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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91112
Folder ID Number: 91112-005

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/30/91 - 2/22/91

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	1/30/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Andres Rodriguez of Paraguay (2 pp.)	1/31/91	(b)(1)	C
03. Telcon	Re: Presidential Call to Prime Minister Nawaz of Pakistan on February 2, 1991 (4 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Telcon	Re: President's Call to the Amir of Qatar on February 2, 1991 (3 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Telcon	Re: President's Call to President Mubarak of Egypt on February 2, 1991 (3 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Telcon	Re: President's Call to the King of Saudi Arabia (3 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Telcon	Re: President's Call to the King of Saudi Arabia (3 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (4 pp.)	2/4/91	(b)(1)	C
09. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (2 pp.)	2/5/91	(b)(1)	C

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Collection:

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/30/91 - 2/22/91

Pinksheet Number: cap947
OA/ID Number: 91112-005
Date Closed: 2/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	2/5/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call with President Francois Mitterrand of France (3 pp.)	2/5/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (3 pp.)	2/5/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia on February 7, 1991 (4 pp.)	2/7/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (3 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Telcon	Re: President's Call to the UN Secretary General (4 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	S
16a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (1 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	S
16b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (6 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	S
17. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Shankar of India on February 8, 1991 (3 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	S
18. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (3 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S

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19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain (4 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S
20. Telcon	Re: Telcon with the Amir of Bahrain on February 9, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	C
21. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Moroccan King Hassan (4 pp.)	2/12/91	(b)(1)	C
22. Telcon	Re: President's Call to President Sheikh Zayyid of the United Arab Emirates (2 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	S
23. Telcon	Re: President's Call to the Sultan of Oman (4 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	S
24. Telcon	Re: President's Call to the Amir of Kuwait (2 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	S
25. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	S
26. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call with President Francois Mitterrand of France (3 pp.)	2/16/91	(b)(1)	S
27. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (4 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	S
28. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey on February 19, 1991 (3 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S

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29. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France on February 19, 1991 (4 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
30. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (4 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
31. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on February 20, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/20/91	(b)(1)	C
32. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR on February 21, 1991 (5 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S
33. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada on February 22, 1991 (3 pp.)	2/22/91	(b)(1)	S

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1157

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
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AS AMENDED
2009-0676-MR
JL 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME January 30, 1991, 1:15-1:26 p.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Turgut. How are you? (Ø)

President Ozal: Hello, George. How are you? Everything is fine. I saw your State of the Union message. God bless you. It was a good speech. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. I hope you didn't mind my mentioning your name. I wanted to give you credit on the peace side. (Ø)

President Ozal: The response from the Congress--the House and Senate -- was good. (Ø)

The President: Yes. I think it is a good signal to our friend in Baghdad. He still thinks there is division in my country. I told some of the Hill leaders that it sends a good signal. (Ø)

President Ozal: I think so. It is misleading. I was just listening to your Commander briefing on CNN. (Ø)

The President: Yes, we are watching it now. The war is going well. I am determined to stay on track. Did you see the Bessmertnykh joint statement that was issued yesterday? (Ø)

President Ozal: There was no difference. (Ø)

The President: There is no difference and there will be no pause to hope he will come to the table. The problem is with some of the wording in one of the paragraphs. Reporters thought there was a difference in our policy and tried to make something out of it. Please understand that we wouldn't go around behind the backs of our allies on a new course. There is no difference. We will pursue the war as you and I have discussed before. (Ø)

President Ozal: I know your position and am not worried. I listened to the State of the Union live at 5:00 a.m. in Ankara. (Ø)

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The President: My God. Get some sleep. (U)

I received your letter and will get back to you as soon as we can prepare a proper response. I understand your position. One other thing. I had to postpone the Moscow trip and hope you will understand I want to make a trip to Turkey and will get back to you. (Ø)

President Ozal: I understand. You have to be in Washington. By the way, I made a little needling of the Germans. (Ø)

The President: I saw that. What was their response? (U)

President Ozal: It was good. (U)

The President: Are they mad? (Ø)

President Ozal: They are not mad. It was the truth. There is too much discussion in Germany. Genscher is reluctant to admit that Article V is operational. (Ø)

The President: I think you got their attention. I've talked to Kohl several times but have heard no anger from him. (Ø)

President Ozal: Kohl is okay. Genscher was the problem. (Ø)

The President: How are things going in your part of the world? (U)

President Ozal: There is a lot of snow in the southeast. Your planes are operating out of Incirlik but are having trouble because of the bad weather. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate your letting us use Incirlik. (Ø)

President Ozal: We have big forces opposite Iraq. And there are eight Iraqi divisions there. The Iraqis are in a difficult situation. The people who have escaped say it is really bad. Many who want to escape are being killed. (Ø)

The President: We're getting the same thing in the south. They are discouraged, they have lice and nothing to eat. (Ø)

President Ozal: Let me tell you. The Saddam Hussein interview shows the situation. He is desperate. He wants to make propaganda. He is a crazy man. (Ø)

The President: CNN is a good mouthpiece for him. A lot of people are getting angry with CNN. It simply reports his programs. (Ø)

President Ozal: I feel the same way. He is alone. He is now calling others. He wants to make propaganda. (Ø)

The President: I think Saddam Hussein is more isolated. The

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dumping of the oil has drawn the environmental world against him now. They might have been sympathetic. It just turns more people against him. (S)

President Ozal: You continue to bomb them before sending your ground forces. (S)

The President: No question. There is no rush on the ground campaign. We will do what we have to do. The air campaign is making real progress. (S)

President Ozal: We see it. They are trying terrorism in my country but it is not that important. (S)

The President: He is trying to say we are bombing civilian targets but that is not true. Anyway, they show pictures of craters with grass growing in them. (S)

There is no change on our end. I am glad you understand there is no difference in the joint statement. (S)

President Ozal: I just called to congratulate you for the speech. (S)

The President: Thank you. (U)

One more question. Are you under control at home? Is everything okay? (S)

President Ozal: Yes. Everything is okay. There is no problem. (S)

The President: I won't worry but you are my friend and I've got to ask you. You're doing just great. Okay. Good-bye. (S)

President Ozal: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of conversation --

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0781

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Andres Rodriguez of Paraguay (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Andres Rodriguez, President of Paraguay
Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME January 31, 1991, 10:21 - 10:26 am EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Rodriguez telephoned the President concerning the situation in the Gulf. (U)

The President: Hello, President Rodriguez, this is George Bush. (U)

President Rodriguez: Hello? (U)

The President: (in Spanish) Como esta? (U)

President Rodriguez: Very well, terrific. Mr. President I want to convey to you my most cordial greeting, a special greeting to you and the American people. I also want to congratulate you for your firm speech to Congress on January 29, which I was privileged to watch here via CNN. (U)

The President: Thank you for those encouraging words. We firmly believe that we're on the right course, and that we will prevail. There is a lot of understandable discussion about CNN lately. We keep hearing a lot from Saddam. I want to tell you that the war and the battle is going about on schedule, with no surprises. But I'm very grateful to you for calling me with this message of support. (U)

President Rodriguez: Not at all. I want to express the support of the Paraguayan people for the courageous and serene attitude you've adopted in this crisis. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. I remember our visit several months ago, I think it was June of last year. I wish you well and thank you for calling me. (U)

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President Rodriguez: I appreciate tremendously that you would take time to receive this call from me. Please convey my warmest feelings of esteem to your family and especially to dear Doro.
(Ø)

The President: Doro was here just a few minutes ago. She was going off to the hospital where she works. When she heard about the call, she asked that I send her love to you and all your family. (U)

President Rodriguez: Thank you so much, and a warm abrazo. I'm with you in all of your intentions. I know everything will go well. I'm sure of it. (Ø)

The President: Thanks for calling and good-bye. (U)

President Rodriguez: Good-bye. (U)

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FEBRUARY 1991

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Call to Prime Minister Nawaz of
Pakistan on February 2, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME February 2, 1991; 10:30 - 10:50 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, hello. How are you? (U)

PM Nawaz: Good Morning. How are you? (U)

The President: Just fine. I am calling, actually this is a call I should have made sooner, to tell you how much we appreciate your courageous and firm support for the coalition's efforts to liberate Kuwait. I know this has not been easy for you. I have been following with some degree of thoroughness the situation in Pakistan. But with Pakistani forces shoulder-to-shoulder with those of 27 other countries, well, that's a wonderful thing, and I just wanted to tell you how grateful we are -- something I have neglected doing before and should have done sooner. (U)

PM Nawaz: I have made a commitment and am convinced we are doing the right thing. It is based on principle and we stand with you and the coalition. (U)

The President: I hope you know when we say we want our people out as soon as this is over, we mean it. And we don't want Iraq destroyed or harm to come to the people of Iraq. I keep saying this even though Saddam Hussein is saying something else. We are not trying to wipe out Iraq. We made this clear in our joint statement with the Soviets when their new Foreign Minister was here. We are trying to keep down civilian casualties and to safeguard religious and cultural shrines. But we are concerned about his disinformation. I wouldn't be surprised if he damaged them himself and then blamed the coalition. He has tried to make this a war between Islam and the West. We are doing what we can to resist this. I just wanted to tell you this personally. (U)

PM Nawaz: I trust you and believe you. I believe we are taking the right approach. It is my understanding from the Soviet President that you want Iraq to withdraw and then you could agree to a ceasefire. (U)

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The President: If they clearly withdraw. What we don't want is a ceasefire and then he rebuilds his forces. We want full implementation of the resolutions. If he stops, with his armor, and gets out of Kuwait, then we don't intend to bomb him and continue the war. But that is what comes first -- he must get out of Kuwait. They won't be under attack when he does. But I am not saying that there will be a ceasefire if he says he will withdraw. Then we would start all over again with the same propaganda as before. The Soviets understand this, and have clarified it. (S)

PM Nawaz: Mr. President, then you would not accept a ceasefire if he says yes he will withdraw and lays down a timeframe for you to consider, and then this would be the basis of a ceasefire. (S)

The President: We can't stop this until we know he is substantially on his way out of Kuwait. He has to cross many bridges getting out. His statements show he is not interested in getting out. So if he says we want one, just talking about withdrawal is not good enough. It would be unacceptable to the coalition. If a withdrawal is going forward, and it is thorough, and we are monitoring it to insure it is happening and we can go in to liberate Kuwait, and the Kuwaitis can go back, then that is a different game, a different formula. But just talking without leaving is not good enough. The coalition and others don't trust a word he says. (S)

PM Nawaz: We have been working on peace efforts. (C)

The President: Are you encouraged? (U)

PM Nawaz: There are people in his camp and the message from them is they would like to propose to be accepted a simultaneous withdrawal, which we know is not acceptable to us or the allies. (C)

The President: No, not at all. There need to be security provisions, and reparations as called for by UN resolution 674. He is not in a position to try to go out to declare victory. If he were, we'd face this aggression some other place at some other time. If he said he was fully complying, and not just talk about it -- and that would be clear soon -- but he is not in a position to make conditions. As I said, our goal is not the destruction of Iraq, but full compliance with the UN resolutions without conditions. Anything else is not good enough. And we don't want U.S. forces there one more day than they have to be. I mean that. I don't like the prospect of leaving US troops there. That would be bad. I will be interested if there is more in your talks with them, but we don't intend to accept any conditions. (S)

PM Nawaz: We will keep you posted on developments. (C)

The President: I know there is some opposition in your country. We have some in ours but support is strong. But watching TV on the demonstrations it is hard to believe. So Saddam feels the US won't support the president in what he is doing. He hoped it would have a backlash, but it has not materialized. He shouldn't get too much comfort from CNN watching these demonstrations. The polls show there is overwhelming support for us and the coalition. Saddam is misreading US public opinion. (C)

PM Nawaz: There is a problem with a section of people here. They have been demonstrating. I admit Saddam's public relations are very good and effective. I mentioned this to King Fahd and he said we must also organize an effective campaign to counter him. His envoy is coming here tomorrow. I also plan to take a trip abroad to press Saddam through the OIC. But I am not impressed by these demonstrations. Governments must take tough positions to defend just positions based on principle. I am not feeling pressure from many quarters. Most have taken a position that is supportive of our principles. (C)

The President: I saw something saying that Egyptian and Saudi Muslim leaders had declared a jihad against Saddam, but there have been no reports of that in any of the newspapers. (U)

PM Nawaz: I also consider it a jihad. He has no conception for what he is doing to Iraq. He has to be punished. He is responsible for the destruction of the Iraqi nation. I wanted to clarify one thing, if he accepts and agrees to withdraw and you accept a ceasefire with assurances -- if materially he has said yes, there could be a ceasefire. Otherwise, no one would stop fighting. (C)

The President: That is what everyone tried before January 15. There has been no indication since then that he is willing to leave Kuwait. In fact yesterday, I think it was yesterday, he made another statement to that effect. Therefore, it would be difficult to accept a withdrawal with conditions. He must be punished, not given face or a way out. He has done something bad and the only way to compensate is for him to fully comply -- not say I'll do this and this and you do that. We don't have to accept any conditions. We are opposed to accepting conditions. With these goals, he will be punished by the results. He needs to comply with the resolutions. We don't want to blow him back to the dark ages. That is not what the coalition military actions are trying to do. We are trying to get him to fully comply with the resolutions. It gets complicated but if we stay with no conditions then we'd look at it and if Kuwait's leaders go back, and if the 674 sanctions thing gets set up. If

he is serious, he might even leave his armor and go. Through full implementation of resolutions and sanctions, there can be a ceasefire. But it concerns me that if we talk about being willing to discuss one, it will be linked to other problems and that will be unacceptable. That is linkage. (S)

Prime Minister Nawaz: If we come across anything worthwhile, then we will let you know. (C)

The President: I just wanted to say how grateful and delighted we are with you and to thank you. (C)

Prime Minister Nawaz: We were elected with a popular mandate. We have more than a two-thirds majority in Parliament. We were going ahead with economic development with good speed. This has had a little bit of an adverse effect but it is only temporary. I have one question, how long do you think this will take to accomplish? (C)

The President: Not long, although I have deliberately not commented on that. Everyone is debating when the next phase on the ground will be. I don't see it taking too long even if the ground phase is necessary. I don't see a protracted war, even though he thinks it will be so. But we won't move before our officers are ready. We will do this on our timetable, not his. I wish to clarify that I have been careful not to say how long it will take. But General Schwarzkopf has a high degree of confidence that it won't be too long. (C)

Prime Minister Nawaz: It is a noble cause, and I appreciate it. We are with you. (C)

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, one more thing -- I understand from my staff that it might be better if we didn't say anything publicly about this call. I appreciate it if you want to keep this confidential. (C)

Prime Minister Nawaz: Thank you. We will keep you posted on any progress. (C)

The President: If in time for some reason, you decide you want to publish it, that's fine. But General Scowcroft mentioned that your staff said you wanted to keep it confidential for now. I just wanted you to know that's fine with me. (C)

Prime Minister Nawaz: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to the Amir of Qatar on
February 2, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Amir Khalifa
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME February 2, 1991; 2:00 - 2:30 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, how are you sir? (U)

Amir Khalifa: Well, thank God. (U)

The President: I am calling first to congratulate you on the wonderful success of your forces in helping to retake Khafji, and in helping to save some of our marines who were trapped there. I know you must be very proud of your ground forces, as well as your pilots. I also am going to call King Fahd and congratulate him too. I haven't talked to him yet. (C)

That was one purpose for calling. I think things are going very well, but I am anxious to get your judgement on that. (C)

Amir Khalifa: First of all, Mr. President, I appreciate your call, and I appreciate the position the United States has taken on the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Regarding what the Qatari Air Force did, Qatar adheres firmly to the UN resolutions, those for defending Saudi territory and those for the liberation of Kuwait. (C)

The President: We were smart to not permit Saddam to tell us when to start the ground war. He was thinking he could draw us in early and get us to start when we weren't ready. I am confident when if necessary a ground offensive is required our allied forces will do very, very well. And I don't think it will take long. I must admit, Your Majesty, I have trouble understanding Saddam and anyone doing what he is doing to the POWs, and innocent civilians with SCUD missiles, and environmental terrorism. He is hard to predict. But it is all bad. (C)

Your Majesty, what is your view on things in Iraq and what do you think Saddam will try to do next? (C)

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Amir Khalifa: Actually, Mr. President, the U.S. position from the beginning of the crisis, the US position has been wise and smart. But my own evaluation on the character of Saddam is that he doesn't know he is a human, because a human being would know how to act. He doesn't. He always said what was important was the survival of the Ba'ath party even at the expense of all of Iraq. (Ø)

The latest information I received -- I got it today from Syria and I am not certain of its accuracy -- is that the situation in Iraq is critical. Saddam doesn't trust anyone. His son is guarding him. When he moves, he is surrounded by 4-5 people who look like him to deceive bystanders and observers. Actually all the news from inside Baghdad is very bad. We also believe his relations with some religious factions are poor. There was a disagreement between them based on his request that his picture be hung in the mosques, and when they refused, some of them were executed. (Ø)

The President: He is a bad man. Your Majesty, I think the thing for us to do is not to compromise or agree to a ceasefire, hoping he will do what he should have done long ago. We should stay with our gameplan. We don't seek the destruction of Iraq. But there should be no concessions, no compromises in any way. I am confident we will win the war. I am confident he will be made to comply with every resolution including the one on reparations, 674. He must be held responsible for the environmental damage and to the other claims against him. (Ø)

Amir Khalifa: Actually, Mr. President, Saddam is worse than just a bad man. That is why any compromise would not only hurt this area of the Gulf but would hurt the whole world if he stays in power. On allied actions targeting civilians, I understand that civilians are not being targeted. They can be spared what they are going through if their President would stop the bombing. (S)

The President: That is a true and wise statement. We will keep our course. I am proud we are shoulder to shoulder with your country and your warriors, ground and air. I hope you will congratulate your commanders for me. (Ø)

My last point, there has been some confusion about the statement by Secretary Baker and Bessmertnykh of the Soviet Union. I want to tell you there is nothing new in that. Some have interpreted this as our interest in a ceasefire or pause. No -- we will not do that and certainly not without discussion with our coalition partners. There is no interest on my part to stop to make concessions, to stop to see if Saddam is ready to do what he should have long ago. (Ø)

Amir Khalifa: Mr. President, I have no doubt about U.S. policy, and no doubt about its serious intent. Not stopping Saddam Hussein would have serious repercussions for the whole world. (Ø)

