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FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91112
Folder ID Number: 91112-003

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 10/11/90 - 12/31/90

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telcon to President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	10/11/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Telcon	Re: Telcon to President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	10/11/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom on October 12, 1990 (3 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	C
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	C
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (2 pp.)	10/17/92	(b)(1)	C
06. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (4 pp.)	10/24/90	(b)(1)	S
07. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (2 pp.)	10/24/90	(b)(1)	S
08. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak (2 pp.)	10/25/90	(b)(1)	C
09. Telcon	Re: The President's Call to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	10/25/90	(b)(1)	S
10. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	10/26/90	(b)(1)	C

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Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 10/11/90 - 12/31/90

Pinksheet Number: cap946

OA/ID Number: 91112-003

Date Closed: 2/4/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (3 pp.)	10/26/90	(b)(1)	✓
12. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy (3 pp.)	10/26/90	(b)(1)	✓
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	10/27/90	(b)(1)	✓
14. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	10/31/90	(b)(1)	✓
15. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (2 pp.)	11/10/90	(b)(1)	✓
16a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (1 pp.)	11/11/90	(b)(1)	✓
16b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (3 pp.)	11/11/90	(b)(1)	✓
17. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (2 pp.)	11/15/90	(b)(1)	✓
18. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Hawke of Australia (4 pp.)	11/15/90	(b)(1)	✓
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Chaim Herzog of Israel (2 pp.)	11/16/90	(b)(1)	✓

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
20. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	11/20/90	(b)(1)	φ
21. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Gaviria of Colombia (2 pp.)	11/23/90	(b)(1)	φ
22. Telcon	Re: Presidential Phone Call to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	φ
23. Telcon	Re: Presidential Phone Call to President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	φ
24. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	φ
25. Telcon	Re: Presidential Phone Call to the Amir of Kuwait (2 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	φ
26. Telcon	Re: Telcon with John Major, Prime Minister of the UK on November 30, 1990 (3 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	φ
27. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Turkish President Turgut Ozal (4 pp.)	12/1/90	(b)(1)	φ
28. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (2 pp.)	12/2/90	(b)(1)	φ
29. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (3 pp.)	12/17/90	(b)(1)	φ

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30. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada on December 24, 1990 (2 pp.)	12/24/90	(b)(1)	S
31. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain on December 24, 1990 (2 pp.)	12/24/90	(b)(1)	C
32. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	12/24/90	(b)(1)	S
33. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Michel Rocard of France (1 pp.)	12/24/90	(b)(1)	C
34. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	12/28/90	(b)(1)	S
35. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (3 pp.)	12/31/90	(b)(1)	C
36. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (3 pp.)	12/31/90	(b)(1)	S
37. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (3 pp.)	12/31/90	(b)(1)	C
38. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan on December 31, 1990 (2 pp.)	12/31/90	(b)(1)	C

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

#8151

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon to President Francois Mitterrand of France
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: October 11, 1990, 3:41-4:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, comment allez-vous? (U)

President Mitterrand: Fine. (U)

The President: I am calling on a matter of great importance for me and I would ask you to let me present my thoughts fully before you respond. I think the current situation is vital for the resolution of the Gulf crisis. You had asked that the U.S. show flexibility regarding a resolution on the tragic events of October 8 in Jerusalem. We now have a tough resolution, with support from the Soviet Union and United Kingdom -- it is tough but balanced. My appeal is that the Permanent Five demonstrate unity among themselves so as to ensure that the text gets proper consideration by the Security Council. (S)

I understand that your representative is continuing to lean towards the NAM resolution. If so, this will split the Permanent Five and thus the Security Council. I fear that the NAM delegations will hide behind this split to push for the NAM resolution. If this goes on to the point that a veto by the U.S. is required, it would be damaging to our position in the Gulf. We must not let Saddam Hussein get away with putting the focus on the Palestinian problem. Without intending it, the NAM resolution has this effect. (S)

I knew we would face a challenge from the PLO, since it is so pro-Saddam Hussein. Candidly, I am feeling considerable political pressure at home because of our attempt to get a resolution strongly condemning Israel. I don't like to do this, and I normally don't, but I am making a strong personal appeal to you to support the British text. You know that, a few weeks ago, we wanted to support your resolution, but the moment was not opportune. It is important to focus attention back where it belongs. The Saudis, the Egyptians, and the Soviets will go

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along with the British resolution. I know that you have influence on Zaire and on other countries. Working together, we can get this resolution through. (S)

President Mitterrand: Our representative at the UN expresses the opinion of France based on our instructions. Foreign Minister Dumas told me two hours ago that the NAM had withdrawn its text, but he also feels that the U.S. text is very weak. It has two key parts. The first part condemns the violence. The second part simply observes that the Secretary General will be going to Israel. I personally found the text rather soft. Saddam Hussein's main strategy is to mobilize Arab opinion against the Israelis. If the Israelis commit such a blatant error as to fire with live ammunition at the Palestinians, this gives Saddam Hussein a very strong argument. It is, therefore, essential that the Israeli action be clearly condemned. (S)

The President: Exactly. (U)

President Mitterrand: Can you read me the text of your resolution? (S)

The President: (Reads the text of the resolution.) This third paragraph represents a major departure by the U.S. The NAM wants to talk about dealing with the Israeli-occupied territories and this would permit Saddam Hussein to link his invasion of Kuwait with the Palestinian issue. It is on this one point that I am making my appeal to you. We, and you also, want to avoid this linkage. (S)

President Mitterrand: I understand. The best way to proceed is for me to return to my office and to read the texts, since I do not have them with me. Then I will call you back in half an hour. (S)

The President: I am very sorry that you will need to go back to the office, but it is important to get a good resolution of this issue. (S)

President Mitterrand: Going back to the office at this time is the least of my concerns. Is it all right to call you back in half an hour? (S)

The President: Absolutely, any time of the day or night. The sooner the better, since the political pressure in this country is mounting and I do not want to have to veto a Security Council resolution. (S)

End of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon to President Francois Mitterrand of France
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: October 11, 1990, 5:25-5:38 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Francois! (U)

President Mitterrand: Good evening once again. I have looked over the text, in English. I have two points. One is on the paragraph that requests the Secretary General to present a report in connection with his visit to Israel, and the other is on the paragraph expressing condemnation for the violence of October 8. (Reads the text, in halting English.) (S)

The President: It is on the language that deals with the Secretary General making a "recommendation on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of Palestinians under Israeli occupation" where we disagree with that text. That is the NAM paragraph. (S)

President Mitterrand: We can accept this language, but I also understand that this poses a problem for you, and so I am prepared to drop it. However, on the earlier paragraph expressing condemnation of the violence, there is language which we cannot accept. The British text says "including those committed by Israeli forces". This is not acceptable to me because it implies that the Israeli violence is secondary. In fact, it is the main point of the condemnation, not a subsidiary point. Language like this would pose a domestic political problem for me. Instead, the text ought to say "notably" or "particularly". (S)

The President: Let's make that change. I see what you mean. It makes sense to me; we accept it. Francois, I am very grateful to you. (S)

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President Mitterrand: Each of us shares the same thought even though we have differences on tactics. Our common thought is that we cannot let the Arabs line up behind Saddam Hussein. We are prepared to make war on Saddam Hussein and, therefore, we cannot appear to be indulgent with Israel. (S)

The President: I would like to read the two paragraphs again just to be sure that we understand each other. (Reads both paragraphs.) (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: I will notify our UN representative right away, and if your UN representative gets instructions soon, we should be able to wrap up this resolution quickly. My sincere thanks. (S)

President Mitterrand: I will tell Roland Dumas to send instructions to our UN Ambassador. Good work! (S)

End of Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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2000-0429-F
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
of the United Kingdom on October 12, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of UK
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow

DATE, TIME: October 12, 1990, 7:06 - 7:15pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Fine. Have you had a difficult week?
(U)

The President: A little bit. Sorry to bother you. I'm calling about the UN resolution. Yesterday I called Francois and he agreed to change the French position so it would be the same as the US, UK, and Soviets. We felt they had been holding up the resolution, the British draft. He agreed to change their view. Now the nonaligned countries are stalling. They want to put forward a different resolution. I was hoping you could encourage your representative in New York to use the power of President of the Security Council to move this forward procedurally. (Ø)

What worries me, and I talked to Mubarak about this today, is that the Arab nonaligned and Saddam and the PLO want the Security Council to go mix up Israel with the Gulf. If the nonaligned motion goes in, it will keep the Israeli matter on the same level of concentration as the Gulf. What we think should happen is this: Get a resolution -- it does use the word condemn, a big step for us -- and get it over with. My appeal, if your comfortable, is to get your representative to do everything he can procedurally to get the nonaligned to vote on the US, British, and Soviet agreed text. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Is it our text? (Ø)

The President: Yes ma'am. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I understand that David Hannay thinks he can get our text, which is not perfect, as a compromise. The worst outcome would be for you to veto a resolution. Just before

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you telephoned, I was informed that Hannay thinks he can get the UK resolution taken first. (Ø)

The President: That's what we want. I heard from Jim Baker that the US and the UK are on the same wavelength. We need to have that resolution taken up first. We should not be reluctant to push hard and bowl over the nonaligned text. It needs a shove now. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Hannay should be willing to do that. He would be the first to appreciate the supreme difficulty of your position and that the vital thing is to get ours taken first. Once it gets through, then the nonaligned one won't come up. I heard there were still differences with you over our text. But if it's ok, then fine. (Ø)

The President: Hannay thinks we disagree? (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I thought it had to do with working on the Secretary General's terms of reference. Some strange argument that may not have reached your ears. (Ø)

The President: It certainly has not reached my ears. Jim told me -- and, by the way, he wanted to call Hurd, so that I wouldn't have to bother you, but Hurd was on his way to Egypt -- that the UK and the US were together. The nonaligned had a different vision for the Secretary General's mission. Their text would have the Secretary General stay involved in a way to keep the issue on the active agenda of the Security Council and mix it up with the Gulf. That would be bad for us. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: The nonaligned approach is difficult indeed. We'll get on to Hannay. You accept the UK resolution and you want that one to be put forward procedurally because we're chairman and can probably do that. (Ø)

The President: If Hannay thinks we have a difficulty then I should go back to Baker. I told Mitterrand yesterday, with Baker standing next to me, that there were no differences between the US and the UK. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I heard it is so persnickety and so tiny as not to bother about it. I understand there is still some argument about the Secretary General's mission, whether it should report conclusions or its recommendations. My instinct is, it doesn't matter which it is, we can rely on the Secretary General to do the right thing. (Ø)

The President: If you feel comfortable calling him again, the main thing is to get moving on the UK text. If there are differences, he and Pickering should work it out. The main reason I was calling was to get the nonaligned (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: There are no differences between us at all. (Ø)

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The President: If it goes to a vote, we've got enough working now with Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, Yemen, and now France to make it pass. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'll get to Hannay. We shouldn't bother about these tiny things. It sounds like a typical UN argument. I'll get Hannay to use our procedural advantage to take the UK resolution first. (Ø)

The President: Next week maybe I'll call and give you the overall picture on where we stand. I sent you information on the weather thing. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Certainly. I'll get on to Hannay. (U)

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WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
Notetaker: Eric T. Johnson

DATE, TIME: October 12, 1990, 11:56 - 11:59 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

President: Hello Hosni. (U)

MUBARAK: Hello George. (U)

President: Hosni, I am deeply shocked at the terrible murder of Dr. Mahgoub this morning. I know this is a terrible loss to Israel (sic) and of course the family. Do you know the nationalities of those involved? (U)

Mubarak: Yes, it is a big tragedy. We don't know whether they were Egyptian or an outside nationality, but we are conducting an investigation. (U)

President: Yes, I was going to ask you who did this terrible thing. Give my condolences and Barbara's to the family of Dr. Mahgoub and the families of the bodyguards. On this other matter, and I'm sorry to bring it up at this sad time, but the UN Security Council resolution - we have a strong resolution; the Five permanent members are together, including France. I called Mitterrand and he feels the language is strong and good. We just need one vote, maybe Yemen, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Cuba - well we can forget Cuba - or Zaire. If you can help us with just one country, then we can get this thing separated from the Gulf Crisis. (Ø)

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Mubarak: Yes, I said this yesterday. (U)

President: Do you have any influence with any of them. Zaire? Yemen? Yemen is probably mad at you. (Ø)

Mubarak: We will try with Mobutu in Zaire. Butros Ghali knows him very well. (Ø)

President: Well, I was thinking of Yemen. I was thinking of calling Saleh. You know Yemen voted once for us. I know you are being helpful but is there anything else you can do to get the PLO to back away from their draft? I would like to see this thing wrapped up now; it has dragged on too long. (Ø)

Mubarak: Okay. I will see what I can do. I am going to do it now. Thanks for the condolences. (Ø)

President: Stay in touch. (U)

Mubarak: I will. Thanks to you. (U)

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8324

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME: October 17, 1990, 9:19 - 9:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President placed the call at Chancellor Kohl's initiation.
(U)

The President: Helmut! How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good, thank you. Thank you for the message concerning the attempt on the life of Minister Schaeuble. Thank you for your sympathy. I am calling to ask how you are. I have nothing special in mind except to express my sympathy that you have to resolve quite a number of issues. I always thought it is good to have a friendly word of support. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. How do you see the Gulf situation from the point of view of public opinion in Germany? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Hopes continue that this will not become a shooting war. We feel some pressure. There is the problem of dependents of Germans there. Messages have been sent to me saying that we should make some gesture, on the possibility that some Germans could be released. We will not do this. It would be outside the common policy of nations standing together. (Ø)

The President: How many hostages do you have? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: We don't know exactly. It is more than 300. Nevertheless, this is not a price we are going to pay. If we did, it would all be over. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. My problem is that this man continues to brutalize Kuwait and take it over. This is a new ingredient, and it has us very concerned. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. It cannot be permitted. (Ø)

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The President: You are doing well in the elections in eastern Germany. Congratulations. The CDU did better than expected in public opinion. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: The public is essentially the journalists from the press. For 20 years the majority of the journalists have been against me. (Ø)

The President: True. We've had the majority against us for a long time. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: It is something one has to put up with. We are working a gut issue, a very difficult issue on agriculture. We need to resolve this. I think maybe we should continue contacts through our staffs before we meet. On the occasion of your visit to Germany, we could talk about this. I am looking forward to welcoming you and Barbara. (Ø)

