Dmitri Zarechnak
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 11, 1991, 9:03-9:47 a.m.
AND PLACE Camp David

The President: Mikhail, this is George Bush. How are you? (U)

President Gorbachev: I am very happy to hear your voice. And I
am happy that your mild condition is behind you. (U)

The President: I'm up at Camp David and I feel good. My heart
is perfect and once I get this thyroid under control I will be
totally normal. (U)

President Gorbachev: Well, George, I hope you will quit jogging
several miles every morning and confine yourself to horseshoes.
(U)

The President: I wanted to talk with you today -- I don't want
to see our countries drift apart. I read Matlock's report and it
had me concerned. And when Eduard Shevardnadze was here, he said
the same thing. (S)

President Gorbachev: My dear George, I thought since we have
covered a lot of ground to reach the current state of our
relations, that when we reached it, it was well received. So I
decided to share my immediate concerns quite sincerely so I could
prevent a bad turn in the relationship. (S)

The President: Good. First, I remain firmly committed to a
strong cooperative relationship with you. I tried to make that
clear in my press conference the other day. I know what you
stand for. As long as you continue down the reform path with
measures like the new agreement with the nine republics, you'll
get nothing but praise from me. Lastly, you are correct. Some
in the U.S. want us to pull back now. I don't want to do that
and will not do that. (S)

President Gorbachev: I am very happy to hear that. I wish to repeat the phrase you used -- I also am firmly committed to cooperation. Acting together we have accomplished a great deal. I am quite convinced we should continue to develop our relations which is in the national interests of the U.S. and USSR. I intend to stand by that approach in the USSR. It enjoys support among people in the USSR but there are some, of course, who have doubts. (S)

Of course, we are going through a special transition period. There are new forms of doing things and no ready-made solutions. Some advocate one thing and some another. We will have to go through this period and shape a new life drawing from the experience and support of others. One very important point to share with you is that we are faced with so many difficulties. Virtually all of the republics felt we had to stand together. We are now finishing the anti-crisis program. You know about it. People from all the republics are now in a Moscow suburb working to complete it. (S)

So, I want you to understand that it will take an effort to make it succeed. Because there are so many things we simply didn't know before. There is no guarantee, given the size of the country and its problems, that we may not get something we didn't expect. I think the biggest mistake would be for us to stop or succumb to pressure or move in reverse. And in this type of situation, I sometimes have to take very drastic measures. So, George, this is what I wanted you to keep in mind. (S)

In a normal situation, some of these steps would have been seen as unacceptable. But we have to make allowances for this period. And when I'm looking to you, George, for assistance, it is because I am in this kind of situation. I really need it. And I appreciate the political support and friendly feelings I've been getting. My hope is that these feelings will stay unabated. The main thing for you, George, is that you must know I've made the choice -- there is no alternative for me. I am going to do everything I can to continue moving along the track of renewal. (S)

Now this is what I wanted you to know. We are at a very important moment. The specific point is that I will take some major decisions in the next few days and weeks. Well, I've been going on for some time now but since we had not spoken in a while, I thought I would be specific about things. (S)

The President: Mikhail, if you have time, I want to touch on arms control and economic issues. (S)

President Gorbachev: That is what I thought we would do after discussing this general overview. (S)

The President: If it is okay with you, I would like to start with arms control. (S)

The CFE problem, frankly, is putting a strain on our relationship. Our biggest concern is naval infantry. It is causing a problem not so much here in the Administration but is very difficult across our public opinion. We will see Moiseyev and hope his visit will lead to a rapid solution of this corrosive issue. (S)

Having gotten CFE done, I believe we could then get our experts to overcome the difficulties on START. Both of us should make sure that gets done. If we can get a CFE solution, I would be anxious to have a summit this summer and make every effort to get START ready for signature. I think we have narrowed the differences but am anxious to get your views. That is about all I have to say on arms control. (S)

President Gorbachev: Well, George, I want you to know I want to resolve quickly the first issue in the near future. Moiseyev will bring something to help push things in that direction. I also share your desire to have a treaty ready to sign. It is simply a duty for us to go ahead with the treaty on fifty percent reductions, especially since we have already accomplished a lot. And, of course, if that goes well, we could have a very large-scale summit this summer. (S)

The President: I would like to do that very much. (S)

President Gorbachev: That is my goal too. Of course, we could have an interim meeting if there are delays, but our goal should be a large-scale meeting. (S)

The President: I agree with that. (S)

President Gorbachev: I also think there is a chance, George, to succeed in our cooperation in the Middle East. Alexander and Jim are moving on the same track. There is a possibility of cooperation there as in the Persian Gulf. (S)

The President: I think it is very good that Jim and Sasha are working together. They will meet in Cairo. It is a wonderful arrangement we are talking about. I hope Israel and the Arabs will be cooperative. (S)

President Gorbachev: I think if we act together, we can push them in the right direction. (S)

The President: At some point, we may have to do so publicly if the Baker-Bessmertnykh shuttle diplomacy doesn't work. (S)

President Gorbachev: Okay, I agree to give that some thought at a later point. (S)

Now within the next three days, I will see the leader of China in Moscow. At the conclusion of this meeting, I will brief you on the visit. Now let me give you my views. We appreciate the role of China on the Persian Gulf -- its cooperation there and in other areas. China's positive decision was well thought out. (S)

The President: Our relations with China are strained more than I want. I have the MFN question. There is big opposition in Congress. But I want to find a way to renew their MFN. I don't want to isolate China. If you can convey that, I would appreciate it. Is Li Peng or Yang Shangkun coming? (S)

President Gorbachev: No, Jiang Zemin. I think we can proceed with what we agreed as we talked in the limousine. (S)

The President: Right. I would like to talk about economic issues now. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes. (U)

The President: One, I know you are in a difficult economic situation. You have explained that at the beginning. In the spirit of frankness, our experts don't believe Pavlov's anti-crisis program will move you fast enough to market reform. If there are more steps toward a market reform effort, then we could do more and help especially with the international financial organizations. (S)

I think...Excuse me, go ahead. (U)

President Gorbachev: Excuse me for interrupting. (U)

The President: I just wanted to say that it would lead quickly to Special Associate Status in the IMF and World Bank. There is also great interest here in the emigration bill that is to be voted on. If that passes and meets internationally acceptable standards, then it would enable us to take steps to normalize the economic relationship; steps such as the trade agreement, and most favored nations status. Then we could go to Congress to repeal the legislative restrictions that make trade and finance so difficult for us. (S)

I have several more points but maybe I should stop there for your comments. (U)

President Gorbachev: I would like to comment on that, George. Among our pressing problems is stabilizing the economic relationship between regions and even enterprises. There are many pitfalls here. The central and republic authorities are on to this issue and are moving to solve it. This is one of the most pressing tasks at hand. I would call it an emergency task. We have done a lot on the planting campaign in the rural areas and have been rather successful at that. In April, agricultural production was up 3-4 percent compared to last year. But there are still difficulties. We are at the end of spring and summer is coming. Last year's reserves are depleted and there is still no new harvest so we have some difficulties. (S)

On Pavlov's program, it has been very seriously changed. But, George, you must always bear in mind the realistic context of our society. The overriding focus of the Pavlov program is to fight inflation through drastic fiscal measures and at the same time stimulate entrepreneurship. You know there are many provisions in the Pavlov program for stepped-up privatization and destatization. There is more economic freedom. It is under strong fire from the trade unions and some in the party organizations. Some call it anti-people and even inhuman. And you know, George, you will reach a different conclusion depending on whether or not you look at the Pavlov program from an academic angle or from a realistic context of society. This is no longer just Pavlov's program by the way since it has been accepted by all the republics. (S)

So much for the current situation. On your other points, I wish to propose something else. What if for the purposes of continuing this discussion, I send over Primakov and Yavlinsky to discuss the possibility of cooperation in the G-7 framework and other international organizations? I know that there is emerging cooperation at the G-7 experts level with your people and ours. But even your experts think it is time to elevate these discussions to a governmental level. (S)

The President: We could talk about that. But I'm not sure exactly what you mean. (S)

President Gorbachev: What I have in mind is that the G-7 will discuss cooperation with the USSR and the place and role of the G-7 in these developments. There is the possibility of Soviet participation in the IMF and participation by the head of the Soviet state in the G-7 session. I'll send Primakov. He will have a package of items to discuss in a closed session. (S)

The President: That is a good idea and I have one to add on agriculture. (S)

President Gorbachev: I just received your letter. I welcome the idea and am prepared to join. (S)

The President: Would May 20 be too soon for the team to arrive? (S)

President Gorbachev: No, it is fine. I will give the appropriate instructions tomorrow. There is much to be done to prepare for this. (S)

The President: I think we can be very helpful. I want you to know that I want it to lead to what you need in agricultural credits. (S)

President Gorbachev: I welcome this very much. I just got the translation of your letter before our conversation. It is a very exciting idea and very encouraging. And I will appoint tomorrow the people who will start work on this. (S)

The President: Good. I will instruct our people to come in a positive frame of mind -- to try to help and not find problems but find reasons to help. After that, Mikhail, it seems to me that at the summit we could discuss financial institutions, energy, the environment and housing. We can discuss this at our meeting. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, these are important and encouraging subjects. I discussed some of these with Mitterrand. George, I am really happy that we had this substantive conversation. It had been some time since we had a conversation like that. (S)

The President: Let me ask you a personal question. How is your health? (S)

President Gorbachev: So far, I am hanging tough. (S)

The President: That is good. You are my friend and I want to prove that and work with you. I don't like stories in our press that put you down. I hope you noticed that I took them on in public the other day. (S)

President Gorbachev: Well, thank you for those words. I share your approach on this and other issues. I have made a choice, a serious choice on relations with the U.S., providing it is reciprocated, and will follow that course. (S)

The President: That is wonderful. It is nice talking to you and good luck. (U)

President Gorbachev: Thank you, George, and the same to you. Best regards to all at Camp David, especially Barbara. (U)

The President: She just walked in the room and just walked out. She is on her way to the gym. (U)

President Gorbachev: I am glad to hear that. (U)

The President: Okay. Good-bye. (U)

President Gorbachev: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Call to King Fahd

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME May 11, 1991; 6:03 - 6:06 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Your Majesty. This is George Bush. How are you? (U)

King Fahd: Very good. How is your health? (U)

The President: Good. I am at Camp David resting. I plan to take Monday off. But my health is perfect. (U)

King Fahd: Thanks be to God. I saw that on CNN. (U)

The President: So everything is okay. I am calling to thank you for the announcement today. It is a marvelous step forward. I know it wasn't easy. It should make Jim Baker's trip easier.
(Ø)

King Fahd: I am ready for you to do anything. (Ø)

The President: I will be consulting with you on next steps once he gets back. (Ø)

King Fahd: Very good. (U)

The President: One other thing, I hope you are still planning to come here. (Ø)

King Fahd: Yes, of course. (U)

The President: Very good. I look forward to it. Thank you again. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you and good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of
Canada on May 15, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME May 15, 1991, 9:39 a.m. - 9:46 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Brian? How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'm doing fine. How are you? (U)

The President: I just wanted to check in. I had a question I
wanted to ask you and I want to ask how's the family? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Well, everyone is fine, coming along
very well. I wish I could say the same about the country.
We're having our troubles, but I think it's improving. The
constitutional thing is settling down a bit and I think our
recession will be over by mid-July and that we will be back to
strong economic growth in the next few years. But we had a tough
one. (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Our people are talking about the
recession ending by the end of July with 3 percent growth next
year. That will be good for us because it's been bad for the
last year in terms of economic growth. We had zero growth. (U)

The President: That's interesting that you expect to come out of
it in July. We're still in the dumps down here economically.
The thinking is that we should be coming out of it in the second
half of the year. They're retreating on the estimates and I am
hoping like hell for recovery in the second half. The reason why
I'm calling is to get a readout. Did you meet with Moiseyev of
the Soviet Union? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: No, I think he's coming in tomorrow.
(U)

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The President: I thought he had already been there. I'd be interested in knowing what his views are on CFE. I am hoping that he is bringing a message from Gorbachev that is positive. I talked to Gorbachev a few days ago and he said Moiseyev would be coming with new ideas. I thought he'd already been there to see you. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I believe he is coming today or tomorrow. I'm not sure. Oh, I see that I have him down for tomorrow afternoon at 1:00. (U)

The President: It would be interesting to know what he says if you can probe him on CFE. Gorbachev is very anxious to have a meeting with me and I want to do it, but we have a sine qua non that we wouldn't do it if we weren't in accord on CFE and ready to sign. CFE and START are both going along all right, but there is still a hang up in CFE on naval infantry. Anything you might glean on this would be helpful. I thought he was going back to Moscow and then coming here but probably not if he hasn't yet come to Ottawa. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: When are you seeing him? (U)

The President: Let me just look at my block. Oddly enough, I don't see him on the schedule. I've got Helmut coming in next Monday, but I don't show Moiseyev. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Do you think you're going to be doing CFE? (S)

The President: I think we are, because Moiseyev is supposed to have some new ideas which we have taken as a positive sign. He's not on the schedule yet, but I know he'll be here. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'm astonished that Gorbachev, with his economic problems, wouldn't be a little more forthcoming, a little more direct with regard to CFE and START and indicate dramatically that he is willing to come to the well in a big way. If he spends more of his GNP on defense, there will not be anything left for soap and consumer goods. (S)

The President: Yes, they need to cut that back. Gorbachev was strong in his appeal to me to be more forthcoming on grain credits. I want to do it. I want to stay with Gorbachev and to be supportive. He raised the issue of participating in the G-7. What is your view? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I thought it would come up in your conversation. We discussed the issue at Houston, and I think there was some talk that he could come as a kind of observer at the end. (S)

The President: Hurd is here and Brent is talking to him today. We're kind of ambivalent on it. The problem is that if he comes, there will be expectations of an enormous bailout. This would

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make things difficult. I'd love to help him, but there are constraints in our law based on which the Agriculture Secretary has to certify good credit, but no one in their right mind could certify that for the Soviet Union right now. I told Brent if it would help at home and give him stability, maybe we ought to do it. We are muddling around on the issue. What is your view?
(S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If he came to the G-7 Summit for the whole thing, we wouldn't have a Summit at all, because he wouldn't have a clue as to what we were talking about and it would throw off the agenda completely. But we may be able to be helpful by including him on the last evening. I don't know. If we extended it on the last afternoon when we have the press conference -- we could extend it a couple of hours and then review his problems with him and invite him to participate. I'll do what the others want, but it is pretty obvious to me that if he's there from the very beginning, its not going to be the kind of effective G-7 Summit that we had in Houston. (S)

The President: Margaret Thatcher checked in and urged me to have him at the G-7, but Hurd and the new government do not agree and they are wondering how to work something out to help him without making him a full participant. We have a little time on that.
(S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If I find out anything at all from Moiseyev, I will call you or get a message to Brent. (S)

The President: On Moiseyev, Monday or Tuesday he'll be here, so I think the plan is that he'll fly back to Moscow after seeing you and then come here. We had assumed that he'd fly here directly. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We'll find out his plans and get back to you. (S)

The President: That's fine. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: All right, George. (U)

The President: Love to Mila. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Bye now. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED ACCESS

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein
of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
Notetaker: Edmund J. Hull, NSC

DATE, TIME May 15, 1991; 2:45 - 2:51 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By LO NARA, Date 7/14/09

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to President Mubarak
of Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Notetaker: Edmund Hull, NSC

DATE, TIME May 17, 1991; 1:06 - 1:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By LO NARA, Date 7/14/09

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ante Markovic of Yugoslavia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ante Markovic, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Victor Jackovich

DATE, TIME May 20, 1991, 2:07 - 2:27 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you, Mr. Prime Minister? This is George Bush. I have been watching with concern the latest developments in Yugoslavia. (U)

Prime Minister Markovic: Thank you, Mr. President. We are grateful for the attention and interest you are showing and your expression of concern. We received your helpful letter, and we take this conversation as a continuation of your expression of support. (U)

The President: That is why I am calling -- to express our continued support. You know that the United States supports the unity of Yugoslavia and the establishment of genuine democracy throughout Yugoslavia. But what we are witnessing in the collective Presidency is unconstitutional and inconsistent with democratic principles, and it could even lead to disintegration and possibly hostilities. I know what you stand for, and that your office is the strongest institution that still represents reform and unity. If you are able to strengthen your role and fill this dangerous void of authority through constitutional means, you will have our support. We would have no objections if you make public the fact that I called to express my concern and expressed this support.

