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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91112
Folder ID Number: 91112-006

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/91 - 3/6/91

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR on February 22, 1991 (9 pp.)	2/22/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on February 22, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/22/91	(b)(1)	C
03. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (2 pp.)	2/23/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia (3 pp.)	2/23/91	(b)(1)	C
05. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on February 23, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/23/91	(b)(1)	C
06. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (3 pp.)	2/23/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mkhail Gorbachev of the USSR on February 23, 1991 (4 pp.)	2/23/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey: February 23, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/23/91	(b)(1)	S
09. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	2/23/91	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/91 - 3/6/91

Pinksheet Number: cap948

OA/ID Number: 91112-006

Date Closed: 2/5/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on February 26, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/26/91	(b)(1)	C
11. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Havel of Czechoslovakia (3 pp.)	2/26/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on February 26, 1991 (5 pp.)	2/26/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (4 pp.)	2/27/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (2 pp.)	2/27/91	(b)(1)	C
15. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C
16. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	S
17. Telcon	Re: Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico, on February 28, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C
18. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Rafael Callejas of Honduras (2 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C
19. Telcon	Re: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on February 28, 1991 (3 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C

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20. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Hawke of Australia on February 28, 1991 (3 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C
21. Telcon	Re: Telcon with King Juan Carlos of Spain on February 28, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C
22. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Jim Bloger of New Zealand on February 28, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C
23. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Menem of Argentina (3 pp.)	3/4/91	(b)(1)	C
24a. Telcon	Re: Telcon to Pope John II (1 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	C
24b. Telcon	Re: Telcon to Pope John II (3 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	C
25. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Chamorro of Nicaragua (3 pp.)	3/6/91	(b)(1)	C
26. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Nelson Mandela of South Africa on March 6, 1991 (4 pp.)	3/6/91	(b)(1)	C

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the
USSR on February 22, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME February 22, 1991, 11:31am - 12:43pm
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Secretary Baker: Hello. (U)

The President was trying to reach you and I tried to reach Sasha -- we could not, he asked that I give the message that he wanted to give to you. (U)

I am calling you from his office -- he has gone to another engagement. (U)

Had he been able to talk to you, he wanted to say the following. (U)

We know you are making an intensive and useful effort as we have said publicly. (U)

And we recognize that Iraq's position has changed. But Saddam is now blowing up Kuwait's oil production and refining capabilities -- in fact he seems to have adopted a "scorched earth" policy. It seems he is taking advantage of the talks with you to destroy Kuwait and play for time. Much of this seems to have been started earlier today. We do not believe that the world can wait and let him do this. So we will be proposing a procedure by which we can avert a ground campaign and bring the war to an end. In effect, this builds on what you have done. (U)

When the President was unable to reach you, he went ahead with a press statement that has just been concluded. I will not repeat that since it will be available to you. Except to say that it provides for a 24 hour waiting period before there would be the initiation of any ground campaign. The President said publicly that he would be releasing a detailed statement on what we think is required by way of Iraqi withdrawal in order to avert a ground campaign. (U)

This statement has not yet been released and I would like to summarize it for you. (U)

It says in the operative part of the statement: (U)

In a final effort to obtain Iraqi compliance with the will of the international community -- the United States after consulting with the government of Kuwait and our other coalition partners declares that a ground campaign will not be initiated against Iraqi forces if prior to 12:00 U.N. time, Saturday Feb 23, Iraq publicly accepts the following terms and communicates that to the United Nations: The terms are as follows:

Begin a large scale withdrawal from Kuwait by 12:00 U.N. time, Saturday Feb. 23. (U)

Complete military withdrawal from Kuwait in one week. (U)

Given the fact that Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait in a matter of hours, anything more than a week would not meet the full terms of the UN Resolution. (U)

Within the first forty-eight hours remove all forces from Kuwait City to allow for the prompt return of the legitimate government of Kuwait and remove its forces from prepared defenses along the Saudi-Kuwait and Saudi-Iraq border. From Bub'iyah and Warbah and from Kuwait's Rumayllah oil field. (U)

Within the one week specified above return all forces to their positions of August 1 in accordance with UN Resolution 660. (U)

In cooperation with the ICRC release all POWs and third country civilians being held against their will. (U)

Return the remains of deceased and killed coalition servicemen. This action to commence immediately with the initiation of the withdrawal and to be completed within 48 hours. (U)

Remove all explosives and booby-traps including those on Kuwaiti oil installations. (As an aside, I may say that it may already be too late for that.) And designate Iraqi military liaison officers to work with Kuwaiti personnel on the operational details of withdrawal to include the provision of information on land or sea mines. (S)

Cease combat air patrols over Iraq and Kuwait except for transport flights carrying withdrawing troops. And allow coalition aircraft exclusive control over and use of Kuwaiti airspace. (U)

Cease all actions against Kuwaiti citizens and property and release all Kuwaiti detainees. (U)

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U.S. and coalition partners reiterate that their forces will not attack retreating Iraqi forces, and will exercise restraint as long as withdrawal proceeds in accordance with the above guidelines and there are no attacks on other countries. (U)

Mr. President, in the beginning of this statement which I did not read there is a statement that the conditions in the Iraqi offer to you must be eliminated. This statement means that there must be a rescission of all other UN resolutions. And the suggestion that there should be a lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for partial withdrawal. President Bush has arrived back while I have been reading this to you and wants to talk with you. (U)

The President: Mikhail, I am anxious to get your reaction. Jim tells me he has read you the entire statement. But I must tell you I can't believe that Tariq Aziz knew what Saddam was going to do to these oil fields. The photographs from the air are absolutely unbelievable they are so devastating. I am so glad to have this conversation and sorry we couldn't get the call through before I made the public statement. The details of what Jim has read to you have not been made public yet. But Marlin Fitzwater will be announcing it very soon. What is the state of play on your end? Thanks for trying hard once again. (S)

President Gorbachev: O.K. thanks and hello to you. I was away because I had to attend a big political rally in the Kremlin Palace of Congress for Army Day and I really was not in a position to leave that gathering because all the T.V. cameras were there and I had 6000 people there. (S)

The President: We are both slaves to the T.V. that's why I had to go ahead with my statement. (S)

President Gorbachev: So there is no misunderstanding. Now on substance. I listened very carefully to what Jim has been reading out to me and I have several questions. The way I understand it, what we did over the past 24 hours in agreeing with Iraq and what is submitted to Saddam is not acceptable to participants in the coalition. I wish to recall once again, exactly what I mean. And this is how the problem looks and we are awaiting a reply from Saddam. (S)

(1) Iraq agrees to fully comply with the terms of the UN Resolution in other words to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all of its troops from Kuwait to their positions prior to August 1.

That is quoted from the UN resolution. (U)

The resolution does not mention Kuwait but we incorporated it into our first point. (S)

(2) The withdrawal of troops is to begin the day following the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities in the air, sea and ground. (U)

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(3) The withdrawal of troops is to be completed within 21 days -- including Kuwait city within the first four days. (U)

Jim mentioned that it took a short time for Iraq to send in its troops -- to be true to reality -- he was building that group of forces for seven months. (S)

Now Iraq first demanded a three-four month period then they said would need six weeks but we pressed for a twenty-one day period and we said if we agreed to that timeframe it might still be an unacceptable condition for the U.S. and the coalition. (S)

(4) After the completion of withdrawals from Kuwait the motives behind the other UN Resolutions will have run their course and will no longer be necessary. (S)

This is not a precondition this is just for the UN Security Council to be seized with the issue and to take appropriate decisions. (S)

(5) All POWs will be released and repatriated within 3 days of the cessation of hostilities. This has even tougher language than your proposal. (S)

(6) Confirmation, verification and monitoring will be carried out by observers and/or by a peacekeeping force to be decided by the UN Security Council. (U)

I wish to express my initial reaction to what I heard from Jim. But I must put to you and to myself the following question. Where does our priority lie in putting a final touch on this settlement? Is it a political approach or the continuation of military operations and the escalation to ground operations? Now, I saw my role in cooperation with you in trying to find a political solution, as trying to protect the U.S. servicemen and peaceful Iraqi civilians from the suffering that may befall them. If you share this understanding then our task is to find a solution that is tough but also implementable. (S)

From this point of view the demands that troops be withdrawn in one week would be impossible to comply with and would open the way for continuation of the military course. Now of course it would be different if you see this political option of settlement as unacceptable. But if on the basis of what we have been able to accomplish here, though we are waiting for a reply from Saddam Hussein, and also on the basis of what you have suggested -- if we could combine them for the Security Council into a joint U.S.-Soviet approach. That would be very important solution if we could do that -- I will pass on to something else. (S)

In the Security Council we could promptly consider the whole complex of a joint plan based on what the two of us have said -- we would have a joint thing that we could consider in the UN Security Council. (S)

Especially since if we use political language on the need to withdraw troops from Kuwait City within four days there is a convergence between us and also on the POWs. (S)

What matters most is that by acting in this way we could show that as in the first instance, now at the very end we are acting together and have used all possible means including the first phase of military activity and now have succeeded in making Iraq backtrack and comply with the UN resolution. This would have taught a lesson to all others and this will be a new reality that all potential and likely aggressors would have to reckon with. Also by acting in this way we would avert the sliding into a difficult and dangerous phase. (S)

I would say that this would be a major victory. The world at large and Americans would give due course to your actions and also to our activities. And in light of the steady cooperation of the two of us and our other partners this would be indicative of the current state of our relations. This would indicate that the two Presidents while remaining true to their principles never forgot that the highest principle is the preservation of human life. (S)

If we accept that approach we may not get 100% support but there is every likelihood we could get 80-90% support. Therefore now that we have a very good shot at a political solution, I wish that we could avoid the situation sliding into a difficult phase and you and I should not squander the opportunity before us. I think we should not succumb to pressure and grow jittery. I want to be frank, we are feeling pressure in this country and I know there is pressure from others -- some would push us toward what we don't want to do. If we manage to turn events in the direction I have described, it would be an achievement that would last for sometime to come. (S)

So much for my line of argument. I am sorry I have been so emotional and used charged language. (S)

The President: First I have a question. Am I correct in saying that Saddam has not agreed to your six points? (S)

President Gorbachev: Tariq Aziz said that he was certain the President would support the six points but he had to transmit them personally. This is understandable just as Bessmertnykh or Baker cannot consent without the Presidents. (S)

The President: Do you have a time when he is supposed to come back to you? (S)

Gorbachev. He said immediately. This reply could come anytime. Aziz has stayed in Moscow and he is using the lines of communication we offered him. He has a man in our Embassy in Baghdad. (S)

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The President: Thanks for that clarification. We and those that I have consulted with and that Jim has consulted and our military are absolutely convinced he can withdraw in one week. Our initial proposal was 96 hours. He can get out if he is serious about it. We think he can get out in one week -- we have a difference there. (S)

Now on the broad philosophical approach you have outlined for me. I expect that you have people in your country that suggest you are too close with the United States. That is particularly true because of the good relationship with Iraq that you have had over the years and we understand that. Similarly, we have elements in this country who suggest we are staying too close to the center in the Soviet Union. We won't depart from that. But we have elements -- crossing liberal and conservative lines -- here who take a different view than Jim and I do. (S)

In spite of that we continue to make clear that we support your role and value your role and believe you are making a contribution. I mean it right from my heart and so does Jim. We view, and I would be glad to say this publicly, what you have tried to do as politically courageous given your long relationship (with Iraq), your standing as a superpower and your minority groups' sentiment. (S)

I don't want to see us pull apart even though we have profound differences at this moment on this particular question. (S)

Let me tell you what is driving our view. It is not just the U.S. -- it is a unanimous coalition view. First, I don't trust Saddam Hussein. Second, what he said yesterday is totally incompatible with not only what we are asking but what you asked. He is trying to restore himself in terms of the Arab world to the prestige of the status quo ante. What he has done and has done today does not merit that kind of restoration in our view. He knows that you have been working hard to bring a peaceful solution here. But what he is trying to do is to wiggle around and try to find time -- he has made time too short to go back to some kind of combination approach. I felt strongly about that after I stayed awake last night thinking about your suggestions and your role and knowing that you have brought him much further than anyone could have thought after his speech. (S)