The President: Fine. Do you have a feeling about where we ought to go or not go? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That depends on what period of time you have in mind for the visit. (Ø)

The President: It would probably be very short, unfortunately. I will be jumping around, ending up visiting our troops. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: For that reason, we thought of Ramstein, which has one of the biggest concentrations of U.S. soldiers. From there it is only a few minutes to my house. (Ø)

The President: Let me ask that Horst and Brent stay in touch. The main thing is that I look forward to seeing you. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: We will find a good solution. (U)

The President: You blurred out a few minutes ago, so I want to return to the Uruguay Round. We have put forward new, more flexible agricultural proposals and also a more flexible textile proposal. I hope you can get the EC to give a little, also. We must have a successful Round, including meaningful agricultural reform, which is also important to the Third World. So may I urge you, if possible, to persuade the EC to be a little more flexible. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: We want to be helpful, so there will not be a rift about it. We will have to work it out now and not wait until December. (Ø)

The President: We will be in touch. Thank you for your thoughtful call. We will get our budget sorted out; don't worry about it. But it is good, as you said, to hear from a friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THATCHER

OCT 18 - PRESIDENT INITIATED SECURE CALL TO
UK THATCHER. MONITORED BY GENERAL SCOWCROFT.
FIRST CALL ON NEW SECURE, HEAD-OF-STATE. INITIATED
1330 - TERMINATED 1402

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8499

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME: October 24, 1990; 9:41 a.m.-10:04 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Well, how are you, Mr. President? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you. (U)

The President: I'm glad to hear from you. (U)

President Ozal: Everything is fine. I hope you will solve your budget problem today. (U)

The President: It is very difficult. Some members of my own party are in rebellion. We're having a big political fight. But we will not let it divert us from supporting our interests in the Gulf. What is your latest thinking on the Gulf? (U)

President Ozal: I visited the region from 13-18 October. I saw King Fahd, Sheikh Zayed, the Emir of Qatar, Mubarak and President Assad of Syria. I had long talks with all of them. It was a good visit and I think it gave them courage. Some of them hate Saddam very much. (U)

There are maybe some differences among the Arabs. First, in the Gulf area -- the Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia--they want to see a fast solution to the crisis, a speedy solution. I said yes we want a fast solution too but give us time so that the embargo will yield results. I said the embargo is biting Saddam. So give President Bush the time if he wants it. Second, Egypt and Syria understand that we must wait for the embargo to get results. The two groups were different in that respect. (U)

Mubarak is still angry with King Hussein and Saddam Hussein and he suspects there was some kind of understanding between them when they formed the ACC-the Arab Cooperation Council. He thinks King Hussein and Saddam Hussein planned the new organization to isolate Egypt and prevent it from making a move in the region. (U)

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After my trip, I sent a special representative to Iran to see Rafsanjani about my discussions in the Middle East and to give my impressions. This went well, and I am also going to see Rafsanjani on 10 November on my way to Japan for the coronation. (S)

The President: Our Vice President will be there. (C)

President Ozal: Good. I'll see him. (U)

The President: He'll have my latest sentiments. (U)

President Ozal: I'll give Rafsanjani my views. I'll be there for four hours. As you can see, we're trying to strengthen the coalition. (C)

The President: What are Rafsanjani's views on the U.S. and on sanctions. (C)

President Ozal: On sanctions, they are hard, as far as we understand. There is the possibility of smuggling on the border. There are good profits there so people do it but it doesn't amount to much. The same is true for the Syrian border with Iraq, but again it is not a big amount. (C)

The President: Did Rafsanjani share his thoughts on U.S.-Iranian relations? (C)

President Ozal: On U.S.-Iran, we relayed what you told us. Your Ambassador gave me a note about it. They have not answered the note. They just listened. (S)

The President: Okay. Well, that is very interesting. I appreciate very much Turkey's support on this issue. (C)

On the Gulf conflict, I haven't changed my views. I don't think we can have any concessions. The Saudi statement surprised us but we have been assured it was not accurate. (C)

President Ozal: My friend, the press is always looking for a story. They helped Saddam with this news. When I heard the Saudi statement, I thought it was strange. But Fahd was clear. He wants to almost hang Saddam Hussein he is so angry with him. Before this happened, they wanted to solve the problems between Kuwait and Iraq by dialogue. (S)

Let me tell you that Saddam Hussein is trying to crack the coalition. If he sees any light, he will jump in. I told them in Saudi Arabia to keep a hard line, not give up anything and continue to insist the UN resolutions be fulfilled. (C)

The President: I couldn't agree more. Your support has been pivotal. Mrs. Thatcher has been pivotal. Some thought the French would waver, but they have been solid. The GCC is solid and Egypt has been too. (C)

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President Ozal: Yes, Syria has also been solid. We're trying to improve relations with the Syrians. (Ø)

The President: I'm worried about the UN and the West Bank problem. (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes, there is a problem there. Some Israelis think that after the crisis you'll try to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. (Ø)

The President: At the UN, I made reference to trying to solve the problem but I am determined not to link the two. That would divide the coalition. Eventually, we have to be as helpful as we possibly can to solve that problem. My words helped but they also caused concern in some countries. (Ø)

President Ozal: I said the same thing. We can't link the problems but can try to solve the Arab-Israeli after the crisis. (Ø)

The President: This is very important in order to keep the coalition together. Let's stay in close touch on it. (U)

President Ozal: Are your deployments over? (Ø)

The President: No, we are still sending troops. They are not all in place. We'll continue. We have good forces there, especially in air power. We have to give sanctions, as you say, time to work. (Ø)

I'll have you briefed on the deployment and will have that done in private and will give you our military thinking. (Ø)

Another worry, and I'm greatly concerned about it is our Embassy and this guests policy. I'm very concerned about the strain on our Embassy in Kuwait. (Ø)

President Ozal: You are right. You should pull out your Embassy people. (Ø)

The President: That would be a problem. We have non-diplomats there and we can't send them into captivity. There are 30-35 people in the Embassy and two thirds of them are non-diplomats. That is something an American President cannot stand for. Those in Kuwait are a worry for me, a big worry. (Ø)

President Ozal: Altogether you have forty people in Kuwait? (Ø)

The President: Less in the Embassy. But there are more in hiding from that butcher. The ones in the Embassy are protected by our flag. If we pull out, it would leave them defenseless. I couldn't do something like that. (Ø)

President Ozal: Can you get any UNSC decision on this? (Ø)

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The President: We are trying to work in the UN. There are resolutions pending on food relief. (Ø)

President Ozal: Reparations too. (Ø)

The President: The agenda has been sidetracked by the Israeli resolution and Jerusalem. The UN is diverted now. We're still interested in more UN support for the crisis. We may want special support for military action someday. We may need that. (Ø)

President Ozal: It would not be vetoed. Some countries might not vote for it, but they wouldn't veto. (Ø)

The President: Maybe. We want to get it done in the UN and we'll stay in close touch. (U)

President Ozal: There are one hundred Iraqi soldiers on our border. They fled to Turkey. We are holding them in a camp. (Ø)

The President: What do they think of Saddam? (Ø)

President Ozal: They all say the army will desert at the start of a war. They also don't want to fight Turkey and Syria in a war. (Ø)

The President: They speak for a lot of Iraqis. (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes, we heard the same thing from Mubarak. He knows the Iraqi army well. The Egyptians helped in training. He thinks the army won't hold together. (Ø)

The President: That is a very interesting question. There is a lot of debate on that here. We have to plan for the worst case but I am interested in this point. (Ø)

President Ozal: I believe Saddam is using the hostages who are being released to create a good impression. We have to be very careful. (Ø)

The President: He is very brutal and is playing with human lives. (Ø)

President Ozal: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Thank you. Please, when you see the Vice President, share with him the Iran link. That is a good private channel. I would appreciate that. (Ø)

President Ozal: Okay. I will do that. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Thank you again. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow

DATE, TIME: October 24, 1990, 1:44 - 1:52pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Prime Minister Mulroney: I wanted to call and congratulate you on the passage of the Clean Air Act. Thank you for your strong stand and consistent leadership. (U)

The President: I appreciate your calling. It was a long struggle. I'm glad it is resolved. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Well it was due to your leadership in the Oval Office. I know it and so does everyone else. (U)

The President: It clears the way for work on other things between us. (U)

What are your thoughts on other subjects, like the Gulf? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Derek was in to see Brent about our preparations. We are prepared to support necessary action. (U)

I'm intrigued by this release of French nationals. I wonder what moved Saddam to take that step. We had a situation where one of our members of parliament, a Conservative of long standing with ties in the Arab world, was invited to meet with Saddam. His name is Robert Corbett, Member of Parliament for New Brunswick. He was told that, as a result of his visit, Canadians would be freed. I killed the visit. I did not want Canadian MPs in Baghdad trying to get Canadians out while others are left there. But I'm mystified now by seeing everyone from Ted Heath onward going there. (U)

The President: The Iraqis are talking to everybody. We just had a Quaker delegation go there. Saddam's trying to get a little high ground in public relations. I'm concerned because these efforts highlight the propaganda nature of all of this. The

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French have denied vigorously giving any quid pro quo. They've gone out of their way to reassure us about all of that. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: In free societies I know it is hard to put the kibosh on things. Maybe Jim should tell our allies that, look, we're all being approached to be used as pawns by Saddam and unless we have a united approach we can get cut off at the knees. Americans are going out there and British are going out there, and I wonder what the hell is going on. (Ø)

The President: Of course we can't control individual citizens. It is propaganda. I can urge members of Congress not to go, but I think we'll see more left-wing leaders, perhaps like Jesse Jackson, going and bringing home a straggle of hostages here or there. We will continue to resist piecemeal pawn playing that plays right into Saddam's hands. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Have you picked up any new signal how Saddam might be thinking, whether to sit down and talk rather than fight? (Ø)

The President: Jim Baker is sitting right here; we've received no signal on their willingness to talk. The Saudis, having overstated their position, are now going to great lengths to pull back, to make clear the Prince didn't say what he said. I don't see a great new offensive, except through Tariq Aziz and others saying they want to talk. But each time they reiterate that they won't give up one inch of Kuwait. Some people say give 'em an island, or an election, or access to the sea. Once you start that, you start unraveling a strong coalition. I'm glad to have this chat. I'll talk to Jim about the idea of circulating the thought to beware of Saddam in sending people over there. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: It just damages the solidarity of the alliance. If Jim would like, in confidence, to use the Canadian example -- where they made clear that if he went Canadians would be freed, Jim would be free to do so. (Ø)

The President: Thanks. The name was, again? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Robert Corbett, Member of Parliament. (Ø)

The President: I'm glad you called. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: One last word. You've got an approval rating higher than any freely elected ruler in the world today. It's equal to several others of us put together. Coming from someone with all the scars, let me urge you not to change your approach and your style. Just ride it through. Do what you're doing -- to hell with it. There is a deep well of admiration for you here and in the States. (Ø)

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt
Notetaker: John Montgomery

DATE, TIME: October 25, 1990; 1:32 - 1:39 P.M. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello Hosni, how's the world traveler? (U)

President Mubarak: Hello, I just got here ten minutes ago. (U)

The President: I just wanted to talk to you to get a sense of how your trip went and before you meet with Primakov (special envoy for Gorbachev). I just spoke with King Fahd and had a good talk and feel that despite some earlier confusion, we are pretty much together, don't you? (U)

President Mubarak: Yes, I spoke with King Fahd about his statement and think he gave a very good statement. (U)

The President: I also was calling to report to you that we have made some progress on the FMS debt cancellation. Last night, the Senate passed their version of the Foreign Aid bill, with a provision for the cancellation; the next stage is a conference committee to reach a compromise with the House. I am pleased with what the Senate has done and will keep on fighting. (U)

President Mubarak: Thank you. (U)

The President: On the Gulf crisis, I see a lot of maneuvering by Saddam but apparently no change in the substance of his position that Kuwait is part of Iraq. He's trying to split the international coalition by giving out hostages. They called a Canadian parliament member and said if you come over you will go home with hostages. They did the same with Genscher and Heath trying to divide us and parcel out these people in such a brutal way. On Primakov, I had a very candid and frank discussion with him and sent a very candid message to Gorbachev. I told them that going to Saddam with proposals that suggest what we would be prepared to do after withdrawal would indeed violate the basic principle of no concessions. Primakov said he understood. I wanted you to know I didn't show any flexibility and I've told Gorbachev the same thing. You know Saddam could present such a

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face saving approach as a reward. This is not the time to show any willingness to let him off the hook. I wanted you to know what I said to Primakov before you see him. Lastly, I am planning to send Jim Baker out early next month to see you, King Fahd, and others in the coalition about the next steps. We've got some good ideas but I can't talk about them on this phone. (C)

President Mubarak: Primakov just met with my aide, and he (Osama el-Baz) told him there can be no rewards for Saddam. The second point was that there will be no negotiations before an unconditional withdrawal and the return of the legitimate government of Kuwait. I am going to take the same line. Afterwards, we could help in the negotiations, but to give him any reward for this could be very dangerous. (C)

The President: I'm delighted to hear your aide told him that. Primakov is a good man. We were impressed but he thinks he knows the area and maybe he does. We need the Soviets, they've been very good and I think they'll stay on the line. (C)

President Mubarak: I'm going to convince Primakov to be aligned with us on the situation. He should not separate with us. (C)

The President: How do you think the sanctions are working? (C)

President Mubarak: I think they're very good right now. (C)

The President: I'm more optimistic. They have imposed gas rationing and there are reports of machine parts shortages. (C)

President Mubarak: He's getting in a much more difficult position now. (C)

The President: We must stay together and in touch. Any time you want to call, day or night, do so. (U)

President Mubarak: I will call you after I meet with Primakov. (U)

The President: Will you apologize to your beautiful wife for me. I saw her across the room at the UN but didn't get a chance to say hello. They rushed me out to some damn meeting. (U)

President Mubarak: She told me she saw you. (U)

The President: Well, I send her 1,000 apologies. Good bye and take care. (U)

President Mubarak: Good bye. (U)

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Call to King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME October 25, 1990; 12:50 - 1:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office.

The President initiated the call to King Fahd.