Prime Minister Markovic: Mr. President, your information is absolutely correct. The Presidency of Yugoslavia is blocked -- not functioning. The situation is difficult, but it is under control. The Parliament is still working, and the Government is functioning. We have control over all movements in the country.

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The Minister of Defense has complete control. Tomorrow there will be a reduction in the state of military readiness and a demobilization of those reserve forces which were called up during the previous crisis in the Presidency. (C)

The President: In other words, you feel things are going better?
(U)

Prime Minister Markovic: I cannot say that we have completely overcome the crisis, but we are seeking a political resolution. We are continuing discussions in an effort to find a constitutional, democratic resolution of the problems facing us.
(C)

The President: Good. Let me raise another matter with you. We and others in the international community want to help. Do not think you are alone. If it would be helpful, we could organize some kind of CSCE statement or, if you wish, mediation by a third party. I know that our European friends would join us in responding to a request from you. Finding the right channel would not be an obstacle. But the request would have to come from you. If you made such a request and got a prompt positive response, it could strengthen you and stop those who would destroy Yugoslavia or want to use violence. If the CSCE or third-party mediation idea is of interest, I would be interested in hearing from you, now or in the future. I want to know what we can do to support you and to support your Government and the principles you represent. I would also like to know if you have any other ideas. (C)

Prime Minister Markovic: I want to thank you very much for attempting to find the best way to support me and my Government and to help us carry out reforms and democratization and to resolve the problems we face. I think the best way at the moment is for the delegation of the European Community headed by Messrs. Santer and Delors to proceed to Yugoslavia as scheduled on May 29 and 30. We will arrange for them to have discussions with us, with all republic presidents, and, if necessary, in other fora such as the mass media. I think it would be good -- this is my suggestion -- that you publicly issue a statement supporting this visit. It would be especially good if you could say that after this European Community visit, your own Secretary of State Baker will be visiting Yugoslavia. This would be an excellent and important sign of support and would demonstrate your personal involvement to support and strengthen our Government's efforts.
(C)

The President: Let me say that we will publicly support the European Community and its mission. Let me think about the Baker suggestion and see what we can do. As you know, he is pretty tied up right now with the Middle East, but I will talk with him. If you think it would be helpful and we think it would be helpful.... We will see. I just don't want to make a commitment yet until I talk to him. (C)

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Prime Minister Markovic: Of course, but please give it some thought. There are two more things I would like to mention. One is the Nickles Amendment. I understand why the Nickles Amendment was adopted. I even believe it could have a positive effect on the situation in Yugoslavia. But its announced implementation today strikes squarely at the government and at our efforts in reform and democratization. Through provisions of the Amendment, technical assistance would be closed off to us, as well as loan guarantees and access to international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and others. We think it is important, for example, for an IMF delegation to come to Yugoslavia now to negotiate a stand-by agreement. Fortunately, we understand that the law has not yet been fully implemented, because we understand that Secretary Baker has not yet decided. (Ø)

The President: That is true. We sometimes have differences with our Congress. In this case, we have decided to defer challenging this until we see how the situation develops in Yugoslavia. But we are making it clear publicly that these measures are a result of actions by the Serbian government, while we continue to support you and the Federal Government. We want to support and strengthen you. Let me see what we can do with the Congress. (Ø)

Prime Minister Markovic: Your assessment is the correct one. The situation in Yugoslavia is such that the Federal government is the promoter of a democratic resolution. It has the trust of the people and is capable of solving the problems which exist. But the Nickles Amendment is harming us. (Ø)

The President: I understand. We will try to work with Congress. Good luck to you. (U)

Prime Minister Markovic: Thank you. I would like to thank you in the name of the government of Yugoslavia and in my own personal name. With me during this conversation was our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Loncar. It is my wish to be able to come to Washington personally as soon as possible. I would then be able to convey my gratitude personally and discuss not only the situation in Yugoslavia but also developments in other formerly socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. I believe this could be of interest to you. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. Please give our best regards to Loncar, who is an old friend. We think the world of him. Second, when your own travel plans become known, please tell Ambassador Zimmermann. I am sure we can accommodate it. Good luck to you, sir. (Ø)

Prime Minister Markovic: Thank you. Goodbye to you in Washington. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Call from Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir
Notetaker: Edmund Hull, NSC

DATE, TIME May 24, 1991; 11:04 - 11:10 a.m.
AND PLACE: Aboard Air Force One

The President: Hello sir. How are you? (U)

The Prime Minister: Fine. How are you? (U)

The President: I am on an airplane, flying somewhere to give a speech, and then I am going to have a few days of rest. (U)

The Prime Minister: I just want you to know that three airplanes have arrived with about 1,000 people. The operation is going well and should continue tonight and tomorrow. Thank you for your help. We are very grateful for all you did and for the success of the operation. (C)

The President: From the first exodus flight from Sudan, I have been emotionally involved. My Jewish friends point out how important it is to save a single life, and this operation is saving many more. Congratulations to Israel, Ethiopia, Rudy Boschwitz and our little team. (C)

The Prime Minister: Thank you, thank you, Mr. President and thanks as well to Rudy, the State Department, and your ambassador in Ethiopia. Tomorrow night we will have all of the refugees here. It was a wonderful job. We are very happy. (C)

The President: Wonderful. I am delighted to talk to you. Let me just add a few words about the peace process. I am convinced we have a real opportunity to do what you want and that it will lead to direct negotiations. We are not letting up. We are trying our best to be a catalyst and hope we will succeed. (C)

The Prime Minister: Thank you for your encouragement. I hope it will go forward with your help and guidance. We appreciate Jim Baker's efforts. I am convinced we will make it. (C)

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The President: Great. It is very kind of you to call. I want you to know this has both my official and personal involvement. (✓)

The Prime Minister: Thank you. I know you are personally involved in the rescue and the peace process. I wish you full success. (✓)

The President: Our relations with the Soviet Union are better than what you read in the newspaper, and we are continuing our efforts there on emigration. (✓)

The Prime Minister: Thank you. People are coming day and night. We know you are working for us. It is also in the interests of the United States. (✓)

The President: I know it is both in our humanitarian and national security interests. Thank you for the phone call. (✓)

Goodbyes.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of
Mexico
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME May 24, 1991, 2:33 - 2:34 p.m.
AND PLACE: Marine One

The President: Can you hear me, Okay? Over. (U)

President Salinas: I can hear you fine. (U)

The President: I'm on the helicopter on the way to
Kennebunkport, but I wanted to call you and tell you how
delighted I am that the Congress passed the fast-track extension.
I want to thank you for your leadership in this effort. We would
never have gotten it if it hadn't been for your efforts. (U)

President Salinas: Thank you very much, George. Your personal
leadership made it possible for us to win this important victory
(U).

The President: Well, I couldn't be more pleased. We look
forward to working this all out with you. And I want to tell you
that if you ever see any bumps in the road on this, don't
hesitate to call me. (U)

President Salinas: Thank you very much, George. We look forward
to working on this. All the best to your family at
Kennebunkport. (U)

The President: We'll be talking soon. Over and out. (U)

President Salinas: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Gorbachev of the USSR on
May 27, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 27, 1991, 4:30 - 4:49pm
AND PLACE Kennebunkport

President Gorbachev: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Mikhail, how are you? I am calling to say that I really would like to go to a summit if we can reach agreement on CFE and get a START agreement. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, I very cordially greet you. And I would like to say that both of us have a lot of work in Moscow and in Washington. Since we both have a lot of work, I hope there will be good results for both of us. I am pleased we are in touch and working hard. I hope you can hear me well, George (there were phone line difficulties throughout the call). (S)

The President: I am wondering if you have received my letter to you on General Moiseyev's visit. I know you have so many other things on your mind, and I want you to know I'm with you. I don't mean to press you on CFE but I am eager to get past this obstacle. First, I want to reiterate directly what I said in my letter about General Moiseyev. He showed real statesmanship and, I think, has helped prepare a solution. He also impressed me with his commitment to our relationship and to what you stand for. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, I received it. The Moiseyev visit was good. I appreciated the attention you gave to it. I hope that in Lisbon Bessmertnykh and Baker will be able to wrap up that work. (S)

The President: Moiseyev is a statesman and I knew that as a military man he had good reasons to say what he did. He described his core problem. He would rather not take 1100 pieces of equipment in the naval infantry, especially another 753 armored vehicles, out of service. As I said in my letter, he had

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practical military arguments for his view. But the issue transcends this equipment. This CFE problem is an obstacle to the summit. (S)

President Gorbachev: I considered carefully your points. I listened to Moiseyev's report and instructed my people on the basis of your letter to urgently prepare a proposal for Lisbon. I hope they will be able to solve it. (S)

The President: I hope we can resolve CFE and START and that I can then come to Moscow. That would be a historic step and I very much want to come to Moscow. Mikhail, I really want to come there. (S)

President Gorbachev: That coincides with what we want. That would be an enormous historical step forward. That is the way it will be and we should assume we must move to complete work on START. (S)

The President: Moiseyev said the differences between us are very narrow and I agree with him. (S)

President Gorbachev: I do too. I think there will be a solution in Lisbon. (S)

The President: By the way, Primakov and Yavlinskiy will be in town this week and we will discuss with them economic issues in general and credit guarantees. (S)

President Gorbachev: I think Primakov will give you a more detailed idea of what I had in mind during our last call. The concept of cooperation at this critical phase in reform and critical passage in our process of change is important. (S)

The President: When Primakov and Yavlinskiy return to Moscow, I am sure they will communicate the results of their meetings. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, George, I very much hope we will cooperate at this very important phase in our reform process. (S)

The President: We will discuss with Primakov not only broad issues, but also in particular the credit issue. We are leaning forward and are not stepping away from you. We want to strengthen the general relationship and I do really want to come to Moscow. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, I think we must both be pragmatic and practical and take a long-term view. This is a unique chance which we must not miss. If we do, then I think we will miss quite a lot. (S)

The President: I appreciate your meeting with our agricultural team. I will be talking with them. Brent Scowcroft has talked to them briefly. They have some good ideas you and I could pursue together. (S)

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President Gorbachev: They had a good visit and good discussions here. They have some facts and material to analyze and certain conclusions that were interesting for me to hear. I can see you have sent competent and constructive people. Therefore our discussion was meaningful. (S)

The President: Well, I am glad they had a good visit with you. You know, Mikhail, as far as credits in general, there are some limits. When it comes to grain in particular, the Soviets will always be good for it. We'll do whatever is possible to get over the limits. (S)

President Gorbachev: Mr. President, yes I am also hopeful. I am pleased to hear what you have just said. You don't know how happy that makes me, especially that last line. (At this point, Gorbachev said but his interpreter did not translate: Can I quote you as having said that?) (S)

The President: We wish you all well. I hope we meet soon in Moscow and have a long discussion because there is a lot to talk about. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, I think both of us feel the summit is possible and what is most important, is necessary. I would like to wish you and your family, especially Barbara, the best. Please tell that to Barbara. (U)

The President: Please send my greetings to Raisa and your family. We want to support the relationship. We have to talk again soon and keep up contacts often. I want to say that here I am not playing games. We will do everything we can to support you. (S)

President Gorbachev: I very much appreciate what you have just said and I could repeat the same words and say that to you. Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. Thanks a million. And let's get that conventional arms treaty thing resolved. I really want to go to Moscow. (S)

(After the President left the line, Gorbachev and his interpreter stayed on the line unsure if the conversation had ended. After asking if it had, Gorbachev asked his interpreter when he could get him a transcript of the conversation. The interpreter said he would do so at 8:00 a.m. May 28. Gorbachev then said he thought it had been a very interesting call, full of substantive content.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of
Canada on May 27, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Daniel Poneman, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 27, 1991, 7:58 - 8:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President: Brian, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You're looking fine, George. I've been
seeing you on television golfing and fishing, etc. (U)

The President: I understand that you are in Japan. What time is
it there? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: It's just about 9 a.m. (U)

The President: Just checking in on nonproliferation, but how is
your trip going? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: It's going well. I've just opened a
new embassy here, and I met with your friend Prime Minister
Kaifu. Takeshita, Uno and other prominent Japanese leaders were
also there. I don't know who's where come October. (S)

The President: It sounds like you got a good turn-out! (U)

Let's talk a little about nonproliferation. I know from your
proposals as well as our own guys that we have a historic
opportunity to do something. I want to come out soon with an
initiative, to try to propose something soon, maybe in a week or
so. I want your views. I'll tell you what we are doing. It
would include conventional arms, export of components for
missiles, and chemical and biological weapons. What is your
view, Brian? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: During the Gulf crisis, we found that
the five members of the Security Council were practically the
exclusive suppliers of arms to Saddam Hussein. This is not the

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kind of business that anyone needs, and not a good situation. We thought there would be a good opportunity when the war wound down for the U.S. to take the lead. When you were in Ottawa, we suggested that it would be a good idea to take such an initiative. This is an opportunity to do something, because the blame or responsibility is shared by all. Your idea is bang on. (S)

The President: We are talking about a freeze on surface-to-surface missiles, including acquisition, testing and production. That can get complicated, however, because one of them has them and the others don't. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I watched Jim Baker testify the other day about his Middle East peace efforts and I must say I sympathize with the beating he has been taking. (S)

The President: Shamir called me just recently to thank me for U.S. assistance in getting the Falasha Jews out of Ethiopia, but he also asked that I have Jim Baker continue to hang in there in his Middle East peace efforts. We did not discuss the issue of settlements on the West Bank on the open line. However, we have to stick with our policy on this issue. They keep sticking it in our eyes on that. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The U.S. does deserve congratulations on the release of the Falashas. (S)

I am simply astonished on the settlements issue. I have watched each time Jim Baker has gone to Israel and been presented with more settlements on the West Bank. This is not fair to the U.S. and not helpful in the peace process. (S)

The President: That's right, but I took Shamir's words as a modest sign of encouragement. Shamir's got enough of a political problem, but that's no reason to stick it in our eye. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If Jim Baker does stay engaged, does it seem to you that Shamir will be offering something? (S)

The President: Maybe, but I'm not sure. I should add that I'm disappointed in King Hussein. He had told us he would be at a peace conference. Then he told us he was going to Syria just to check in with Assad. When he returned from Damascus, however, he said he could no longer attend a peace conference. I must say that his waffling again on this issue bothers me. So I am sore at him again, but there's no reason to despair. (S)

On arms control, I think the world is in a rush to see something done and now is the right time to take the initiative. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The arms control thing follows up what we discussed in Canada. I made a speech on February 8th on this subject, and from what Brent has told me, your initiative contains some of the same ideas. The timing is bang on. (S)

The President: Yes, your proposals were excellent and we are borrowing from you. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You think the arms initiative could boost the Middle East peace process? And could it be a question for the London Economic Summit? (S)

The President: I think it can be part of one big package. It's not directly related to the peace process, but it ought to help indirectly. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: When would you announce it? (U)

