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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91112
Folder ID Number: 91112-007

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 3/7/91 - 4/25/91

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (3 pp.)	3/7/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany (5 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on April 2, 1991 (2 pp.)	4/2/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (5 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (4 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia on April 12, 1991 (4 pp.)	4/12/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on April 15, 1991 (4 pp.)	4/15/91	(b)(1)	S
08a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Ozal of Turkey on April 16, 1991 (3 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	S
08b. Talking Points	Re: Presidential Call to President Ozal (1 pp.)	4/16	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 3/7/91 - 4/25/91

Pinksheet Number: cap949

OA/ID Number: 91112-007

Date Closed: 2/5/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France on April 16, 1991 (4 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	S
09b. Talking Points	Re: Presidential Call to President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	4/16	(b)(1)	
09c. Talking Points	Re: Calls to Major and Mitterrand (1 pp.)	4/16	(b)(1)	
10. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister John Major of England on April 16, 1991 (4 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chnacellor Kohl of Germany (3 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (4 pp.)	4/19/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela on April 20, 1991 (3 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain (3 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	S
16. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (3 pp.)	4/25/91	(b)(1)	S
17. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Javier Perez de Cuellar, United Nations Secretary General, on April 25, 1991 (4 pp.)	4/25/91	(b)(1)	S

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME March 7, 1991, 9:47 - 10:05 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut! How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good, thank you. Very well. How are things going? You have a lot of reasons to be very satisfied. (U)

The President: Well, Jim Baker is going on what we think a very important trip. We are going to start figuring out the role the U.S. can play in being a catalyst for peace on the Israel-Palestinian issue, Lebanon, and the Gulf. Overall, we are very pleased with the way things are working out, though we are worried about anarchy and revolution in Iraq. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: George, do you have any information on the present position of Saddam Hussein? (Ø)

The President: No. We do not. We have no reason to believe he is not in office. But I don't see how he can survive after his people learn the truth. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: But there is a problem: will he allow his people to know? (Ø)

The President: There have been so many prisoners and so much destruction that it is hard to see how he can avoid the truth coming out, though he is trying. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I hope you are right. George, as I said, I hope the people will eventually learn the truth. I think it is crucial that people in the region know it was indeed a war against Saddam Hussein and not the Iraqi people, and not the U.S. versus the Arabs or the Islamic world. We have to convey this message, and the U.S. is in a good position to do so. Please, if there is anything we can do to be of help, you can always count on our support. (Ø)

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AS AMENDED
GJ 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

I had quite a surprise the day before yesterday. The Iranian Ambassador came up and said he wanted me to talk to Rafsanjani and asked if I would take a call. I said yes, so Rafsanjani called. It was a fairly unusual conversation. His main subject was that he saw a risk of the West turning against the Islamic countries. I told him there was no basis for that; this was a preconceived image from an earlier day. I explained that this was no longer true, that things had changed. I mentioned your name and said that image was not your view. It was interesting that he then addressed the question that the two of us were friends. I said, yes, that was well known, and that Germany stood shoulder-to-shoulder with its American friends. I explained in no uncertain terms that Americans, too, understood that the war had not solved all the problems in the region but only the terror meted out by Saddam Hussein. What I gathered from his remarks was that something is moving there, too. (S)

The President: You know, Helmut, if you talk to him again, tell him, without reference to our conversation, that the best thing he could do would be to secure the release of American hostages. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I will do that. (U)

The President: It would be very helpful. Incidentally, Helmut, I was very pleased to hear of your decision to send German minesweepers to the Gulf. This is an important step. Don't think there is any criticism from this Administration. We are very grateful for your support. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I know that. I would like to thank you very sincerely for that. George, perhaps we should proceed in the following way. Rafsanjani said he would call again in the following week. I will call you afterwards and give you an update. How do you assess the present mood in the UN Security Council and the initiatives taken in view of Gorbachev? (S)

The President: The UN Security Council has been very cooperative. I am not sure what initiative you were referring to re Gorbachev. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I was referring to the impression I have that he is pondering ways and means of how he can get into the picture. He wants to be a player. (S)

The President: Let me make a couple of comments. First, I did not have a problem with Gorbachev in the last days before the ground war, when he was trying to make peace. I didn't worry about that. He got a lot of criticism from some quarters in the U.S., but I told him -- and Jim Baker will tell him -- that we had no problem with his trying to make peace. Second, they have an historic interest in the region, and all of us have to understand that it is very important to them. I don't think they will emerge as the key negotiator, or the one country that solves all the problems in the Middle East. Lastly, I will stay in

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touch with Gorbachev. I won't give up on him. We are very worried about what is going on in the Soviet Union, but he is President, and we will deal with him. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, it is very important. George, it would be very good if you make this clear to him from time to time, with a remark here and a gesture there, because from a psychological viewpoint it is very important that he is confirmed in this view. (S)

The President: That is a good point. I will accept your advice. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I think I can say that you have been very successful in dealing with him in the past. I consider it very remarkable what he has to say about you, using your first name. It doesn't solve all the problems we have, but it is very important. I do think we can safely say there has not been the kind of contact between heads of state of the U.S. and the Soviet Union that you have. I must also say that it is a very realistic relationship, not a matter of concessions by one side or the other. This is very important for all of us. I hope that people on the Hill understand. (S)

The President: I think so, but there is an odd coalition of the left-wing and the right-wing that has a different view. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: There are rather absurd things one hears. George, good luck. (U)

The President: I hope to see you before too long. I've got your old friend Margaret Thatcher here tonight. I will give her the Medal of Freedom. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Please give her my kindest regards. (U)

The President: Incidentally, Prime Minister Major is a good man to work with. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I can only confirm that. Give my love to Barbara. (U)

The President: Thank you. Love to Hannelore. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany (5 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 3/7/91 - 4/25/91

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By Ja (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(832)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisella Marcuse, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: March 21, 1991, 3:02 - 3:23 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Helmut! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, George. (U)

The President: They tell me you look like Arnold Schwarzenegger because you are taking such wonderful care of your body these days. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I have no desire to look like that. (U)

The President: I thought you were up there getting some rest and going through a good program. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, I've been doing this for many years. I found out many years ago that the world's religions are very wise in recommending a period of fasting, so I've been doing it for two weeks every year. During that period, I do whatever official things I have to, but other than that I totally concentrate on relaxing, I read a lot and I have a fine opportunity to think. And for 12 days I don't eat anything at all -- just drink water. (U)

The President: I remember you told me about that and I think you're on to something. It must get your mind clear. I really salute you for doing it. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: You know, George, in our job, it is really important to do some thinking and not simply to do daily business. (U)

The President: I know. I'm going to do some fishing in Florida in early April. It ought to be a relaxed time, but it's not quite long enough. (U)

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Chancellor Kohl: I hope that the dates are right and I'll be able to see you after Whitsuntide in May, I believe that is. (S)

The President: Well, we'll work on it because I'm very anxious to sit down and have a good relaxed talk. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I have two points mainly. First, what news do you have regarding Iraq? How do you view Saddam Hussein's situation? Is he going to stay? What is your assessment? (S)

The President: We're still keeping on the verbal pressure to make clear to him that there will be no normal relations with the United States if he does stay. I think the feeling in the area is that he will have to get out one way or the other. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That would be best. (U)

The President: It would be the best. As you know, the Saudis met with some of the opposition leaders and, of course, the opposition leaders from disparate backgrounds all came together feeling that he will be removed one way or another. We are proceeding, Helmut, to try to finalize the cease-fire. We are worried about a totally unstable Iraq. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: You are right. (U)

(b)(1)

Chancellor Kohl: I think that's smart. George, when I come back, I'll be talking to Francois and before that, in the next two weeks or so, I'll call you to get a feeling for the situation. I think it's important that he doesn't embark on a path of his own. (S)

The President: I must tell you we had a very good talk in Martinique. And, although he still is committed to some sort of international conference and still committed to having the Security Council chiefs of state meet, he wasn't pushing a specific proposal. And he was anxious to hear about how Jim

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Baker's trip went. We will be filling him in, as we will you, on what Baker found, because maybe there will be some other idea that's better than either of his two ideas to really start moving toward a peaceful Middle East. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I want to talk with you because, after my return, there will be a special EC Summit on April 8, and I would like to be in touch before and coordinate. (S)

The President: Absolutely. I'd like to and when you get home, before that EC Summit, give me a call. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: My second point: the Israeli Foreign Minister came to see me. They have really immense ideas about financial aid. They are thinking on a magnitude that I simply cannot handle. I would like to help them within the bounds of what we can manage, but I'm not entirely clear to what extent they are willing to make a real contribution toward reconciliation. (S)

The President: We're not sure, either. When Jim Baker was there, they talked a little more flexibly, seemed a little more open. But the Prime Minister still has the problem out on his right wing with Sharon, Arens and some of those people, so we don't know the answer to that question. I hope you'll keep probing them as to what they're willing to do. It's my view, Helmut, that with your financial help and our help out there with the military and everyone else involved, we have reduced the threat to Israel from its biggest enemy, Iraq, and that should reduce some of their requirements. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: And as we continue to negotiate with them, George, I want to remain in close contact with you and I want to use whatever options I have to say we don't want to support anything that might ultimately be counterproductive. They are going to be needing a lot of money because in three years they will be receiving 1 million immigrants from the Soviet Union. They expect that number and I welcome that. However, if they go ahead and settle those people in the occupied territories, they're not going to be contributing to peace, but rather to upheaval throughout the Arab world. (S)

The President: That's true, and they know our position -- but then their Housing Minister, Sharon, comes out with a very difficult statement. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I, for one, will not support that kind of a plan financially. (S)

The President: That's good. Helmut, the other thing I am anxious to talk about when you get back, or when we meet, is your broad views on the Soviet Union. We're worried about it. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I shall keep you posted whenever I find out something new. George, there's one last point I'd like to bring up, and that's a matter I find very irritating. Members of the SPD party group in the Bundestag have, during their visit to

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Washington, as usual, had many talks on the Hill. Then they returned and they said the Federal Republic had been paying far too much money. They said they had heard from the Americans that the actual cost of the Gulf war had been lower, and then they took the whole thing and turned it into a debate and they brought this up recently at the level of the Bundestag. (S)

I want to make a very clear statement in this context. We, the Federal government, do, of course, stand behind the obligations that we have undertaken and, of course, the last installment will be paid. In that sense, the discussion that is ongoing in the Senate, too, is really quite absurd. But -- and this is a big request, George -- we must talk with each other prior to announcing the official costs, so that I don't get into a position where I'm being accused to having acted incorrectly. And, of course, as I said, I made a commitment and the money will be paid. But it would put me into an awkward position if the U.S. Congress said at the end that the Germans paid too much. I need not tell you that that would be most awkward and therefore I do have an urgent request. Finance Minister Waigel will be in Washington next week, and I ask that you see him. I think a date has been set. (S)

The President: It has been, yes. I look forward to seeing him.
(U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, the important thing as far as I'm concerned is that you and I do not say different things. We can talk about anything at all, but in the end we must come out with identical statements. As an experienced parliamentarian, so to speak, you know how important that is and I was quite angry that the debate came up at all. But it originated in Congress. (S)

The President: Yes, yes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Members of Congress told German members of Parliament that the Federal Government had paid too much. So they couldn't wait to get home and open their mouths in a big way in Bonn. (S)

The President: I don't know which Members of Congress are saying that, but there will be a full discussion with Waigel when he is here. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: But it's important that in the end you and I say the same thing, and that we are united in our approach. My intention, of course, has always been to help George Bush and, if that discussion hadn't come up somehow, it wouldn't have been an issue in our country. (S)

The President: I think we can straighten it out, and we do have to be on the same wavelength. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Waigel is a good man. (C)

The President: I know he is, and I like him. (S)

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Chancellor Kohl: He does have my confidence and trust. (S)

The President: I'll see that he's well received. Take care, and I look forward to talking to you when you get back. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Please give my regards to Barbara. (U)

The President: I will. Is Hannelore there with you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: No, this is the kind of thing you have to do alone. (U)

The President: I think you're right.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2072

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Abdou
Diouf of Senegal, March 22, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal
Notetaker: Robert C. Frasure

DATE, TIME March 22, 1991, 10:30 - 10:35 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Bush telephoned President Diouf to express his condolences in the death of ninety-two Senegalese soldiers in Saudi Arabia.

