

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91112
Folder ID Number: 91112-004

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/91 - 1/28/91

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (2 pp.)	1/1/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Telcon	Re: Telecon with President Mitterrand of France on January 3, 1991 (2 pp.)	1/3/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Telcon	Re: Telecon with Prime Minister Major of Britain (2 pp.)	1/3/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir (3 pp.)	1/7/91	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Adrian Basora to William F. Sittmann Re: Telecon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on January 9, 1991 (1 pp.)	1/16/91	(b)(1)	S
05b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (1 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	S
06a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	S
06b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia (3 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/91 - 1/28/91

Pinksheet Number: cap945

OA/ID Number: 91112-004

Date Closed: 2/4/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	1/10/91	(b)(1)	✓
09a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (1 pp.)	1/10/91	(b)(1)	✓
09b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	1/10/91	(b)(1)	✓
09c. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	1/10/91	(b)(1)	✓
10a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan on January 10, 1991 (1 pp.)	1/10/91	(b)(1)	✓
10b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan on January 10, 1991 (2 pp.)	1/10/91	(b)(1)	✓
11. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (2 pp.)	1/11/91	(b)(1)	✓
12. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	1/12/91	(b)(1)	✓
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (2 pp.)	1/14/91	(b)(1)	✓
14. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis of Greece (1 pp.)	1/14/91	(b)(1)	✓

Page 2 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/91 - 1/28/91

Pinksheet Number: cap945

OA/ID Number: 91112-004

Date Closed: 2/4/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
15. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with F.W. de Klerk of South Africa on January 15, 1991 (2 pp.)	1/15/91	(b)(1)	S
16. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Luis Alberto Lacalle of Uruguay (1 pp.)	1/16/91	(b)(1)	C
17. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (2 pp.)	1/16/91	(b)(1)	C
18. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (2 pp.)	1/16/91	(b)(1)	C
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Corazon Aquino of the Phillippines (2 pp.)	1/17/91	(b)(1)	C
20. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (6 pp.)	1/18/91	(b)(1)	S
21. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (2 pp.)	1/18/91	(b)(1)	S
22. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (2 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	C
23. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (4 pp.)	1/20/91	(b)(1)	S
24. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France (4 pp.)	1/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 3 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/91 - 1/28/91

Pinksheet Number: cap945

OA/ID Number: 91112-004

Date Closed: 2/4/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
25a. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (1 pp.)	1/21/91	(b)(1)	S
25b. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	1/21/91	(b)(1)	S
26. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy (3 pp.)	1/21/91	(b)(1)	S
27. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	1/21/91	(b)(1)	S
28. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (3 pp.)	1/21/91	(b)(1)	S
29. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (4 pp.)	1/22/91	(b)(1)	S
30. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (3 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	S
31a. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (1 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(1)	S
31b. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(1)	S
32a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (4 pp.)	1/28/91	(b)(1)	S
32b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (2 pp.)	1/28/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 4 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/91 - 1/28/91

Pinksheet Number: cap945

OA/ID Number: 91112-004

Date Closed: 2/4/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

JANUARY 1991

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0007

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Dmitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME January 1, 1991, 8:00-8:13 A.M.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Mikhail. I am just calling to wish you, Raisa and your family a happy New Year. (U)

President Gorbachev: Thank you for this New Years greeting. It is good to hear from you. On behalf of Raisa and my family, our best to you and Barbara. (U)

The President: We are at Camp David, and we have had a quiet and peaceful Christmas and New Years. I hope everything is going well. I appreciate the message Ambassador Bessmertnykh brought the other day. I won't comment on the open line about the substance. But I want to assure you of our full cooperation and of our keen interest in our good relationship getting better. (✓)

President Gorbachev: George, I wanted despite all the things that have happened--you know we have had some hot days here recently--to write that letter to you. I am sure we will continue our good relations based on what Ambassador Bessmertnykh has told me of your conversation. (✓)

The President: That is true. We will want to conclude work on START and on the little discrepancies on CFE. And of course we will want to continue our total cooperation and the exchange of information on the Gulf. (✓)

President Gorbachev: I fully agree with you. I want to say on this first day of the New Year that this really will be the case, although we have a great deal of work to do yet at home. (✓)

The President: We are thinking about you. I wish we had a secure line to talk about some of these problems. We are so committed to your reforms. Any place we can help, we'll do that. Please let us know. We hope you can overcome these difficulties and continue your reforms. You still have the respect and support of the American people. (✓)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
91 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

President Gorbachev: I will keep you informed of our efforts, since there is a great deal that needs to be done here which is new for our country and its surroundings. I want to give you information on what we are doing. (Ø)

The President: Okay. Please stay in touch. Happy New Year to you. I enjoyed this conversation. (U)

President Gorbachev: Okay. Let us then raise our glasses, for me in the evening, and for you in the morning, for the New Year. (U)

The President: All right. Good bye. (U)

President Gorbachev: Thank you. I wish you the same. Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0039

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with President Mitterrand of France on
January 3, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand
Interpreter: Alec Toumayan
Notetaker: Richard Haass

DATE, TIME January 3, 1991, 5:47 - 5:53am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned President Mitterrand concerning the proposed meeting of Secretary Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Switzerland.

After complimentary greetings, President Bush stated that he hoped President Mitterrand had received his cable, but wished to confirm that President Mitterrand was aware that Secretary Baker would be traveling to Europe and the Gulf to consult with coalition allies. President Bush stated that, as he had mentioned to President Mitterrand at Christmas, Secretary Baker would be his emissary to President Mitterrand and he expressed his hope that Secretary Baker could meet with President Mitterrand on his behalf. President Mitterrand replied that he would meet with Secretary Baker 30 minutes after he arrived. President Bush was glad to hear this.

President Bush then said that he would announce an offer to Iraq that Secretary Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Switzerland between January 7 and 9. President Bush stated that this meeting would be going the "extra mile for peace" and would serve to remove any criticism that the U.S. Was not doing enough to find a diplomatic solution to the Gulf Crisis. President Bush then stated that he wished to reiterate that this meeting would not be to negotiate or make any behind the scene deals or compromises.

President Mitterrand again stated he would meet Secretary Baker and inquired as to the dates of Secretary Baker's visit. President Bush replied that the trip was still in the planning stages and much depended on the Iraqi response.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CBI 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

The President suggested that a meeting between President Mitterrand and Secretary Baker might be best after Secretary Baker meets with Foreign Minister Aziz. President Mitterrand replied that he is prepared to meet with Secretary Baker and asked to be kept informed of his travel plans.

President Bush said that he is disinclined to participate in any further meetings after Secretary Baker meets with Foreign Minister Aziz. He said that this offer of a meeting is a new approach to the Iraqis and feels that this meeting is sufficient to inform Saddam Husayn that he has to withdraw from Kuwait without concessions. He solicited President Mitterrand's Views on this point.

President Mitterrand thanked the President for his advance notice and said that this meeting in Switzerland is a good idea. He added that the delegates at tomorrow's EC meeting will have been briefed on the offer and will understand the situation.

In closing, the President reiterated that this will be the last offer of a meeting. He said that Saddam Husayn is unwilling to be flexible and has been waging a public relations battle. President Mitterrand said he understood and further stated that he would be in touch with President Bush and might telephone later this week.

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0038

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Prime Minister Major of Britain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Major
Note Taker: Richard Haass

DATE, TIME January 3, 1991, 5:30 - 5:39am EST
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President telephoned Prime Minister Major concerning the proposed visit of Secretary Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Switzerland.

After complimentary greetings, President Bush stated that he wished to confirm that Prime Minister Major was aware that Secretary Baker would be traveling to Europe and the Gulf to consult with coalition allies. President Bush said that his proposal to Iraq expired 3 January and that he would announce a new offer to Iraq that Secretary Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Switzerland between January 7 and 9. President Bush stated that this meeting would be going the "extra mile for peace" and would serve to remove any criticism that the U.S. was not doing enough to find a diplomatic solution to the Gulf Crisis.

President Bush then stated that he has not changed his thinking one iota and wished to reiterate that this meeting would not be to negotiate or make deals or compromises. There are no behind the scenes maneuvers. The President wanted the Prime Minister "to hear it from me" and hoped that this meeting would meet with the Prime Minister's approval.

Prime Minister Major said that this meeting was "right" and he accepts that there is no change in President Bush's thinking. He added that this offer will make the Friday EC meeting easier for British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd and that this public presentation is just what we want.

President Bush then stated that he is disinclined to accept any further meetings if the Iraqis accept the Baker and Aziz meeting.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2000-0429-F
SCS 6/6/13

The President stated we have tried and that Saddam has met with every rag tag: Connelly, Muhammed Ali. . .this is it." He solicited Prime Minister Major's views on this subject.

The Prime Minister stated that he shared the President's view that a meeting in Switzerland between Baker and Aziz would be sufficient and sees no need for a subsequent meeting. The President again stated that he did not see the need and that there were all kinds of outside initiatives. Benjidad had one and King Hussein also.

The President asked if the Prime Minister had met yet with Jordanian King Hussein. The Prime Minister replied that he would have lunch with him today and speculated that the King would have "an initiative in his back pocket." President Bush replied that it was his opinion that any such initiative would contain nothing new. Prime Minister Major agreed, but stated that he would listen and would give the President a read-out of the meeting shortly after its conclusion either by telephone or special message. The President then stated Hussein is a good little man and requested Prime Minister Major express to King Hussein that President Bush's personal relationship goes back many years and that he sympathizes with King Hussein's tough spot. The President stated that King Hussein would like to hear of his distress at the new tensions between the United States and Jordan. The Prime Minister replied that he would be happy to convey this.

In closing, the President reiterated that nothing has changed in his thinking and expressed his hope that events would occur sooner rather than later. The President promised to keep the Prime Minister informed of any developments.

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0140

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir
Notetaker: John Montgomery

DATE, TIME January 7, 1991, 1500 - 1510 EDT
AND PLACE: the White House

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, How are you?

PM Shamir: I am fine and happy to hear your voice.

The President: I thought our meeting in December was quite good and I want to keep up the communication. There are a couple things about the Gulf Crisis that I would like to raise with you.

First, when Jim Baker sees Tariq Aziz in Geneva, he will be very straight. Everything is exactly as we have made public: Iraq must leave Kuwait, or face catastrophe. There will be no behind the scenes negotiations, no deals, no face-saving, and no linkage. That is the underline or main spring of our policy. There is no hidden agenda, no secret emissaries. I also said publicly that we do not plan any follow-up meeting in Baghdad with Saddam himself. We are also being very direct with our European partners. We are cautioning them against diplomacy that could encourage Saddam to believe there are splits in the coalition. What the EC said officially is quite good. We don't want any appearances of splits in a diverse coalition. As this moves down the track, many are looking or hope for a peaceful solution. I think what [Luxembourg Foreign Minister] Poos said is very good.

I also would like to ask your agreement to receive Larry Eagleburger on a very quiet mission to talk to you about where I see things going. Larry is very close to me. He was at my house last night and that is what we talked about. His points will be specific and from me. This would be a continuation of the private conversation you and I had during your visit. If it is agreeable to you, I will ask Ambassador Brown to set up this very important meeting.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
GJ 8/12/2009
2000-0429-F

CONFIDENTIAL

2

PM Shamir: Thank you. I know him. If he has your confidence, I will be very happy to receive him and talk with him.

The President: Yes he does. He will reflect my personal views; I consider this a confidence building mission. He is a very good man to do it. Please consider him a personal emissary.

PM Shamir: Will you be sending him soon? In the next few days?

The President: Yes, before the weekend.

PM Shamir: I will receive him at any moment and be happy to listen and to understand your views better.

The President: Wonderful, we also want to hear your views, anything you say will be important. [Deputy Secretary] Eagleburger will be in contact with me before he comes.

PM Shamir: Will Larry Eagleburger's visit be made public?

The President: I hope not, but it is up to you. It would be better if it were kept quiet. It should be a private meeting, but if word gets out, at least the subject matter should be kept confidential. The visit is not a secret mission, but would be better if it were kept a quiet mission.

PM Shamir: Good. I may have something else to convey to you.

The President: Okay. Ambassador Brown will know about the visit.

PM Shamir: OK. Very good. Thank you.

The President: As I said to you before, Israel has conducted itself with great restraint and that has helped to hold together a disparate coalition.

PM Shamir: We are maintaining a steady course.

The President: I respect that. [Deputy Secretary] Eagleburger will talk with [Ambassador] Brown who will be in touch with your appointment people to set up the meeting.

PM Shamir: I want to wish you a happy new year.

The President: Thank you and I hope you had happy holidays.

PM Shamir: I admire your strong positions in these hard times.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

The President: Don't be diverted by what's going on in Congress, there is strong support throughout the country for our position. Thank you for receiving [Deputy Secretary] Eagleburger.

PM Shamir: Thank you for the phone call.

The President: Thank you and good bye.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 16, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AAB*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada on January 9, 1991

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on
January 9, 1991.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *M*

Disapprove

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CS NARA, Date 5/24/00

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME January 9, 1991, 3:02 p.m. - 3:06 p.m.

PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Brian. I am just calling to tell you about Jim Baker's meeting in Geneva today. They stonewalled and they refused to accept our letter, which was not conciliatory of them. There isn't anything secret going on. They repeated the same positions. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I had him (Tariq Aziz) on CNN and I turned it off in disgust. I was extremely disappointed that he wouldn't accept the letter. (S)

The President: I just wanted you to know that what you see is what you got. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We will need to talk further on a secure line at some time. (S)

The President: I will also be calling Mitterrand, Kohl and Hawke. So long. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas
Adrian Basora, Notetaker, NSC Staff
Carol Wolter, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: January 9, 1991, 12:02 - 12:06 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Francois, comment allez vous? (U)

President Mitterrand: I am very glad to hear from you. I received Jim Baker yesterday. I will be making a statement to the French people soon regarding our talks. I am calling to see what has come out of the talks in Geneva. (S)

The President: Not much so far. At this juncture, there is nothing new, although the talks are continuing after the luncheon break. So far, Tariq Aziz has simply done a repetition of Iraq's existing positions and a review of the history of the situation. (S)

President Mitterrand: Then we will need to continue to follow the situation. (S)

The President: I appreciated your seeing Jim Baker. He has briefed me on his talks there. (S)

President Mitterrand: I am thinking of a demarche, as I discussed with Mr. Baker. In speaking to the French people, I will repeat the same principles which we have continued to uphold. So, Saddam Hussein is not making any proposals? (S)

The President: No, none at all. Saddam Hussein has made no proposals, but they are still meeting in Geneva. Shall I call you after the Baker/Aziz meeting is over? (S)

President Mitterrand: If you would be willing to. I will be at the Elysee until late this evening. (S)

The President: You are cutting out; I can't hear the interpreter. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: I am the interpreter. (Repeats what Mitterrand had said.) (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/12/09
2000-0429-F

SECRET

2

President Mitterrand: I meant what I said to Jim Baker yesterday. We are in the same position. (S)

The President: If you like, I will call you later today if it is not too late for you. Au revoir, Francois. Au revoir Roland.
(S)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Adrian Basora, Notetaker, NSC Staff
Interpreter, Carol Wolter

DATE, TIME: January 9, 1991 3:40 - 3:45 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Francois, this is George Bush here. (U)

President Mitterrand: Good evening my dear friend. (U)

The President: I am calling to close the loop. There was nothing more in Geneva than what was said in the press conference. (S)

President Mitterrand: And what conclusion do you draw? (S)

The President: My conclusion is that we must just keep on going and trying to convince Saddam. I talked to the UN Secretary General and told him that, if he wants to make one last effort, I would not oppose it. With the failure of the Baker mission, there will be a flurry of missions. Of course, we won't oppose them. I must say, however, that I doubt that they will amount to anything. (S)

President Mitterrand: I understand. (S)

The President: I see no point in accepting Aziz's suggestion that he come here or Baker to Baghdad. Frankly, I find the suggestion futile and I have rejected it. (S)

But let us think further about the situation. I propose that both of us do so, and if you have any thoughts I would welcome them. I hope that Saddam Hussein will change his mind at the last minute, but I am doubtful. (S)

President Mitterrand: It is not impossible, but it is unlikely. (S)

I did a press conference this evening, as you know, in which I reminded the French people of the firm principle of the evacuation of Iraq as of January 15. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
01 01/12/2009
2000-0129-F

The President: I saw your press conference and I thought it was outstanding. I propose that we keep in contact. I would welcome any thoughts you have. Call me at any time of the day or night. I was touched by your call. Now, get some sleep! It's late where you are. (S)

President Mitterrand: I hope you have a good day! (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Robert Hawke of Australia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Robert Hawke, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Douglas Paal

DATE, TIME January 9, 1991 5:38 p.m. - 5:50 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Bob? Listen, I'm calling you on the Baker-Aziz meeting. First, I saw a statement that you made to your own Parliament and it was a superb statement about what was at stake in the Gulf. Great. Somebody sent it to me. I received it only recently, but . . . Second, I'm calling key people like you, Brian, Helmut, so that you would hear from me directly. We went in thinking Tariq Aziz might have something. He showed no indication of flexibility of any kind. What Jim Baker said at the press conference is all there was to this. We are going to try to think of things to do. I am encouraging Perez de Cuellar to use his good offices. I just wanted to let key coalition partners like you know this meeting was unproductive. (L)

PM Hawke: I appreciate your ringing. First, I appreciate the efforts you are making to get a peaceful result, and you have our support. If Perez de Cuellar can do something, that will be good. I have a question: Are you totally satisfied with the Europeans, particularly the French? (L)

The President: I talked to Mitterrand twice today, and we differ on an international conference, but he does say they will avoid linkage of the Palestinian issue, and that he is firm on the use of force. Baker had a good talk with him, a solid talk, the day before. He has been sending mixed signals Mitterrand knows we are strong and that we firmly hold the course. I do not see him backing out. He has been very supportive. (L)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
01 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

PM Hawke: If you had to make a statement, what do you think the odds are, will the balloon go up? (C)

The President: I have to tell you, as a friend, yes, but I don't want to say it publicly. But as a co-collaborator, yes. (C)

PM Hawke: George, if I may, I have two things to raise with you. If it is not to be the peaceful scenario, will there be any opportunity for a further talk before a decision is taken on action? (C)

The President: Talk with you? Do you mean talk before we begin? And I do have... I would be glad to do it if it can be arranged. You have equities out there. I have to worry about the numbers of contacts, but you have been side by side with me on this. If we have to use our assets out there the element of surprise is very important because it's our kids out there. (C)

PM Hawke: I am more than happy to leave it in your hands, I understand the need for the element of surprise. Your final point is important. I will rest in your judgement. (C)

The President: I will mention it to Brent. We will try to get to you. It will not be widely known. I will get Brent or Baker, one of my trusted assets. I will have to tell you, in my view the longer we wait after the 15th, the more chance for erosion of the coalition. Sooner or later. (C)

PM Hawke: George, one point of procedure. My foreign minister, Gareth Evans will be in Washington Friday. He has arranged to see Cheney and Scowcroft. Is there any chance he can see Secretary Baker. (C)

The President: Who? (U)

PM Hawke: My foreign minister, Senator Gareth Evans. I would like for him to meet with his counterpart Jim Baker. (U)

The President: Your foreign minister? (U)

PM Hawke: Yes, Gareth Evans. (U)

The President: A very good man, he's done a lot of good work. I will pass that along and mention it. I don't know that Jim will be back. I am not sure he will be here. I will mention it to Scowcroft and he can work with his counterparts. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PM Hawke: I would appreciate that very much, George. You have got an enormous responsibility in your hands. (L)

The President: I know that, and we appreciate Australia's actions and support for the right position. It is good to have good friends. And Bob, keep your head down out there on the links. (U)

PM Hawke: Thank you, my good friend. Goodbye. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

FAHD

JAN 9 - PRESIDENT CALLED SAUDI ARABIAN KING FAHD.
TRANSLATED BY KAMAL; MONITORED BY HAASS. INITIATED
1514 - TERMINATED 1529. PRES IN WASHINGTON

MITTERRAND JAN 9 - CALL #2 FOR THE DAY. PRES CALLED
MITTERRAND. CALL INITIATED 1536 - TERMINATED 1544.
CALL MONITORED BY BASORA. PRES IN WASHINGTON

KOHL

JAN 9 - PRES CALLED GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL.
TRANSLATED BY KONUK; MONITORED BY HUTCHINGS.
PRES IN WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0256

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir
Notetaker: John Montgomery

DATE, TIME January 10, 1991, 10:30 - 10:34 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, it is good to speak to you again. (U)

PM Shamir: Mr. President, glad to hear your voice. (U)

The President: I just wanted to call and let you know that there was nothing that was said in the Baker-Aziz meeting that in any way alters what you have heard or read. There is nothing going on behind the scenes as I said in my press conference. Aziz stonewalled during the meeting and insisted on linkages leaving no doubt that Saddam Hussein is not contemplating leaving Kuwait. I remain more determined than ever that he must get out of Kuwait. My focus right now is here at home where I am trying to persuade the Congress to support me. It will be close, but I am confident that we will prevail. If Congress goes against me, the U.S. Constitution gives me the authority to go ahead. (Ø)

All of this makes your meeting with Larry Eagleburger this weekend even more critical. Larry will be carrying an important message from me. I very much appreciate your taking the time to meet with him at such short notice. Larry travels as a Presidential Emissary. Word of the trip has not become public and I will continue to keep it from becoming public. With the approach of January 15, I think that it would be helpful for both Israel and us to keep a close watch on what is said. Sometimes less is better. I will be careful here. I know it is hard there and it is hard here too. That is my message. (Ø)

PM Shamir: Thank you for your message. I have no doubt about your determination to carry out your policy. I wish you success. I am sure you will succeed. I will rely on your decisions. We will keep in close contact and work together to achieve our goals and your goals. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/12/2009
2000-0429-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The President: Larry Eagleburger will report to me as soon as he returns. I understand arrangements for the meeting have already been made. Thank you. Have a good day. (Ø)

PM Shamir: Thank you. Good bye. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1216

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns (notetaker)

DATE, TIME January 10, 1991, 10:38-10:55 a.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: I am very fine, George. How are you? (U)

The President: Okay, thank you. I am very glad to be able to continue our conversations which I treasure. They have meant much to me. I thought you Jim Baker's meeting with 2 scenes. You saw the press agenda and no hidden talk General. He is willing to go, and not Baker. It is be U.S.-Iraq talks here a there. I will not see Az will receive him. Anyway deter us from the course

*Call
unrepeated
1048*

the
secret
secretary
that he
are won't
t go
the Iraqis
talks to

My focus is at home. I v
I do have one request. I
much--Bob Byrd. Would yo
comfortable doing that, I
Please think about it.
embroiled in our interna
friendly. I respect him. ne
longer. I don't know anyone more influential with him than you.
We are asking him to support UN 678. I don't need Congress to do
what I have to do. I know I don't. But it would be useful for
public opinion if the Congress supported the President. If you
do not feel comfortable doing this, please don't call. (8)

support.
ou very
you felt
policy?
you
and
work

President Ozal: I will talk to Baker on Sunday. I met the Washington Times people today. And at 6:45 p.m. today I will be on CNN. (U)

The President: With Bernard Shaw? (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
81 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1216

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns (notetaker)

DATE, TIME January 10, 1991, 10:38-10:55 a.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: I am very fine, George. How are you? (U)

The President: Okay, thank you. I am very glad to be able to continue our conversations which I treasure. They have meant much to me. I thought you would like to hear an assessment of Jim Baker's meeting with Aziz. There is nothing behind the scenes. You saw the press conference. There was no secret agenda and no hidden talks. I just talked to the UN Secretary General. He is willing to make the trip. It is better that he go, and not Baker. It is the last hope for peace. There won't be U.S.-Iraq talks here and Iraq agrees that Baker won't go there. I will not see Aziz. The SYG doesn't know if the Iraqis will receive him. Anyway, I heard nothing from these talks to deter us from the course we have discussed. (S)

My focus is at home. I want to get more Congressional support. I do have one request. An important Senator admires you very much--Bob Byrd. Would you be willing to call him, if you felt comfortable doing that, to ask for his support for our policy? Please think about it. I certainly don't want to get you embroiled in our internal affairs. Byrd is important and friendly. I respect him. He thinks sanctions should work longer. I don't know anyone more influential with him than you. We are asking him to support UN 678. I don't need Congress to do what I have to do. I know I don't. But it would be useful for public opinion if the Congress supported the President. If you do not feel comfortable doing this, please don't call. (S)

President Ozal: I will talk to Baker on Sunday. I met the Washington Times people today. And at 6:45 p.m. today I will be on CNN. (U)

The President: With Bernard Shaw? (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
81 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

President Ozal: It will be an interview by telephone. I talked to the Washington Times in order to say that to reach a peaceful solution, this is the last chance. I also said Congress should support George Bush. If Congress does this, it will help toward a peaceful solution. (U)

The President: That is very helpful. (U)

President Ozal: I'll say the same thing to CNN. Don't worry.
(Ø)

The President: As we count down to the deadline, I think Saddam Hussein may try a last-minute gimmick. What do you think? (Ø)

President Ozal: Let me tell you. Yesterday when Baker saw no change and Aziz was not able to say he would pull out, he had no authority. Saddam will pull out at the last minute. (Ø)

The President: He'll say that but that is not good enough. He must be out by January 14. You may be right. (Ø)

President Ozal: Saddam Hussein will probably say around the 14th or 15th, give me more time to pull out. That may be a possibility. Or, this man is unpredictable. He may stay and think you won't make war because of world public opinion. He may underestimate your seriousness. Aziz refused to take the letter. Can I see a copy of the letter? (Ø)

The President: Yes. I'll send it through our Ambassador. It is a forceful letter. (U)

President Ozal: I think you should issue it to the public. (Ø)

The President: That is one option. But I want the debate to calm down on our side. We'll cable the letter to the Ambassador today. The letter simply said, look, here is what you are up against. There will be no negotiations, no linkage. It was forceful and direct but not rude. The reason we wrote a letter is because his people don't tell the truth. (Ø)

President Ozal: George, I had a special interview with Turkish TV a few days ago. Can you do a special interview with a reporter before you come to Turkey? (Ø)

The President: Sure. If it is helpful to you. What is his name? (Ø)

President Ozal: Mohammed ALi Birand. (U)

The President: I'll mention it to Fitzwater for the coming trip. In principle, I'll be glad to do it. It would probably have to be a short interview. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

