

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91112
Folder ID Number: 91112-002

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/22/90 - 10/5/90

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	8/22/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis of Greece (2 pp.)	8/22/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (1 pp.)	8/23/90	(b)(1)	C
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	8/24/90	(b)(1)	C
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President George Vassiliou of Cyprus (2 pp.)	8/25/90	(b)(1)	S
06. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak (2 pp.)	8/26/90	(b)(1)	C
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	8/27/90	(b)(1)	C
08. Telcon	Re: Telcon with United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar (3 pp.)	8/28/90	(b)(1)	C
09. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan on August 29, 1990 (3 pp.)	8/29/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 5

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/22/90 - 10/5/90

Pinksheet Number: cap944
OA/ID Number: 91112-002
Date Closed: 2/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Bendjedid of Algeria (3 pp.)	8/29/90	(b)(1)	S
11. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan on August 29, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/29/90	(b)(1)	S
12. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	S
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	C
14. Telcon	Re: President's Telephone Conversation with the Amir of Kuwait (2 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	S
15. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Zayyid of United Arab Emirates (2 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	S
16. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	S
17. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	8/31/90	(b)(1)	S
18. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (4 pp.)	8/31/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 5

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19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Francois Mitterrand, President of France (4 pp.)	8/31/90	(b)(1)	S
20. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on September 1, 1990 (2 pp.)	9/1/90	(b)(1)	C
21. Telcon	Re: President's Telephone Call from the President of Yemen (3 pp.)	9/1/90	(b)(1)	S
22. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to the UN Secretary General (3 pp.)	9/5/90	(b)(1)	S
23. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (4 pp.)	9/6/90	(b)(1)	S
24. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	9/6/90	(b)(1)	C
25. Telcon	Re: Presidential Telephone Call to President Assad of Syria (2 pp.)	9/6/90	(b)(1)	S
26. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	9/6/90	(b)(1)	S
27. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (3 pp.)	9/7/90	(b)(1)	S
28. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	9/10/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 3 of 5

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29. Telcon	Re: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on September 10, 1990 (4 pp.)	9/10/90	(b)(1)	S
30. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Francois Mitterrand, President of France (2 pp.)	9/10/90	(b)(1)	S
31. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (2 pp.)	9/10/90	(b)(1)	S
32. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)	9/11/90	(b)(1)	C
33. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan, September 13, 1990 (3 pp.)	9/13/90	(b)(1)	C
34. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom on September 14, 1990 (4 pp.)	9/14/90	(b)(1)	S
35. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	9/14/90	(b)(1)	C
36. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from President Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	9/16/90	(b)(1)	C
37. Telcon	Re: Telcon to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	C
38a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the ANC, South Africa, on October 5, 1990 (1 pp.)	10/5/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 4 of 5

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38b. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the ANC, South Africa, on October 5, 1990 (3 pp.)	10/5/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 5 of 5

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Stephen Benko, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 22, 1990, 8:15 - 8:36am
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Helmut, how are you, my friend? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am fine. How are you? (U)

The President: We're still here in Kennebunkport. Glad to hear from you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I just want to find out how you see the issues. You know we had the WEU meeting, after the EC meeting, on cooperation. I coordinated with Foreign Minister Genscher for full support of the U.S. position. I wanted to hear your thoughts after you heard about the results of those two bodies. (U)

There was something else I wanted to raise. As you know, at the time of the 1948 constitution, under the urging of the occupation forces in Germany, we accepted restrictions on military operations for Germany outside of its borders. (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: And now we are under pressure from the Socialists to defend the Constitution. We are trying to change the Constitution, but it won't happen very quickly. I hope that we can do it before the UN Resolution. It is very important that solidarity be a two-way street. The U.S. has always helped us, so we want to be able to help in any way we can. (U)

The President: Helmut, that's fine. I understand your position and respect it. I have followed the WEU and the internal German discussions. We respect your position and are grateful for the solidarity you were able to project. I felt the WEU statement

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was very helpful. I also understand the constraints you face on out-of-area commitments and appreciate your efforts to modify them. We view your sending forces to the eastern Mediterranean as very helpful to substitute for those deployed to the Gulf. (Ø)