The President: Your Majesty, how are you today? (U)

King Fahd: I am glad to speak with you. (U)

The President: I am glad to speak with you too. I am calling to say I am pleased that Saudi Arabia's policy of steadfastness and strength about Iraq has not changed. I feel more strongly than ever that Saddam's aggression should not be rewarded. It would be a terrible precedent for other aggressors should he acquire territory or get another concession before he does what the UN calls on him to do. Your statement was terrific. And I will do my best to insure that there are no rifts, no divisions in this strong, international coalition. (Ø)

Ozal of Turkey told me of his good conversations with you. And I am looking forward to seeing Colin Powell and hearing about what he found. Again, we appreciate all the generous support we are getting. I feel it is important to get the rest of the U.S., Egyptian, and Syrian troops there as soon as possible. (Ø)

I am going to ask, with your permission, that Secretary Baker come consult with you early next month to be sure we are together on our ultimate objective. On Ozal, he is as strong as he can be, and on the same wavelength as you and I are on. He still is concerned about the economic impact of the sanctions, particularly on oil, and would appreciate whatever help can be provided there. (Ø)

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I am still shocked by the horrible reports of the brutality against Kuwait, the uncivilized, unprincipled behavior by Iraq and the way he is treating American, Kuwaiti, and other hostages. It is brutal, terrible. (Ø)

Again, the real reason for this call is simply to say thank you. I am comfortable we are on the same course, and grateful for the hospitality being shown to our young people in the Kingdom. Thank you very much. (Ø)

King Fahd: First, let me assure you our position in Saudi Arabia is the same as the United States. It has not changed; it cannot be changed, and it will not change. Let me assure you, Mr. President, that no one in the world can influence or sway us in this. I am pleased to receive Secretary Baker and will expect him. (Ø)

The President: He will be reflecting my views about what we must do in the future. Before I hang up, I had one question: what affect do you think the sanctions are having right now? (Ø)

King Fahd: First, they have had a good effect, a very good effect. This is based on reports we are receiving from Iraq that they have had an effect on the Iraqi economy and the people of Iraq. With regard to Ozal, we will do everything we can to reassure him and to make him feel comfortable. (Ø)

The President: It was nice talking to you. I hope I will be seeing you one of these days. If you see any problem, anything from the United States, please just pick up the phone anytime day or night and give me a call. I am determined to stay in close touch with you, and I would welcome a call any time, so please feel free to keep in touch. (Ø)

King Fahd: I would like to assure you that the people of Saudi Arabia stand in solidarity behind me; there are no problems. (Ø)

The President: That's wonderful. Good-bye and my respects to all. (U)

King Fahd: Good-bye. I hope to see you soon. Many thanks. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME October 26, 1990, 4:10 - 4:22 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Helmut! How are you, my friend? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good, thank you. Are you in California?
(U)

The President: Yes, out doing some politics, just ahead of our
Congressional elections. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good luck. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. I am calling on a couple of
things. First, I was very pleased with your reaction to Saddam
Hussein's propaganda ploy with the hostages. He is handing these
people out. Your strong position sets the right example. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I will not give in. Tomorrow we will discuss
this at the EC Summit. I will make sure we arrive at a just
principle, and also ensure that all of us ask for the release of
all hostages, not just our own nationals. Any idea how things
are going? (Ø)

The President: We believe that the sanctions are starting to
work, and now more than ever we need to stand united and firm for
an unconditional withdrawal. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I am wondering whether we shouldn't
internationally increase the pressure concerning the hostages.
(Ø)

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The President: I agree -- perhaps through the UN. And the UN should take action on reparations. He is holding hostages and also embassies. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I wonder tomorrow at the EC Summit if we could make some urgent statement demanding the immediate release of all hostages. (Ø)

The President: That's a good idea. On another matter, we are trying to keep the Israel matter separate from the issue of the Gulf, in order not to break up the coalition we have on the Gulf issue. Saddam Hussein is trying to mix the two together. My concern is that if the EC calls for a conference on Palestine, it will have the result of breaking the coalition on the Gulf and of emphasis being shifted to an old issue that has been around for a long time. Of course we have to resolve that issue as well, but we should not mix it up with the Gulf. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I won't do it. Once we have gotten over the Iraq crisis, we have to take the next step and do something about the Palestinian Question. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. I am not ruling out an international conference, but not now. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I'll represent matters tomorrow accordingly, in the way we have talked. At a later time we will have to tackle the Palestinian Question. (Ø)

The President: I agree. One other thing: following our telephone conversation, I sent a letter on the Uruguay Round. I know it is complicated for you, but I hope you will look into it. We have to have agreement at that Round. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I got the letter today, George. I read it with a great level of attention. My position is that we Germans are very interested in a successful GATT round -- interested because we are big exporters, interested for reasons of the Third World, and also interested because we support free trade. Our problem is that the issue has to be resolved within the EC. Today we talked about this with the British Foreign Secretary. I told him we will have to work hard on that in November, because there is no way to delay the December deadline. The issue is very difficult for us because of difficulties for German farmers, but I am going to try to arrive at a sensible middle ground. I will give it my personal attention. Last night there was a meeting in Brussels of the six Christian Democratic heads of government in the EC. We agreed that the six of us would work together. But

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we don't want to do this in Rome. We have to make preparations. But I am fully aware of all your problems and will surely call you within the next 10 days. (P)

The President: Thank you. I think we are thinking broadly together. I don't know where we stand on my trip, but I look forward to seeing you soon. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: I am looking forward very much, too. I will see you soon, and before that I will definitely be in touch. (P)

The President: Thank you.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME October 26, 1990, 4:27 - 4:40 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Ruud, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Excellent. How are you? (U)

The President: Good. I am out in California, but I wanted to call on two matters. I just wanted to say that I was glad you did not fall into Saddam Hussein's propaganda ploy with the hostages. He is handing these people out like candy, and we should have no part of it. We had some groups go out there, but there was no government role. Hans van den Broek's rejection of the idea of travelling to Baghdad sets a wonderful example. Mulroney told me he had the same offer from Iraq. So did Hans-Dietrich Genscher. So I wanted to congratulate you for your stand. (L)

The other item is that we have a lot of work ahead of us, and not much time, if we are to have a successful Uruguay Round. It is important that we make real progress on agriculture. I worry that if we don't, protectionism will get a new lease on life. We have put forward more flexible positions, and I hope you will do all you can to persuade the EC to do the same. (L)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I agree with you. We have a problem over here. We have a mandate, which is not just our position. The FRG is dragging its feet. I expected it of the French but not the Germans. (L)

The President: I was told that. I just called Kohl, who said he would help. The last point: on the EC meeting, it is my strong

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hope that the EC does not pass a resolution on the Middle East that will blend the Gulf situation together with the Palestine Question. Some day there will be a Palestine conference, which the U.S. will support, but I believe that Saddam Hussein is trying to negate the pressure against him by bringing in the Palestinian issue so the coalition will fall apart. So I wanted to urge you not to go along with any EC call. That's my appeal. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: There is a risk going around in Europe - a real risk with the Italians and the French. Kohl understands we can't link the two. We discussed the issue here in a Cabinet meeting. We will take a firm position not to go along. (C)

The President: Good. I'll talk to Andreotti in a few minutes. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: One other thing: on the oil problem, we have to think further after the Gulf crisis. I don't know how you feel, but I think it would be worthwhile to talk about new links between oil suppliers and oil consumers, between the Arabs and ourselves -- not now, but at a certain point this link could avoid new tensions in the future. (C)

The President: I'd be interested in hearing your views. I haven't thought about that particular issue, but I think you are right. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I handed you a paper once on energy cooperation. The Russians are interested. We are not looking for a mechanism to fix prices, but to eliminate the extreme fluctuations -- specifically between IEA and OPEC. I think this idea will get more and more support, at least in Europe. It is better than linking the Gulf situation to Jerusalem and the West Bank and all that. (C)

The President: It is true in the Arab world, with the tensions between the haves and the have nots. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: And in the Third World, too. So I have a feeling this idea will come again. (C)

The President: I'm interested in knowing more. Let's stay in touch. Will you discuss this in the EC? (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We will very carefully discuss it. We want to avoid the idea that we are trying to fix prices. The second risk is that this would be viewed as the solution to the Gulf. It is not that. (C)

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The President: I appreciate the talk. I'll give Andreotti a call. It might help. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We will work together. Give my best to Bar. (U)

The President: Will do. Thanks, Ruud. It was nice talking with you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Giulio
Andreotti of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Sim Smiley

DATE, TIME October 26, 1990, 4:45 - 4:59 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Giulio. How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Fine, thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I am out doing politics in California. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: It is down to the last ten days. I wish you luck. (U)

The President: Thank you. I would like to raise two matters with you. The first relates to my letter to you on the Uruguay Round. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, I received it yesterday. (U)

The President: I know I sound like a broken record, but I want to reiterate my strong hope that real progress can be made on reforming agricultural trade, because without such reform, in my view, the prospects for the entire Uruguay Round are in jeopardy. And, of course, agriculture is the main stumbling block. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I can give you some information. There was a meeting in Luxembourg among agricultural ministers of the 12. As current President of the EC, we made a new proposal, which we think reasonable. However, agreement has not been reached yet. Ministers will meet again next Monday. Tomorrow morning I will meet with our agriculture minister, since tomorrow evening there is a meeting with President Mitterrand and the 12

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heads of state. I will recommend that they give their ministers instructions to agree. (Ø)

The President: That sounds encouraging. I appreciate your leadership on that. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, and I will commit myself so that this agreement will be reached. (Ø)

The President: Fine. Let me raise another matter, relating to the situation in the Gulf. I think that sanctions are working and that we are succeeding despite Saddam's persistent efforts to change the focus and weaken the coalition against him. The coalition is staying pretty strong, and I think this has his attention. One thing worries me: that is linking Palestine and the Gulf. That's what Saddam Hussein is trying to do. This brings me to the possibility that at the EC Summit there might be a resolution calling for an international conference right now. I have long felt that such a conference could be constructive if the timing was right and it was structured properly. But I am very worried that if we push now, the timing is all wrong. It would give Saddam Hussein just what he is looking for. It would weaken our coalition in the Gulf. We cannot be seen to be rewarding him by linking his aggression against Kuwait with the Israeli-Arab problem. I also don't think there is any reason to reward the PLO at a time when it is supporting Saddam and working against our common interests in the Gulf. I think we may well want to return to the conference idea once the Gulf situation is behind us, but I worry that a call now would weaken our coalition. I ask you to use your influence to keep the EC from issuing such a resolution. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I agree. Tomorrow the EC will make two proposals. We have to follow and support the thesis of what you declared at the UN: that is, we cannot create a simultaneous linkage between Kuwait and the Palestinian Question. Right now we must solve the Kuwait problem but remain committed to solving other problems afterwards. I think this is very clear. In my text, I will use the same words you used, Mr. President. The other point I will make is that the 12 must not treat the hostage question as countries like France have done. We must launch an appeal to Saddam Hussein that all hostages should be freed, with no discrimination because of nationality. We will also reconfirm our full commitment to the UN resolutions. We must tell the Palestinians that their cause will not be defended by Saddam Hussein but by everyone. (Ø)

The President: I couldn't agree more. Today you made a fine statement. Thank you very, very much. Once again, Giulio, you

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and I seem to be together on these important questions. I am very grateful. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Very good. I wish you all the best. (U)

The President: Okay. Good luck on your meeting. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANT: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME: October 27, 1990; 2:24 - 2:31 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Mubarak initiated the call.

The President: Hosni, how are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Very well, George. I met with Primakov. (U)

The President: How did it go? (U)

President Mubarak: I will tell you all of it. I impressed on him our conclusion that the only way to avoid military action is for Iraq to accept to withdraw totally and unconditionally. The aggression should never be rewarded. I told him that the Soviet Union must avoid the impression of a wedge between it and the United States. There is no direct linkage, I said, between the Gulf and other Middle Eastern issues; otherwise, both would not be solved. Regarding the Palestinian problem, all he can say is that he will consult with the United States. (Ø)

The President: That is very encouraging. (U)

President Mubarak: I was very straight with him. You are an expert; you know these guys, I said. If you support them, then you will have a problem with all the Arabs. Primakov said Assad had proposed an Arab League summit, which would call for Iraq to withdraw. I said that we had done this before, so a summit is of no use. But if he accepts total withdrawal, then we will have a summit to ask for it as a facesaver. I told him to tell Saddam Hussein that the United States is hard as a wall and for military action. He agreed. He was to go to Baghdad at seven this morning, but Tariq Aziz called to say that as they were supporting the United States at the U.N., he shouldn't come. I also sent a message to Mitterrand today. He is seeing Gorbachev today. (Ø)

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The President: The EC met today. Their statement was important.
(Ø)

President Mubarak: He (Primakov) will hear the same thing from King Fahd. (Ø)

The President: I'm very grateful to you. All the coalition partners will be grateful. Jim Baker will talk to you about where we are and where we go. There are lots of ideas, in direct accord with what you say. Your talk with Primakov was very helpful. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I was very clear with him. He understood well. (Ø)

The President: He seems like a nice man, who thinks he knows the area well. What he heard, coming from you, was important. (Ø)

President Mubarak: He is going to Saudi Arabia tomorrow. I will inform King Fahd of what I said. (Ø)

The President: He made a good statement. (U)

President Mubarak: Yes, he did. (U)

The President: Well, I'm off to do some more campaigning. See you soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME October 31, 1990; 11:04-11:14 a.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: I am fine, thank you. (U)

The President: I am calling in the spirit of our cooperation on the Gulf issue. I wanted to give you advance notice of my intention to travel to the Middle East in mid-November after the Paris CSCE meeting. I am going to visit the American troops to give visible support to our policy of maintaining very strong sanctions against Iraq. Because I have been so pleased by your magnificent cooperation, I wanted you to hear this from me first.
(S)

There is another question. You graciously invited me to come to Turkey. The last American President to visit Turkey, and you reminded me of this when we last met, was Eisenhower. What I want, if it is okay with you, is to come to Turkey after the signing of the START agreement in Moscow in January 1991. I would stop by Greece too. I want to know if you can agree to that plan. Also, I think we should carve out time in Paris at CSCE for you and I to have a good, substantive talk. That is essential. I would like to announce my intention to visit Turkey after our meeting in Paris. (U)

President Ozal: What I understand is that you will visit us after Moscow in January 1991. Will you visit Greece? (U)

The President: Yes, after Turkey. Is that okay? (U)

President Ozal: That is okay. (U)

The President: I had been thinking of coming to see you after Paris in November, but the schedule is terrible and I don't want to stop for just a few hours. (U)