The President: I'm hoping to do it next week, probably in a speech. I am not sure about this week. There is ~~our~~ Air Force Academy speech. (C) *can*

Prime Minister Mulroney: In a university setting? (C)

The President: I am hoping so, but it's not pinned down yet. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: What do you expect from the Five? (S)

The President: I am not sure. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Have you heard anything more from Gorbachev about the London Summit? (S)

The President: I just got off the phone from a long talk with him a couple of hours ago. He did not mention the Summit. The call was on CFE. Gorbachev told me that we were very close and he was prepared to be helpful. We did not get into specifics because he was so forward leaning. (S)

Primakov and Yavlinskiy will be in this week. He wants CFE and START, and very much wants a meeting in Moscow. We are working on it. (S)

Gorbachev did raise the issue of credits for grain, however. We still have some distance to go. We have a law that requires such credits to be based on creditworthiness and it is hard to certify this for the Soviet Union right now. But I want to find a way to do it. Gorbachev was irritated. He said that the Soviet Union had never defaulted on an agricultural credit. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I would like to help you there. (C)

The President: I am a little more optimistic on arms control than I was one month ago. I am now more optimistic about Gorbachev's survival and I want to stick with him. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Have you talked to John Major about it? (C)

The President: Yes, I have. John Major has reservations. He is worried with the G-7 that, if Gorbachev comes and then fails, that the whole Summit will fail. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Major is going into an election campaign. It may seem crass to raise the issue, but I remember when I chaired the Summit in 1988 it was helpful with an election coming up. If Major is in the chair for the G-7 Summit and everything goes well, this could help him. If Gorbachev comes to the Summit, things could get out of control, and that may not be good for John Major. (S)

The President: We ought to keep that in mind. If it helps to have Gorbachev there, then let's lean a bit in favor of it. If not, then let's lean against it. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: From my experience, a well-run Summit can actually be a major benefit. Will you be seeing Gorbachev before the Summit? (S)

The President: No, I don't think so, although when Moiseyev was here, he said that we were very close on CFE. I didn't have to use my talking points because he was so forward leaning. (S)

When do you come home? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: On Saturday. I will call you once I get turned around. In the meantime, if anyone hits you in the ear while you are fishing, it's not me! And thank you for the call and the heads up. (S)

The President: Thank you. We are building on your initiative so, if we get off track, weigh in. We'll try to mention that we are not in this thing alone. Is Mila there? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: She is out, but we are having a good visit. When I was in Hong Kong, I was struck by how badly they want MFN for China. They also want moral support from you. Your Consul General gave a good speech when I was there, by the way. (S)

The 6 million people of Hong Kong are panic-stricken as to what China will do if MFN is denied. They fear they will be in a blind alley after 1997. (S)

The President: I'm in an uphill fight with Congress on MFN for China. If there's anyone you know in Congress, and if it can be done appropriately, it might be helpful if you would share your Hong Kong experience with them. I just gave a speech down at Yale where I announced we'd continue MFN. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If Brent could give Derek Burney a couple of key names on the Hill, I would be happy to call them. (S)

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The people in Hong Kong think that denial of MFN would be the kiss of death. Two-thirds of foreign investment in China goes in via Hong Kong. (S)

The President: I will talk to Brent about it. Some of our guys naively think that you can hit them over the head and then think you'll get something from them. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: On that again you are on the right track. I am sure your announcement of a Middle East non-proliferation initiative will go over well. (S)

The President: Thanks. Good talking to you. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Thanks for calling. God Bless. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Call from the Amir of Kuwait

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Amir Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah
Interpreter: Gamal Helal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME May 28, 1991; 7:54 - 8:26 a.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Your Highness, how are you sir? (U)

Amir Jaber: Thank God, I am well. (U)

The President: We have been following Kuwait with interest and pride. I hope things are going well with you. (U)

Amir Jaber: First of all, I want to ask about your health. (U)

The President: It's very good. There is nothing wrong with my heart. The problem is my thyroid but it's under control. When we hang up I am going to play some more golf. I'm up at the seashore in Maine and I actually have one day off. I feel like a spring colt. (U)

Amir Jaber: Thank God, your health is good. That is what others think, too. (U)

The President: Thank you. How are things going in Kuwait, and what's on your mind? I just want to say first that we are still grateful for your support on the war and grateful we had a hand in liberating Kuwait. That spirit hasn't changed here. (U)

Amir Jaber: Actually, I would like to thank the United States for its stand and you for your position. That was one reason for my call. But I also have two other requests. (U)

The President: Go ahead, sir. (U)

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Amir Jaber: First, I wanted to ask about your health. The second thing, the issue is the Middle East issue. The whole world is looking to the United States and its position to press Israel to end the Middle East problem. Because if we don't end it, the region will produce another dictator with a call to destroy Israel. If the problem is not solved, the climate will be right to create such a dictator. I am saying this as a friend, and am talking about a variety of things. (S)

The President: First, I understand what you are saying. Second, we are trying hard. I think our Administration has made it clear to Israel that it must participate and cooperate, and as you know we have spoken out forcefully against settlements. Having said that, it also is essential for Syria to come forward and essential for Jordan to come forward. It is not simply just one recalcitrant party. I know your country and my country were crosswise with the King of Jordan because of the war. In my heart I am still distressed that King Hussein in the war went too far over into the arms of Saddam Hussein. (S)

Having said that, we have reestablished contact to get him to participate in the peace process. He told me he would do that, he then went to Syria, and then he came back and said the time was not right, that he was not sure the he could do that now. He went back on what he told me before. I make the point because there needs to be cooperation from Israel -- and Jim Baker and I remain engaged on that -- but also there needs to be cooperation from Jordan and Syria. What's your view on what I've said? (S)

Amir Jaber: There is no doubt I appreciate what your Excellency, the President has said. On this issue we have done what we have been asked. We have asked the GCC Secretary General to be present at a conference to get Israel to compromise. But Israel didn't, and so it is difficult for Jordan and Syria to do something. (S)

The President: I am delighted that Bishara, the Secretary General has agreed to attend with your and King Fahd's leadership. It is a step for which we give you credit. I also agree that Israel must come forward. But the only point I would make is that anyone with influence on Syria and Jordan, that also would be very, very helpful. But I agree with your assessment. We mustn't miss the opportunity so we will continue to do what is necessary with our friends and the other countries to get everybody to attend this conference. (S)

Amir Jaber: I think Syria in particular won't agree as long as Israel won't find a way and change its position. (S)

The President: True, but if we can get both to a conference then that's where the concession stage begins. (S)

Amir Jaber: That's my point. Syria won't attend a conference with Israel if they are not assured that Israel hasn't changed its position. (S)

The President: Let me think about it. Israel has changed some in that they are now talking about attending to Jim Baker and before they refused to attend at all. Only the United States can encourage Israel to do what is necessary, and we are prepared to do more publicly and go the extra mile to get them to this discussion stage. In Israel, we now will get help from the Israeli people, but the government will be more difficult. (S)

Amir Jaber: I wish you success in your efforts because this issue is important to us. (S)

The President: Your Majesty, I wanted to ask you how things are going at home in Kuwait? (S)

Amir Jaber: I didn't mean this was my last point. (U)

The President: Okay. (U)

Amir Jaber: I wanted to give your Excellency an idea about what is taking place in Kuwait. Perhaps you are hearing in the news and reading in the papers the untrue stories about human rights and related issues. I am sure your Ambassador here is giving you a clear idea of what is going on here. (S)

The President: He came to see me and he had a different view from the papers. I was pleased because we have great confidence in Skip Gnehm. (S)

Amir Jaber: That's what we are trying to do, to be clear about the trials that are taking place and to give a clear idea that we will not put anyone on trial in absentia and that we are working hard to conduct these trials in a civilized way. Each suspect has his own lawyer, and this is something we regard as a duty because the reputation of Kuwait is something we can't compromise. (S)

The President: The more this gets out in the western press, which can be difficult, the better it is. The western press has made a lot about the man who got fifteen years for wearing the Saddam t-shirt, but I'm confident that on that man there was more to his record than that. (Ø)

Amir Jaber: True, but unfortunately the western press didn't reflect the reality of the acts this individual had committed which were horrifying. (Ø)

The President: That is a good example. If our Ambassador sends me the details, I'd be glad to see if we can get more balance on this issue. (Ø)

Amir Jaber: I will give him all the details on this case. (U)

The President: In any case, I am delighted to know your spirit on this. (Ø)

Amir Jaber: On the other issue, of course, Kuwait just came out of occupation, and things are improving gradually. We have a committee examining the issue of parliamentary elections to set up the activities needed and to work on those things affiliated with elections like registering voters, organizing election procedures. We hope for parliamentary elections next year. (Ø)

The President: I am delighted to hear that. How are you doing on the oil fires? (U)

Amir Jaber: On your question on oil fires, we have invited most of the companies with experience in this work and they have been able to put out over 130 fires. (U)

The President: Very good. (U)

Amir Jaber: We hope within the next few months to put out more. (U)

The President: Your Majesty, can I ask you two other questions? (U)

Amir Jaber: Yes. (U)

The President: First, on the extension of martial law for 30 more days, I am sure there were specific concerns involved and I'd be interested in what they are. And second, on Saddam Hussein and his survival. We are outraged at what he is doing, yet we don't know that he will get out of there. (S)

Amir Jaber: On the issue of martial law and its extension for 30 days, the main reason for this is to collect arms in Kuwait. A lot of Kuwaiti citizens and non-citizens have in their possession some types of arms and weapons still. So that is the main reason. It will not be extended beyond 30 days. We are hoping in 30 days to collect those arms in a peaceful manner. (S)

The President: Good luck on that. (U)

Amir Jaber: On the second point, we aren't comfortable at all with Saddam Hussein because he can't be trusted -- period. (S)

The President: I agree. We have to keep the pressure on. I hope that all will stick to the sanctions until his people can get him out. (S)

Amir Jaber: I hope so too. (U)

The President: We will work on that. I wish you the best Your Majesty. I am pleased you think things are moving well in your country, and again I am pleased that we were side-by-side with you in the war. (S)

Amir Jaber: Wish you the best of luck and good health. I don't wish to take more of your time. Have a good golf game. (U)

The President: First, I am delighted you called, and second, please call any time. We are committed to your success, and to the path you've set out. So on any matter large or small, don't hesitate to call, nor will I hesitate to call you. Some day I hope to come calling. I can't tell you how much I look forward to that, although it will be some months down the road. (S)

Amir Jaber: I wish you the best of luck in all your efforts and endeavors, and good health. (U)

The President: Thank you, your Majesty. God speed and good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of Nicaragua

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, President of Nicaragua
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME AND PLACE May 31, 1991, 5:11 - 5:14 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Violeta, how are you? (U)

President Chamorro: How are you? (U)

The President: Well, I didn't want to keep you, but I couldn't let you come to Texas and not call you to see how you are doing. (U)

President Chamorro: I didn't want to bother you. How are you doing? (U)

The President: Just fine, everything's fine. (U)

President Chamorro: The same to me, thanks be to God. I'm leaving Tuesday for Managua. I'm at the Marriott Hotel. I'm an out-patient. The nurse comes to my hotel room. (U)

The President: I just wanted to check in on you and see how you're doing. Barbara sends her love. (U)

President Chamorro: How is Barbara? (U)

The President: We're both fine. We're going to the theater tonight, to see a play. Tomorrow we're going up to Camp David. Then I have to make a graduation speech at West Point. (U)

President Chamorro: Oh, West Point. I've seen you on television, making speeches all this week. And on the Soviet Union, meetings on the Soviet Union. (U)

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The President: We had a meeting today with Primakov. They want a helluva lot of money for their economic plan. We're trying to help, but I'm not sure that we have it. (Ø)

President Chamorro: I need some too, but not as much as Gorbachev. Maybe five million. Don't forget. (Ø)

The President: Well, we send you our love, and best wishes. (U)

President Chamorro: Have a nice weekend. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

President Chamorro: Bye-bye, my dear George. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Giulio Andreotti, President of Italy
on June 3, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Giulio Andreotti, President
Interpreter: Sim Smiley
Notetaker: Tony Wayne

DATE, TIME June 3, 1991, 2:58 p.m. - 3:13 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: How are you, my friend? (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Very well, thank you, Mr. President.
(U)

The President: Did I find you still in Italy? (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: No, we're in the United Arab
Emirates, in Abu Dhabi. (U)

The President: Oh, what time is it? Did I wake you up? (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: No, don't worry about it. It's about
11 p.m. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about your visit to Syria
and where we are in the Middle East, if you have a minute. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, thank you very much. Because
tomorrow morning I'm going to Kuwait and then in the afternoon,
I'm going to Syria. (Ø)

The President: Well, first, pay my respects to the Emir of
Kuwait. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I will be very happy to do so. (U)

The President: Well, first of all thank you very much for your
letter. And secondly, let me, if I could, make a few points and
then I'll be glad to hear from you on the Middle East. We still
have a problem on the question of the UN role and whether or not
the conference can reconvene. These are two stumbling blocks.
And Asad in particular has been absolutely rigid on these two
questions even though these are only questions of form rather
than substance. And, of course, as you know, this obstinance on

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this question makes it very difficult for Israel, whom we're also encouraging to make concessions, to go along. (S)

Baker was in Lisbon and he gave the Syrian Foreign Minister a letter from me to Asad. It outlines what we've done to meet the Syrian concerns and why Syria ought to be willing to commit to a credible peace process. It also points out that Asad should not block the process; that Syria can only lose if it seeks to block a process that can provide real hope for peace in the process. And all I was going to ask you is that when you see Asad, that you make the point that he'll never, never have a better opportunity to be part of a process that can actually produce for the Syrians and the Palestinians. And he ought not to miss the boat in this opportunity. And if you agree that he's been given every chance to be a part of the process, I wish you would let him know that all of us in the West are together on this and are not prepared to let him and him alone define the terms that make it possible to go ahead. For the U.S., anyway, we're determined to press ahead whether he chooses to be a part of the process or not. Bessmertnykh is talking to him along these same lines and so is Mubarak. (S)

So this was the point. I hesitate to call you so late but your's is a very important visit, and if you can persuade him to come to the table, that will be an enormous step forward. And Giulio, you should know that before he went to Syria, King Hussain told me, "I will be at the table." And he goes to Syria and returns to Jordan and he's very vague. He goes back on that commitment. And Asad obviously talked him out of it or talked him into being much more reluctant, and that's bad, too. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I absolutely agree that we must make all efforts possible to convince Asad. And on the question of the two points that you brought up earlier, this is the way I see the question. But on the first question, I don't think it's logical to exclude the UN. However, I don't think that we can give Israel a pretext not to do what it should be doing, to negotiate. (S)

The President: I agree and actually, the UN has a role in our proposal. But it's not as much as Asad has wanted so far. You know we're starting from the Israelis saying "no UN role at all" and Asad saying "the UN should chair the conference". So we're trying to find some compromises here. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I will certainly work in that direction and I'm not sure I'll be successful, but I will make my best efforts. (S)

The President: That's wonderful. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: On the second issue of the conference, even if the conference doesn't take place when we think it should, some day it may go well and then we can take those steps we think are necessary. (S)

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The President: That would be a good way to approach it. I think he'll listen to you. (C)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, I hope so and tomorrow evening I will meet him after stopping for a few hours in Kuwait. (C)

The President: Wonderful. Your letter also said you were going to Libya. (C)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, I'm going to spend about 2 hours in Tripoli before returning to Italy because Qadhafi insisted that I stop there. And he's been behaving well lately. I decided to talk to him, and Mubarak suggested I talk to him. (S)

The President: Mubarak is very high on that issue, and he thinks I'm dragging my feet. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, he told me that he talked to you, and the day after tomorrow I will speak to him and see what commitment he can make. (S)