But very candidly, he is taking advantage of this time and, I think, of your good-faith to destroy Kuwait. Get your people to show you photographs of what he has done to Kuwait this morning. About 9:00 this morning, our intelligence people brought me pictures and showed me the pictures from yesterday and the one from today and there is the blackest fire covering almost all of Kuwait you have ever seen in your life. This is the entire city I mean. And he did it after you were dealing with Tariq Aziz in good faith. And yesterday he fired a bunch of SCUD missiles again. So please understand, I have a lot of young soldiers over

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there and you and I have talked enough that I hope you know that I share your values on human life that you so eloquently outlined to me. But Mikhail do you know the whole time this propaganda was going on about civilian life -- that we worried about and didn't target-- do you know up to 200 young Kuwaitis 15-20 years old were killed and mutilated and the breasts cut off of the young women. That is the kind of man that we are up against. I know this is a report of the Emir of Kuwait. (S)

Let me reassure you that I have not changed my view on human life. I dread sending young men and women into battle and because of our position -- the forces of the coalition. And I know that what I am going to ask will put you in a difficult position. I would understand it if you simply said "George I cannot do it." I want you to tell Aziz that the hand-writing is on the wall. It is not just the U.S.-- it is the rest of this coalition and that we must have compliance with our proposal now. This is a serious proposal. He has not responded to your proposal. We have waited and waited and waited. We have been patient. We need an answer now. There are deadlines here and after what he has done in Kuwait -- we cannot yield. This proposal is deadly serious. (S)

I will send this statement to you instantly and, of course, my request is that you support our position after trying hard for a more reasonable position from your point of view but one that for the reasons I have given, we cannot go along now. If you can't support it, we would appreciate your not opposing it. We have not lost our senses and know the importance of the Soviet Union in all of this. Whatever happens in the next few days, I want to keep all doors open with you and with your country. We will never change from the view that you have a critically important role -- it is your neighborhood and some of them are your friends. We recognize Soviet interests in the area. I want to get our forces out of there just as soon as possible. I know how the Iranians and others feel. I want them out as soon as possible. I want to continue to stay in touch. Please examine what we have proposed. If you can encourage his adoption of this that is the best -- and at this point -- only way -- to save the lives you and I both want to. (S/S)

That is my appeal. I know you want to think about it. We will send the proposal on and welcome your views. (S)

President Gorbachev: I got it all and I want to make a brief comment or two. (S)

First, in practice we have the same assessment of Hussein. I think that his fate has been foreshadowed. Far be it from us to try to whitewash him or try and save him or to raise his prestige. You and I are compelled to deal with him because on the other side he is the only realistic figure there. (S)

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Second, I am not talking about Hussein or the methods he has employed over the last few hours -- I am talking about the possibility of taking advantage of the accomplishments we have behind us given the burden of the entire operation that rests with you and the tremendous contributions we have both made. I am talking about trying to attain the goals we both seek by turning things in a political direction. By doing so we could avoid great tragedy -- that is the central point and the main concern. And that is the main merit of this approach. (S)

Third, you have requested that we relay your demands to Tariq Aziz and the Iraqi leadership. If you can very rapidly send them to us, we will convey them to him. We will also describe your approach and position to him. But my final suggestion is as follows -- that we tentatively decide: (S)

We and you should come out with a joint initiative to convene the UN Security Council meeting in order to consider this package of demands. There would certainly be a lot of pressure in that meeting to take advantage and formalize what we get out of that meeting in a document. It would be a good thing if we got the best possible results. It would be just as good if we got an intermediate result that would satisfy both of us. As before, we will continue to give priority to our relationship with the United States. And of course the responsibility we bear before the international community and our peoples is to resolve the conflict and to accomplish the goals we set out before while avoiding a tragedy.

The President: The problem is we have heard nothing out of Saddam Hussein. That is essential before we implement this through the UN. We have resolutions and a mandate under 678 through the UN. He is stalling and ducking and sending Jordan and the PLO and Yemen in to stall and give his side. We have a mandate and we have to have a positive reply from him. But having spelled out the U.S. proposal, we cannot hold off. I will discuss this with Jim and with Scowcroft and others and let you know my reaction. But this is my first reaction. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, we did get a reaction from Hussein and his agreement to withdraw troops. We don't believe everything is satisfactory in his position. We made our position tougher. Now we need to hear from him again. (S)

The President: You have brought him along on delinkage and a concept of withdrawal but it falls far short of the unconditional withdrawal called for in the resolution. Let us talk about that here. Before I hang up I want to make one further point. (S)

Life goes on and I want to assure you we are pushing our people on the arms control proposals. I wrote you recently on CFE and naval infantry. I urge your personal attention to that because no matter what happens here -- common ground there would be very good. I have not lost my interest in moving forward with START - - I want to personally assure you of that. (S)

Thank you for the time. I am sorry for what might be a difference but the relationship is too important and it is not going to fall apart over Iraq. (S)

President Gorbachev: Good George. I am saying goodbye. I want you to know that I have given instructions to my people to look into the matter you just mentioned. One more word on Iraq -- we must give some serious thought to the way the position is developing and where in detail and substance the two positions coincide. Logic would prompt that we decide in favor of one option -- building on what we have done to try to avert a tragic turn in the situation. Best regards to your family. (S)

The President: Thank you and to Raisa. We need to do this more often in these difficult times. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1309

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on
February 22, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME February 22, 1991; 10:08 - 10:14 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President returned President Mubarak's telephone call. (U)

President Mubarak: I received your message and its points. I have read them and sent you a message. (Ø)

The President: Thanks, I got your message. I don't see how we can have a 72 hour delay, Hosni. Today, Iraq set fire to almost the entire Kuwaiti oil fields, including wells, shipping points, and distribution facilities. Kuwait is almost invisible under the smoke. This has happened at a time when we are sitting and talking -- Saddam sends Aziz to Moscow to talk peace and then he burns the oil fields. We can't have a 72 hour delay. As you know from your military commanders, the forces are moving and they are ready. I don't want to go into any specifics on this line, but you know of this already. I think it is time for a statement that says we appreciate what the Soviets have done, but we demand that you (Iraq) get out and do so right away. If we don't do this, then he will just continue to burn and rape Kuwait. That's our only difficulty with your points -- we can't delay for 72 hours. This is a good cop, bad cop routine: he's the bad cop; while Aziz talks peace, he launches SCUD's and puts the torch to Kuwait. You can't even see it from the air anymore. I hope you can agree. He will have to pay the price. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I hope you can explain in public about the burning. (Ø)

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The President: I'm going out in front of CNN and the whole world in just 20 minutes, and I'm going to tell them. I will mention it as another reason for urgency, and a reason for the ultimatum. I will make this as a U.S. statement, but I want the coalition together. I've spoken to Mitterrand, and the Turks have checked in. I believe everyone is mostly together on this. I would like your support. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Right -- I didn't know this information before. (Ø)

The President: I am going to call Gorbachev now to tell him that we have a proposal, and then I'm going to do the 10:30 statement. Bessmertnykh called with some new ideas. Unless he withdraws soon, we are prepared. It will be fast, it won't take long. The military will be very quick. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes, well, thank you very much. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MITTERRAND FEB 22 - PRESIDENT PLACED SECURE CALL TO
FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND AT 0911 - TERMINATED
0935. ANDRIAN BASORA MONITORED. PRES IN
WASH

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3258

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of
Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Ralph Sigler (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 23, 1991,
AND PLACE: Camp David

(Early portion of call not monitored.)

The President: No one knows I am going back down to do this.
(Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I won't say a word. (U)

The President: The Soviets have been very constructive, but
Saddam is still setting new oil fires. He has brutalized the
Kuwaitis. I wanted you to know that, in the spirit of
consultation. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Do you hold out any hope at all for
reconciliation of your approaches on the final terms? (Ø)

The President: No, but he asked me to stay in the UN for another
48 hours. However, we have a problem here because I spelled out
the ultimatum for Saddam yesterday. He fires missiles, talks
peace to the Soviets, but shows no signs of peace. I said I
can't do this, I don't see any way unless he moves out of Kuwait.
(Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Did he say he would get hold of Saddam?
(Ø)

The President: He didn't say that. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Are there lines of communication open,
just in case, with Gorbachev? (Ø)

The President: I don't know. We don't have lines to Saddam, but
maybe Gorbachev has lines to him. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: It has been a long, tough one. I don't
agree with the New York Times very often, but I have to say,

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execution of the war so far has been unrivaled in terms of your accomplishments in rallying this coalition and holding it together. (C)

The President: You're nice to say that. I hope now that it will be very, very fast. The casualties will be there and it worries all of us, but I think they will be less than some predictions say. I say that because a lot of destruction has gone on to his armor. The early probing actions are going very, very well. The coalition is predicting rapid surrender, etc. This may be some wishful thinking. But I hope it's not long. We'll move fast. There we are. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I look forward to seeing you on the tube at 10 and give my best to Barbara. (C)

The President: I am instructing Cheney to move ahead. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Robert Hawke
of Australia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Robert Hawke
Douglas Paal, Notetaker

DATE, TIME February 23, 1991, 6:02 p.m.- 6:12 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Bob? (U)

PM Hawke: G'day, George. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

PM Hawke: Fine. And you? (U)

The President: I am phoning to let you know that at 10:00 p.m. tonight I will be telling the American people that I have given General Schwarzkopf approval to intensify the ground war to liberate Iraq. This will involve a major number of ground units. I have done this because the Iraqis show no sign of complying with our position, because there has been no progress. I talked with Gorbachev -- a long talk. Jim Baker, who is here with me, spoke two times today with Bessmertnykh. It is important that we recognize what they have attempted. But with all the destruction in Kuwait and killing people... I wanted you to know ahead of time. I have worried about it. The loss of ground troops is on my mind. I hope it will be quicker than people's predictions, with fewer casualties. (Ø)

PM Hawke: George, one question. Will the Soviets pursue some embarrassing or confrontational position at the United Nations Security Council? (U)

The President: I do not think so. Of course, I do not know. Vorontsov has been helpful today. Gorbachev agrees with me on Saddam Hussein. I would be surprised. They were trying to avert this. We have no indication he will lead some nonaligned or Third World coalition. I have that impression -- and Jim Baker has that feeling, John Major has that feeling. (Ø)

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PM Hawke: Judging from the Security Council, that seems to be the case. (Ø)

The President: That's so, Bob. (U)

PM Hawke: George, if it goes to the Security Council, what indication do you have as to how they will line up? How would they view the difference between the latest Soviet proposal and the U.S. position. Have you got a read? (Ø)

The President: I have a good read. There is a recognition. Some, Yemen and Cuba, may not agree, not everyone is for our position, and may not agree, but dropping sanctions would be a new mandate. They knew the Soviet proposal was a new condition. (Ø)

PM Hawke: That is right. When we looked at the Soviet position we had a view that it would be difficult to hang a war on 7 days or 21 days. But their wanting to suspend sanctions immediately and canceling the resolutions was going too far. (Ø)

The President: This man has been defeated, punished. I do not want casualties, but he has been stalling. (Ø)

PM Hawke: This is to the point of canceling. I do not know if Brent Scowcroft talked about our conversation.