The President: Mr. President. How are you? This is George Bush.

President Diouf: I am here. I am fine. How are you?

The President: I just wanted to call to express our shock and sadness over the death of your soldiers in Saudi Arabia this week in this terrible plane crash.

President Diouf: Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

The President: I understand that our people on the ground did everything they could to help at the crash site. But unfortunately very little was possible, I understand.

You know in every wartime situation is tragic. But somehow the death of soldiers after the guns have become silent is particularly terrible and poignant. I would ask you to express my condolences to the families of those who died.

President Diouf: Precisely so. And again I appreciate your sentiments. Thank you very much.

The President: It was good to speak with you.

President Diouf: Thank you. Please my best regards to Mrs. Bush.

The President: Thank you. She is in good health again.

President Diouf: We are all very proud of you.

The President: Thank you. It was a team effort. And I was pleased to have to the U.S. and Senegal out there on the same side.

President Diouf: Thank you again and goodbye.

The President: Goodbye.

-- End of Conversation --

OZAL

MAR 27 - TURKISH PRESIDENT OZAL CALLED THE
PRESIDENT. MONITORED BY NICK BURNS.
CALL STARTED 1827 - ENDED 1833. PRES
AT WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey
on April 2, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns

DATE, TIME April 2, 1991, 11:49 - 11:56 a.m.
AND PLACE Islamorada Island, Florida

The President: Turgut, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: Fine. I just came back from the U.S. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

President Ozal: Then I saw a very difficult situation at the border with Iraq. There are now 250,000 people, mainly children and women fleeing from northern Iraq. Eighty to ninety percent of them have accumulated on our border. We believe up to 600,000 more people may also flee. The Iraqis are pushing them, using many kinds of weapons. The people are trying to come to Turkey away from the violence. I had a National Security Council meeting today and we decided to appeal to the UN for a UN presence in northern Iraq to stop the killing. We want the five permanent representatives of the UN Security Council to know of our analysis. We have called in the Iraqi Ambassador and asked them to stop the fighting. (S)

The President: Are they mostly Kurds? (S)

President Ozal: Yes. (U)

The President: I see. What has the UN said? (S)

President Ozal: We are applying tonight and will give the same information to your Ambassador. (S)

The President: This is a terrible damn thing. (S)

President Ozal: It is a tragedy, George. (U)

The President: What should the U.S. do? (S)

President Ozal: You must give the Iraqis high pressure. (S)

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The President: I agree. We are reluctant to shoot at helicopters--we have no mandate for that. We are still working on a UN cease-fire resolution. We have been disinclined to take military action. (S)

President Ozal: I defended your stance with my people. (S)

The President: That's right. Saudi Arabia and others agree. But I don't like the problem on your border. (S)

President Ozal: In any case, we need to tell the Iraqis to stay away from the border. I need to find a way to cope with the refugees. (S)

The President: We'll wait to hear from our Ambassador. I welcome your thoughts on what the U.S. should do. (S)

President Ozal: Put pressure on Iraq. Give some kind of indication of your seriousness. (S)

The President: Let us think about it. I will wait to hear from our Ambassador tonight. (S)

President Ozal: There are children and women--it is worse than the 1988 massacre. (S)

The President: Well, they must get rid of Saddam Hussein. By the way, how is your health? What did DeBakey say in Houston? (S)

President Ozal: There is no problem. I am overweight, but I knew that. But my heart is okay. Unfortunately, my assistant, Guner, will have bypass. His heart is blocked up--75% closed. (S)

The President: He just took the test? (S)

President Ozal: Yes. So I left him there and today he will have the operation. (S)

The President: I hope he feels okay. (U)

President Ozal: Thank you, George. If there is any additional problem, I will let you know. (S)

The President: We are on a boat right now. (U)

President Ozal: I wish you good fishing. Good luck. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Pérez
Interpreter: Stephanie Van Reigersberg
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME April 9, 1991, 4:12 - 4:49 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: How are you, my friend? (U)

President Perez: What a great pleasure to talk to you, Mr.
President. (U)

The President: It's a great pleasure for me, too. Nice to hear
your voice again. (U)

President Perez: I've been wanting for some time, since the end
of the war in the Middle East, to call and talk to you. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

President Perez: I wanted to express my deepest pleasure for the
way you handled this conflict. You handled all the important
decisions with great intelligence. (U)

The President: Thank you very much for the kind words. We are
very concerned about the human suffering there. But I have no
intention of using U.S. forces to solve that problem. (U)

President Perez: Unfortunately, that's true. It's irritating
and difficult to feel powerless when dealing with such a
situation. I think you've done the best thing possible, and you
could not have done otherwise. It's important that the United
Nations be involved to help in this matter. (U)

The President: Thank you for those words of support. (U)

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AS AMENDED
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President Perez: As usual, the people who criticized you for intervening in the Gulf are the same ones who are now criticizing you for not intervening. But that is the fate of those of us who have to make the difficult decisions. (Ø)

The President: True. (U)

President Perez: I called to talk about the situations in El Salvador and in Haiti. (Ø)

The President: Please go ahead. (U)

President Perez: As you know, the conversations in Mexico City are paralyzed. There is a lack of flexibility by the FMLN as well as by the Salvadoran Government. I understand that President Cristiani is being pressured a great deal by people in the right of his party linked to Roberto D'Aubisson. (Ø)

The President: Uh-huh. (U)

President Perez: It would be a tremendous mistake to waste this opportunity to solve the problem. If we can get to a cease-fire, that would mark the end of the guerrillas. (Ø)

It is necessary to pressure Cristiani to give as much as possible, so he'll be as flexible as possible, but to support him publicly very strongly so he'll gain respect at home, and this will help him with the parties of the left. (Ø)

The President: Uh-huh. (U)

President Perez: What they're doing now is arguing about constitutional niceties, but what they need is real constitutional reforms. The FMLN needs constitutional guarantees, because the people in charge of the Assembly are ARENA and the Christian Democrats. (Ø)

I've called Cristiani and will call him again today. There is a Salvadoran commission presently in Caracas, and I spoke to them, praising him (Cristiani) very much, so it will get wide play in the press in El Salvador. (Ø)

The President: I see. (U)

President Perez: I've also been talking on the phone to the FMLN, asking them to be flexible. But I think the one who will have to give more is Cristiani. That is the important thing. (Ø)

They need to get to the point of a cease-fire. (Ø)

The President: Yes. (U)

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President Perez: Now, on Haiti. I was extremely concerned when I heard of the arrest of Mrs. Trouillot. But she got out, however, and the incident came out all right. I think Aristide is increasingly sound (sensato). Unfortunately, he's got some people who are confused and extremists, and they are trying to drive him to adopt ever more negative positions. We need to help him. (Ø)

The tragedy is that the poor man has no money at all. Venezuela is making a great effort to help. We have been doing even more than we can do. We cannot let Haiti sink (naufragar). (Ø)

The President: Well, I think that's very important. We've put together a project that Beatrice Rangel discussed with General Scowcroft -- maybe not. It's \$83 million and we've already started disbursement. (Ø)

President Perez: I'm going to tell Beatrice to call General Scowcroft because this is a very important thing. (Ø)

The President: He'll be looking forward to talking to her. (Ø)

President Perez: I want to raise the Middle East with you again. Shimon Peres is coming to Caracas later this week. I'm going to have a breakfast for him on Friday. We can't waste any opportunity to try to resolve this conflict. This is the most dangerous issue that you will face during your Presidency. If you have anything you'd like me to raise or anything you want me to do, I'll be delighted to do so. I'd like also to ask if you have any advice or counsel for me on this issue. (Ø)

The President: One, please pay my personal respects to Shimon Peres. We have not settled on one specific plan. But Jim Baker is back in the Middle East as you know, and he's trying to make headway with Israel on two points: One, they're going to have to give up some land, and second, that there must be some talking, some discussion going on. (Ø)

As you know, Peres supported rather strongly the concept of an international conference. The Europeans are still talking about an international conference. And our position is that we don't oppose the concept, but after all these visits by Baker we want a conference that will work. (Ø)

We want people to come together and talk to each other. But too broad a conference at this juncture would only guarantee that the Shamir Government would not attend. (Ø)

We do feel the Arabs are a little more flexible now than they were. We would like them to eliminate the anti-Israel boycott and agree to talk to the Israelis. We'll know a little more about that when Baker gets back from the trip. But we were a

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little more optimistic after his first visit, that there was a chance to put an end to hostilities and begin a dialogue. (C)

The last point relates to Jordan. I'm interested in knowing what Shimon Peres thinks on this point. We think Jordan will eventually have a very important part to play in any final solution. Jordan is still in the bad graces of the Saudis, of the other Gulf states, and Egypt. But we've re-established contact at the Foreign Minister level, and Baker will meet their Foreign Minister in Geneva. (C)

We will handle the Jordanian situation, which is a delicate situation, properly. We were upset with King Hussein. At the same time, we knew the pressures he was under. It will take a little time, but we don't want to destabilize Jordan. (C)

These are the main themes, and we'll be glad to bring you up to date when the trip is finished. (C)

If you pick up anything of importance from Shimon Peres, I'd be happy to hear about it, but I worry that he no longer has the political clout he once had. (C)

President Perez: I'm very much in agreement with all you said. Hussein behaved in an extremely clumsy manner in this crisis. It's as we say "A crown without a head under it" (una corona sin cabeza). We share your view on an international conference. Too broad a conference would be a negative thing. However, the basic countries need to participate. We need to keep pressuring Israel to start talking to the Arabs. And the Arabs need to be more flexible. (C)

Mr. President, I don't want you to forget what I told you in Caracas last December on Iran. My energy minister is going to Iran next week. I'm sending a letter to Rafsanjani with him. (C)

The President: That's very interesting. We've told Iranian representatives, through the appropriate channels, that we're willing to help on the refugee problem that they have. Maybe this will help. (C)

Tell your minister to say the one word that I keep repeating over and over again -- "Hostages." Please help us with the hostages. (C)

President Perez: Of course, Mr. President. I agree, and have already sent a message to Rafsanjani on the subject of the hostages. It would also be good to start dealing with Iranian claims for compensation. (C)

The President: Exactly. That's the one they're interested in, and talks are going on right now with their representatives. But we can't buy out our hostages with some deal. That would lead to more hostages down the road. (Ø)

President Perez: It's clear that something has to be done so it doesn't appear that the two things are linked to each other. (Ø)

The President: Well, I've enjoyed this call, and it's wonderful to hear from you. (U)

President Perez: I feel very satisfied to be able to talk to you. It is always such a great pleasure. I send you an abrazo. (U)

The President: If you have any news on the meeting with Peres, please pass it to me. (Ø)

President Perez: Thank you, and good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