The President: Good, but please bear in mind that there is substantial evidence that he continues to support terrorism, albeit in a lower profile. And we continue to believe he is producing chemical weapons. I'm not misleading you. Our evidence is pretty convincing here. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Well, certainly we must examine more carefully the issue of giving credit to Qadhafi, which I don't think we should do right now. But at the same time we should encourage him to continue down the peaceful road he has embarked upon lately. (S)

The President: The more peaceful the road, the better. But I plan to keep my eyes open because he says one thing on chemical but does something else. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, Italy will also be very careful because we are so much closer to him and we will be at risk if he uses chemical weapons. (S)

The President: Yes, very much so. Have a wonderful trip and I appreciate your taking this call. (C)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you very much and good luck, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Now get a little sleep, my friend. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Good bye. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey
on June 3, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns

DATE, TIME June 4, 1991, 3:31 p.m. - 3:42 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hey, how are you, my friend? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm OK. In fact, my health is really good. (U)

President Ozal: I want to make your visit quite a good visit.
(U)

The President: Well, listen. I'm looking forward to it. (U)

President Ozal: One information. An important one. You know
that President Rafsanjani visited Turkey. (S)

The President: How did it go? Oh, Rafsanjani. I thought you
were talking about Aziz coming. (S)

President Ozal: I'll tell you about that later. With
Rafsanjani, I talked about the hostages in Lebanon. (S)

The President: Oh, you did? (U)

President Ozal: Yes. I asked him without any condition to let
two of them go as a sign. And maybe one of them will be this
Terry Anderson. We are not very sure yet. (S)

The President: I missed what you said. (U)

President Ozal: Terry Anderson. I'm not very sure. The answer
is that they will let two go without any conditions in 10 days.
(S)

The President: You believe him? (S)

President Ozal: Yes. That's how the news came to me. I believe
him. But they would like to see this gesture reciprocated by
Israel. (S)

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The President: What do they have in mind? (U)

President Ozal: I think there are some Shi'ia prisoners. The most important one is Sheikh Obeid. (S)

The President: Well, we know of that and I have the feeling that there's talking going on in that part of the world regarding the release of Obeid over there. But it is not with us. (S)

President Ozal: One additional. If the gesture is made by the Israelis, this could be done not through you, but with Lebanon. At the border of Lebanon. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Ozal: They have relations there. Then Rafsanjani wants to finish all this business and try to let all the hostages free. (S)

The President: I see. What will that take? (U)

President Ozal: A gesture by Israel. After the other gesture, they want to see. They have some effect on the people in Lebanon, but those people are also very interested in their people in Israel. Hello? (S)

The President: Yes, I hear you with great interest -- everything you said. (U)

President Ozal: I think this is the most important one. I think this is the real one because his visit in Turkey was a very good one. We have very good relations. (S)

The President: Well, we've heard good things about the man but we have this historic enmity about the assets. (S)

President Ozal: He wants to finish it. Maybe they would like to establish relations with you. I feel it. (S)

The President: But you think he can finish it by the first gesture and then if he gets a reciprocal gesture, he'll do the rest. (S)

President Ozal: Yes, in 10 days. (S)

The President: Well I hope you are right. The fact you talked to him about this -- I'm so very grateful to you. (S)

President Ozal: Yes, I'm working for you. The second one is about your visit to Turkey. I think you are coming on the 19th from Greece to Ankara and leaving the morning of the 21st. This is a problem they told me. I would like to see a change in the program a little bit because the city of Istanbul is the most important city in Turkey. If you do not visit it, you have not seen Turkey. What I suggest is that you come on the 19th to

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Ankara as planned and the 20th about noon we will together leave for Istanbul. I would like to make you rest and see this beautiful scenery of Istanbul. A small excursion. I will come with you. (S)

The President: How nice. (U)

President Ozal: We will go to Istanbul the next day - 20th - and when we arrive in Istanbul, take a boat from the airport. We will go to a hotel and then to the Bosphorus where you will see a nice view of Istanbul. (S)

The President: Wouldn't that be wonderful? (U)

President Ozal: It would be good for Mrs. Bush, also. (U)

The President: She would love it. (U)

President Ozal: You are going to go in the morning but it requires 6 hours more. (U)

The President: Let me talk to the schedulers. I don't mind flying all night. (S)

President Ozal: I'm going to ask...

The President: I'll take this up right now with General Scowcroft and the schedulers and tell them I'd like to do it. The only problem I've got is the time on the other end, but I would love to do that. (S)

President Ozal: If you go for example at 3:00 or 4:00 in the afternoon, you will arrive at 7:00 p.m. in the evening in Washington direct. (U)

The President: As opposed to getting here at 1:00 p.m. we get here at 7:00 p.m.? (U)

President Ozal: Yes, 6 hours difference. (U)

The President: Let us see what we can do. You've been so good to us and I will try, but I don't know the schedule on the other end. We'll get to work on it right away. (U)

President Ozal: And, George, it is also important for me. (S)

The President: That matters to me. (U)

President Ozal: Thank you. (U)

The President: Has Aziz been there yet? (S)

President Ozal: I am not very sure but he is supposed to come. We told the news the 11th and 12th of this month. Then what comes out of it, I'll tell you. I'll tell him that there will be no relations with the west as long as Saddam is in power. (S)

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The President: Hold the line on that. But Saddam, the things he's doing now. You know there's some evidence that he's diverting the flour into his own hometown and away from humanitarian needs. The man has not changed. He is still a bad person. (S)

President Ozal: He is not a nice person. After the humiliating defeat, he should not stay in power. He should kill himself as a good Arab. (S)

The President: Good luck and we are very, very pleased that Colin Powell came back. He was grateful to you for coming to supper. And pleased that we're getting these people almost entirely out of Turkey. (S)

President Ozal: Also your army corps of engineers is coming. Which will go to Arab countries and maybe to Israel. If there is a peace, we will give them water through the Peace Pipeline. (S)

The President: That would give us leverage. Let's see what we can do. It's a big project and I'm glad the corps are coming. Those are the people that have a lot to say. Thank you for the two points. I'm glad to get the first one and we'll try to be helpful on the second one. (S)

President Ozal: Thank you. (U)

The President: Thank you. Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Jorge Serrano of the
Republic of Guatemala on June 11, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jorge Serrano
Notetakers: Bill Pryce/David Pacelli

DATE, TIME June 11, 1991, 10:40 - 11:07am EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office - Presidential Palace

The President returned a phone call from President Serrano which he was unable to take earlier. President Serrano spoke in English. (U)

The President: Hello Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Serrano: Hello Mr. President. How are you, sir? I'm just fine, just working away here. (U)

The President: All is well here. I am feeling okay. I'm delighted to hear from you. (U)

President Serrano: I would like to talk with you on a couple of questions. I've been trying to call you for two weeks. (U)

The President: This is a good time to talk. I'd like to know about any problems you might want to bring up with me. (U)

President Serrano: I don't know if you remember me. We've met several times. (U)

The President: Yes, I think I met you in a meeting when I was down there at one point. (U)

President Serrano: Yes, I also met you in your office with Charlie Bartlett. (U)

The President: Charlie Bartlett has told me about you. He's a very strong supporter of yours and I feel like I know you. He went down to your inauguration. (U)

President Serrano: Thank you for taking this call. We have a lot of problems here. (U)

The President: Please tell me what they are. We haven't talked yet. We want you to succeed; we want democracy to succeed.

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Please tell me your problems, I'd like to know what we can do to help. (✓)

President Serrano: Thank you, Mr. President. First, my party and your Republican party have had a long, very good relationship. We got support from the National Republican Institute for leadership training. We are members of the International Democratic Union, brother parties. (✓)

The President: Yes, sir. (U)

President Serrano: Our government is encouraging a conservative policy in Guatemala. Yet, we've got a situation where our countries are not as friendly as they might be. (✓)

The President: You mean when you came in? (U)

President Serrano: Yes, regarding human rights and several other subjects. At the beginning, they said that this is a sticking point. We have made improvements but this is still the situation we face. (✓)

The President: Are they still beating up on you? Are they still giving you a hard time? (✓)

President Serrano: We would like to have the best relations with the White House. We are working together and ideologically on a same line. I was helping with Panama. I was a member of the Carter election observer mission to Panama. I also was President of the observer mission of the International Democratic Union in Nicaragua. When my party was in opposition, we had a good relationship with your party. What I do not understand is why we can't go ahead with your Administration. If we are ideologically the same and do our best; if we can present accomplishments, then there should not be problems. We have had a good relationship with the Republican side in the Senate. We are doing all we can to get a resolution, which Administration people are helping with in Congress, in order to have a better relationship. I want to ask you to help me from the House side. What I would like is help from the White House. We need more understanding from the State Department. It could be a different view from the White House. I want to have an objective person from the White House staff to come to Guatemala to understand what we are doing and have a more objective view of the situation. (✓)

The President: I have a couple of comments. I don't want you to feel that the Administration is opposing you. You are right about the philosophical identity. We are pleased with your approach to a number of difficult problems. One way you have been very positive with dealing with the guerrillas. I am thinking about the agreement your government reached with the guerrillas in Mexico in April. We view this as historic. I hope we made clear our appreciation of your courage in taking that historic step. Thanks to your efforts, your country now has a better chance for peace. So, I salute you and it is a step that we fully support. If that is not coming through, we have to do

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better. And if State is not passing that message of approbation, we want to know. We want to salute you where you have made progress. (S)

What are the main problem areas you face? Economic? (S)

President Serrano: Yes. (U)

Let me tell you a couple of other things. We are helping on the drug problem. We are combatting drugs. We are absolutely against drug trafficking. We are trying to do our best. Guatemala was number three in opium production. We don't like that. But we cannot do it alone. They are extremely powerful. They have a lot of money. We need your help. It is good for you and good for us. (S)

The peace process has been difficult for me. I am the first civilian president who took real power. I changed the military commander. Now, I am the real commander. And then there is the peace problem. After thirty years of inactivity, I have been able to get together with the guerrillas. We are having a meeting next week and maybe we will have results in that area. (S)

There are three main economic problems. There is \$50 million which was in the last budget for external assistances. (S)

The President: Yes, it is called ESF. (S)

President Serrano: This is directly for balance of payment support. We don't need it for internal purposes. We need it for international organizations. We need to pay to international organizations part of the foreign debt and to open windows that I get closed which make it possible to deal with the social problems of the country. Let me tell you that when I came in, just four months ago, the government had only 4.5 million in reserves. Now, with the confidence of the private sector we have over \$500 million. In collection of taxes, we are doing well. We are reducing the deficit. If we keep it up, at the end of the year we will have 15 percent inflation instead of 85 percent inflation under the last government.

The President: My, that is a real drop. (U)

President Serrano: We are doing this with a lot of sacrifice. That is why we need \$50 million to help to solve our external debt problems. AID says that we must first reach agreement with the IMF. We want to talk to them, but to do it when we have made our adjustment, in our time. Since we have made changes in our economy, we will be ready to do what they ask of us. They see our policy working, but the 50 million we need ahead and is still in the hands of AID. (S)

Relations with your Ambassador and State are improving, but we would like this money as soon as possible. Not for my budget in Guatemala, but to open the windows of the Inter-American

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Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. (S)

The President: I thought that was our policy. I thought that the 50 million should be used to support a program with the IMF. Isn't that what you want to do? (S)

President Serrano: Yes. But we can't wait for two to five months. We don't have time to develop a program. So if there is no support from your side, we could fail with what we are trying to do here. (S)

The President: Let me look at this. We don't want you to fail. We want you to succeed. I thought that an economic program would help with the IMF. I will talk with Treasury people to see that we are not overly restrictive. I know how IMF agreements are tough, but this is not against Guatemala. If you have problems, we want to help, I will get with the Secretary of Treasury. I will also talk with General Scowcroft, our National Security Advisor, to see if we have any flexibility. (S)

Now, on the drug question, we would be glad to have a drug official come -- not someone from State, but someone like Governor Martinez, the head of our drug office -- if that would be helpful. (S)

President Serrano: Yes, that would be helpful. Drugs are increasing tremendously, switching their operations to Guatemala. We are giving all assistance that you are asking. We still have the problem of the guerrillas and other problems. As you know, we don't have military assistance. So, the equipment we have, we have to use it to fight the guerrillas. We lack resources for fighting drugs. This is still something in which we would like to have some help. We can achieve more with it. We have been satisfied with the program we do with you, but we think it is not enough to have to find a solution to the problem. (S)

The President: Let me tell you, that is in our interest. I will talk here and perhaps we can have a high-level drug official to visit you. We call him our drug czar. That is not his official title, but that is what he is called here, the drug czar. Governor Martinez has come back from a follow-up meeting to Cartagena, visiting Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico and he had some positive things to say. (S)

President Serrano: We are willing to work with him. A third point is military assistance. This was cut off one month before I became president. The move was made to send a message to the past president but it is affecting me. In Guatemala, if you want to support civilian government, and civilian control of military groups in Latin America, you have to have the bonds to do it. If you could help on this. I have made strong decisions with the military and I will keep doing this. I changed the chief of intelligence and I changed the High Command of the army. I did this to get control. But at the same time, you are cutting military support, this makes my position weaker in the face of

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the military. They have real problems with their military equipment. (S)

The President: Let me comment. You are right that the suspension of assistance was meant to send a signal to your predecessor. It was specifically triggered by military involvement in the case of the murder of Michael Devine, a U.S. citizen. We appreciate your efforts and we are eager to see a judicial resolution to get it removed as a irritant in our relations. The problem is that we have a big Congressional problem. You have got to convince them, for they play a big role in human rights. I hope you will continue to work with us on the criteria for reestablishing our military aid relationship. You are hearing here maybe for the first time that we want to see the aid relationship reestablished. Frankly, we have worked hard to get Congress to reduce the conditioning language it wants to impose on aid. I don't control Congress. I think they recognize that you have made progress. I'll say this. If you need to make more progress, we need to tell you what needs to be done. We should tell you what it is you need to do in addition to what you have already done. (S)

Do you feel that State is opposing what you are trying to do in this? (S)

President Serrano: No, no. I sensed a feeling of cooperation from State. I sensed a progress in the Congress. They were working on a final draft to be considered in the Senate. We have good friends on the Republican side. We feel we need a stronger support for Guatemala. (S)

The President: Let me look at that. It is food for thought. You mentioned our Ambassador. Tom Stroock is an old friend. We got the feeling that he was doing a very good job. Charlie Bartlett told me what a great job he was doing. We don't want you to think that the Ambassador is working against you. Let me look into that. On the other hand, they have certain instructions as it relates to ESF and military assistance. It is good to have this call. We don't want you to think that we are not positive. (S)

I will follow-up on ESF and military aid. I will follow-up on a drug mission and get someone to come down there to talk about the issues you have raised. I want to make sure that we are not pulling away and letting you face these things all alone. (S)

President Serrano: Thank you. Relations with the Ambassador have improved much in the last two weeks. He is understanding my needs. (S)

The President: Wonderful. He is not just my friend. He gets orders from the Secretary of State. But I don't want to learn that a guy from the White House is getting crosswise with the President of a country. I will follow up on the other points and let that rest for a while. (S)

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President Serrano: The problem is that he is over-evaluating the democracy problem. We are doing our best, but you have to understand the limitations we face dealing with a corrupt judicial system. (S)

The President: Oh, no, I understand. (U)

President Serrano: We are working on four or five cases, and there are other countries that have hundreds of cases. We are doing our best. We have put as Minister of Government, a former Congressman. We are getting help from Chile on human rights. We are getting support from Caribbeans to help change polices. We will keep working on this. We want to do more over the next several months. We need time. We made this clear with the Ambassador, and there has not been any problem. (S)