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President Ozal: Okay. January is good for us. That is better. You have to visit your troops in the Gulf now. We will talk in Paris. (Ø)

The President: Yes. I want to have a good bilateral in Paris. I would announce my visit to Turkey. The only question is the exact dates for Moscow. (Ø)

President Ozal: Okay, Mr. President. That suits us. You will announce the visit and will say that we do not know exactly when it will be, but that you will come. (Ø)

The President: Definitely. (U)

I have a few comments on the Gulf situation. When we last talked, we had a very useful discussion of the sanctions. As you know Secretary Baker will be coming to Ankara next week. (Ø)

President Ozal: I know. I will see him. (U)

The President: I am pleased you will see him. He will fill you in on the details of our military strategy and will answer any questions you have. Please speak as frankly to him as you would to me. He'll want to ask you certain questions that he, Brent Scowcroft and I have been discussing in the last few days. We will need to know your views on these very important questions. (S)

President Ozal: Are these mostly military matters or political/military issues? (S)

The President: Both. They involve the military, sanctions, how to have a peaceful resolution. We have to think of the military options -- what happens if there is provocation. It will be a wide-ranging discussion. We will not ask for anything and will not make any demands on you. We want to talk to the two to three critical coalition partners, of which Turkey is one, to get your views. And we will give you our views. (S)

President Ozal: I will talk to Secretary Baker. (Ø)

The President: What is your latest thinking on sanctions? (Ø)

President Ozal: Sanctions will work. I have no doubt about that. It will take time. That may squeeze you because it may take another two to three months to have a big effect. (Ø)

The President: Have you had any more Iraqi deserters? (Ø)

President Ozal: Just a few days ago, we had more than one hundred. (Ø)

The President: I am increasingly worried about the hostages and our Embassy in Kuwait. (S)

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President Ozal: I know, especially about your embassy. (C)

The President: It is a big worry. Secretary Baker will discuss the situation with you. These are sensitive issues and I don't want to go into them on the phone. He will speak to you about them in person. I look forward to seeing you in Paris. (C)

President Ozal: Okay. I would also like to wish you good luck in the elections. (U)

The President: We took a big hit on the deficit. (U)

President Ozal: I think that eventually people will appreciate your firm stand on the deficit. This is the first real effort on the deficit in a decade. (U)

The President: I'm glad you feel that way. I think you watch CNN more than I do! (U)

It was nice talking to you. I look forward to seeing you soon. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NOVEMBER 1990

THATCHER

NOV 4 - PRESIDENT CALLED THATCHER SECURE FROM
HOUSTON, TEXAS AT 0900 - CALL TERMINATED
0916. GATES AND SCOWCROFT MONITORED.

KOHL

NOV 8 - PRESIDENT CALLED GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL.
INITIATED 1338 - TERMINATED 1348. TRANSLATED
BY GISELA MARCUSE; MONITORED BY BENKO. PRES
IN WASHINGTON.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE: November 10, 1990
LOCATION: Camp David
TIME: 12:59-13:08 p.m.

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'm sorry to intrude on a Saturday. I am calling to follow up on a conversation that Derek had with Brent. Its a subject I had also mentioned in New York. I know that the Baker trip is going well and that he's not back yet. (§)

The President: Yes, Mitterrand is holding firm. I have had reports from each stop. (§)

Prime Minister Mulroney: It looks like we are moving inexorably towards war. If so, so be it. We will be there. We will do our share and then some. (§)

The issue I wanted to mention is one that I raised with Perez de Cuellar and with Diouf of Senegal. Mugabe has said that what Saddam Hussein is doing will bankrupt his country. What do you think about the idea of a face-saver in which the poorest Islamic countries would go to Saddam Hussein and tell him: "We know it is not your intention to cripple us, but you are ruining us. We're going down the chute!" They would tell Saddam Hussein that they have no problem with his fighting the U.S., the UK and Canada, but he should not want to hurt his Islamic brothers. Diouf has said that this would be the kind of face-saver that Saddam Hussein would go for. I don't know Saddam Hussein, but Diouf does know him. Diouf likes the idea of the poorest of the poor Muslim countries serving as a face-saver, and believes that Saddam Hussein would buy this. (§)

The President: It's an interesting idea. Let me talk to Baker. I see no harm in it if he does not go off into other concessions. I think this next troop movement that we are making will get Saddam Hussein's attention. I don't think it would hurt to offer

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him a face-saver if it does not affect our resolve. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I will see you in Paris next week. A day or two after I had seen him, Diouf called back and said his idea could work. Diouf stressed that Senegal was our ally in the Gulf and that he had troops there. He said that he had just bought oil on the spot market the previous week at \$43 a barrel, whereas his budget was based on \$16 a barrel. Diouf is afraid that he is going to be overthrown. He is ready to go to Baghdad and give the message. (S)

The President: Has Derek talked to Brent about it? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, but I wanted to make sure that Jim Baker and you were aware of the idea. This was an idea that I mentioned to you at the UN but you were preoccupied with your budget problems, and so I didn't pursue it. (S)

The President: I'll talk to Jim about it. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If war does start, I wouldn't want to have to look back and say "why didn't we try this idea?" The idea doesn't involve us. It would involve Senegal, Bangladesh, and perhaps one other poor Islamic country. They would say to Saddam you are not doing the U.S. a favor, but do yourself a favor and save us. (S)

The President: I know Ershad, who thinks we should move fast in the Gulf, and yet he says he is a friend of Saddam Hussein's. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Congratulations on the Congressional elections. Only a fellow politician knows how good a result that was at mid-term. (S)

The President: Now I am shifting gears to focus more on the economy. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Is the Gulf situation looking worse? (S)

The President: No, I still see solidarity holding. There must be no giving in. The problem is that Saddam Hussein is unpredictable. If the sanctions don't work, we have to be ready to pursue other options. We cannot fail to prevail in this thing. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl
of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl
Stephen Benko, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME November 11, 1990, 1:38 - 1:48 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President:

Chancellor Kohl
with Prime Minister
regards. But
thinking about
elections. We
losing election
for you at the
foundation for

*This call
made on
Nov 8
not 11*

come from a meeting
to convey his best
that I have been
days because of the
ing and sometimes
tly things went well
de you with a solid

The President:
were some per-
example. But
history -- the
Normally the

all. Of course, there
and Texas, for
atter -- we defied
as. We did better.
s. (U)

Chancellor Kohl:

at when I said a solid
foundation. Here in Germany newspapers were full of prophecies
which didn't come true. (U)

The President: Well, I'm very glad you called. Public opinion
is very important because of the enormous problem in the Middle
East, and that's holding up well. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That's exactly what I meant, the importance of
public opinion. It's very important when you look at Boston and
Massachusetts. (U)

The President: That was from the Helmut Kohl speech at Harvard
about how you turn things around. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: (Laughs.) Yes, but it was unprecedented. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl
of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl
Stephen Benko, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME November 11, 1990, 1:38 - 1:48 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Helmut? How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello George. I've just come from a meeting with Prime Minister Mazowiecki. He asked me to convey his best regards. But the real reason for my call is that I have been thinking about you very much in the past few days because of the elections. We are all specialists in winning and sometimes losing elections. I am pleased that apparently things went well for you at the ballot box. It should provide you with a solid foundation for the years to come. (Ø)

The President: It's very sweet of you to call. Of course, there were some personal disappointments, Florida and Texas, for example. But in historical terms, we did better -- we defied history -- than a party in power usually does. We did better. Normally the party in power loses more seats. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That's exactly what I meant when I said a solid foundation. Here in Germany newspapers were full of prophecies which didn't come true. (Ø)

The President: Well, I'm very glad you called. Public opinion is very important because of the enormous problem in the Middle East, and that's holding up well. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That's exactly what I meant, the importance of public opinion. It's very important when you look at Boston and Massachusetts. (Ø)

The President: That was from the Helmut Kohl speech at Harvard about how you turn things around. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: (Laughs.) Yes, but it was unprecedented. (U)

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The President: Exactly. But it was a very good thing for my party if you look at Massachusetts and elsewhere. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I am thinking particularly of the next two years. (U)

The President: Yes. But we have tough economic problems. A recession, if we have a full one, will be over soon, and that will help in 1992. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: The second point I wanted to raise is that on GATT. We now have a basis for discussion. (Ø)

The President: That's good news. I'm not sure I had heard about it. (Ø)

The Chancellor: I do believe we have a good basis. (Ø)

The President: Good. We must break the agricultural deadlock if we are to save the Round. (Ø)

The Chancellor: I hope we'll be able to succeed in working this problem together. The third point I wanted to raise is the Middle East conflict, obviously. (Ø)

The President: We're going forward together. I'll announce very soon that we're sending more forces to the area, as I believe Gerhard Stoltenberg knows. It is a sizable force, and if that doesn't get Hussein's attention and cause him to abide by the UN resolutions, I don't know what will. Maybe we need more UN resolutions. Secretary Baker is talking to various countries about that. I look forward to talking with you about it. We have varying reports of the effectiveness of the sanctions. They are having an effect, but the question is whether it is enough. I continue to worry about the lives and safety and health of the so-called "guests," the hostages in Iraq and Kuwait. This is the one that really plays on my soul, because we are not going to change our policy because of his brutality. What is your latest thinking? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me say first of all, that we totally agree, that one shouldn't give in to that sort of brutality. There is one factor of reaction, which is his reaction to the sanctions once they begin to bite. That is the decisive question. (Ø)

The President: Yes it is. I'm certain that we can't go on forever. That is an unacceptable answer. The stance of the U.S. and around the world is that we can't let it go on forever. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: I look forward to seeing you to talk about it all. I think that not very far from now, on November 18, we'll be seeing each other. (Ø)

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Chancellor Kohl: Let me say that I look very much forward to that visit, and look forward to seeing Barbara too. Is she coming? (U)

The President: She will be, and she looks forward to seeing you and Hannelore. I appreciate your phone call, and am very, very grateful for it. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE: November 15, 1990
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 5:12-5:22 p.m.

The President: We've got a new Clean Air Act. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Congratulations on the signing. You were very persuasive with Congress. (Ø)

The President: The whole thing had a nice feel to it. What's on your mind? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I wanted to talk to you about the Mack Amendment. It involves American controls over subsidiaries of U.S. corporations in Canada. (Ø)

The President: Oh, you mean extraterritoriality? Just between you and me I'm going to veto the whole bill. I plan to do it in the next day or two, but it is still confidential so please keep it to yourself. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I will. How did you get on with Andreotti regarding agricultural subsidies? (Ø)

The President: It was a confrontational meeting. Delors said that the EC was offering more than we realized, but I am skeptical. Delors also had meetings with Baker and Brady and they didn't get too far. He said that Carla was too tough. (Ø)

Prime Minister Hawke called me today. He is up in arms. He wants a meeting of heads of state in April. He feels we have not made much headway. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I had Arthur Dunkel come to see me about this, and I was wondering if there would be any value in

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two or three of us getting together in Paris. (Ø)

The President: It might be useful. I have meetings with Mitterrand and Kohl, and I want to remind them about what we said in Houston. If it looks like a meeting would be helpful, count me in. I don't know the schedule but it may be a tough one. Let's wait and see until after I talk to Kohl and Mitterrand. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Do you have any recent word about how Margaret is doing? (Ø)

The President: The prediction that I saw earlier today was that she would make it, but it looks to me like they're after her. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I hope she survives it all. She's a good ally. What do you plan to do about the transatlantic declaration? (Ø)

The President: I think they are still talking about one word. You are talking about the EC Declaration? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, the EC with the U.S. (Ø)

The President: We're getting close. There is one word that needs to be worked out and then the agreement is ready. Not everyone in our government is enthusiastic about this declaration -- that's the understatement of the year! I can check into it and have someone send you a cable. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Why don't you have someone let Derek know. I am going to Italy and we have our own version of a declaration with the EC, not identical. I would hope to sign it in Rome. (Ø)

The President: I will get someone to call Derek. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: When are you off to Europe? (U)

The President: Tomorrow night. I'm going to Kohl's home town and then we will go to Paris where I will be for three nights. I don't know why. Then one night in Saudi Arabia. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I look forward to seeing you in Paris. (Ø)

The President: Me, too. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Congratulations again on the environmental thing. It is very important. (Ø)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Hawke of
Australia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Robert Hawke
Notetaker: Douglas H. Paal

DATE, TIME November 15, 1990, 7:47 - 8:15 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

(Throughout this conversation, the Australian side became inaudible from time to time. Points where verbatim reconstruction of the conversation is not possible are marked as follows: "...")