The President: Thank you again, and again thanks to your young men. I am proud we are together to overcome this evil in the Gulf. Thank you again. (C)

Amir Khalifa: I wish to thank you for your gracious remarks and sentiments toward our young men. I hope your next call will come after the liberation of Kuwait, and I hope it will come soon. (U)

The President: I hope so too. It was good to talk to you. (U)

Amir Khalifa: Thank you. I was pleased to talk with you. God bless you and your troops. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to President Mubarak of Egypt on
February 2, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME February 2, 1991; 2:35 - 2:45 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hosni, how are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Fine, fine. How are you, George? (U)

The President: I thought I'd call to touch base at the end of the week and compare thoughts. I just spent yesterday going around to several of our military bases visiting with some of the families of our troops in the Gulf. I was very impressed. Morale is very strong here. And support in the country is strong. I was touched and impressed by what I heard from the families. They have no doubt about what their husbands and fathers are doing is right. (Ø)

I also had a good talk with Esmat Meguid. He and Jim are doing some good work on the IMF agreement. I'm interested in helping on that. From our end, the military effort is going well. We will not let Saddam decide the timing of any ground action. The air campaign will go on as long as necessary. (Ø)

Another point I wanted to make is to be sure there is no misunderstanding about the Baker/Bessmertnykh statement. There is no change. We have no interest in a ceasefire, concessions or a pause, hoping Saddam will do in the future what he should have done before. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I saw your tour yesterday on TV. I saw your reception. It was very warm. I saw it on TV here. (U)

The President: How do you see things? (U)

President Mubarak: Things are going well, very well. I am in touch with our forces every day. Everything is going well. (Ø)

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The President: He made a mistake trying to get us into ground combat early. Instead he got his equipment and personnel captured and killed. We will set the timetable and not be drawn in until we are ready. (C)

President Mubarak: I have sent a message to our people, to General Schwarzkopf that we should not slip into a ground war until we are ready. (C)

The President: When we do I am ready to go all out. It won't take long unlike what the press says. And it will not be costly in life despite what the press says. We will convince Saddam he will not get a stalemate so he can claim victory like he did with Iran. We are going to beat him bad. (S)

President Mubarak: I agree. I have the same conception. (C)

The President: That's good because you know the area. We are on the same wavelength. Apparently, there was some misunderstanding by some countries about the Baker/Bessmertnykh communique. Jim insists there was nothing new in it. I want our coalition partners to know we are not deviating from our agreed path. I don't see how this man can remain alive after the conflict. I don't see why his own people don't kick him out. (S)

President Mubarak: We didn't misunderstand at all. In Saudi Arabia we issued a statement saying the same thing as yours. Besides he won't agree on withdrawal. (C)

The President: You told me before he wouldn't after withdrawing from Iran. (C)

President Mubarak: I think things are going well. (C)

The President: I wish his people would throw him out. That would make it perfect. (S)

President Mubarak: Inshallah, as we say in Arabic. (U)

The President: Well, I thought we should talk once a week to see if there are any problems to see how things are going. One other thing, I am worried about the Maghreb and what to do there if there is anything. There have been more demonstrations in Tunis and Morocco. So I worry, but I don't know what we should do. (S)

President Mubarak: In Tunis things will slow down on their own. (S)

The President: Good, so we'll leave it. I understand there was a meeting of religious leaders in Egypt or Saudi Arabia and they called for a jihad against Saddam. If there was a meeting, there was nothing in the paper on it. (C)

President Mubarak: Yes, it was held in Saudi Arabia. The meetings here and all the conferences are against that. In Parliament there was a tough speech against Saddam. That will be good for public opinion here. (Ø)

The President: Is public opinion in good shape? (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes. (U)

The President: Good, well I was just checking in to say hello. I appreciate our staying in close touch. I am going to call King Fahd, and I talked with the Amir of Qatar already, remembering your advice to stay in touch. I am glad we are together on this. (Ø)

President Mubarak: If anything arises, I will contact you. How is Barbara? (Ø)

The President: Fine, we are up at Camp David. She's doing well. (U)

President Mubarak: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0993

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to the King of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME February 2, 1991; 3:05 - 3:35 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, your Majesty. How are you? (U)

King Fahd: How are you? I am glad to speak to you. (U)

The President: Well, it's nice to talk to you. I just wanted to call to congratulate you on the outstanding success in retaking Khafji and thank your forces for helping to recover some of the marines who were trapped there. We are really grateful. (U)

Things are still going quite well and are right on schedule. This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early failed miserably. I also placed a call to thank the Amir of Qatar. His forces were involved too. They are performing quite well. (U)

Another point, I know you understood but on the Baker/Bessmertnykh communique, there is no change in our position. I wanted to tell you that personally. We are not interested in a ceasefire or to give him a chance to regroup. There won't be any concessions to Saddam. After what he has done to our POWs, launching SCUDs at your people and those in Israel, and now environmental terrorism, he must pay for that under resolution 674. There can be no compromise, and there is no interest in a ceasefire that will make a concession to him. But I am anxious to know how you think things are going. (U)

King Fahd: First of all, thank you for your call, and I want to congratulate you for the success in retaking Khafji. I also want to thank you, Mr. President, for what the U.S. Marines did and the services rendered to Saudi and Qatari forces. The way we see it, we don't think there are varied armies on the front -- we have one united army. (U)

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The President: Good, that's right. (U)

King Fahd: I heard a statement you made, Mr. President, that there will be no hesitation in the U.S. position, and no cessation of the action until this matter is resolved -- and that means when Kuwait is restored to its preaggression state and Saddam has returned where he is supposed to be. I would like to affirm my belief the army on the front has arranged its operations in a proper manner so that Saddam cannot take any action. Actually, I believe what happened will make this area quiet over the next one hundred years. (S)

The President: I hope so. It is our ambition for the Gulf area too. Your Majesty, what are you hearing inside Iraq? (S)

King Fahd: The news we are receiving from inside Iraq is that the people are unhappy; the army is dissatisfied. But no one talks to Saddam. The only solution if there is dissatisfaction expressed to him is to be killed. This is what was told to us by the Iraqi officers captured with the soldiers. They told us they don't want to be in the fighting, but they told us the troops behind us keep pushing us so we would fight. (S)

I believe that the end of the revolutionary (sic) guard is starting to happen as a result of the bombing. This is an important factor for demoralizing the rest of the army and making them surrender. (S)

The President: I agree with that. (U)

King Fahd: At the same time I also am pleased, Mr. President, that prime targets are being hit by bombs from Jordan to Kuwait borders and destroyed. We know these are the places where missiles are being launched and where binary gases are made. (S)

The President: The air forces are doing a good job -- that's air forces plural. Could I raise one last question? I called Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. It was the first time I talked to him. I thanked him for his steadfast support despite tough opposition at home. But we are concerned about statements by General Beg and statements by some of the Afghan Resistance who oppose your and our position on Iraq. Beg's statements that inflame the opposition concern me because we worry about the safety of American citizens in Pakistan. The Prime Minister was quite reassuring about managing the dissent and staying with us. I was just wondering if the situation worries you or if it is under control. (S)

King Fahd: I spoke at length with the Prime Minister when he was here three days ago. We discussed this matter clearly. I asked him that there be no opposition to our position and to the United States. He promised he would take the necessary measures to make sure that happens. He asked me to send an envoy, and he will go tomorrow. We also will extend an invitation to Beg to visit here in Saudi Arabia. (S)

The President: That is all very encouraging. I must say he sounded confident he could weather the criticism and stay with us. (S)

King Fahd: This is what the Prime Minister told me also. He told me he was able to overcome this unexpected problem and stay the course. I have known him a long time, and he is a strong man. I am willing to help him in a variety of ways, and we are. (S)

The President: Thank you, unless there was something else. I wanted to call to congratulate you on the heroism of your troops. I wish you well. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you. God willing, you will be hearing good news about Pakistan next week. (S)

The President: Well, that's good. Call me if you have any problems, but I think things are going well. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you, Mr. President, for this call. It is much appreciated. (U)

The President: Good-bye and my respects. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

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PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Sandra Charles
Shukran Kamal, interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1991; 3:05-3:35, Camp David

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Things are still going quite well and are right on schedule. This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early failed miserably. I also placed a call to thank the Amir of Qatar. His forces were involved too. They are performing quite well.

Another point, I know you understood but on the Baker/Bessmerytnykh communique, there is no change in our position. I wanted to tell you that personally. We are not interested in a ceasefire or to give him a chance to regroup. There won't be any concessions to Saddam. After what he has done to our POWs, launching SCUDs at your people and those in Israel, and now environmental terrorism he must pay for that under resolution 674. There can be no compromise and there is no interest in a ceasefire that will make a concession to him. But I am anxious to know how you think things are going.

King Fahd: First of all, thank you for your call and I want to congratulate you for the success in retaking Khafji. I also want to thank you Mr. President for what the US Marines did and the services rendered to Saudi and Qatari forces. The way we see it we don't think there are varied armies on the front -- we have one united army.

The President: Good, that's right.

King Fahd: I heard a statement you made Mr President that there will be no hesitation in the US position, and no cessation of the action until this matter is resolved -- and

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The President: Thank you, unless there was something else. I wanted to call to congratulate you on the heroism of your troops. I wish you well.

King Fahd: Thank you. God willing, you will be hearing good news about Pakistan next week.

The President: Well, that's good. Call me if you have nay problems, but I think things are going well.

King Fahd: Thank you Mr. President for this call. It is much appreciated.

The President: Good-bye and my respects.

MAJOR

FEB 3 - PRES CALLED UK PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
SECURE FROM CAMP DAVID AT 1500 - TERMINATED
1510 - NO ONE MONITORED

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with F.W. de Klerk
of South Africa on February 4, 1991 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
F.W. de Klerk, President of South Africa
Notetaker: Robert C. Frasure

DATE, TIME February 4, 1991, 9:45 - 10:05 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned President de Klerk to congratulate him on his February 1 speech.

President de Klerk: Good morning. How are you, sir? (U)

The President: Hello. I'm fine. I hope you are too. (U)

I wanted to call you to commend you on the vision you so clearly displayed on February 1 in your speech. It has gotten a lot of interest back here. People are favorably recognizing your commitment to progress. (U)

I just wanted to weigh in to show our support. (U)

We also are taking heart in the Mandela/Buthelezi accord. We had been encouraging them to talk. We are encouraged that all sides will be taking part in this multi-party conference and wanted you to know that as well. (Ø)

Finally, I want you to know that we will be moving as soon as possible on relief on the sanctions. You have my commitment to see that this will be done. (Ø)

There may still be a few hardliners around here on the sanctions issue. But I believe we will find an enthusiastic reception in the U.S. for what you have done. (Ø)

Also I want to thank you for your support on the Gulf. I saw Minister Botha on television the other night and I am very grateful to him for what he said. (Ø)

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So that was the purpose for my call. And I want to wish you well. (U)

President de Klerk: Thank you. May I say how much I appreciate what you have said about what I have announced. We had a little surprise for everyone on the Population Registration Act. We can move sooner than we had anticipated on that, although there may have to be some transitional measures on certain aspects. (Ø)

All of this was in the offing when I saw you in Washington. We have thus taken a series of unilateral actions. (Ø)

We have been gratified by the reactions inside the country. It has been supportive generally other than from the party to my right. (Ø)

The President: The Conservative Party? (U)

President de Klerk: Yes. (U)

And there has been a marvelous reaction internationally. We have even received support from unexpected quarters, Canada and Australia. (Ø)

The President: Good. I'm glad to hear that. (U)

President de Klerk: I was especially gratified by your support. We plan to turn words into deeds in this Parliament. This positive international response gives courage to our people. It is having a good effect here. A negative response would play into the hands of my political opponents. (Ø)

On the Buthelezi/Mandela meeting, we put pressure on them as well to get together. They agreed on some rules. It was not a policy accord. A key issue with them was the Constituent Assembly. And Buthelezi is against it. He takes the position that a sovereign state cannot have a void. That is supportive of our line of thinking. This accord will make a contribution to reducing violence among the Blacks. So it is a very important accord. (Ø)

It could be the opening up of the democratic process. That is the most important point. The accord recognizes the right of political dissent. In that sense, it is against intimidation. (Ø)

Another important development is the multi-party conference. The ANC accepts it. We have been asking for it. It makes for real negotiation, real consensus. Mandela made a quantum jump. Let's hope he sticks to it. (Ø)

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In sum, the positive factors for a negotiation are now stronger than the negative factors. (Ø)

We appreciate your assurances and your interest. (U)

On the Gulf War, we are taking a principled stand. I will convey your remarks to Minister Botha. (Ø)

The President: Thank you for that. (U)

President de Klerk: Our Muslims are divided on this. Some support Saddam Hussein. Others support the Saudis. (Ø)

There have also been some negative voices from the ANC. (Ø)

The President: Is that right? I had missed that. (U)

President de Klerk: Some in the ANC went overboard on the issue. Mandela had to cool it, I believe. But there were strong negative voices. (Ø)

The President: That's too damn bad! How much control does Mandela have in that organization? Is he really in charge? (Ø)

President de Klerk: There are some pretty wild elements in the ANC. It is a coalition of forces in alliance with the South African Communist Party, as you know. It is hard to get them to become a political party and not a liberation movement. They need encouragement from everyone. What is required in the world community is pressure on them. (Ø)

Things are often not as simple as they seem. It is not all cream cakes and cool drinks. (Ø)

But Mandela realizes that there can be no winner-take-all system. We are working with him. I can tell you confidentially that there will soon be some high level discussions to talk about the remaining stumbling blocks to the multi-party conference. (Ø)

I must say it is positive at the leadership level. Mandela must not shirk from taking a lead. He must take courageous steps. (Ø)

The President: That is a very interesting update and I appreciate it. I talked to John Major the other day and he is as enthusiastic about the situation as I am. (Ø)

We are spending a lot of time here on the Gulf, as you can imagine. But I want to play a constructive role on South Africa, if we can. (Ø)

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President de Klerk: Are you satisfied with the way the war is going up to now?

The President: Yes. It is on schedule. We are continuing to do what we have to do. We are attacking their armor and their strategic positions. The bombing has been pin point for the most part. We have had fewer casualties than we had anticipated. Khafji was a disaster for them. The Republican Guards are not broken yet. I think support is high for the war in the U.S. We may have to use our ground forces but not yet. (U)

I'm satisfied so far. The hardships in Baghdad are legion. World opinion is on our side partly because of three things, the horrible things he has done to our prisoners, the Scud attacks and his environmental warfare. (U)

All of this has turned opinion against him. So I am satisfied that the plan is being implemented. But there could be some unforeseen developments. (U)

President de Klerk: We are thinking of you. Our stand is based on principle. We will stick with you. You have a heavy responsibility on your shoulders. But we have full trust in your leadership of the coalition. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

I don't know whether South Africa will be approached on any of these so called peace plans which are floating around. But you should know that we are not interested in any pauses. There will be no compromises. None of them is acceptable to me. There can be no rewards for aggression. It's not that we don't want peace. (U)

President de Klerk: There must be withdrawal from Kuwait. Aggression cannot be recognized. (U)

The President: That's right. And under the UN resolutions there must be reparations. (U)

We appreciate your support. (U)

President de Klerk: Thank you very much for your phone call. Please give my best wishes to Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President: All the best to you. I'll do that. Good bye. (U)

President de Klerk: Good bye. (U)

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of Mexico
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME February 5, 1991, 9:12 - 9:17 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Senor Presidente, how are you? (U)

President Salinas: Buenos dias, George, how are you? (U)

The President: I'm calling on something I think you know about, the free trade agreement. I understand from my staff that we've worked out the details for proceeding with a trilateral FTA. (U)

President Salinas: Absolutely true. (U)

The President: I want to recite to you what I understand are the four key points. First, we will not use the negotiations to retreat from the U.S.-Canada FTA, although we are open to using the trilateral mechanism to improve on the bilateral agreement. (U)

President Salinas: That's true. (U)

The President: That was point one. Second, we're going to stick to our end-of-1991 timetable. (U)

Third, we have left open, I understand, the possibility that some issues, because they are special, may have to be solved bilaterally, as opposed to trilaterally. (U)

President Salinas: That's very important, yes. (U)

The President: Fourth, Canada will withdraw if its continued participation would delay or jeopardize the U.S.-Mexico FTA, thus allowing the bilateral negotiations to go forward. Canada has agreed to pull back if this were the case. (U)

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President Salinas: For us it was important for us to assure that the bilateral agreement would move forward. (C)

The President: If this is acceptable, I just want to call Brian to make the same points to him. (C)

President Salinas: I'm totally comfortable with this. This insures that at least the bilateral agreement would come through. We will create the biggest free trade area in the world here in North America. (C)

The President: I want this Free Trade Agreement to be one of the major accomplishments of your and my presidencies. You've got my personal commitment to the success of the negotiations. (C)

What I would like to do, but only if you're comfortable with this. If you're agreeable, I would like to propose that we make the announcement today. I would like to make the announcement at my press conference today at 11:30. (C)

President Salinas: That's okay with me. (U)

The President: Then we'll shoot for an announcement this morning. I would like to lead off my press conference with this announcement. (C)

President Salinas: This will show your total commitment to this process. (C)

Also, congratulations on your State of the Union address. (C)

The President: Thanks. I think it went okay. I don't think it (the Persian Gulf War) will be dragged out too far. Things are going pretty well, according to plan with no real surprises. But we don't want to see this man (Saddam Hussein) clutch victory from the jaws of defeat through a cease-fire now. At the same time, we don't want to drag this out too long. (C)

President Salinas: I'm glad of the overwhelming support of the American people for your position. (C)

The President: It seems pretty good. (C)

President Salinas: (laughs) It's overwhelming. (C)

The President: Who knows how long it will last, though? But I'm glad it is holding strong now. (C)

President Salinas: Best wishes to you and your family. (U)

The President: Best wishes to you, too. Our love, and over. (U)

President Salinas: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 5, 1991, 10:02-10:17 a.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: How are you, Turgut? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you. I talked to Rafsanjani this morning. I asked him what is going on with his peace initiative. I asked if he has any plans. He said there is no plan. Hammadi's visit to Tehran showed the Iraqis to be stubborn, and that they had not changed their mind. It reminded them of a similar conversation they had with Hammadi before the war. Hammadi said Iraq would fight a guerrilla war. I think they are dreaming, George. This was what I got from Rafsanjani. (S)