The President: I will try to follow up. The big point I want to make is that I appreciate your call. You have a friend in the White House. We will try to help. But we have constraints and Congressional problems. (S)

President Serrano: We are working in Congress -- if you could help there. (S)

The President: We will try very hard. I appreciate the phone call. (U)

President Serrano: Let me express my admiration for your Administration and the American people. Thank you for your words of interest and support. (S)

The President: Thank you for your kind words. (U)

President Serrano: Thank you and say hello to your family. (U)

The President: Thank you. Will do. And the same to yours. (U)

--- End of Conversation ---

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Jorge Serrano of
Guatemala on June 11, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jorge Serrano
Notetaker: David Pacelli

DATE, TIME June 11, 1991, 10:40 - 11:07 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office - Presidential Palace

The President returned a phone call from President Serrano which he was unable to take earlier. President Serrano spoke in English. The following topics were discussed: (U)

Establishing a Relationship

President Serrano began by saying that he had been trying to call the President for two weeks. He said that he did not know if the President remembered him, but that they had met several times, including one time with Charlie Bartlett. (U)

President Serrano said that his political party had a long established relationship with the U.S. Republican Party, including support from the National Republican Institute for leadership training. The parties are brother parties through the International Democratic Union, and shared the same ideological perspective. President Serrano also said that he personally had worked for goals which the United States shared, such as participating in President Carter's election observer team in Panama, and leading the IDU team to Nicaragua's election. (U)

Despite these points in common, President Serrano believed that we had a situation where our countries are not as friendly as they might be. President Serrano said several times that he wanted to have good ties with the President. He had good ties with Senate Republicans, but he needed the President's help with the House side. (U)

The President said that this was a good time to talk, that he very much welcomed the call, and that he wanted to discuss any problems which President Serrano wanted to bring up. The President recalled that Charlie Bartlett was a strong supporter of President Serrano, that Bartlett had told the President good things about him, and that as a result the President felt like he knew President Serrano. (U)

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The President expressed his support for President Serrano, and that he had a friend in the White House. He said that he did not want President Serrano to feel that the Administration was opposing him. President Serrano was correct about the philosophical similarities. (✓)

The President said that he was pleased with the way President Serrano was approaching a number of different problems. The President cited Guatemala's agreement with the guerrillas in Mexico in April, and said it had his full support. The President said he viewed this as an historic agreement, and he hoped that we had made clear our appreciation of President Serrano's courage in taking that historic step. The President said he hoped that the State Department has passed on to President Serrano our support and approval for this agreement, since we wanted to salute him where he had made progress. (✓)

Relations with the Embassy

President Serrano said that he had had problems with the State Department, and that he needed more understanding. He suggested that perhaps there was a different view from the White House. He suggested that the President send "an objective person" from the White House staff to Guatemala to understand what he was doing and have a more objective view of the situation. (✓)

Nevertheless, he asserted that relations with the Ambassador and the State Department had been improving recently. He cited State Department help on recent foreign aid discussions in Congress. President Serrano said relations with the Ambassador had improved much in the last two weeks, and the Ambassador is understanding his needs. (✓)

The President said he was interested in learning President Serrano's views. He did not comment on President Serrano's suggestion of a special emissary. The President said that Ambassador Stroock was a good friend of his, and that Charlie Bartlett had told him what a great job he was doing. The President did not want President Serrano to think that the Ambassador was working against him. The Ambassador also has instructions from the Secretary of State on specific topics, such as on ESF and military assistance. (✓)

ESF

President Serrano requested immediate release of \$50 million for ESF. He said that this was not for internal purposes, but for paying debts to international organizations. (✓)

President Serrano supported his case by telling the President of his economic accomplishments: reserves had increased from only

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\$4.5 million to over \$500 million; tax collection had improved; and inflation, which was 85 percent when he entered office, would drop to 15 percent by year end. (C)

President Serrano said he wanted to talk to the IMF, but to do it on his own schedule. Since changes have already been made in the economy, Guatemala would be ready to do what the IMF asked. Guatemala could not wait for two to five months; it did not have time to develop a program. He said that he could fail in what he was trying to do without support on this issue. (C)

The President said that he did not want President Serrano to fail. The President said that he thought that our policy was that the \$50 million was to be used to support a program with the IMF, and that he thought that this was what President Serrano wanted to do. The President said that he would talk to Treasury to see that we are not being overly restrictive, and that he would get back to President Serrano. (C)

U.S. Military Assistance

President Serrano said that the U.S. cutoff of military aid, which was meant to send a signal to President Cerezo, was having a negative effect on him and on his relations with the Guatemalan military. He said that he had taken several strong steps to assert civilian control over the military, including replacing the High Command and chief of intelligence. He said he had made strong decisions with the military, and intended to continue doing so. The withholding of U.S. military aid made his position weaker with the military, and they have real problems with their present equipment. (C)

The President said that President Serrano was correct in noting that the aid suspension originally was meant to send a signal to President Cerezo. It was specifically triggered by military involvement in the case of a U.S. citizen, Michael Devine. The President said we appreciated President Serrano's efforts to get a judicial resolution in order to remove it as an irritant in our relations. Nevertheless, there also is Congressional interest in this issue. The President noted that the Administration had worked hard to get Congress to reduce the conditioning language it wants to impose on U.S. aid. (C)

The President said that he hoped that President Serrano would continue to work with us on the criteria for reestablishing our military aid relationship. We want to see that relationship reestablished. The President said that if Guatemala needed to make more progress, we needed to tell President Serrano what additional steps were necessary. (C)

President Serrano said that he was doing his best on human rights issues, and that he would keep working on this. He said that he

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wanted to do more over the next several months, but that he needed time. President Serrano asked for understanding of the limitations he faced with a corrupt judicial system. (S)

Drug Cooperation

President Serrano said that he was doing all he could on combatting drugs. He said that he did not like the fact that Guatemala was number three in the world in opium production. The drug traffickers were powerful and had substantial resources. Guatemala was giving to the United States all the assistance it had asked for, but it lacked resources. Guatemala was satisfied with the U.S. program of cooperation, but it needed more help in order to achieve greater results. (S)

The President indicated that he would be glad to have a high-level drug official, such as Governor Martinez, go to Guatemala to talk with President Serrano, if that would be helpful. President Serrano said it would be helpful. (S)

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4354 Add

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. R. BLAIR DOWNING
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Transportation

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Conversation with
President Serrano of Guatemala, June 11, 1991 (U)

The President discussed U.S. Economic Support Fund aid to Guatemala during his telephone conversation with Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano on June 11, 1991. The President indicated that the U.S. Government would reexamine its policy that Guatemala must conclude an IMF agreement before \$50 million in ESF is released. The summary of the conversation (Tab A) should be forwarded to Under Secretary Mulford. It has also been forwarded to the Department of State and AID so that the issue may be reviewed by the NSC Policy Coordinating Committee. (C)

William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Memorandum of Conversation

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SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CALL
TO PRESIDENT SERRANO OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA

ESF

President Serrano requested immediate release of \$50 million for ESF. He said that this was not for internal purposes, but for paying debts to international organizations. (Ø)

President Serrano supported his case by telling the President of his economic accomplishments: reserves had increased from only \$4.5 million to over \$500 million; tax collection had improved; and inflation, which was 85 percent when he entered office, would drop to 15 percent by year end. (Ø)

President Serrano said he wanted to talk to the IMF, but to do it on his own schedule. Since changes have already been made in the economy, Guatemala would be ready to do what the IMF asked. Guatemala could not wait for two to five months; it did not have time to develop a program. He said that he could fail in what he was trying to do without support on this issue. (Ø)

The President said that he did not want President Serrano to fail. The President said that he thought that our policy was that the \$50 million was to be used to support a program with the IMF, and that he thought that this was what President Serrano wanted to do. The President said that he would talk to Treasury to see that we are not being overly restrictive, and that he would get back to President Serrano. (Ø)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on
June 12, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: President Bush
President Mubarak
Notetaker: Edmund Hull, NSC

DATE, TIME June 12, 1991; 2:35 - 2:41 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Hosni, how are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Hello, Happy Birthday, George. (U)

The President: It has been happy so far, but I don't like
getting older. Where are you? (U)

President Mubarak: In Egypt. Suzie and the boys also wish you
well and a happy birthday. (U)

The President: Thank you. What's happening? I know you have
been working with the Syrians. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes, I met Assad several days ago and sent my
Foreign Minister to Damascus. They have worked out good options.
The Foreign Minister has briefed Jim Baker. (Ø)

The President: Yes, Jim Baker is encouraged. We are now waiting
for the exact wording from the Syrians. (Ø)

President Mubarak: They have agreed to Baker's points. (Ø)

The President: Are you optimistic? (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes, I am after four hours of talks with
Assad. (Ø)

The President: That is encouraging. I hope there are no
conditions. (Ø)

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The President: No. None at all. After you receive the Syrian response, let me know if anything is needed. (S)

The President: We haven't got it yet, but we are grateful to Amr for his efforts and his call to Baker. (S)

President Mubarak: You should get the Syrian response within two days. (S)

The President: It would be useful if you could now weigh in with King Hussein to encourage him to start working with West Bankers on a joint delegation. We are talking to the King and to Feisal Husseini in this regard. (S)

President Mubarak: I was talking with the King five minutes ago. (S)

The President: How is he feeling? (U)

President Mubarak: Much better. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

President Mubarak: I spoke with him about the delegation. We are also urging the Palestinians. We are trying hard and hope everyone may accept. (S)

The President: Shamir's response does not constitute a "no." He has outlined his problems with the UN and reconvening, but hasn't stated a bottom line. The door is still open. With a positive Syrian response and joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation formed, it would be very, very difficult for him not to engage. We are not giving up. (S)

President Mubarak: We are working with the Syrians, Palestinians and Jordanian and hope to create common ground. (S)

The President: I hope you are able to stay close to the framework. You are doing a great job. We appreciate your efforts. (S)

President Mubarak: Thanks. Love to all. (U)

The President: Just been handed your telegram. I am very pleased with what it says. Oh, one more thing. Ambassador Wisner has briefed you on the mounting Congressional concern about the case of the Egyptian Christians. I know it is difficult for you. You have your internal legal processes. Unfortunately, it has gotten considerable attention here. We need to get this behind us. Pressure is building in the House and Senate. Anything you can do would be appreciated. I know you must respect Egyptian law, but there is a political dimension. (S)

President Mubarak: I am trying to find out what I can do. If I do it, it will cause a hell of problem with the extremists. We need to do it legally. That is much better. (S)

The President: You are doing great, but it is a bubbling problem. We don't want Congress to step on Egypt. (S)

President Mubarak: I have similar cases with other countries, and I do not want to set a precedent which will cause me a hell of a problem with the extremists. That is my fear. (S)

The President: I do not know all the details, and they did violate the law, but see what you can do. (S)

President Mubarak: I will try hard. If I can, I will never hesitate. (S)

The President: I appreciate the phone call. Thanks and good-bye. (U)

President Mubarak: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey
on June 13, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME June 13, 1991, 3:49 - 4:01 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Turgut! (U)

President Ozal: Yes, yes, hello, George. (U)

The President: How are you? How did your visit go? (U)

President Ozal: That is the point of my call. I am going to tell you about Tariq Aziz. Now I will give you some short explanation. First of all, Tariq Aziz has brought an oral message from Saddam Hussein. They say they are ready to forget the past. They want to turn a new page in Turkish-Iraqi relations. They want to start a political dialogue, and an economic and commercial exchange. They want us to open the pipeline. They tried to convince us that article 51 of the UN Charter permitted us to buy oil from Iraq in spite of the embargo.

Tariq Aziz said they wanted a normal Turkish-Iraqi relationship. There was an additional argument. They emphasized that they gave autonomy to the Kurds in 1974 and that there had been cooperation in the economic and commercial fields. Under present conditions, however, they say they are weak and cannot keep up a long struggle with the Kurds. They therefore might be obliged to give in to their demands and give them autonomy. And they may not be able to keep them under control. He also asked for Turkish cooperation with the embargo and a resumption of the political dialogue right away to determine how we can best help them.

I replied in the following terms. I said we want to improve our relations with the people of Iraq. That is why we are sending humanitarian aid -- food and medicine. But I said the UN resolutions do not permit us to go further. I did not reply to the demands for normalization of relations. I said that the Iraqi negotiations with the Kurds were a domestic affair. I said they would concern us to the extent that they caused instability in the region; that we would not tolerate another mass movement of Kurdish refugees along our borders. I said we would not

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object to autonomy and just wanted a fair share for the Kurds. I clearly stated that the West did not want to see Saddam Hussein in power any longer. The embargo would continue as long as he was there. I said this very bluntly. I said the only solution to this whole problem lay in the establishment of real democracy. An important part of our talks focused on this question. I said that it was essential to convince the West that they would start a general process of democratization. I said it is essential to involve international organizations like the UN. Democracy would solve problems and help preserve the integrity of Iraq. They would also have to agree beforehand to hold elections. If Saddam Hussein loses, he loses. I said this is the only course to lead Iraq to an open future. Otherwise there would be other problems.

In reply, Tariq Aziz said they had already started the democratic process before the war. That they were not doing this because the west wanted it. He said Saddam was very popular and would win any election. I said if Saddam is going to win this election, why are you hesitating to have a really genuine democratic system if he is so popular? But Tariq Aziz would not consent to the involvement of the UN or any foreign government in elections. He said that, under present conditions, it would take time to realize this process. I think this visit, George, provided some fruitful talk. He left me with visible disappointment. His eye was blinking. Some kind of tic. (S)

The President: Well, that's a very interesting report. I think that is a very useful stand that you took. Does he think that Barzani and Saddam will work out a deal soon? (S)

President Ozal: I asked him whether they would give back Kirkuk or some other place. They said no. It is very difficult for them to agree. I will see some of the Kurdish leaders very soon, probably tomorrow, and we will learn about it. What I found out, the Iraqis are really in desperate condition. I think you can see it. I told him face to face "you made a big mistake." When it happened, I told Ramadan on August 5 that Iraq should quit Kuwait right away. And then I said to Aziz that they shouldn't have refused Secretary Baker in Geneva. I said that Saddam Hussein would have been a hero if you had accepted the conditions in Geneva but you lost also this chance. And I think he understood all of those things. What I feel, is that they are in very desperate condition. (S)

The President: Well, maybe the pressure will work. I think it took a lot of courage on your part to tell him there will not be normal relations as long as Saddam is there. (S)

President Ozal: I told him very clearly the only oil flow will be permitted through the UN Security Council. Our pipeline is ready but it will require UN permission. (S)

The President: Well, that's an interesting report and I appreciate it. Obviously we agree with your position and we will stay in touch on this. (S)

President Ozal: I think it looks like the pipeline will be closed for a long time. Do you remember I requested you talk to the Saudis about compensation. (S)

The President: We've already made a contact but let me see where we stand. What do you want them to do? (S)

President Ozal: I think they give us 175,000 barrels a day for us free of charge. The total will reach \$1.1 billion and will be completed probably in August of this year. I say that as long as this pipeline stays closed, they should continue to give us this oil. (S)

The President: That's what we said but let me see where we stand. (S)

President Ozal: Let me tell you more about the hostages. In about one week they will let two of them go. It is the first indication of good will. Two of the hostages. Probably one of them will be Terry Anderson. (S)

The President: Terry Anderson, yes. (S)

President Ozal: The longest one. I am not very sure, but they are trying to do it. (S)

The President: That would be very, very good. (U)

President Ozal: They would like to see what will happen with the Shia because they think this will have a big effect on the Lebanese. (S)

The President: You say Israel should let them know how many can leave? (S)

President Ozal: I told you about Sheikh Obeid and some of the others they have taken. (S)

The President: We know they are very interested in Obeid. (S)