The President: Hey, Bob Hawke, my old friend, how are you doing?
(U)

PM Hawke: How are you, George? I have called to express my deep concern with the situation reached so far in the Uruguay Round. I wonder if you have two or three minutes to allow me to set out my reaction to this situation... (Ø)

The President: Bob, I look forward to hearing your views. I am as concerned as you are about the state of the Uruguay Round. I spoke with (President) Delors and (Prime Minister) Andreotti about this on Tuesday. (Ø)

PM Hawke: It is my considered position that the Uruguay Round is in an absolute crisis... I know your concern. I saw you meeting with Andreotti. I also read Clayton Yeutter's excellent speech on the prospects for agriculture in the Round. I share the pessimism about achieving any result in the Uruguay Round. I think it is fair to say that the U.S. and Australia agree on two propositions. First, the requirement to create a more fair and open international trading system is absolutely vital. Failure would be an international economic tragedy... a political tragedy as well. When international trends are running so favorably... (Ø)

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Second, we have agreed that as to the success or failure of the Uruguay Round, the fact is there cannot be any successful result unless there is success with agriculture. All the rest depends on agriculture. To be precise, George, the success of the entire Uruguay Round hinges on the position of the Europeans. I for one do not see this position as last minute jockeying for advantage. I feel very strongly that there is a fundamental absence of political will on the part of the Europeans. The unsatisfactory offer of the EC on agriculture is not... comparable with the Cairns Group. Their offer is backdated to 1996, a year when supports are particularly bloated. The thirty percent cut over ten years has already taken place. The offer also fails... on agricultural access. (Ø)

On the whole, unless political will is expressed from the top, the Round will fail completely. I believe we should seriously contemplate Heads of Government involvement... There is virtually no chance that Brussels will work. We need to focus on the six major blockages in the Round. I am not optimistic at this time. (Ø)

Common sense and prudence should put us on guard to work against the worst case scenario. I propose to look at a Heads of Government meeting, possibly in January to... The list of possible participants could include the U.S., France, Germany, ..., the U.K., Japan, Australia, Mexico, Argentina and Indonesia. Obviously such a meeting would not be a matter of discussing detail. Rather, it would provide renewed impetus to successful completion of the Round. I hope to call the European Heads of Government... Rocard and Kohl and raise the possibility of Heads of Government involvement. (Ø)

I am sorry to take so long, George, but I wanted to show you how I see the situation. I would like to hear your views on how you contemplate the Brussels meeting. Is there anything, George, that we can do to press the Europeans on the Round? (Ø)

Finally, I have a technical question about the deadline for the fast-track legislation of 1st March. I would be interested to know how binding is the deadline and... This is not only an economic question. History shows that increased autarchy and protectionism can undo all that you and you and your predecessor achieved. (Ø)

The President: Bob, let me reply to your various points. First, I agree that without success on agriculture this will not be a successful round. I made this point repeatedly to Andreotti and Delors. They were rather heated meetings. I pointed out that they had not followed up what the G-7 had decided. They took exception and said they had. (Ø)

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There is no question that I agree with you that we have to have a satisfactory outcome on agriculture. They accused me of trying to get the Cairns Group up in arms. I told them that the Cairns Group, Australia included, does not need the U.S. to get them going. They have to look at the impact on the whole third world. Jim Baker is going to talk to Delors in Europe. I just talked with him in his car on the way to the airport. He will be there tonight. (Ø)

This weekend I will have bilaterals with Mitterrand and Kohl. You know he has an election coming up just before the Round. My suggestion, on your meeting, is that it deserves serious consideration. You should go ahead with your calls. They are very timely, very useful. Let the next week or so pass. (Ø)

On the technical point on the fast-track legislation deadline in the spring, I will get my people to get you the technical answer. If the question is, can we do something after that, I have to get the answer. You are right. (Ø)

PM Hawke: Thanks. If I may just respond. I will go ahead and make the calls. I take the point that we should wait and see how the bilaterals come out. I just ask that if all you and we are doing through the established processes and the Brussels meeting look like they are running into the sand, you would give serious consideration to the proposal I have made. While waiting for now, George, ... (Ø)

The President: I have no problems in principle. Obviously, when we get down to the crazy things like timing and schedules, but no problem in principle. It will be terrible if there is no success. In principle, agreed. I will try to kick some players into action. Our problem is the EC and the EC machinery and a couple of countries. (Ø)

PM Hawke: Let's keep in touch on how your meetings and... (Ø)

The President: I will ask our people, as soon as Baker and Hills complete their meetings, to get it to you personally. (Ø)

PM Hawke: I must say that Carla Hills...excellent in cooperation with us. George, obviously I could not complete this conversation without asking about the Gulf. (Ø)

The President: I wish you would ask in two weeks when we will know the results of my trip. We are moving more troops. The sanctions appear to be working. To be honest, I cannot say to what degree. I still want a peaceful solution. I am increasingly concerned about the embassy and the condition of the hostages. We have a lively debate at home with some of the usual critics. It is almost a post-Vietnam syndrome debate.

Meanwhile, we continue to build our forces so that if we need to use force we will prevail and prevail rapidly. (Ø)

Overall, I think it is going well. I think I can handle the controversy. The press just loves controversy. Can you imagine if this were World War II and the press asking Franklin Roosevelt or some general, or some Australian general, and then turning to ask Hitler his point of view? They tend to blame things here. (Ø)

I have taken on a little water. Tonight I will do a CNN interview and spell out our goals and objectives once again. Maybe you can catch that. Basically I am in a good frame of mind on this. I am pleased the UN Security Council is holding. You have seen the speculation on a UN resolution on the use of force. There is no decision. I will talk to Mitterrand and Gorbachev. I feel good about this. There are no time lines about working this. Basically you got me on a morning when I feel fairly upbeat. (Ø)

PM Hawke: George, you know we remain supportive of what you are doing. There can be no conditionality on anything, including the release of the hostages. We share the hope that this will be resolved peacefully as a rational judgment by Saddam Hussein in the interest of his own people. If other means are necessary, I hope you will be able to consult with us as much as possible. I understand the constraints. I know what you mean when you say you have taken some water aboard, but Australia continues to support you as you press for a peaceful... If the circumstances change, I hope you can consult as early as possible. (Ø)

The President: Bob, that is understandable. You know I get a sense of camaraderie, maybe it is a World War II memory, when I see Australians taking part in boarding parties and other activities. It makes me feel warm. We know you have got kids there, as we have got a hell of a lot. (Ø)

PM Hawke: We are with you. (Ø)

The President: Give Hazel our love. (U)

PM Hawke: On the first matter, I hope you will stay in touch with us. In its way, it poses a threat to the world situation comparable to the threat in Iraq. (Ø)

The President: Barbara, if she were sitting here, would say the same thing. I hope our paths cross soon. (Ø)

PM Hawke: Same to you, George. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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9252

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Chaim Herzog
of Israel (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chaim Herzog
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME November 16, 1990; 3:30 - 3:34 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Mr. President, it's good to hear your voice again. I heard you were here, and I had hoped we could get together, but unfortunately our schedules did not coincide. (U)

President Herzog: Thank you. I opened the General Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations in San Francisco. (U)

The President: I remember your great hospitality in Israel. I am off to Czechoslovakia this evening, and I just wanted to touch base with you. Thank you for seeing Dan Quayle. How are you?
(U)

President Herzog: Well, I have a bad cold. Tokyo was very interesting. I met with Perez de Cuellar to iron out the Security Council problems. I invited him to come to Israel for a state visit, with Aime to come in advance to work out the details. (U)

The President: I appreciate your constructive role. We are also trying to keep it out of the Security Council, but certain elements -- those close to Saddam Hussein -- are trying to keep it there. (U)

President Herzog: We need to make a major effort to keep it out. There are elements that want to divert attention from your saving us from this lunatic. We should not be the whipping boy at the United Nations. (U)

The President: I am not happy with our relations. I would have liked to have a quiet chat with you. We have a little communication problem, and I'm not happy about it. If you ever have some quiet thoughts I would welcome them, just let me know.
(C)

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President Herzog: I would be very happy to do so, Mr. President. I spoke to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, and I made remarks to the effect that but for you, this bully might have gotten away with it. (U)

The President: I'm grateful for your kind remarks. I'm very sorry to miss you. How long are you with us? (U)

President Herzog: I will be in the United States until Wednesday. As I said, the consequences of failure would be catastrophic. (U)

The President: Don't worry, we won't fail. (U)

President Herzog: I had a good chat with Ozal. He's a good man. I told him that Iraq is overrated as a military power. (U)

The President: Well, convincing people is a big concern to us all. I have written an article for Newsweek which I hope helps. I was glad to have this opportunity to say hello to an old friend. (U)

President Herzog: You are saving the lives of millions and I will make it clear in all that I say. (U)

The President: Thanks. I'm glad to have this opportunity to say hello. I recall so very well that nice dinner in your garden. Some day we will reciprocate. (U)

President Herzog: You are welcome in Israel anytime, Mr. President. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME November 20, 1990; 7:55 - 8:01 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: CSCE Conference Center, Paris

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hosni, how are you? I'm still in Paris, just wanted to touch base with you on an item or two. (U)

President Mubarak: Everything is going all right. (U)

The President: I think we are beginning to get Saddam Hussein's attention. I'm calling regarding President Assad and how important you believe it is to see him on this trip. I could see him in Geneva on the way back. Do you think that would be okay with him? (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will call him, George. That is a very good idea. It is extremely important to support him because he is with our line on this. We need to encourage him. He is with us against Saddam Hussein, George. He did not want to come here for a meeting; that way, some would have said that he came to Egypt just because George Bush wanted him to. But if you are offering a third place, that shows you have worked to meet his concerns. (Ø)

The President: We could do it at a British base in Cyprus, or in Geneva, whatever he thinks is best. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will ask. (Ø)

The President: We have not checked with the Brits yet, but we could do an airport stop in Cyprus. It would be after we left you, either in Cyprus or in Geneva. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will contact him. Maybe he will agree to both and then you can choose. (Ø)

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The President: I was a little worried about his statement on his troops staying in Saudi Arabia. (Ø)

President Mubarak: This is for local consumption, George. We are not going to fight Iraq in Iraq -- we are going to Kuwait. (Ø)

The President: He's saying that they are going to stay in Saudi Arabia. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I know him -- when the action starts, he will go quickly with us. (Ø)

The President: Well, call me through Signal once you know his reaction. If I'm busy at the conference, then I hope you will speak to Brent Scowcroft. Or tell Wisner. Tell Assad I look forward to seeing him. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will tell you or through Scowcroft or Frank. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

MAHATHIR

NOV 20 - PRES CALLED MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER
MAHATHIR. MONITORED BY WATSON. PRES IN
PARIS - INITIATED CALL 0838 - TERMINATED 0850

THATCHER

NOV 22 - PRES CALLED THATCHER FROM AIR FORCE
ONE; MONITORED BY ZELIKOW. CALL INITIATED 1316
TERMINATED 1320.

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9250

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Gaviria
of Colombia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Caesar Gaviria of Colombia
Interpreter: Patricia Arizu
Notetaker: William T. Pryce

DATE, TIME November 23, 1990, 5:05 - 5:12 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President telephoned President Gaviria to thank him for agreeing to meet with Secretary of State Baker and ask his support for a new United Nations Resolution on Iraq. (U)

The President: We have just taken off from Geneva headed for Washington, D.C. I'm calling with a simple request. All I would like to say is that I very much appreciate your seeing Secretary of State Baker, and please help us on this Resolution if you can. (U)

I have just come from the Gulf where I have talked with President Mubarik, King Fhad, and Syria's Assad and all are united that the United Nations must take this next step. I ask you to see Jim and urge you to be as helpful as you can on the Resolution. (U)

President Gaviria: We are friends and allies. We will cooperate as much as possible. But you understand our policy. We will vote with you. You don't need to worry about it. (U)

The President: I am very very grateful. I want to thank you. I am sorry to bother you, but I wanted to get in touch with you personally. I'm glad you will see Jim. I wanted you to know how much I felt personally on this. Let's plan to stay in touch on this or anything you want to discuss. Thank you again. (U)

President Gaviria: It has been no bother to me. Tomorrow we will be with Secretary Baker and we can analyze the situation. We will talk on the details. (U)

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The President: Thank you. Goodbye and good luck. My regards to your family. (U)

President Gaviria: It was good to talk to you. (U)

The President: Hasta Luego. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THATCHER

NOV 24 - PRES CALLED THATCHER FROM CAMP DAVID
AT 1015 - TERMINATED 1029. SITRM MONITORED.

MAJOR

NOV 27 - PRESIDENT CALLED NEW UK PRIME MINISTER
MAJOR FROM AIR FORCE ONE. CALL INITIATED 1622
TERMINATED 1629

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0434

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
C. David Welch, NSC
Shukran Kamal, Interpreter

DATE, TIME November 30, 1990; 12:05 - 12:18 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: I'm calling in regard... I don't know if you saw my press conference a few minutes ago. (P)

King Fahd: Yes. I saw it. I am very pleased. (P)

The President: My sending Jim Baker to Baghdad in no way is a weakening; no way is it a concession; he will do nothing but explain to Saddam Hussein that he must get out of Kuwait. Sending Jim Baker to Baghdad is one final step to get to peace after the United Nations (Security Council) resolution (678). There will be no conceding, no concession. I wanted to tell you first, after my decision last night. You have been so steadfast, I wanted to tell you first and get your advice if you have any. Lastly, Your Majesty, I don't know whether Saddam Hussein will see Jim Baker or if he will send Tariq Aziz, we've had no contact with them. But if Tariq Aziz comes, your Ambassador is invited to sit in on the meeting. I welcome any thoughts you have but I hope you understand that this strengthens our position because we've gone the extra mile. We have not changed our position on the military or anything else. (P)

King Fahd: First, thank you for the call, if it proves anything it proves the strength and depth of the friendship between our two nations. At the same time, this decision is very wise. Anyone who talks about it will have to conclude that we want peace, but peace on principles. At the same time, I believe that this is the last message we can address to Saddam Hussein to tell him the opportunity is now to withdraw from Kuwait and go back to Iraqi land. (P)

The President: I agree. (U)

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King Fahd: At the same time, we hear talk from Europe, Asia, and Africa and some Arabs about Saddam Hussein wanting to withdraw from Kuwait, but that he wants to discuss it with the United States. (Ø)

The President: Please tell all that his withdrawal cannot be by keeping some island, access to the Gulf, or something else. We will not discuss any such thing. (Ø)

King Fahd: I know your steadfast position. This decision to be in touch with Saddam Hussein after obtaining U.N. members support through the U.N. resolution is from a position of strength. (Ø)

The President: We will stay in close touch. You are the first to hear of this decision. I will give your Ambassador a transcript of my press conference. (Ø)

King Fahd: In any case, let me repeat that this step is very wise, practical and positive, which should benefit all. (U)

The President: Thank you, and thank you for a wonderful visit. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you for calling me first. I am sure that our next meeting will be in the United States. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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0433

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to President Mubarak
of Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME November 30, 1990; 12:23 - 12:40 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: How are you? Did you see my press conference?
(U)

President Mubarak: I heard about it. (U)

The President: After the U.N. (Security Council) resolution (678), I decided to send Jim Baker and ask if he wanted to send Tariq Aziz. King Fahd, whom I have spoken to, is very enthusiastic. I told him there would be no concessions, no partial withdrawal, nothing short of the U.N. resolutions. I hope this will convince the world that no stone has been left unturned when and if we use force. Nothing was discussed before with Saddam Hussein. Baker will not discuss anything about concessions. I invited Tariq Aziz to meet with me, and I will invite the Egyptian Ambassador if you wish. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I told Fahd before you contacted him that this is a good step before the whole world. (Ø)

The President: I think it's a good thing. (U)

President Mubarak: For sure, it is a step in front of the whole world, that this is the maximum I could ever do. (Ø)

The President: It will reduce the accusation that I'm rushing to use force. We're moving our people, and we are much more ready. There will be no concessions about some island. Be sure to tell everyone. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I told Fahd that there won't be any concessions, George. (Ø)