I joked with Rafsanjani and asked if Saddam Hussein gave him a positive sign, would he meet him at the border or in Baghdad. Rafsanjani repeated there is no such plan. He is not sure anything will materialize. I asked him if he had changed his opinion on an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait or the UN resolutions. He said Iran supports all the UN resolutions and that it wants a complete Iraqi withdrawal. (S)

Then I asked him how many Iraqi planes are in Iran. He said the western figures are too big. He said there are civilian planes, 747s, 727s and transports and that there was an agreement beforehand that Iraq would send them to Iran. But he said there was no agreement on sending the warplanes. He said there were only about twenty such warplanes in Iran. (S)

The President: I don't think that is right. I think the number is higher, but we will check it. This is what he told you? (S)

President Ozal: Yes, he told me this. Transport and civilian planes are there and there are only twenty warplanes. (S)

The President: I will pass this on but we think there are many more. (S)

President Ozal: I said to Rafsanjani that if you have anything on a peace plan we can only help you if Iraq implements completely all of the UN resolutions. (S)

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The President: Interesting. Did he sound relaxed? (S)

President Ozal: They are making propaganda for after the crisis. Yes, the Iranians want to be a kind of protector of the Islamic nation, and of the Shia in Iraq. (S)

The President: Did he mention the U.S.? (S)

President Ozal: No, he didn't mention you. (S)

The President: He keeps thinking we want to stay in the Gulf and that is not true. (S)

President Ozal: He told me two months ago the same thing. He said today he does not want Saddam Hussein in power after the war. (S)

The President: I wish the Iraqis would take care of Saddam Hussein. (S)

President Ozal: I think it is going well, George. (U)

The President: It is. Incidentally, we think there are more planes in Iran. Excluding the civilian ones, we think there are closer to seventy. (S)

President Ozal: Seventy. But the only thing is Iran may take them as war reparations. I asked Rafsanjani if he had discussed this with Hammadi. He said they did not discuss it. (S)

The President: The Iraqis will have a big reparations bill for the environmental damage. They will have big claims for damage from many people. (S)

President Ozal: There will also be a lot of immigrants. (S)

The President: We are doing better on the SCUDs. We have damaged their ability to launch. (S)

President Ozal: I think they still have some from what I have been told. If a ground attack starts, he might use chemical weapons. He may put some on planes. I have some doubts but he could use them for a chemical attack. (S)

The President: Do you think so? We worry about this. We are training our people. I think world opinion would go against him if he did it. (S)

President Ozal: I said the same to Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani said yes, it is a possibility. In that case I said there would be a big retaliation. (S)

The President: Iran doesn't like Saddam Hussein. There is some feeling Iran is willing to make up but I don't think so. (S)

President Ozal: No, Rafsanjani is looking for a post-war without Saddam Hussein. What kind of regime will there be after? Iran is Shia and Iraq is 60 percent Shia. (S)

The President: That's right. I would welcome your thoughts about the post-war period. We are not trying to wipe out Iraq so that Iraq is seen as a victim. I hope the Iranians understand that. (C)

President Ozal: Your Ambassador said you would send a military team to discuss the war. (C)

The President: This is very important to let you look at the issue of collateral damage. You will find the intelligence interesting. I thought this was all set up. (C)

President Ozal: I will be very happy to see them. I also want to discuss with you what will come after the war. (C)

The President: I would find your views very interesting. I welcome them either through our Ambassadors or any other way. (C)

President Ozal: My Foreign Minister will be in Washington in a few weeks. (C)

The President: Will he be prepared to discuss this issue of the post-war? Is he going to Tehran too? (C)

President Ozal: He is going to Tehran and the Arab world and then to Washington. He will see Cheney and Baker. I would like him to see you briefly if you have time. (C)

The President: If it is important to you, I will definitely see him. (C)

President Ozal: Yes, it is definitely important. (C)

The President: We have told the Iranians via the Swiss that we are interested in direct communications. (S)

I am glad you and I are together on how to end this thing--no conditions. I am glad to hear that. (S)

President Ozal: There is no change in Iran either, George. (S)

The President: I look forward to seeing your Foreign Minister. Things are on schedule and Saddam Hussein won't set the time for the next step. (S)

President Ozal: George, continue the bombardment. (S)

The President: We will do so. Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call with President Francois Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Interpreter: Stephanie Van Riegersberg
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME February 5, 1991, 1:08 - 1:22 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

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The President: Francois how are you? (U)

President Mitterrand: Hello dear friend. (U)

The President: I'm fine. I wanted to be back in touch to share views on the Gulf war. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, please go ahead. (S)

The President: Frankly, we think the war is going well. Saddam Hussein is a tough adversary but he is still capable of surprises. I understand that Brent Scowcroft is in regular touch with Admiral Lanxade and providing assessments, but you and I should also be in touch often. The coalition is holding together well. (S)

President Mitterrand: We are completely committed. We will do what is necessary to be done. (S)

The President: I know we are close on the issues. I see no sign of movement by Saddam Hussein. I detect no change on their part. (S)

President Mitterrand: No, none at all. All of our contacts both direct and indirect confirm that whenever there is talk of a pullout it is out of the question for them. (S)

The President: I spoke to Ozal a couple of hours ago. He said that Rafsanjani sees things the same way we do. He is a good interlocutor. (S)

President Mitterrand: Rafsanjani has been wanting to talk to me. (S)

The President: We appreciated the readout on the visit to Iran of Secretary General Scheer. It is important to keep pushing the

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Iranians on the issue of full compliance with the UN resolutions, but I see no problems on this score at present. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, that is right. (S)

The President: I have still done nothing in the Maghreb, even though we talked about it several days ago. I would be interested in any suggestions you have on what would be effective. I am delighted that we had that briefing for you yesterday and glad that you found it useful. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. Regarding the Maghreb, we have good relations and contacts with leaders of the region, especially the Algerians. We have had reports from the Algerian foreign minister on his contacts with the Iranians and the Iraqis. The Algerian government confirms its solidarity with Saddam Hussein, but without emotion. They want good relations with France as well. (S)

France has a delicate relationship with these countries -- Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. They are French speaking, and they naturally tend to turn against France in a situation like this. The political opposition is taking advantage of the situation to attack the King and the President. It is an unpleasant situation for us, but it is tolerable. For the moment, the most delightful situation involves Qadhafi. Qadhafi called me the other day for the first time in many years. He says that he continues to favor self-determination for Kuwait. He told me that, with so many crazy people running around, wise men like he and I needed to be in touch. (S)

The President: (laughing) How did you reply diplomatically? (S)

President Mitterrand: (in humorous tone) I said that I was happy to find him in that frame of mind. (S)

Morocco is more complicated, however. The King is being criticized on many other issues than the war. I hope that in the post conflict period, which should come soon -- hopefully this spring -- that we can work on reconciliation. Normally, winning the war should be the key. These countries tend to turn towards the victor. (S)

For the rest, I see no particular problem. We are waiting for the signal. We are in no hurry. Our planes are doing their work along with your troops. (S)

The President: They are doing very well. I hear good reports. (S)

President Mitterrand: We have got some very well trained pilots. (S)

The President: I think we are well together, and I appreciate this chance to exchange views. It is understandable that people are now saying "let's have peace", but we must have Saddam Hussein pull out of Kuwait first. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, the prior condition to peace is the liberation of Kuwait. (S)

I have noticed that there were campaigns against France in the UK and the US. I spoke to John Major about this earlier today. With Joxe as Defense Minister, things are under control. He is just getting back from the Gulf today. (S)

I am so glad you called. I had wanted to call you. (S)

The President: Brent and Admiral Lanxade are staying in touch and that is good, and we should talk frequently too. (S)

President Mitterrand: Public opinion is holding up well in France. (S)

The President: Ours is too. (S)

President Mitterrand: Thanks for calling. (U)

The President: Au revior

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Mulroney
of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Adrian Basora, Notetaker, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: February 5, 1991, 9:20 - 9:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Brian, how are you doing? I wanted to touch base generally and to say something about the trade agreement. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: How is it going? (U)

The President: The war is going ahead on schedule. International support is good. I am in no rush to move to a land war. I will wait to receive suggestions from our generals in the field and from Colin Powell and Dick Cheney, and then I will make a decision. I am somewhat worried about Iraqi accusations about civilian casualties. We are doing all we can to minimize them. I am afraid you caught me on a day when I am taking great pride in what we are doing. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You are right to do so. I am going to visit our war college training facility for pilots today. The mood in Canada is somewhat along the lines of yours. It is a mood of strong support for what Canada is doing. I suppose your decisions on the ground war will have an effect. As long as there is not too much sadness coming out of the Gulf, support is likely to stay high. (S)

The President: Yes, the speculation on body counts and the talk of body bags is beginning to mount again as the idea of a ground war comes closer. But I haven't given up hope that the air war will persuade him to relent. (S)

I am concerned about the calls for a cease fire. Nobody is more for peace than I am. But some people have the concept that things would be fine if we would just stop and talk. This would enable Saddam Hussein to snatch victory from defeat and it would make the new world order very difficult to achieve. Saddam would have the mantle of Arab heroism, despite the decimation of his military apparatus. This is not the time to stop. There do not need to be any concessions to him. Most people agree on this, including the Iranians. (S)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: If we did a list of the most harmful things that could be done, with rankings from one to ten, the most harmful thing that could happen now would be a cease fire if Saddam is not out of Kuwait. I keep hoping that the pounding he is taking from the air will cause him to pull back -- and then we can have a cease fire. But a cease fire in place is unacceptable. (S)

The President: I really called you on the FTA, although I suppose that Derek Burney has briefed you. I just talked to Carlos Salinas and he says that the understanding is fine with him. I want to read you the four key points of our understanding just to check them with you: (a) we will not use the negotiations to retreat from our bilateral FTA; (b) we will stick to our end-of-91 timetable; (c) we have left open the possibility that some issues may have to be solved bilaterally, and not trilaterally; and (d) Canada will gracefully withdraw if its continued participation would in any way delay or jeopardize the U.S.-Mexico FTA, thus allowing bilateral negotiations to continue. Salinas feels this is important. We don't think this would happen, but it is important to have an understanding. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, I agree. Those points are realistic. (S)

The President: As I understand it, our negotiators had agreed on these points. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Fine, I agree with the points, but if you can avoid emphasizing the fourth point regarding Canada withdrawing that would be helpful. (S)

The President: That's no problem. I don't have to mention all of the points in public. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: My GATT negotiators tell me that this FTA is having an impact on the EC. They came to see me after Poos saw you. The idea of a North American FTA or a hemispheric FTA scares the hell out of them. (S)

The President: Good. They need incentives to keep them moving. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, they see the U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement moving towards an FTA for the whole hemisphere. They see that this would have consequences for the GATT. (S)

The President: How are your political wars going? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I am starting to inch back up, although I am not within striking distance of your rankings in the polls. But I would settle for half of what you've got. However, our internal constitutional problems are coming to the surface again. (S)

The President: Oh, is that coming up again? I had heard something about it, but it isn't getting much coverage here. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We've got a long way to go. The issues are complicated. We can discuss them in private the next time we meet. (S)

The President: Yes, that would be a good idea and we should get together soon. I'll have Brent look into it. Love and out.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Robert Hawke of
Australia on February 7, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia
Charles Graul, Notetaker

DATE, TIME February 7, 1991 07:21 - 07:47
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned Prime Minister Hawke concerning the present situation in the Persian Gulf war. (U)

The President: Hey Bob, how are you?

PM Hawke: G'day George, how are you doing?

The President: I am calling because we have not talked in a while and I wanted to let you know how things were going in the Gulf. Basically things are going well. I would like to make a couple of points, then if you have any questions I will be glad to answer them. The war is going well. The air campaign is accomplishing its objectives, our losses are less than we thought they would be. There have been some coalition losses and the tragic brutalization of the POWs continues. We will dictate the tempo of the war -- not Saddam -- we will only go on the ground when our commanders think the time is right. I suppose you know that Cheney and Powell are going to go to Saudi Arabia to go over everything with the commanders. We are not in a rush. If a ground war is necessary we are confident. We are softening up his ability to wage war by attacking his Republican Guard. Bob, Saddam is saying we are targeting civilians--we are not. He is calling these bridges civilian targets, but these are used to resupply his troops -- they are not civilian targets, my conscience on this point is clear.

We are watching the movement of Iraqi aircraft to Iran. We have been assured by the Iranians, publicly and privately, that they will stay in Iran. We are concerned that Iran is saying there are only 20 in the country and we know there are five or six times that many. Many of them are his top line fighters. Iran assures us they are watching them. Bob, I have been assured that our military can protect against any kind of surprise from these aircraft.

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There are still rumors of peace talks, but Saddam can end it at any time by withdrawing from Kuwait and fully complying with the UN Resolutions. Every time there is talk of a peace offer -- when they talk to Aziz or Hammadi -- the bottom line always is that they will not withdraw from Kuwait. Like I said in my speech at the UN, we want to work for peace, but the brutality continues. We have reduced the SCUD threat by using a hell of a lot of firepower, but we cannot be sure it has been eliminated.

Bob, Jordan is saying we have targeted civilian trucks on the highways. We have conclusive proof that the Iraqis use culverts on this highway to hide SCUDS. I am sorry the Jordanians were hit, but it is war. We have no intent to target legitimate commerce, but as long as they use the road for these SCUD attacks against Israel it is risky to use the road. King Hussein's speech last night was a surprise -- his rhetoric was unhelpful. I know he is under a lot of domestic pressure. I am trying to be objective, to think of our long standing friendship, but I think he made a mistake getting so closely associated with Saddam.

The environmental terrorism continues, we know he is pumping this oil. Urban terrorism too -- you probably heard about this attack at Whitehall this morning. I wish the Iraqi people would throw him out. We control the seas and air.

PM Hawke: Thanks for the clear and concise update, George. I would like to comment and ask a couple of questions. More than most, I know the pressure you are under. I just want to say how much I admire your handling of this situation. Cheney, Powell and Schwarzkopf are all doing well. We share your grief over the losses. I get daily intelligence and military briefings and share your view that things are going well. I share your view that casualties are lower than we could have reasonably expected. I share your view that we must accept higher risks in order to keep civilian casualties low. You are succeeding admirably in keeping civilian casualties low. We are committed to the coalition and the UN resolutions and the way we are going about it. We support the way the U.S. is backing the UN war aims.

The President: Well, we appreciate your support. I want you to know we have no intent to destroy Iraq or punish the Iraqi people.

PM Hawke: George, we must start to think about the post-war situation. I was watching CNN and saw Baker's House testimony. I feel you have it right. We must tackle all Mid-East problems. World peace is a problem without it. We will be involved with you in it. I have one question. I felt from the beginning that there was an outside chance that we have got air superiority, and are attacking strategic targets, and his forces in Kuwait, do you think the conflict can end without a ground war?

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The President: Bob, that is a good question, I wish I could answer it. It is hard to assess the damage to the Republican Guards. No military commander can say that air will do it. I do not want a prolongation of the war. I am concerned about its effect on public opinion and that his propaganda can take hold. I might make the case that the air war might do it. There is always the possibility that something unforeseen could happen to Saddam Hussein a la Ceausescu -- he rules by terror.

PM Hawke: George, let me make clear that we are with you. There is only one way to resolve it, complete immediate withdrawal. George, I have an observation on the press conference in Jordan. I know the King, and his brother -- I know his brother better. I agree that he made a mistake. It is a pity he could not have had more strength and not follow Saddam so closely.

The President: I'll tell you his Arab neighbors are livid.

PM Hawke: Obviously George we are concerned about the Soviet Union. It looks like Gorbachev wants to save the empire over all else. He is in bed with the hard liners. How do you see it? Will his support on the Gulf lessen?

The President: Not necessarily, unless he leaves the scene. We cannot condone what is going on. I am called a Gorbachev lover because of not anticipating this. It is important here because of the question of freedom. I believe him when he says he did not issue the order to use force. You have caught me on a pessimistic day. It is a powder keg. I feel a special responsibility because we do not recognize the incorporation of the Baltics and there are a hell of a lot of Balts here. We cannot move further on commerce because he has not been able to go forward on reforms that would allow economic assistance. I like him, but he is captured by reality. He cannot move the country forward. Do not make things difficult for him. Tell him his policy is not good, but keep the Gulf in mind. If they did jump ship, we are far enough along that it will not make a difference.

If they did go to the UN it could be a problem, but I do not think so.

PM Hawke: You are in the best position to know. The military leaders still nurture old ideas -- they think the U.S. wants to destroy them. We must let them know we want to coexist peacefully.

The President: I hope we are past that stage now. We have had very frank exchanges with the military and the KGB, but the Leninist right and the military right are still a concern.

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PM Hawke: Well George, I have two things I would like to go over quickly. We were thrilled by de Klerk's speech to parliament. We took the lead in encouraging these changes and we feel a moral obligation to phase out sanctions. The awfulness of apartheid will be removed. We want to take the lead in the Commonwealth to encourage it.

The President: We are totally in agreement. de Klerk told me the other day, I called him, that he was very pleased with your stand. He mentioned Australia specifically. We are in total accord -- we will try to reward him for going in this direction.

PM Hawke: Fine. I know you cannot travel with this war on, but we still want you to come to Australia. I can guarantee you a very enthusiastic welcome.

The President: Yes, I still want to get down there to see you again and your country. I want to get out of here, but the war has screwed up my foreign travel plans. It has screwed up lots of things.

PM Hawke: Well George, thanks for the call.