President Ozal: He asked me why I am so hard on Saddam Hussein. I told a Turkish anecdote. A burglar came and stole from me. The next day, the people accused me of not having told anyone about it. (U)

The President: That is a good anecdote. Listen, Baker will fill me in on his visit. I'll follow up with you. I'll tell Byrd what you said in the Washington Times and tell him to watch CNN. If you are talking to him, tell him you support us. (C)

President Ozal: Okay. (U)

The President: Byrd is an important and good man and is an admirer of yours. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1216

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME January 10, 1991, 5:39-5:43 p.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Turgut, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: I am fine. I talked to Senator Byrd. I think he was considering about waiting for the embargo to work. But I gave him my reasoning. He said that he could not guarantee but thought there would be two resolutions. The second resolution would support you. (Ø)

The President: That's good. (U)

President Ozal: Then I said if you wait for the embargo to be effective, Ramadan will come and it will be difficult for the coalition. The hot season will start. U.S. soldiers will suffer. If there is going to be war, you should do it before Ramadan and the hot season. (Ø)

The President: Was he pleasant? (Ø)

President Ozal: I think he was pleasant. But I called him. Old democrats can't change easily. (Ø)

The President: It was very nice of you to call. (U)

President Ozal: I didn't say anything about you asking me to call him. I told him about the CNN interview and said I was following the discussion in the Senate. I said I wanted to give him my views. I said the President should be supported by the Congress. Saddam Hussein would get this message. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. I will keep it quiet. But I think it is very helpful. (Ø)

President Ozal: I will have my Ambassador weigh in too. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. It must be late over there. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0129-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Ozal: I always go to bed late. (U)

The President: Thanks so much. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAJOR

JAN 10 - PRES CALLED MAJOR - INITIATED
0945 - SCOWCROFT MONITORED -- NO TERMINATION
TIME. CALL FROM OVAL OFFICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0317

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
on January 10, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME: January 10, 1991, 7:42 - 7:55am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The Prime Minister telephoned the President concerning the Gulf crisis. (Ø)

The President: Toshiki, Good Morning! Glad to hear from you.
What's on your mind? (U)

PM Kaifu:

are you? (U)

First, than.
Baker-Aziz i
like to empl
crisis. (Ø)

CALL Made
on
Jan 11

of the results of the
himself. I would also
our efforts on the Gulf

I also regre
did not make
did not acce
departure, I

meeting, the Iraqi side
he question that they
fore Perez de Cuellar's
m on his task. (Ø)

The Presiden
talked to Pe.
There are no
know of. The
still determi

een no change. I
He was not hopeful.
g out of Iraq that I
that the coalition is
olution 678, which will

mean the use of force if he is not moving out. This would mean
that force must be used if he does not move in a way that he
refused to do at Geneva. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0317

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
on January 10, 1991 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME January 10, 1991, 7:42 - 7:55am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The Prime Minister telephoned the President concerning the Gulf crisis. (Ø)

The President: Toshiki, Good Morning! Glad to hear from you.
What's on your mind? (U)

PM Kaifu: This is Toshiki speaking. How are you? (U)

First, thanks for the prompt notification of the results of the Baker-Aziz meeting, from Secretary Baker himself. I would also like to emphasize how much I appreciate your efforts on the Gulf crisis. (Ø)

I also regret that during the Baker-Aziz meeting, the Iraqi side did not make any decision. It is out of the question that they did not accept your letter. Yesterday, before Perez de Cuellar's departure, I sent a message encouraging him on his task. (Ø)

The President: Unfortunately, there has been no change. I talked to Perez de Cuellar before he left. He was not hopeful. There are no signs of reasonableness coming out of Iraq that I know of. The only thing I would repeat is that the coalition is still determined to implement fully UN Resolution 678, which will mean the use of force if he is not moving out. This would mean that force must be used if he does not move in a way that he refused to do at Geneva. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
BY 8/21/2009
2000-0429F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

PM Kaifu: With respect to the Gulf, I am very much aware of our common stance. I just returned from a meeting with Roh Tae Woo. I also called the leaders of Southeast Asia to cancel my trip to the region. I spoke with Prime Minister Mahathir, Prime Minister Goh, Prime Minister Chatichai and President Aquino. We confirmed that the UN Resolutions must be respected and the principles observed. Through our coalition we remain united behind your policy to attain peace. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate that very important message of unified support from these four ASEAN leaders. Thank you very much for conveying this message. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: There are two more things I want to tell you about. (Ø)

With respect to your request for a drawdown of oil reserves in your message of the 9th, I have instructed my representatives at the IEA to cooperate with your side. I have instructed our representatives to agree to a 350,000 barrel per day drawdown in case of hostilities. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate this news although I am not familiar with the exact numbers, but it is good news. Thank you. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: The final thing is my recent visit to Korea. I met with Roh Tae Woo yesterday. We agreed on the status of Korean nationals living in Japan, putting this past controversy behind us and entering a new era. (Ø)

With regard to the normalization negotiations with North Korea, I indicated we would urge the acceptance of inspection of their facilities under IAEA as we progress forward in normalization talks. (Ø)

The President: This sounds very positive. You must be very pleased. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: I wish you success. Please keep up your efforts. (Ø)

The President: Thank you for your friendly call -- going the extra mile on consultation. We will stay the course. I hope, at the last minute, Saddam Hussein will show flexibility, but I am not at all sure he will. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: I hope so too. Goodbye. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9100325 Pres telcon w/ President Gorbachev of USSR on 11 Jan

LIMITED ACCESS -- NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME

~~SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Felipe Gonzalez of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Barbara Phillips (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME January 11, 1991 11:07-11:21 a.m.
PLACE: Camp David

The President: Felipe, can you hear me all right? (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, very well. (U)

The President: I am out in the woods here at Camp David. I had a couple of things I had in mind I wanted to tell you. I wanted to give you an update on the Middle East, but let me begin by thanking you for your wonderful cooperation. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Thank you. (U)

The President: I just spoke with Jim Baker a couple of hours ago en route to Damascus. His talks with Mubarak, King Fahd, the Amir of Kuwait and the other Gulf Coordination Council leaders have gone well. That part of the coalition is holding together strongly. On the Baker/Aziz meeting, I want you to know that there was no hidden agenda. There was no progress and no flexibility on their part. In terms of the UN Secretary General's mission to Baghdad, he was here at Camp David last weekend and we had two further talks by phone after the failure of the Baker/Aziz meeting. He is carrying no new secret plan with him. He is just telling Saddam Hussein -- trying to convince him -- that he should fully comply with the 12 UN resolutions. (S)

Jim Baker appreciated his conversations with your Foreign Minister in the EC context. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: I expect that one and maybe both Houses of the U.S. Congress will vote to back my resolution on the Gulf during the next few hours. My opinion is that Saddam Hussein is still misreading the intentions of the President of the United States that he must leave Kuwait. I think that he still thinks that we

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

will not use force and that, even if we did, he could postpone a withdrawal. (S)

My last point is that I am still somewhat hopeful that he will get the word and decide to withdraw from Kuwait rapidly. But I am not optimistic that he will start a rapid withdrawal. If he does not, I feel obliged, as a fundamental part of the coalition, to force him to leave Kuwait. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Obviously. I would like to know if any measures are being taken to convoke a meeting of the UN Security Council if Iraq moves to begin withdrawal. (S)

The President: There is no plan for such a meeting, but I guess that, if he started to move, then there would be grounds for a meeting. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: But the UN Secretary General will have to inform the Security Council once he returns from Baghdad. (S)

The President: Exactly, but I don't know if he plans to do so in a meeting. When Resolution 678 was approved, it was understood that this would be the last meeting unless Saddam Hussein starts to withdraw. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, I understand. Are there any plans for any mission after he returns from his trip to Baghdad, which I don't think will be successful? Are the French undertaking a mission? (S)

The President: I know of no definite plans for a mission. I have been in close contact with Francois Mitterrand and he has no specific plans. I know the EC has been talking about one. Gorbachev called yesterday, and he is considering one if the Secretary General's mission fails. But there is nothing definite, nothing that I am sure of. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I want you to know that, as my Foreign Minister said, you can count on our cooperation. We must ensure that the coalition has sufficient cooperation. (S)

The President: You are very nice to say so. Thank you very much. Many thanks, my friend! (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: If you will excuse me for adding one point, I believe it is true that Saddam Hussein harbors a hope that he won't be attacked. But we should not dismiss the possibility that at the last minute he will make a statement of withdrawal, probably with conditions in order to permit him to save face. If so, I want to ask that we maintain an open line of communication and consult in order to coordinate our response. (S)

The President: I think that is fine. I think we should do that. Goodbye, and thanks for the conversation. (S)

--End of Conversation--

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0341

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME January 12, 1991, 6:55 - 6:59 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Ozal initiated the call. (U)

The President: Turgut, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you. How are you? (U)

The President: What's the latest? (U)

President Ozal: I just saw the vote in your Congress. (U)

The President: I am very pleased. I hope it will be read loud and clear in Baghdad. It was a good win for us. (U)

President Ozal: I think so. Monday he goes to his puppet Congress. (U)

The President: What is it about? (U)

President Ozal: If he is going out, he will decide that. If not, he will strongly put forward his position. (U)

The President: Have you heard about de Cuellar yet? (U)

President Ozal: No, but I have heard they were holding their position until after your Congress decided. (U)

The President: If he decides on a slow pullout, we will need to consult. We can't accept half measures. (U)

President Ozal: Yes. We discussed that here. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

The President: Also, Turgut, if he starts a pullout, we should monitor it. We should overfly it to prove it is genuine and peaceful, and we should tell him we will do that. If he is unwilling to allow it, it would demonstrate bad faith. (Ø)

President Ozal: It is a critical time. We will know on Monday. (Ø)

The President: I talked to Jim Baker. He can't make it in. (U)

President Ozal: The three airports are fogged in. Probably one will open by 10:00. I saw your press conference. You looked good. (U)

The President: I am still determined. If he doesn't get out, we will have to use force. There may be some last minute concessions, but we can't back down, and I won't. (Ø)

President Ozal: No. After your Congressional vote, you can't back down. (Ø)

The President: Your interviews in the Washington Times and on CNN were very good. Thank you for your call. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Menem, President of Argentina
Interpreter: Lilian Nigaglioni
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME January 14, 1991, 9:33 - 9:40 am EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Menem telephoned the President concerning the situation in the situation in the Gulf. (U)

The President: Hello, this is George Bush, are you there, Mr. President? (U)

President Menem: How are you, my dear President and friend, and how is your wife? (U)

The President: My wife is fine. She has a very minor break in her lower leg, but she's laughing and joking, and in great spirits. (U)

As for me, I'm in good shape. We're trying hard at the last minute to avoid a conflagration, and avoid a war. I must tell you that the report from the U.N. Secretary General is very discouraging in this regard. (Ø)

(line goes dead -- pause)

Are you still there? (U)

President Menem: Yes, Mr. President. Please go ahead with your report. (U)

The President: The line went dead for a minute. I'm discouraged by the lack of results from the Secretary General's visit. I haven't talked to him, but he debriefed our Ambassador in Paris. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
GJ 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

I must tell you that at this late juncture, I don't see diplomatic efforts going forward that can be fruitful. As for my own disposition, I've said publicly that the United States and the coalition are standing strongly together, and we are. (Ø)

So although January 15 is not a date when military action has to begin, it's a very serious date as far as we're concerned. Through various channels we've tried to make clear to Saddam Hussein what is at risk as far as he's concerned if the coalition forces are used against him. (Ø)

So I wish I had a more optimistic report for you, my friend, but right now I'm not too hopeful. (Ø)

President Menem: I've clearly received your report, my dear George. We're also very concerned. If there is anything we can do, you can count on the Argentine Government. Apart from showing my concerns for you and your wife, I've called to tell you of our complete solidarity at this moment. The U.S. has a loyal ally in Argentina. And you have in the President of Argentina a complete and true friend. I remain completely at your disposal; if there is anything I can do to help, just call me. At this moment, I would like to tell you of our support and friendship. (Ø)

The President: That is a very generous and very important statement of friendship and alliance. I'm very grateful to you, Carlos. (Ø)

They're having demonstrations now, and accusing me of wanting war. Nobody in his right mind wants a war. But if we have to have it, we'll do our best. But anyway, many thanks, my friend. (Ø)

President Menem: A very big and friendly abrazo. I leave with you my respect and admiration. (U)

The President: You've lifted my spirits with this call of solidarity. Good-bye. (Ø)

President Menem: (In English) Good-bye, and good luck, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Thanks, Carlos, good-bye. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Constantine Mitsotakis of Greece

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis
Nicholas Burns (notetaker)

DATE, TIME January 14, 1991, 2:32-2:35 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. Prime Minister. How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Hello, Mr. President. Good
afternoon. (U)

The President: It is good to hear your voice. I welcome this
call. How are things going there? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: All right. There are no problems.
We are in complete control here. (Ø)

The President: I am grateful for your cooperation on the Gulf. I
wanted to touch base with you on that. I have tried the peace
formula, but am discouraged now. The UN Secretary General came
back from Iraq with no apparent solution. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I know that. I have the same
impression. I wanted to say that I support your policy one
hundred percent. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. You recognize that we have had many
contacts with your neighbor. This will in no way put your
government at a disadvantage. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I understand completely. There is no
problem. Greece is with the U.S. at every critical moment. (Ø)