President Ozal: They also want information about 2 or 3 Iranian soldiers, whether they are dead or one is alive. (S)

The President: We've told them for all our information, over and over again, it is our best bet that they are dead. They aren't accusing us of complicity. We've told them from the intelligence we can get that these people are not alive but to the degree that someone can get more information, they are entitled to know the disposition of the bodies and what happened. All we know is that, from what we can glean, they are dead. Iran is not accusing us. (S)

President Ozal: They told me that they would try to learn whether they are dead; try to get information. (S)

The President: Okay. Well, Turgut, on another subject, I think we have our itinerary worked out so we get to go to the Bosphorus. (U)

President Ozal: Yes, it will be very good for you. (U)

The President: We are very excited and pleased. (U)

President Ozal: One more thing. I am going to write you a letter on our F-16 program. You know there was the Arab Fund with the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and United Arab Emirates that Mr. Baker told us about. But now we would like to start this project. I will have some other alternatives in case they don't give sufficient money. (S)

The President: Well, send me the letter. (U)

President Ozal: I'll send it before you come. Maybe you'll be able to work on it. (U)

The President: Oh, yes. When we get the letter, we'll take a look at it. And once again, I commend you for this difficult but very important conversation with Tariq Aziz. (C)

President Ozal: They may get another round. I don't know. (U)

The President: Well, I hope so. All that contact, we view that as constructive as long as you hold the line and I can guarantee you I will. (S)

President Ozal: I will hold the line. Don't worry. (C)

The President: Okay. Goodbye, my friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, President of Colombia, June 20, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, President
Notetaker: R. Rand Beers

DATE, TIME: June 20, 1991, 5:13 - 5:18 P.M. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President returned a telephone call from President Gaviria concerning the surrender of Pablo Escobar. President Gaviria spoke in English. (Ø)

The President: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

President Gaviria: Hello, how are you? (U)

The President: Just fine. I am delighted to hear from you. (U)

President Gaviria: I was calling to tell you about Escobar. (Ø)

The President: We keep on having the line cut out. Can you hear me now? (U)

President Gaviria: Yes. (U)

The President: Now, that is a little better. (U)

President Gaviria: I wanted to tell you about the surrender of Escobar. It was a victory of law and our joint effort. He surrendered yesterday. He was transported by helicopter to the jail. Upon arrival, the judicial process opened against him. (Ø)

About the jail, we have set it up to avoid him from being able to escape. It is also a big jail. The press has reported that it is a luxurious jail. That is not true. It's not luxurious. You can verify that, it's no better than any other. We will be taking all measures to keep him in jail, to see that we avoid complications, including monitoring his communications. (Ø)

[President Gaviria's voice fades out again.]

The President: Hello? This connection is bad. But I think I heard all that. Go ahead. (U)

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President Gaviria: We have a new judicial process which uses anonymous and protected judges. We have a good case against him, with lots of evidence. I hope we can agree on cooperating. It should all work well. (S)

The President: I know you talked to Bob Martinez. (U)

President Gaviria: Yes. We talked yesterday. (U)

The President: He filled me in. That seems to answer some of our concerns. But, the press seems to make the jail look like a country club. (S)

President Gaviria: No, just ask the Embassy; they can verify. It's only a jail, no more. (S)

The President: OK. Look, if there is any cooperating we can help with, let us know. I know we have our differences on extradition. We have been open about this, that we have not agreed with that option. But, if there is any evidence in the trial that can be helpful, we be glad to do it. We have lots of cases here. Maybe we can cooperate on the evidence here. (S)

President Gaviria: That would be very very good. (U)

The President: Good. We understand the problems you have. We would have preferred extradition. But, I know you are under a lot of pressure. If extradition is not an option, I think they can convict him, based on the evidence reported against him, and hope they give him a long prison term. He is a really bad egg, and the Colombian people know this too. What about this priest, who seems almost like a campaign manager for him? What is the word about the priest? (S)

President Gaviria: The Colombian Government got [not heard] from the National Assembly. We really can build a strong case here. And, we will work very hard against the Cali Cartel. (S)

The President: Good, very good. We will continue to work with you. We have our differences, but we want to cooperate anyway we can. I appreciate your phone call. I hope we can keep up the pressure. The best thing we can hope for is a fair trial and a just sentence. I know you can't control all that, but that would go a long way. Good talking to you. (S)

President Gaviria: Yes. (U)

The President: How is your family. Is it OK? (U)

President Gaviria: Yes. Thank you. (U)

The President: Give them my love. (U)

President Gaviria: OK, thank you. Bye bye. ()

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns
Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko

DATE, TIME: June 21, 1991, 10:00 - 10:38am
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Mikhail, can you hear me? (U)

President Gorbachev: Yes. (U)

The President: Please go ahead. Is this your call or were you returning my call of yesterday? (U)

President Gorbachev: George, I recognized your voice immediately and send you my cordial greetings. I am very sorry that we couldn't talk yesterday. It was the result of some confusion. I feel uncomfortable that we couldn't talk. So, I had to punish some people here for that! (S)

The President: No problem at all. Yeltsin was here and he suggested that we call you. He made statements in support of you, by the way. It was his idea and it was understandable it couldn't be done on short notice. (S)

President Gorbachev: Good. Are you pleased by your meeting with Yeltsin? (S)

The President: Yes I am, more so than in our previous meeting. He came with a big democratic victory. In private meetings and in public he said he was working with you. We worried frankly that there might be a difference so broad between you that we might be in a delicate situation. But as your Ambassador undoubtedly reported, I made it very clear that you are our man. That is my obligation and I am personally pleased to work with you as President of the USSR. I think he understood and I hope your Ambassador reported it that way. I said this inside the meeting as well as outside. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, indeed, that is true, George. (S)

George, I would like to say on this basis that I have every reason to value your position and you personally. Your

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association and attitudes help us to pursue this difficult process of reforming our country. I would also like to say that over the years we have created value in the relationship for all of us and that this creates responsibility for us. I particularly value your attitude on practical developments such as finalizing the CFE problem and agreeing to move on START. You responded to my personal appeal on food and found a solution. I wrote to you and found your response to be very satisfactory. And I appreciate it. (S)

Now I am preparing for our meeting in London with the G-7, our collective meeting and for our one on one. I would like to take this opportunity to speak about the current domestic situation. I felt you may have been concerned about the internal situation here and I appreciate that concern. (S)

What is happening here in our political institutions and in public opinion is that Perestroika and reform have reached a stage that we feel we must move faster and more decisively. We have gone far to dismantle the old forms of life and now have to go quickly on 1) economic reform; and 2) on relations between the center and the republics. And the most important fact is that, while six months to a year ago the people were not ready for change, they are now ready and are pushing us forward. (S)

We are currently preparing and implementing major decisions and reforms on property, market infrastructure and the union treaty. There is a new attitude too in favor of cooperation with western countries. The aim is to make that cooperation part of integrating the USSR into the world economy. (S)

What is also very important is that, within our society, I feel there is a desire and an intention for consensus and national accord to cooperate on the difficult problems we have to address in the coming months. I will do my best to make sure that this process is not sidetracked. I will make sure it gains momentum. So in that sense I value highly the recent development in my relations with Boris Yeltsin. (S)

Over the past few days there was an attempt in the Supreme Soviet by a group of reactionary deputies to create problems. I spoke today in the Supreme Soviet and resolved the problem in a decisive way and really got support. And the people against me got a thrashing from the other deputies today. So, George, I think for the time being that is a good enough report to you on events in the USSR. We will soon meet and talk. In the meantime... (S)

The President: All right. First, that was a very helpful report. I just read an Agence France Presse story on your meeting in the Supreme Soviet. That was a very strong message you gave them. And I wonder whether that had a connection with the message Matlock passed to you yesterday. I would like to explain how that came about. (S)

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President Gorbachev: George, I told the Ambassador to reassure him and you that this is 1000 percent impossible. (S)

The President: That's good. I conveyed the message to Yeltsin at the specific request of Popov. And I did so but I wanted you to understand I was not trying to interfere in internal matters. But I felt it was important you be informed. (S)

President Gorbachev: Well, I regarded that as a gesture of concern and trust on your part. I took the occasion to convey the information you needed. Let me say, George, in a direct way that we are in a decisive stage and my assessment is that the greater force is on our side. I still understand we have to be concerned by the financial and economic situation of the country. It creates a situation where certain forces try to denigrate and frustrate our process of reform. They may try but they will not succeed. (S)

The President: We talked here this morning, we had a big meeting, on the Economic Summit in London. Frankly, one of the reasons I want to move fast on START is to be able to talk with you about the realities on our side. I would love to have a Camp David-like chat about the economic problems of the USSR and then about our own problems and what we may or may not be able to do. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, but I think we will find time to talk in London. (S)

The President: Yes, no question. I am determined to do so. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes. (U)

The President: We won't blindside you. But it is very important that the G-7 be seen to be progressing and understanding as opposed to confrontation over the economic question. I don't want to be crosswise with our European partners. So, we are having what we call our "Sherpa" meetings with the other six countries. I would like to suggest that before the G-7 meeting, I will be in touch with you or Baker with Bessmertnykh. We will give you our latest thinking so we don't blindside or embarrass you. And we can give you an idea of what the Europeans are thinking. At the start of the conversation you said you were calling me back. I would welcome your calling anytime and I will feel free to call you if there is anything to report. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, yes, I appreciate this remark and we will talk one or two times. (C)

The President: That sounds good to me. Thank you for the call. The Yeltsin visit has done nothing to embarrass the Center. I think it is coming out that Yeltsin is prepared to work with you. Our concern before the visit was that it would focus on the difficulties between you and Yeltsin. Those fears have been allayed. Read the U.S. press on this. He handled it well and I

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hope you think that we have. I want to do nothing to undermine you there. In the meantime, we will.... (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me say, as I have said recently, that Yeltsin has taken a constructive position. I responded fully and am committed to expand cooperation with him and there are no obstacles. But of course sometimes we are pressed and he is too. He has to stick to this position of cooperation. (S)

The President: Let me tell you that I am going off in a few hours to Camp David to play horseshoes. I hope you have a good restful weekend. (U)

President Gorbachev: Please throw one for me. (U)

The President: You own the Camp David record -- the first guy to throw a ringer on his first throw. (U)

President Gorbachev: Is this recorded in the history of Camp David? (U)

The President: Yes, the picture of you is still there. (U)

President Gorbachev: Thank you, George. I think we have had a meaningful talk in the spirit of partnership and friendship. Please give my best to your associates and to Barbara from me and Mrs. Gorbachev. (U)

The President: We will do that. One last word and then I promise I will let you go. This will be the last sentence. It relates to Bob Strauss. When I was Chairman of the Republican party in 1973-74, Strauss was Chairman of the opposition party. He is still a strong Democrat. He is a very constructive individual given this time of economic problems. He is constructive, progressive and I think he will be of help to you if you are interested. He is not a diplomat and doesn't have the language. You will find him engaging and plugged in to the Congress and my Administration. He has my confidence and that of Jim Baker. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, I would like to say that here in the USSR diplomatic and political circles, we have heard all positive feelings about this appointment. He will have my full support and attention as the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. (S)

The President: Okay, good-bye. (U)

President Gorbachev: I wish you all the best and shake your hand. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany on
June 24, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME June 24, 1991, 11:27 - 11:51 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello. (U)

The President: Helmut? How's my friend? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. And I'm pleased to hear your voice.
How's Barbara? (U)

The President: She's fine. I wanted to call you before you
headed off to Moscow. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I wanted to say from the start that you
may know that I will go to see Gorbachev and I'll be there on the
5th of July. I wanted to call you immediately afterwards on the
8th of July to report on my conversation with him. Is that
agreeable, the Monday of the week before we meet in London? (U)

The President: Very good. That's one of the things I was going
to ask you. That's wonderful. But at this point, let me just
say we are trying to avoid any talk of a so-called grand bargain.
And in my view, what is more important than some blank check or
some grand bargain is working out concrete measures that will
help him reform his economy. Jim spoke Tuesday in Berlin about
some of the things that we're doing to help the Soviets in
industry, food, energy. These are very important points. We've
had our position out there that I hope others agree with on the
special associate status at the IMF and the World Bank. That was
gone over with our finance ministers and I guess they agreed.
And in terms of principle, we are unanimous that the so-called
anti-crisis program is unworkable and that the only good thing
would be something like Yavlinsky is proposing. Yavlinsky,
however, wants a large aid check up front and that's very
difficult for a lot of the western countries, probably also
especially for Germany. The only other point I wanted to make

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before you go is that we think it's important to keep the emphasis on Eastern Europe because these new democracies must remain a priority. They are already embarked on a painful transformation and, of course, Germany I know is very interested in this. But anyway I'll appreciate your calling me when you get back. It will be an interesting trip at an interesting time. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much for that update, George. Let me come back for a moment to the position of principle. I'm going to tell Mikhail Gorbachev exactly the same thing that I've been telling everyone else for the past week -- that we can only help him if he is ready and willing to help himself. The most important thing right now is that he pursue the transformation of the structure of the state. That is to say a restructuring of the relationship between the central state and the individual republics. That is the precondition for things actually working out. I met Shevardnadze last week. (S)

The President: Oh. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It was a very interesting meeting. I asked him, actually, do you pin your hopes on Mikhail Gorbachev? Do you think he is going to prevail? Do you give him any chance at all? And he said that the chances for reform were a lot less probable without Gorbachev. He also said that what one would have to try now was to somehow bring Yeltsin and Gorbachev together because the reforms will only be successful if the two work together. Otherwise, the reform movement will fail. He was very clear and unambiguous. He took up a formula, a statement which I had made earlier, namely that we should try to give them help so that they can help themselves. I think that we should continue to argue along those lines. John Major actually sent a message to me today suggesting that we should deal with him in such a way that he knows that we are genuinely interested in coming to some form of solution. But I think that we should also be very frank indeed in telling him what we think he should do; what his contribution should be to the reform process and what kind of reforms we think are absolutely necessary. (S)

The President: I agree with you. You are looking at it just right. I think it's very important that we all make clear we want to help but that we stay together and I think your visit is coming at a very important time. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, George, let me tell you that I'm going to get back to you as soon as possible on that subject but I would like to mention another subject while we're at it. Let me say that we're going to have the European Summit meeting over the coming weekend and I'm going to argue in the direction of what we have discussed. (S)

The President: Oh good, Helmut. You're very critical to all of that. You know I miss our talks during the war. I missed these conversations because they're always very fruitful. (S)

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Chancellor Kohl: We can call each other. (U)

The President: Naturally. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: After all, we'll pick up where we stopped on the 8th of July. There's one last point, George, which I really would like to mention, that is the developments in Yugoslavia. I have the feeling that things are exacerbated. There is one thing which I don't like at all, namely that the Serbs bank on it that we are all trying to promote this idea of a unitarian state without having any regard to the interests of the Croats. George, let me be very frank. It is causing increasing problems for me here. Because we as Germans have demanded the right to self determination and we have made use of that right. Obviously I cannot deny the same right to the Slovenes and the other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. I am not for a dissolution of Yugoslavia, but the whole thing is only going to hold together if the Slavs grant the same rights to all the same groups.