The President: Well, thank you. Let's keep in touch. Goodbye

PM Hawke: Goodbye

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Menem, President of Argentina
Interpreter: Patsy Arizu
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME February 8, 1991, 4:25 - 4:35 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Menem telephoned the President give him a progress report on the current situation in the Gulf. (U)

The President: Hello, Carlos, how are you? (U)

President Menem: Very well, George. (U)

The President: I'm just calling to check in with you. I had a very good meeting just an hour or two ago with your new Foreign Minister. And I want to go over some of the points I made to him in that meeting. (U)

President Menem: Of course, George, go ahead. (U)

The President: I thought I would give you a progress report on the situation in the Gulf. The air campaign is going well. We have total air supremacy, and right now we are using it to hammer away at the Republican Guard, and reduce his military machine. (U)

One point I wanted to reassure you on -- that we are intentionally not targeting civilians or holy sites. Obviously, there can be some collateral damage, but the bombing has been very precise, and most people who have looked into it understand it has been. (U)

No decision has been made as to a ground campaign. Although I am skeptical that air power alone can drive Iraq out of Kuwait, I want to hear from Cheney and Powell, who have gone out to the theater to assess the whole military situation. (U)

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If we have to use military forces on the ground, it will not be a long war. We're also starting to look at how we might use the opportunities after the war to build peace and stability in the area. (C)

We will turn our attention again to other regional conflicts, especially the Arab-Israeli problem, after this war is brought to an end. I just wanted you to know this because of your interest in the area. (C)

We certainly don't want to see Iraq totally dismembered or destroyed, because, and I'm sure you agree, that would threaten regional stability. And also, I had a very good talk with Hafez Assad a few days ago. (C)

That was about all I wanted to report to you, and express my pleasure and gratitude that we are standing side-by-side in the Gulf. (C)

President Menem: Thank you very much, George. I hope that our Foreign Minister has already told you of all of Argentina's actions in this regard. We've had a favorable vote from the Congress to permit our ships to stay in the Gulf. (C)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Menem: When the ships were sent, we had 20 percent support in the polls, but now it represents 60 percent. I'm following very closely the situation in the Gulf. I hear your words and see you on TV frequently. I'm convinced that things are going well. We must try to prevent civilian damage in the aggressor country. (Note: Menem's interpreter did not interpret the following sentence: "Argentina will always be on the side of the Allied forces in this conflict.") I'm sure you know that I give you my full support. (C)

I hope this war will be as short as possible. It would be wonderful if after the war we can work to start conversations to deal with the other Middle East problems -- involving Israel, Syria, and Jordan. You know Argentina and I are willing to help you in any way you see fit. (C)

The President: That's good. (C)

President Menem: (Note: Menem's interpreter did not interpret the following sentence: "George, I'm convinced that success is certain. And I hope there will be low casualties.") But the cost of all this is the direct result of this one man who is totally demented. I am prepared to go with you with discussions and defend peace in that area. I hope you'll keep me informed. (C)

The President: Okay, we'll stay in touch. I'm delighted to have had the chat with your Foreign Minister, and look forward to keeping in touch as things develop. (C)

President Menem: I hope you'll send your regards to your dear wife and to your daughter who accompanied you to Argentina. (U)

The President: I will do it. Barbara and I are at Camp David, and I'll tell her that right now. Goodbye. (U)

President Menem: I send you an abrazo and my support. (In English) Good luck, George. (U)

The President: (does not wait for translation) Good luck, and thank you; I understood that. (U)

President Menem: Goodbye. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to the UN Secretary General
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME February 8, 1991; 5:00 - 5:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Javier, how are you? (U)

Secretary General: Fine, George. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine, fine. I just wanted to touch base with you on a couple of things if you've got a minute. I heard about the letters from Iraq with those false accusations about you. What an ugly business. Fortunately, we all know they have a history of lying. I want you to know we still have total confidence in you and the good work you are doing. If there was any question of that, dismiss it and any question that hurt your feelings.

(Ø)

Secretary General: I am not easy to discourage. (Ø)

The President: I know there is a campaign saying we are bombing religious sites and civilian targets and people. I would like to offer to send you a team to show you why I say our bombing has had pinpoint accuracy. There is some damage. But you'll be impressed with the photos. If you are interested, I can have them shown to you. They show why we are targeting along the Jordan road where they are hiding missiles and moving troops. And using the bridges in the south for resupply. They show how accurate we have been. If that would interest you, I can arrange to have them shown to you with Tom Pickering. I don't want to burden you though. You don't need to feel that you have to make a statement about them. (Ø)

Secretary General: Yes, I would be interested to look at them. But my opinion is not enough. Other people need to see them. Maybe for strategic reasons you are not able to circulate them, but I am interested in you sending them over. (Ø)

The President: Okay. I also understand what you said about Jordan. (Ø)

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Secretary General: We are disturbed about the situation with Jordan. They are in an impossible position. But I would be pleased to see the briefing. (S)

The President: We will do this quietly. We will call and arrange it through Tom Pickering. I saw it and we have shown it to Mitterrand, Major and Ozal and others who are interested. We won't expect a statement from you or anything. It would just be for your information. (S)

Secretary General: I understand. (U)

The President: Another point, I know you got several indirect queries out of Iran. I know you told Brent of the interest there. We don't want to run down any individual trails, but I was just wondering if you had heard anything more. (S)

Secretary General: No. But I will let you know if there is anything new through Brent. The man here was to convey this back to his country. (S)

The President: Good. If it doesn't work, fine. But given their interest, it would be good to have a quiet chat. But we hadn't heard anything. (S)

Secretary General: I will do this with pleasure. (U)

The President: As for the rest, we intend to finish this. After what he has done parading our POWs, launching SCUDs at civilian targets, environmental terrorism -- this shows Saddam is a very difficult man. We will keep on unless he gets out. This is not expanding our war aims. We just want to get him out of Kuwait. But we will keep doing this until he does what he should have long ago. I am not optimistic that there won't be a ground war, but we have not made a decision to use our ground forces. General Powell and Dick Cheney are over there now. I will meet with them when they get back on Monday. (S)

I can tell you as I told our people this will not be long, costly in terms of human life like so many have predicted. But I always worry about even one human life. It will be a tough decision, but I wanted you to know it has not been made yet. (S)

Secretary General: That's what concerns me, what is horrible is the killing once ground operations start. And the appalling possibility that chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction could be used. (S)

The President: I don't know if he will use unconventional weapons or not. But he did use chemicals on his own people. I also have been disappointed with King Hussein's statements in the press. (S)

Secretary General: The poor man is under a lot of pressure. He is at great risk of being toppled down. But frankly, in the post crisis we will need him. (Ø)

The President: It is too bad. He is a good man. We have to understand the difficulties he is in now. But we won't have a ceasefire like Vietnam where the enemy has time to regroup and be strong again. We are going to finish the job. But I understand your position. We all want peace. Someday that will be realized. The truth, the facts are that we are fighting this war so that we will keep casualties at a minimum. We will not fail. We can't. Our country and the coalition believe we must fully implement the resolutions. (Ø)

Secretary General: It is important for the United Nations to support the coalition. But nothing is happening in the Council. It will be hard to hold off indefinitely. It will create the wrong impression if the Council doesn't do something. We need to find the right moment to hold a meeting of the Council. As such it is difficult to explain why the Security Council is not moving one way or another. (Ø)

The President: The Security Council has already taken strong action. Our position is the resolutions are there and we are helping countries to implement them. We know this can't go on forever. We don't want it to. I want this over soon. But there can be no ceasefire or something that let's him save face. (Ø)

Secretary General: The resolutions are clear. My view is they must be fully implemented, and if there is something new to help fully implement the resolutions, then we will take another look at it. Such a meeting could be used to get the Permanent members to stop in their tracks. But I agree, a ceasefire without a withdrawal is not possible. (Ø)

The President: Saddam is saying he won't get out. King Hussein is saying Saddam won't get out. In the meeting in Tehran, there was no movement by Iraq. I know your position as Secretary General and I respect it. Sometimes our nuances differ. But I wanted you to have my views. I also wanted you to hear from us that we aren't targeting innocent women and children. We are hitting some bridges used for resupply. We could cut the loss of life to the coalition if we used force indiscriminately. Do you know there is an anti-aircraft gun next to the al-Rashid Hotel? But we are not targeting it. We can show you where. What it does is risk our pilots' lives when they try to take out Iraqi communications and other targets. It is a difficult situation when he takes people to see an alleged baby milk factory and we have information that it is not. Just like Rabta was not making aspirin. (Ø)

Secretary General: He asked me to send a commission to investigate the fact of whether it is a milk factory or not. (Ø)

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The President: If they go, be sure they get the right plant and get information beforehand on the plant. The Nestle people have said they never made formula there even though he showed that on TV. There are lots of things like this we can't get out. But I just wanted you to have our evaluation and to let you know we think you are doing fine. It was nice talking to you. Someone will be in touch next week to set up the briefing. (Ø)

Secretary General: Thank you. Just let me know through your Ambassador. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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1015

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela
Interpreter: P
Notetaker: DC

DATE, TIME February 8,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

*Call
made
from
Camp David*

The President telephoned President Perez to report on the situation in

The President: Hello?

President Perez: Hello, Mr.

The President: Nice to hear your

President Perez: Thanks very much, Mr. I've been thinking of you a lot, and know of the decisions you are making. (P)

The President: I appreciate that. I'm really calling, with no special agenda, but since I haven't talked with you for a while, I wanted to give you a progress report on the situation in the Gulf. Let me go through a few points, and then I will answer your questions. (P)

In the first place, I want to say that we are not targeting civilians or holy sites. I think people who look at targeting and see the pictures are convinced that we have done a good job, that we've been very precise. (P)

As you probably know, I've sent Dick Cheney and Powell to the theater. They will report back on Monday. (P)

No decision has been made yet on a ground campaign. I am somewhat skeptical that air power alone can drive Iraq out of Kuwait, but I really want to hear from Cheney and Powell. (P)

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2009-0876-MR
31 8/21/09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Patsy Arizu
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME February 8, 1991, 5:45 - 6:17 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President telephoned President Perez to give him a progress report on the situation in the Gulf. (Ø)

The President: Hello? (U)

President Perez: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Nice to hear your voice again. (U)

President Perez: Thanks very much, Mr. President. We've been thinking of you a lot, and know of the difficult decisions you are making. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate that. I'm really calling, with no special agenda, but since I haven't talked with you for a while, I wanted to give you a progress report on the situation in the Gulf. Let me go through a few points, and then I will answer your questions. (Ø)

In the first place, I want to say that we are not targeting civilians or holy sites. I think people who look at targeting and see the pictures are convinced that we have done a good job, that we've been very precise. (Ø)

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31 8/21/09

In any case we will set the timing of the next phase -- not Saddam. The initiative is ours, and we control the skies. We feel that we are controlling events. (C)

When Saddam sent his forces down to Kafji, he really got wiped out. We wiped out a lot of his armor. Some said he was trying to draw us into a ground war. (C)

I want to tell you that we don't want to dismember Iraq or destroy it, because that would create an Iraq that is so unstable that it is a target for aggression of others. We believe that Iraq can and should play a role in the Gulf's security arrangements, but certainly there can be no return to Saddam's military hegemony. (C)

I've been pleased that so far casualties have been low -- far less than we would have anticipated -- that we did anticipate before the air war began. In my view, there is no chance for a cease-fire, because as recently as two days ago, the Iraqis reiterated their view that they would not get out of Kuwait. (C)

We're outraged by their treatment of our POW's, and by their SCUD attacks. These SCUDs are terror weapons against civilians. And also by the oil terrorism of the environment that comes from the dumping of that oil into the Gulf. (C)

The other point is we're already starting to think about a post-war Middle East, and I personally want you to know that I will try to be helpful on these other regional conflicts, especially the Arab-Israeli problem. There is potential for progress there, based on the Arab coalition -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria -- that has united against Iraq's aggression. (C)

That's kind of an update, and I wanted to fill you in. How are things with you? (C)

President Perez: Thanks, Mr. President. It is very interesting to hear from you. I want to tell you some of the ideas that we have now. (C)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Perez: First, there has been a growing trend among thinkers, the press, and political leaders about the anguish that the destruction of Kuwait is causing. Some people are asking for a cease-fire. There is a movement among the non-aligned countries, which are requesting a meeting of the UN Security Council. (C)

A meeting has been called in Belgrade. Fifteen countries from three continents are attending. The Foreign Minister of Venezuela was invited. There are some quite radical countries attending. I made the decision that our Foreign Minister should:

not go, but I will have another minister go instead. Tomorrow the Minister of the Secretariat, Dr. Duran, will be going to Belgrade, with clear instructions from us. (Ø)

The President: Where is the meeting, Pat? (U)

Patsy Arizu: In Belgrade, sir. (Ø)

President Perez: I think there will be some harsh discussion, and there will be some who will be more balanced, and it will not be without interest. (Ø)

No doubt there will be discussion of a proposal by Iran on solving the situation. I have sent a letter by fax to President Rafsanjani, expressing our solidarity for his position of neutrality and the need for that neutrality, and the need to find a solution. (Ø)

The President: They keep assuring us that they'll be neutral, despite the fact that they have more than 100 Iraqi aircraft that they've allowed to land there. (Ø)

President Perez: I believe that what we have to do is to stimulate their neutrality in this conflict. Prolonging the conflict is not going to help the stability of the area. (Ø)

The President: Exactly, yeah. (U)

President Perez: The Minister I'm sending to Belgrade has very precise instructions. He is to take careful notes of what goes on there, and talk to Foreign Ministers such as the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and report back to me. There will be Egyptian, Cuban, Iranian, and Algerian Foreign Ministers there. This will be a broad group of Foreign Ministers, representing various positions. Our man has instructions to listen and report back. (Ø)

The President: Well, that's interesting. Because the Egyptians are very solid. I have great respect for Algeria, although they seem to favor Iraq. Syria, oddly enough, has been solid with the coalition. (Ø)

President Perez: This will be an interesting meeting. Mr. President, I want to call your attention to another matter. As usual there is a campaign starting in favor of those who are the weakest or the losers. I have to mention that in the next three weeks when the bombing continues, it will become greater. There is a situation that needs to be looked at carefully. (Ø)

The President: I do think this is important. He's trying to portray this as a targeting of civilians. (Ø)

President Perez: I think we should give a more important role to the UN Secretary General. He could help matters. (Ø)

The President: I just talked to him a few minutes ago. He thinks there may be a useful role for the Security Council. I don't think I agree with him, at least not now. There has to be some evidence that this man is getting out of Kuwait. (Ø)

President Perez: I fear that there may be mounting pressure for another meeting of the Security Council, and this can be dangerous. We can't be sure of the position of the Soviets and the Chinese in this. (Ø)

The President: I think so far the Soviets have been very supportive. In my conversations with Gorbachev and other Soviets, the Soviet position has been very supportive. I don't think they will change much. There has not been much out of China lately. (Ø)

President Perez: But, I think perhaps we need to exert more diplomatic action. It is very possible that the Belgrade meeting will call for a Security Council meeting. It is not clear how things are shaping up there, however. (Ø)

The President: My view is that there is no reason for having a meeting until the fundamental position is addressed by Saddam Hussein, and that is unilateral withdrawal from Kuwait without any concessions. I'm not sure he can do that. People I talk to are divided on this. The Egyptians think that he can't do it and survive, especially after withdrawing from Iran. (Ø)

President Perez: I'm afraid that is so. It's tragic that Saddam Hussein cannot take a step backwards without risking his position and his life. I also understand the U.S. position with the problem. But in Arab countries they want a quick decision, with the ground war beginning. I'm also skeptical that an air war alone can get Saddam out of Kuwait. (Ø)

The President: I may be wrong on this, and I want to hear from Cheney, but I don't think a ground war will be a long war. (Ø)

President Perez: Besides, it would be useful, Mr. President, to have some kind of declaration, going on with the UN Security Council resolution, in which France also participated. Otherwise we might run into strong opposition. (Ø)

The President: I think France is very solid in the position that I've just outlined. (Ø)

President Perez: I know the burden on you is very heavy. It needs to be shared by the other allies. This would help. (Ø)

The President: They're sharing the burdens in terms of the military effort. There are a total of 28 countries in the coalition. None of them want a new UN Security Council resolution. There is nothing to do, nothing for the UN Security Council to do right now. There is no indication that this man wants to get out of Kuwait. (C)

President Perez: Well, I believe things are as you say. But we need a sense in public that the USSR, the US, France, and the UK and others are maintaining a solid position that does not go beyond the mandate of the UN Security Council resolution. Because there is concern in some quarters that the mandate is being exceeded. (C)

The President: Well, with that group (the NAM) it will be evidenced. But with people in the coalition, you'll find the position that we have to get this job finished. The UN resolution is very clear and the debate leading up to it was very clear. Resolution 674 about reparations was very clear. (C)

But if there's a way to reaffirm that solidarity, we ought to be looking at that. But I worry about the mischief that would occur from those taken in by Saddam Hussein's propaganda. (C)

President Perez: This is why I'm making these reflections. I'm very clear: I believe you are acting in the only way possible, despite all the difficult decisions you have to make. That is why I have presented these ideas. But we have to be in accord with public opinion in our position. (C)

The President: Exactly. And maybe we can find a way to do it. But I'm worried about the UN Security Council because of the composition. (C)

But in any event, let's stay in touch. I'm embarrassed to say I wasn't following the fact that the Belgrade meeting was taking place so soon. (C)

President Perez: We have to move so that it doesn't become a negative event. (C)

Yesterday, in Haiti, I had a good meeting with Assistant Secretary Aronson. And I would like him to inform you of our conversation. I see some favorable points on El Salvador and Nicaragua. (C)

The President: I'll be sure to have him report to me on it. I'll be anxious to hear what you had to say to him. (C)

President Perez: Please receive a great abrazo and I want you to know that we're in solidarity with you and fully backing the UN resolutions. (C)

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The President: I'm delighted to have had this conversation.
Please call me whenever you need to talk to me. (U)

President Perez: Goodbye. (U)

The President: (in Spanish) Hasta luego. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Shankar of India on
February 8, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shankar
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME February 8, 1991; 5:30 - 5:40 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you sir? This is George Bush calling from the United States. (U)

Prime Minister: Good morning. Prime Minister Shankar here. (U)

The President: I am calling to thank you for your assurances to Ambassador Clark that India would do everything necessary to support the coalition's efforts. I am very grateful to you for that. (Ø)

Prime Minister: Yes, we are doing everything possible. Our people are anxious about developments in the Gulf area. (Ø)

The President: We are anxious ourselves. I want to tell you personally that contrary to his propaganda we are not targeting innocent civilians like Saddam is doing with his SCUDs which have no military value. Our targeting has been effective and our technology is working well. (Ø)

Our casualties are lower than we thought they would be. I am determined and so are the 27 countries in the coalition. I wanted to call to thank you for your support. I know you are under strong pressure at home. (Ø)

Prime Minister: Yes, you know the difficulties here, and the position the political parties have taken. They say we should not allow refueling of US planes, but we have. I said we should do it for humanitarian purposes. Parliament will meet in a few days. Political opinion is with the opposition at the moment. (Ø)

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The President: I recognize the pressure but hope you can stay with it. The UN also puts you in a strong position. No one likes war. This won't last long. This brutal man has engaged in environmental terrorism, threatens to use chemical weapons, has brutalized our POWs. This man must be brought to justice. And I hope the public upholds your forthright position. I called to express my appreciation for it. We all do want to stop the killing. All he has to do is get out of Kuwait. But there is no evidence he will. In his talks with the French, the Iranians and others, he says he won't get out. (C)

Prime Minister: The opinion is he will get out but not from outside pressure. We need to stop the fighting and find a peaceful way for him to get out. I know there is a certain compulsion to finish this but we should find some way to stop. (C)

On the refueling, could you consider another option by going to Sri Lanka? I hear they have granted you rights to use refueling facilities. Can you shift from India to Sri Lanka? (C)

The President: I wasn't aware of this. We had been pleased to use India. We had not thought about shifting. But I will look into it. I hadn't thought about it frankly, because I thought you were able to support the coalition. (C)

Prime Minister: Please look into it. Parliament may take a different view. We will keep your Charge' informed. But you should reconsider the problem. (C)

The President: But we cannot reconsider on UN resolutions. (U)

Prime Minister: I agree there. That is why we gave you refueling rights, but in Parliament they may not agree, and I cannot take this decision without Parliament. I don't want to say no to it. But you could make the decision to change the venue to Sri Lanka. (C)

The President: I hope you will carry the day in Parliament. But we will see. But thank you for what you have done. (C)

Prime Minister: You had a need for refueling so we extended the cooperation, but now... (C)

The President: No one wants this war to end any more than I do. (C)

Prime Minister: How long will it be? (C)

The President: General Powell and Dick Cheney are over there now. They will discuss with me Monday the question of using ground forces. Please understand no decision has been made.