The President: I am still hoping for a peaceful resolution. But
I want to tell you as a friend and ally that I am not encouraged.
Secretary Baker just left my office. He feels the coalition is
solid, but he agrees there is little prospect for a peaceful
solution. We know of no initiative that looks as if it will bear
fruit. And there are no secret negotiations behind the scenes.
(Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Good. May God be with you. (U)

The President: We will do what we have to do. I give you my
profound thanks. I hope to be able to express my gratitude in
person very soon. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

0336

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with F.W. de Klerk
of South Africa on January 15, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
F.W. de Klerk, President of South Africa
Notetaker: Robert C. Frasure

DATE, TIME January 15, 1991, 7:30 - 7:40 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President de Klerk telephoned the President to express his support in the Gulf Crisis. (U)

The President: Good morning, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

President de Klerk: I'm fine. I'm phoning to tell you that we are thinking about you at this time. I know you have very heavy responsibility on your shoulders now. We are fully behind you. We are fully supportive of you. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. I appreciate that very much. This is a very significant date. UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force comes into effect today, at midnight. (U)

You have captured the mood here, and I cannot tell you ^{how} much I appreciate your phone call. (U)

But we don't feel lonely in all of this. There has been so much consultation and so much solidarity. It has been a shared decision. (U)

It was so thoughtful of you to call at this time. (U)

President de Klerk: I want to congratulate you as well on your support in Congress. You have your allies with you, if I may say so. And now you have legislative support. (U)

We will also be supporting you on all of this. Timing is of the essence now, I guess. I mean you don't have to do anything at midnight. The days ahead will weigh heavily on you. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
01 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

We have tried to be helpful to you. For our part, we have given you the particulars on all of the weapons we have sold to the other side in former days. (S)

The President: Yes. Yes. (U)

President de Klerk: The details have been made available to you. (S)

I also want to thank you once again for your strong statement of the time of my visit to Washington on the "irreversibility" of the process in South Africa. It made the recent helpful European decisions possible, in my view. (S)

I will be announcing early in February several things which will let you make the steps which I know you want to make. (S)

The President: I'm glad to hear that. We have a lot of respect here for your leadership. (U)

I meant what I said in the statement on the irreversibility. I'm glad it has been helpful. (U)

President de Klerk: I appreciate the way that Secretary Baker has kept us informed on developments in the Gulf. (S)

I just had a good meeting with your Health Secretary, Sullivan. (U)

The President: Good. He's a good man. I'm glad you could spend some time with him. He will be reporting to me when he gets back from his trip. (U)

President de Klerk: All the very best to you. And to Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President: Thank you for calling. God bless you. (U)

President de Klerk: God forbid that it ever comes to it, but if you need any physical support from us -- airfields, anything -- it is all available. (S)

The President: How generous of you for thinking of us in this regard. Thank you again for calling. Good by. (U)

President de Klerk: Good by. (U)

-- End of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MAJOR

JAN 15 - PRES CALLED MAJOR - INITIATED
1730 - SCOWCROFT MONITORED - PRES IN
WASH - NO TIME OF TERMINATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1180

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Luis Alberto Lacalle of Uruguay (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Luis Alberto Lacalle
Notetaker: None

DATE, TIME January 16, 1991, 7:35 - 7:37 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Lacalle of Uruguay called the President on January 16 at 7:30 in the evening to show his support for the President's actions in the Persian Gulf. (Ø)

There was no notetaker from the Latin American Directorate and no interpreter. Neil O'Leary, Director of the Situation Room, monitored the conversation, but did not take notes. He remembers the conversation as being very short and supportive, and told Mr. Pryce shortly after the call that it went something like this: (Ø)

President Lacalle: I want to know that we are with you in your actions in the Gulf. We are praying for you and your people. You have done the right thing. I hope that Barbara is okay. I wish you well. (Ø)

The President: Thank you very much for your support. It means a lot to me. Barbara is well. The accident was not serious. We wish the best to you and your family. (Ø)

-- End Summary --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CJ 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings
Interpreter

DATE, TIME: January 16, 1991, 10:23 - 10:28 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I simply wanted to call at this moment. I know how difficult it is for you. I wanted to offer a word of friendship and understanding in the present situation. I hope everything will turn out as something good. (U)

The President: It is very thoughtful of you to call. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I also hope all sides will continue to extend their support. (U)

The President: Let me tell you that it looks increasingly like we will have to use the force that was indicated in the last UN resolution. There is no evidence that Saddam Hussein is prepared to do what fundamentally he must do -- get out of Kuwait. There is no evidence of compromise. We have had diplomatic initiative after diplomatic initiative. So I have concluded, barring some last diplomatic initiative, that force will have to be used. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It is up to Saddam Hussein to decide, and I don't hold out much hope. (U)

The President: I would like to suggest that we contact your Ambassador prior to the actual application of force, so that you will have some advance notice. He can get in touch with you right away. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I agree completely. That is a good suggestion. I am very grateful. I can be reached any time night or day. (U)

The President: Good. It is important that what I have told you be held in close confidence. Otherwise, the lives of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines could be at risk. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, of course. I understand. (U)

The President: You are a good friend. I understand the question of your forces. I have understood from the beginning. I appreciate this call from a friend. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. God bless you. (U)

The President: Keep our kids in your prayers. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

388

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of Mexico
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME January 16, 1991, 9:40 - 9:42 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Salinas: Mr. President, this is Carlos Salinas. (U)

The President: Carlos, how are you? (U)

President Salinas: I'm calling as a personal friend to wish you well at this very difficult moment. (U)

The President: Aren't you sweet to call. It was a very difficult and tough decision. I know it will be controversial. I feel comfortable. But as I said in my speech tonight, I hope it will be over soon. (Ø)

President Salinas: I heard your message. It was very clear, especially where you talked about making every diplomatic effort with regard to compliance with the UN resolutions. (Ø)

The President: You are so sweet to call. Give my love to your family. How are things going down there? (U)

President Salinas: Things are going quite well. We have strengthened our security measures on your southern border, and at ports of entry. We are strengthening our controls on the southern border. (Ø)

The President: How is everything? (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
BY 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Salinas: The country is calm. The majority of the population is strongly behind the full implementation of the UN resolutions. (Ø)

The President: Well, that's fine. You are a good friend, and your call really lifts me up. It's been a tough day. A long and complicated day. (Ø)

President Salinas: I wanted to express my warm personal friendship to you at this moment. (Ø)

The President: Thank you, we love you, and thanks a lot for your call. Good-bye. (U)

President Salinas: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OZAL

JAN 16 - PRES CALLED OZAL OF TURKEY.
CALL INITIATED 1731 - TERMINATED
1734. MONITORED BY SIGLER/SITRM.
PRES IN WASH

HAWKE

JAN 16 - PRES CALLED AUSTRALIAN PRIME
MINISTER HAWKE. MONITORED BY SIGLER
CALL INITIATED 1749 - TERMINATED 1753.
PRES IN WASH

MULRONEY

JAN 16 - PRES CALLED CANADIAN PRIME
MINISTER MULRONEY. MONITORED BY SIGLER.
CALL INITIATED 1759 - TERMINATED
1802. PRES IN WASH

MUBARAK

JAN 16 - PRES CALLED EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT
MUBARAK. MONITORED BY SIGLER. CALL
INITIATED 1812 - TERMINATED 1815.
PRES IN WASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0436

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Corazon Aquino, President
NSC Notetaker: Peter Watson

DATE, TIME January 17, 1991 5:56 p.m. - 6:01 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Aquino: Hello, Mr. President? How are you? I have been watching you on TV. (U)

The President: Well, fine thank you. How are you? (U)

President Aquino: I just wanted to convey to you the support of the Philippine people. (U)

The President: We are involved in a very serious coalition effort half way across the world. I am very pleased with the effort of our partners. How are things with you? (U)

President Aquino: As you know, we have made a small contribution of a medical unit to the effort. (U)

The President: Well, aren't you sweet, it was very nice of you to call. I know how difficult it is to contemplate the use of force, but we felt that with the direct refusal in Iraq to work towards peace, we had no choice. I am very grateful for your call and support. (U)

President Aquino: I certainly hope for the best. I think you did the right thing by exhausting all peaceful efforts. (U)

The President: Thank you, you know you worry about it, it was very nice of you to call. How are things at home? (U)

President Aquino: Things are stable now. We hope this crisis will be resolved as quickly as possible so that we can get down to the business at hand. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on : OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
81 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

The President: Certainly this Gulf crisis has had an effect on speculative efforts on oil prices. I'm sure it has had a negative impact on your own economy. (Ø)

President Aquino: Yes, it has. And, we have 600,000 Philippine people in the Middle East working in oil. I realize you are busy, I just wanted to convey to you that the Philippine government supports you. How is Mrs. Bush? (Ø)

The President: She is doing fine, you know she had a sledding accident. (U)

President Aquino: I read about that. I hope she feels better soon. (U)

The President: Thank you, I will tell her you asked about her. I will see her in about five minutes. She will be pleased that you asked about her. Goodbye. (U)

President Aquino: Goodbye. (U)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9100456 Pres telcon w/ PM Shamir of Israel on 18 Jan

LIMITED ACCESS -- NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

471

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME January 18, 1991, 9:23-10:34 a.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Mikhail, how are you? (U)

President Gorbachev: George, good afternoon and greetings. This is not a simple time for both of us. (S)

The President: No, it is not. It is a very complicated time. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, indeed. It is almost the end of the day in Moscow and getting dark. It is morning in Washington. (S)

The President: Yes. It is 9:20 a.m. in the morning. (S)

President Gorbachev: Well, I would, of course, like to engage first in a discussion of the Persian Gulf situation. (S)

The President: I would be glad to fill you in from our end. I also welcome any thoughts from yours. (S)

President Gorbachev: First of all, I would like to say that our doubts, yours and mine, about Saddam Hussein have proven right. He is the kind of person against whom force is necessary. I have a full understanding of this burden to the nations of the world. Now, casualties have occurred and the situation is developing. We have to think about what to do next. (S)

The President: That is true. I hope we can all agree on full compliance with the UN resolutions. (S)

President Gorbachev: In my statement, I reaffirmed our position of principle. I said Saddam Hussein was to blame, and that war had become inevitable. I said it would be necessary for Iraq to leave Kuwait and comply with the UN resolutions. (S)

The President: I thought it was an outstanding statement. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
81 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

President Gorbachev: Now that war is beginning, our number one priority should be to shorten it and make sure it does not spread. (S)

The President: I worry about that, too. When Saddam Hussein fired the missiles on Israel, he was trying from his side to make the war spread. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, and I think your position is good. Your advice to the Israelis was timely, appropriate and right. (S)

The President: We are trying to figure out what they might do. I hope it does not encourage the war to spread and draw others into it. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, indeed. I think this is precisely what Saddam Hussein wants to see. (S)

The President: We are worried about the Jordan equation, Mikhail. I want to know what you think about that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Mr. President, let me first share with you my thinking on further steps. (S)

The President: Please. I'd be delighted to hear them. (U)

President Gorbachev: First of all. Two days of powerful military action have moved the situation to a new phase. Saddam Hussein before that showed ambitious and threatening behavior and contempt for the U.S., UN and the USSR. Now we can speak of his political defeat. This is my first point. (S)

The second point is that with the enormous damage done, the irreparable damage to the military and industrial potential of Iraq, now we have a different Iraq. Any ambition to dictate its will in the region has no material basis. And I believe that an important victory has been achieved. That is a victory that is important for you domestically and important for the world. The aggressor has been taught a lesson. (S)

And I think that now, George, think about this. What is the purpose of continuing military action? The cost of bombing and air missions and participation of the land forces would mean many more casualties among the American forces and victims among the civilians in Iraq. I understand you don't want that, not only among American troops, but it would mean a major loss of life among civilians. (S)

The President: Exactly. I feel strongly about that. (S)

President Gorbachev: This is a very important statement. So now what can we have if the strikes continue, strikes against people. This military action could change the character of the war. And I don't underrate Saddam Hussein. He may still have some land military capability. (S)

SECRET

Based on all this today, in the middle of the day, I instructed my Ambassador in Baghdad to get in touch with Saddam Hussein and to ask him a question. My question is: if there is a pause in the full development of the military option, would he be able to state he would leave Kuwait. I asked for an urgent answer. In the meantime, I wanted to inform you about that contact. (S)

And my question to you is: if he agrees, although it is difficult to suppose he will do that, would you be ready to pause in the military option. And if Saddam Hussein rejects this proposal, I'll publicly speak about this. People have to know with whom they are dealing. (S)

And I also know you are worried about the possibility if Saddam Hussein leaves Kuwait peacefully, that he will have a tremendous military potential to destabilize the Middle East. But that has been taken care of. And in that new situation, we could continue UN Security Council cooperation and new security structures in the Middle East. This is what I was going to say. (S)

The President: Let me respond in some detail. In the first place, we have no evidence that he'll accept this offer of yours. Secondly, the concept that the military superiority that has given him arrogance in the Middle East has been resolved is not correct. A lot of his military power is still intact. He could continue to dominate his neighbors. (S)

What we would have to consider carefully at any time in the cessation of hostilities is the following: would the cessation of hostilities make a hero of him in the Middle East? At this juncture, his having attacked Israel and the continued use of the SCUDs and the Republican Guards make me feel he could claim victory out of the rubble of defeat. (S)

There is another point that would concern me. The coalition forces at this juncture are highly motivated, including the Arab participants. They would feel a cessation now would clearly be a victory for Saddam Hussein. It would put them in an extraordinarily weakened position in my view. They would see this as the one thing we said we wouldn't do--compromise. They would see Saddam Hussein, though weakened, with a military still intact, his ground forces in particular. (S)

So I think this effort may be premature. But, Mikhail, let me add a personal note. I continually worry about the loss of life you talked about in your message today. But we have been so far very lucky in that category. By that I mean we are targeting carefully and going the extra mile to protect against the very attack he launched on Israel yesterday. The targeting specifically excludes religious sites, mosques and damage to hospitals, schools and population centers. It has been precise and our analysis so far is that we've been successful in that regard. (S)

But, so nobody likes this. There is no joy in what is happening at all. I think we're now in a position to solve this problem.