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The President: He was quite supportive. I haven't told the French, Brits or Soviets. You are the second to hear. Jim Baker didn't even know. Will he see Baker? (Ø)

President Mubarak: He will be very eager to receive him. (Ø)

The President: What about Aziz coming here? (Ø)

President Mubarak: Of course. (U)

The President: There will be no ultimatum -- just no concessions. The basic message will be that we support the U.N. resolution, including use of force if necessary. (Ø)

President Mubarak: About the Ambassadors being at the meeting with Tariq Aziz, he will be nervous and will make no concessions if they are there. He will try to be the hero. He will speak more freely without them present. You need to think this over. (Ø)

The President: Maybe we could do both; one private meeting and a larger one. I've already announced it. (Ø)

President Mubarak: The meeting should be held without the Ambassadors. Otherwise, he will not make concessions, he will try to be a big Arab hero. He will speak more freely in private. (Ø)

The President: Maybe the Ambassadors can show so that I can say that the coalition is intact. I'll call Oza and the Kuwaiti Emir. Maybe you can inform the Gulf states. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Okay, goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9476

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME November 30, 1990; 12:48 - 12:57 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President. (U)

President Ozal: Hello, how are you? (U)

The President: I am fine. I'm calling you, and I have just called King Fahd and President Mubarak, about some of the ideas I announced this morning. This idea, my idea, is to send Secretary Baker to Iraq and to invite Tariq Aziz here to tell this man Saddam Hussein that we will fulfill our obligations following the UN resolutions. I don't know if he'll see Baker. We had no previous contact with Saddam Hussein, direct or indirect before making the announcement. If we take this last step for peace, I think we will encourage more support for force if we have to use it. (S)

I wanted you to know personally that there were no previous consultations or discussions with Iraq. We are deadly serious, and will not make any concessions. I think he needs to get this message. The Baker trip will be the last, best chance for peace. I don't know if Aziz will come here. But I did want to explore these options. (S)

President Ozal: Let me tell you what I told you in Paris. Saddam Hussein doesn't hear bad news. You have decided to give him the right message. (S)

The President: You told me Saddam Hussein never gets a frank view of events from his people. That is why I thought my initiative with Tariq Aziz may be worthwhile. (S)

Did you see my press conference? (U)

President Ozal: I was only able to hear part of it, but we have taped it and I will watch it in full later this evening. (U)

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The President: I would appreciate it if you would watch it and listen carefully to the opening. Please give me a call if you have any thoughts. I'll be at Camp David over the weekend. (Ø)

There is no change in the U.S. position or in George Bush's determination to do what we have to do without conditions or concessions. Jim Baker will have a very tough mission--he will have to look Saddam Hussein in the eye and give him a straight message. (Ø)

President Ozal: During the last ten to fifteen days, some private people from Iraq and Jordan came to tell me that Saddam Hussein will pull out and accept conditions. They wanted my advice. I did not give them any sign. I said no, he must obey the UN decisions. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. (U)

President Ozal: Their Ambassador who left Turkey, he talked to me and tried to say Saddam Hussein has respect for me and may listen to me. But I did not give him any points. I wanted to wait for the UN resolution. (Ø)

The President: The UN resolution was a good, important step. (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes, it will give us a change to solve the problem. (Ø)

The President: When you see the press conference, you will see that I said we must take a step toward peace, but that he must understand that we will use tremendous force against him unless he gets out. That is the message we will give to Tariq Aziz. (Ø)

I want to urge our friends to make no concessions. He must get out, comply with the resolutions, restore the legitimate government. And then we can talk with the Arab world. (Ø)

I am glad you feel he will get out. (Ø)

President Ozal: I can talk with him and say that you have to withdraw, accept the UN resolutions. There will be no discussion of anything else. (Ø)

The President: Good. Do you have any feeling about the sanctions? (Ø)

President Ozal: The sanctions are working. In the coming one and a half months they will be much more effective. They are causing not only a problem with food, but with spare parts too. (Ø)

They are in a desperate condition. But I think he will keep himself until the last moment. (Ø)

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The President: It is good talking to you. I enjoyed our recent visit. Please give me your ideas over this weekend if you have any you would like to share. (Ø)

President Ozal: I'll see the press conference. Thank you. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

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0435

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to the Amir of Kuwait

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Amir Sheikh Jaber
C. David Welch, NSC
Shukran Kamal, Interpreter

DATE, TIME November 30, 1990; 1:00 - 1:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Did you see the press conference? (U)

The Amir: I did not see it but I heard it on the news. (U)

The President: I hope you will get the tape and see it, because I talked a good deal about your country. (U)

The Amir: I will try to obtain one and see it. (U)

The President: The big proposal was for Jim Baker to see Saddam Hussein. What I wanted to assure you is that this is not a trip to negotiate, to discuss any concessions. This is a trip after the U.N. (Security Council) resolution (678) to tell Saddam Hussein that I'm determined to implement fully the U.N. resolutions including the use of force if necessary and do that if he refuses to withdraw from Kuwait. It is important for our partners to know that there will be no concessions, no side negotiations of any kind. I don't know if Saddam Hussein will accept to see Baker or not. (Ø)

The Amir: Thank you. I have full confidence in your decision. I have complete faith that you stand by the cause of Kuwait just as I would. I know that you will offer no concessions -- especially you, Mr. President. This move is designed to give the world the clear picture that you tried to get peace but Saddam Hussein doesn't want it. (Ø)

The President: I wanted you to know that there was no pre-contact with Saddam Hussein and there will be no concessions. (C)

The Amir: I hope Saddam Hussein will be reasonable and willing to end the matter peacefully and doesn't involve the world in a war we don't want. (C)

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The President: Thank you. I appreciate your hospitality in our recent visit. (U)

The Amir: Thank you. We will continue the contacts between our two peoples. (U)

The President: I think the Kuwaiti presentation at the United Nations captured the heart of Americans who watched it. (U)

The Amir: That was what we wanted. Americans need to know what is happening in my country. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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9539

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with John Major, Prime Minister of the UK
on November 30, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Major, Prime Minister of the UK
Notetaker: Stephen E. Benko, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME November 30, 1990, 3:06 - 3:15 pm (EST)
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello. George Bush here. How are you? (U)

PM Major: Good evening. Just fine, thanks. (U)

The President: I heard you might be able to come over here before Christmas. That would be great if it's true. I hope it's not too inconvenient to your Christmas plans and your wife. I hope she can come too. (U)

PM Major: She's an extremely tolerant girl. I'd be delighted to come. (U)

The President: Barbara would love it if she could come. I was thinking we could get together at Camp David. I look forward to it. (U)

I'm calling about the press conference. I am determined to take the one last step. I wanted to tell you -- I told Fahd and everyone else -- that this means nothing from us on negotiations or concessions of any sort. My view on the Resolution, and thanks go to many here for their heavy work, is that it is helpful to signal our willingness to take that step. That man hasn't got the message yet. Each of us should work bilaterally to convince him we're serious. I've talked to Fahd, Mubarak, Ozal, the Emir, now I've got you, and I'm trying to get Francois to say that this is no departure. It's only a step to tell him, here's what you're up against. (S)

PM Major: I was delighted with the Resolution. I hope he understands that this does not mean negotiations. I hope he has got the message. I quite see the advantage of going the last mile in hopes of getting him to withdraw. (S)

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The President: That's it. There have been no negotiations or discussions underway with him. When he heard it, I'm sure it was a bolt out of the blue. He may not accept, after he heard the way the President framed the mission. The Saudis think he will accept it and send Aziz here. As Margaret once said to me, "George, this is not the time to go wobblly." I'm not going wobblly. It's just a last step before I have to make a very tough decision in January. I haven't changed my mind about that; I'm not going to step back from that decision. But we can talk more about it when we get together. (S)

PM Major: I am extremely grateful. There is not a shred of difference between our positions. I hope he gets the message. (S)

The President: Mubarak thinks he has, Fahd is doubtful, Ozal has heard from friends that Saddam wants out. Margaret told me that at the Paris Summit, at the CSCE meeting, that Gorbachev was excited that Primakov told him that Iraq had agreed to get out with just access to the Gulf. I told her that that's a condition, and it's unacceptable. The only risk is that this might be looked at as a willingness to compromise. That's not what this is about. (S)

How is it going with your life? (U)

PM Major: It has not been the most relaxed week, but I am rather pleased with it. (U)

The President: John, the way you handled everything was very impressive and the response here has been just great. We have a great amount of respect for Margaret, but what you have done on your own is very impressive, not that it was ever in doubt that you would handle it so extraordinarily well. (S)

PM Major: I'm glad it was so well received there. She'll be missed; she was a towering figure, and will be hard to replace. (S)

The President: I want to confide one thing with you and ask your judgment about it. I want to confer on her our highest honor here at the White House; it's what we call the Medal of Freedom. I wouldn't do it if it conflicts with your role as Prime Minister. But I have checked on the modalities and it is not hard to arrange. I know it would be very well received by the American people. I just want to check on what you think the timing should be. (S)

PM Major: I would be very grateful if I could just look at the timing. On the substance of it, I think it's a wonderful idea, and I'm sure she will be thrilled by it. (S)

The President: Check on the timing; there's no rush, maybe the spring or winter. I won't discuss it outside of the White House. Maybe there is some parliamentary procedure there it could fit with. (S)

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PM Major: Okay. I will check on it just so that the time doesn't look odd. (Ø)

The President: That's it, that's it. Let us know. Well, I look forward to seeing you soon. Goodbye. (U)

PM Major: So do I. Thank you. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9476

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Turkish President Turgut Ozal

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME December 1, 1990; 4:35-4:46 p.m.
AND PLACE Camp David

The President: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

President Ozal: I am fine. (U)

The President: We're up at Camp David this weekend. (U)

President Ozal: I am also at a winter place for the weekend.
(U)

The President: Thank you for calling. (U)

President Ozal: I read the transcript of your press conference.
And I saw the tape of your press conference. It was very, very
good. (Ø)

The President: I hope so. I appreciate your remarks. The
Saudis were also pleased, although Bandar, their Ambassador here,
had some reservations. But King Fahd thought it was a good idea.
(Ø)

President Ozal: The problem is that Saddam Hussein is using the
line at home that America is softening. He will say that the
Palestinian question must be linked. (Ø)

The President: He is saying that when Baker comes over, everyone
else should meet with him, including Arab groups like the PLO,
the Libyans, I mean the Lebanese. We are saying that we will
meet with Aziz alone here, and that Baker and Saddam should meet
alone in Baghdad with no outsiders. We want to keep him from
bringing in other countries and groups. (Ø)

President Ozal: They talk about a link to the Palestinian
question -- is that true? (Ø)

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The President: No. They made that statement. My statement was carefully drawn. I have no intention of linking the two issues. (Ø)

President Ozal: If I were you, I would clarify it. I would say I will listen, but won't discuss these other issues. (Ø)

The President: That is a good idea. I will pass it along to Baker. We will listen, but not discuss these issues. (Ø)

President Ozal: In any case, you must listen. (U)

The President: But not negotiate. We have to be careful Saddam Hussein doesn't expand the agenda. (Ø)

President Ozal: I'm with you. You were very clear talking to the press after your speech. (Ø)

The President: This is important. We will put out a statement to clarify. I will tell Scowcroft to get the statement out. The Tariq Aziz meeting will be important, but the Baker-Saddam Hussein meeting will be more so. (Ø)

President Ozal: There is a possibility that some important Iraqis may come to see me quietly. This is a possibility. I have not yet decided. I wanted to consult with you first. There is no problem. We will stay together. There will be no conditions and no mixing the Palestinian question. I sent a message that we cannot talk if they want to negotiate. If they do send an important person, I will call you afterward to report. (Ø)

The President: When will this happen? (Ø)

President Ozal: Probably by the end of the week. I am not telling anyone, not even members of the government. (Ø)

The President: I won't mention it here to anyone except Scowcroft and Baker. I think it is good to do. If we all stay together and present the same line, he will get a clearer view of his situation. (Ø)

President Ozal: This is acceptable. These meetings show the weakness of Saddam Hussein, not the strength. You clearly stated there would be no negotiations, face to face. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. It was clearly stated. I hope everyone understands that. Did you talk to Fahd? (Ø)

President Ozal: No. (U)

The President: I want to be sure he is happy. He said it was a wonderful thing yesterday. But I just want to cross every T. But Bandar was uneasy. If you talk to him, I would like to know what you think Fahd really feels. Mubarak, Mitterrand, and Major all told me the same thing -- they are enthusiastic. (Ø)

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President Ozal: I see. The day after tomorrow, a Saudi Prince will visit with a message from the King. I will talk to him to find out. I think it is the Interior Minister. (Ø)

The President: Good. Please see what they think. The Ambassador may have felt left out. This is interesting. I appreciate the call. If you learn anything, I would be interested to know. (Ø)

President Ozal: When do you leave for South America? (U)

The President: I leave tomorrow and return Friday. (U)

President Ozal: I will call you over the weekend. (U)

The President: The airplane has very good communications. It is easy to talk. The Iraqis are sending a message about the Tariq Aziz meeting. They are using the fact that I said some allied Ambassadors could participate in the meeting with Tariq Aziz to argue that other Arab groups should meet with Baker in Baghdad. Our statement will say that the Baker meeting should be one-on-one with no outsiders. They used the coalition Ambassadors as an excuse for the PLO and others to be in the Baker meeting. It is better that Baker meet directly without these groups. (Ø)

President Ozal: George, they are trying to save face for the Arab people, the local population. But they really want to talk with you. (Ø)

The President: The meetings will go forward. (Ø)

President Ozal: Very good. The results in your country will be positive. (U)

The President: The results have been good so far. I met with the JCS today, the military leadership. They are getting ready and prepared. There will be no pulling back. It was a good meeting. We have strong forces. You'll be interested in this: there are 600 trains moving our forces and equipment from Germany. (Ø)

President Ozal: Very good. (U)

The President: When Saddam Hussein understands all this, maybe he will get out. (Ø)

President Ozal: One last point. Remember I asked in Paris about the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Our candidate is Ambassador Turkmen. I believe that if you support him, Mr. Perez de Cuellar will accept him too. There is one French candidate and Turkmen. I believe Perez de Cuellar will accept ours if you support him too. (Ø)

The President: I am sorry to say I do not know the status of our own thinking. We will get back to you on this. Good-bye, Mr.