If you're asking for my viewpoints, Helmut, Turkey has been very steadfast. Ozal has been strong. So we need to consider financial assistance to Turkey. Same is true of Egypt. Mubarak is acting very well in all of this. Jordan is also in a squeeze. King Hussein says they are supporting the sanctions, but the jury is still out on that in my view. If they all cooperate fully, that's an area where we should give financial assistance. (Ø)

On the rest of the situation, we're determined to enforce the naval blockade, the interdiction. The Yemenis permitted one ship to go by. They said at the UN it would not unload. There are now three other ships on the way to Yemen which contravene the UN sanctions. (Ø)

Whether or not we get the collective action at the UN we want, these ships should not be allowed to get through. For your information, the captain of the first ship said at first that he was only carrying water as ballast. But later he admitted he was carrying oil. (Ø)

On the broader front, we continue to move forces to Saudi Arabia, and so do other powers. At this time, I believe it would be exceedingly reckless for Saddam Husayn to attack Saudi Arabia. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I don't think he will. (Ø)

The President: I kind of agree with you on that. I'm also very concerned about the foreign individuals there. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, quite so. (U)

The President: There is no basis for their position to call them guests. His actions make them hostages. But using human beings as human shields is unacceptable by any norms of human law. (U)

Another comment on the broad front: Saddam Husayn is trying to make this the world against the U.S. The world should make the case this is the civilized world against Saddam Husayn, Arab and non-Arab. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I fully agree. I will say so. George, thanks very much for these thoughts. And if we can do anything more under the existing Constitution, we will be very happy to do so. Please phone me day or night. This is a big challenge, and failure has dire consequences. Many parts of the world are watching and will know what outrages they can commit. (U)

The President: I appreciate it. Any public statements you can make would be helpful in case we have to interdict. (Ø)

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Chancellor Kohl: I will make a special point of it in Parliament. (U)

The President: I don't want to do anything reckless. But the status quo is unacceptable. I'm increasingly worried, but still hope the sanctions work. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Thanks very much, George. There is another issue I want to raise with you which is gaining momentum in the elections. This concerns low-flying aircraft. This is a very important domestic issue. Stoltenberg has had good conversations with Cheney. There is one point I want to discuss. That is the altitude of 200-300 meters. It ought to be our aim to restrict aircraft to a figure above 300 meters. This is a clearly important and central matter to Germany. It is important and I would like to request you to request your people to help reach a satisfactory result. (Ø)

The President: Helmut, in about three hours Cheney and General Colin Powell will be here in Kennebunkport. I know Cheney and Stoltenberg have been in regular contact on this subject and we have already taken several steps to address the problem. I am acutely aware of the politics involved and will remind Cheney of them. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: This is very important to me personally. Despite many things going on, this is the most important of many domestic issues. If you could be of any help, it would be helpful. (Ø)

The President: If it's important to you, I'll tell Cheney to be responsive. Let's leave it at that. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Many thanks. (U)

The President: We'll be in touch. Barbara and I give our best to you and Hannelore. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Constantine Mitsotakis of Greece (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 22, 1990, 11:44-11:49 a.m.
AND PLACE Kennebunkport

The President: Hello. How are you, Mr. Prime Minister? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Good morning, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good morning. I am calling to thank you for your courageous actions in support of the multinational effort to maintain sanctions against Iraq. Your government has taken a courageous position and we appreciate it. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you very much. I appreciate your call and the opportunity to talk. (U)

The President: I understand your opposition has criticized your actions. We were very encouraged by your government's statement of a few days ago reaffirming Greek support for international efforts to counter Iraqi aggression and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. I also wanted to mention that we were pleased by your contribution of a frigate to the multinational naval force and by your permission of overflights. I am told that Greece participated in the WEU meeting yesterday and we were pleased by its results. (U)

I do think it is important for free countries to stay together to make this an international opposition to Saddam Husayn. He is trying to make it a U.S.-Iraq conflict when it is much more than that--it is an international conflict with Iraq. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you. Greece is firmly resolved to follow its line. We have had trouble with the opposition, yes, but we will not change. We also have economic problems because of this crisis, especially due to our previous arrangements with Iraq on oil. But this is no reason to change our position. You can count on Greece. (U)