MAJOR

APR 10 - PRES PLACED SECURE CALL TO UK
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR. MONITORED BY SCOWCROFT
INITIATED 1215 - TERMINATED 1235 - PRES AT WH

DE CUELLAR APR 10 - PRES CALLED UN SECRETARY GENERAL
PEREZ DE CUELLAR AT 1540. NO TERMINATION
TIME - MONITORED BY SCOWCROFT - PRES AT
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Francois
Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand
Alex Toumayan, Interpreter
Christopher Thierry, Interpreter
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME April 11, 1991, 1:45-2:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Francois, it's nice to talk to you again. (U)

President Mitterrand: I am also very happy to talk to you. Much
has been going on since we last talked. (U)

The President: The Gulf War now seems calm compared to the
Kurdish refugee problem! (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it is very difficult, but we need to
be present there. (S)

The President: Francois, if you have a few minutes I would like
to go over some points with you and then ask for your views. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, go ahead. (U)

The President: I appreciate your efforts in focusing the world's
attention on the refugee problem in northern Iraq. And I believe
our joint airlift with you, the British and others has helped to
get international support for the refugees. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: Now it is important for the UN to get this relief
effort organized on the ground in Turkey and northern and
southern Iraq as quickly as possible. Specifically, we want the
UN to get some people on the ground in the camps both in Turkey
and Iraq. We think that they have the authority to do that under
UNSC Resolution 688 and I have talked to the Secretary General on
this, and I think he agrees with me. (S)

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We also want a logistics network put in place on the ground using trucks and trains in Turkey, and crossborder into Iraq, to replace this airlift operation at some point. Our people have suggested working with the Turks to set up a hub near the border from which supplies can be transported to the camps in Turkey and also inside of Iraq. And we will be discussing this with both the Turks and the UN. (S)

One reason I called was to mention the conversation John Major and I had yesterday about his original proposal for safe havens in northern and southern Iraq. I was very anxious to get your views. But first, he and I agreed that it is important that there be no daylight between us on this issue. I just finished a meeting with Jacques Santer and Jacques Delors and we are in close proximity with them as well. (S)

Our primary objective should be getting humanitarian support to the refugees safely without Iraqi interference, and we agreed the UN has the authority to do that under 688. (S)

We believe the presence of UN and other relief agencies conducting relief operations should continue to deter the Iraqi military actions, and therefore provide the necessary safety for these operations and for the displaced populations in both northern and southern Iraq. (S)

President Mitterrand: I fully agree. (U)

The President: So, for all intents and purposes, north of the 36th parallel and south within 10 km of the DMZ have already become safe havens. It is our feeling that we should accept them de facto and not try to formalize them further. My worry about formalizing them is that we will have difficulties with some members of the Security Council, like China or the Soviet Union. I would hate to go and get vetoed. (S)

We have said to the Iraqis "do not interfere north of the 36th parallel". And we have intelligence reports showing that they have been honoring this warning from the moment it was given until now. (S)

I am going increasingly public with my policy that we don't intend to use U.S. military forces to try to settle a civil war that has been going on for several years. But we will do what is necessary on humanitarian assistance. And if the Iraqis attack a convoy, we should attack Iraq with force. (S)

President Mitterrand: Indeed. (U)

The President: That is my view, but I would like to hear your thoughts. (C)

President Mitterrand: We have both a moral duty -- but also a political requirement -- to protect these people against this man who was militarily defeated. Not to do anything would ruin the

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moral credit that we have acquired by our victory in the Gulf, by virtue of the magnificent American intervention. We have to stop him, but how to do it and what to do? (S)

I think the safe haven concept is a good one. We are not detracting from the sovereignty of the state involved by removing territories. Very simply, we are acting because we must forestall ^{de} genocide. We are facing a specific circumstance not a long-term ^{de}jure situation. These people must not be punished for believing in our victory. Their needs are huge in scope and, with the powerful pictures that are being seen around the world, there must not be the perception that our victory did not help alleviate their suffering. (S)

Then the first question, if I understand it, is how we should go about this. What we need is not zones that are legally established as safe havens, but instead zones that are protected in fact from Iraqi repression. (S)

The President: Exactly. (U)

President Mitterrand: In practical terms if there is the presence of NGO's and international organizations, and of doctors, in the form of the airdrop of food and other supplies, then we have a solution -- but not in terms of military repression. So now we should determine together -- France and U.S., the English and others acting jointly -- how to keep Saddam Hussein from killing and starving these people. (S)

I fully appreciate the legal difficulty of our position. But at the same time if we do nothing we will risk worrying other countries where there are minority groups -- and they are everywhere. Very simply, we have to say we are coming to the rescue of people who are being persecuted. That's all. We are endowed with a special right; we won the war. We could have gone on with the war for two more weeks but we did not. (S)

If we do it like this, no resolution is needed. If we are criticized, we can just say what we are doing is extending protection. We can not let him strafe these people with machine guns. (S)

The President: Exactly. We should stay in close touch and keep doing what we are doing. We should treat this as a human rights case and not worry about the legal niceties. We should just do what we must do. Our warning will be enforced. I expect others will do the same if he attacks the relief effort. Let's be in touch. (S)

President Mitterrand: I am ready to discuss the modalities with you whenever you would like. I am not moving; I will be in Paris for the next week. I think we are doing the right thing and we need to keep getting supplies in there. (S)

The President: I am glad we agree. (U)

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President Mitterrand: We are working together and we will go on doing so. Goodbye, dear George. (C)

The President: Au revoir, mon ami. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Vaclav Havel
of Czechoslovakia on April 12, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Vaclav Havel
Interpreter: Ms. Heyda
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME April 12, 1991, 9:13-9:40 a.m.
AND PLACE Oval Office

The President: Hello. How are you feeling? I hear you have the flu. (U)

President Havel: I have just a little flu. I am grateful you have taken the time to talk. (U)

The President: Please tell me what is on your mind. (U)

President Havel: I would like to mention two things and report on the situation in Czechoslovakia. (U)

The President: Please go ahead. (U)

President Havel: One of the small things is that my friend Foreign Minister Dienstbier is in the U.S. and I would be grateful if you could see him. (U)

The President: General Scowcroft will meet with him. But since you put it on a personal basis, I'll be glad to work it out. (U)

President Havel: First, thank you for being able to see Dienstbier. Second, I want to talk about funding for Radio Free Europe. I understand the Congress may cut funding for RFE. I hope it will be possible to give support to this institution. It is very important. (U)

The President: I am glad you raised this. No decision has been taken yet to close it but broadcasts have been reduced somewhat. Eventually, we do foresee an end to RFE broadcasts. I will ask your Foreign Minister to give me more information. Please tell him to level with us as to why you think RFE is important. Incidentally, most Poles and Hungarians agree with what you are telling me. (U)

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President Havel: The reason why they want RFE open is that, although our radio is free, our journalists are not experienced enough. RFE is an educational institution for us. We need to learn from it. I think we will need two years to get up to speed and to be proficient. (C)

The President: I will discuss this with your Foreign Minister as will General Scowcroft and the people at State. (U)

President Havel: Well, I want to thank you for your understanding on RFE. Next, we are sending help to the Kurds to assist your efforts. I would like to ask you about the international safety zone for the Kurds. (C)

The President: In the first place, I appreciate your interest and your help. We are mounting a major humanitarian relief effort which is going very well. The problem with the UN establishing an "enclave" in Iraq is that several members of the Security Council, including the USSR and China, would veto any resolution creating such an enclave. But we are treating the situation on the ground in Iraq as an enclave. We are going to insist that Saddam Hussein not use military force north of the 36th parallel. In essence, it will be a safe haven, a humanitarian zone without going back to the UN for more specific authority. I think we have the authority under UN resolution 688. (S)

It is a very tense situation and frankly I do not see an end until Saddam Hussein is out of that office. Even then, there would have to be a healing process because of the rivalries. As you know, the Shias in the south, the Baathists and Sunnis in the center and the Kurds in the north -- these are age-old rivalries. (S)

What is your view? You are a man who knows what suffering and oppression is. What is your view as to what we should be doing? (C)

President Havel: The idea of a safety zone produced by a UN resolution would be wonderful. But since there is no chance of that, your idea seems to be a very good one. (C)

The President: I think we will have a de facto safety zone. I have made clear to the Iraqis that they must not use force north of the 36th parallel. (C)

President Havel: I want to thank you for all your efforts and your thinking on this situation. Now, I would like to brief you on the situation in Czechoslovakia. (C)

We have problems now. Writing a new constitution and creating a new legislature is one. We had not thought enough about economic problems. There really are several problems. In Slovakia, there is a big concentration of military factories and installations. It was very big and supplied guns to the Warsaw Pact countries. Now our political orientation is totally different. The

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factories are being closed down and there is unemployment. We need to convert these factories to civilian use. This big problem has created tension between the Federal government and Slovakia. This is a big issue. (Ø)

We would appreciate help from the West, especially from the U.S. to provide experts to convert these factories to civilian use. We would also like financial help. Political stability is precarious -- 150,000 are unemployed. We need help on this big problem. (Ø)

The President: We do want to help. I will immediately talk to the proper authorities here to get the expert advice. We will see what we can do to get financial help and technical advice. (Ø)

President Havel: I really, truly appreciate your help and advice and want to stress once more the problem of internal stability whose consequences could reach beyond Slovakia to all Central Europe. There is no other possibility of employment of the people in those factories in Slovakia. I actually have two concrete points. I would ask you to publicly mention this problem so our people would know it is being thought about. Also, if you could tell your experts that we need to have the factories converted into productive investments, that would be very helpful. (Ø)

The President: I would be glad to say something publicly. I discussed these problems with the EC -- with Delors and Santer-- yesterday. (Ø)

President Havel: It would also be helpful if you could think of ways to tie our factories into sales for the reconstruction of Kuwait. Our factories have no markets for their products due to the crash of the East European market. (Ø)

The President: Let me think about the connection there. We will try to be helpful on this major problem. (U)

President Havel: I want to thank you for your understanding. You should have no concern about democracy in Czechoslovakia. We will win. But there are obstacles, especially the economy. We are in close cooperation with Poland and Hungary. (U)

The President: I am delighted to have that appraisal and we are willing to help. (U)

President Havel: Thank you again for this talk and for taking the time to meet me on the phone. Please give my best to Barbara Bush. (U)

The President: Thank you and give my love to your family. Take care of yourself and we'll try to help. (U)

President Havel: (in English) Thank you very much. (U)

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The President: Take care of yourself. Get well, get well. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on April 15, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME April 15, 1991, 10:21 - 10:37 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. President. Turgut, how are you, sir? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you. How are you? (U)

The President: Well, I'm fine and worried about the refugee problem. I'm glad to hear from you but this is a terrible human tragedy. (U)

President Ozal: Yes, George, the reason I'm calling you is the problem on the Turkish-Iraqi border. There are very rugged mountains there. They are almost 7,000 feet and 400,000 people have come almost in one week, maybe more, and there is no flat place and it is all rugged mountains. It is a very difficult situation to get supplies to those people because there is no flat place in those two provinces. And therefore I suggest we should take a part of a flat place at the Iraqi border in Turkey. Now we are transferring some 40,000 from the most difficult parts to those areas. Today the transfer has started. (S)

The President: 40,000? (S)

President Ozal: 40,000. The problem is this. I think your people have seen it - your military and also embassy people and also some of the people related to the refugee problem -- it seems in the areas adjacent to the Turkish border there are very nice flat places and we have to get some of those people to those areas. Otherwise, they will be lost. Everyday something like 500 to 800 people are dying. (S)