The President: They are trying to avoid the consequences. (Ø)

PM Hawke: With Scowcroft I said what we ought to be saying is nail this bastard on the horns of a dilemma. He has to give public commitment to renounce claims to Kuwait. He must renounce his claim. We have not yet said he must repudiate his claim to Kuwait. If he raises it, he can go to International Court to resolve it. He must repudiate his claim to the retention of Kuwait. (Ø)

The President: I understand, that is a good point. A very good point. We have not said it. We have said we can discuss our differences. (Ø)

PM Hawke: Do not just bugger around the edges -- put him to it. (Ø)

The President: "Must renounce the claim." I will get that going. (Ø)

PM Hawke: If he does, he will lose a lot of face. (Ø)

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The President: He will lose plenty from what is coming his way. This will be fast, I can tell you that. (Ø)

PM Hawke: Just this point: if he refuses to repudiate it, the whole international community will be in a good position. When he inferred to the Soviets he would withdraw we thought that is what he would do. (Ø)

The President: That is an important position, something we have been silent on. You are making much... (Ø)

PM Hawke: He can pull out and that is one thing, but if on the record he repudiates, that is quite another. Thank you for ringing. I know your time is valuable. Of course, as I have done before, I hope for the very best for you and your forces -- speedy victory at lowest cost. (Ø)

The President: Thanks -- Jim Baker sends his very best, he is right here with me. (U)

PM Hawke: Mine to him too, George. Goodbye. (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on
February 23, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME February 23, 1991; 5:29 - 5:33 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hosni, how are you? Sorry for calling you so late in the evening. As you know, I've directed Norm Schwarzkopf to intensify the military effort to liberate Kuwait. I am confident that our military will accomplish the mission decisively. I intend to announce this at 10:00 p.m. tonight. The action, as you know, will already have started. I hope that your troops will do well. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Inshallah. I talked to Gorbachev. I told him that there are two initiatives, one has gaps, the other is firm. I said that we wanted the United States and the Soviet Union to be together, that was important to us. (Ø)

The President: Yes. I talked to him also, told him that his plan had more conditions. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein is burning and killing. He understood, but still wanted a delay. I believe he was trying hard, and not being mischievous. He was trying to stop any loss of life, but his plan had too many conditions. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes. I told him that these conditions would create a hell of a problem later. I told him that you (Gorbachev) need to discuss it with President Bush and Baker. (Ø)

The President: Well, he didn't get very far. We had long talks, but I did not change my position. (Ø)

President Mubarak: The delay was the point we discussed -- he was convinced. (Ø)

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The President: Well, I'm sorry again that it's so late. I'll be making a statement at 10:00 p.m. (U)

President Mubarak: We'll hear it in Cairo in the early morning.
(U)

The President: And, as you know from your military guys, the action will have started a little earlier. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME: February 23, 1991, 1:28 - 1:41 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

Secretary Baker: Chancellor, how are you? This is Jim Baker.
(U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good, Jim. How are you? (U)

Secretary Baker: The President is right here, talking to John Major. He will be through in just a moment but asked me to receive your call. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I talked with Gorbachev earlier. I got the latest press statement to the effect that Saddam Hussein has accepted the conditions. Is that correct? (U)

Secretary Baker: No. Gorbachev talked to President Bush two hours ago. The press statement was erroneous. There has been no acceptance by Iraq of the coalition's plan. We have made it clear that the Soviet plan does not include acceptance of all the UN resolutions. The President is off the phone now. (U)

The President: Helmut! Wie geht's? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good, thanks. I am glad to hear your voice. Mikhail Gorbachev called earlier, after he had talked to you. He said he had a good talk with you, in a good atmosphere, but that you had no agreement. How do you assess the situation at this point? (U)

The President: He is right on his assessment of the call. My view is that the Soviets are not being tricky. They are trying to stop the war and play a constructive role. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That is my view, too. (U)

The President: But I told him that we could not delay. First, I don't trust Saddam Hussein. Second, with his scorched earth policy he is laying waste to Kuwait. Third, he is trying to delay; he didn't meet the ultimatum. So I told Gorbachev that makes it impossible to do anything other than make him leave Kuwait. We are going through with our military planning, and I will have an important statement on that subject tonight at 10:00. But I don't see any way to avert going forward. Gorbachev wanted us to go to the UN. Their people are being cooperative, not contentious. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: One of the important issues for me is if Saddam Hussein is being honest, why does he need 21 days to withdraw? (S)

The President: Right. Also, there are other UN conditions such as reparations, paying for damages. And he is not in a position to bargain, though maybe he thinks he is. There are terrible stories even today that they are brutalizing the citizens of Kuwait. So, anyway, maybe he will come to his senses and start moving out, but we seen no evidence of that. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I feel it is very, very important that Gorbachev knows that you appreciate what he is doing. (S)

The President: I think he knows that. I have told him over and over again. Not only that: I have told him that he will have a place in the region after the conflict is over. He wants to consider his country as a great power with interests in the region, and he wants to be taken seriously. I have told him we feel the same way. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I think it important that he continue to be regarded as an ally in this effort. (S)

The President: I agree. People here are coming at me from the right and the left saying that I am being too kind to Gorbachev, but I am going to continue treating him with respect. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: They don't know what they are talking about. Your course is absolutely correct and will pay off. (S)

The President: I think so. Our discussions have been very civilized. In the talks Jim Baker has had with Bessmertnykh, the tone also has been very good. Major said the same about his talks with Gorbachev -- that the tone and atmosphere were very good. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. He confirmed that explicitly when he talked to me just now. Leaving everything else aside, that is very important. (S)

The President: My view is that the ground war will not be long. I am absolutely convinced of that. I am deeply concerned about the loss of life. It weighs on me every single minute. But to fall short of our stated goals would destroy the international credibility of many, many countries. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That's true. (U)

The President: So there we are, at a very difficult period in history. I hope that afterwards we can all work together for a peaceful Middle East and, as you said, for a constructive and cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. That's good. George, all the best, then. (U)

The President: Thanks very much, my friend, for your support and kind words. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

1338

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR on February 23, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR
Interpreter: Dmitry Zarechnak
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME February 23, 1991, 11:15 - 11:43am
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The President: Hello, Mikhail, how are you? (U)

President Gorbachev: Greetings. (U)

The President: Greetings. (U)

President Gorbachev: Fine, George. We have a holiday today. We are waiting for congratulations from the chief of the U.S. armed forces to the chief of the Soviet forces for Red Army Day. (U)

The President: I hope this is in train. Are our greetings on the way? (U)

President Gorbachev: Well, we began the celebration yesterday of the 73rd anniversary of the Soviet army -- but the real day is today. People here -- some of my assistants were on the front in World War II. Yakovlev and Chernayev were on the front in the trenches in World War II. They want this working day to end so that they can begin to celebrate. (U)

The President: Please convey my personal congratulations as the Commander in Chief of the American armed forces. (U)

What is the latest in the Middle East? (U)

President Gorbachev: This is precisely what I want to talk about. To continue yesterday's discussion - after our talk yesterday, something has happened that changed the situation. In Baghdad, an official statement has been issued that agrees to full and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait as specified in the U.N. Resolution and that it will happen from Kuwait City within four days. That is to say we have a white flag from Saddam Hussein. (S)

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Now it is evening here in Moscow. In the afternoon Tariq Aziz had a press conference here in Moscow and set forth that acceptance. Yesterday, after we talked, I gave the suggestions and thoughts from you that were discussed on the phone to Aziz and also my own view. I think that our very firm position and your severe demands have made possible that statement of acceptance. And now we have a new situation that is new for both of us. And I believe that we must weigh carefully the entire situation and discuss what we must decide to do next. (S)

I understand the meaning of your demands that have their own logic. Let me say that today I talked to the leaders of a number of countries and many of them said that there are no differences in the two sets of demands that are insurmountable. To put it briefly, the fact that we have been together from beginning to end has been of decisive importance in making sure that this new situation has come about. Let me say something else, without what the U.S. has done, there would not have been this kind of change in the Iraqi position. And I asked Mr. Ignatenko, my Press Secretary to communicate that particular thought to the world press. He has already done that in a press conference. (S)

Let me now complete my thoughts and then I want to listen to you. After we talked yesterday, I have been thinking what should we do now? And how should we act in order to make certain that there are no doubts about our ability further to cooperate? By the way, this is something that I felt in my discussions with other leaders. They all want the same thing. President Mubarak said very frankly and straightforwardly --- "to me the most important thing is that the U.S. President and the Soviet Union continue to stand together." (S)

Based on that -- I want to propose the following: That at this new stage, we together, the U.S. and Soviet Union, cooperate in the framework of the U.N. Security Council and find a way that would incorporate all the elements of the ideas that we both put forward in a joint resolution. I believe that it is this that would make it possible for our two countries to continue to work together and to attain the desired goal -- the desired result. This is all I wanted to say at this point because we had a wide-ranging philosophical discussion yesterday. (S)

The President: Thank you sir. Jim Baker had a good long talk with Bessmertnykh late last night and for you was this morning. I don't believe that Saddam has ever believed me or how strongly the U.S. feels. Yesterday while you were trying to work all this out -- their spokesman went out and called me a liar about the burning up those oil wells. And once again there have been a bunch more oil wells set on fire overnight. They are continuing to use a scorched earth policy and stalling and this has made a profound impact on me and on other coalition partners. (S)

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And they want to negotiate back from an existing United Nations mandate. So we put down a time when they could demonstrate good-faith. We are in a difficult position -- I can't be seen to be saying something and then not be sincere. I can't say you must move out by noon and -- with no movement and continued destruction of the oil fields -- do nothing. Particularly, when there are still conditions -- you have worked hard -- but there are still conditions. And we too have had extensive consultations -- before you and I talked -- and there is a solid view that he is stalling particularly as it relates to damages and he just wants to do it in a different way. (S)

I do not believe there can be any flexibility in what we can do at this point, even though I know that they are talking in informal conversations in the U.N. Security Council. The best thing, I agree, is for us to be together. I think I have tried, you have tried and Jim and Bessmertnykh have tried. I agree with the premise. You see, we think our position is the United Nations position. So I would again appeal -- with respect for your fantastic efforts -- that you support the position of the U.N. -- unconditional withdrawal -- absolutely without conditions. They say its unconditional and they have dropped some conditions -- thanks to your intervention -- but there are still conditions. Our countries, those involved, feel that now is the time to come to the full U.N. position -- already enshrined in the U.N. resolutions. (S)

Jim tried to make it clear to Bessmertnykh. We cannot put anything on hold -- I have been out there and others have strongly supported that position. I can understand that Iraq doesn't want to accept the conditions but I can't wait. I don't think we should give the Iraqis any other choice but the instant acceptance of these conditions immediately. (S)

That is where we are and I think the difference we have is that you think they have agreed to unconditional withdrawal and we and others with us do not agree. Let's not let this divide the U.S. and the Soviet Union. There are things far bigger than this conflagration which is going to be over very soon. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, let's keep cool. Although, of course, all of us are human beings, I think both of us understand that what we need is not Saddam Hussein -- his fate has been determined. Our concern is to take advantage of the opportunity before us in order to obtain the goal we set together within the framework together in the U.N. Security Council and also to prevent a tragic phase in the further development of the conflict. (S)

Saddam Hussein wants to stall but we are not simpletons. Without wasting time, within 24-48 hours we should raise this in the U.N. Security Council and have a very tough discussion and consider this there. I would accept your idea that within this general

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understanding we have between us -- Baker and Bessmertnykh should work out the details and we would be able to get it done. I want in particular to be understood by you that what I am saying are the words of a friend in the spirit of cooperation. And I fully share what you have just said that there will be many questions to work out. So, George, let me shake your hand and let me say good-bye in a spirit of full understanding. (S)

The President: Mikhail, I appreciate that spirit but I don't want to leave a false impression that there is any more time. Of course I will ask Jim to talk about this but I do not want you to feel that there is any inclination for the U.S. and the coalition to delay. I will talk to Jim about he and Bessmertnykh. You have mentioned the human life aspect about which we talked yesterday and I agree. But I do think this man is stalling and what he is doing to the oil wells in Kuwait and the people there argues against any reasonableness on his part. I don't want to mislead you. I don't feel inclined to wait. I will talk to Jim but don't want to leave the impression that I can delay. We will see what we can do but unless there is something in the next few minutes that he does what has been demanded of him by the coalition under the U.N. mandate and resolutions. (S)

I will talk to Jim. But thank you very much. (U)

President Gorbachev: Good. I understand what you have just said but I think with all we have been through -- one or two days may not be decisive in one sense but in another they could be very decisive and we can do what is right. (S)

The President: Thanks. (U)

President Gorbachev: Thanks. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey: February 23, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns

DATE, TIME February 23, 1991, 10:30 - 10:35am
AND PLACE Camp David

The President: Turgut. How are things? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, how are you? (U)

The President: Fine. I am calling with a little heads up. We have imposed a deadline and it has broad support. I wanted you to know about our plan because it doesn't look like he will withdraw. We will then have to undertake action but I don't want to go into the timing over the open line. We have not changed the threat. I wanted you to know we tried hard. (S)

Jim Baker is with me. He had a one hour talk with Bessmertnykh last night. Bessmertnykh pleaded for further UN action. But Jim said we hadn't even fulfilled the original UN resolutions yet, much less take on new actions. (S)

We met with Alptemocin yesterday. I am afraid it was hectic due to the events. I hope you understand. (S)

President Ozal: I am very comfortable. We are waiting. And Turkey supports you. Don't worry about that. The Iraqi army will surrender in a short time. (S)

The President: We don't think it will be long. We'll go forward and will stay in close touch. I wanted you to know we have to go forward. I can't lose credibility and won't have much of a delay. But again, I do not want to give any more detail because of the open line. (S)