(S)

The President: Helmut, may I ask a favor of you right now. Can I shift this call to Jim Baker, because he is just back from there. And I'd like to be sure that our Secretary of State and the Germans are looking at this in the same way. Could I let him finish up this phone call? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: He's right here in the White House. Thank you very much and I'll talk to you on the 8th. I'll switch this over to Jim. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, George. (U)

The President: All right. Hold on. (U)

Secretary Baker: Hello, Chancellor, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Jim, I saw you on television being a candidate for the presidential elections in Albania. (S)

Secretary Baker: Yes, I think I would have a great opportunity there, Chancellor. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Jim, I think you should tell the President that this is a really sizeable congregation for a presidential candidate, 500,000 people. (S)

Secretary Baker: I've never seen anything like it in the 20 years I've been in politics. And I have accompanied three Presidents on trips abroad. It was all totally spontaneous. It was an extremely moving event. These people have not been permitted to express themselves in any way for 50 years or more and you could just see that this was a yearning for the right to just be able to speak their mind. We really should try and find

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a way to help them because they are desperately poor and they desperately want to move to democracy and free markets. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: But I do, Jim, see a real chance for helping them. I think we should use the G-7 meetings, the breaks, for talking a little bit about them. Perhaps you have noticed that the Albanians pin a lot of their hopes on the Germans. There is a very strong pro-German feeling in the country despite the very terrible experience they have had during the war. (S)

Secretary Baker: Yes, I detected that while I was there and furthermore, Chancellor, I think the fact that it is such a small country that the G-7 could do something very meaningful as far as they are concerned. They do not need a lot of money. Their total debt is only about 350 or 400 million dollars. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Jim, I do think that we will be able to find a way here of helping them. Let me say I am very much concerned about the developments in Yugoslavia. Because I think that the situation there is gradually drifting towards a no return position. A no way out situation. It seems to me that it is the Serbs in a rather determined way who were deliberately misunderstanding what we are aiming at, namely keeping Yugoslavia together because we want to see the Slovenes, the Croats, and all the other ethnic groups respected. (S)

Secretary Baker: I totally agree with you, Chancellor. I am quite depressed having spent a full day and having talked at length with each republic president and the prime minister and the foreign minister. I brought, of course, a message from the 12 that we agreed upon in Berlin. I agreed upon with Jacques Poos and frankly with some of Yugoslavia's neighbors including Austria and Hungary. I made a suggestion that they consider receiving a technical assistance mission from the 12 to assist them in preparing a new basis for Yugoslav unity, perhaps a new constitution that would recognize the desire of Slovenia and Croatia for democracy and for greater autonomy. We, of course, would be willing to participate in that and I indicated that, but I think it's an effort that should be led by Europe. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, we are preparing to do that. We are going to do that. The only problem I see is that according to information given so far, I don't see any indication of the Serbs wanting to move. (S)

Secretary Baker: No and I saw very little indication of the willingness of the central government to receive such a mission because they see that as a prelude to arbitration which is something that they do not want to subject themselves to at this time. The situation is fast becoming critical, I think, Chancellor, when you consider that the average citizenry are being armed and indeed, in some republics, party members are being given arms. Should there be any violence and bloodshed, it might easily spread. In fact, it was brought home to me in Albania where the Albanians made it quite clear that if there was disintegration or destabilization in Yugoslavia, it would quickly

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of
Germany, on July 8, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME July 8, 1991, 8:14 - 8:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good, thanks. I wanted to briefly mention my impressions from the meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev last Friday. First, it is my personal impression that, despite the difficult situation, he seems in quite a good position. This is true also for his physical condition. He seemed very much determined to go into battle. It is his intention to call a meeting of the Central Committee in July and his intention also to present a new party program. He will then expect a split of the party. He made it very clear that he wanted to get the ultras out of his party. I asked him whether he has fears regarding the military. His answer was a clear no. There was not the faintest trace of resignation. As concerns relations between the central government and the various republic governments, I think he gained a very important point on Friday following the vote of the various republics. They basically accepted his program. I talked to the Ukrainian government. Their intent is to accept a proposal over the holiday sometime. They told me their intent was not to leave the central state. Irredentist groups, they said, were very small. They were frank about the number of Russians in the Ukraine -- 10 million, especially in the Donets area. They could not accept a solution that might lead to violence or upheaval. (Ø)

As concerns the G-7 in London, he is very content with the meeting as planned by John Major, including the various meeting points. I think he is expecting more than special status in the IMF and EBRD. He plans to present his overall economic plan. I also told him he should perhaps tell us how he intends to promote privatization. I said he needed to privatize as soon as possible. That is his intention also. He is also thinking of entrusting the rehabilitation of the energy sector to foreign companies, including nuclear energy. He sees an urgent need to change existing nuclear plants to meet international safety

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standards. As far as disarmament is concerned, I told him it was very important to make some progress. (C)

That is a very brief outline of the most important points. I will close with this: it is very important for him that he will be able to keep his dignity at London. He does not want to play the part of a poor relation, but he is very aware of his enormous problems and also very interested in being given technical assistance and advice. On relations with the U.S., he wants to avoid a setback. He also made very friendly mention of his contacts with George Bush. I told him he should be aware of certain groups in the U.S. which are reflected in Congress. I also pointed out the question of the Baltic states. He thinks Prunskiene's return would lead to a better basis for discussions. I share this view. I think she has more sense than that gentleman (meaning Landsbergis). (C)

The President: Helmut, that's a very interesting report. I appreciate your call. It seems that Germany and the U.S. would be very comfortable with that approach. Certainly we will do nothing to detract from his dignity or standing. That is very important. Thank you for the report. I am very comfortable with that agenda if it works out that way. Helmut, if you have one more minute, I want to raise another question. I was talking with our experts about Yugoslavia and wondered about your latest thoughts. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: My impression is that people are being reasonable, but I cannot assess the part the military plays and cannot foretell how they will act. The problem is, first, that there is a majority of Serbs in the military and, second, and more serious, that they are still old Communists. That has been a problem for a very long time. If the civilian government can get its views through, I see a chance. If they stick to the agreement, we should see an opportunity. (C)

The President: I agree with that and am hopeful that matters can be resolved peacefully and that the west won't get dragged into some kind of military action. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: For me, that is inconceivable. But some people are very fanatic. Of course, if you have fanatical attitudes, you get a fanatical response. That has also become clear when you look at the way they respond to Germans over there. I don't know whether you have received information from their papers, but they are even charging that Germany is supplying weapons. (C)

The President: It's a complicated situation. I look forward to seeing you in a week -- less than a week. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Until Monday, then. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt
on July 10, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary Baker
President Mubarak
Notetaker: Bruce Riedel

DATE, TIME July 10, 1991; 9:35 - 9:51 EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello Hosni. (U)

President Mubarak: Hello George. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. I'm with Jim Baker and Brent Scowcroft and I'd like to touch base with you on where we stand on several issues of great importance to both of us. (U)

President Mubarak: Fine. (U)

The President: First is the situation in northern Iraq. Coalition troops will be leaving shortly and we intend to make a statement soon making public what we have told the Iraqis privately. We will retain the capability to intervene and punish Iraq if Saddam starts brutalizing the Kurds again. I want our troops out of Iraq. They've done a great job as have all the coalition forces, but we cannot stay forever. If Saddam hurts the Kurds again, however, he will pay a price. (S)

The second point concerns Iraq's non-compliance with UNSC Resolution 687. Time will only make it harder to find and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability. We've talked to King Fahd about this and he shares our worry, especially about Iraq's nuclear capability. Iraq's latest report to the UN is a hopeful sign but not enough. (S)

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So this is what we propose to do. We will demand that Iraq go along with inspections at any time and at any place we require. If it fails to comply we will hit the site from the air after providing a brief notification to clear the area of people. We're talking about a grave nuclear threat. We'll be demanding inspection and if they refuse we'll hit them. I think we won't have to use force, but I can't sit here with the UN resolution unfulfilled. Our military says most of the sites are in the Baghdad area, so flying missions out of Saudi Arabia would be optimal. I would like to have broad coalition support for what is needed. Our whole victory in the Gulf will be diminished if this villainous man doesn't comply. (S)

President Mubarak: I agree he is a villain. If he is not removed he will use his weapons. (S)

The President: Please think about our proposal. I don't want another war and hope we don't need force. I'll be talking to Ozal on this too. We will punish Iraq selectively and we will not be reckless. (S)

President Mubarak: I agree with you 100%. I'll send Saddam another message telling him if he doesn't comply he will again face fate. (S)

The President: That's okay. Send it soon. I've spoken to Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney on this and he is also sending a message via the Iraqi ambassador warning Iraq of the risks of non-compliance. I know you have channels of your own. (S)

President Mubarak: I'll do it immediately. (S)

The President: You are the first in the area to hear of this. I want Egypt on board if it comes to force. I don't mean that we are going to attack soon, of course. (S)

President Mubarak: I'm with you 100% on this issue. (S)

The President: Let me touch on the peace process while I have you. It has been a month since I wrote President Assad. Time is working against us. I know how hard you have tried to get Syria on board and I'm grateful. Can we get the Arabs or the Arab League to make a statement saying they will give up the boycott of Israel if Israel stopped that damned settlement activity? Will you consider this and talk to the other Arabs? We've sounded out the Saudis and I think they are receptive. Can you raise it also? We need more to go to Shamir with. Once Syria is on board I'm ready to go public or do whatever is necessary with Israel. (S)

President Mubarak: I am looking forward to my Foreign Minister's meeting with Jim Baker in Greece. I'll speak to Saudis on it and my Foreign Minister will speak to Baker. We understand Assad will answer you today. I've told Der Speigal the answer will come today. (S)

The President: Good. I'm glad we agree. (S)

President Mubarak: I'd like to have Jim visit Cairo on his trip even if only for a few hours. (S)

The President: Will you give him a meal? I'll put him on the phone. (S)

Secretary Baker: How are you Mr. President? (U)

President Mubarak: It's been a long time since you visited. You'll hear from Assad soon. (S)

Secretary Baker: I hope so and I hope it is a positive answer. Let me reiterate the import of the President's proposal on the boycott. This could shake loose the process. (S)

President Mubarak: Okay, I'll talk to my Foreign Minister. (S)

Secretary Baker: As the President said we think the Saudis are receptive. (S)

President Mubarak: I'll talk to Fahd. Can you visit us? (S)

Secretary Baker: I've got to go to Malaysia on this visit for the ASEAN meeting. I'll see Foreign Minister Moussa in Athens. If I can visit I will. Let's get some movement on the boycott going. (S)

Goodbyes.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Nelson Mandela,
President of the ANC of South Africa

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Nelson Mandela, President of the ANC
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Robert C. Frasure

DATE, TIME July 10, 1991, 11:30 - 11:40 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned Mr. Mandela concerning the lifting of sanctions against South Africa. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Yes sir. Good morning, sir. (U)

The President: Mr. Mandela, how are you? Congratulations on your election as President of the ANC. I think this is just de facto recognition of your outstanding leadership all along, not to disparage anyone. I just wanted to call and tell you of my decision to lift sanctions against South Africa, the sanctions imposed by the CAAA, you know, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act imposed by Congress. (U)

The State Department and our bureaucracy have unanimously agreed that the five conditions set by Congress have been met, and I will be signing an Executive Order to that effect. As you know, other sanctions remain in place including the IMF and World Bank. (U)

I wanted to assure you of our continued support to you and others who are committed to negotiations. And I wanted you to know that I will continue to keep in touch with you on this. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Thank you, Mr. President. As I have pointed out before, we deeply appreciate the practice of constant consultation with us on matters of common interest. It has made a deep impression on us. (U)

The sanctions applied by the U.S. in the CAAA have helped immeasurably. And we are grateful for it. On lifting the sanctions, we differ on timing. (U)

Apparently you have no other alternative if South Africa has fulfilled the conditions. Our view differs in that we feel that the provisions in the Act have not been completed fully. But we do understand your action. (U)

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Nevertheless, I must say your action is premature. One can do damage if there are two parties talking to each other and a third party with a reputation for impartiality appears to be acting in favor of one or another of the parties. (Ø)

I know how you feel. And you don't mean to do that and you want to avoid that damage, especially because you have given the impression of being impartial. But you would be convinced that the Act has been fulfilled. (Ø)

But I still think it is premature. There are still political prisoners in prison. It is not correct for the U.S. to have its own definition. You should use the same definition we used in the Pretoria Minute. (Ø)

That is political prisoners are those convicted of politically motivated offenses. (Ø)

Then there are the prisoners in Bophuthatswana which doesn't exist under American law. You are acting against your own law. (Ø)

Thirdly, the abolition of Apartheid is not complete. There are funding differences in the social services, in education. (Ø)

Fourthly, the violence is raging in the country. That is impeding the free political activity. (Ø)

Nonetheless we appreciate the role of sanctions in getting discussion going. So we sincerely hope you will pressurize the South African government on negotiation. We recognize the extreme importance of the U.S. in this regard. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate your reasonable approach to negotiations. And I want to continue to share views and opinions on the situation on South Africa. (U)

I have a few more comments to make. (U)

Although sanctions will be lifted, there are others means to ensure South Africa continues toward reform. These include bilateral discussions through our Embassy and open, public discussions with the South African government and other negotiating parties in addition to using the upcoming G-7 summit in London. We'll continue to sustain the pressure to ensure that reform happens. (Ø)

The CAAA was enacted to encourage negotiations and I think it has done that. I did note that in your address to the recent ANC Congress you emphasized the need to move forward in negotiations. (Ø)

The negotiations process will be primarily an internal one but I'd like to continue to keep in touch with you. We continue to stress with the South African government the need to address the areas of education and housing for Black South Africans. (Ø)

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Mr. Mandela: Thank you. I appreciate that. It is good to learn that. (U)

The President: Again, I want to continue to communicate with you on the negotiations process. I want my lifting of the sanctions to be a confirmation of U.S. law and to assure you that as President of the United States, I will do everything in my power as President to keep the pressure on the South African government to ensure democratic reforms continue. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Thank you and good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
29. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on July 10, 1991 [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	7/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 1/8/2016

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 5/3/91 - 7/21/91

Date Closed:	2/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(874)	MR Case #:	2012-2268-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	6/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on July 10, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Beth Sanner, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: July 10, 1991, 4:29 - 4:42 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Ozal: Hello, George. (U)

The President: Turgut, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you. (U)

The President: I'm looking forward to my visit very much and will be seeing you in a few days. (U)

President Ozal: You are first coming to London and then you will be in Athens? (U)

The President: I will be in Athens on the 18th. I get over to Athens about noon on the 18th, which is a week from tomorrow. Then we come to you on Saturday. (U)

President Ozal: Saturday morning. (U)

The President: Yes. So we're all set and I'm looking forward to it. But I'm calling you on another subject and if you have a minute, let me run through some points and then I'd be glad to hear your ideas. (U)

President Ozal: OK. (U)

The President: OK. The first issue concerns northern Iraq. You know, I know you and your concern on the Kurdish situation and I'm very concerned, too, but I really believe that both the Kurds and Saddam know that we are not abandoning them. We want Saddam to know that we are not abandoning the Kurds but we still plan to leave by mid-month. I've made that clear to the American people and we've got to leave by the middle of this month. We will make a statement later this week that will reinforce what we have privately said to Iraq - that we will retain the ability to intervene and punish Iraq if need be. We will not be gone but

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President Ozal: I informed my Secretary of Defense. I told him that and he had no objections. (8)

The President: Oh, that's very good. I haven't gotten that word. Good and I'm very pleased about that. The other point, Turgut, is you know I mentioned this but Iraq's refusal to comply with UN Resolution 687 is a real concern to us. Particularly when their refusal relates to their building a nuclear device or their attempt to do that. I haven't heard statements from you on it. Permit me to give my view and then I'd be interested in yours. My view is that we simply cannot let this go on. Time will make it very much more difficult to find this equipment which he continues to hide and destroy. I've talked to the Saudis about this and they are as concerned as we are. I think the whole international community is concerned but especially the Saudis. There is some hope because Iraq recently submitted a paper to the UN indicating they finally might be willing to comply. I just had a press conference and stated that this man, who denied all along that he has been in violation, now admits that he has and says he's willing to comply. Our own feeling is positive, but very candidly, what do you think? Do I believe the man or not? My gut instinct is that we're not going to know until we test him. Let me run an idea by you. My thought is that we should demand Iraq go along with inspections at any time and any place that the international community requires.