The President: Oh, God. Well, how do we get them down there and what do you think is needed to get them in there? (S)

President Ozal: According to the UN Security Council decision, we should have something that Iraq should not object to putting those people in their territory. We would supply their food and electricity and other things. That is our problem. (S)

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The President: Yes. Well, can't they just go there? Can't we all just pitch in and send them there? (S)

President Ozal: But then if there is a military reaction, what are we going to do? We are going into another conflict. (S)

The President: Well, of course, what we've said is they must not interfere with refugee operations north of the 36th parallel. These flat places are north of that, aren't they? (S)

President Ozal: Well north of them. But there are soldiers on the border. Iraqi soldiers. (S)

The President: Are the Iraqi soldiers trying to keep these people from going back? (S)

President Ozal: If they go inside, there may be some kind of skirmish. But I'll try to go inside if you let us. (S)

The President: In principle, I think we need to back the concept of getting these Iraqi people in the flat places in Iraq itself. But do you feel that the soldiers will interfere with the normal flow going back into Iraq? (S)

President Ozal: We have not tried, but if you give the order to your people that you can go in, then ours will go also. (S)

The President: What people are you talking about, Turgut? Are you talking about our people, relief workers or others? (S)

President Ozal: The refugee people and your people. (S)

The President: You mean our relief team? You say my people. What people are you talking about going into Iraq? Would they be soldiers going in? Turgut? (S)

(conversation interrupted by technical problems for a few minutes)

The President: Hello? (U)

President Ozal: Yes, hello. (U)

The President: We got cut off. I was asking you what kind of people did you want to see go into the flat places in Iraq. That's the last I heard. (S)

President Ozal: What I'm going to suggest is we are now bringing 40,000 to Silopi and I also asked our people to establish another camp right at the border and other refugee camps. They are going to establish them and then there are other places on the other side of the Iraqi border. If I go there I am afraid there will be some kind of military intervention by Iraq. If that intervention takes place, then we will answer back. That's the problem. (S)

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The President: Well, we have said that they must not have military action against the refugee efforts north of the 36th parallel so if those people go back in there, I think we all would then have not only the right but the obligation to protect those people if the Iraqis came in there and started interfering with that. (S)

President Ozal: That is the point. You should give the order to your people and also I'll give the order. (S)

The President: What people are you taking about, Turgut? (S)

President Ozal: If there is some kind of intervention, then we should strike back. (S)

The President: Are you thinking of taking these couple of hundred thousand and getting them to go voluntarily to flat areas? (S)

President Ozal: I am not. I'm just trying to put new refugee camps in flat areas. (S)

The President: Exactly, that's what we want. Everybody wants that...and these cross the border into Iraq? (S)

President Ozal: I don't know how these refugees later on will go back to their original places.

The President: The French have an idea. They are working on that. They are trying there. (S)

President Ozal: How? (U)

The President: I don't know but they are talking about having UN personnel in each town -- not to stop repression, but they could report if there was a violation and we are talking to them about that. (S)

President Ozal: First of all, I think we should not let the sanctions be removed. (S)

The President: Definitely not. Definitely. (S)

President Ozal: And then maybe the real solution is that Saddam and his people leave Iraq. (S)

The President: Well, that's exactly what we want but the trouble is we don't have any way of enforcing it. And we are saying no normal relations with the U.S. as long as Saddam Hussein is in there. Do you think there is any chance to get him out? (S)

President Ozal: I think you put the refugees in those places along the border. I don't think he's going to make anything, if he does he'll get his answer. (S)

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The President: If he interferes, then he gets hit. That's true. I'm not sure how to get him out of power. (S)

President Ozal: If he has no money, how can he stay? (S)

The President: And we will certainly be with you in keeping those economic sanctions. Let me talk to our people and get back to you. One, there is a hell of a problem. Two, we want to see Iraqi refugees be in Iraq in flat places. We want to see that. Three, we have said that he ought not, should not, must not interfere with any refugee efforts north of the 36th parallel. So we already have a marker to Saddam Hussein if he should start using military action and I don't know why those people could not be talked into going back to the flat places in Iraq with a pledge of support from the U.S. and other coalition members to support them in the flat places in Iraq. (S)

President Ozal: I think if you support us, we can also protect them. (S)

The President: Well, I think we can also support them. We've made clear that he must not use military force to stop refugee relief. So we would be prepared to support that. But I don't know what we're talking about in terms of support. If he uses his air force to stop convoys, that would be a clear violation and we would be required to use force. (S)

President Ozal: George, in northern Iraq -- we should go and your people should go in in preparation of the camps. Also the water supply and electricity for these people. I mean this is a point we have to solve. (S)

The President: But wouldn't that be a proper responsibility for the UN to go there and send their refugee people and the rest of us supplying these drops and enormous amounts of supplies. (S)

President Ozal: You have 500,000 people in Turkey and probably some are engineers. If we are going to establish these camps in Iraq, then your people, my people and the UN people should go in and establish the camps. (S)

The President: I'll talk to my people today. I think we have got to have these camps established. (S)

President Ozal: I'll be waiting for your call. (U)

The President: In principle, we agree that these refugees should be moved to flat areas in Iraq. (S)

President Ozal: OK. (U)

The President: We'll get back to you as soon as we can. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Ozal of Turkey on April 16, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME April 16, 1991, 2:30 - 2:38 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Turgut. (U)

President Ozal: Hello. Yes, George, how are you? (U)

The President: I told you I would call you back and wanted to get back to you quickly. We've got a few things to discuss. I shared your sense of urgency once you told me how extremely distressing the situation is. We've been making a few phone calls. (S)

President Ozal: I know. (U)

The President: Obviously, there is a security problem and frankly I doubt that Saddam would interfere. Clearly we and others will warn him not to interfere, but I think that we will only be able to convince the people to go to the flat areas if we provide some security. So what we have in mind is something rather ambitious that builds on your thinking. The long term goal, obviously, I think we would agree, is to get the Kurds to return home safely. That is the long term goal but there is the immediate need that you told me about to get the refugees to go to those flat areas in northern Iraq just inside the border. We believe that our military is the best suited to build these temporary encampments in a hurry. We've located a lot of equipment. So we are prepared to have our military go in there to build the temporary encampments for the refugees and we obviously want to work with your people and anybody else to create the supply trains that would be necessary to get the equipment into Iraq. Do you have a question? (S)

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President Ozal: In that case, we are going to help you as much as we can. (S)

The President: That's good. (U)

President Ozal: And if you want our military to help in that, we will. (S)

The President: Here's the next point. As for the security of the flat area encampments -- and we think there probably will end up being 5 or 6 camps if we can get all those people to come out of the mountains to go there -- but the U.S. air forces, with your permission in terms of operations out of Turkey, would provide cover with our air power to see that these camps were not attacked. We also think, Turgut, that we need ground forces and the reason for that is simply to reassure the Kurds that they can move into Iraq without fear. We think if Saddam says "I promise not to hurt you" that won't be good enough. The Kurds will say "The hell with that. You killed us once before." I have talked to Prime Minister Major and President Mitterrand and they are prepared to join us in supplying troops for the camps. We would call them military observers probably but we would have some forces there then on the ground to help build the camps and to protect what is necessary until we can maybe get the UN to do something. So this is what we're thinking about and we obviously would have to have the cooperation of the Turkish military. We need the people on the ground to work out the details but I've talked to de Cuellar and I think he is agreeable to this. He says that Saddrudin Aga Khan and a Belgian are in Baghdad and they are 90 percent sure that the Iraqis will permit this. Now he did not talk to them about U.S. and British and French forces being on the ground in northwest Iraq. And I don't want to get involved in a civil war. I do not want to send our young people into battle, but I think we have to protect the people in the camps and get them back to Iraq. (S)

President Ozal: George, we can help. You do not mention the Turkish troops. We will go in with you if you want. (S)

The President: I'm not sure we need that. I think we'll have enough troops and what we need is the cooperation of the Turkish army up to the border. Then we can talk further. I think the most important thing is to be sure that we get total cooperation with the Turkish, U.S., British and French forces as we move supplies in. I can see reasons why you would not want to have your troops in the camps in Iraq. I think we can get by but need total Turkish support right at the border. (S)

President Ozal: We will give you the people. If you want military, we will give military. We will help you in any case. (S)

The President: Maybe we could use some civilian support, like truck drivers. We will get people in touch over there. The new plan -- I'm going to try to announce it tonight. We will go

forward. We'll get some criticism, but not too much because the suffering is so great. We want to help. (S)

President Ozal: You know what is the Iranian situation? (S)

The President: I know its bad. What do you think? Germany is helping Iran you know. (S)

President Ozal: Rafsanjani is coming to Turkey the end of this month. Its an official visit. I will talk to him. (S)

The President: We'll get started on this plan. I hope it takes the pressure off of Turkey. You've been very good and I think we need to get these people to flat lands. (S)

President Ozal: Thank you. Its a good plan. We will do everything we can to help. (S)

The President: I appreciate that very much. You've been wonderful. We will move and we'll be back in touch at some level. (S)

President Ozal: Let us know through your ambassador or anybody. (S)

The President: Good luck. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Presidential Call to Pres. Ozal

--I wanted to get back to you quickly on the matter we discussed yesterday.

--I share your sense of urgency. Your description of the situation was extremely distressing. Despite all our best efforts, the fact is that we are not getting enough food and medicine to those who need it. Hundreds are dying daily.

--Our military and the relief organizations fully subscribe to your view that we must get these people off the mountains and into lowlands in Iraq where we can deliver and distribute food, medicine and shelter on the necessary large scale.

--Obviously, there is the security problem. Although I doubt Saddam would interfere, and we will warn him not to, we will only convince people to move if they are confident of their safety.

--What I have in mind is something ambitious that builds upon your own thinking. The long-term goal is to get all the Kurds to return home, safely. But there is the immediate need to persuade the refugees to return to the lowland areas in northern Iraq, just inside the border. Our own military is best suited to build these temporary encampments in a hurry. We would like to work with your people and others in creating the supply train.

--As for security, U.S. air forces operating out of southern Turkey could provide cover. But I think we would also need a ground presence, primarily to reassure the Kurds that they can move into Iraq without fear. No amount of Iraqi promises will do. I've spoken to both Major and Mitterrand, and they are prepared to supply troops for this purpose, [as are we].

[if Ozal raises a Turkish military role inside Iraq: I appreciate the offer. Let me discuss this further with my military and with the British and French. My initial thinking is that a Turkish military presence might be misunderstood, and that it might be better for you to focus your resources on the situation within Turkey and on moving supplies into Iraq.]

--It will be essential to get the UN involved in running these camps. I am confident that this is consistent with UNSC Resolution 688. I phoned Perez de Cuellar, who was positive. I urged him to push his bureaucracy to get more active inside Iraq.