SECRET

But I must say I really feel we have got to stay the course until it is abundantly clear that he will unilaterally and without concessions or conciliation leave Kuwait. (S)

I would be interested in what your Ambassador learns. I hate to hold out hope to Saddam Hussein and would not want to hold out hope that talks or negotiations about this would satisfy the coalition. And what he did yesterday in attacking Israel with city-busting weapons, that complicates things. If the fighting stopped this minute, he would say the attack on Israel brought the war to an end and made him victorious. That would put an end to the new world order you and I want. He would march out and say that striking Israel had brought the war to an end. Instead of being the humiliated braggart, he would be the victor, and others would see that. I am thinking of Egypt when I say that. (S)

That is my thinking. I think it accurately reflects the thinking of the coalition partners, but I haven't talked to them about what you have mentioned to me, obviously. I think the other coalition partners would agree with what I've told you here today. (S)

None of us want to see a vacuum in Iraq, an Iraq so weak and impotent that it would be destabilizing. So weak that it would be subject to aggression from its neighbors. We don't want to see that and we would work with you and others to stop that. In other words, we don't want to wipe out Iraq. So, I would-- (S)

President Gorbachev: If you are through then a few words from me. (S)

The President: I welcome your thoughtfulness and your concerns. I encourage you to stay in touch. I thought you were entitled to a frank assessment of the situation. Please go ahead. (S)

President Gorbachev: First of all, I would repeat. We will be with you to the very end, committed to the end. We will maintain the same position on the Saddam Hussein regime. The fact that hostilities have begun, the blame is fully with Saddam Hussein. (S)

The difference between us is on the following. You believe Iraq retains a significant military power that could threaten its neighbors, and that it will not comply with the UN resolutions. But, please, George, consider the central point I am making in this conversation. The first phase of action against Saddam Hussein was fully justified and has brought practical, strategic results. We, you and I, agree that if Saddam Hussein had left Kuwait a week ago, talks could have begun. But first he had to leave. If he were to leave Kuwait now, he would be weakened, rendered powerless for many years to come. It would be a lesson to everyone. (S)

SECRET

(At this point, the call was disconnected. It resumed ten minutes later.)

The President: Mikhail, we were cut off some time ago.
(S)

President Gorbachev: George, I thought communications was our problem, but it seems the U.S. has problems too. (S)

The President: Always, always. We can put a man on the moon but can't talk to Moscow. (S)

President Gorbachev: Still, yours is better than ours. (S)

The President: I'm not so sure about that. (U)

President Gorbachev: What was the last point I was making? (S)

The President: You said we agreed if Saddam left completely, the talks could begin and he would be weakened. That was the last thing I heard. (S)

President Gorbachev: There are two possibilities. One, I assume that the UN resolutions are complied with. The other possibility is to use all forces and begin a new phase in hostilities. That means a greater loss of life. We must think of the long-term political consequences. We must think of the loss of opportunity. (S)

So, George, my concern is that we make sure not to lose the opportunity now that we have attained strategic objectives. We have taught a lesson to the aggressor. Our new U.S.-Soviet cooperation, the spirit of our common values, means it is important to do the right thing. Stop in this phase. I am thinking about the casualties of U.S. forces and the loss of life among civilians and Iraqi soldiers. (S)

The President: I understand your concerns and share them. But I worry that if we stop short of full compliance with the UN resolutions, this man will pull victory out of the jaws of defeat. That would be a terrible example for the future. I agree with you on bloodshed. But I don't think our objectives have been achieved yet. There is no evidence he will comply with the UN resolutions right now. He could do that this very minute if he wanted to. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, well I think there is no difference between you and me on the need for compliance. There is no doubt that is valid and in effect. And there are no cracks, there must be no cracks on this. And at the same time, I think that the President of the U.S. and the President of the USSR must think of how to get out of this situation. This new phase brings me to the conclusion that we can take steps, all of us. (S)

The President: Let's stay in touch. I would be interested in what your Ambassador hears. We cannot end up in negotiations or

SECRET

conciliation. Please think what the attack on Israel last night did to this equation. Its a whole new dimension. (S)

I saw the Soviet statement and thought it was good. Let's think about it. Stay in touch. I agree with you that the Presidents of the U.S. and USSR must find a way to resolve this thing. (S)

One point of possible difference. Maybe you think he has been pounded more than we think. We think he still has a powerful military component in place. (S)

President Gorbachev: George, I think we have had a timely discussion. I hope we'll talk again soon. (S)

The President: I appreciate the call. Let me add in conclusion that I really empathize with you this week. Let me simply reiterate what we said to your very able new Foreign Minister, Mr. Bessmertnykh. We are so hopeful the Baltic situation can be resolved peacefully. It would really complicate things. (S)

We want to clear up CFE and START and go the extra mile on those two. We've not lost interest in either of them. (S)

President Gorbachev: I take note of this very important point. I would like to shake your hand and hope to talk soon. (S)

The President: The phone lines are open. Call day or night. It doesn't matter what time of day it is. Good luck to you on this and all the problems you have at home. (S)

President Gorbachev: Thank you. I shake your hand. (S)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME January 18, 1991, 10:10 a.m. - 10:20 a.m.
PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Brian. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Hello, George. (U)

The President: I am in the middle of talking with Gorbachev, but we got cut off and we can talk for now, although I may have to take his call when he calls back. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, I understand. I just had two quick questions that I wanted to ask you on the conduct of the war so far. I was hoping you could give me a general outlook on the situation and anything you can say specifically on Israel. I have to talk to the House of Commons this afternoon. (S)

The President: Things are going well so far. Our casualties are "at an acceptable minimum", whatever that means. The targeting and pinpointing are going very well. The bombing is aimed at military targets and command and control capabilities. (S)

Jim Baker is here and is just leaving. He says hello and asks me to thank you for your hospitality on Sunday. (S)

On the Israel equation, we have been very concerned. The damage from the missiles is limited, but we have to understand this attack in the context of the history of the region. Israel is going to try to respond. We are trying to contain their reaction, and have been up late discussing this with them. I don't think we have been totally successful. We are worried about Jordan and Syria, and a lot would depend on what Israel did. A proportionate response would not cause Egypt, Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states to pull out of the coalition. Turkey will be all right. We are trying to keep the Israelis from over-responding, or from putting Jordan in a humiliating position so that the

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
21 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

Jordanians feel forced to respond. We are trying to hold the line. It is important to keep them from getting close to Saddam Hussein who is being condemned by a lot of people. (S)

It would be helpful if you could make a statement identifying with the agony of the Israeli people. Gorbachev has condemned Saddam Hussein and what he is doing. Fortunately, no real damage has been done by the Iraqi missiles. (S)

(At this point the White House switchboard operator interrupted to inform the President that the Gorbachev call was back on the line.)

The President: I'll have to go, but Brent Scowcroft is here and he will be able to finish the conversation. (S)

General Scowcroft: I am here. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I want you to know that I don't view you as the second team! (S)

General Scowcroft: The Iraqis launched seven SCUD missiles; four on Tel Aviv, and three on Haifa. There was no serious damage although several people were lightly wounded. But it is hard to talk the Israelis out of responding, even though the situation looks all right for today. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Has the bombing been as successful recently as it was on the first day? (S)

General Scowcroft: Day 2 of the bombing was even better than Day 1. I am very impressed with the precision. We are not doing collateral damage. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If it keeps going on like this, how long do you think it will last? I don't want to pin you down, but just get your current estimate. (S)

General Scowcroft: Oh, maybe a couple of weeks. After the next day or so, we will be able to move from strategic targets around Baghdad and command and control to bombing of their ground forces. It is hard to estimate how long it will take to soften them up. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Thanks for the assessment, Brent. (S)

General Scowcroft: We will try to keep you posted. Goodbye Mr. Prime Minister. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Menem, President of Argentina
Interpreter: Patsy Arizu
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME January 19, 1991, 10:14 - 10:28 am EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Menem telephoned the President concerning the situation in the situation in the Gulf. (U)

The President: Hello, Carlos? (U)

President Menem: Yes, George. (U)

The President: (in Spanish) Como esta? (U)

President Menem: Very well, and you? (U)

The President: (in Spanish) Muy bien. Things are going reasonably well. (Ø)

President Menem: I was calling on that and also to tell you George that you can count on the support of the Argentine people. (Ø)

The President: That's important to me. Things are going as well if not better than we had hoped at this point in the battle. It is gratifying to the whole world that casualties seem to be kept to a minimum -- not only on our side of the coalition, but also among innocent civilians in Iraq. (Ø)

The coalition air forces have been superb. Our sophisticated weaponry has been more accurate than I would have dared to hope. I think that Saddam's brutal use of city-busting SCUD missiles shows a sign of desperation, and his desire to undo our coalition. But my friend, Mr. President, Carlos, tell me -- the worry I have now is about that point. Israel may or may not respond to these attacks. With your knowledge of the Middle East, I want to know if you have any advice on that point. (Ø)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

Ø1 8/21/2009 2000-0429-F

President Menem: I think, George, that Israel should not get involved in this conflict. Israel should wait to the limit of its patience. We've been sending a message of this type to the Israeli Government. The best way for things to finish is with this incredible weaponry. If Israel comes to the end of its patience, and attacks, I don't think that Syria will fight against the coalition. (Ø)

The President: We're trying to cool the passions in the area. Israel showed great restraint after the first SCUD missile attack. But it's increasingly difficult to get Israel to keep showing restraint, because their people are asking what the government there is going to do to protect its own people. (Ø)

President Menem: I believe, George, that we have to avoid another attack on Israel. Of course the Israelis have the right to defend themselves. After all, Israel is a country which has been attacked by Iraq. The Arab allies have also been attacked by Iraq. I don't think it will be so difficult to control other countries in the Arab world. We'll do everything possible to help you out -- to finish this conflict. We'll back any resolution to stop the war. If the UN asks us to do more, we want to do so. (Ø)

The President: Well, I appreciate this very much. The coalition will hold together. Things are going better than we had hoped. I pray that Saddam will throw down his arms, that we can stop the bloodshed, and start working on what we call the New World Order. (Ø)

President Menem: This seems very good to me. I too, in the name of the Argentine people, want to thank you for all you are doing for the cause of peace. War is not good. If you want, I could call the President of Syria to talk to him, and tell him to stay in the coalition. (Ø)

The President: I don't see anything now, but it might be very useful, if we wake up to see that Israel has responded, that you call Assad and tell him that he should view this as self-defense, and that he should stay in the coalition. This would be extremely useful coming from you. (Ø)

President Menem: I agree, George. If such a situation takes place, I'll immediately call Assad. (Ø)

The President: Thanks, my friend, for calling. I can't begin to tell you how much this means to me, not only for the friendship -- and my gratitude for the help of the Argentine people. (U)

President Menem: Thanks for everything, my friend George. My love to your wife Barbara and your family. (U)

The President: Well, over and out, and thanks again. (U)

President Menem: Goodbye. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0527

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on January 20, 1991 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME January 20, 1991; 3:45 - 4:05 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call to King Fahd. (Ø)

The President: Hello Your Majesty. How are you today, sir? (U)

King Fahd: Fine, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I was just calling to check in and compare notes on what is going on in the Gulf. (U)

King Fahd: That pleases me, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Frankly, our assessment is that after these first few days, things are going very well, in fact better than we had thought at the very beginning. We are sorry about the loss of the lives of the pilots, but basically the casualties have probably been less than we would have expected. As you know better than I do, the weather has not been good for the last couple of days, so we don't have the fullest, clearest bomb damage assessments that we would like to have. (Ø)

I do worry that Saddam Hussein is trying to draw Israel into this conflict. I have talked several times to Shamir and urged him to let us do what needs to be done to search for and destroy the SCUDs in the western part of Iraq. It is clear what Saddam is trying to do, but Shamir tells me he understands that and so far so good. I have sent Eagleburger and a good team out there to talk with him and other senior Israeli officials urging continued restraint. I am hopeful the Patriot batteries will encourage Israel and Shamir to continue with restraint. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
81 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
2

We have made no other commitments of assistance, political, military or economic. There is no commitment of any kind. I just keep urging them to show restraint even though they tell me it is very hard after having been attacked. (S)

The last point I want to make is that as this campaign continues, there will be more and more people will call out for a ceasefire. Gorbachev talked to me about something like that. Incidentally, I thought your letter to him was outstanding. But we have no intention to let up, no intention of stopping until our full objectives are met, no intention of letting these television pictures of demonstrations worldwide influence the United States or keep the United States from doing what it must do -- and that is to stand with you and the others until our mission is complete. (S)