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President. (Q)

President Qzal: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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MONITORED BY ZELIKOW; INTERPRETED BY ELIZA
BURNHAM. PRES AT CAMP DAVID. CALL INITIATED
0627 - TERMINATED 0638

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME December 2, 1990, 4:45 - 4:50 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Helmut! Congratulations on your big win! What were the final results? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Excellent! The CDU/CSU got the best results they ever had in the history of the German parliament since the time of Bismarck. We finished with 44.1% and the FDP with 11%. Between the two, we have 55%. The SPD was far behind, and the Greens will not be in parliament any longer. I am very happy with the results. There is something else, which is not all that important but which is good for me: the list for Ludwigshafen, my home district, for the first time since 1898 has not elected a Social Democrat but elected me instead. (Ø)

The President: That is excellent. I know you have a hundred phone calls, but I just wanted to check in and give you my best wishes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very, very much, indeed. I do appreciate it. Another wonderful thing happened: we got Berlin back -- united Berlin. (U)

The President: That's wonderful. I loved the way CNN said that this result was a great tribute to you. They gave great praise to you, and the voters did the same. I'm heading for South America in about an hour. I'll be in touch about the Gulf and the GATT round, but for now I just wanted to congratulate you. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Please give my best to Barbara. (U)

The President: One last thing: how is Hannelore's neck? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: She is right next to the phone. I will put her on. (U)

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Mrs. Kohl: It has been a great day! Helmut told you about winning his constituency. (U)

The President: How is your neck? (U)

Mrs. Kohl: It is better now. I can't turn to the left side, but that is not necessary because we are right-going people. Good luck with Iraq. It was a good idea to go ahead with talks. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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OZAL

DEC 16 - TURKISH PRESIDENT OZAL CALLED THE
PRESIDENT AT 1701 - CALL TERMINATED 1715.
PRES IN WASHINGTON - SDO GRAUL MONITORED.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Harry Obst

DATE, TIME: December 17, 1990, 8:37 - 8:50 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Helmut! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, George! How are you? (U)

The President: Good. How are you? I hope you have the Christmas spirit. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Everything is going smoothly. Winter has come early here. There is snow everywhere. All in all, things are going quite well. (U)

One thing I wanted to tell you about is the EC Summit in Rome, particularly questions concerning the GATT. First, we issued a statement saying that we want to see the GATT end successfully. No one said that we should try to keep a low profile. We want to make full use of the time throughout January. The general opinion was that we should use a more global approach -- dealing not just with one subject but including all questions, obviously including agriculture. Second, we said that all sides have to be ready for compromise. That means also the Europeans. Third, we said we want to make full use of the remaining time before negotiations resume. We want to find out beforehand how progress can be made so that we prevent a possible collision. We want to prepare the ground so things run smoothly. (U)

The President: That seems encouraging. You know I have been very concerned about the breakup of the talks. We feel the Hellstrom text offers us a way out. It is not what we had hoped for, but we are willing to accept it as a basis for the kind of negotiation you are talking about if the EC will do likewise. We did take steps to address your concerns about trade in services. These were not easy steps, but we told our trade representative to do everything within reason to get these talks back on track. Perhaps what you told me about what the Community has done will help unblock the stalemate. If we cannot unblock, I am afraid it could mean the end of the Round, and that would be bad for everybody. (U)

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Helmut, we are talking with the Japanese and think they will come along. That would be good news, but on the other hand we don't want to see the EC isolated. This would be very bad before world opinion. I am counting on you to use your influence, especially with the French, to move things along, recognizing that you have domestic difficulties. I think it would be good if you could take the initiative, even if only on the basis of the Hellstrom text, which could form the basis to move the dialogue to more fruitful negotiations. If we can agree on the Hellstrom text, it would be seen as a compromise by all sides. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: George, let me say that I will try very hard. After the holidays, I will meet with Jacques Delors once again and will also meet with others. Then I will try to get in touch with you again between January 6 and 9. (Ø)

The President: Helmut, let me ask you a personal question, as a friend. Do your negotiators think the U.S. is being too rigid and inflexible, too ideological? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. You have been very frank with me, so I will be equally frank. We do think so. (Ø)

The President: Is this because we want agriculture included, or because we want too much out of agriculture? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: The latter. Obviously agriculture has to be included; but, to be very frank, it seems to me that it is above all the tone of the negotiations which seems to rankle. Of course I cannot give you my personal impression, because I was not at the negotiating table. I am simply telling you what my negotiators have told me. (Ø)

The President: Maybe this time off for the holidays will help create a calm atmosphere, and this calm atmosphere will help move things forward. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, that is certainly true. Another thing that would possibly be quite beneficial and useful would be for you to talk with Francois Mitterrand over the holiday period. You could talk not just about this issue. (Ø)

The President: That is a good suggestion. I have just gotten a nice letter from him regarding the Middle East and the UN resolution and need to talk to him about the Gulf. I have talked to him in the past and he knows my position, but I think that would be a good idea. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I think it will be useful in any case. (U)

The President: I appreciate your phone call and update. We have got the get this thing resolved. If you get any new ideas, or if I do, we should be in touch by telephone. (Ø)

I hope you get some rest over Christmas. You have worked so

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hard, and you've had such a wonderful year. Bar and I sent our Christmas love. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thanks, George. Please give our love to Barbara. I hope you will have a good rest, too. I will call again. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney,
Prime Minister of Canada on December 24, 1990

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Mulroney
George Malick, WHSR (notetaker)

DATE, TIME December 24, 1990, 1:07-1:12 p.m.
PLACE: Camp David

The President: Brian, how are you? (U)

The Prime Minister: Merry Christmas, George. (U)

The President: Where are you right now? (U)

The Prime Minister: I'm at Herrington Lake. (U)

The President: I'm at Camp David -- its cold here; the
temperature's dropped 25 degrees in the past hour. (U)

The Prime Minister: I'll be playing hockey in a few minutes.
(U)

The President: Well, I called to check in and wish you a Merry
Christmas and a Happy New Year. (U)

The Prime Minister: The same to you. (U)

The President: Barbara's here and enjoying herself. Cheney and
Powell left a while ago; they were up here to brief me. (✓)

The Prime Minister: And your view? (✓)

The President: There seems to be no inclination to move away
from their annexation of Kuwait as Province 19. We hope he will
understand our resolve. Most leaders seem to agree that there
is no change. (✓)

The Prime Minister: I had a chance meeting with the Iraqi
Ambassador here at a reception that we held. The Iraqi
Ambassador came up to me and said he wished me peace. I took him
aside for 5-6 minutes and told him directly that "your President

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is calling your chance for peace. If he thinks otherwise, he is in for trouble. Canada is not a superpower. We have no Ambitions. The proof of our resolve is our support of the UN. I hope that you carry this message directly to your President." We were surprised when he was called back to Baghdad for consultations. (S)

The President: Did he have any comment? (U)

The Prime Minister: All he said was that he believed there would be a peaceful settlement. I responded that a peaceful way to resolve the matter is to withdraw from Kuwait; then we could consider further talks. (S)

The President: Well, we'll stay in touch. (U)

The Prime Minister: Thanks for hanging in there with us during this past year. (U)

The President: Good luck at home. (U)

The Prime Minister: Thanks for being such a good friend and my best to you and your family. (U)

The President: You too. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain on December 24, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The First Lady
Margaret Thatcher

DATE, TIME, December 24, 1990, 1:48 - 1:53pm
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Margaret, how are you? I wanted to call to wish you and Denis a Merry Christmas. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher: Thank you, George. Merry Christmas to you too. (U)

The President: I understand you have a new home in London. What is it like? (U)

Mrs. Thatcher: No, I am still in my old place on the outskirts of London. I have yet to find a new home in London. (U)

The President: It has been a very traumatic year for all of us. You know, my meeting with Prime Minister Major went very well; we had a very good talk. How was the visit played up in Britain? (Ø)

Mrs. Thatcher: It went well here. (Ø)

The President: I think John may have felt a little uneasy coming here at this time. (Ø)

Mrs. Thatcher: I assure you all is well. John had been, after all, my Chancellor of the Exchequer and was not out of touch from the beginning. (Ø)

The President: Well, again, I want to wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. I also wanted to say that I and the American people would like you to come to the White House this spring to accept the highest presidential award, the Medal of Freedom. (Ø)

Mrs. Thatcher: Of course I will accept. I am greatly honored and overwhelmed by this. (Ø)

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The President: Lech Walesa is probably the only other non-American who has received the award. The details of the visit for the presentation can be worked out later, but I very much look forward to seeing you at the White House in the spring. Be sure to bring Dennis and any other friends that you want to attend the ceremony. Now I just want to put Barbara on the phone. (C)

The First Lady: Merry Christmas, Margaret. I send my best wishes to you and Dennis. You know you are welcome to come stay with us anytime you come to the U.S. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher: Merry Christmas to you, Barbara. Thank you very much. I look forward to seeing both you and George next year. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Francois Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff, (notetaker)
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 24, 1990, 2:08-2:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Francois, comment allez vous? I am just calling to wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. I am with my family at Camp David and our spirits are good for the Christmas season, despite the difficult times. (U)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. Please give my warm regards to your family and my Christmas greetings. Is it cold there at Camp David? (U)

The President: Yes, and Barbara is out for one of her long walks in the cold. (U)

President Mitterrand: Is it a good cold? Are your children there? (U)

The President: Yes, it is a refreshing cold. The rest of my children and grandchildren arrive tonight, all except for two. Are you in Paris, or at your country home? (U)

President Mitterrand: I am in the country for a few days. (U)

The President: Listen, I don't want to talk business on Christmas Eve, but I would like to consider sending a very high-level emissary to visit you soon after the first of January to discuss the Gulf and a few other issues. (S)

President Mitterrand: I will be back in Paris on the morning of January 3. (U)

The President: I much appreciated your strong statement on the Gulf the other day. Would you be able to receive Brent Scowcroft, or someone else, soon after January 3? (S)

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President Mitterrand: Yes, certainly. I will receive him as soon as he arrives. We will then be in a more difficult time frame. (S)

The President: Yes, we will. I don't see any sign of change by Saddam Hussein, nor any room for flexibility on our part. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, that is right, as long as things remain as they are. But I am not sure that Saddam Hussein will not show some movement before January 15. (S)

The President: Perhaps, peut-etre, peut-etre. (U)

President Mitterrand: I hope you will have a good Christmas Eve with your family. You know you can reach me at any time. (U)

The President: I hesitated to call during your private holiday, but I wanted to tell you how much I appreciate our personal relationship. (U)

President Mitterrand: This is the time of year when one likes to be in touch with one's friends. Have a happy 1991!

The President: Let's keep in touch. Have a Merry Christmas.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Michel Rocard, Prime Minister of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Michel Rocard
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: December 24, 1990, 2:34-2:37 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you? Brent Scowcroft told me that you were in Washington and I just wanted to say hello. (U)

The Prime Minister: I am honored that you picked up the phone. I am in Washington on a private visit, showing my son the museums. (U)

The President: How long are you here? (U)

The Prime Minister: I am leaving for New York tomorrow and will be there until Sunday the 30th, but I could arrange to meet with you if you wanted to. We really need to do something about the GATT. (U)

The President: It is nice of you to offer but it doesn't look like it would work out. We are here up at Camp David and the family is coming to visit us from all over the country. Where are you staying in New York? (U)

The Prime Minister: At the French Consulate. (U)

The President: I just spoke with President Mitterrand a few minutes ago to wish him a good holiday. I knew you were here, and I just wanted to wish you well. (U)

The Prime Minister: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: December 28, 1990, 10:45 - 10:56 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello! How are you? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you, George. How are you? (U)

The President: I am fine, Turgut. I am just calling to wish you a very happy new year. I hope you are able to get a little rest. I have no real news out of the Gulf -- nothing on the diplomatic front that you don't know about. I keep reading in the press that Saddam will make some concession, but so far I see no change. Do you? (Ø)

President Ozal: No. If we keep the faith, that is the best course. If you look at their faces -- of their Minister of Information, for example -- you can see they are worried. (Ø)

The President: Please don't be disturbed about U.S. press reports concerning readiness. Don't worry. We will be ready for what we have to do. There are no plans to delay. (Ø)

President Ozal: I am not worried about it. I keep taking a hard line on Saddam Hussein. That's why I am getting criticized in our papers. (Ø)

The President: Because of your decisiveness and vision, Turkey is emerging as a leading player, commanding wide respect and wielding great influence. I know you have concerns about NATO's deliberations concerning ACE Mobile Force deployment. (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes. Germany's delay will harm our Government's position. (Ø)

The President: If Kohl had not been surprised, the matter would be settled already. We are in touch with the Germans at the highest level. I am monitoring the situation closely. If you need my intervention to produce a positive decision, I will be glad to do it. We will do what we can to ensure that outcome. (Ø)

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President Ozal: I already talked to Kohl. I said, look, we wanted the AMF not for military reasons but to show solidarity to Iraq, together with the U.S. and NATO. (Ø)

The President: What did he say? (Ø)

President Ozal: He said it was because the news came before there was a decision in NATO. It leaked to the papers. I don't know how -- perhaps in Brussels. (Ø)

The President: I think it will work out. I just wanted you to know that I have been briefed personally on this. I know this would send a strong signal to Iraq. (Ø)

President Ozal: We are sending more troops to the border area. (Ø)

The President: I am grateful for that. Also, on the question of your military and financing requests, we will share some initial thoughts with you after the first of the year, in the first week of January. I want to see common ground before our meeting. (Ø)

President Ozal: Are you coming in February? (Ø)

The President: I don't know. They still want a summit, and we want to go forward. We are thinking of a February 11-13 time frame. We told your Ambassador here that we would like to wait until mid-January before announcing the visit publicly since there are a number of events which might delay a trip to Moscow. I'll be back in touch on this. (Ø)

President Ozal: Another point: I talked to Kohl and learned they are trying some contact to Saddam Hussein. (Ø)

The President: What kind? (Ø)

President Ozal: He told me that Saddam Hussein will pull out. I think there are some special channels. (Ø)

The President: That's interesting. I didn't know about that. He thinks Saddam Hussein will pull out? (Ø)

President Ozal: He thinks there is a quite a big possibility. I am not so sure. (Ø)

The President: I'm not, either. (Ø)

President Ozal: Maybe he believes that because public opinion in Germany doesn't want a war. But in recent days I saw some changes in their faces in Iraq. They are starting to get the message. We will know by early January. (Ø)