--I plan to announce something today. I just want you to know how much I appreciate what Turkey is doing to assist. I also want you to know that we stand ready to continue helping you through this difficult situation.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France on April 16, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME April 16, 1991, 1:07 - 1:21 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Bonsoir. Hey, Francois, can you hear me OK? (U)

President Mitterrand: Bonjour. I hear you fine, just fine. How are you? (U)

The President: Beaucoup de problemes avec les Kurds. (S)

President Mitterrand: I know we do. (U)

The President: I'd like to run over some of the ground that Mr. Morel talked to Brent Scowcroft about. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I know about it. (U)

The President: I think we agree that we have got a hell of a problem and that we have to get these Kurds down out of the mountains to the flat places. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, absolutely. (U)

The President: Ozal says he can take about 40-50,000 refugees, but we're talking about the need for 5 or 6 camps in the flat places in Iraq and we don't see any other way to take care of these refugees. Now, the refugees will not come down from the mountains and into these flat places in Iraq unless they have some guarantee of security. So that brings me to the idea that Scowcroft and Morel talked about. Let me repeat what we're thinking about. We think your idea of way stations is very good. We would like to work with you if we can be useful in building up that idea of getting the people to go back to the cities. It has got to be our fundamental objective. But in the short run, we are worried, as you are, about the loss of life and an immediate

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need is to encourage these refugees to get down to the low lands. And we think that the U.S. military is best suited to build these temporary encampments in a hurry just because we've located all the supplies. Obviously, we would welcome a cooperative effort. But we would pledge to build these camps. We've got the equipment coming out of Europe and it's a massive construction job. Now the Turks, British and everybody else would be a part and we would work with everyone else to get it moving from Turkey to these places in Iraq. Now on security, U.S. air forces operating out of southern Turkey could provide cover. Our view is that we would probably need a ground presence, primarily to reassure the Kurds to move into Iraq without fear. We don't believe, and I'd be interested in your view, that any amount of promises by Iraq for safehaven will satisfy the Kurds. (S)

President Mitterrand: Certainly not. (U)

The President: What Scowcroft broached to Morel was the UK and France and subsequently others would supply troops for this purpose and if necessary and Morel felt that might be difficult, the U.S. would join in that. (S)

President Mitterrand: That would be the principle thing. These three forces would be the main ones. (S)

The President: Unless the Turks would help. (S)

President Mitterrand: I don't think as a military presence inside Iraq, no. (S)

The President: You think the Turks would not or should not? (S)

President Mitterrand: Should not. (S)

The President: I'm sure they would welcome someone else doing it. (S)

President Mitterrand: I think they could render greater service by staying inside the Turkish border. (S)

The President: Good point. Francois, I just talked to Javier Perez de Cuellar who is going to be talking to you tomorrow and I went over this with him. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I know about that demarche.

The President: I just talked to him now. (S)

President Mitterrand: France must be associated as much as possible with that. (S)

The President: He was very supportive of these ideas. I think, with all respect, you could impress that on him more than I did. I think he's for it but needs to hear from others that this is not just some U.S. thing. (S)

President Mitterrand: I agree that the French army should participate in this effort to provide humanitarian aid under the umbrella of the UN, of course, together with our American and UK friends. And everything else that you have just said seems to me quite right. These people have got to be saved. (S)

The President: Can I mention more about the UN? Sadruddin Agha Khan and some Belgian gentleman are in Baghdad now. The Belgian is the legal adviser to the Secretary General. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I know him. (U)

The President: Well, they reported to Perez de Cuellar a few minutes ago that they were 90 percent sure that Iraq would permit these human centers -- they call them human centers -- to be set up in Iraq. They did not raise with Iraq having some security for these human centers. (S)

President Mitterrand: I see. (U)

The President: But de Cuellar seemed very agreeable to this and we would call them military observers. They cannot wear blue helmets because that would require a separate resolution in the UN Security Council. (S)

President Mitterrand: I don't think that is true. (U)

The President: That's what he says. (U)

President Mitterrand: I think Resolution 688 would suffice. (S)

The President: I agree, but to get blue helmets in the human centers in Iraq, the opinion of the Secretary General was that there would have to be a new resolution. (S)

President Mitterrand: I really don't think its all that necessary. (S)

The President: I agree. What did you say? (S)

President Mitterrand: It shouldn't prove all that difficult to get such a UN resolution. The Russians would probably be agreeable. (S)

The President: But, Francois, did you see what China said today? They're very firm against something like this. (S)

President Mitterrand: I see. (U)

The President: But, in any event, de Cuellar says what we ought to do is expand UNIKOM under the existing resolution - extend the terms of assistance to the refugees under 688. That's your idea. (S)

President Mitterrand: But its not necessary. Its not obligatory to have the blue helmet. (S)

The President: I agree and the way he ended the conversation was with "I will support you". But I'd like to get this thing going. I think that France, England and the U.S. together ought to just say we're going to do this and get started. (S)

President Mitterrand: I'm ready to start tomorrow morning, Mr. President. (S)

The President: Fantastic and I'm not surprised. I'm very pleased. (S)

President Mitterrand: I am going to mobilize all means. I'll communicate immediately with the prime minister and the foreign minister and have them contact the proper people in the U.S. -- General Scowcroft and others -- to see what needs to be done. (S)

The President: That's very good and very positive and we're very grateful about your leadership about getting these people back to their cities. (S)

President Mitterrand: No, I'm absolutely ready to act in this way. (S)

The President: We'll be back in touch through Scowcroft and I'm available. I think if we go ahead and get this program going other people will join in and we can worry about the technical details with the UN later on. (S)

President Mitterrand: I absolutely agree 100 percent with that. (S)

The President: It was nice talking to you and we'll be back in touch with details and look forward to hearing from your people. (S)

President Mitterrand: Then we'll talk very soon, my dear friend. (S)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Presidential Call to Pres. Mitterrand

--I am calling to discuss the plight of the Iraqi refugees, especially the Kurds in southern Turkey and northern Iraq.

--I feel a real sense of urgency. The most recent reports we are receiving are extremely distressing. Despite all our best efforts, the fact is that we are not getting enough food and medicine to those who need it. Hundreds are dying daily.

--President Ozal phoned me yesterday. To be frank, he is extremely anxious. He will take in 40-50,000 refugees, but there are hundreds of thousands more in the mountain areas he cannot take and who will not be able to survive there indefinitely.

--His view, one that our military and the relief organizations fully subscribe to, is that we must get these people off the mountains and into lowlands where we can deliver and distribute food, medicine and shelter on the necessary large scale.

--Obviously, there is the related problem of security. Although I doubt Saddam would interfere, and we will warn him not to, we will only convince these people to move if they are confident they will be safe.

--What I have in mind is something ambitious that builds upon your own thinking on "way stations." The long-term goal is to get all the Kurds to return home, safely. But there is the immediate need to encourage the refugees to return to the lowland areas in northern Iraq, just inside the border. Our own military is best suited to build these temporary encampments in a hurry. We will work with the Turks, your people and others in creating the supply train.

--As for security, U.S. air forces operating out of southern Turkey could provide cover. But I think we would also need a ground presence, primarily to reassure the Kurds that they can move into Iraq without fear. No amount of Iraqi promises will do. Our idea is that the UK and France and subsequently others would supply troops for this purpose. [if necessary: We'd be prepared to join with you in this.]

--It will be essential to get the UN involved in running these camps. I am confident that all this is consistent with UNSC Resolution 688. We informally sounded out Perez de Cuellar, who seemed positive. I will phone him later today to see if I can get him to push his bureaucracy to get more active inside Iraq.

--I also expect to get back to Ozal and then announce something today. Can you agree with all this?

Apr. 16

Calls to Major and Mitterrand

--I am calling to discuss the plight of the Iraqi refugees, especially the Kurds in southern Turkey and northern Iraq.

--I feel a real sense of urgency. The most recent reports we are receiving are extremely distressing. Despite all our best efforts, the fact is that we are not getting enough food and medicine to those who need it. Hundreds are dying daily.

--President Ozal phoned me yesterday. To be frank, he is extremely anxious, almost desperate. He will take in some tens of thousands of refugees, but there are hundreds of thousands more in the mountain areas who will not be able to survive.

-- His view, one that ~~I have come to~~ ^{our military and relief agencies} subscribe to, is that we ^{strongly} must get these people off the mountains and into lowlands where we can deliver and distribute food, medicine and shelter on the necessary large scale. ^{subscribe}

--Obviously, there is the related problem of security. Although I doubt Saddam would interfere, we will only convince these people to move if they are confident they will be safe.

--What I have in mind, and it is entirely consistent with what I take to be your own thinking, is to encourage the refugees to return to the lowland areas in northern Iraq, just inside the border. | Our own military is best suited to provide massive relief in a hurry. | We will work with the Turks and your people.

--As for security, U.S. air forces operating out of southern Turkey could provide cover. But I think we would also need some ground presence, in part to reassure the Kurds, ~~in part to discourage them from using these encampments to mount operations against Iraq.~~ Would you be willing to supply troops to this?

--~~I will confess to some concern that building these large encampments in northern Iraq raises the danger that the refugee population could become permanent.~~ It will be important to stress that this is temporary, and that the goal remains to see them return to their homes as soon as it is safe to do so.

--In this vein, it will be essential to get the UN involved in running these camps. I am confident that we could demonstrate that all this is consistent with UNSC Resolution 688. But I will also be calling Perez de Cuellar to see if I can get him to endorse this effort and energize the international bureaucracy.

--I'd like to get in touch with de Cuellar and get back to Ozal and then announce something. Do you agree with all this?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister John Major of England on April 16, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Major, Prime Minister
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME: April 16, 1991, 12:25 - 12:40 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Major: There's been a fair amount of fuss over here one way or another. (C)

The President: What do they want you to do that we are not doing? (C)

Prime Minister Major: I know what they would like us to have done -- magically, without invading or killing Saddam, have him replaced by a nice, gentle democrat. (S)

The President: That's about the same criticism that we're getting here. Ours is focused more that I personally made a mistake. Maybe it was by not shooting down the helicopters. But the main thing is where do we go from here and I've got a couple of ideas I'll run by. If you like I'll go ahead or you can lead off. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I think we have to move ahead. We produced proposals earlier in the week. They may or may not be the way. It seems there are so many Kurds running loose and we need to ensure they are first, fed, and, secondly, protected from attack. I doubt the problem will go away until we grasp that. (S)

The President: Here's what we're thinking. Let me run down this. In the first place, I talked to Ozal yesterday and he thinks he can keep 40-50,000 refugees but he thinks another 240-400,000 need to get to what he called the flat areas. Indeed, that is what we want to do. So his view is one that our military and relief organizations fully subscribe to. No one is arguing about getting them down there. There is a security problem and I

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don't think, based on talking to our experts, that Saddam Hussein would interfere and I think he has to be publicly warned not to. But we will only get these people to move out of the mountains and down to the flat areas if they are confident that they will be safe. We got a further UN resolution problem, as you know. It was reinforced by the Chinese statement respecting Iraq's sovereignty so we wouldn't get a UN resolution probably but should build on 688. I think you and we believe implicitly that it gives us authorization to help settle these people. (S)

Prime Minister Major: We've always thought that 688 was that authorization. (S)

The President: What I'm talking about is to get the Kurds to return home safely. The French have ideas that make sense. You had this safehaven idea in the beginning. We want to build on that idea. We have got to get them to go home and we think that our own military -- I'm talking U.S. not collective, but welcoming all support -- is best suited, given the logistics, to build temporary shelters in Iraq in a hurry. We will work with the Turks in creating a supply train to get into this area. (S)