Your Majesty, that was my message, and I would be very interested in hearing your views of how long Saddam will be able to sustain these losses and keep trying to stand up against the force we will keep bringing to bear against him. (S)

King Fahd: First of all, I would like to thank you for calling so we can confer about these matters. We are not concerned or interested about any demonstrations that occur anywhere. These people do not speak the truth. We know that we are pursuing the proper road, the road of truth, and they are not. They are walking down the wrong path. (S)

Saddam was given opportunities for several months but he did not listen to reason and he didn't comply. As far as I am concerned I am pleased he did not comply. Our position I think is an honorable one. It is a position consistent with justice and fairness and logic. And, the most important thing is that we and our allies are convinced that we are pursuing the proper path. Anyone who is saying that we should stop to negotiate with Saddam only wants to give him a chance to fortify himself so he can continue to proceed with his plans. (S)

The President: Exactly. (U)

King Fahd: The operations that have started are most magnificent and splendid. They are actually achieving more than we expected. History will show that you have done something that is quite great and revolutionary, Mr. President. The question now is this about those asking us to stop these operations and negotiate, why didn't they speak up before? (S)

I believe Mr. President that based on what I have seen in our ongoing operations so far is that Saddam may not last for more than one month. I see, at any rate, that we are certain and convinced that we are on the right track and pursuing the proper course. (S)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

The President: I agree. I just wanted to touch base, and compare notes, and to thank you for all the cooperation on the ground. I gather communications between the forces -- Saudi, US, Kuwait, French and British -- is going very well and that is a good thing. (Ø)

King Fahd: This is true. I frankly did not believe we could achieve this so quickly and meet our primary objectives. (Ø)

The President: Where do you think Saddam is, just sitting there and hiding out in Baghdad? (Ø)

King FAhd: I believe Mr. President he is outside Baghdad, but close to it. (Ø)

The President: I see. I wish we could find out. (Ø)

King Fahd: We will inevitably find out where he is. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. Well, thank you Your Majesty for everything. We will keep working closely together. I just wanted to call you up and touch base with you. (Ø)

King Fahd: I would like to salute you, Mr. President and thank you. I pledge that we will continue to work closely with you. (Ø)

The President: Good. May I make one last point your Majesty? (U)

King Fahd: Yes. (U)

The President: You mentioned the demonstrations. Please don't think the demonstrations you see on CNN represent the total will of the American people. Support from the American people is very strong. And there was an ABC poll yesterday that showed a tremendous number of Americans actually disapprove of the demonstrations themselves. (Ø)

King Fahd: That is true, Mr. President. The other poll that I saw says 86 percent of the American people support you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I think that is true now. It will fall off, of course, but it still will remain strong even after the euphoria wears off. (Ø)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

King Fahd: At any rate, we know and we have evidence to show that the demonstrations that have taken place and are taking place in Arab countries and in Asia and Africa were paid for by Saddam Hussein. We know he has paid billions of dollars to anyone who will organize them. Eventually, his money will run out. (C)

The President: That is very interesting. Good luck and thanks so much for all you are doing. We will stay in close touch. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you for all you are doing. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: January 20, 1991, 1:17 p.m. - 1:34 p.m.
PLACE: Camp David

The President: Francois, how are you? (U)

President Mitterrand: Good evening, dear George. I want to speak to you tonight to get your assessment of the situation as it stands today. (S)

The President: Absolutely. Let me make a few comments. In the first place, the actual targeting of the air campaign is going very well. I am pleased it has been accurate enough so that civilian casualties are lower than could be expected. Our planes, those of the coalition forces, the UK, the French, the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, now basically control the skies. The danger is not so much from SAMs but from stray anti-aircraft rounds. (S)

The weather is bad and thus we do not have the bomb damage assessment that I would like to see. We have not gotten the real, hard analytical results of the damage so far. But, as soon as the weather clears -- and we expect it to clear in 24-48 hours -- we should have a better assessment of whether we have disabled a lot of these key targets. It is my view that Saddam Hussein himself does not know how much damage has been done. (S)

President Mitterrand: Undoubtedly! How seriously has his communications network been affected? (S)

The President: We are not sure, but we think a lot of damage has been done to his communications networks, particularly his ability to communicate with his troops. But we believe he still has a good deal of contact. The damage to the Republican Guard, we believe, is significant -- but that job has not been finished. There was a tremendous explosion on one of the attacks, so big that it was actually recorded by our machinery that picks up major detonations for testing. But we still don't have the total

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
BY 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

assessment. My main concern at this point is out in the west of Iraq because of the attacks on Israel. (S)

President Mitterrand: These attacks are more symbolic than real. (S)

The President: Yes, and fortunately the loss of life has been minimal. The problem is we are trying to convince Shamir not to overreact and I am hopeful we will be able to keep him from doing so. I am convinced we can do the job of wiping out the SCUDs better than they can with their aircraft. But they keep talking about what kind of retaliation they will take. I don't think we need that risk and I am trying to keep him from doing anything, but that problem is not solved. I talked him into not attacking the other night and, fortunately, no attacks occurred last night. We have also sent Patriots. But you know how they are; they may feel they may have to attack. This worries me some. I have checked with the coalition partners and I think they will stay firm, but it is better if Israel lets us take care of this problem. (S)

President Mitterrand: Surely; that is very important. (U)

The President: I wish I could tell you I have talked him out of doing anything, but I cannot guarantee that I have. There have been no real surprises; our reaction is that things are going as well as or better than expected. (S)

President Mitterrand: I believe the media have overstated the successes at the very beginning. (S)

The President: Exactly, and there is euphoria and optimism. It is not good. (S)

President Mitterrand: This is the first time we have had to wage a war while being harassed by the media, which are talking incessantly. (S)

The President: That is true. I think CNN has been a great asset for Saddam Hussein. (S)

President Mitterrand: More the pity for us. (S)

The President: Francois, how is public opinion holding up in France? (S)

President Mitterrand: It is holding up well. I am looking at a poll that was conducted today. I have a 75 percent approval rating, and you have 74 percent approval. (S)

The President: That is amazing. (U)

President Mitterrand: I apologize for being one point ahead of you. (S)

The President: You deserve it, Francois. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

President Mitterrand: I didn't say I deserved it, but that proves that French opinion continues to remain very sound, and this percentage has been in effect for the last four days. I see that we have 67-68 percent of opinion consistently very favorable to the US, so I have no complaints on that score. (S)

The President: What do you think Saddam's next move will be? (S)

President Mitterrand: Do you think he has something up his sleeve for us? I am worried he has some clever tricks. If he could launch SCUDs and manage to strike Israel in spite of the Patriots, this would be a major success for him. Of course all of this is fiction, but it would register and have an impact. Another problem is whether he is going to be able to bring out his aircraft. And the last problem is the air campaign, which must last long enough so that the land campaign is not too deadly. (S)

The President: I agree completely. Our people tell us our Air Force totally dominates the skies. The count is 11-0 when we have engaged them in the air. (S)

President Mitterrand: The French pilots are doing a very good job every day. We have a total of 52 aircraft in the area. We have sustained no losses yet, but of course there will be some. (S)

The President: That is very good, wonderful. (S)

President Mitterrand: We feel very close to you every time you sustain a loss because we know there will be losses spread out among all us over time. Our only real problem is the way the countries of the Maghreb are beginning to react. There are crowds in the streets engaging in some violent acts against our consulates. (S)

There you are. I just wanted to tell you where we stand. But I believe a major diplomatic effort is called for in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. (S)

The President: I have been remiss on that, but we will try. Bendjedid himself seems fairly supportive. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, he is very friendly towards France, but the fundamentalist and Islamic movements are very strong. So, for the time being, that is my number one concern. I wanted to talk to you tonight so we could share views and exchange impressions, and I will be in touch again very soon. (S)

The President: I totally agree that the air campaign must go on long enough to protect our ground forces. We must give our ground forces full protection by finishing phases 1,2 and 3 of the air campaign. There will be voices calling for a halt. (S)

President Mitterrand: It is up to Saddam alone to stop. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President: Exactly. (U)

President Mitterrand: He can't tell us to stop. Saddam alone can say stop -- that is the landmark really. He is the one who bears the responsibility, he alone. The others are not responsible. (S)

The President: I appreciate the fact we can talk like this, and I appreciate the role that France is playing. I will call if anything comes up, and I would welcome a call from you at any time. (S)

President Mitterrand: This is quite understood. I want very much for us to go on working as we have, in the same spirit. It is not easy, but it has to be done. (S)

The President: I agree; so far so good. (S)

President Mitterrand: Good night, my dear friend, and good luck for your soldiers. (S)

The President: Thank you, and the same for your heroic airmen and soldiers. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MAJOR

JAN 20 - PRES PLACED SECURE CALL TO
UK PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AT 1006.
MONITORED BY SCOWCROFT (NO TERMINATION
TIME) PRES AT CAMP DAVID

MUBARAK

JAN 20 - PRES CALLED EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT
MUBARAK. MONITORED BY SANDY CHARLES
INITIATED 1529 - TERMINATED 1535.
PRES AT CAMP DAVID

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0528

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to President Mubarak
of Egypt on January 21, 1991 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME January 21, 1991, 3:25 - 3:35 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call to President Mubarak. (Ø)

The President: Hello Hosni. (U)

President Mubarak: Hello, how are you? (U)

The Pres ing in to compare notes and
to see r

Preside /s more, things will be
good.

The Pre you thought. The air
campaign has been bad in affecting
the nur image assessments. We
haven't ents because we don't have
full c nings are better than we
expect but overall not as many as
we thc bly well. I wanted to see
what }
*Pres returned
from Camp David
at 1127 - This
call made from
WH.*

Presi wing the campaign and
following n all the points. I have
nothing new except to move target. (Ø)

The President: I agree. We will not stop short of achieving our
ends. I expect more will start speaking up to stop this. I just
want you to know that I don't intend to do that. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I have sent Abdel to Syria to keep them
holding to the situation. (Ø)

The President: I've been disappointed in Qadhafi. He's been
making some crazy statements. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0528

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to President Mubarak
of Egypt on January 21, 1991 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME January 21, 1991, 3:25 - 3:35 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call to President Mubarak. (Ø)

The President: Hello Hosni. (U)

President Mubarak: Hello, how are you? (U)

The President: Fine. I am just checking in to compare notes and to see how things are going. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Well, a couple days more, things will be good. (Ø)

The President: I wanted to see what you thought. The air campaign is going well. The weather has been bad in affecting the number of sorties and the bomb damage assessments. We haven't got full bomb damage assessments because we don't have full coverage from the air. Still things are better than we expected. We lost more pilots today but overall not as many as we thought. Things are going reasonably well. I wanted to see what you thought. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I've been following the campaign and following the weather. I agree with all the points. I have nothing new except to insist on the target. (Ø)

The President: I agree. We will not stop short of achieving our ends. I expect more will start speaking up to stop this. I just want you to know that I don't intend to do that. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I have sent Abdel to Syria to keep them holding to the situation. (Ø)

The President: I've been disappointed in Qadhafi. He's been making some crazy statements. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

President Mubarak: I am sending the Minister for Information to speak to him tomorrow. I'll tell you when he gets back. (Ø)

The President: I think he is just grandstanding. (Ø)

President Mubarak: He will be giving him notice. We will tell him to be careful, he is not right, and it is dangerous on his side. (Ø)

The President: We are working with the State of Israel. So far they have been good and restrained. I hope this will continue. But Israel has been attacked twice. I talked with Shamir and asked that he let us do the job. But I don't know how long they will be restrained. (Ø)

President Mubarak: What Saddam Hussein wants is to start problems with the masses. Hopefully, he won't find an excuse to make this necessary. You have done a fine job with Shamir. (Ø)

The President: I don't know how long it will last, but it is important. What do you make of King Hussein's speech? (Ø)

President Mubarak: He likes the theater. There was one change in what he said -- both are mistaken. This is the first time he has said this that both are mistaken. He has never said this before. This is the only thing I picked up in his words. (Ø)

The President: Well, just wanted you to know things are keeping on. We will stay the course. We will not pull back. We will not knuckle under to public criticism. Support in this country is very strong. If you were watching CNN you would wonder. A survey shows 80 percent for Desert Storm. (Ø)

President Mubarak: 84 percent. Very good. (U)

The President: How is public support there? (Ø)

President Mubarak: It is still good. (Ø)

The President: Okay, I was just checking in. I wish you well. Let's all stay together until we get this man out of there. (Ø)

President Mubarak: How is Barbara? I heard she slipped. (U)

The President: She's right here on crutches. I will tell her you asked. Please give our love to Susie. And call me if you have any questions. (U)

President Mubarak: I will. Good-bye George. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti
of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Sim Smiley

DATE, TIME January 21, 1991, 9:49 - 10:04 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Prime Minister, how are you today? (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Good morning. How are you? (U)

The President: I am fine. I am just calling to touch base and give you an updated report on the way we think the situation is going in the Gulf. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you very much. I am very pleased. (U)

The President: First, let me express my condolences over the loss of one of your pilots. I don't know if it has been confirmed whether he is dead or alive, but let us hope he is alive. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: We have almost certain confirmation that he is alive, though he has been taken prisoner. (U)

The President: I don't like what Saddam Hussein is doing -- parading these prisoners, against the Geneva Convention. It is not surprising, but it is disgraceful. It is cruel and brutal. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Right. (U)