But if they are used I am convinced it won't take long. I am not being overly confident or macho, but I believe we will overwhelm them fast. But I want to wait to hear from our generals, and those from Britain and France. Powell and Cheney will be talking to them too. (Ø)

Prime Minister: I am concerned about the 5,000 Indians still there and their security in Kuwait. (Ø)

The President: It is difficult with the way he brutalizes people. I hope he is not doing that to the Indians. He is still is to the Kuwaiti people from the reports we see. (Ø)

Prime Minister: He has done nothing to our people, but they know he can be cruel. (Ø)

The President: I am sorry to call so late, but I am glad I called. I appreciate what you have done, and I will look into the other thing. (Ø)

Prime Minister: Thank you, Mr. President. I want to give this cooperation but our people are incensed over the Gulf so I have to consider this obstacle. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

Prime Minister: Thank you for the call. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

1046

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0479-F

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of
the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME February 9, 1991, 6:56 - 7:13 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Ruud, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Good. How are you, George? (U)

The President: I am sorry to bother you on a weekend, but I
hadn't talked to you for a while and wanted to give you an
update. I had a good visit with Hans. (U)

The air campaign is going well. There has been no decision to
launch a ground offensive, and we are in no rush. On the other
hand, I sent Cheney and Powell over there and will be anxious to
talk with them when they get back on Monday. I am not sure that
air power alone will do it; we may have to start a ground
operation. In any case, we will decide, and we will set the
timing ourselves. (S)

I am worried about his propaganda campaign that we are targeting
the civilian population and going after the destruction of Iraq.
Our air missions have been carefully targeted to minimize
civilian loss of life. Of course there have been some civilian
casualties, but that is not our aim. For example, there are
Scuds placed under the Baghdad highway. Similarly, down south we
have gone after bridges, but only those with real military value
as supply routes for Republican Guard units. But the Iraqi
propaganda has been strong. A British correspondent reported
that soldiers who had been killed were then made to look like
civilians. (S)

I am still outraged by the treatment of POWs. We have more than
1,000 Iraqis, who are being treated properly, while coalition
POWs are brutalized. I am also concerned about terrorism,
including urban terrorism, and the attacks on Riyadh, Tel Aviv,

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and Haifa. Right across from the Rashid hotel there is an anti-aircraft gun on the roof of an office building, but we are not taking it out because of the risk of civilian casualties. So I worry about his propaganda, but I am not going to be deterred by it. (S)

On the battle itself, we are making real progress -- punishing the Republican Guards and going after his air force. On the aircraft sent to Iran, the Iranians keep low-balling the numbers. I don't know why, because we know how many there are. I believe them when they say they will keep them impounded, but we are watching carefully. Those are some of the main points. I am also starting to look at how we might use the opportunities after the war to build peace and stability. We don't want to dismember or destroy Iraq, because that would lead to instability in the region. Iraq without Saddam Hussein could play a constructive, stabilizing role. I think the remarkable coalition that has been assembled -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and others -- can work afterwards for a peaceful settlement. And I think the U.S. can play a role in getting at the Palestinian issue. My last point: we believe that in a ground campaign there will not be as many casualties as many have estimated. The number of air casualties has been less than we estimated beforehand. That's my rundown. I would welcome your thoughts. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Listen, George, what you have been telling me about propaganda is making no impression in the Netherlands. I don't think it is making any impression in the neighboring countries, either. Maybe it is having a stronger impact in the U.S. than in Europe. (C)

The President: Cuellar raised it when I talked to him. So did Perez in Venezuela. It's not a big issue in the U.S. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We Europeans hope that, although a ground attack may be needed, we go on as long as possible with the air campaign. Every day we diminish his ground potential is a good day, because that means it will be weakened further on. A ground attack will be divisive if people conclude that it was launched too early, so it is important to show that we have gone the extra mile. From a political point of view, this is more important that the propaganda campaign of Saddam Hussein. (C)

The President: That's a good point. The question militarily is how much good we are doing. At some point, the law of diminishing returns sets in. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I don't think air power alone will do the job, but from the political point of view it is better to start a ground attack later. (C)

The President: Yes. That's a good point. I guarantee we will not use ground power unless we are convinced that it will be quick, with low allied casualties. He wants a protracted ground war in the desert, but I believe he can't achieve that. (C)

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Prime Minister Lubbers: That's the point: he will become nervous if this goes on and on. (Ø)

The President: My point is different. He will keep his propaganda going, but we are doing enough damage that he is miscalculating how his forces would stand up. We won't play into his hand. We are talking not weeks, but a very, very fast campaign. Powell and Cheney will be coming back to discuss these points. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I can't judge the military rationale, but politically the propaganda is having no effect. And those who worry about casualties from the air campaign would surely worry about a ground war, too. (Ø)

The President: We think a cease fire would be a very bad mistake. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes. I agree. (U)

The President: Anyway, it is very interesting that you think the propaganda is not having an effect. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: No. Forget the propaganda; it is unimportant. (Ø)

The President: Right. That's the way to look at it. The coalition is holding up very well. In any event, I am glad to talk to you. If ever you have a question or comment, just call. We are very grateful to you for standing side-by-side with us. I told Hans how grateful we are for Dutch support. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain (4 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/30/91 - 2/22/91

Document Partially Declassified
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Date Closed:	2/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(790)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Gonzalez
of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
Adrian Basora, Notetaker, NSC Staff
Patricia Arizu, Interpreter

DATE, TIME February 9, 1991, 7:20 - 7:40 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Felipe. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Good day, how are you? (U)

The President: I am sorry to interrupt your weekend, but I
wanted to give you an update on the Gulf war. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: It's no problem at all. I am glad to
hear from you. (U)

The President: The one thing that concerns me somewhat is the
fact that Saddam Hussein has launched a propaganda campaign
alleging that we are targeting civilians. This is, of course,
false. It is obviously impossible to avoid some collateral
damage, but there has been very little. Saddam continues to
shift his military weapons into civilian areas. He has placed
anti-aircraft guns and airplanes in civilian neighborhoods. For
example, he has put an anti-aircraft battery in front of the
Hotel Rashid. We have spared this battery, even though it is a
threat to our aircraft. (S)

I have sent Cheney and Powell to the region to assess the
military situation. I will reserve my decision as to when to
launch a ground campaign, but I am in no hurry. We will set the
timing of the next phase, not Saddam. (S)

We are also starting to look beyond the war to see how the U.S.,
and other countries might cooperate on how to build peace and
stability in the area, and to catalyze the Palestinian issue. We
don't want an Iraq so weakened that it undermines regional
stability. Iran is playing a helpful role. I believe they will

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*keep the Iraqi planes, but I don't understand why Rafsanjani says there are only 20 planes when we know there are 129. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I too, think Iran is playing a positive role. (S)

The President: I am very disappointed with King Hussein. He went very far to the left in his last speech. I know he has problems domestically, and I am trying to be understanding. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I think that is important. He has no margin for maneuver. He is very threatened inside of Jordan. (S)

The President: That's true, and I am trying to be understanding. But this time Hussein went so far that I had to lay down a marker. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes. (U)

The President: Over 1,000 Iraqi prisoners have come across the border. Based on their report, there seem to be serious morale problems. One last point, I continue to be outraged by the SCUD attacks, which are a form of terrorism, and by Saddam's brutal treatment of our POWs. That is an updated report on the situation. I would be interested in your views. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: My views coincide with what you have said, and with your analysis. To save time, I will just make some complementary remarks. First, it is true that there is a contradiction between the political interest in moving militarily on the ground soon, and the military interest in waiting longer in order to minimize casualties. But I fully understand that you want to find the right time before taking actions on the ground. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the earliest moment is the best politically. (S)

When the ground war begins, and not before, Saddam Hussein is likely to make a peace offer. The response has to be prepared in advance, and you need to be very careful that the Security Council and the UN Secretary General continues to be fully behind your efforts. (S)

The President: I talked to Perez de Cuellar on that very point yesterday. I do worry about a UN call for a cease fire. That would give Saddam a victory. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, but a closed-door UN meeting seems a certainty. (S)

The President: I don't know where that stands, but there may well be a meeting. (S)

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Prime Minister Gonzalez: One other point: [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] Karsanjani doesn't control all of the planes. Part of them may be controlled by the Revolutionary Guards. (S)

Another point is that you should try to control the flow of information, in the good sense, because the mass media are playing Saddam Hussein's game. (S)

The President: I know, we are failing on that score. Only one-sided coverage is coming out of Iraq, including destruction, and the media are picking it up. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, so you have to make an effort to counteract this. You should emphasize the fact that the U.S. is trying not just to save American lives, but also Iraqi civilians, and the lives of its coalition partners. (S)

The President: I agree, and I will try to step up my own efforts in this regard. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I have a couple of other important points. It is important to calm down the Israelis, but we also need to talk to them on the Palestinian issue. They have to be willing to discuss the Palestinian issue after the war. One other element of concern is North Africa. (S)

The President: Exactly, what is your view on that? (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: We have them right here, 14 kilometers from our borders. The situation in Algeria is serious. I believe there are divisions in the government. Tunisia is complicated. In Morocco, for the first time, we are worried about their stability, even though the King is trying to maintain the balance. Our Foreign Minister will visit all of the countries of North Africa next week. We see these problems because of our proximity. These countries are under pressure for many reasons, but especially because of the frustration of the people. (S)

We too have had problems with public opinion. There is no problem in Parliament. All parties except the Communists support our role. But we do have problems with the press now that the story about the B-52s is being made into a public scandal. However, you'll have no problem with Spain. Our attitude will be one of 100 percent support. (S)

However, more attention must be paid to North Africa. We foresee more problems in the Maghreb. (S)

Regarding Iraq, after Iraq's decision to break relations Spain proposed that the EC make a statement of solidarity with the Gulf coalition partners, and on the issue of diplomatic relations.

(S)

SECRET

The President: That's very good. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Finally, the terrorism threat cannot be neglected. We are making a big effort, but there are real possibilities of terrorist actions. We must remain alert.
(S)

The President: Exactly. I think we are looking at the situation eye-to-eye. If you have additional ideas, please give me a call in the coming days, and I will do the same. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Fine. To sum up, we have to keep an eye on the UN Security Council and the mass media. (S)

The President: I think so too. I appreciated our talk and your suggestions. Have a good weekend. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Thanks, Mr. President. You too. (U)

SECRET

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20. Telcon	Re: Telcon with the Amir of Bahrain on February 9, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/30/91 - 2/22/91

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By gc (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(791)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with the Amir of Bahrain on February 9, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Amir Shaikh Isa
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME February 9, 1991; 8:00 - 8:05 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Your Highness, how are you, sir? (U)

The Amir: Good morning. (U)

The President: I am calling to thank you for your kind message of support and to tell you how happy I was to hear that your health is improving. I know you must be pleased to be home. (U)

The Amir: Thank you for your kindness and your hospitality. We support you and we pray for you. We are grateful for all that you are doing in the Middle East. (U)

The President: I also want you to know that I take great pride in the outstanding performance of the Bahraini Air Force which has played such an important role in our military operations. (U)

The Amir: We stand with you. We know that you would do anything for us in this part of the world. Every head of state here feels the same way. (U)

The President: Our support is holding. Saddam is waging a vicious propaganda campaign saying we are targeting innocent women and children and civilian population. It is not true. (U)

The Amir: I know. I feel very sorry for the people who support him in the area. (U)

The President: [REDACTED] (b)(1)

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The Amir: We support you here in Bahrain. Don't hesitate to ask us for anything. We just hope we can repay you someday. (Ø)

The President: We don't feel that way about it. We all have a lot at stake and the Gulf is important to all of us. Dick Cheney and General Powell are there now. We are in no rush to start a ground war. But we will set the timing not him. We are convinced if there is a ground war it won't last long. (Ø)

The Amir: Yes. I am pleased with the way things are going. I hope it will be finished soon. (Ø)

The President: I think so. I do too. Despite predictions that it would be a long, drawn-out war. I don't believe it will be long and drawn-out. (Ø)

The Amir: It will be finished soon. The whole area supports you, Mr. President. (Ø)

The President: Well, I am grateful to you. I just wanted to check in and send you my warm regards. On our hospitality, I feel bad that I was not able to see you personally when you were here, but I am glad you got good attention. (Ø)

The Amir: I will never forget your hospitality. Bless you and your family. How is Barbara? (U)

The President: She's here. We are up at Camp David. I will tell her you asked. (U)

The Amir: Thank you. (U)

The President: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

SHAMIR

FEB 10 - PRES CALLED ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER
SHAMIR AT 1400 - CALL TERMINATED 1406.
HAASS AND WELCH MONITORED.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
21. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Moroccan King Hassan (4 pp.)	2/12/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/30/91 - 2/22/91

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By 31 (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(792)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with Moroccan King Hassan (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hassan
Interpreter: Alec Toumayan
Notetaker: John W. Montgomery

DATE, TIME February 12, 1991; 3:50 - 4:26 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The White House

The President: Your Majesty, how are you? (U)

King Hassan: I'm fine Mr. President, and you? (U)

The President: I'm calling to express my appreciation for your friendship and support in the international effort to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. We haven't talked in a long time and I wanted to call up and ask how things are going on your end. But first a couple points I want to make. From our commanders I hear your troops are making an excellent contribution in Saudi Arabia; the others in the multinational coalition are grateful, and certainly I am, for Morocco's role. I also know this is not an easy time for you or your people. I know of the divisions and difficulties. I was thinking that it might be valuable if we could have a serious exchange of views so that you could hear first hand how I see the situation in the Gulf and where I think we are headed. If you think it would be useful, I ask that you receive Larry Eagleburger, my very trusted right hand man at State, he's the number two there who is close to me personally and a man whose advice and judgement I value greatly. What I have in mind is a private, unpublicized and quick visit in the next several days. He will come to see you and report back to me, so that we can exchange our views in confidence, out of the public eye. I have ask Mr. Eagleburger to bring highly classified intelligence to show you the effectiveness of what has happened so far. If the idea has merit from your end, I would like to ask you to share with him your ideas on other countries in the region. I ask that you make suggestions and give him ideas he can bring back directly to me. (C)

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King Hassan: Did you read Saddam Hussein's latest speech? (U)

The President: I'm not sure which one you are talking about. I think I saw a summary but not the whole speech. (U)

King Hassan: His message in it is that "I am ready to negotiate an Arab solution but with no prior conditions." What does it mean Mr. President? Perhaps it means I am ready for an Arab solution, but as to conditions, I am to fulfil prior to that, I would be able to grant this at the end of negotiations. That is how I understood his message. I met his deputy prime minister today and asked him that question. I ask him if that is how he would translate Saddam's speech and he said yes. I am giving this to you as an element for your own reflections. As I said earlier, the decisions have been made and the die is cast. (✓)

The President: I hope you understand a couple points if I might reply here. (U)

King Hassan: Yes. (U)

The President: In the first place, the U.S. is not there to settle some past differences. They are there under the UN mandate, twelve resolutions having spoken loud and clear. Please let me assure you that I understand exactly what you are telling me about the role of Moroccan troops and I am glad you clarified that to me. (✓)

Secondly, I am inclined to discount most offensive personal rhetoric coming from Baghdad but I'm more determined that ever to fulfill the UN mandate and I think most of the other countries with whom we are allied in this cause feel the same way. In other words, I listened to the speech without an Arab insight but I heard nothing about withdrawal from Kuwait. Therefore, there can be no conditions and no pause until that time. (✓)

King Hassan: Basically, Mr. President, we are exchanging impressions, right? (U)

The President: Right. (U)

King Hassan: I believe we are pretty much in the same position as we found ourselves near the end of World War II when, having declared that nothing short of an unconditional surrender would suffice, the war lasted 6 - 7 months longer. We are discussing history. This could very well be a discussion between two professors of history. In any event, be that as it may, Iraq must get out of Kuwait. I have said it and it is my public stand. (✓)

The President: Yes. (U)

King Hassan: My only problem is not the Iraq-Kuwait problem but an Arab-Israeli conflict that still needs to be settled. That is the real issue, it must be settled or otherwise it will be very serious. I believe, Mr. President, in historical terms this is the number one issue that awaits you and only your true friends can tell you. We have been friends for a long time. We were friends long before you became president. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. (U)

King Hassan: And when we began this friendship, I personally had nothing to gain. We became friends because you believe in what you are doing. You are a man of rectitude. And then of course there is Mrs Bush, a great lady, full of charm and a wonder person. So I feel I can speak in all personal candor. (Ø)

The President: We recognize our special role in what comes after Iraq withdraws from Kuwait. I have mentioned that the only difference, and I feel strongly about it, the only problem is I don't think Saddam Hussein can justify taking Kuwait with the Israel-Palestinian problem; they are not related. Let me say, I appreciate your willingness to see Larry Eagleburger and I hope you will share your thoughts on the post Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with him. We already are looking at that. Larry Eagleburger is familiar with my thinking on it. I am anxious to hear your thinking. This war won't go on much longer. I say that not with machismo but because I am confident that our forces will prevail quickly when and if we move to a ground campaign. (Ø)

It is essential to make clear to our Arab friends we don't want a ground presence of U.S. troops in the area as Iran thinks and Saddam Hussein accuses us of wanting to do. In any event, Larry Eagleburger will be prepared not only to share intelligence with you but also to discuss this most important phase you raised with me. That is my responsibility and I will face up to it. (Ø)