On the security -U.S. air forces are operating out of southern Turkey and we can enhance this with helicopter gunships which are somewhere that we can bring in and provide cover and protection. But we have concluded, and here's the point I need to talk about, that we need a ground presence. Its not because we think they will be attacked but to reassure the Kurds that they can move into Iraq without fear. I'm afraid that just promises by Saddam will not get the job done. The original idea was that we would provide logistics and air cover and the construction units and that UK and France would supply some troops. If that is complicated, we could put some troops in there as well. I'm in a dilemma because I keep saying we're not going to get involved in their civil war, just the humanitarian refugee effort. We're flexible in addition to logistics and troops that we put in -- troops to help others defend. I think air power is essential. The last point is that it would be essential to get the UN involved in running these camps and, like you, I feel it is consistent with 688. We've informally sounded out Perez de Cuellar. He seems positive. But its moving so damn slow. I'll phone him later today to see if we can get the bureaucracy moving. That's our approach and I would love to have your feeling. I haven't talked to Mitterrand though I think Brent Scowcroft has talked to his new Chief of Staff. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I would react very warmly to those ideas. They are very much in line with what we had in mind earlier in the week. I think we would certainly welcome... we would be happy to play our part in it. I'm not sure of how many camps we would need, how many troops we would need. Or whether it would be wholly credible without U.S. ground troops. I'm not sure. The other question that arises immediately is how long is it likely to be for because at the moment it is difficult to judge

whether it will be short term or quite lengthy. We have to do something like this. We are convinced here. (S)

The President: We're thinking 5 or 6 camps would be required and we don't yet have a thought on the number of troops. Obviously, the fewer, the better. I don't want to look like an occupation army and you are as concerned as I am about permanence. I'll get with our defense people and find out if they have estimates of the numbers. I don't think it requires a lot. I think what should go with this is a proclamation to Saddam not to interfere. And so far I assume your fellows agree. There have not been violations when we say "don't do this" in terms of the 36th parallel. They've been pretty good and I expect, given world opinion, they would not harass our camps. But the Kurds that had fled don't agree, obviously. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I would be surprised if we made a proclamation if he did interfere. And if he did, a certain set of circumstances would arise. I think he would be ill advised to do so and don't think he would. Would the troops be under UN cover or international? (S)

The President: I don't think under UN unless there is another resolution. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Even under 688? (S)

The President: Maybe we could say that. I assumed we had to have it as coalition forces, but ... (S)

Prime Minister Major: If they're there wearing blue berets rather than U.S. uniforms, it will be easier for Iraq to bear and more difficult to attack. I think we might get more international support. (S)

The President: That would be best. (U)

Prime Minister Major: If we're about to do this under 688 I would very much personally like to persuade Perez de Cuellar. They can be our people wearing UN hats. If we can't, we can't. (S)

The President: I agree with you and I think that's best. I had planned --and I think its scheduled -- to talk to him this afternoon. And, of course, any talks you have with him would be fine. I think we ought to get international sanction, whether it needs specific UN creation of peace keeping force to go into this specific area. I can't remember the rules. In any event, we'll try and if it doesn't work, we'll have to go forward. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I believe so. When will it be announced? (C)

The President: I've got to talk to Francois and then de Cuellar -- the sooner, the better and we would coordinate the

announcement. We hope to get something today. I know the timing is not too good for you, but we may not be far enough along. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I wouldn't worry about timing for us. Its important to get it announced. (S)

The President: Why don't we make a couple of more calls and then we'll get back to you? (S)

Prime Minister Major: Marvelous. (U)

The President: I have a kind of personal question. Is Margaret giving you grief publicly? (S)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, semi-publicly. What she is doing is talking extremely recklessly to some people who are then spreading the word. She hasn't remotely come to grips with the fact that she's not the prime minister anymore. The press is giving enormous amounts of difficulty. (S)

The President: Is there anything we can do to help. I'm afraid I'm a part of your problem. (S)

Prime Minister Major: To be absolutely frank, when she was prime minister she used to sit down and denounce colleagues in the same way. From the press' point of view, it's a good story. She tends to do this when she's abroad. She did a bit of it in the U.S. a couple of days ago. In a curious way, she doesn't realize what she's doing. Its caused a lot of resentment over here in the party. (S)

The President: I didn't know she was here. I don't think it got picked up over here. (C)

Prime Minister Major: It blew back. -- dinner table discussions. The press use it and they don't quote her. (S)

The President: Well, if you want any support, we feel you've been up front on this. I'm catching a hell of a lot of grief. None of the sources want to say send in the 82nd airborne. They just criticize but don't have any answers. It is a complex problem. The refugee problem has a lot of potential for grief if its not handled right. The critics know that but they have a free shot. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I agree. A very cheap shot, but it causes a lot of difficulties. (C)

The President: There are some but they are manageable. We'll call back. I think we have something to build on. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Harry Obst

DATE, TIME April 16, 1991, 8:42 - 8:59 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Helmut! How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good, George. How are you? (U)

The President: Good. What's up? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: The economy is moving fairly well in the old Laender, but there are problems in the new Laender to the east. This is a transitional phase we have to overcome in the next few years. (U)

The reason I am calling is the Kurdish question. I wanted to discuss it with you. It has created a lot of emotion, not only here but also in the U.S. The images on television are terrible. We would like to do everything we can to lend these people support and humanitarian aid. We decided today, in consultation with your people, how we want to bring about distribution, especially to those in Iran. We will build up an airlift in the area and also establish an airlink of helicopters from the airfield to the camps. We have earmarked DM 250 million for this purpose. Obviously, it is not the solution for the long term. We now have to assure that these people may return in safety to their homes without repression by this criminal regime. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I wonder if we might launch a joint initiative to help them find homes. (Ø)

The President: We agree, Helmut. We want them to go home. The French have a proposal for monitors to be located in their home towns to report on conditions there. We have launched a major refugee effort along the Turkish border. I am delighted to know

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about your initiative on the Iranian border. So far, it seems that Saddam Hussein won't interfere, but we are not sure. I think we must stay in very close touch to facilitate the return of these people to their cities. We are trying to do all we can. We have delivered an enormous amount of food and supplies and are trying to get the refugees to move from the mountains down to the flat areas of Turkey and Iraq. I have made it quite clear that we don't want to involve our troops in a civil war. However, if he interferes north of the 36th parallel, all bets are off and we will be forced to take action. What is your view? (P)

Chancellor Kohl: George, you know we are very close. Let me be frank. I am concerned that the prestige of the U.S., which you so courageously won, and the prestige that the President of the U.S. won, not be prejudiced by what is happening right now. This is why we should think about a new kind of leadership, beyond humanitarian relief, because what is happening is exactly what Saddam Hussein wants -- the Kurds leaving his country. So perhaps we should think of how to further expand the French program. (P)

The President: We are like-minded on that. I would like to do it. I agree that we don't want the U.S. tarnished by failing to do anything, but I would be very wary of committing U.S. ground troops for military operations. This civil war has been going on for decades. We could expand the French proposal, as you say, but I would be very reluctant to commit U.S. forces. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: Exactly. I completely agree. I would never give you that kind of advice. But couldn't we think about a short-term way in order to expand the French initiative and supplement it by instituting an international monitoring body? (S)

The President: We would be all for it. The question is, can you get the Soviet Union and China to go along in the UN Security Council? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That is true, but it wouldn't be necessary to gain support. It would be enough if they would abstain. (S)

The President: True, but I read a Reuter dispatch today that China was opposing setting up a safety zone because it would be a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Getting UN support could be quite difficult now, because we are up against a very sacrosanct principle as far as China, and I think the Soviet Union, goes. We will be working this, and you will, too. I would like to stay in touch, because we must find a way to get these people back into their cities. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I will try, George, to get in touch with Gorbachev once he is back from Japan. (S)

The President: Very good. That would be very useful. I would be very interested to know what happens. (P)

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Chancellor Kohl: I do think if we can achieve a situation where the Soviets go along, it will be difficult for China to veto. (S)

The President: Exactly, exactly. It is worth a real effort. I will send you a personal cable today, telling you what has been done to help the refugees. I don't think public opinion in Germany or the U.S. knows how much has already been done. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I would be most grateful. I would suggest the following: I will wait for your cable, then I will try to get in touch with Mikhail Gorbachev and then get back to you. (S)

The President: Okay. In the cable I will also include some new ideas regarding enclaves or safe havens for refugees in Iraq. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay, very good. (U)

The President: Thanks. It is a terrible thing, but I am delighted to know what Germany is doing. It is wonderful. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me say I am always willing and ready to try to mobilize the EC, because this is a very terrible, sad situation. (S)

The President: Yes. Thanks for your call. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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DE CUELLAR

APR 16 - PRES CALLED UN SECRETARY GENERAL
PEREZ DE CUELLAR. MONITORED BY NANCY
BEARG DYKE - CALL STARTED 1244 - ENDED 1303
PRES AT WH

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WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Cristiani
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli, NSC

DATE, TIME April 19, 1991, 10:04 - 10:13 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office -- Presidential Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Cristiani: Hello. (U)

The President: Fredi, how are you? (U)

President Cristiani: Fine, how are you? (U)

The President: Alright here. I am calling to tell you that I received your letter and will be happy to send a U.S. representative to the Mexico City talks when you think that the time is appropriate. (Ø)

President Cristiani: Great. I really appreciate that. We had mentioned this possibility previously, I think. The four foreign ministers of the friends of the Secretary General are coming down sometime next week. That would perhaps be a good time. (Ø)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Cristiani: It would be good to be able to count on a U.S. representative to come down. (Ø)

The President: One other thing. I want to repeat what I have said before. I want you to know that you have our strong support, both moral and political. I appreciate your taking the time to meet with General Colin Powell on his visit. You did meet with him, didn't you? (Ø)

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President Cristiani: Yes, yes. It was a great pleasure to meet with him. (Ø)

The President: Good. I received a report from my staff that you had a good visit and I appreciate you seeing him. (Ø)

I talked to Carlos Andres Perez on April 9. He told me that he thought the negotiations in Mexico City were in trouble. He also said that he would be calling you to press you for more flexibility in the talks. I just wanted to let you know about this and to ask how you see the prospects for reaching a solid agreement before the end of April? (Ø)

President Cristiani: There are many problems with the issue of constitutional reforms. (Ø)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Cristiani: The other issues -- military reform and a cease-fire agreement -- we are closer, and we have a good chance of reaching agreement. (Ø)

On the constitutional reform, the FMLN is insisting on reforming the reform mechanism. We have a debate internally about that. Most lawyers and constitutional experts here have pronounced against it mainly because of the constitutional aspect, that it can not be done this way under the constitution. (Ø)

We are now looking for another possibility and have explained it to UN representatives who flew down to see us yesterday. The idea is for the political parties to support a package of issues on constitutional reform developed by the parties and present their package as a possibility for the UN and the FMLN. (Ø)

This is the main aspect of the issue. The FMLN has been inflexible in its position regarding that matter. (Ø)

Because of the legal dimension on the matter, we have to be inflexible, because of the constitutional angle, and to change our position would be the wrong way to go. Now, we have approved a decision to go with specific reforms to the constitution. That would handle one of the main problems. (Ø)

Carlos Andres Perez called me. His position is somewhat simplistic in saying that we should put peace above everything and consider giving in to the FMLN position. I think that if the parties can pass constitutional changes without changing Article 248, it would be the best way. When I told him of our plan, he calmed down a little bit. Also, I asked his help with his party to contact the social democratic party here to support our position. (Ø)

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We are going back today to the political parties to see if they agree with our proposals or not. We have had a meeting and I think agreement is basically a reality. (Ø)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Cristiani: Convincing the FMLN on this is the main issue. (Ø)

The President: I know that you want me to call Presidents Salinas and Perez, and Prime Minister Gonzalez to urge them to use their influence with the FMLN to be flexible. At least, I gather this from what my staff has told me. I am willing to do so, but I wanted to touch base with you personally first. We have no influence with the FMLN, and I understand these countries do. I am glad to do it if you want me to. (Ø)

President Cristiani: I really appreciate that. Yes, [not heard]. If they can be pressed into accepting what the majority of parties are asking for on constitutional change, it would be most helpful. [Gap in transmission] because of all the different parties. (Ø)