The President: Basically, let me just make a few points. Then I would particularly like to hear your views. First, the air campaign has gone even better than we thought it would when we were planning it. The weather the last couple of days has been bad, so we have had to reduce the number of sorties. The

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

technical equipment is working well; thus we are convinced we have kept the loss of innocent life to a minimum in Baghdad and Iraq. We will continue the air campaign. We have already started to work on Republican Guard units in southeastern Iraq and across into Kuwait. Your planes and ours control the air. There have been eleven challenges from Iraqi aircraft, and they have lost all eleven fights. The danger to our pilots comes largely from anti-aircraft fire, because we have been able to suppress most SAM sites. (S)

I still worry about the Israel card. Saddam Hussein knows what he is doing in trying to draw Israel into the war, hoping it will ruin the coalition. So far Shamir has been quite reasonable, given Israel's history of fighting back right away against aggression, but it will be hard to ask them not to do anything if they get hit a third time. Basically, the coalition is holding well, and public opinion is holding pretty well, including in the U.S. The longer it goes, the more public demonstrations probably will take place. But I wanted you to know that I am more determined than ever to finish this job, and that means full compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions -- especially getting out of Kuwait. We have avoided making predictions about how long this will last, because we simply don't know exactly what the bomb damage has been or what Saddam Hussein has up his sleeve. It is my view, given the disruption of communication, that Saddam does not know of the damage to some of his forces and installations in outlying areas. This is about the situation right now. We are pleased that the Patriot missiles seem to be defending against Scud missiles very well. That's about the way I see it. I would love to have your views, my friend. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: My view is that public opinion understands more and more that what we are dealing with is to make sure the UN resolutions are fully applied. If the UN is unable to reach these goals, including the liberation of Kuwait, this will be a defeat for the entire international community. It is not a war between Iraq and the U.S. but between Iraq and the UN. I wanted to tell you, Mr. President, that your speech on October 1 at the UN was very important -- that is, no linking, but as soon as the Kuwaiti problem is solved then we should address the Palestinian problem. (U)

The President: We have to do that, yes. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: The message you delivered a few days ago also expressed this idea very clearly. The more often you can express this view, the better it is for the Arab world. That is our opinion. We will try to stay in touch with the Maghreb and help them resist the fundamentalist position. This sums up my thinking, Mr. President. I would like to express my best hopes and best prayers to you. (U)

The President: Thank you. We will stay in touch. If you have any thoughts or questions, don't hesitate to call. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you. I will very gladly do so.
Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye, Giulio. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0499

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Turgut Ozal of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME January 21, 1991: 7:31-7:39 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Turgut. How are you? (U)

I am calling to check in to compare notes on how things are going. We feel pretty good about the situation. The weather has been bad the last few days which has delayed us. But from our end, we are pleased by the way things are going. Civilian casualties have been kept as low as possible. We're doing great damage to military installations. (S)

President Ozal: Generally from our side, things are okay too. My opposition makes noise and opposes the war. But it doesn't matter. The larger population supports me. (S)

I wonder if maybe the Iraqis have chemicals to use on the troops, from artillery and planes. One information I've received is that some Turkish contractors built underground airfields in Iraq. (S)

The President: We had heard something about that. (U)

President Ozal: Not only storage facilities, but airfields. The planes can come out of the bunkers. (S)

The President: How does it work? Do the planes go straight up? Can you tell us where these bunkers are? (S)

President Ozal: They don't know where they are, but maybe in the north. I'll check it out once more and will let you know. (S)

The President: We are upset they are parading our pilots on TV. The American public is outraged. (S)

President Ozal: I know. It is similar in Turkey. George, I tell you this -- this man and his military machine must be destroyed. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/12/2009
2000-0429-F

The President: Yes, and it will be. I'm confident of it. Some reporters are concentrating on how long it will take. Some are trying to turn public opinion against the war. But it will go pretty fast. How long do you think it will go? (S)

President Ozal: My estimate is that it will take less than two months, but maybe one to two months more. (S)

The President: That is about right. It will depend on the ground forces. Or one of his officers may decide enough is enough and get rid of him. (S)

President Ozal: Are you bombing electric power plants? (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Ozal: Are you bombing water facilities? (S)

The President: We've been careful on the water. I am not sure. But electricity, and communications to the military are down. Every time he sends up his airplanes, we shoot them down. Their air force sent up eleven planes. Every one was shot down without one allied plane lost. Our planes have been lost to ground fire, not to planes. (S)

President Ozal: It looks like ground fire is decreasing. Some units are on the tops of buildings. (S)

The President: We think there are 40,000 anti-aircraft guns on tops of buildings. Most of the SAMs have been wiped out. Our pilots fly over easily. I hope they are not getting too careless. (S)

President Ozal: One other thing. Are you using B-52s, especially on the ground troops? (S)

The President: Yes. We are using them on ground troops. We think it has been effective so far, but it is hard to measure the effectiveness due to the weather. We are trying to keep Israel responsible. They have been attacked twice now. So far, Israel is okay. (S)

President Ozal: Yes, the coalition is holding strong. There may be some noise from some Arab countries. (S)

The President: Listen, it has been nice talking to you. Please call anytime and stay in touch. (U)

President Ozal: Okay. God bless you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0497

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
Interpreter: Patricia Arizu
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME January 21, 1991, 7:48 - 8:02 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President telephoned Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez concerning the Gulf crisis. (U)

The President: Hello, buenos dias. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Good day. (U)

The President: I am calling just to check in on the Gulf crisis and cover a couple of points. If I sound bad, it is because I've got a head cold. First, I would like to thank you and Spain for the role you are playing. I have been fully briefed on the Spanish role and I am very grateful. Second, I would like to brief you on the situation on the Gulf, if you have a few minutes. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, I would appreciate that very much. I am very interested. (S)

The President: The first days of the aerial campaign were very successful. Unfortunately, we have had bad weather for the last couple of days and therefore we don't have a full estimate of the damage. But, even without a full bomb damage assessment, the precision armaments are working well. We are confident that, if we haven't totally eliminated his nuclear installations, we have at least damaged them enough to set back his program. It will be years before they can be fired up. We are pleased with the way the Patriot anti-SCUD missiles are operating but, with the bad weather, he is still able to launch SCUDs against Israel and

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

Saudi Arabia -- although we have countered some of them with our Patriots. (S)

So far, thank God, Israel has reacted with restraint. I hope they will continue to do so. But if the missile attacks continue, it will be hard for them not to respond. If they are hit again, they may do so even though we have intensified our targeting of western Iraq. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: That's understandable. (S)

The President: We are starting to hit his Republican Guards in southeastern Iraq and Kuwait. We have total control of the air. Every time they have tried to fly against us, we have shot them down. The balance is 11-0. One of our early planes lost was shot down by a SAM, but we think that since then the rest have been hit by anti-aircraft fire. We control the skies, and when we turn to their forces in Kuwait, it will be very difficult for Saddam Hussein because he has never had to fight without having control of the skies. (S)

The coalition is holding quite well. You will hear cries from some quarters for a halt or a cease-fire. But all of the people I have talked to think that we should pursue our campaign until the objective is achieved. That's about where we are now. (S)

But what do you think? I would like to hear your views, and if you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: First, you can count on our cooperation, and we now have the full backing of the Parliament. (S)

The President: Wonderful. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: We have gotten a 90 percent vote of support from Parliament, even though public support in Spain is weaker than in other countries. How do you foresee things unfolding from here on in? Do you think it will be a long war? (S)

The President: I don't really think so. Because of our cutting off of communications, Saddam Hussein and his commanders don't know how badly his facilities have been damaged. When they do realize the extent of the damage to military and to military-related targets, such as power plants, maybe someone will force him to quit. Maybe this is wishful thinking, however. (S)

Our softening up of the Republican Guards will be continuing for quite a while, until we soften them up more. Our search and destroy operations in Kuwait will also continue, until our planes

there finish the job. We are also continuing efforts to cut off supply lines in southern Iraq and Kuwait. (S)

At that point, perhaps his troops may run away, or perhaps they will stand and fight. If so, it will be very difficult for them. It won't be as difficult to dislodge him as people think. Having said that, it is impossible to predict exactly how long it will last. I have discussed this with the Turks, the Saudis, the Egyptians, and others close to the area, but no one can say for sure. That's about it; that's how I see it as of today. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzales: All right. I thank you so much, Mr. President, for the information. I think the current outlines of the international coalition should be kept as is, including its linkage to the United Nations. You will continue to have our support. (S)

The President: Thanks. I will be in touch later on and I appreciate everything that Spain is doing. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Very good, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

-- End of conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME January 22, 1991, 1:23 - 1:45 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut! Good day to you. How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine. I hope you are well, too. How is Barbara? (U)

The President: She is fine. She is walking with a cane but is doing well. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Please give her my love and Hannelore's love. We didn't know she was in training for the sledding world championship. (U)

The President: What's new? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I wanted to know your thinking about the Gulf situation and ask a couple of questions -- one about Saddam Hussein's state of mind and another on Israel. (U)

The President: Let me take a few minutes to fill you in. First, things are going pretty well. The air campaign is on schedule. The weather was bad for two or three days over the weekend, but despite that an enormous number of sorties have been flown, we think with good effect. The air campaign will go on for quite a few more days. We are pleased with the laser-like accuracy of going after targets. We think we have held innocent loss of life to a minimum. We think already there has been enormous damage to his nuclear bomb capability. Similarly, there has been enormous damage to his communications and support effort -- command and control, and so on. But we can't say all of this is taken care of yet, so we have to continue our mission. We think his air defense is virtually destroyed, at least his ground-to-air missiles. Now a lot of attention will be paid to his elite Republican Guard troops and equipment. So generally we are happy with the way the air campaign is working and happy that Saddam

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
GJ 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

Hussein has not been able to brutally damage population centers, because of the effectiveness of Patriot. In air-to-air combat, every time they have gone down -- every time, without exception. The loss of Allied air power that we mourned has come about because of the concentration of air power for the most part. (S)

On our assessment of Saddam Hussein that you asked about, he may believe that he can keep some planes hidden and hold his forces back for an attack. He may still believe that, but we do not believe that. One interesting sidelight his propaganda minister, in charge of public relations, told Bernie Shaw of CNN that he did not believe Allied aircraft could get to Baghdad. I still believe Saddam Hussein is making assessments on the basis of erroneous data. (S)

You also mentioned that you had a question about Israel. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, of course. Will you be able to keep them under restraint? (S)

The President: My answer is that I don't know, but I do think they have been pleased with the way Patriot has been used over Saudi Arabia. We had several talks with Shamir on this. So far we are pleased with their restraint. I am now pretty well convinced that if Israel does take some action the coalition will nevertheless hold together. I hope the coalition won't be put to that test, so we are urging continued restraint on the part of the Israelis. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: What is Shamir's mood, his psychological state of mind? (S)

The President: He is grateful for the Patriot batteries. Israel is concerned about these blatant attacks. He knows that Saddam Hussein is trying to undermine the coalition, but he sees the situations in terms of what a Prime Minister must do with regard to attacks on his population. (S)

Helmut, one other point: what this man is doing when he parades prisoners on television is causing a strong reaction against Saddam Hussein in many countries. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It is an incredible crime. It sets us backward to the terrible situation in years past. However terrible it is for those involved, it has had a positive effect on world opinion. (S)

The President: That is one way of looking at it, that's true. I have given you some of my views. What are your thoughts? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I have two questions. We are considering sending someone to Israel with a message of sympathy and provision of financial support. (S)

The President: Do you want me to respond to that? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, as a friend -- not a diplomatic response.
(U)

The President: I think it would be well appreciated. I don't think it would have any adverse effect on coalition members, because the aggression against Israel has been so blatant. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: The second point: your Treasury Secretary and Finance Minister Waigel met in New York yesterday. I haven't yet received a report, but I assure you that as far as financial support is concerned, we are more than ready. I told Jim Baker that. (S)

The President: That is very important. I am very grateful. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: On a completely different question, the political forces that came up in 1983 are up again. The Social Democrats are making deals based on the fear of war. They are starting a campaign. It is very sad. The Socialists in other countries are taking very good positions. I told our British friends that we should have Kinnock here. (S)

The President: Yours are pretty unreasonable, I think. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That brings me to the subject of Turkey. (S)

The President: May I interrupt? I was just handed a note -- in high confidence -- that a Scud is headed toward Israel right now. That just came in and shows you what kind of war we are dealing with. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. Back to Turkey, I don't know if Saddam Hussein will attack, but perhaps he will mount an air campaign or even a missile attack. The question of NATO involvement may come up. You have been able to count on Helmut Kohl up to now, and you will continue to be able to count on me now, even if I am facing great troubles. (S)

The President: We do not yet carry a high likelihood that Saddam Hussein will attack Turkey. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I simply want to say that there may be things, nonsense, written in our papers, but you can count on us. (S)

The President: Thank you very much. We were very pleased with the movement of forces into Turkey and hope it doesn't cause too many problems at home. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We will remain in contact. (U)

The President: All right. If there are any questions, don't hesitate to call. Likewise, I will call you if anything comes up. I appreciate your conversation with Jim Baker and your willingness to do more. That is very important to German-U.S. relations. So I hope that can be worked out without problems for you, given the Social Democratic position you told me about. (S)

Okay, thanks. Are you worried about the election in Hesse? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I am not worried. It is similar to an election in one of your states. The last time we had a victory. This time we lost, but it was only a slight loss. (C)