President Ozal: The Iraqis are in desperate condition. I noticed the soldiers when I was in Diyarbakir on our border. They are increasing in number every day. (S)

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The President: What he has done with the oil fields is terrible. He is laying waste to Kuwait like a terrorist. I told Gorbachev that we cannot wait while he does that. He is blowing up the oilfields. He is brutalizing the Kuwaiti people. We simply don't have time to wait. (S)

President Ozal: Yes. I think you have no time. God bless the United States and the American people. (S)

The President: I am looking forward to March. I will bring you right up here to Camp David. We'll sleep and then have a good chance to talk. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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1361

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu of Japan on February 23, 1991 (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME: February 23, 1991, 7:20 - 7:31 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The Prime Minister telephoned the President concerning the situation in the Gulf. (S)

The President: Toshiki is that you? (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Good Morning George. This is Toshiki speaking. The reason I called you today is to pay my respects to your day-to-day effort to attain peace. I believe the six-point proposal of the Soviet Union is insufficient and that what is important is the immediate and unconditional implementation of withdrawal. I support your decision of yesterday, and in order to avoid tragedy in human terms, I will continue to urge the Iraqis to put into action a withdrawal in response to your call of yesterday. (S)

Today, we called in the Iraqi Ambassador to convey our message to be passed to Saddam Hussein. We also used our Ambassador to the UN to convey our message to Saddam Hussein through his Ambassador at the UN. (S)

What is important is to further consolidate the solidarity of the international community so that we can have a fair and principaled solution. Everyday, in the Diet, we have been debating against the opposition parties how to achieve our share of responsibility. We should maintain contact between the U.S. and Japan so that we can attain peace together. (S)

The President: I appreciate the position you have taken in the Diet. (S)

We will maintain very close contact now and when the war is over. (S)

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While Tariq Aziz was talking peace in Moscow, Saddam Hussein was ordering Kuwaiti oil fields set on fire. Now, 190 wells are on fire in a scorched earth policy. My own view, Toshiki, is that President Gorbachev is not making mischief but is trying to solve the problem. We have no problem with what Gorbachev is doing at all. You are 100% correct when you say that his proposal is still insufficient. (S)

I am not optimistic that Saddam Hussein will comply with the deadline for withdrawal that I announced yesterday, after much consultation with our coalition partners. (S)

If land forces must be used, I can guarantee the world it will be quick. It will not be prolonged. I still hope Iraq will comply but I cannot report to you any optimism. I appreciate very much this phone call and have never doubted, in a sometimes contentious Diet debate, that Japan would come through to help us. Lastly, I would be remiss if I did not thank you for your support. This world solidarity you mentioned is very important. (S)

Prime Minister Kaifu: George, I am very glad to hear your voice, and am very encouraged, and hope you will keep up the efforts to meet our common objectives. (S)

The President: Goodbye Toshiki, my friend. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/91 - 3/6/91

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on February 26, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME February 26, 1991; 3:02 - 3:05 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hi, Hosni, I just wanted to touch base with you. How are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Very well. And you? (U)

The President: Everything is going very well. From what I hear, your forces are moving well and making good progress. Have you seen Saddam Hussein's latest statement? I read the whole thing and it is very disappointing. It is a call to arms. He did not give up his claim to Kuwait. He has not learned his lesson, and he is losing his army. I will not give up on prosecuting the war until he accepts all twelve resolutions and until his forces lay down their arms. This is not the time for a ceasefire. I do not want U.S. troops at risk, just as I am sure that you do not want your boys at risk either. There is still a large Army out there and the Iraqi military capability is still large, although diminishing. We will set the terms for ceasefire and withdrawal. Even the Republican Guard units are putting down their arms and fleeing. It becomes more and more clear that this man is impossible. I have no good thoughts on how to get him out. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I heard his speech also. It was astonishing. Unbelievable. A ceasefire is very dangerous to us. We have forces moving, and you can't just stop. I agree with your conception; you are 100% right. (Ø)

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The President: Within 48 hours his whole armor, including the Republican Guard, will be cut off. There is a big traffic jam in Basra because all the bridges were taken out. The forces are just stacking up there. We won't permit the Iraqi army to go back to Baghdad intact. I would appreciate your ideas for a clean end, a nice clear victory. I don't know if the Iraqi people will throw him out. You once told me he couldn't withdraw and stay in power. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Don't worry -- let's wait 2-3 days to see what he does. (Ø)

The President: Yeah, that's a good point, maybe it will be more clear in 2-3 days. I just wanted to stay in touch. I talked to Ozal today, and he totally agreed that we must get Saddam out, but I don't know how. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Wait 2-3 days, see what happens. (Ø)

The President: Say, he's calling me worse names than you! (U)

President Mubarak: Don't worry -- we are used to it! (U)

The President: I am disappointed at Qadhafi sounding off a few days ago for CNN, about a ceasefire before the ground war. (Ø)

President Mubarak: [REDACTED] (b)(1)

The President: OK -- it's been good talking to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Havel of Czechoslovakia
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Vaclav Havel, President
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings
Interpreter: Radovan Pletka

DATE, TIME February 26, 1991, 7:20 - 7:26 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Havel initiated the call. (U)

The President: Mr. President, how are you, sir? (U)

President Havel: I would like to greet you most cordially. I don't have any news but would just like to say that I am glad we have established telephone contact. I would like to congratulate you for all you have done in the Gulf. It is a great success that Iraq is starting to leave Kuwait. I had an interesting meeting with the Presidents of Hungary and Poland in Visegrad. I will write you about it. (Ø)

The President: I will be very interested. Thank you, sir. (U)

President Havel: Along with the Polish and Hungarian Presidents, we agreed to cooperate together with the European Community and NATO. (Ø)

The President: Good. Were any specific actions taken? Do you have any specific requests for the EC or the U.S.? (Ø)

President Havel: We did not come to agreement regarding contacts with the West, but we did agree on cooperation among Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The first result is the abrogation of the military structure of the Warsaw Pact. (Ø)

The President: I noted that with interest and great satisfaction. It must have been very satisfying to you as well. It sent a strong signal of this change we all rejoiced in. (Ø)

President Havel: In two weeks I will be in Brussels to give a speech. I will be one of the first to speak at NATO. (Ø)

The President: Good. If you would be interested, I could give you a few thoughts about the Iraq war. (U)

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President Havel: Yes. I am very interested. (U)

The President: First, I was very sorry that one of your own people lost his life as a casualty of the war. We have studied Saddam Hussein's diatribe that came across early this morning. Our view is that he did not renounce claims to Kuwait, and the horror of the Scud missiles still goes on. He made no reference to any other UN resolution. I am particularly thinking of reparations, of compensation for damage. We have well over 20 thousand POWs, but there was no mention by him of U.S. or other coalition POWs. This is a matter of grave concern here in the U.S. (Ø)

I just this minute hung up from talking to General Powell, who confirmed massive movement out of Kuwait by Iraqi soldiers. Last night I said we will continue to fight, but we are insisting that if they want free passage they must lay down their weapons. The war is continuing, but the weather is the worst it has been in the last six months. His arrogance is higher than ever, and that concerns us, because he has shown no remorse for what he has done. Fortunately for the American people, combat casualties are much lower than feared, but as of this minute we are mourning the loss of some 22 killed in a reckless Scud attack. Arab forces are performing very well in coalition. The city of Kuwait will be liberated very soon, and we are anxious about what we will find there. (Ø)

The role of the Soviet Union -- a word on that. The Soviets tried before Saturday for a peaceful solution. We had long talks with Gorbachev and Bessmertnykh, but my view now is that Gorbachev and the Soviet Union are interested in seeing Saddam Hussein remain in power. Though we have not stated the goal of Saddam Hussein's removal, it will be complicated if this arrogant man remains in power with this attitude. The last point: my military officers assure me that Saddam Hussein's ability to be an aggressive threat to his neighbors has been destroyed, and he has got a lot of reconstruction to do to his own infrastructure. So, we are rejoicing that his army seems to be folding, but my heart is not full of joy, because I don't see an entirely satisfactory end of the whole affair. So, that is my update, Mr. President. (Ø)

President Havel: I would like to thank you very heartily for that information. I can assure you that the whole of Czechoslovakia supports your policies and is looking forward to the day when Kuwait is free. (U)

The President: Thank you for your call. Let me assure you that despite the high costs of the Gulf operation, we have tried to increase our support for Central and Eastern Europe. I remember your telling me of the impact on Czechoslovakia of oil price increases. Thank God they have come down considerably. (U)

President Havel: Thank you again. I will write you a long letter soon, putting together the information I mentioned. (Ø)

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The President: Thank you. I appreciate your call very much and am delighted about the continued support in Czechoslovakia for the coalition. (U)

President Havel: Thank you very much. Please give Mrs. Bush my kind regards. (U)

The President: She just walked in. I will tell her. Let's be in touch again soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey on
February 26, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 26, 1991, 2:37 - 2:49 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Well, Turgut, how are you today? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you. I want to congratulate you.
(U)

The President: Well, listen, you were about right. It seems to
me we are making big progress and fast. (S)

President Ozal: Yes, because I didn't rate the Iraqis as strong
as many others did. (S)

The President: It's going very well indeed. We are continuing
after analyzing Saddam's very unsatisfactory statement -- and it
was unsatisfactory -- we are continuing to prosecute the war. We
will not shoot at unarmed people who are surrendering or throwing
down their arms, but he cannot take these armed convoys and say
in his statement that they are going to fight their way out
without running into opposition. We will have to challenge him.
(S)

President Ozal: When I received the 22nd of February proposal
through your embassy, I have two points. They should leave all
armaments in Kuwait. (S)

The President: You made that point. I remember that. (S)

President Ozal: Yes, it is happening. I think the Israelis are
right. This man has to go. (S)

The President: I don't know how we can do that but I agree. We
did not have that as an original objective. Can we appeal to the
Revolutionary Command Council to throw him out or something? (S)

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President Ozal: But the Revolutionary Council is in his control. I think probably if you take all the Republican Guards prisoner of war, maybe that will affect him. This man has to be humiliated. (S)

The President: Well, I think that's right and I think its good to add to the humiliation by being sure that the armor doesn't get out. But the problem is that we don't think the people in Baghdad know just how bad the defeat is. (S)

President Ozal: Yes, but I think the news will come. I think you must take Basra. (S)

The President: We don't have to do that but what we can do is south of Basra be sure we have troops there -- be sure they don't cross the river. The report is that there is a mammoth really tremendous traffic jam right there where people are trying to flee. But soon they will be engaged by our very strong forces. (S)

President Ozal: Are your forces racing to the Euphrates or do you have your airborne division? (S)

The President: We have both. The airborne is coming up and down the Euphrates Valley -- and the weather is bad -- and we have massive armor trying to cut them off from running away. We have armor above the Republican Guard but below Basra. (S)

President Ozal: That is a point I want to make: those Republican Guards, if they are taken prisoner of war, he will be humiliated very much. (S)

The President: They will be defeated. The problem is there are a lot of them and it is hard to handle. We're tripping all over these people. There are over 30,000 prisoners right now. (S)

President Ozal: George, another thing, in the Kuwait theatre, we're talking about 500,000 people, all these reports. It seems to me there are Iraqi divisions but they are empty inside. (S)

The President: You're right. Right now, the divisions are decapitated. Its called combat ineffective. There are maybe one or two units left but they are running away, breaking up and ineffective. (S)

President Ozal: I think it is the right moment to follow and complete everything. One thing you remember I told you -- this war reparations that we talked about in Washington. I think this will be the most important point. (S)

The President: Excuse me. What did you say? ((U))

President Ozal: War preparations. (S)

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The President: We've got to press for that. He is refusing to comment on that and the POWs. Of course, we have very few but every life is special. He better not have killed our prisoners or he will have serious problems. (S)

President Ozal: Look carefully at what they have done in Kuwait. (S)

The President: You know tomorrow Arab forces will go into Kuwait City and liberate it. They'll be backed up by a lot of marines, but I think its better for Arab forces to go in. CBS is in there and Mutual Broadcasting. They've just gone into the city. Our forces are waiting until dawn which comes in a few hours. (S)

President Ozal: In that case, maybe this man could be tried as a war criminal. (S)

The President: We're for that, but if we make it a goal, how do you get a hold of him? How do you capture him to bring him to trial? That's a problem. (S)

President Ozal: We will continue with the embargo. I think we should say very clearly that if this man doesn't go out, we will not go out. (S)