Lastly your majesty, I can't tell you how much I appreciate what you said about our friendship. It is very important to me personally and we shall never forget your kindness to us and to my family before I became president. (Ø)

King Hassan: Mr. President, this is only so natural because friendship is not like temperature. Temperature goes up and down. Friendship remains constant. (U)

The President: Frankly, I regret very much the pressures with Jordan. I also have a friendship with King Hussein, but it is regrettably being strained by his recent actions. I can empathize with him, there are tough strains on him but I understand. I will not let this interfere with our relations after the war. (Ø)

King Hassan: [REDACTED] (b)(1)

The President: Exactly. (U) (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

The President: I think that is true. Let me assure you I have no rancor in my heart. If there is any there, it is for Saddam Hussein personally. I do feel a certain rancor when I see the treatment of our POWs, or the acts of environmental terrorism, or missile pointed toward cities to kill innocent people. But I have no rancor for the Iraqi people, its culture, its history, or cities, only for this brutal man. (U)

King Hassan: Mr. President, I was very happy to talk to you. I want to ask you extend my kind greetings to Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President: I will tell her. She's out seeing the families of some of our troops this afternoon. I will convey your regards and I am sure she will be touched by your kind words. (U)

King Hassan: I will wait to be contacted by your ambassador to make arrangements for the arrival of your envoy. (U)

The President: Thank you very much and I can't tell you how much I appreciate our having this conversation. (U)

King Hassan: I appreciated it as much as you. (U)

Good byes.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to President Sheikh Zayyid
of the United Arab Emirates (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Sheikh Zayyid
Sandra Charles, NSC
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal

DATE, TIME February 14, 1991; 2:36 - 2:53 p.m.;
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello? Your Highness, can you hear me okay? (U)

Sheikh Zayyid: Welcome, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I am calling simply to congratulate you on the wonderful success of your pilots against targets in Kuwait. (Ø)

Sheikh Zayyid: God willing, this is their duty. (U)

The President: I also want to thank you for the financial support for our military operations and that of our allies. We are grateful for that and for what you and Jim Baker talked about. (Ø)

On the military front, it is my conviction things are going very well, and when I finish these one or two points, I would like to get your judgement on that. I am totally confident that when a ground offensive is required, our forces will do well, and I don't think it will take long. (Ø)

I want you to know of my determination not to compromise, agree to a ceasefire or a pause, unless he does what he should've done long ago and gets out of Kuwait. (Ø)

On the bombing of the bunker in Baghdad, as you know we are not targetting civilians. It looks like he is using his own citizens as human shields, something he said he would do with our POWs. Jordan and Iraq particularly are trying to get us bad press on this. This is stimulating hatred against us in the Arab world. Somehow we must return the focus to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, and Iraqi atrocities being committed against Kuwaiti citizens, and his shooting missiles into Saudi Arabia that are aimed at killing people on purpose. (Ø)

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But I really called just to stay in touch, and to say I have not lost one iota of commitment or determination. We will do everything required to fulfill the UN resolutions and to get this man out of Kuwait and do it soon. (Ø)

Sheikh Zayyid: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, and to affirm we feel proud of our friendship with you and proud of the position you have taken, and we have taken with you. It is a just position. It should reassure the whole world, not just the Gulf, that there is justice in the world. Your position is just. God gave you the power and the awareness to affect this justice now and in the future. Your victories are all our victories. We are not concerned about what his mercenaries are saying about what is happening and what we are doing. They are paid by an unjust and unfair man. If this had not been your position, Saddam would have done a lot of evil and injustice in our midst. (Ø)

The President: Thank you, Your Highness, for looking at it that way. I wish you well. I just wanted to touch base. It was good talking to you. I am convinced the coalition will hold together, and prevail against this evil. (Ø)

Sheikh Zayyid: Mr. President, we are proud of our friendship with you, and also proud of the position you have taken by our side. The whole world is proud. Everyone who believes in the principles of truth and justice is proud. You are a superpower who is upholding the principles of justice and truth. We are certain of that. You are a superpower who respects justice, unlike Saddam Hussein and his lackeys who don't respect the principles of justice and truth, and who use innocent people as human shields. They have no principles. They adhere to no such rules. They have no religion even though they pretend to adhere to religion and Islam. But I find their behavior totally unacceptable. Islam calls on people to respect others. Saddam Hussein has no respect and shows no respect for those who are unarmed and innocent. For us on our side, the whole world knows who stands for truth and justice. We are proud of our friendship. I am confident it will last forever. We will never forget what you have done for us, that you stood by our side. For this reason, everything that is ours is yours. We are at your disposal. (Ø)

The President: One of these days we will finish the job. Thank you for your kind words of support. (Ø)

Sheikh Zayyid: Inshallah, we will be victorious. God grants victories and knows who is on the side of justice. (Ø)

The President: Thank you, sir. Good luck and goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to the Sultan of Oman

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Sultan Qaboos
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC
Interpreter: Shukran KamalDATE, TIME February 14, 1991; 3:18 - 3:28 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval OfficeThe President: Your Highness, George Bush calling. (U)The Sultan: Hello. (U)The President: How are you, Your Majesty? (U)The Sultan: Very well, how are you? (U)The President: Just fine. We haven't talked in a long time.
(U)The Sultan: You have been busy, there are lots of things on your mind. (U)The President: If you have a minute, I just wanted to bring you up to date and compare notes with you. (U)The Sultan: I have all the time you want. (U)

The President: First off, regarding the war, things are going well, and I am confident that when a ground offensive is required, the significant coalition of forces will do the job. Speaking very candidly after talking to Powell and Cheney, I don't think the ground operation will take long. He thinks he can bog us down in a long, drawn-out war. I don't think this will happen. Our preparations are very good. I am pleased our casualties, given the intensity of the attacks, have been so low, though each death you mourn, and each prisoner taken captive, particularly those brutalized in contravention of the Geneva Conventions. (U)

Let me say a word about the commendable efforts to arrange a ceasefire. I say these are commendable efforts because I understand the intentions of these people, including the Soviets and Gorbachev, whom I've have been in contact with, but the thing I can't do -- and the United States won't do -- is agree to

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a ceasefire hoping that will encourage Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait. Every so-called peace initiative has resulted in his staying absolutely firm in Kuwait and is failing to get him to say he will get out. So I can't and won't accept any language for a ceasefire saying if we stop shooting, he gets out, or calling for negotiations and he gets out of Kuwait. We want nothing of that nature. We've said what is required. He knows what is required, but I don't think he is prepared to stop and make a credible withdrawal and restore the legitimate rulers to Kuwait. But I know he won't do that. (C)

Needless to say, I know you well enough to talk candidly about the bombing of the bunker in Baghdad. It has caused a lot of concern because innocent civilians were killed. I want to tell you personally we do not target civilians. I have incontrovertible evidence that the bunker was a military target. He put people there knowing this, like he publicly said he would put POWs there and placed innocent travelers there from before as human shields. As much as it hurts Barbara and me whenever we see these babies -- anyone would be concerned to see civilian casualties -- but he is using his civilians and he has gassed his own people before. (C)

I personally saw the intelligence on what the military did, and there was no collateral damage to anything other than to this command and control bunker which unfortunately was used to house innocent civilians. We have gotten a lot of bad press, but people now are starting to see the truth. We do not tolerate the bombing of innocent citizens. But I just wanted you to hear this from me. (C)

The Sultan: Thank you very much. (C)

The President: Your Majesty, how do you feel and do you have any advice to offer? (C)

The Sultan: From what I have heard and seen and what you said, I think things are going very well indeed. People in this part of the world expected more casualties and more intense fighting from the other side. But of course with careful planning on your side, things are going very well. Speaking as somebody with some military experience, I think your planning was excellent. (C)

On the civilian side, when you fight a war you cannot avoid some civilian casualties. Sometimes it does happen, especially if the command of that country deliberately puts civilians or puts military equipment in civilian areas to make propaganda against those fighting for a good cause. This will happen. I do believe he would do this to make an impression that the allies and the coalition is targeting civilian people. And if I may say so, anybody who can think properly knows this is not so and a lot of people will know this is not so. (C)

The President: Well, I hope that's right and I think you are. We've had about 24 hours of flamboyant publicity, but I think people are beginning to see it as you do. (Ø)

The Sultan: On the effort for a ceasefire, the last time I heard of this effort was from Pakistan, during a visit from the Pakistanis. In my words I told them it would do no good unless he packs up and goes and takes all his equipment and soldiers and leaves Kuwait; then that is a different matter. But to speak of a ceasefire or peace settlement while the cause is still there and who caused it is saying nothing to go away from Kuwait, then there is no good talking because he will take advantage to consolidate his political and other aims. (Ø)

The President: That is so true and I don't understand why some don't understand this. (Ø)

The Sultan: Speaking honestly, I think these people do this for domestic consumption. They try to appear as peace makers. But peacemakers must be seen to remove the cause of it all and make the person who caused the problem go away and not stay. At the same time, they speak about tying things together, talking about other problems, comparing them with the problem he caused. That is not the correct way to go about it at all. I think all your friends do see this; I believe they do, so I think you should not take much notice of people making peaceful noises to arrange this or that. I am convinced they don't believe in it. This is my feeling. (Ø)

The President: Yes, we agree totally on that position. I wanted to assure you things are going well. We are determined as ever. There is some hope no ground forces will be required, but I am afraid they will be. We have done a great deal of thinking and a lot of planning has gone into this. I have not lost my determination to do what is required; it will be relatively soon. I am confident I can say to my own children for example that there will be less loss of life with a ground offensive than is said in the press in this country. (Ø)

The Sultan: Yes, the press magnifies things and talks about subjects that they don't know much about. They make up stories. (Ø)

The President: That's so true. (U)

The Sultan: The worry in this part of the world is just whether there are capabilities for chemicals and other unconventional weapons that have not been used yet. (Ø)

The President: Well, let me assure you, that's a nonstarter on our part. If it happens that he does use chemical weapons, as far as we are concerned, that would raise the stakes. As your friend I want to say we have no intention of doing so, and don't need to. He has used gas on the Kurds. I worry about our troops and others on the front lines, and worry whether he can put them on missiles into cities. We are certainly aware of the complications for us if unconventional weapons are used. (S)

The Sultan: Yes, that is so. Perhaps in this instance Saddam will be wise enough and not try to use unconventional weapons and complicate things. (P)

The President: I hope not. It has been nice talking to you, Your Majesty. Barbara and I wish you good health, and send you respectfully our best wishes. (U)

The Sultan: Thank you very much. I send you and Mrs. Bush my best wishes. Let me take this opportunity to reassure you of my friendship and my support. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to the Amir of Kuwait

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Amir of Kuwait
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME February 14, 1991; 12:05 - 12:23 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, how are you sir? (U)

The Amir: Hello, very well, thank you. (U)

The President: I am just calling to thank you for your kind words of support in your letter, and to congratulate you on the success of your pilots in the fight to liberate Kuwait. I also want to thank you for your pledge of financial support for our operations and that of the allies. (Ø)

I hope you agree that on the military front, things are going well. I am confident, totally confident, that our combined forces will get the job done. Especially following my talks with Cheney and Powell when they returned, I am confident it will not take long, and that it won't be a long drawn out war. I just wanted to share these thoughts with you. (S)

I also wanted you to know we are not interested in any compromise or any pause or a ceasefire but must maintain our steadfast position to convince Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw from Kuwait, from your country. (Ø)

Lastly, regarding the bombing of the bunker in Baghdad, I want you to know we are not targeting civilians. It looks like he is using his own civilians like he used foreign hostages and POWs as human shields. Frankly, he got a lot of propaganda yesterday as the press made it look like it was imperialists against Iraqi citizens, but I think we're starting to get this under control. Your Ambassador here yesterday raised the proper questions and did very well. Also, your military briefer in Riyadh today was first class. (C)

I just wanted to get back in touch with you and hear your comments about how things are going. (Ø)

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The Amir: Thank you, Mr. President, for your support and commitment. It is my wish that we continue to communicate all the time on these matters. I agree with what you said on the points you raised. Regarding the bunker and what Saddam Hussein said, we know him quite well and how he uses propaganda to try to create cracks in the coalition. This is what he is trying to do with all the emphasis on the bunker. Saddam Hussein knows that last week his troops killed over 200 Kuwaiti civilians. Most were 15-20 year old boys and girls. They were dragged out of their homes and they were just killed. They didn't commit any crimes, were given no trial. He also mutilated their bodies, young boys and girls. With the girls he cut off their breasts. These brutalities are unprecedented. Not only did these acts take place over the last six months, but they are happening now. Under no other conditions of occupation have I heard of such brutalities. It is insane and unprecedented. At the same time, he cries and pretends to be mourning the incident at the bunker. (Ø)

The President: I am very disturbed to hear that horrible story, but not surprised to hear what you are saying because he is so brutal. I just wish we could get that word out more and find some way to convey to your people our deep sorrow. The best we can do is win and win quickly to vindicate the terrible loss of lives. (Ø)

The Amir: I am pleased to hear your comments that the best thing is to win and win fast. This is very important and I am pleased to hear it. I believe Saddam Hussein wants to prolong this war because he doesn't care about the Iraqi people; he only cares about his survival. People talk about comparing him to Hitler. Cheney and Powell talked about this when they were here. When the comparison between him and Hitler comes up what I always say is there is a difference. Hitler believed the German people were superior to everybody else. Saddam Hussein does not believe the Iraqi people are superior. He does not believe in them; they are not important to him. He only believes in self aggrandizement. Hitler committed suicide when he was in a difficult situation. I believe Saddam Hussein lacks the courage to kill himself because he is too scared. He is in love with himself too much. (Ø)

The President: I see we are both determined, and first, I want to thank you, and secondly tell you that I am more determined now than ever. And third, to tell you it won't be long, it won't be long before we move against this man on the ground. (Ø)

The Amir: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for the good conversation and your commitment. We stand together for the liberation of Kuwait and our strong steadfast cooperation. (Ø)

The President: My thanks to you and your people and good luck. We will do our part. (U)

The Amir: We too thank you and wish you success. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 15, 1991, 3:31 - 3:39 p.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Hello, Turgut. How are you? I was just calling to discuss the new initiative by Saddam Hussein. We've looked at it closely and frankly he is going backwards. It is unacceptable to us. (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes. When I first heard about it, I felt it was propaganda. (Ø)

The President: Yes, serious propaganda. Everyone has pointed that out. There are old conditions and new conditions. We would have to pay for the reconstruction of Iraq whereas the UN says he should pay for damages. We knocked it down hard. I just wanted to be sure you knew how we felt. (Ø)

President Ozal: I wanted to speak to you earlier today to give you my support. There is a big possibility to end the Vietnam syndrome in the U.S. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I want it to end. We have a ways to go to fulfill our objectives. (Ø)

President Ozal: We must ask him to implement all UN resolutions. (Ø)

The President: The only good thing is that this is the first crack in his armor. He didn't call Kuwait the nineteenth province. But the other conditions are unhelpful. (Ø)

President Ozal: I think you have hit him very hard. Your military commanders say you have destroyed one-third of his army tanks. But I think it is fifty percent or more. You are being too conservative. You are hitting his forces very hard. (Ø)

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The President: We are moving forward on the other plans and I will give you a heads up. The problem in Vietnam is that we would stop the bombing for a ceasefire. We can't have a pause or ceasefire. We will stay the course. (S)

President Ozal: That is agreeable to me. One more point. People were very excited in Baghdad when they heard the announcement this morning. (C)

The President: Exactly. I am convinced, Turgut, you know this better than me, that when Saddam Hussein is out of the picture, the Iraqi people will dance in the streets. (S)

President Ozal: The second point is that you have an opportunity to erase the Vietnam memory and give a big push to the U.S. (S)

The President: I look forward to seeing Alptemocin on February 22. Please tell him to come to see me. (U)

President Ozal: Yes. I believe it is already scheduled. I may come to the U.S. in March. I will speak at Pennsylvania University. (C)

The President: Fantastic. Please come to see me. Let me know when you are coming. Let's get this thing nailed down. (U)

President Ozal: It will be March 23-24. I will be at Pennsylvania, Brown and Duke. (C)

The President: Good. Those are great universities. That is wonderful. I'll look at the schedule and make sure we can meet. Maybe we can have a relaxed dinner at home. (U)

President Ozal: Anytime after March 22, on the 23rd or 24th or after I go to the universities. (C)

The President: Get your Foreign Minister to let me know and we'll work out a program. (U)

Jim Baker spoke to Bessmertnykh. We are okay with the USSR. They've got demonstrations in Azerbaijan. But they agree fully and completely with the UN resolutions. We are not drifting apart. (C)

President Ozal: I will visit the USSR before I come to the U.S. I'll be ready to talk to you then about my trip there. (C)

The President: We'll be in touch. The war is okay. I am unhappy with the loss of life in Baghdad. I can assure you that was a military center. It is terrible there were civilians in there. (C)

Did you get our military briefing? (C)

President Ozal: Yes. (U)

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The President: There was one picture of his planes against a 4,000 year-old building. You could clearly see two planes right up against it. (Ø)

President Ozal: But Saddam Hussein is losing. (Ø)

The President: I think so. It was good talking to you. Give me a call if anything comes up. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call with President Francois Mitterrand
of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Eliza Burnham (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 16, 1990, 10:18 - 10:27 a.m.
PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Hello, Francois? (U)

President Mitterrand: Good morning, I am on the line. Is the
President there? (U)

The President: Yes, good morning. What's the latest? (S)

President Mitterrand: I'm sure you know the latest about the
Gulf just as well as I do. I tried to call you last night
regarding the Saddam Hussein proposal. From the French side,
there is no question of being fooled by what he is doing. I
wanted to say something to you about it last night, but today I
am simply confirming what we have already said in public. (S)

The President: I totally agree with that, and I thought your
statement yesterday was wonderful. (S)

President Mitterrand: We and the other allies have said the same
thing. How do you explain or interpret Saddam Hussein's move?
(S)

The President: I can't explain it unless it was instigated by
the Soviets, but I don't think so. Jim Baker talked to
Bessmertnyhk yesterday and he doesn't believe that the Soviets
are behind it. Perhaps it is because Saddam Hussein is hurting
militarily. (S)

President Mitterrand: I think there is a Soviet suggestion
behind this. I would not be surprised if this had been
instigated in Moscow. The Soviet Union could claim that this
represents a new element and they could thus present themselves
as mediators. (S)