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21 8/21/2009
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The President: I don't know if you are aware that we have asked your government for permission for KC-135 tankers to be stationed temporarily in Greece to help with our deployment in the Gulf. I hope you can agree to this request. (S)

We talked in June about building a more hopeful era in U.S.-Greek relations. Your actions have proven that. I was with some Greek-Americans yesterday and they and I are very hopeful about the future of our relationship. They are very proud of you. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you. We are prepared to do anything we can on this common effort. You can count on us. (U)

The President: I am very grateful for that statement. Please stay in touch. We should stay in touch on this. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: What is the position of China and the USSR on the UN resolution? (U)

The President: We will know very soon. The USSR has been supportive overall on this crisis, but dragged its feet yesterday in the UN. They want to wait but we will try to get their support for a formal UN resolution. The Chinese won't vote against a resolution but favor a multilateral force in naval and ground forces. I hope the new UN resolution tracks with the WEU statement yesterday. And I hope we get both their support. We do want a resolution soon. There are several ships underway in the Gulf to possibly violate sanctions. We cannot afford that. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Good. Thank you very much. I appreciated your call. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl
of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 23, 1990, 12:24-12:27 p.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, George. (U)

The President: I am sorry to bother you in the Bundestag where I
know you are working. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: This is a pleasant interruption, George. (U)

The President: You raised yesterday the question of 300 meters
on our flights. I have talked to Dick Cheney who was very
understanding, and to General Scowcroft. I wanted to tell you
that we will no longer exercise below 300 meters. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That is fantastic news, George. (Ø)

The President: I am glad to do it and I hope it will be helpful
to you personally. We'll have some grumbling, but it is the
right move. After you called, I wanted to do what we could. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, George. This is really a great help
to me personally. I wish you the best and will talk to you soon.
(Ø)

The President: Let's stay in touch. Good-bye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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El 11/19/07
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HAWKE

AUG 23 - PRES CALL FROM PRIME MINISTER HAWKE OF
AUSTRALIA. MONITORED BY PETER WATSON. PRES
AT KENNEBUNKPORT - INITIATED 1805 - CONCLUDED 1825

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7049

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 24, 1990; 4:06 - 4:12 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

King Hussein initiated the call. (U)

King Hussein: How are you, sir? I have some good news. I wrote the President in Iraq. I appealed to him to help out on the guests there. In response, Iraq has stated that the families and children of all foreigners, including Americans, can leave. I don't know what that means but it seems to be good news. (Ø)

The President: That sounds very good. What exactly does it say?
(Ø)

King Hussein: It is a small message. Our communications with Baghdad are not very good. It says: The families and children of all foreigners, including Americans, can leave. (Ø)

The President: But not of others...? (Ø)

King Hussein: This is probably a first step. Somehow if the atmosphere can improve, then the situation may take a turn for the better. If there is a feeling on both sides, if both said that no aggression is planned, then maybe one could do more. (Ø)

The President: The display on television yesterday was appalling. Maybe he intended differently, but it came out bad. In addition, ships are still steaming out. Well, I appreciate the call. I consider it good news. For anybody to get out, it's good news. We don't call them guests -- we think they are hostages because there are demands. But this is a good step -- but what should be done is the question. We have the same problem here as in Lebanon -- one gets out, then they ask "OK, what will you do?" (Ø)

King Hussein: He isn't asking but I am suggesting that if a way can be found to improve the atmosphere, maybe we can help. (Ø)

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The President: We still have a great problem with him holding folks against their will, or staked out someplace. (Ø)

King Hussein: We will stay in touch. I'm going to try to form a group to work on a solution. (Ø)

The President: When will this release be announced, do you know? (Ø)

King Hussein: Shortly. I was just letting you know in advance. (Ø)

The President: Thanks very much. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President George Vassiliou of Cyprus

Participants: The President
President George Vassiliou
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 25, 1990, 2:05-2:05 p.m. 2:07-2:12 p.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Hello Mr. Prime Minister. What's going on? (U)

President Vassiliou: Thanks for calling Mr. President. I want to express admiration for the cool and measured way in which you are handling the crisis. You have made it clear to the world that there is no reason for panicking and that each step that you have taken has been seriously considered. (S)