The President: Yes, that's right. But there's a little problem with the Soviets, but I think its manageable. (S)

President Ozal: I think the Soviets should understand because this man is crazy. I know your Arab coalition has been difficult. (S)

The President: That's true. That's one of the reasons we are escalating our call to get him out. We haven't really made that a goal yet. Don't want to set a goal we can't necessarily fulfill. We are trying to think of ways to get him out to save the suffering of his people. Maybe we could say as soon as he leaves, we will provide medicine and clean water. (S)

President Ozal: Maybe you could put some leaflets over Baghdad demanding this. (S)

The President: That's a good idea and I think we're already doing some of that. I'll double check on that and see where we are but the time has come to get him out. (S)

President Ozal: You remember Nasser. He was a hero of the Arabs but his defeat in the 1967 war with Israel brought him down. After he died, he was one of the biggest heroes of the Arabs, but no one talks anymore about him. (S)

The President: We have to get him out some way and maybe the people will throw him out or some army unit who lost a lot of life will do something. There is a humiliation factor but he doesn't know it yet. Did you see his statement? (S)

President Ozal: Yes, I saw CNN and was amazed. When you see a cease fire, he will announce that he is victorious. (S)

The President: We're not going to permit that. (S)

President Ozal: I know the Arab mentality and this man has to be humiliated and demanded by the victors to be removed. I believe the Arabs will forget him. Like they forgot Nasser. (S)

The President: We totally agree with you. Now we have to figure out how to get it done. It's bad if he continues, I don't see a happy ending. (S)

President Ozal: What we can do is get as many prisoners of war as possible, especially from the Republican Guards, then try to put pressure on Baghdad and some way the war will continue. You have liberated Kuwait but if their position is to not accept the other UN Security Council decisions, to continue to push and not only on land but by airpower. Send leaflets and continue the embargo. I believe he will go away. (S)

The President: Well, listen. I think that's right on target, just the way you always have been. I appreciate hearing from you and we will stay in touch. Right now, I have no inclination to permit anything short of total completion of our objectives and disarming the Republican Guard ... blowing up tanks and armor. We won't let their armor get back to Baghdad. (S)

President Ozal: I think you can ask, in my opinion, for complete surrender.

The President: We're told that the word "surrender" is a bad word in Arabic. They say that "surrender" has bad connotations in the Arabic language. (S)

President Ozal: I didn't know that. (S)

The President: Ask your specialists about that. I'd like to know your view. Maybe we're wrong. (S)

President Ozal: I will ask. (S)

The President: The Saudi representative said, "No, that's a bad word. It might turn the Arabs against you if you use that word." But I'd like to know. You have a lot of Arab specialists there. (S)

President Ozal: I will look into that. But, George, I want to say one thing. I am quite happy with this. I remember Tariq Aziz saying America will be humiliated. (S)

The President: Yes, I do, too, but he will be humiliated. He cannot have a victory and we have to get the word out. (S)

President Ozal: He has to be humiliated. (S)

The President: He has to be humiliated. Okay, Turgut, its been wonderful to hear from you. Once again, let me say we are grateful for your steadfast support and standing together. (S)

President Ozal: We will completely support you. Don't worry. (S)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

President Ozal: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President of France
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Eliza Burnham (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 27, 1991, 10:37 - 10:50 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Bonjour, Francois. (U)

President Mitterrand: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello. How are you, sir? (S)

President Mitterrand: Good Morning. How are you? (U)

The President: Tres bien. (U)

President Mitterrand: I am very happy to hear you this morning. I think there are many events we can discuss. (S)

The President: Yes, there are many. Things are going very well on the battlefield, aren't they? (S)

President Mitterrand: What do you thing about the stage we've reached in the military situation? (S)

The President: I think the fighting is almost over. The southern half of Kuwait is almost liberated. We are now engaged with the Republican Guards. There is only one division left in a high state of competence and even that may not be combat effective. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: I think it is going very well and it went much faster than we thought. We're very proud of the French troops and also very fortunate that the casualty figures appear to be far lower than we ever anticipated. (S)

President Mitterrand: Absolutely. What is the timing, in your opinion, at this point? Do you think that from a military standpoint everything will be done by the end of the week? (S)

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The President: Definitely by the end of the week. I've just talked to the Secretary of Defense who thinks there needs to be one more day of fighting, which would be Thursday here. He thinks that that could pretty well conclude any fighting on the ground. (S)

President Mitterrand: So now we enter the phase of diplomacy. It is especially as regards the diplomatic situation and what takes place in the Security Council that I wish to talk to you today. How do you see events shaping up at the Security Council in upcoming days? (S)

The President: I'd be delighted to get your views on that one. Right now there is not much pressure in the Security Council, since most agree Saddam Hussein must accept all 12 UN resolutions. Dumas, I believe, is here or coming soon to talk to Jim Baker on the subject of the Security Council. We think that somebody in Iraq should be compelled to state compliance with the rest of the resolutions, and so we are not in a hurry to go to the UN Security Council. (S)

President Mitterrand: Mr. President, can I ask you whom you mentioned was coming? (S)

The President: I thought Dumas was coming here. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, indeed. He should be in Washington tomorrow. (S)

The President: And today Hurd is here, and Jim Baker is trying to work with both of them to make recommendations as to what we should do next. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, indeed. That's precisely the reason I am sending him to have discussions with Secretary Baker -- to discuss the end of the war, but also the beginning of the post-war period, specifically from the diplomatic standpoint. And I also think we are less pressed by events now. I think the pressure exerted by the Soviets, and by other countries, has lessened as well. (S)

The President: I agree, Francois, and I think that's very important. We have to get rid of all the other resolutions. The sanctions can be gotten rid of, but we also have to be sure that Iraq is on board on everything else. They have come in now on Wednesday, today, and told the UN that Iraq would accept demands for reparations and abandon its claim to Kuwait. So we have a little time, and things are moving in the right direction. We have prisoners of war and Scud missile firings to deal with. We've tried to get them to end all the killing. There is no mention of third country detainees. Even the Soviets say the Iraqi response is insufficient. I think it is inadequate, but we do have a little time. (S)

Like you, I think the Baker-Dumas meeting and the one with Hurd is very important. And then, Francois, I would like to suggest

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that you and I get together afterwards. (S)

President Mitterrand: What time are you suggesting -- in March?
(S)

The President: Sometime early in March. I'd like to just be sure we're on the same wavelength. We have big problems in the Middle East. I'd like to get your view on the role of the UN and on what kind of peacekeeping is required. I want to get our troops out as soon as we can. I think the Arabs are suspicious of our troops.

President Mitterrand: Indeed. I will look at my schedule. I think it should be feasible for us to meet. I will discuss this with my immediate staff and we will get back to you with an answer as to what might be feasible. In any event, I do agree with you that such a meeting would be useful. (S)

The President: And I think it is better to do this on a bilateral basis -- just you and me. (S)

President Mitterrand: Agreed as well. (U)

The President: Let me just be sure -- I was a little unclear -- but I want to go back to something I mentioned earlier. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: I was responding to a Reuters tape just handed to me that said Iraq had said on Wednesday, had told the UN it would accept the demand for reparations and abandon the claim to Kuwait in return for a cease fire. That answer gets rid of all the other resolutions. We cannot agree to the elimination of sanctions until we get every other matter resolved. There is no mention of third country detainees, and there's no mention of Scuds, so these things are problems. But I agree with you, we've got time. We control the battlefield, but I want to assure you that we want to end the shooting as soon as we can. (S)

President Mitterrand: I agree with you. You are right. We will be working to that end as well, of course, and to make this quite clear to public opinion, because they are in a hurry to see the end of the war. (S)

The President: Exactly. (U)

President Mitterrand: But Saddam Hussein must be compelled, forced to, at the very least, acknowledge his failure and his liability. (S)

The President: Exactly. The arrogant tone of his statement infuriated me and everybody that heard it. (S)

President Mitterrand: Absolutely. (U)

The President: Francois, there's some interesting intelligence

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that indicates he may be trying to leave Iraq. I don't know if your people have picked it up, or how good it is. (S)

President Mitterrand: Indeed. We will look into these reports. In the meantime, may I please say again that I agree with your proposal that we meet soon, and we will look into details. Congratulations to you for the courage and determination of yourself and your troops. (S)

The President: The same is true for the French and we are grateful. I'm told your troops got there ahead of schedule and saw combat out there. It's been wonderful standing together. And, Francois, in our country now there's a wonderful patriotic feeling, a feeling of the allies working together and succeeding. I hope it's true in France. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, indeed. Between 75% and 80% of the population are absolutely in favor. In fact, our polls indicate that not only do the people support me on this, but that they also support you and your actions. This is very positive. They stand for the unity of the coalition. (S)

The President: That's great. Now we have got to win the post-war challenge. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, indeed. We'll have an opportunity to discuss this and work on these issues together when we meet. (S)

The President: I might get Brent to call Lanxade to work on that. (S)

President Mitterrand: I would also like to thank your interpreter. She's done all my work for me. (S)

The President: I'll tell her in person. (S)

President Mitterrand: Well, almost all the work, since I have my interpreter as well. (S)

The President: He's very fast. I can hear him myself. Tres rapide! (S)

President Mitterrand: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 27, 1991, 9:20 - 9:24 p.m.
AND PLACE: Private Quarters

Prime Minister Mulroney: Hello, George. (U)

The President: Hi. How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I just want to say very briefly this. I was with you in the White House before you deployed your troops in August and I just watched you tonight in the White House. And I just want to say that obviously it was a great military victory, but the military victory was eclipsed by the political leadership. Your leadership was outstanding from beginning to end in putting together the coalition, in keeping it together, in massaging it, and in making sure the execution of the war was on line. (Ø)

The President: It was nice of you to call and, of course, we're very grateful to you personally. It isn't easy to get up there with that cantankerous parliament of yours. I'm sitting here upstairs with Cheney, Powell, Scowcroft. We're having a drink and going over this. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: (Have a drink for me.) *U*

The President: It's sweet of you to call. It's a wonderful turn of events. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You've got all the right people there to have a drink with, because you've all done a tremendous job. I shared your feelings each time you had to call the difficult shots. I just want to say that this was political and military leadership of the highest order, and I just want to congratulate you. Please pass the congratulations to your colleagues. (Ø)

The President: I'll sure do it. Barbara is here and is sending her love. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: Please give her my love, too. (C)

The President: I'll do it. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
on February 28 (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME February 28, 1991, 7:03 - 7:15 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The Prime Minister called the President to offer congratulations on the Gulf situation. (S)

The President: Toshiki, good morning. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: George. Congratulations! (U)

The President: Thank you so much. It is a great relief to have this over -- if, I say, if Saddam Hussein does what he ought to do. Unfortunately, Baghdad radio is still broadcasting absurd propaganda. As far as we are concerned, we have completed the job and I really appreciate your phone call of congratulations. (S)

Prime Minister Kaifu: I was very much moved by your television speech in which you announced your decision. (U)

The President: Our military leaders feel very comfortable with this decision. I did not want to put our forces at risk but they felt that it was appropriate too. (S)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Let me restate my admiration for your unwavering resolve not to condone aggression, and your wide ranging leadership of the coalition. At the same time I want to praise highly the servicemen and women of the U.S. and other members of the multinational forces. I want to extend my sympathies to the bereaved families of soldiers who were lost. (S)

The President: We are very thankful that there were relatively low casualties but I appreciate your expression of sympathy. (U)

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Prime Minister Kaifu: What is important now George, is that Saddam Hussein accept your proposal promptly and unconditionally, and implement the resolutions. I have just said to the Japanese people that it was of utmost importance that Saddam Hussein do this. (Ø)

The President: That is an important point and I appreciate your going public with that to the Japanese people. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Lastly, many tasks remain for the restoration of peace and stability in the region. That is why I want to send Foreign Minister Nakayama to consult with Secretary Baker. (Ø)

The President: That is very important. Would you like to have Secretary Baker contact you? (Ø)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Our Embassy in Washington will contact the Secretary. (Ø)

The President: General Scowcroft is here and he or I will tell Secretary Baker about Foreign Minister Nakayama. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Thank you. (U)

The President: I am pleased very much with the cooperation that you have given us and look forward to more cooperation in the future, and I need to start focusing on when I can accept your invitation to come to Japan. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Thank you. I am very much looking forward to receiving you in Japan. (U)

The President: Goodbye sir and its nice to talk to you. I am grateful for the call. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Goodbye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns (notetaker)

DATE, TIME: February 28, 1991, 8:05 a.m. - 8:17 a.m.

AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Turgut, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: I am calling to congratulate you for a speedy
victory. (U)

The President: Thank you for the call. I should be calling you
for your total cooperation on this. The trouble is Baghdad radio
is saying the Iraqis won the war and that the U.S. quit. That
makes finding an end to this difficult. (Ø)

President Ozal: Will your commanders meet with their commanders?
(Ø)

The President: There will be no formal conference through that
channel. But we hope to be able to arrange a meeting to work
out details on prisoners of war. (Ø)

President Ozal: They will have some difficult conditions. (Ø)

The President: Do you think so? (U)

President Ozal: Their commanders may have some. (Ø)

The President: The Iraqi commanders are in no position to make
conditions. They must accept the just conditions we have laid
down. We will not give one inch. They will meet our demands.
Our military is comfortable with the cease-fire. We destroyed
their offensive capabilities. There is no point in killing
individual soldiers. (Ø)

President Ozal: You destroyed their armor? (Ø)

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The President: That is true. The damage was enormous. My problem is that they don't realize that because the radio is saying otherwise. We have work to do. I share your enthusiasm that the killing is probably over but we also need to make sure there will be no SCUDs fired against other countries like yours. (S)

President Ozal: Your commanders should ask that their SCUDs be eliminated. (S)

The President: We're discussing that now -- the elimination of the SCUDs and the other rockets. I know that is important to all of you who are within range. (S)

President Ozal: There are Republican Guards in Baghdad. (S)

The President: Yes, but they are infantry. They are not heavily mechanized. I'm not sure there are armored units there. Brent Scowcroft says no, there are no heavy guard units near Baghdad. (S)

President Ozal: You should ask the Iraqis to put their forces under UN control. He should accept disarmament of his army. (S)

The President: The only danger to total disarmament is that would make them a target for others. We don't want to tempt Iran. But they shouldn't be able to rearm. Our military says Iraq is destroyed as an offensive threat. We have destroyed over 4,000 tanks. (S)

President Ozal: George, I want to humiliate him even more. He is making propaganda. (S)

The President: I agree. I want him out. We can't have normal relations with him. I agree with you. I want to find ways to do anything to encourage them to get him out. We can't have him there. (S)

President Ozal: Yes. On our border there are ten Iraqi divisions. One is a Republican Guard Brigade. I am not afraid of them and do not rate them highly. (S)

The President: We will cover Turkey's security requirements. We will be in close touch. Don't worry. Maybe we can make this a condition. Please stay in close touch. (S)

President Ozal: I am not afraid of Iraq. But the problem is Saddam Hussein and the Revolutionary Command Council will be in power. They could launch terrorist activities in the future. There will be lots of problems in Iraq in the future. (S)

The President: I am sure of it. We will consider any positive suggestions you have. We are interested in the same thing: getting Saddam Hussein out. I was just handed a note that says Iraqi forces outside the Kuwaiti theater are smaller and lower in quality than those in the Kuwaiti theater. (S)

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President Ozal: The question is you must put Iraq in a difficult situation by asking it to disarm. (S)

The President: Brent Scowcroft pointed out there are two Republican Guard infantry brigades in Baghdad. They have some armor but our assessment is they are not a threat. They remain there and there is a chance they could reposition these forces to block a coalition advance. But the Iraqis are decimated and their morale is gone. They did exactly what you said they would do. There are 50,000 POWs. It was a one hundred hour war. That is humiliating for them. (S)

President Ozal: You should leaflet them. (U)

The President: We will do so. (U)

President Ozal: Will you fly your planes over Iraq? What will you do if they attack them? (S)

The President: We will hit back. We won't let up on them. I will keep in mind your security requirements. If you don't feel Turkey's interests are being properly considered, give me a call. Okay, Turgut, it has been a joy to work with you. We'll stay in touch by phone. Don't watch CNN so much. Get some rest. I'm turning them all off. I'm getting tired of it. (S)

President Ozal: Okay, I'll watch BBC. (U)

The President: We want to do what is right by Turkey. (S)

President Ozal: You tell Powell that I remember he said we shouldn't underestimate the Iraqi forces. When he told me that in September, I disagreed. (S)

The President: I'll tell him. I'll remind him. He has done a marvelous job. Thank you so much for your support. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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1478

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico,
on February 28, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Salinas, President
Notetaker: Nancy Bearg Dyke

DATE, TIME February 28, 1991, 9:31 - 9:37 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, my friend. How are you? (U)

President Salinas: I wanted to call to congratulate you on the decisive victory for the US and coalition. (U)

The President: You are nice to call. It is a victory, and our forces and the coalition forces did a superb job. But, there is no sense of elation because it is not really over. That man (Saddam Hussein) is still putting out propaganda and failing to recognize what has happened. I am pleased with how it has gone up to now and that the killing has stopped. (U)

President Salinas: People know he is a liar. (U)

The President: Do you think they do? (U)

President Salinas: The returning Iraqi soldiers will tell the truth: They had no feeding, no leadership, no support. (U)

The President: Yes, but the problem is he is still there and putting out propaganda. The troops will tell the truth, I agree. The destruction has been tremendous. In the debriefing of 50,000 prisoners of war, many are turning on him and saying he lied, he deceived them. I know it will work out in the end. I am pleased, but it's not a clean finish yet. (U)

President Salinas: Congratulations on your masterful political handling of the situation. (U)

The President: It was a team effort -- Jim Baker and Scowcroft and his team. I got good advice. The UN part was good --

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yourself included. Things fell into place. Diplomacy worked well. I am being given more personal credit than I deserve. (U)

President Salinas: You put at risk your political career with your decisions, and for that you deserve credit. (U)

The President: You're nice to say so. How are things at home? (U)

President Salinas: Fine. People are supportive of fulfilling the UN resolutions. (U)

The President: Good. There is more work coming for the UN. The UN has to cross the Ts and dot the Is. Now we can shift back to other matters. My interest in this hemisphere is not diminished but I have just been focusing on the Gulf. (U)

President Salinas: I was so pleased that on the same day as the ceasefire, you approved the free trade negotiations (?). (He was probably referring to the sending of the Enterprise for the Americas legislation to the Congress.) (U)

The President: It's not hollow rhetoric and we won't forget it. I appreciate your call and know this has posed political difficulties for you too, so I appreciate your support. Are you coming here any time soon? (U)

President Salinas: In April I will go to Canada to see Brian Mulroney, then to the University of Chicago and San Antonio. (U)

The President: If I am down there or you are around here, we could have a cup of coffee. It is good for us to stay in touch, so you'd be welcome to come in. What is the San Antonio appearance? (U)

President Salinas: Thirty centuries of Mexican art. (U)

The President: I think I know someone putting that on. (U)

President Salinas: Congratulations again. (U)

The President: Love to your wonderful family. (U)

President Salinas: Same to yours. (U)

The two parties say goodbye to each other. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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1484

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Rafael Callejas of Honduras (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Rafael Callejas, President of Honduras
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli

DATE, TIME February 28, 1991, 1:10 - 1:13 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office - Presidential Office

The President returned a call from President Callejas to discuss events in the Persian Gulf. (U)

The President: Hello, how are you, my friend? (U)

President Callejas: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: Well, it is good to hear your voice. I am very happy to hear from you. (U)

President Callejas: I know from reading the news that you have been under a lot of stress and strain during the last few days. I want you to know that I am very proud of the excellent leadership you have shown in constructing a new world order. (U)

The President: You are very sweet to say that. I really appreciate that. We are trying the best we can for a new world order. We are trying to work with our friends within the hemisphere for that. Knowing that we have your support, and support from others in the hemisphere, makes things easier. I am very grateful, and pleased to hear from you. (U)

President Callejas: Your actions in the Persian Gulf have been a tremendous success. I have followed them closely here, and I have seen your speeches on the news. What you did, if I may say this, required a lot of guts, a lot of courage. Without that, a new order would not be a success. I am satisfied and proud that Honduras will be a part of a new world order. (U)

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The President: Well, we have a lot to do for that. I want you to know that we are not going to neglect our friends in the hemisphere either. Tell me, how are things back at home in your country? (C)

President Callejas: Things are not easy. We have a lot of cooperation from the United States. But these are tough times. We have had close relations with you. I believe that we [in Honduras] can work out our economic problems. We are looking ahead. (C)

The President: That is good to hear. Good luck. We are ready to pitch in and do our share to help you out. (C)

President Callejas: We admire all you have done, Mr. President. You have worked to defend the rule of law. The position you took is very positive from the perspective of a country like Honduras: no longer can a neighboring country come along and double you up simply because it is stronger. (C)

The President: That is a good way to look at it. We are looking at it as an accomplishment, which you put very well in terms of defending the rule of law. Another development is that there is a new patriotic spirit here. We have gotten beyond the Vietnam divisions and the Vietnam syndrome. For us, this is an additional positive point. (C)

President Callejas: We are happy with the way things worked out. You chose the best and most efficient way of handling things. (C)

The President: Thank you. I am sitting here with the Secretary of State, Brent Scowcroft, and Bob Gates. They will be very interested in what you have said and I will certainly share it with them. Well, good luck and stay in touch. (C)

President Callejas: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Thanks again so much for your call. Goodbye. (U)

President Callejas: Goodbye. (U)

End of conversation

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19. Telcon	Re: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on February 28, 1991 (3 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/91 - 3/6/91

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By 31 (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429F(823)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/12/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on February 28, 1991


PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter: Ambassador Bandar bin Sultan
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME February 28, 1991; 6:58 - 7:19 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: I wanted to call to say how grateful the American people and I are to you, and for all your support. I was very happy to hear of the performance of your brave army. Today, I met with your Ambassador and I told him of our deep friendship. I hope that the enthusiasm of the Saudi people is as strong as that of the American people. We are solidly behind the coalition and all that it has done. I was simply calling to say thank you for the extraordinary cooperation and to congratulate you and your commanders and your soldiers in the field. (U)

King Fahd:



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The President: I am grateful for those kind words but we still have work to do. I want to stay in very close touch as we move ahead to cement the military victory and move to the political front, so that Saudi Arabia and the United States remain as close together as we were during the battle. (U)

King Fahd: I can assure you that in Saudi Arabia and with our GCC partners, there is complete agreement that we must have total harmony in the next battle, the political one, so that we can have the same success. (U)

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The President: Permit me a question -- what are the chances of Saddam Hussein remaining in power or what are the chances of him being thrown out by his disillusioned people? (C)

King Fahd: Before this crisis, we knew that the Iraqi people did not support or want Saddam Hussein, but for fear of retribution could not open their mouths. Now, it is a different story and a different reality. This could induce something. (C)

The President: If there is anything the United States can do to have him pushed out, I'd be very interested to hear it. We have no fight with the Iraqi people but I don't see how we can have improved, comfortable relations if he is in power. (C)

King Fahd: That is a fact. I'm confident that the Iraqi people want to get rid of this man. I have hosted a large gathering of Iraqis from all sectors of life in Riyadh now -- all agree that they want to get rid of him. They are outside but they have their connections inside. We are working with them. (C)

The President: Please tell them that there is no bitterness in our hearts for the Iraqi people, we have no quarrel with them. We wish them well in returning Iraq to its people. (C)

King Fahd: Those people believe in their cause and in Iraq, and that it cannot progress with him in charge. All are agreed that Iraq must be rescued; the question is how and when. They represent various cross-sections of society. (C)

The President: There is another point. Your Ambassador came in today and there was some good TV coverage that I hope will be seen there; it was good for us and for Saudi Arabia. I asked him about Jordan, and how you feel. I know that there are great difficulties between you and Jordan, and between the United States and Jordan. We have had a long relationship with Jordan and you have had a long relationship with Jordan. I hope we can go back to a better relationship with a stable Jordan that will not cater to left wing radicals. I want to assure you I know of your country's feelings on this matter. I want to stay in close touch, since someday we will need to support the King or some replacement who is moderate and reasonable. But I want you to know that we will not rehabilitate him prematurely or do anything that will strain relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States on this matter. (C)

King Fahd: I appreciate this and I am watching the situation carefully, weighing all the options taking into account the internal and external situations there. I have ideas and I will share these with Secretary Baker. We are looking at this objectively and for our mutual interest. (C)

The President: I won't press on this open line, but please understand I have had a long and personal relationship with the King. I intend to work very closely with you on what we should do. (C)

King Fahd: I agree. I had the same thing. (C)

The President: Well, I just called to pay my respects. Thank you for the hospitality to U.S. forces and congratulations to General Khalid and the others in the Saudi armed forces. This is a moment of triumph and U.S.-Saudi relations are stronger than ever in history. (C)

King Fahd: I appreciate that. I feel the same way about the strength of our relations -- they have never been this high. All the Gulf states feel the same way. As for the hospitality to your forces, it was our duty. (C)

The President: Thank you, goodbye. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you, goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Hawke of Australia
on February 28, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Robert Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia
Douglas Paal, Notetaker

DATE, TIME February 28, 1991 4:10 p.m. - 4:20 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Hawke telephoned the President to congratulate him on the successful completion of the Persian Gulf War. (U)

PM Hawke: Hi, George. (U)

The President: Yes, Bob, how are you? (U)

PM Hawke: I am very well, thank you. Congratulations my friend on a magnificent effort. Your speech was superb. (U)

The President: Thank you, and I really appreciate your comments to your people, which were reported on the UPI wire, I think, this morning. (U)

PM Hawke: The cease-fire appears to be holding. (U)

The President: Yes, I am grateful it appears to be holding. In fact, Iraq has just agreed to send military representatives to start working out details of the cease-fire. They agreed to begin working on exchanges of people, including POWs, which is of great concern to the American people. The military conditions are there to put a permanent cease-fire in place. (U)

PM Hawke: Do you have any intelligence on where Saddam Hussein may be, on his position? (U)

The President: We have very little. There are reports of unrest in Baghdad. We are unable to confirm them. There is a feeling here that once the people know how devastating the defeat was... Now, Baghdad radio is spouting stuff from "Baghdad command."