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The President: You may be right. I think you are on to something there. (S)

President Mitterrand: We'll see when Tariq Aziz visits Gorbachev on Monday. I am not overly worried about Gorbachev's move. What do you think? He seems to be playing both sides, but I do not think he is in a position to move away from the other UN Security Council members on this issue. (S)

The President: I agree, but we also think that Gorbachev is in a lot of trouble at home. This worries me. He has made it clear to me that he wants a place in the negotiations or final arrangements after the war. This is fine. Bessmertnykh was very reassuring to Baker as well as to the Kuwaitis. So I think that Gorbachev is with us and I don't think they will split off from the coalition. (S)

President Mitterrand: One last thing: we should not push him on the Baltics at present. It is not in our interest to get worked up on the Baltics. It would be advisable to wait for the referendum before reacting to Soviet policy there. A month from now, we can see what we should do. (S)

The President: I agree. I am trying to hold back anti-Soviet legislation and statements here in Washington. We should not give his enemies ammunition. I don't want to get too far out in front on the Baltics. We should cool it and not overreact. (S)

President Mitterrand: We should wait at least until March 24th, and then we will see more clearly both on the Baltics and on the Persian Gulf. (S)

The President: I agree, Francois. One more thing: the dates that Admiral Lanxade talked to Brent Scowcroft about are the same as ours. Lanxade's dates are right on. I'll be back in touch next week if there is any fine tuning on the dates. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: It is nice talking to you. Let's stay in touch. I really appreciate your call. (S)

President Mitterrand: I understand you are at Kennebunkport? (S)

The President: Yes, and it is 11 degrees. Its colder than hell outside, but cozy inside. (U)

President Mitterrand: I remember your house fondly. It is cozy indeed. (S)

The President: Thank you very much for the call. As to the coziness up here, we'll have to do it again soon. (S)

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President Mitterrand: On the French side, everything is fine.
Public opinion is staying firm so far. We'll be in touch soon.
(S)

The President: Goodbye, Francois. (U)

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmuth Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME February 18, 1991, 12:04 - 12:32 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut! How are you today? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Quite well. There is a lot of work, but things are going well. (U)

The President: You are nice to call. What is going on? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: There are three things I wanted to discuss. The first is a conversation I just had with the Iranian foreign minister, who was just here. What was quite interesting was that he reported that his side and yours started from the assumption that Iraq suffered substantial damage. He said that he had a conversation with the Iraqi foreign minister yesterday, before he went to Moscow. In the conversation, the Iraqi let the information seep through that there had been heavy damage. Obviously, the Iranian foreign minister has known his counterpart for a long time, and he said that this must have had the agreement of his government back home in Baghdad. Velayati is of the opinion that they are trying to find a face-saving option, a way out. I told him quite clearly that the declaration on Friday was clearly not in that direction, but he said that even in the face of what I told him he still believed they were trying for a face-saving option. He also told me they are pinning their hopes on the talks in Moscow. This morning I got a call from Gorbachev during a break in his conversation with the Iraqi foreign minister. This was because we had agreed on a date and hour before he knew of that meeting; we wanted to talk about the Two Plus Four in the Supreme Soviet. Incidentally, he assured me he wanted to push it through at all costs. He also said he would call tomorrow to report on the results of the Iraqi foreign minister's visit, and that he also intended to call you. So, I don't really know any specifics, but I have the impression that

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something is happening within Iraq. As to the outcome, we will have to wait and see. (S)

The President: That is interesting. We have to see that Iraq will comply. I don't know about face-saving for Saddam Hussein. That doesn't interest me. The important thing, as you know, is compliance with the UN resolutions. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, the Iranian foreign minister was very clear. He said they will have to comply with the UN resolutions demanding they withdraw. (S)

The President: Helmut, did he mention reparations and other conditions? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: No. What he did was try to explain that the conditions were not really conditions. What he wanted to tell me, and he considered this the most important point, was that Saddam Hussein did not make reference to Kuwait as his 19th province. He thought that meant he was preparing for withdrawal. I am only reporting, not assessing. (S)

The President: I agree. It was the only thing that was new and encouraging. The rest of it was totally unacceptable. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Did Mikhail Gorbachev try to get in touch with you after his conversation? (S)

The President: No, but I think Bessmertnykh will try to get in touch with Baker. On the other side, we cannot and will not permit Saddam Hussein to bring victory from the jaws of certain defeat. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I am in complete agreement with you, but if I understand the message coming out of the Iranian foreign minister correctly, Saddam Hussein has quite a lot of difficulties maintaining his foothold. He said something very interesting, that Iraq is not Saddam Hussein and that Iran wants to help Iraq but not help a certain individual. I thought it unusual. (S)

The President: That is very interesting -- a very interesting statement, Helmut. I hadn't heard it before. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: As soon as I have anything new, I will get in touch with you. Another point: I had a long discussion with Francois Mitterrand on Friday concerning the GATT. Bearing in mind our many conversations, I tried to press on him the importance of the issue. I am not making promises, but only reporting my impressions from the conversation. He did agree that the GATT round must be successful. He also agreed that GATT must address not just agricultural policy but all other areas as well, and agreed that both sides must show a readiness to compromise. I told him that for the EC's part, our aim must be to assure that Congress will renew or prolong fast track authority for the President. I told him that there are three important points for the EC: first, market access; second,

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internal supports; and, third, export subsidies. That is the most difficult and delicate point from the French point of view. I told him we have to get to work. George, I have a bit of advice. I think it would be very helpful, in spite of the great burdens you have, to telephone Jacques Delors. Or I can tell him to call you, so that a conversational link is established. Delors knows how important this is. I think he is ready to move, but he is getting a lot of flak. Perhaps it would be helpful from a psychological point of view if I told him to call you. (C)

The President: I would be delighted to talk with him. I would like to wait until I get home so I can be updated by my negotiators and the Secretary of State, but I could talk to him from tomorrow afternoon on if you think it would be helpful. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: It wouldn't be necessary for the next few hours. If you agree, I might call him in the next few days and tell him to call you in the second half of the week. (C)

The President: Very good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Excellent. Is there any news from the Gulf? (U)

The President: Nothing new. The operation is going well. I just talked to Cheney. We are damaging his armor very greatly. Helmut, I am convinced that if there is a ground war -- one, it will not be long, and two, allied casualties will be far less than what we hear from the experts on TV. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I certainly hope so. (U)

The President: Can I ask a question about Velayati? Is he a good man? I have heard positive things about him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: He is a man of quality, and a real Iranian. I remember when I studied I had fellow students from Iran. That is why I venture such an opinion. Second, from a religious viewpoint, his convictions are very strong. That is something to bear in mind. It was quite interesting when I said that it was a disgrace to see what was happening at the cradle of the three large religions of mankind. He was very glad to take up the subject. He also knows a lot about the West. He studied medicine in the U.S., I believe. I also have the impression, from something which Mikhail Gorbachev told me, that he has the ear of his President. Another thing, which I can't prove: my impression from the conversation is that once everything moves, once the dust settles, they are interested in improved relations with the U.S. -- not right away, because there are still hostilities, but I do think there is a real possibility. He was addressing the future of the region, and who would play a role there. He said all relevant countries have to play a role, including the U.S. (C)

The President: I think he is right. Given the pressures within

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Iran, this is not the time to restore full relations, but we keep hearing they want better relations. Yet here they are after an eight-year war with Iraq. I am very interested in what he said about the Iraqi people and not Saddam Hussein. My view is that if he got out we would all have a better time of it. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: But unfortunately he is still there. (S)

The President: Maybe not forever. Perhaps someday he will go. It has happened before. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Unfortunately it may take some time. You know we Germans have experience with that. (S)

The President: Look at Romania, how people were dancing in the street after Ceausescu went. Thank you very much for the call, for keeping me informed. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Please give my kindest greetings to Barbara. (U)

The President: She is right here and sends her love. Her leg is almost well. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: All the best. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of
Turkey on February 19, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns (notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 19, 1991, 5:03 - 5:16 p.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Turgut. (U)

President Ozal: Hello, how are you? I was today at the Turkish-Iraqi border. (Ø)

The President: Oh. What did you see? (U)

President Ozal: I visited our army troops in that area. I saw the situation and I have some information for you. (U)

The President: Please. And I have some information for you on the Gorbachev initiative. (Ø)

President Ozal: The numbers of Iraqi army deserters have increased substantially last week. Every day 200 people are coming to our border and more than half of them are soldiers, perhaps 70 per cent. It seems to me that was a fake piece some time ago by the Revolutionary Command Council. The same day our people noticed that their troops on the other side were enjoying like crazy people. And I think when this ground offensive starts, most of the Iraqi armed forces will desert the army or will become POWs. (Ø)

The President: That's interesting. We are encountering the same thing on the Saudi-Iraqi border and the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. More people are coming across discouraged. (Ø)

President Ozal: I told our TV people today when they asked about the Russian initiative. I said I don't know, but I feel they don't want to see a big victory. And they want to protect Saddam. I don't know, but I feel they want to guarantee the regime of Iraq. (Ø)

The President: You made a good statement that Saddam ought to be out of there. (Ø)

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President Ozal: Yes. I also said that their Soviet equipment is no match for the U.S. equipment. They don't want to see that. When the ground war starts, they will see the other equipment is also not matched. (Ø)

The President: Let me tell you Turgut - very interesting. The Soviet proposal stops short of what we can accept. They did not mention POWs. They said cease-fire and then withdrawal. We can't stop and then withdraw. There's no time set for troop withdrawal -- we said 96 hours. There was no reference to reparations and last week they said we had to pay to reconstruct Iraq. They should be paying for damage to coalition partners and the oil spill and for Kuwait. There are several important points missing: If Saddam Hussein tells Gorbachev he accepts the plan, it would not be acceptable to us. And I am sure it would not be acceptable to Turkey. (Ø)

President Ozal: I think I would agree. I felt it was guaranteeing the regime of Iraq. I know Saddam. He wants to protect his head. The Iraqi people are at a stage where they want no more war. (Ø)

The other thing, Rafsanjani called me today. He says that we should go forward in order to reach a peace. I asked do you know the Russian plan. He said no. Did Tariq Aziz tell you about the plan? He had no concrete information. I told him I am going to speak to President Bush, and he had nothing to relay. (Ø)

The President: There's something strange between Iraq and Iran. Aziz goes and spends the night. On the wire right now is a message to you putting in more detail than what I've told you. Be sure to get it right away. It spells out in detail our concerns. Mitterrand shares our concerns. I have not talked to Major, but Mitterrand tells me that the British share our reservations on the plan. I just talked to the Prime Minister of Canada. They are changing their commitment to participate in the bombing to show solidarity. (Ø)

Everybody we've talked to including Mubarak, says be careful of tricks. We cannot just jump at this peace proposal. Please read the telegram carefully. (Ø)

President Ozal: I suggest you should not change your position. (Ø)

The President: I will stay on the road. We are getting close on when to commit ground forces. Our military people are confident with the planning. We will keep hitting hard. If he said today "I'm getting out" and he does so with his military intact, we would not have done anything. All want to see Iraq without a war machine. Although we have hit him hard, its still a big force. (Ø)

President Ozal: Yesterday at Incirlik, I saw your people, your generals. They have not lost any planes. They say this base at

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Incirlik is the biggest and most comfortable in Europe. (S)

The President: Wonderful. You have been magnificent. If you have any questions, please let me know. (S)

President Ozal: I'll let you know. I may be coming to the U.S. in March before the end of month if you want to talk to me in a relaxed atmosphere. (S)

The President: 22nd? 23rd? We will definitely do that. All the day? (S)

President Ozal: It could be when you want. (S)

The President: I want to talk for sure. The only problem is I have a big dinner on Saturday. Maybe we could do something relaxed on Friday. We could fly to Camp David. (S)

President Ozal: I may be coming on 21st and leaving on 22nd. (S)

The President: Think about coming by here on Friday at 4:00 on the 22nd. We will fly to Camp David. I have to be back by Saturday afternoon at around 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. I'll bring you back. (S)

President Ozal: I will be there in Washington Friday at 4 or 3. Whatever. We will come to the military airport at Andrews Air Base. (S)

The President: Keep it small. Just Barbara and me and maybe one or two others. (S)

President Ozal: Maybe my wife. I don't know if she is coming. (S)

The President: That's wonderful. Hope she does. (S)

President Ozal: Everything is arranged. Thank you. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France on February 19, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Eliza Burnham (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 19, 1991, 3:24 - 3:47 p.m.
PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Francois, can you hear me OK? (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I hear you well. (U)

The President: I just wanted to touch base and compare notes on the Soviet initiative. (S)

President Mitterrand: I understand. I feel a great need to know your views on this. (S)

The President: I have already written to Gorbachev emphasizing the importance that there be a prompt and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. I said that I have problems with an unspecified length of time, and that 96 hours should suffice -- it only took the Iraqis 48 hours to go into Kuwait. After this, we have to keep the pressure on. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: I stressed that Saddam Hussein would have to comply with all of the UN conditions. I am planning to send a second letter pinning down more details such as the need for an immediate exchange of POWs and the principle that there can be no cease fire until a credible withdrawal has begun. This will not be a problem for Gorbachev, but I question whether it will be acceptable to the Iraqis. (S)

We will not attack the departing forces. The POW exchange must occur within the first 24 hours. We have a lot of their prisoners, approximately 1,200. They have very few of ours, but they are very important to us. (S)

The Soviet initiative, in its totality, is not acceptable. But this does not mean that we have entirely closed it off. However,

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we cannot be drawn into negotiating the terms of the Iraqi withdrawal. The UN has established those terms. There can be no pause. It is military pressure that has brought us this far with Saddam Hussein, and this military pressure has to continue. (S)

I would very much like to know your views. (S)

President Mitterrand: My views are the following. First, we must have a very quick response from Saddam Hussein, that is, by tomorrow. Second, the reply must be very clear and unconditional. Third, any postponement makes for difficulties for our armed forces, vis-a-vis public opinion, or even within the coalition. You have seen the Italian and German reactions. (S)

The President: No, what are they? (U)

President Mitterrand: They have shown indiscriminate enthusiasm for the Soviet proposal. We have demanded that Saddam Hussein's response be rapid, clear, unconditional and fully in compliance with the UN resolutions. As long as he has not replied, we can continue the war, perhaps almost with increased force. (S)

The first hypothesis is that he imposes conditions for his withdrawal. In that case, the war would simply continue. The second hypothesis is that he agrees to depart without conditions. If so, that clearly changes the situation. We then must pose questions as to the modalities, such as the speed of withdrawal, the POW question, and the timeframe for his final pullout. You said four days. I would have said one week. (S)

The combatants will have to agree to these conditions. It is not up to the USSR to determine them. (S)

The President: Exactly. (U)

President Mitterrand: You are right that we must continue what we started, although we should not bomb withdrawing troops. But until they withdraw, the threat must continue to be felt by Saddam Hussein. This creates a special problem for Israel, however. (S)

Perhaps for the next few days we should pursue our discussions by means other than the telephone. I have no specific ideas, but let's think about the possible means of doing so. (S)

In conclusion, if Saddam Hussein accepts all these conditions, then we can't continue the war as we have until now. By this I mean our conditions, as we have outlined them, not just Soviet conditions. (S)

The President: What would be your prediction as to Saddam Hussein's reaction? You know him. (S)

President Mitterrand: I don't know him, but if I look at the precedents, I think he will refuse. However, if Saddam Hussein is looking at Iraq's disastrous situation, he will find a way to withdraw. He will use some gimmick so as not to appear to be conceding. He will try to enhance his prestige by all available means. We must not allow him to do so. (S)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Mitterrand: This is the state of our thinking. I have worked on this with only a very small group of my advisers and we have not made the Gorbachev proposal public. We should consult fully, and we must act in concert. (S)

The President: I agree. We are not commenting on any of the specifics of the Soviet proposal as Gorbachev has requested. It is important to respect his request, although we must not let public opinion get out ahead of us, believing that peace is at hand and then having their hopes dashed. (S)

I have not yet talked to John Major although I have had a written message from him. You are the first person I have called. Have you spoken to John Major? I agree that we must stay in close touch. (S)

President Mitterrand: I spoke to John Major just 30 minutes ago. A rough summary of his thinking would be to say that he shares the same opinions that I do. (S)

The President: Do you think there are differences with the British? (S)

President Mitterrand: No, I said just the contrary. His position is the same as ours. (S)

The President: Good, that is very important. I have not talked to anyone yet. This is the first call I have made. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, yes. We need a response within 24 hours, otherwise we will be overwhelmed by public opinion getting out ahead of us and political statements will begin to be made by others, and the UN Security Council may be getting into the act. (S)

The President: Yes, that is true and it would not be productive at this stage. The Soviets have made a statement at the UN although I don't know the details of it. However, they have not revealed the details of their plan. (S)

The Soviets would clearly like a piece of the action. I see no problem in that, but they should not make the decisions. I don't think that they should carry the ball. They want to play a role, but they must not have too big a role and they cannot be the sole broker. The UN has a position, and the coalition has a position. I don't think we need the Soviets to negotiate for us. (S)

President Mitterrand: The issue is very clear. As soon as Saddam Hussein's position is known, the role of the Soviets as a broker is over. We then take over. Those who are prosecuting the war should establish the conditions for his pullout, and that is we. But, of course, we should be very diplomatic with the Soviets. (S)

We will need to talk again very soon, since events are moving so swiftly. (S)

The President: Yes, but if Saddam Hussein comes back with new conditions, we must strive ahead with the war. (S)

President Mitterrand: I am absolutely in agreement. (S)

The President: I am asking Brent to see if we have anything further from Bessmertnyhk with whom Baker was talking if you can hold on just for a minute. No, the call is just starting and it will take a while before we have any readout. Perhaps Brent can call Admiral Lanxade. (S)

President Mitterrand: Or Dumas can call Baker. (S)

The President: Yes. Thank you for the call and we will remain in close touch. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, indeed. Have a good day -- and this is the moment to say so. (S)

The President: Goodbye, Francois. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 19, 1991, 4:41 - 5:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Brian. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Hello, George. How are you doing? (U)

The President: I'm doing fine. Things are going well. I assume you are calling about the Gorbachev idea. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I saw your statement and that of John Major. I don't think that, from what I've seen, the Soviet offer is acceptable. But I wonder where we are if Saddam Hussein decides to accept it. (S)