The President: The worst would be a partial withdrawal. (Ø)

President Ozal: They could divide it into two parts: the Basra part -- the islands and oil fields -- and Kuwait. They may say

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we will pull out of Kuwait but keep Basra, which is historically ours. (S)

The President: I don't like that. It would fray the coalition. We will see. It will be a very interesting time period. Let's stay in close touch. For now, let me wish you a very happy new year. (S)

President Ozal: Same to you and your wife. The very best for 1991! (U)

The President: The same to you, my friend. I can't say how much I appreciate your support and determination. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
Notetaker: Richard N. Haass

DATE, TIME: December 31, 1990, 10:13 a.m. - 10:18 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

President: Hosni, how are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Hello George, how are you. (U)

President Bush: Fine. (U)

President Mubarak: We were just sitting here thinking of you and Barbara. (U)

President Bush: Great minds think alike. Barbara and I are at Camp David; it's very cold. I was just thinking of you, counting our blessings. (U)

President Mubarak: I want to wish you a happy new year. (U)

President Bush: Thank you, this will be an interesting time. I have not changed my mind about the importance of getting Iraq out of Kuwait without conditions. (Ø)

President Mubarak: In a speech tonight, I'm calling on him to be courageous and respond to peace. But he won't do anything. (Ø)

President Bush: I agree. We'll have to do something, and by something I mean to implement the UN resolutions. Don't be discouraged by the controversy here you've read about. It is just the Congress. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I understand. (Ø)

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President Bush: The EC is talking about sending somebody to see Aziz. This is fine, but there can be no compromise. (Ø)

President Mubarak: There will be no result if there is a meeting with the EC. (Ø)

President: I don't know if I should say something about seeing Aziz. Nothing will come out of that. You know he's accusing me of drinking. He's crazy. (Ø)

President Mubarak: You know, I sent him a tough message. I was very frank. (Ø)

President: Have you received an answer? (U)

President Mubarak: Well he just received it last night. (U)

President: What did you say? (U)

President Mubarak: I told him to get out. That it was going to be a problem you don't want around you. (Ø)

President: It's important he gets a clear message. I'm tired of saying the same thing. He's so unreasonable. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes, he is a strange man. (Ø)

President: He is. Well, I didn't call to commiserate about him. I called to wish you and Susie a happy new year. (U)

President Mubarak: Happy New Year to you and Barbara. Is Barbara there? (U)

President: Yes, she's here with me at Camp David. But she's gone swimming. (U)

Mubarak: In the cold? (U)

President: Well, we have an indoor heated pool here. (U)

President Mubarak: Well we're shivering here. Anyway, all the best. (U)

President: All the best to you and Susie. Is Susie there, I want to say Happy New Years to her. (U)

President Mubarak: Yes, she's here. She's on the line. (U)

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President: I'd like to wish you a happy new year. (U)

Mrs. Mubarak: How are you Mr. President? How was your Christmas? (U)

President: Oh fine. We had a wonderful family Christmas here at Camp David. (U)

Mrs. Mubarak: Oh that's wonderful. (U)

President: How is the beautiful fiancée? (U)

Mrs. Mubarak: Oh she is doing fine. (U)

President: Give her a hug from me; we can't do it in front of the cameras. (U)

Mrs. Mubarak: I will Mr. President. All the best to you and happy New Years. (U)

President: All the best. Good bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of Mexico
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli, NSC

DATE, TIME: December 31, 1990, 11:00 - 11:06 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David - Presidential Office, Mexico City

The President: Hello, my good friend Carlos. (U)

President Salinas: Hello, George, how are you? (U)

The President: I was just calling to wish you well for the New Year and to hope that all is going well with you. (U)

President Salinas: That is very kind of you, George, and I wish the same for you and Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President: We are all well and had a delightful holiday. We are still up at Camp David. It is getting pretty cold here now, but it is beautiful. Where are you right now? (U)

President Salinas: I returned yesterday to Mexico City to be ready for the beginning of the year. (U)

The President: I see. Well, we wish you well and we just loved our visit to Monterrey. We had a wonderful time on our trip to your beautiful country. Tell me, did you receive the photograph of me in my Mexican suit? Jeb was supposed to get it delivered to you. (U)

President Salinas: No, I haven't received it yet. (U)

The President: Well, I hope that it turns up. Some people were sensitive up here and did not want to see it released because I would get teased about it. But I am not worried about that. It is a picture of me in a Mexican outfit with black pants and a silver stripe running down the side; it's just wonderful. (U)

I just hope that we can continue the good work between our two countries that we had this year. And I appreciate your personal role in the good relations between our two countries. (U)

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President Salinas: Thank you, you are very kind. I hope the situation on January 15 will come out alright. (Ø)

The President: I am still worried about that. There is not much progress to report. Saddam Hussein has not taken a constructive posture toward resolving this issue. There seems to be no recognition that there is a serious risk of war. Why, just the other day he accused me of being drunk and being like Judas Iscariot. He can't seem to figure it out too well the risks involved. He seems to be convinced that he can get out of this situation without ever making a concession. I must say, though, that he has to leave Kuwait. We cannot make a concession on this issue. He still thinks that we would not use force; that we would be in trouble if we did, and that we would agree to some compromise if we did not. But we can't do that. And we are still working hard to try to convince him. But I am sorry to say there is no evidence of that. (Ø)

President Salinas: Yes, and the whole world is against him. The UN Security Council has spoken very clearly that he must leave Kuwait. (Ø)

The President: In our own hemisphere, what about the peace talks between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government? I understand that there is a meeting this week in Mexico City. (Ø)

President Salinas: Yes, there is a meeting next week with the five Presidents from Central America to take place in the southern state of Chiapas, along our border with Guatemala. I will be talking directly with President Cristiani and the other presidents. We will push for an economic support plan for recovery of the region, and for the pacification of El Salvador. I expect that we will all back President Cristiani in his position in the peace talks with the FMLN. (Ø)

The President: We have been very concerned with the military offensive by the FMLN, and their use of surface to air missiles and obstruction in the peace talks. Maybe there is something good that you and the Central American Presidents can do. (Ø)

But isn't the UN mediating talks between the government and the FMLN in Mexico City this week? (Ø)

President Salinas: We hope so, yes. (U)

The President: Your government can play an important role here. I know that you have helped before, and I hope you will use your leverage with the FMLN to negotiate a cease-fire just as soon as possible. I think this is one area where Mexican leadership is key. Our hands are pretty full now with the events in the Middle East. And if there is anything that you can think of that we can do, just let us know. I salute your efforts thus far in this. (Ø)

President Salinas: I will be talking with President Cristiani on Thursday, the 10th, and will discuss all of this with him. We all very much want an end to the FMLN offensive and a cease-fire. (S)

The President: That would be good. (U)

Are you going to be able to take any time off? (U)

President Salinas: Yes. (U)

The President: I am taking the day off. How about you tomorrow? (U)

President Salinas: Oh, yes, totally. It is a holiday here. (U)

The President: Well, I am proud of our friendship, Carlos. I can't tell you how much we value your role in fostering good relations. (U)

President Salinas: I appreciate your kind words. We all enjoyed your visit to Monterrey. (U)

The President: It was wonderful. (U)

President Salinas: Your trip was very well received. It made a very good impression on the Mexican people and we were glad that you could come. (U)

The President: I was delighted. Well, good luck to you in 1991, and my love to all of your wonderful family who received us with so much warmth during our visit. (U)

President Salinas: Thank you, the same to you, and thank you very much for this call. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Salinas: Goodbye, George. (U)

- End of Conversation-

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WASHINGTON

#0017

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter Mrs. Shukran
Notetaker: Richard Haass

DATE, TIME December 31, 1990, 1:58 - 2:22 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

President Bush: Hello Your Majesty, this is George Bush. (U)

King Fahd: Welcome Mr. President. I wish to congratulate you and offer great success in the new year. (U)

President: That's why I'm calling you. I hope to work with you in a most cooperative way. At year's end, we count our blessings and I'm grateful for the wonderful cooperation we've had and for our friendship. (U)

The other point I'd like to make to you is that my view remains exactly the same as when we talked in Saudi Arabia. I don't think Saddam Hussein will compromise and if there is no total withdrawal very soon, we will have to do what we will have to do. (U)

We will just keep staying on course. This will be a very interesting two week period. What is your feeling on the subject? (Ø)

King Fahd: First of all, I'd like to confirm to you Mr. President, that we continue to have the same united point of view and we will continue to be united until the very end. (Ø)

Second, Saddam Hussein was given a chance and no one can say he was not adequately given a chance to comply. (Ø)

Third, as far as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is concerned, we all agree with the U.S. as what needs to be done. No one can influence us. What you think and perceive is exactly what I think and perceive. Mr. President, you are fully authorized to

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do what you think will achieve the objectives of truth and justice. This is my opinion and the opinion of all the people and government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (Ø)

President: That's very good. There is some talk that the EC will be sending someone to see Aziz and this is ok with me, but I don't think he can make compromises. I don't believe Aziz has the power to make a decision to withdraw. (Ø)

King Fahd: This is true, Mr. President, we are not bothered at all by the Europeans going to meet with Tariq Aziz. Let's see if they can get him to budge, get him to move. It is your opinion, mine and Saudi Arabia's that Saddam must withdraw completely and unconditionally. But let them go and talk. (Ø)

President: I agree with that; the only thing that I'm worried about is that at the last minute he'll make a statement to partly withdraw. That will not be sufficient for the U.S. (Ø)

Fahd: This is true, Mr. President. This is not acceptable to Saudi Arabia or any other country in the world that believes in truth and justice. (Ø)

President: That's true. We will stay firm on that point. Over the next two weeks, you will be reading a lot of controversy in the U.S. because the Congress is coming into session in two days. But do not let this discourage you. Congress is covering its own tracks. They do not want to take action and do not have the power or right to tie the hands of the President. (Ø)

Fahd: I am certain of what you are saying. I agree with you. Like you, I expect this controversy to take place and people to say to wait and give sanctions time to work. But why did Saddam Hussein give Iran everything it wanted after 8 years of fighting? If he wants to do the right thing, he can withdraw from Kuwait totally and unconditionally. Anyone who argues to wait is talking for the purpose of discussion only. I believe the Congress and the people will be on your side and back you up completely because you believe in truth and justice. (Ø)

President: I noticed Khomeini attacked us today about our wanting to leave troops in the area. But I don't understand why he chose today. (Ø)

Fahd: I hope Mr. President you won't pay attention to what Khomeini has said and his attack. We've known him for 10 years; he was addressing his own people. This is only for local consumption. He will not get involved in the Gulf crisis. (Ø)

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President: That's good because basically I believe Iran has been pretty good during the crisis. (Ø)

King Fahd: Yes, Mr. President. If you permit me Mr. President, I would like to express this idea. If any member of Congress believes Saddam will leave Kuwait after a year, let them go to Iraq and speak to Saddam. If there is some way he can be persuaded to withdraw without conditions, let them go and try to talk with him. We know that he will not accept any discussion on this subject. (Ø)

President: I agree. There is no flexibility about this at all. Every time they insist they will not withdraw from Kuwait. We have very little to talk about. (Ø)

King Fahd: This is true, Mr. President. Saddam Hussein has been given a chance and an opportunity. We both have made statements that he must withdraw from Kuwait. If he wants to follow the logical course, this is what he must do. As far as we're concerned, we agree with what you have said. (Ø)

President: Do you think he'll try to make a last minute compromise offer before January 15 like a partial withdrawal? (Ø)

King Fahd: I believe the possibility for that is about ten percent and believe he does not know he does not know and I also believe he does not know that he is about to self-destruct.

President: I agree that he does not know. We will remain resolute. I really called to wish you a happy new year. (Ø)

King Fahd: I thank you, Mr. President, and I'd like to wish all of us victory in all areas and success in all our endeavors, God willing. (U)

President: Thank you. I agree. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10092 Add-on

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
on December 31, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME December 31, 1990, 7:00 - 7:13pm EST
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The President telephoned Prime Minister Kaifu to send New Year greetings. (U)

The President: Hello Toshiki, Happy New Year. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Happy New Year, George. (U)

The President: That's why I was calling to wish you and your family a Happy New Year. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Very glad to hear your fine voice. (U)

The President: We, the Bush family, always count our blessings at this time of year and one of our blessings is our friendship with you, and I want to wish you and your family and the people of Japan the very best for the New Year. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: I am very glad to hear that. (U)

The President: I also want to thank you for what you described regarding Host Nation Support in your December 20 letter. The new agreement will strengthen our alliance. We appreciate that very much and know it was not easy for you. I wish you well and notice you have made some changes in your Government. It looks like you are on top of that too. Good luck there too. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Thank you. With respect to Host Nation Support, based on our discussion in September, when I promised I would do as much as possible, I have done as I said and made the decisions described in my letter. We will get to the 50%-50%

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point on burdensharing in the final year of the five-year defense plan. We hope to complete the signatures between the U.S. and Japan in January and get the agreement approved by the Diet in the next session. We are trying for a maximum effort and this will be helped by maintaining the same Foreign Minister and Minister of Finance, even with the cabinet reshuffle. (U)

The President: Thanks very much. We enjoy working with them very much. I won't keep you because I really called to wish you a happy New Year. I appreciate your help on the Persian Gulf and know it has not been easy for you. I am not sure that we will have a peaceful solution but we will keep trying. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: George, I am very aware that you have exercised great leadership, particularly with regard to your proposal for direct dialogue with Iraq. I sincerely hope a dialogue can lead to peace. As part of this, I wrote a letter to Saddam Hussein. I sincerely hope that your efforts will achieve a peaceful solution. (U)

The President: I know about your letter and thought it was very constructive. The problem is that Saddam Hussein shows no propensity whatsoever for getting out of Kuwait that we can tell but we will keep trying. The January 15 date is a serious deadline. The UN must not fail in this regard. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: With the January 15 deadline just around the corner, the world must keep sending Iraq the correct message. (U)

The President: That's a very good point and a very important point. We will be talking about this when we meet tomorrow night with Secretaries Baker and Cheney, and Generals Scowcroft and Powell. We want to give peace every chance. We are talking too much business and I just wanted to say, God bless you and have a wonderful New Year. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Thank you very much. I am looking forward to your visit to Japan. (U)

The President: I want to come and I will come. I will get my people working on the dates. Good luck and thanks for taking my call. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Not at all. Good luck and good health.

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