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Baghdad radio is still reporting victory. The people are not getting the facts. There is feeling here in the analytical community that the man will not be able to survive this. (Ø)

PM Hawke: I see. I was glad to see that you went to the issues we will have to address after the war in the region. Until we get those other questions settled... We will have to step out. (Ø)

The President: Jim Baker will be going out right away to start working on the other problems, including the Palestinians and trying to do something about Lebanon. (Ø)

PM Hawke: Right! Do you have any sense what difficulties our Israeli friends will be? (Ø)

The President: We are getting differing reports. I think it will be tough. They think we owe them something for staying out of the war, but we have taken care of their number one enemy and it seems there should be some gratitude. I hope they will be more forthcoming. With the PLO fractured by being on the wrong side, maybe we have a chance now. (Ø)

PM Hawke: I certainly hope so. Their intransigence in the pre-war period with you was certainly unhelpful. You have got to hope they understand that they have got to be prepared to show some flexibility. (Ø)

The President: We will be pushing for that. I have an obligation to try very hard here. In diminishing the threat of Saddam Hussein, we have taken care of one of their most threatening enemies. (Ø)

PM Hawke: George, one other question, my dear friend. What is your reading of the position of King Hussein? I know we have been terribly disappointed with his position, how do you read the fallout in Jordan? (Ø)

The President: So far they have been quiet. I recall that King Hussein said he was reflecting the views of the government when he made his first statement. Then we sent a private emissary to see him and he came out very critical of us. Then he issued a blast. I think that set him back in American public opinion. Now he has sent a feeler out that says he wants to have better relations. It is my judgment that we do not want a vacuum there. He turned on us more than he needed. He hurt himself, but I think he is worth trying to work with, but the coalition partners, especially the Arab partners of the coalition, are very, very upset with him. (Ø)

PM Hawke: I agree with your assessment that in the current circumstances he is our best bet. (Ø)

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The President: I like him, and I know you do, too, Bob. He is in a very tough position, I empathize with him, but he went overboard more than he had to. (U)

PM Hawke: George, I know how terribly busy you are. I want to really thank you for how we have been able to share thoughts on this area. I appreciate those opportunities. Again it has been a splendid performance. The way you handled all areas from the beginning, running on about four different tracks -- the logistics, the UN, bilateral relations, and your own constituency and Congress. I have been very proud to be associated with it. (U)

The President: It has been a pleasure to be side by side. Thank you for your call. (U)

PM Hawke: Okay, George, Goodbye. (U)

The President: Over and out. Thank you. (U)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
21. Telcon	Re: Telcon with King Juan Carlos of Spain on February 28, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/91 - 3/6/91

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By gc (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(825)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with King Juan Carlos of Spain on February 28, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Juan Carlos, King of Spain
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 28, 1991, 3:05 - 3:11 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Your Majesty. (U)

King Juan Carlos: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: How are you, sir? (U)

King Juan Carlos: Well, I am very, very happy and I wanted to tell you today -- I know how hectic it must be there -- I wanted to tell you how proud we feel and how happy we feel, myself and the Spanish people, on this peaceful day that is starting. (C)

The President: Aren't you nice to call and I'm very grateful for this phone call on behalf of you and the people of Spain. And I might take this opportunity to say how grateful we are to the Government of Spain for its cooperation. I know it hasn't been easy for the government, but you came through. It is a wonderful, great day, isn't it? (C)

King Juan Carlos: As a military man, I also want to tell you the military have been so proud of General Schwarzkopf because he's been so fantastic and if you can tell him from me that I hope to meet him one day. (C)

The President: I know he would be honored and when things calm down, he would love to pay his respects. I'll be sure he has that message personally relayed from you to me to him. He is a great guy. I don't know if you saw his CNN briefing? He is very good. (C)

King Juan Carlos: Yes, all of it. (U)

The President: He says it well and we're quite proud. And that is the same for General Powell. We are also proud of him. I don't know if you know him, but he has been a strong guiding hand on the military side. (C)

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King Juan Carlos: I wanted to tell you he is very good and I don't want to forget Cheney and all of them. (C)

The President: You're nice to say so. You have my sincere thanks. Our Vice President came back and said he loved seeing you. Thank you for your courtesy to him. (C)

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The President: I am glad to know that and I never doubted where you would be on this. It is very gratifying to see how the coalition and all the countries held together. I hope that we can get this matter finally concluded and then work for a more peaceful world. I know we have a better chance to play a more peaceful role. (C)

King Juan Carlos: I really hope for the best for all. I spoke to other European Chiefs of State to tell them how happy we were and I talked to the UN and Perez de Cuellar and I can tell you here in Spain -- privately, as a friend -- some newspapers were even sad about it which I think is awful to say, Mr. President, but- (C)

The President: Well, listen, I'll never forget our very pleasant, all too short, supper over there in Tokyo. (C)

King Juan Carlos: You are very sincere. I've been looking to see if we can go over and get together again. I hope we have the time to do so and now we have to work together in this new way of peace and integrate security in the Middle East. (C)

The President: We'll try together and we look forward to seeing you. Please give my respects to the Queen. (C)

King Juan Carlos: And to Barbara our love and sympathy and to you all my congratulations. (C)

The President: Thank you very much. (U)

King Juan Carlos: Don't hesitate if there is anything you want me to say or the government. And please don't hesitate to call the Prime Minister. I will tell him I talked to you. (C)

The President: Please tell him thanks and I'll remember what you've told me. I won't impose on you but I'll remember. (C)

King Juan Carlos: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Jim Bolger of
New Zealand on February 28, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Jim Bolger
Notetaker: Douglas Paal

DATE, TIME February 28, 1991 6:34 - 6:40 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Bolger telephoned the President to congratulate him on the successful completion of the Persian Gulf war. (U)

The President: Hello, Mr. Prime Minister. (U)

PM Bolger: Mr. President, good afternoon. Thank you for accepting my call. I know you are terribly busy. I wanted to call to congratulate you on the Gulf. It was quite remarkable. (U)

The President: You are nice to call. The problem is not all over, though I am very relieved. You are very, very nice to call. (U)

PM Bolger: I wanted to hand on my personal congratulations for your fine performance. (U)

The President: I was pleased we were all together on the objectives. It certainly was a team effort, we had a magnificent response. It was a marvelous thing. We have a new found credibility. We want to work with yourselves and others to find peace. Our country has not been so united and patriotic since World War II. (U)

PM Bolger: Another reason, your country has been pounded on. I hope you will gain the respect you should gain. Hope you gain satisfaction in the credibility, despite our sympathy for those who were killed. You must be pleased with your military men, your top staff, and their judgment. (U)

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The President: Not being a military man myself, except for the service we all do, I left it to my military leaders. I left it to my generals. I have total confidence in them. I caught hell for sending more troops, but I took their advice. It was terrible about the casualties, we lost nine Brits to friendly fire. The pilot will carry it with him the rest of his life. The Brits understand, but casualties were low. (✓)

PM Bolger: I spoke with John Major this morning, he too was happy, while regretting the losses. He had wondered how formidable Iraq would be, and did not know. Your team is superb. (✓)

The President: You are very nice, generous, and, I think, accurate, too. I am grateful for your call and have not lost one iota of affection for New Zealand. I hope to get going on our differences. (✓)

PM Bolger: If I may just respond to that, there is no loss of affection here. We have strong admiration. We are working closely with Carla Hills on GATT. Yes, we have our differences. (✓)

The President: Our Ambassador out there is an old friend, Della, she is your campaign manager. Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for your call. (U)

PM Bolger: Thank you. Have a little rest. (U)

The President: Over and out. (U)

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MARCH 1991

MUBARAK

MAR 1 - PRESIDENT MUBARAK CALLED THE PRES
AT 1601 - TERMINATED 1608. WELCH MONITORED.
PRES WASH

MAJOR

MAR 2 - PRES CALLED SECURE TO UK PRIME
MINISTER MAJOR AT 1500. SCOWCROFT MONITORED.
NO TERMINATION TIME RECORDED. PRES AT CAMP
DAVID.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Menem of Argentina (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Menem, President of Argentina
Interpreter: Patricia Arizu (U.S.)
Sheila Fernandez Mojan
(Argentina)
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli

DATE, TIME March 4, 1991, 4:04 - 4:13 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office - Presidential Office

The President returned a call from President Menem on March 4 to discuss the vote on Cuba in the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. President Menem's call followed an unsuccessful attempt by the Vice President to reach him on March 2. (U)

Before the President came on line, President Menem, speaking to his staff, asked if the call was being recorded. He then referred to activities by technicians on his staff. (U)

The President: Hello. (U)

President Menem: Hello. (U)

The President: How are you, Mr. President? (U)

President Menem: Very well, George, and how are you? (U)

The President: I'm feeling well, and I am glad to hear from you. (U)

President Menem: The same. I was calling to send you a warm and fraternal embrace, and congratulations, in the name of the people and government of Argentina for the great success you have had in the Persian Gulf war. You have shown tolerance and courage in pursuing this end, and this has been recognized by your people. We will have President Bush for quite some time doing this job in the United States. (U)

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The President: Well, I don't know about that. But right now, there is great support for our troops and for success in reaching our objectives. But again, this is a team effort, and we are grateful for you taking what I think was a historical position to send forces to participate in the Gulf. (C)

President Menem: Yes. (U)

The President: I think the naval vessels that you provided sent a good strong signal against Saddam's aggression. You sent them early in the conflict, and I know that wasn't easy. It was a very important action. (C)

Carlos, while I have you, can I raise one additional subject?
(U)

President Menem: Yes, of course. (U)

The President: I am thinking of the United Nations Human Rights Commission meetings in Geneva. Once again, it is seized with the issue of human rights in Cuba. I haven't followed the discussions all that closely, but we are getting down to the wire now. We, along with a number of other countries, asked for the appointment of a special rapporteur to review the human rights situation in Cuba. I don't think that we have too big a difference with Argentina on this, but I believe you think that the rapporteur ought to make a private visit and that he do a private report. (C)

But given the focus on human rights around the world, we think that a public process would put Castro on notice and would benefit the people of Cuba. I am just worried that Castro will view a private investigation and report and see it as a retreat by the world community. So if there is a way for Argentina to support a public process, we would appreciate it. (C)

President Menem: Well, what I would like to say is that our earlier position came from the Rio meeting of the Group of Eight. It is being changed now. We are taking steps to review that decision. It is going to be changed. I have already given instructions after Vice President Quayle spoke to us. The instructions are now oriented to do what you are expressing at this moment. That is all I can say for the present. But be assured that things will work out in agreement. (C)

The President: Well, I appreciate that. We applaud your willingness to look at the situation. I hate to get in touch on what Dan Quayle has mentioned, but it was very important that you know our views. And I want to thank you for your position. (C)

In any event, I also want to thank you for your kind words about the situation in the Gulf. I am so glad to have it over. Knowing of your special interest in the area, one, we are pleased

Knowing of your special interest in the area, one, we are pleased with your serious cooperation with the naval vessels, and two, as we try to move forward with a comprehensive settlement to the Palestinian question, I remember and will keep in mind your kind offer to help out. (U)

President Menem: George, thanks for all that you have said. I spoke with the Amir of Kuwait to congratulate him, and with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. But I could not fail to speak to you, which is similar to saying, to speak to the people of the United States. Once again, a very strong abrazo, and if there is anything else I can do, or if there is anything I can do for the cause of peace in the Middle East, all you have to do is call on me. (U)

I send a warm greeting to your family and to your wife, Barbara. (U)

The President: Thank you. Give my love to your lovely family, and I can't tell you how much I appreciate this call. Over and out. (U)

President Menem: Good bye, and good luck. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

End of conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon to Pope John Paul II (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Pope John Paul II
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME: March 5, 1991, 7:23 - 7:30 a.m.