The President: Okay. Thanks for calling. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

SHAMIR

JAN 23 - PRES CALLED ISRAELI PM SHAMIR
AT 0005 - CALL TERMINATED 0010. PRES
AT WH - MONITORED BY RICHARD HAASS.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME January 24, 1991, 11:09 - 11:21 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good, thanks. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine. Helmut, the other day you mentioned the question of "responsibility-sharing" for Desert Storm, and I appreciated your comment that you are "more than ready" on financial support. I just wanted to follow up with a specific request. I know that Jim, when he met with you, said that we would be reassessing the request he made if hostilities broke out. I also understand that Nick Brady gave Minister Waigel a figure, and Jim Baker in Bonn gave a figure of \$1 billion. As we look at the overall figures, what we would firmly request is \$6 billion for the first three months of 1991. That would include the \$1 billion that Jim Baker mentioned. The request is in line with the percentage that Germany contributed very generously to the 1990 Desert Shield operation. We have made similar requests of Japan and the Gulf states, and today Kaifu announced a Japanese pledge of \$9 billion. It still has to go through his legislature, but he is firmly committed. (S)

Germany has been criticized in our Congress, as you know. We have been standing up for Germany and will continue to do so. Congress criticizes everybody. But if you can come through, it would be very good for German-U.S. relations. I don't want to sound unappreciative, because we are very appreciative of all those who have contributed during this historic effort. I know these are difficult times for you financially with your other obligations, but what we are doing is for the benefit of the entire world -- stabilizing energy prices and assuring peace in the world. So that is where we stand. The request is for our operations, not for the Front Line states, where you have made an

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

important contribution. The move toward Israel that you mentioned was very thoughtful and very helpful. I hope it was well received. I know that Minister Waigel and Brady talked, but since you mentioned that you would help I wanted to follow up. I firmly urge your consideration. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, let me say that Waigel only gave me a fairly short oral briefing. I will see him in a longer meeting tomorrow. I jotted down what you told me. I will think about it and get back to you very soon. As you said, we want to be helpful and will certainly do that. As far as I understand, the Bundeswehr is also in the process of supplying equipment. I would like to know how far that is included in this calculation. (S)

The President: I think that was in 1990 and was not included in this request. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I will look at the figures and get back to you. (S)

The President: I am not unsympathetic to your situation, but I would appreciate it if you get back to us as soon as possible. The mission is going well. It is not going to be a many month operation. It is not going that way, in our view. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Is there anything new? (S)

The President: No, nothing new. The Patriot missiles seem to be working well against the indiscriminate bombing of civilians by the Scud missiles. Many of the most serious targets in Iraq, such as the nuclear capability of this madman, have been damaged or destroyed. Saddam seems to be digging in as much as ever -- not only his forces but his mental attitude. But our general officers and the Secretary of Defense feel we are moving according to plan. We will be moving to soften his armor. Maybe Saddam will begin to get the message. So far he has not. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: How long do you think it will take until ground forces start to participate? (S)

The President: I don't have a specific date. It would not begin within the next week. We need more time. I would appreciate your holding this confidential, of course, but I don't think it will be before February. But at that juncture, if we do our work now, it won't be a long, drawn out campaign. One reason for the high costs we are all putting in is the high cost of munitions, which have been so effective. In any event, I would appreciate your soulful consideration of that request. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, let me say again that I promised this and will stick to my promise. I will check into it.

SECRET

3

The President: Thank you, sir. Good-bye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

0616

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu of Japan on January 25, 1991 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME January 25, 1991, 8:02 - 8:12 am, EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Kai
situation. (Ø)

Concerning the Gulf

The President: Go

you? (U)

Prime Minister Kai
efforts. Day and
your position. Yes
from New York to br
As a result, I have
with Secretary Brad
billion. As reques
will emphasize the

*This call
took place
on Jan 24
Not Jan 25*

appreciate your
side and support
imoto returned
cretary Brady.
conversation
tribution of \$9
ecision and I
(Ø)

The leaders of the I
amount. This might
Starting tomorrow, w
insist, and appeal for
supplementary budget to obtain the resources. (Ø)

decided on the
re higher taxes.
ession. I will persuade,
We must pass a
(Ø)

Today, we had an LDP convention. I appealed to the participants and told them we must raise taxes. We must appeal to the Japanese public for understanding. This is our obligation to the international community. Already the Socialists and the Communists are voicing opposition. In Parliament, we will seek the understanding of the Japanese people. (Ø)

In addition, to help evacuees repatriate, we will send two civilian aircraft to Cairo and, in addition, aircraft of our SDF will be sent by amending our government decrees. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
BY 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0616

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu of Japan on January 25, 1991 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME January 25, 1991, 8:02 - 8:12 am, EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Kaifu telephoned the President concerning the Gulf situation. (Ø)

The President: Good morning, Toshiki. How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Good morning, George. I appreciate your efforts. Day and night I will always be on your side and support your position. Yesterday, Finance Minister Hashimoto returned from New York to brief me on his meeting with Secretary Brady. As a result, I have made a decision based on his conversation with Secretary Brady. We have decided on our contribution of \$9 billion. As requested, I have made an official decision and I will emphasize the necessity of our contribution. (Ø)

The leaders of the LDP and I met this morning and decided on the amount. This might mean that we would need to have higher taxes. Starting tomorrow, we will have a Diet Session. I will persuade, insist, and appeal for the contribution. We must pass a supplementary budget to obtain the resources. (Ø)

Today, we had an LDP convention. I appealed to the participants and told them we must raise taxes. We must appeal to the Japanese public for understanding. This is our obligation to the international community. Already the Socialists and the Communists are voicing opposition. In Parliament, we will seek the understanding of the Japanese people. (Ø)

In addition, to help evacuees repatriate, we will send two civilian aircraft to Cairo and, in addition, aircraft of our SDF will be sent by amending our government decrees. (Ø)

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

I sincerely hope the Gulf crisis will be solved in accordance with the UN Resolution at the earliest date possible. We in Japan are determined to do as much as possible. (S)

I would like to express my deepest condolences and deepest sympathies to the bereaved families. (U)

I also hope that Barbara Bush is recovering from her injury. My wife is very worried too. (U)

The President: Thank you for this very, very important and much appreciated phone call. Thank you also for considering Barbara. She is doing fine and I will tell her your wife was asking after her. (U)

We are concerned about the loss of life of our fliers and, therefore, very much appreciate your condolences on that account. (U)

I am very, very grateful for the magnificent support from your Cabinet and the LDP, and hope you will be successful in persuading the Japanese people. I know you will be. (S)

The airplanes -- both civilian and SDF -- which you mentioned, will be widely appreciated, not only in the U.S., but by all the coalition partners. (S)

I would like your permission to mention this phone call so that I can thank the Japanese Prime Minister and the Japanese people before the day is over. (S)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Please do so. I, myself, have just announced the decision on television. (S)

The President: Thank you ever so much for this magnificent contribution. It will be well received multilaterally and, needless to say, by the people of the United States. I will make sure every member of the Congress will know how I feel about this. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

MAJOR

JAN 27 - PRES CALLED PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
FROM CAMP DAVID SECURE AT 1230. NO ONE
MONITORED

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

0793

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME January 28, 1991, 11:08 - 11:28 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello, Helmut. How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good, thank you. I wanted to talk as a follow-up to our last talk. But, first, is there any news about the Gulf? (✓)

The President: No inside news. It is going according to plan. We were surprised at the evacuation of Iraqi planes to Iran. (✓)

Chancellor Kohl: What is the meaning of that? Did they fly out illegally or under the command of Saddam Hussein? (✓)

The President: At first we thought it was illegal, that they were fleeing. Now we are not sure. If we had to guess, we would say now that he has orchestrated an evacuation to protect these front-line fighters. There have been quite a few air engagements and every time, without exception, the Iraqi aircraft have been shot down. (✓)

Chancellor Kohl: If he sends more into safety, do you think they will come back or will Iran do what it has said and keep them until the end of the war? (✓)

The President: I hope they will. We will be monitoring this through intelligence. (✓)

Chancellor Kohl: Is there other news? (U)

The President: There is not much else. The oil slick worries us. It is a desperate move with no military advantage. The evidence is very good that he is simply dumping all this oil into the Gulf. (✓)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

Chancellor Kohl: In Europe, this matter is having a terrible psychological effect for him. Psychologically, it is one of his biggest mistakes. His first mistake was attacking Kuwait. There is no doubt about that. He has made three further mistakes. The hostage taking is a major mistake. Then there was this crazy act with the POWs. He seems half-mad. Now he has gone right into the heart of all the ecologists in Europe. These are terrible acts, but they have a positive side effect in European opinion. (P)

The day after tomorrow I will present the government's program in the Bundestag. I will send the text of those parts on German-American relations and the Gulf, which may interest you, as quickly as possible. I would be grateful if your press people could look at it. Tonight we will have a visit from the Israelis and will discuss specific assistance with them. You can imagine what equipment I am thinking of. I think that meets your interests, too. (P)

The President: Yes, anything you can do will be helpful. I thought Genscher's trip was very good and very generous. I was embarrassed when I saw there were some demonstrations against him. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: I simply wanted to say we intend to act generously. Once we are finished I will send a letter addressed to you personally, because I am not sure they will tell you exactly what we intend to do. (P)

The President: Good. That is a good way. Send it to me directly. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: In presenting the government program I will also say something on Turkey. I will announce that certain parts of our air defense will be sent to Turkey. This will have an important stabilizing effect. (U)

The President: Yes, I think so, too. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Then we will also repeat that of course we will stand by our NATO obligation. I will repeat that and be very precise. (U)

The President: Excellent. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: The last point: the two things I just mentioned on Turkey I will make public only the day after tomorrow. That brings me to our last conversation and the question of support for the United States. I wanted to tell you today because tomorrow you have your report on the State of the Union. First, I also intend to announce that due to the cost resulting from the war in the Middle East and also because of the high cost we have had to pay for a very long time for reform countries like Poland, it is my intention to increase taxes. We have a tight budget situation, so we have tried to be careful.

Of course, we can't stand aside if countries like the U.S. have enormous costs. Therefore, I will tackle the problem in a very offensive manner. (Ø)

My question concerns the 5 billion dollars your finance minister mentioned to our finance minister. You spoke of 6 billion, and in parallel to that we have a British request of about 800 million. At the same time I have gotten a letter from Walesa asking us to do something because they are in a very tight situation. Could we agree on 5 billion dollars for three months? (Ø)

The President: I don't have my notes in front of me on the difference between the 5 billion and the 1 billion, but if that is your decision we would welcome that. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me be very frank: I would like to do something with respect to London. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I understand that. It is very noble. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Can we then agree on 5 billion dollars? Let me say just as frankly that if this causes problems for you I won't do it. I want to be helpful. (Ø)

The President: Can I do this -- check with Jim Baker and get right back to you through him or Brent Scowcroft. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I am just as willing to contact you again by phone. I just wanted to reach agreement with you so you can go public. (Ø)

The President: I will talk to Baker right away. First, I am very appreciative of your willingness to something like this. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: George, that is self-understood. You do this also on our behalf. So I don't want to be difficult; I just wanted to get something also to London. (Ø)

The President: I will get back to you. I am a little confused. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I think there is a misunderstanding. Last year I discussed with Jim Baker three billion DM, then in January I met again with Baker, and then Brady in his meeting with Waigel talked about 5 billion. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I think one billion dollars was for Desert Shield and 5 billion for the first of this year for hostilities. I believe that is the discrepancy. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, would you like to talk to Jim? (Ø)

The President: Yes, I will call him and get right back to you. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Within the next hour? (C)

The President: Yes. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME: January 28, 1991, 11:50 - 11:57 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut, I am back again. The 6 billion dollars was our original proposal. It includes a new 5 billion for operations and 1 billion on the track before for Desert Shield, before hostilities broke out. The 6 billion would put German participation to just over 10%. 5 billion would put it at just under 10%. I think from the perception of the public -- which we will join you in fighting, whatever you decide -- it would be better if you committed 6 billion. There might be a compromise; 5 1/2 billion would be exactly 10 percent. But whatever you do will be fine with me. We will welcome your contribution and express our gratitude. I will tell you that Congress, in its infinite wisdom, would react better to 6 than 5, but I don't want to get into a rug auction like in Baghdad. I hope it will be 6 but if it can't be, we will understand and put the best possible face on it. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: If 5 1/2 billion would be exactly 10 percent, then we will make it 5 1/2 and the rest will go to London. (S)

The President: Let's do that. I am grateful to you. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: London would be almost another billion dollars. (S)

The President: We will point that out, too. It is very generous. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I would like to ask you not to tell the public the exact amount for London. You could say 5 1/2 billion and also a contribution for London. (S)

The President: We could say 5 1/2 and be silent on London or whatever you prefer. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It would be better for tomorrow to say that we have agreed on 5 1/2 billion, and if asked you could say that we will also support London. (S)

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
81 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

The President: Let me be clear. It is okay to say today or tomorrow that Germany has agreed to 5 1/2 billion dollars. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Tomorrow, please, because it is already evening here. (Ø)

The President: We will be silent today and wait until your announcement and then follow up with gratitude. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That makes the thing definite from my side. (Ø)

The President: Okay. Thanks very much. (U)

-- End of Conversation --