The President: If you've got a few minutes, I'd like to discuss my concerns. First, I've tried to keep the Soviets in a constructive role. I have expressed a spirit of gratitude; I've put it in that kind of context. Second, we are going back to them with some concerns -- in more detail than the original concerns we expressed. I think you have the same concerns. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, we do. (U)

The President: Baker just talked to Bessmertnykh. Baker understands that they will let us know as soon as he hears from Saddam Hussein. They think it will be soon. He mentioned nothing about a report that Aziz is on his way. They understand that we have reservations. They want to be a player, but they are a little ahead of us. (S)

Gorbachev wrote that he had proposed this plan and wants Iraq to announce its intent to withdraw by a certain date, to be followed by a cease-fire. It is our view that it has got to be very soon. We propose something like 96 hours for the actual withdrawal, which means he must leave behind his armor. Mitterrand said we might wait a week. We have told the Soviets it would have to be very, very fast. (S)

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Iraq, according to the Soviets, wants a pledge that troops would not be attacked while withdrawing. We are prepared to say that. But we are not prepared to say that the hostilities have ceased. We are worried about some of the details, worried he may not go forward with all he has said. We thought he could be out in a week but he says he can't make it. We won't shoot him in the back. We won't kill him. We did say to the Soviets that any withdrawal must be unconditional and immediate, and I think all in the coalition are in agreement with that. We added that all UN resolutions had to be complied with. It's the same as for reparations. Do you remember if that was the word? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Compensation. I think it's compensation. (S)

The President: They were in agreement on that. Last week they said he should pay them, and gave some indication that all resolutions should be implemented. They devastated Kuwait. We told the Soviets that there must be recognition of all resolutions, and also that we want an instant exchange of prisoners. We want to trade all on an even basis and get it done right away. We feel very strongly. Any questions before I go on? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: No, that's fine. Keep going, George. (U)

The President: I don't have the damn letter in front of me. Let me see if I can find it. I am in the process of sending this second message to Gorbachev with further amplification. There can not be a cease-fire and then a withdrawal. That is what the Soviets called for -- a cease-fire, and then he would start withdrawal. That is unacceptable. We will not have pauses; we will not have cease-fires. Cheney has insisted on how bad it would be to have a cease-fire and then to start on a massive withdrawal. I want to be sure Gorbachev understands there can be no cease-fire until a major withdrawal is underway. Even then, there can be no cessation of the overall state of hostilities. If you have a minute, I'd be glad to read this to you -- only two pages. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Please do. (U)

The President: (reads letter)

My view is that, if he uses chemical weapons, this is a war crime. There is a problem with citing him for war crimes. How do you get him? Do we do a Noriega? That would be devastating. At least we get on record that this is a matter of utmost seriousness. (S)

(continues letter)

Gorbachev indicated when Aziz was coming and said he hoped there wouldn't be a ground war, and he made some reference to holding

up. These are the points I was concerned about. I'm told that Major agrees. Mitterrand agrees totally with Major. Mubarak said, "don't fall for any tricks." I am about to get a call from Ozal. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Ozal has been the toughest one of all about not leaving him in a position of quasi-victory. I don't know the answer, but I think you have covered as much territory as possible without shooting down the chances for peace. (S)

The President: We can not let him pull a victory out of defeat. Our people are confident the ground war will be short and involve minimal casualties. I'm getting emotional when you talk about many casualties. But Colin believes the loss of life will be restricted. We are going down this path. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Our cabinet met today and changed the tasking of our CF-18's to include air-to-ground support in order to be more active in the war, including on Iraqi territory. We want to step up our solidarity under your leadership. (S)

The President: That will be well received. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: It isn't the end of the world, but psychologically I thought it might help. This will be immediate. We won't jump at the first sign of a peace proposal. (S)

The President: Peace -- the hopes of everyone have soared. I am trying not to react so negatively that it looks like we are for war but not for peace. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Has Gorbachev asked you to hold up on ground action? (S)

The President: He did last week, but we didn't agree. He didn't say outright there must be no ground action. I think he made some more indirect reference. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Would it be safe to conclude that you will not say anything while this is going on? (S)

The President: I don't want to give him time. It lowers the pressure on Saddam. Mitterrand says we've got half a day. I'd rather be silent because it serves as a stick for him to get going. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Saddam should move fast and meet our conditions. (S)

The President: We just can't let this guy off the hook. We can't give him a victory. Gorbachev's letter is full of linkage. I don't want to have him say, "I finally got the Palestinian issue on the agenda." (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If so, it would ruin Mubarak and Ozal. (S)

The President: Yes, they would be screwed to the wall. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I think your approach is water-tight.
Good luck, and we will be with you all the way. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on
February 20, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME February 20, 1991; 7:14 - 7:21 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you, Hosni? (U)

President Mubarak: Very well. I received your message. I agree to it. (Ø)

The President: Yes. I gather Jim Baker and Abd el-Meguid have talked. I wanted your advice or thoughts. I got your message on being careful. I do not want him to pull victory from the jaws of defeat. We haven't heard any more from the Soviets. We are going forward with the plan you are aware of and a part of. There will be no let up in our campaign. We have no interest in killing Iraqis but the ending must be clear and unequivocal. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I am pleased that your message is very firm. (Ø)

The President: The French, Brits, and Ozal are in good shape. I talked also to Mulroney from Canada; they are very solid. The coalition is standing all together. There will be no concessions. Fahd and the Amir mentioned reparations in their public statements; we agree that this is an issue. The Soviet proposal is silent on lots of points. To have a ceasefire, then a withdrawal is unacceptable. I will not put our men, and yours, at risk. I am glad that you agree with us. (Ø)

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President Mubarak: The Soviets want a ceasefire, but then that will cause complications. (Ø)

The President: Our plans are going forward. If the ground war commences, then I'm optimistic. Casualties will be lower than people expect. How's your public opinion? (Ø)

President Mubarak: Nothing new here -- it's good. (U)

The President: CNN's Peter Arnett -- you know, the guy in Baghdad -- he is guilty these days of spreading their propaganda. (Ø)

President Mubarak: He broadcasts what Iraq wants -- he can't say anything else. (Ø)

The President: Is there anything else from Iraq, from the RCC today? I noticed they celebrated in Iraq on February 15 -- I wonder if the people will move against him. (Ø)

President Mubarak: There are slogans on walls there against Saddam Hussein; they are painting these on the walls. The people are fed up with him. (Ø)

The President: They would probably rejoice if he were pushed aside. (Ø)

President Mubarak: They are very upset with him. (Ø)

The President: No one has seen him in the last several days. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes, there are some doubts, maybe he is not even alive. No word from him. (Ø)

The President: Well, maybe we'll be lucky. I hate to think that way about a person. Some think he'll be a new Nasser. (Ø)

President Mubarak: He won't be respected because he failed to take a decision in time to save his people. All this is on the bodies of his people. (Ø)

The President: Well, I'm pleased to talk to you, let's remain together. Call me anytime. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1331

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the
USSR on February 21, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME February 21, 1991, 6:45 - 7:20pm
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello, Mikhail, how are you? (U)

President Gorbachev: Good morning, it's morning here. (U)

The President: I know. Why are you working so late? (U)

President Gorbachev: Hello, good afternoon to you. I have spent three hours talking to Tariq Aziz and wanted to immediately inform you about it. The conversation took place on the basis of a serious shift in their position. Today I can see some kind of impression based on realism. After our conversation, it seemed we were developing such a scheme as a political solution of the conflict. First, I want to make a couple of points. First, we rebutted all their attempts to tie the main issue of withdrawal to all the other questions of the region. Secondly, we firmly pushed your positions of an exchange of POWs and the restoration of the authority and return of legitimate power to Kuwait. (S)

The scheme looks like the following now: (S)

1. Iraq declares an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of troops from Kuwait;
2. The withdrawal starts the next day after the ceasefire;
3. The withdrawal will be exercised in strictly fixed terms and dates;
4. It is after duration of the term when two thirds of all the troops are pulled out of Kuwait, that the economic sanctions would be released;

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5. After complete withdrawal from Kuwait, then the reason for adoption of the UN resolutions will be eliminated and they will no longer have any standing;

6. Verification of withdrawal is exercised by observers authorized by UN Security Council.

The most complicated point, but I should say all the points were complicated, but the most complex was the term or duration for withdrawal. (S)

Since the POWs would be released after the ceasefire and since we can return the legitimate authorities of Kuwait and we have agreed on the unacceptability of tying this up with Palestinian and other issues -- we have eliminated these questions from the agenda. (S)

But on the withdrawal they said that it would take about six weeks. We said that was unacceptable and we put in front of them the question of reducing this term by at least twice (half?). And during the first weeks, two thirds have to be pulled out, and from the very first day they will be pulled out on a large scale. Aziz claimed it is unrealistic because all the communications and facilities have been destroyed. The bridges are destroyed. But, now they have the conditions we put in front of them. (S)

Right now he will be in touch with Baghdad, and today from 8 or 9 in the morning the work will continue, and in a thorough and detailed way we must examine each issue. I don't know what Baghdad will say, what their final reaction will be, but I have the impression that there is an important shift here. We are insisting on having an answer from them in the first half of the day so that we can complete it all. If we can reach an acceptable position, we can let this matter be public and involve the UN General Secretary. Maybe, George, you will also think about it. That, in a quick way, tells you the essence of these very sharp and serious conversations. (S)

The President: First, thank you very much for the courtesy of this phone call. Secondly, I thought Bessmertnykh made good a comment earlier this week when he said it is not up to Bush to reject the plan because this is a matter we are talking to Tariq Aziz about. I understood what he meant and I think it was a very good point. We heard the speech today by Saddam Husayn and saw nothing in there positive and, unless there is total change, I would be surprised if he would accept these terms. (S)

Having said that, I would be less than frank if I did not make several comments here having just listened to these ideas for the first time. Very candidly, to be very honest with you, we have no trust anymore in anything the man says. This is not just the U.S., it is the other coalition forces too. The idea of stopping

and hoping he will then follow through on a cease fire, I am certain will be unacceptable to the coalition, I am certain of that. (S)

We are convinced he is beating up these POWs and this has the same devastating effect in our country as it would in your country if these were Soviet soldiers. There has to be an immediate release of POWs. He has not even permitted the ICRC to see these people, whereas the Saudis hold several thousands of Iraqis who are being well treated, certifiably so. (S)

There is another UN resolution which relates to damages or reparations, and that obviously some of the Kuwait leaders and Saudi leaders feel very strongly that there has to be a proper pay back for the environmental damage and other damage that is called for under one of the UN resolutions. I don't know whether there was any discussion of an arms embargo, but the idea of releasing the sanctions until these points are totally satisfied is not good. The question of weapons or nonconventional weapons, chemical, biological and nuclear, is something that is very important to the countries that we are standing with there. I am sure that would be important to the Soviets and I don't see how we resolve that question, but the idea that he can somehow get a victory out of a crushing defeat would simply be unacceptable. (S)

One problem that Jim may have mentioned to Bessmertnykh is if you take off the economic sanctions before the dust settles, they start rearming and they ought to use their vast oil revenues for peaceful means. But if you remove economic sanctions to get him to stop or withdraw, that problem is very much still on the table, it seems to me. (S)

I appreciate very much the effort you are trying to make on the time of withdrawal but our estimates and those of our coalition partners have been carefully determined. It took him only 48 hours to get a hell of a lot of troops in Kuwait and, now I admit that a lot of their transportation is down, but they can do a lot better than a relatively slow withdrawal and I think you were right to point that out to them but I would have to think very carefully about any formula other than we have proposed. The UN resolutions include, I think, talk about their going back to their positions before the invasion and they can go back into southern Iraq without going over any bridges. But those are just some preliminary thoughts. This comes as very big news to us and we will start our conference with the other countries who have stakes in this on the ground there. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, I understand that we are discussing an issue of great importance and that is why I am thinking about your arguments in the most careful way. I really highly appreciate that we are working together in the spirit of complete

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understanding. Today, there may be a serious shift by Saddam and in the thinking of Saddam and people around him. There would have been no changes like this if we hadn't acted together before January 15 and after. I do not want to underestimate the role of the international community's sanctions as well as the burden of arms and military sanctions carried out by the U.S. Administration and American people. And everything is changing as a result of the efficiency of all these measures and efforts. (S)

We have our reservations in believing Saddam who made such a speech as he made today. But we also keep this in mind, but when we discussed these proposals and the formulation of all these positions, we decided to check their intentions and told Aziz that we will make it known to all the news media. And he said they have adopted the decision to go for this move and he agreed to make it all public which I think means a change is taking place there. (S)

I think that we must try to realize the fruits of these activities we have undertaken now -- to forestall unaccounted casualties on the coalition forces, as well as humanitarian approach toward Iraqi people. This is point number one. Number two, you speak about lifting sanctions, but we have tied it up in a tough way so that after two thirds have pulled out all economic sanctions lifted and rest will be lifted afterwards. Speaking about the POW issue, we put it in a tough way reflecting absolutely your position. As soon as we can do this we will be working on a system of security in this region and will not allow any rearming of Iraq. So we are always taking into account our agreed positions and joint approach. And in my conversation I completely put it on the table with Tariq Aziz, saying our positions were coordinated with you. (S)

That is what I wanted to say. Maybe you will give some thought and our people will work on it now. (S)

The President: Do you think Saddam has signed off on these positions, that he will accept them, even though we have reservations? (S)

President Gorbachev: Judging by Aziz' statements, that some of the questions he has to coordinate with Baghdad, but I still see that the decision was taken in principle by them. If they refuse now to this kind of approach then all the blame will be on them. We are putting these questions toughly, of course they have to give the answer, and that is it. (S)

The President: Well, thank you very much. I want to reassure you once more that we understand and appreciate what you are doing, and we are determined to continue to work with the Soviet Union when this is all over. We know that if it had not been for

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your total consultation and cooperation with us that we would never have gotten the UN action, and though I have problems with some of these proposals, I want you to know that nobody here thinks you are doing anything other than trying to be extra helpful and working toward peace. There is a lot of speculation in our country, but I feel strongly you are playing a very helpful and constructive role that will save lives. I still have problems, but I will do what you suggest, and we will talk with our coalition partners as soon as we can. (S)

President Gorbachev: Okay George. I would like to add that no winds and no storms can put us off the course we have made toward cooperation with the U.S. President, and that is a reflection of the fact that this is a vital necessity for us and to some extent to your country as well and believe this is the strategy we will follow. (S)

The President: I am delighted, and hope you will be back in touch if you get anything from Baghdad. We would be very interested because time is running out. (S)

President Gorbachev: Okay, goodbye. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. (U)

MITTERRAND FEB 21 - FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND CALLED
THE PRESIDENT SECURE. MONITORED AND
TRANSLATED BY BASORA. CALL INITIATED 1408 -
TERMINATED 1417. PRES IN WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada on February 22, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 22, 1991, 12:49 - 12:58 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Brian. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Hi, George. (U)

The President: A thousand apologies. I've just set a long-distance record: one hour and 15 minutes talking to Gorbachev. I think we paid for the phone call. It will transcend the deficit. (S)

It was a fascinating conversation. He has not heard back from Saddam. I told him of our proposal and our deadline. I was not in the Oval Office when the call started, so when I got in Jim Baker was reading the provisions of this statement to Gorbachev and we assured him that we had tried to get him in advance. He went through a long situation where he said all he was trying to do was to resolve the crisis but avoid force. You're familiar with his proposals, so I won't go into that. I asked if Iraq had agreed to the 6 points. He said no. I told him I thought that our people thought one week was plenty. It was originally 4 days that we had wanted. I told him I welcomed his approach. (S)

The most important thing for Gorbachev is his place in the sun. Gorbachev said "You and I must act together. We will teach a lesson to all the others. The new reality that we all reckon with would be a victory." (S)

He's got all these problems at home, and I've tried to stay in touch with him -- but it comes clearer to me that they have to have a place at the table, a place in the sun as their fortunes at home are getting more complicated. (S)

I tried to give him assurances that no matter what we did here, we wanted to keep cooperative relations with him. I did tell him

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that one thing that has changed is what the Iraqis have done to the oil wells in Kuwait. I don't know if you've heard but, literally, there's a scorched earth policy. Kuwait's oil tanks are burning. I told him the intelligence today shows the biggest fire you can imagine. It is so thick and so pervasive that it blacks out Kuwait City. He was silent. This makes me believe we have to keep on going. I told him how upset I was about the Iraqi civilians that have been killed. I asked him, "Did you know at the same time this was happening the Emir of Kuwait told us that 200 kids aged 14 to 20 were taken out and killed - innocent children killed? And the women had their breasts cut off; they were mutilated." I said, "Mikhail that's why I don't think we have time here and, if you can't support our proposal, at least please be silent. Whatever you do, we should try to keep up our relationship for the future." Gorbachev knows we are deadly serious at this point, and we have to be. That conversation took an hour and 15 minutes! (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Are all of our people on-side? (S)

The President: Yes, all of them are on board. Of course we haven't touched base with the Danes. Let me ask Brent. (S)

Yes, all the majors are on board. Mubarak had initially wanted more time. I don't want to misrepresent his position but I said we have to be together on this. He was fine on it, but I didn't want to indicate that from the beginning he was comfortable with the short ultimatum. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We would have liked another 24 hours ourselves, but as soon as we heard about the scorched earth policy, we changed our minds. (S)

The President: It is terrible, and it's not a charade that we've cooked up. Oh, I told Gorbachev at the same time the Iraqi Foreign Minister is talking peace to you, the man is torching wells in Kuwait and launching Scuds -- just the things he said we were doing. I may have made an impression on Gorbachev, but I don't know. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Joe Clark just had a conversation with Prince Fahd in Saudi Arabia. Joe asked at the end of the conversation, "Why would a guy on the ropes seek to burn everything as they leave?" Fahd said, "You are dealing with a very, very sick man, that's why." And that's probably the best answer we can get. (S)

The President: Yes, he's a very sick man. I told Gorbachev, "I know you have differences and I'm respectful of the relationship you've had with Saddam Hussein." And he made it very clear that he is not carrying water for Saddam Hussein. There is no difference in our assessments regarding Saddam Hussein. His fate is foreshadowed. I said, "I know you are under pressure from

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different elements in your country. So am I. They're coming at me from both left and right. In any event, it was a good talk, and good that we had such a frank discussions. If we have any differences with them, I think we want them to know the details. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Well, they're not going to be able to say the hot line is not working. Tomorrow the other shoe will drop. (S)

The President: Yes, and we'll stay in touch. If you have more thoughts or if Joe picks up anything more, let me know. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I will. So long, George.

-- End of Conversation --

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