AND PLACE: The Oval Office

... Holiness, how are you, sir? I am delighted
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*Call was
made on March 6*

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helpful in the peace process. I have great respect for that
influence. We must also be concerned about human rights in the
region. (Ø)

Pope John Paul II: Yes, that is very important. It is difficult
for the many Christian minorities in the Islamic countries,
including the one in Saudi Arabia. (Ø)

The President: That is true, and we are trying, even though the
problems are very, very difficult. (Ø)

Pope John Paul II: They are still living in some tension. Some
Moslems still view them negatively. (Ø)

The President: I hope we are now at the beginning of a new
situation. (Ø)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon to Pope John Paul II (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Pope John Paul II
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME March 5, 1991, 7:23 - 7:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Your Holiness, how are you, sir? I am delighted to hear your voice. Now that the war is over, I wanted to be in touch. I believe we have an important opportunity for peace in the Middle East. (✓)

Pope John Paul II: Yes, it is an important opportunity from my viewpoint also. (U)

The President: I know of your interest in peace and of your concerns about Lebanon, about the Palestinian question, and about the Christian minorities in several other countries of the region. (✓)

Pope John Paul II: It is very important that we work to bring peace to this region, but some problems remain unresolved. (✓)

The President: Yes, I realize that and that is why Jim Baker is en route to the region. We want peace, but not peace at any price. I share your concern about the Christian minorities in the Arab countries, and I think that your moral influence can be helpful in the peace process. I have great respect for that influence. We must also be concerned about human rights in the region. (✓)

Pope John Paul II: Yes, that is very important. It is difficult for the many Christian minorities in the Islamic countries, including the one in Saudi Arabia. (✓)

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Pope John Paul II: Some of the Christians of the region are still having problems with fundamentalist groups. I was concerned that Saddam Hussein would encourage the fundamentalists. (Ø)

The President: I think that was a danger, but putting down Saddam Hussein should help to alleviate the problem. I just wanted you to know of the efforts we are making in the cause of peace, because I know of your commitment to peace in the region. (Ø)

Pope John Paul II: I pray every day for this result. (U)

The President: I hope our paths will cross soon, although I have no plans as yet to be in Italy in the foreseeable future. Despite the war with Iraq, the United States is prepared to do its part for peace. (Ø)

Pope John Paul II: Perhaps there is a new occasion for peace appearing now. (Ø)

The President: All I wanted you to know is that we will be trying. (Ø)

Pope John Paul II: Yes, and I will be praying for the success of your efforts. (Ø)

The President: Please give my respects to Cardinal Casaroli. Barbara joins me in paying our respects to you as well, Your Holiness. (U)

Pope John Paul II: I am very grateful for your call and my respects to you as well. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Pope John Paul II: Some of the Christians of the region are still having problems with fundamentalist groups. I was concerned that Saddam Hussein would encourage the fundamentalists. (C)

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The President: Please give my respects to Cardinal Casaroli. Barbara joins me in paying our respects to you as well, Your Holiness. (U)

Pope John Paul II: I am very grateful for your call and my respects to you as well. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Chamorro of Nicaragua (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Violeta Chamorro, President of Nicaragua
Interpreter: Patricia Arizu
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli, NSC

DATE, TIME March 6, 1991, 1:31 - 1:40 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office - Presidential Office

The President returned a call that President Chamorro had made at 1:18 p.m., March 6. (U)

The President: OK, Violeta, please go ahead. (U)

President Chamorro: I am calling to congratulate you on the liberation of Kuwait. (Ø)

The President: [Without waiting for translation of the above into English] Muchas gracias. (U)

President Chamorro: Ah, you understood me! Very good. I would have called you earlier, but I just was not able to make the call. (Ø)

The President: There is no problem in that. I appreciate the sentiments you have expressed. And I am very pleased that the war is over. Now, Jim Baker, who sends his very best regards to you -- he was here just two minutes ago -- is leaving on a very important trip to try to bring peace to the Middle East. (Ø)

[At this point there was the sound of music on the telephone.]

President Chamorro: What is that music? (U)

The President: I am not sure where that music is coming from. I sure hope that it is not [White House] Signal. (Ø)

[The music stops.] (U)

Please go ahead, Violeta, I can hear you. (U)

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President Chamorro: I also wanted to tell you about the economic measures we adopted which were announced on March 4. These measures are intended to eliminate inflation and improve the economy. (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Chamorro: My first goal from the first day I took office, February 25, 1990, was to stop the war through dialogue. This I was able to do through an accord on national reconciliation. Now, I am turning to the economy. Improving the economy was the second priority I had when I took office. (U)

The President: Madam President, what is the reaction of the Sandinistas to your cooperative approach? (U)

President Chamorro: Until today, it has been a success. I would say, very successful. I have been walking through the streets of Managua, and I have encountered many Sandinistas, and I have the support of most of them. Until now, I have had no problem. (U)

The President: Wonderful. We congratulate you on the economic reform measures. Knowing of your call, I brought myself up to date with information about what they are. (U)

President Chamorro: Oh, so you already knew about them from your own information? Perfect. There is another matter. I wish to have your help with regard to assistance from AID. (U)

The President: Yes? (U)

President Chamorro: I need very flexible terms. This has a major role in my economic plan. (U)

The President: Well, I don't have an answer for you on that. I can look into it and see. I thank you for letting me know about the importance of it. (U)

President Chamorro: Yes, of course. I will send you a short letter explaining about the plan so you will know about it. (U)

The President: I will be delighted to read it. I appreciate it very much. (U)

President Chamorro: This was the principal reason for my call. We could spend all day talking about this, Mr. President, but I will let you go. I salute you again. And I send special greetings to my good friend Barbara, and hope all goes well for her. And as for you, we will see each other in April. I thank you very much for taking this call. My best to you, and thank you for all you have done for Nicaragua. (U)

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The President: Thank you. I am also looking forward to seeing you on the State Visit. During the visit, I do want to talk about some important security issues, such as that the Sandinistas should not help the FMLN. Also, I noted your courageous efforts to get to the bottom of the Bermudez matter. That case seems to be having some important effects, both down there and up here. I do not really have time to discuss these issues now, but I just wanted to mention them. (Ø)

President Chamorro: Of course. We will talk about them next month when I see you there. I want to assure you now that I am firmly against all assassinations. I have also condemned Sandinista arms transfers to El Salvador. And in fact, President Cristiani thanked me for doing so. (Ø)

The President: Well, thank you again. I will check into the AID question, and I look forward to seeing you. (Ø)

President Chamorro: [In English] I send a big kiss to you, my dear friend. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. God bless. Adios. (U)

President Chamorro: Good bye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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1649

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Nelson Mandela of
South Africa on March 6, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Nelson Mandela, African National Congress of
South Africa
Notetakers: Robert C. Frasure
Charles Grahl, SWO

DATE, TIME March 6, 1991, 9:45 - 10:02 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Bush telephoned Nelson Mandela who had expressed a
desire to speak to the President on the sanctions issue. (Ø)

The President: Mr. Mandela? How are you? (U)

Mr. Mandela: I'm very well. I'm happy to hear your voice. (U)

The President: What do you have on your mind? I think you were
trying to call me. (U)

Mr. Mandela: I have your letter to me. And I have Hank Cohen's
letter. In the context of your letter, we have had a chat in the
ANC National Executive. (Ø)

We thank you for your letter. (U)

I have two issues I want to raise with you; first, the sanctions
issue and then secondly the Gulf. (Ø)

The President: Please go ahead. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Firstly on the Gulf, I don't know whether you have
seen the full text of the statement we made. (Ø)

The President: No. But I have seen a summary. (U)

Mr. Mandela: We intended to make a balanced statement. We hoped
it would be welcomed by all. We say that the following items are
critical: withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the resolution of
the dispute by bilateral negotiation. Our view is similar to the
UN. (Ø)

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Secondly, there should be the convening of an international conference for a comprehensive settlement of the problems of the Middle East including the restoration of rights to the Palestinians and the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories. That is also similar to what the UN has said. (S)

Finally, we wished to oppose the efforts of the White minority government on the Gulf in offering facilities to participants. We are committed to peace and wanted to make a contribution. (S)

Lastly, we called on the government and the police to stop harassing our people who were demonstrating about the Gulf. (S)

That was the totality of the statement. We were disturbed that you took exception to it. (S)

We wanted to handle the issue in a way to draw people together. (S)

On sanctions, we note what you say in the letter and welcome that you will take us into your confidence. We also recall that our International Affairs Director Thabo Mbeki met recently with Mr. Bob Frasure, your Africa Director, and with Mr. Hank Cohen. We should want to leave the matter as we discussed it with Mr. Frasure. I'm sure that when all conditions in your legislation have been settled, you will be able to lift sanctions.

When that happens, we hope you can say that you won't support organizations that support Apartheid, that you can say on South African Airways for example, that Apartheid is still being practiced. You should tell South African Airways that the service should be democratic that all population groups should be represented, that you are not prepared to accept an Apartheid service. (S)

The President: I appreciate hearing your views. (U)

On the Gulf, I had not seen your total statement. But we opposed Palestinian linkage from the beginning. It plays into the hands of the brutal dictator Saddam Hussein. The UN stayed away from it. Maybe we have an honest difference of opinion. But linkage plays into their hands. (S)

Secondly, I reject any perception that puts the Coalition on the same moral ground as Iraq. Yemen, Cuba and a few others tried to do that. And the rest of the world didn't buy it. (S)

And I don't like being equated with Saddam Hussein. (S)

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I will say tonight that we want to play a constructive role in the region including on the Palestinian question and Israel on things like UN Resolution 242. (U)

We are very pleased that the war is over. Most people supported us and the UN. I didn't expect the ANC to support us. It engaged me. We had world support. When the South African government supported us, we welcomed it. I don't want to mislead you. (U)

Mr. Mandela: I have heard you. (U)

The President: I understand your concerns about not lifting sanctions too soon. And we welcome your views. (U)

Our legislation on the subject -- in particular the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act -- is very specific. (U)

Under that law, as certain events take place including the freeing of political prisoners and the repeal of Apartheid legislation, I am mandated by a very powerful Congress to take certain actions. (U)

Of course in doing so, I will be consulting with members of Congress and others. I welcome your views. I don't want to do anything to set back the irreversibility of the process. You should feel free to criticize and to send us suggestions. (U)

Of course, we won't be lifting some sanctions such as the arms embargo. (U)

My hands are bound, however, by very clear legislation. But I'm not going to do anything premature. I would welcome your continuous contact with Fraser and Cohen. And call me anytime. (U)

I like the open spirit of our communications. We need to keep the lines open to see whether the differences are real or not. It's better than reading about each other's views in the press. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Thank you. I have noted all of your remarks. I will pass them along to the ANC National Executive Committee. (U)

The President: Good. How do you feel? How is your health? (U)

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Mr. Mandela: I feel good, especially having heard your voice today. I'm planning to leave for a month's vacation. I will get to see the faces of animals rather than the faces of human beings. (C)

The President: Good. That will be good for you! All the best on your vacation and goodbye. (U)

Mr. Mandela: Goodbye to you, sir. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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SWAN

MAR 6 - PRES CALLED PREMIER SWAN OF BERMUDA AT
1312 - TERMINATED 1319. NICK BURNS MONITORED.
PRES IN WASH