1.4(c)

We have to have the right to prove it. The second point is that if Iraq fails to comply, then we would hit the site from the air after a brief notification so we get innocent people out of the way.

1.4(c)

It is there and you have failed to declare it and just let it be understood that we are going to hit this. Take it out. You have one hour to move women and children and everyone from that place. Just the notice, I think, might make him comply. But if the pattern of non-compliance still continued, then I think we'd have to go after him from the air -- some military targets of value to him that would make him comply with the UN resolution.

1.4(d)

This has got to end. He is evil. He is bad. He is lying and I don't think it is fair to countries in the area to know that he is cheating on chemical and nuclear weapons and we do nothing about it. I don't think the world

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
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should be asked to do that. We want this to be a coalition effort. We want the UK and France to be involved. I haven't talked to Major but I think the UK should be involved. But once again it would require some cooperation from Turkey. I just want to know if you could give that some thought. And maybe you have some other ideas. But there's no other way to make this man comply -- all predicated on the fact that he does not come through now totally. If he doesn't, we need to at least talk about options to make him do what he should under the UN resolution. (S)

1.4(c)



President Ozal: I think I generally agree with the principle. I think we should not believe him. (S)

The President: Turgut, you're cutting out a little bit. (U)

President Ozal: I think he will try to cheat us, do you understand? And I don't think we should believe him. (S)

The President: Well, I agree with that, so please think about this because this plan would mean that if we find him cheating, we will end it. We will use some air power and high technology to go in there and take it away. I think we can do it. I don't like to risk lives of American pilots again, but I think the UN resolution gives us, along with others, not just on our own, the right to punish him if he does this and the right to remove this nuclear threat. I'm sorry we don't have a better connection. I'll be talking to Mitterrand, and Baker will meet with the Soviets, and I will be talking to Major about this in the next couple of days before I see him. I want you to know that first I'm happy Saddam has sent this letter. But secondly, we don't believe him and third if he lies again, we'll have to teach him a lesson. (S)

President Ozal: I think we can talk more when you're here. (U)

The President: Well, let's talk then. One last upbeat note. I've just received a long message from King Fahd that came through his Ambassador here and it appears as though the Saudis will follow through on the commitment they made to you. I consider it good news. They know we're interested. This is not

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a good line to talk about this, but I will give you the specific details when we meet. Some specific details must be kept quiet.
(S)

President Ozal: Thank you, George. (U)

The President: I look forward to seeing you. (U)

President Ozal: OK, George, maybe I'll take you to some places where...when you're here. (U)

The President: OK, let's go, that will be fun. I'm really excited about coming to Turkey and I know we will have a good visit. (U)

President Ozal: Thank you, George. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand President of France on July 11, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President of France
Interpreter: Eliza Burnham
Notetaker: Earl Anthony Wayne

DATE, TIME: July 11, 1991, 6:59 - 7:08 a.m.
AND PLACE: The White House

(Opening pleasantries by both Presidents.)

The President: You and I are both concerned about the Kurds. Saddam must know that we are not abandoning them. We delayed our departure to mid-July (to make that clear). We will make a public statement this week repeating what we have told Iraq in private -- that we will retain the ability to intervene and to punish Iraq, if they start to punish the Kurds again. For this we need to keep a limited force in the area. Would you consider participating? (S)

President Mitterrand: As for France, I agree. (U)

The President: Good. I spoke to Ozal and I think he agrees. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, we need to retain the ability to monitor the situation. (S)

The President: I have another issue that I want to raise. Iraq's failure to comply with UNSCR 687 is very disturbing. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, we cannot abandon that cause. (S)

The President: We want to have the ability to punish Iraq, if it continues to deceive us and especially to build nuclear weapons. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I have the same view as you. We must either reinforce or maintain the force in place. What's there should be sufficient. But in essence I agree with your basic thinking. (S)

The President: I have talked to the Saudis and they share our concern. Iraq recently submitted a letter to the UN suggesting

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that they might be ready to comply, but we won't know until we test them. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, we need a pre-agreed way of establishing what to do. We can't just declare war. We need an agreed signal. (S)

The President: I have a proposal. We will demand that Iraq go along with inspections at any time and at any place. If Iraq fails to comply fully, we would hit the site from the air, after brief notification to clear the site of civilians. (S)

President Mitterrand: Absolutely. (U)

The President: If Iraq still fails to comply, then we would hit selected military targets of great value to Saddam. I'm not enthusiastic to do this, but Iraq needs to comply with the UN resolution. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, he must indeed submit. But I agree. I hope this will be possible with relatively limited means so there is no need to have something major as we had before. He must be forced to comply. (S)

The President: I agree he must be forced to comply or be punished, and we do not want a major conflict. I am happy you share our point of view. (S)

President Mitterrand: I share your concerns. We can discuss the means and modalities at Rambouillet. (S)

The President: Yes, I look forward to talking with you. We have a lot to talk about. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, we can discuss Iraq and many other things. Thank you for coming to French soil. (S)

The President: Thank you for finding the time to see me. (S)

President Mitterrand: Oh, no, it's my pleasure. See you soon. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President F.W.
de Klerk of South Africa

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President de Klerk of South Africa
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: Robert C. Frasure

DATE, TIME July 11, 1991, 14:04 - 14:14 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President telephoned President de Klerk concerning the removal of sanctions against South Africa. (U)

The President: President de Klerk, how are you? I just wanted to talk with you for a few minutes on the action I took yesterday on lifting sanctions imposed against South Africa. (U)

President de Klerk: We were extremely pleased, and I wanted to thank you personally. (U)

I know you were under a lot of pressure from many sides. You said you would not shift the goalposts, and you did not shift them. We are highly pleased. (U)

The President: I appreciate your comments. Your able ambassador previously thanked me for our support during a function we had at the White House yesterday. He expressed your thanks and appreciation for my lifting of sanctions. (U)

Secretary Baker will inform Nick Brady that the five Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act conditions have been met. This will also end the provisions of the so-called "Rangel Amendment" which resulted in double taxation of American companies in South Africa. So this in turn should help the economic side and that will be good for you. (U)

We'll talk more on the other sanctions and the IMF and World Bank and others. We're ready to talk at any time and place about this. (U)

President de Klerk: Thank you. In my public statement I said we were extremely pleased about the taxation. (U)

We are concerned about IMF. It is one of the stumbling blocks in our way. We will need to talk about it. (U)

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The President: I talked to Nelson Mandela on my actions on sanctions and although he and I disagreed, I must say he was real polite about it. But lifting sanctions was a thing whose time had come. (Ø)

Mr. President, there is one thing that I would mention and that is the Bophuthatswana political prisoners. Some people even in my government think we should have waited awhile on lifting sanctions because of them. I'm taking some hits on that. We had some internal differences in our own government on this one. (Ø)

I wanted you to be aware that we're concerned about the 150 or so people in Bophuthatswana and other homelands, and I would ask for your consideration. No, it's not a part of the sanctions, but I just wanted to raise this with you. (Ø)

President de Klerk: It is a problem, the situation in Bophuthatswana. (U)

You are on firm grounds with the ANC! They agreed with us that it is not our responsibility. I said although it is not our responsibility we are prepared to use our good offices. And we will do so. I will convey your concerns to President Mangope. I will be in touch with him this weekend. You should tell your ambassador to convey your concerns as well. (Ø)

You have my assurances that we want to lessen tension. I will try to do it over this weekend. (Ø)

You know the ANC is ambivalent about all of this. They see Boputhatswana to be part of South Africa but they recognize Transkei and use it. The ANC should talk to President Mangope too. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate that. On sanctions, again, I did this with great enthusiasm, and it was something whose time had come. (Ø)

President de Klerk: Thank you. May I say I have no doubt that what you have done is of great assistance to South Africa. And it has consequences for all of southern Africa, for the entire region. (Ø)

Things are going well in Angola and Mozambique. (U)

You know South Africa is the entry point to the economy of the region. The lifting of sanctions will benefit all in southern Africa. A strong South African economy will be a new start. (U)

The President: I think that is a good way to look at it and good luck and thank you and my respects to you and your wife. (U)

President de Klerk: Thank you. (U)

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The President: I'm upstairs in Kennebunkport and just about to sit down with Prime Minister Kaifu, and Barbara is here. I'm looking out on a beautiful day overlooking the Atlantic Ocean and it is a beautiful day although I can't see South Africa from here! (U)

President de Klerk: May I ask in conclusion if I could issue a short press statement saying that we talked? If you have no objection to that? (U)

The President: I have no objection to a short statement on the phone call. You can include something like, "the President of the United States supported the lifting of sanctions, and we agreed to continue discussions on South Africa." (U)

President de Klerk: Good. Thank you. (U)

The President: Good luck and goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 15, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH:

WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

FROM:

ROBERT MORLEY *RM*

SUBJECT:

Telcon with Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico on
July 12, 1991

SIGNED

Attached at Tab A is a telephone conversation between the
President and President Carlos Salinas of Mexico.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding a copy of the
Telephone Conversation to the State Department for the use of
Assistant Secretary Aronson and Ambassador Negroponte.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agency Counterpart
Tab A Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By LO NARA, Date 7/14/07

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Salinas of Mexico (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico
Notetaker: William Pryce/Robert Morley

DATE, TIME July 12, 1991, 6:43 - 6:51 P.M. EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Hello, Carlos. (U)

President Salinas: Hello, George (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

President Salinas: Okay. (U)

The President: I'm leaving on a trip to Europe tomorrow and wanted to talk to you before I left. I think the meeting will go okay. I saw Kaifu today and that meeting went well. (U)

We are trying to make progress on arms control. I had a call from Jim Baker. He thinks there is some progress but I don't know if we will get enough to have a meeting at the end of the month. We'll see. (U)

I'm calling you because you have your own meeting coming up. I don't want to appear to be ignoring the countries so important to us in this hemisphere because of business elsewhere. I just want to reiterate some things where I know you understand how we feel, but I thought I would mention them to you. (U)

Last week you went to Europe yourself, didn't you? (U)

President Salinas: Yes, I went to Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Soviet Union. (U)

The President: How did it go? (U)

President Salinas: It went fine. I had a response from all of them. (U)

The President: Did you see Gorbachev? (U)

President Salinas: Yes. He is in a positive mood for London. He said he is at the end of the line. His options are over. He hopes he will get a good response for his problems. (U)

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The President: I hope that he will too. The problem is that his problems are so big, his finances are so bad, that it will be tough. But we want to encourage him, to give him respect. We don't want him to be put down. But we want him to come home with something. I think he has made real reform. (Ø)

But I called to talk about the Guadalajara summit. It is a great opportunity for discussions on important issues. I had a good visit with President Cristiani and I know he talked to you as well. We are strong for him but he hasn't got much to show for his efforts. I think Freddie intends to make more reforms, but he has to show something in return. The big thing is that he has to get a cease-fire and incorporate the FMLN back into civilian life. (Ø)

I don't think we have much of a direct role to play -- you and CAP have more influence on events. I hope you and CAP and the so-called friends will use your influence. (Ø)

President Salinas: We are planning to put strong pressure on the FMLN, we want to show the FMLN that we are behind the proposal Cristiani has made. (Ø)

The President: Great. I know it will make a difference. I knew you would help. We think Cristiani has made a really good effort. (Ø)

President Salinas: Perez de Cuellar will be there also. He will make a difference. It will show that we are supporting a cease-fire. (Ø)

The President: Good. I'm glad the Secretary General will be there. I know that de Soto has tried, but I don't think he has been forceful enough. His approach hasn't been a forceful one. (Ø)

President Salinas: I personally believe Cristiani deserves credit and will get support. (Ø)

The President: I'm glad to hear that. One other thing. My friend Fidel will be there. I hope there will be pressure for him to reform. We would have instantly better relations if he did. (Ø)

President Salinas: That would be good. (U)

The President: If Castro would do something, then we could do something. But without change on his side, I can't do anything. I have my own political problems here. I had a talk with CAP. He said "Why don't you give Castro something"? I'm not going to do that. We can't do much to get him to change. I think that if there is pressure from everyone it would be helpful. What is needed is pressure from people who have better relations with him. We have great affection for the Cuban people and want

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better relations with Cuba. After all, there are more Cubans in Miami than there are in Cuba. (C)

President Salinas: Not quite. CAP called and told me he talked to Castro for seven hours, trying to persuade Castro with some good ideas. Castro was not very forthcoming. (C)

The President: If you could put pressure on him, do it in a way that will get results. I guess he's pretty locked in. (C)

President Salinas: Don't worry. He will have lots of peer pressure at Guadalajara. (C)

The President: Good. I'm glad to hear that. I knew I could count on you. I'll talk to you when I get back. Do you have any plans to come here informally anytime soon? We should talk soon. (C)

President Salinas: No, I don't think so. I'll let you know. Best wishes for your trip and the meeting in London. (C)

The President: Thanks. And my best wishes for you at your meeting. Good luck. (U)

President Salinas: Thanks. (U)

The President: Best to your family. Over and out. (U)

--- End of Conversation ---

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with King Hussein of Jordan on
July 16, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
Notetaker: Bruce O. Riedel

DATE, TIME July 16, 1991; 2:14 - 2:20 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: London, UK

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello. How are you? How is your heart these days? We both have the same troubles. (U)

The King: I'm fine and I'm glad to see on TV that you are well.
(U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you today about the peace process. President Assad's letter is a positive step toward peace. It creates the basis for progress. I'm sending Jim Baker to the region to build on the impetus, to follow up on the momentum from the Syrian letter. Assad's response should make it easier for you to form a joint delegation with the Palestinians, and for Jordan and Palestinians from the occupied territories to go to a conference. (S)

We feel Yassir Arafat should not choose the delegation. We have been troubled by his recent statements on his visit to Baghdad which are critical of the process. I would like you to think about several issues. Can you commit Jordan to attend a conference? Can you help form the joint delegation? (S)

If you can move, it will help us get the process going. It is time for action, we are eager to hear from you. (S)

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The King: We are very encouraged by all these developments. We are still waiting for the Palestinians to contact us. They must choose their delegation. We are ready for them. Sir, we are doing everything we can. (S)

Do not worry about the Arafat visit to Iraq. He is only conveying Egyptian and Libyan concerns about the nuclear issue -- urging them to open everything for inspection. (S)

In the meantime we trying to move them. When Arafat comes to Amman next we will do more. (S)

The President: We appreciate your efforts. We will run more ideas past you as they develop. I'll see Gorbachev tomorrow and we are close to a START agreement. (S)

The King: That is wonderful news. We here are trying to do our best to make our dreams for the area a reality. (S)

The President: We'll be in touch. (U)

Goodbyes.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter Mrs. Kamal
Notetaker: Bruce O. Riedel

DATE, TIME 21 July 1991, 1030-1040EDT
AND PLACE: Istanbul, Turkey

The President initiated the call. (U)

Mr. President: I'm in Istanbul, Turkey. I wanted to call you to thank you for your step forward in the peace process. We're very grateful again for your leadership on this issue. Secretary Baker is working very hard on this. His next step is to get Israel to come forward now on the peace process. The same is true for King Hussein of Jordan. I just want to say thank you for your step. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you for calling. We're attempting to find the way to peace in the area. I hope Israel will understand that this is a good chance to establish lasting peace in the Middle East. I'm certain Secretary Baker will do his best. My talks with him yesterday were useful and constructive. Let me say we are doing everything we can for peace. (S)

Again thank you for calling and let us stay in contact. Please give my regards to President Ozal. (U)

Mr. President: I'll do that at dinner tonight in three hours.
(U)

Goodbyes

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