The President: How many parties are there? Are there lots of them? (Ø)

President Cristiani: Our reform mechanism provides for constitutional changes to be approved by two legislative assemblies. The first assembly we are more concerned with, since it ends on April 30. We are with four parties in this assembly. The idea is that after this assembly, we will have an expanded number of parties in the next elected assembly. In this one, there are four: the Christian Democrats; the Christian Democratic Movement, which is a splinter from the Christian Democrats; and the PCN, and us. In the next assembly, we will add the Democratic Convergence, which is a coalition of parties of the left. (Ø)

The President: Yes. (U)

One other point, on arms aid to the FMLN. We are troubled by the intelligence we have about Cuban shipments of SA-16 missiles and other equipment to the FMLN. We have gone to the Cubans on this, as well as to other friendly governments. (Ø)

I had a good discussion with Dona Violeta during her State Visit on Wednesday about Sandinista aid to the FMLN and other guerrilla groups. Speaking frankly, I asked her to provide us with all the serial numbers of SAMs which the Sandinista Army has received so we can check them against what has showed up in El Salvador. (Ø)

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There was no response on that, but we made very clear that this aid must stop. I made the effort and wanted you to know that. We will keep up the pressure on this issue, and I hope that you will too. We want to be very helpful. (C)

President Cristiani: It definitely is. I had the opportunity to talk to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico and I asked him to go back to the Cubans on this. I asked him to pressure Castro. Basically, Castro had promised the Mexican Government that while he would support the FMLN morally, he would stop shipping weapons. The Vice Minister was very keen on getting into this, and I think he'll help. (C)

The President: I hope that you are right, not that I trust the word of Castro. (C)

I appreciate your good will, and I will contact these leaders. (C)

President Cristiani: I appreciate it, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Give my love to all your wonderful family. (U)

President Cristiani: Yes, and the same to yours. (U)

The President: Okay, goodbye. (U)

President Cristiani: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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SALINAS

APR 19 - PRES CALLED SALINAS/PRES MEXICO AT
1047 - CALL TERMINATED 1057. MONITORED BY
PACELLI AND PRYCE.

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2960

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela on April 20, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Stephanie Van Reigersberg
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME: April 20, 1991, 7:00 - 7:17 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, how are you my friend? (U)

President Perez: Delighted to hear your voice, Mr. President.
(U)

The President: Sorry to call you so early, but I wanted to discuss with you the peace negotiations in El Salvador. (Ø)

President Perez: I'm very worried. I'm in permanent contact with President Cristiani and with the FMLN. From this I understand the talks are at a critical juncture. (Ø)

The President: You know much more about it than I do. But I talked yesterday with Cristiani. I wanted to fill you in on our conversation. Let me run through a couple of points. (Ø)

As you know, De Soto met with him on Thursday. The key issue, as he [Cristiani] explained it to me, is constitutional change. Cristiani tells me he is prepared to go a long way to meet legitimate FMLN demands. And, indeed, we have been impressed with his, and the government's flexibility. He has strong domestic support, including in his own party, and he sounded confident to me. (Ø)

He has to bring something back from the negotiations to justify the steps he is willing to take, particularly on reducing and reforming the military. It seems to us the guerrillas should not demand an unlimited number of revolutionary changes. They have never been elected to anything. (Ø)

The last point, on this Article 248 question. All the democratic parties in El Salvador oppose this, but this seems to be one of the major objectives of the FMLN. I don't know why the FMLN is

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so adamant. If they leave this Article 248 open, there will be unlimited amendments to the constitution, and make the process open-ended. All the parties oppose this. (C)

I told Cristiani if he wanted someone from the U.S. at the next meeting, we could send someone, but I'm not sure whether that would help or not. That's how we see it, but how do you see it? We hope you'd use your wonderful influence with the FMLN to urge them to agree to a cease-fire. (C)

President Perez: I'm a bit confused about the situation there. It's not clear to me that all of the political parties are supporting the government. (C)

The President: On constitutional reform? (C)

President Perez: Correct, Mr. President. Second, because Alvaro de Soto tells me there's a great deal of difference between Cristiani's position and what the FMLN is seeking. It seems necessary to extend Article 248 until next year. (C)

Third, the Assembly which would change the Constitution next year is an Assembly where ARENA and the Christian Democrats have an absolute majority. So, in practice, this democratic sector would always have the power to dictate any changes in the Constitution. (C)

But for me the following is the most important thing: It is clear that, once a cease-fire is established, the FMLN will cease to exist or be an operating force. After a cease-fire is established, it will be very difficult for them to keep their morale up. They will become a demoralized force. The FMLN knows that once a cease-fire is declared, all of its possibilities to act are over. (C)

So the talks have to be seen from that point of view. The greater flexibility therefore has to be shown by Cristiani, or better put, by the Army. (C)

I agree with you that Cristiani gives the impression of great sincerity, but there are strong pressures on him. (C)

The President: Mainly from the right, from ARENA? (C)

President Perez: Right, and from the Army. (C)

But this idea of sending someone to Mexico is quite interesting. I'm going to do something similar. I am going to name someone of my utmost confidence and send him to Mexico City. Because if these talks fail, the situation will be very grave. (C)

The President: We worry about it, too, and we're glad you're going to send someone. (C)

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President Perez: Today I'm going to talk to the person I'll send down. I'm thinking of sending our Ambassador in Washington. He knows the situation has good sense. (S)

The President: Yes, he's a very good man. (S)

President Perez: That would make it easier for the person I send to keep in touch with whoever you send. (S)

The President: That's right. (U)

President Perez: Why don't we agree to keep in touch after we choose our parties? (S)

The President: Let me fill you in a little on the visit of your friend Dona Violeta. We had a good visit. Her number one priority is to clear Nicaragua's arrears with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. (S)

I told her we would give serious help. I found her to be in a good frame of mind, and I'm always impressed with her commitment to peace and reconciliation. I wanted you to know that we're determined to help her. (S)

And also, I look forward to seeing you here in early May. I understand you're coming up here. (U)

President Perez: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I'll be delighted to see you. (U)

We've been helping Nicaragua in our own way. We need to have the U.S. increase its contribution in the international financial institutions, so they can clear the arrears. We've done more than we really can afford. (S)

The President: Okay, we'll keep trying on that. (S)

President Perez: I'm delighted to hear you will do so. (S)

(Dog barks in background)

The President: Is that your dog, or ours? (U)

Stephanie Van Reigersberg: That's Stephe's, Mr. President. (U)

President Perez: Well, delighted to talk to you. (U)

The President: (in Spanish) Muchisimas gracias, y adios. (U)

President Perez: Adios, Presidente. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain (3 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 3/7/91 - 4/25/91

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By jr (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(844)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Stephanie van Riegersberg, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: April 20, 1991, 8:15 - 8:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Felipe, can you hear me OK? (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I hear you perfectly. (U)

The President: I'm sorry about the delays. We have had technical difficulties. I hope we haven't bothered you too much. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Not at all. I am here at a wonderful natural preserve, surrounded by beauty. (U)

The President: I am here at Camp David and its the worst day ever. But I'm calling you about El Salvador. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I hear things are coming to a critical stage there. (S)

The President: Yes. Let me run through a few points, and then I'd like to hear your views. (S)

I have just talked to President Cristiani and to Perez and Salinas on this. As you may know, UN Assistant Secretary General De Soto met with Cristiani on Thursday. This is a crucial week for gaining global agreement on key issues in the talks, including a cease-fire. The key issues that remain to be agreed involve constitutional change, and they must be agreed on before April 30 if the two sides want the current legislature to vote for them. (S)

It is our view that Cristiani is prepared to go a long way to meet legitimate FMLN demands, and he has been flexible. But, as we see the situation, he has to bring something back from negotiations to justify the steps he is willing to take,

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particularly on reducing and reforming the military. It is our view that the guerrillas cannot demand an unlimited number of revolutionary changes. They have never been elected by anyone.

(S)

What I would hope is that you will use your considerable influence with the FMLN to urge them to agree on key political issues and on a cease-fire. One key point is how the constitution is amended. Changing Article 248 is not a good idea because it will make the process open-ended, and I understand that all the democratic political parties -- not just Cristiani's party -- oppose this. I am told that the democratic parties believe that the two sides should be able to agree on a formula.

(S)

I have also told Cristiani that I would be ready to send someone to Mexico to the meeting next week if it would help. Cristiani said that he thought it would be helpful. That's all I have on this but I'd like to hear your views. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: First, I agree on the whole with your diagnosis. We are following the situation step by step. (S)

Second, the procedural problem of how to reform the constitution is the blocking point, and it is difficult to overcome. On armed forces reform, I think Cristiani's position is more sensible than the FMLN's, especially given the limits on his maneuvering room.

(S)

They have invited us along with the Venezuelan and Mexican foreign ministers. They have invited us to the meeting in Mexico. At the moment, our foreign minister is in Central America. Our reply, in order to put more pressure on the Salvadorans, is to require some guarantee that the meeting in Mexico will be successful. Our minister is ready to go in three days time, provided both sides and De Soto give reasonable guarantees that the meeting will produce results. (S)

In sum, if we don't reach a resolution at this opportunity, the issue will be blocked for a very long time. The second problem is constitutional reform, because the present constitution makes it practically impossible to change the constitution. Therefore what we must do is force the Salvadoran Government to agree that, if all political parties can agree, they would pass changes as a means of agreeing to modifications before April 30. (S)

One last point. The demands of the guerrillas regarding the armed forces cannot be agreed to by the Salvadoran Government, nor by any other government. However, the government must make clear that there will be supremacy of civilian authority over the armed forces. (S)

The President: I agree. (U)

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Prime Minister Gonzalez: I want you to know that I received the Salvadoran Minister of Defense a few months ago and I said exactly the same thing to him. (S) (C)

The President: We are in agreement with that. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: We are exerting every pressure, and if there is the slightest possibility of a successfully meeting in Mexico, we will be there. (S)

The President: I would like to make one more point regarding our good friend Dona Violeta. I just had a very productive meeting with her during her state visit. She seemed in a good mood. She said that her number one priority is to clear Nicaragua's arrearages with the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank. (S)

I pledged that we would do whatever we can, and I know she is seeking your help, too. But this is a very important point for her. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The King and our foreign minister were in Managua yesterday and today and we have pledged to help. (S)

The President: Well, she's got to succeed. Also, I want to say it has been nice to talk to you again. (S) (b)(1)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I have enjoyed it, too. [REDACTED] (S)

The President: Let's do it. It may come as a surprise to you, but I don't have much influence with him! (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: No, no, that is for us to do, and we're doing it. We're seeing him this afternoon. (S)

The President: Good luck. It was nice talking to you. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME April 20, 1991, 9:42 - 9:49 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Turgut! How are you? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you, George. (U)

The President: I'm afraid I'm bothering you, but I wanted to call and see how things are going. After our last telephone conversation we moved very quickly. (U)

President Ozal: I saw that. I thanked you on television for what you have done. (U)

The President: We have got to keep this operation temporary. We have no interest in dismembering Iraq or getting involved in a civil war. We need a UN umbrella of some kind. As Abramowitz told you, we are encouraging other countries to contribute contingents to the effort. We want to internationalize it. It is probably best that the Turkish military not go in; I think you feel the same way. (U)

President Ozal: The problem is this: on the Iranian side, Iraq has an agreement with the UN, but I am not sure those people will go back without security of some kind. (U)

The President: I don't want those lives sacrificed, but I don't want the U.S. to become bogged down in a civil war in Iraq. (U)

President Ozal: I don't think that will happen. If we stay more months, probably Saddam Hussein will leave. (U)

The President: I hope so. We have got to get him out. He cannot remain. (U)

President Ozal: We should keep the embargo on. (U)

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The President: That may do it. I have been wary about a war crimes tribunal, because people would then want to know how we can get him. We don't want to go into Baghdad to get him. (S)

President Ozal: Your proposal is good -- to get him out of Iraq in return for not bringing him to trial. (S)

The President: People say that position has no moral principle. My principle is that any way to get him out is to the good. (S)

Presidents Ozal: I am sure he will go if we push him in different ways. (S)

The President: Thank you. You have been helpful in various ways. (S)

President Ozal: Yes. Genscher was here. Up to now help to Turkey has been substantial. We have already given more than ten thousand tons. Everything will go all right. The difficulty is the terrain, but we are getting them to the flat places. They will go some miles beyond the northern camps, I think. (S)

The President: I don't have the exact details. Cheney and Powell are coming up to brief me soon. Let us know on Rafsanjani. We want the hostages out. We've offered to help in Iran, but they haven't wanted our help. (S)

President Ozal: They are concerned about the frozen assets. (S)

The President: True. We are working on that, but our main problem is with the hostages. (S)

I know you are busy, but I wanted to touch base. I wanted to be sure that what we are doing meets with your approval. We did so because of what you said about the conditions there. (S)

President Ozal: I am very thankful for what you have done. We will do everything we can, except military. (S)

The President: You have been wonderful on this. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME: April 25, 1991, 9:19 - 9:40 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut! How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good, thanks. I wanted to put a call in to give you a brief report of two telephone calls I had recently. Yesterday I had a long conversation on the telephone with Mikhail Gorbachev. He called directly after the meeting of the Central Committee. I gained the impression from the conversation that he made a lot of headway in this meeting. Apparently he has been able to strike a compromise with Yeltsin, and also a compromise on a new federal structure. He maintains that he will push through a number of new economic reform measures in the next few days. I said once again that he could not count on help from the West unless he put those reforms through and implemented them seriously. I said this was so also with regard to Germany. I said I was at the end of my tether if he did not seriously implement economic reform. Secondly, I mentioned the Kurdish situation. I said I hoped the Soviet Union was supporting our humanitarian efforts. My impression is that if we underline strongly that we are rendering humanitarian aid and assistance through all the efforts you have made (and that we are making in Iran), that this does meet with a positive response. At any rate, the impression I have gained is that if there are problems, you can address them with him and talk about them. (S)

Second, the day before yesterday I talked again by telephone with President Rafsanjani, because of German assistance to Iran. I must say that he was quite helpful. You are perhaps aware that we are going to send units of the Bundeswehr, including helicopters, transport units, and engineers. He was quite helpful. Obviously, they have been sent to construct refugee camps. He was grateful for the help from Germany and other EC member states. George, I raised the issue of the hostages again.

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I said that he must understand what sort of bad impression this will create in the world at large. His response, I must say, was a fairly poor one. He said Israel would have to fulfill the earlier demands. But I will raise this with him time and again. I don't know if it will do any good, but he will at least know that people do remember that there are hostages, so he won't think the world has forgotten. (S)

The President: Thank you, Helmut, for raising that with him. If he knows that others besides the U.S. are concerned, I think it will help. I am very grateful to you for that. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I think what I told you about Gorbachev is also quite significant. (S)

The President: Yes, I think it is important. In that regard, there is a new wire service report that he has resigned as head of the Central Committee. I don't know if it is just a ploy; the report just came in. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That obviously is something we are not yet in a position to assess. I think it may be a ploy or a maneuver. (C)

The President: It may be. His comment was that "70% of the people criticize me, so in the name of the people I resign." I do think, Helmut, that he is supportive of our relief efforts. Incidentally, we are very impressed with what you are doing on the Iran side. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I wanted to raise again the issue of Israel and the Palestinian Question. After all, it is a subject that also concerns me. The Israelis want to have support. They have asked for it especially in view of the expected one million Jewish refugees over the next few years. This year alone there have been 400,000, so obviously they need help. Our possibilities are not unlimited, but within those limits we will try to do all we can. My concern -- a question they have not yet properly responded to -- is that they will move these people into the occupied areas and use them to settle there. I would like to support you and Jim Baker in trying to promote a solution now. In Germany we have a saying, which dates back in our history, that we won the war but lost the peace. This is a very important thing indeed: I would like my friend George Bush, after winning the war, also to win the peace. In Europe there is massive support that you can tap into. I met with Francois Mitterrand over dinner last night, and I must say that I have rarely seen him as willing to support the policy of George Bush. That is very important political capital to draw on, and the same goes for all EC member states. (S)

The President: Thank you for those comments. Let me make a couple of points. First, your instincts were right on Mikhail Gorbachev. I just received a new, up-to-date wire story. The Party Central Committee rejected any suggestion of his resignation by an overwhelming vote, on the recommendation of the Politburo. (C)

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Chancellor Kohl: George, I think we should introduce that kind of maneuver into our party politics. (U)

The President: I'd be worried they might accept! (Laughter) I think Gorbachev is sincere on the refugee question. We are still trying to work with him on CFE and START, but no firm date has been set for a Summit. On Israel, we are very concerned about putting these settlements in the West Bank. We keep telling them that, but they rather arrogantly continue putting them there. I think we ought to say jointly that this doesn't help the peace effort. When Baker gets back, we will have a debrief and let you know where things stand. There is some good news, but also some bad. I don't think we are close to a breakthrough. Clearly, Germany has an interest in this. On the settlements issue, the more all of us say this is not helpful, the better. Jim Baker said so again yesterday. I believe our law prohibits us from helping if those people go into the West Bank. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, but unfortunately we can't control that. We will get in a very tight spot there. The worst situation would be, in the aftermath of the war against Iraq, for all this to be depicted as the West versus the Arab world. (S)

The President: We will work on that. I am really looking forward to seeing you. By then, we will have more information to share with you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good, George. I will be very, very glad to see you. I also hope that we will have an opportunity to talk about the economic side. Perhaps Brady could be present at one of our meetings. You are aware that he was here. We had breakfast and a very good meeting. I want to avoid at all costs a controversy on the economic side. (S)

The President: I think I am inviting your Finance Minister and your Economics Minister to an affair at the White House on Saturday or Sunday. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That is very, very good, George, because really we should avoid being led into a public controversy in the upcoming IMF meeting. (S)

The President: Right. We may have differences on interest rates, but I agree with you that we don't want an open controversy. I am very grateful to you for seeing Brady. I look forward to seeing you, my friend. Thanks for your report and for the phone call. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Best to Barbara. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Javier Perez de Cuellar,
United Nations Secretary General, on
April 25, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary
General
Notetaker: Nancy Bearg Dyke

DATE, TIME April 25, 1991, 3:35 - 3:45pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned UN Secretary General de Cuellar concerning the Iraqi refugee situation. (U)

The President: How are you? Where are you? (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: New York; I have been traveling.
(U)

The President: I am calling to chat further on the Iraq situation, if you have a minute. I appreciated very much the conversation we had last week, and we went ahead since then trying to aid these pitiful refugees. What the US and others are doing for these victims of Saddam Hussein is right and necessary, and a tremendous amount of world opinion has backed up this action. (U)

There are two issues in this regard I want to talk over with you today: the care and treatment of the Iraqi refugees and the protection and security for them, until they can be returned to their homes -- maybe there is some hope they can return to their homes. First, the refugees. I hope there is no question about UNHCR having the authority to do everything necessary under UNSCR 688. It is our judgment that 688 gives this authority. (U)

I know this is a complex problem with many dimensions, but it is really important for the UNHCR to get into Iraq to where the refugees are now and to the temporary encampments we are building. (U)

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Secretary General de Cuellar: Sadruddin is in Geneva and in constant liaison with me, and I am sending a representative to Turkey at the end of the week, and I have a man in Baghdad. Then, everything is alright for now. We want to take over when almost everything is done on your side. We don't have resources. We will send 300-400 people. (C)

The President: We are thinking the same way. We want the UNHCR and the relief officials to come as soon as possible. Javier, do you have any timetable in mind? (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: It is for your side to give us a timetable. Then we will accelerate. We cannot move until you are completely ready. (C)

The President: I will get an up-to-date report and have Ambassador Pickering discuss it with you. We will get assets on the ground, what we have available, and a timetable. (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: I have a 5:30 meeting with him.
(U)

The President: Either Brent Scowcroft or Larry Eagleburger will talk with Pickering before that meeting. Our goal is to transfer the relief operation to you as soon as possible. Until you are ready, the only way to do the job, the only way to provide for the refugees, is through the coalition. (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: It's a vicious circle. We are ready when you are ready. Then we can mobilize. (C)

The President: We will take the next step and have Ambassador Pickering talk to you later today. Then there is the question of security for the refugees. Without some credible assurance of security, the refugees will not be willing to come down from the mountains to the camps being constructed to care for them. (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: Yes, they won't come down without security. (U)

The President: Now we are there with enough force. There was that Iraqi goon squad there. We told them they have to get out of there. It was 200-300 people in what they called a police unit. We got the word that they left. We want to turn responsibility over to the UN as quickly as possible but not leave the refugees in the lurch. But we can talk about it more later. (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: Very well. If Tom Pickering can come, we can talk about it. (U)

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The President: I was intrigued by your suggestion in our last conversation about the possibility of extending the terms of reference of UNIKOM to UNSCR 688. Do you still think something might be possible, or do you think a new resolution is necessary. (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: It doesn't depend on me. It is up to the UN Security Council. I suppose the President of the Security Council could start consultations. (Ø)

The President: Why don't we talk to Pickering about this too? (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: I am ready. Every military action has to be supported and endorsed by the UNSC. (U)

The President: Did the Iraqi foreign minister write you and request that the UN take over operations? (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: He specified civilians, he was not talking about military. (Ø)

The President: We don't want forces there any longer than necessary. We know a UNSC resolution would be difficult to achieve, especially with China. But, we will do what needs to be done. (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: I remember I was talking with President Mitterrand about what could be done, but you three moved in. (Ø)

The President: We just felt we had to do it on an emergency basis to help these pitiful refugees. (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: There can be no military movements without Council authority. (U)

The President: The south (Iraq) concerns me. (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: The poor Shiites. (U)

The President: We have tried to take care of them. (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: Saudi Arabia will take some, but some (refugees) will still be there in Iraq. (U)

The President: Your people are moving quickly, aren't they, into the south? (U)

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Secretary General de Cuellar: Of course. I am going to call Sadruddin right now and say we must keep in touch. (U)

The President: Do you think Saddam Hussein is willing to make a deal with the Kurds? (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: He is a man able to turn with great facility. He gave it all to Iran. But is he trustable? (Ø)

The President: No. But the Iraqi people have to get him out. I guarantee we won't have normal relations with Iraq while he is there, and we will encourage others to have the same policy. I have stopped short on war crimes because it may make it more difficult for his people to go against him. What do you think about war crimes? (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: You and I can't so much discuss that -- it is for the international community to discuss. (Ø)

The President: Will it be raised in a committee in the UN? (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: It is not the time now. We need to get rid of the humanitarian problem. (Ø)

The President: Yes, then I'd like to get rid of Saddam Hussein -- that is, I hope his people will. That is the Bush view. I'm not asking my old friend to give a view. We will go forward on funding for the relief effort. There will be a lot of money from the US, and I made a pitch to the Japanese yesterday. (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: There is not much we can do. We have no resources. (U)

The President: Call me if you need to be in touch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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