The President: The UN Security Council resolution last night was a very important victory. (S)

President Vassiliou: Yes, it was excellent. I want you to know that when the UN imposed sanctions on Iraq, Cyprus immediately stopped all trade. This included our oil imports and our very substantial exports to Iraq. We are happy to have the United States using bases in Cyprus as a transit point and we are ready to do anything else we can to support you. **(The telephone conversation was cut at this point and reestablished 2 minutes later).** (S)

The President: I appreciate all that you have done. (S)

President Vassiliou: If there is any other service or facility that we can offer, please let us know. (S)

The President: I had heard of your extraordinary cooperation and I admire it. We will continue to try to enforce the will of the UN. (S)

President Vassiliou: If they do not comply with the UN resolutions, then there is no long-term option. A long-term embargo would be counterproductive. (S)

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8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

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The President: I agree. An embargo will not work unless it has an impact very quickly. The way that Husayn has taken hostages, and the way that he is treating them, is an international offense that should be punished in the same way that the war criminals at Nuremberg were punished. (S)

President Vassiliou: Yes, he is absolutely ruthless. It is not for me to give you advise, but I believe that, as soon as your forces are ready, then you should move on. Even if the embargo works, you will win the battle but lose the war. In a long embargo, Husayn will become the hero of the Arab world. (S)

The President: Yes -- although I feel better now that we have U.S. troops there and contingents from other nations. At least, Saudi Arabia is now safe. (S)

President Vassiliou: Yes, but when your forces are there and ready, you must move on. (S)

The President: I think you are right, but we are working hard in the meantime to get a resolution. (S)

President Vassiliou: I support you 100 percent. (S)

The President: I am very grateful for your support. I agree that a long-term stalemate is not good enough. Thank you for calling. (S)

President Vassiliou: Thank you, Mr. President (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/22/90 - 10/5/90

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By 32 (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(665)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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6801

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt on August 26, 1990 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Interpreter: None required
Notetaker: Richard Haass, David Radi

DATE, TIME August 26, 1990, 1:05 - 1:12 pm EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President telephoned President Mubarak concerning the situation in the Persian Gulf region. (Ø)

The President: Hosni, how's the world's greatest diplomat? (U)

President Mubarak: Fine, fine. (U)

The President: I'm calling on a closely held matter. | (b) (1)
(b) (1)

President Mubarak: I will study this and call you tomorrow if I can. (Ø)

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The President: Okay, please do call. |
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Please be frank with me.

(C)
President Mubarak: I will study this very sincerely. (C)

The President: Everything else seems to be going very well. I am pleased with the UN action. We must stop the Iraqi shipping. It is not fair to our and your soldiers out there in the heat to allow these ships to just go steaming by. We will interdict them if we have to. (C)

President Mubarak: We must be very firm in the sanctions. (C)

The President: I was very pleased with the Soviet reaction. At the beginning I was worried, but not now. They seem to want to be part of the response to the problem. (C)

President Mubarak: It is good that you have brought them in. (C)

The President: Hosni, let me know if you have any other suggestions. You know that you gave me the original suggestion for all this here in Washington long before Saddam Hussein came on the scene. You told me to get on the phone and call these other leaders. (C)

President Mubarak: Oh, thank you. (U)

The President: My only problem is if you invite my old friend Muammar Qadhafi. (C)

(b)(1)

President Mubarak: I will study your ideas and phone you tomorrow afternoon.

The President: Thank you and goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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INITIATED 1328 - TERMINATED 1340. PRES AT
KENNEBUNKPORT.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	8/27/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/22/90 - 10/5/90

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By 31 (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(666)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WASHINGTON



6802

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak of Egypt
Interpreter: None required
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 27, 1990; 9:33 - 9:38 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

President Mubarak initiated the call. (U)

The President: Good morning, Hosni, how are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Just fine; how are you? (U)

The President: Well, everything is rocking along. The news is reasonably steady. How do you see things? (U)

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The President: Thank you very much and goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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6877

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with United Nations Secretary
General Javier Perez de Cuellar (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General
of the United Nations
Nancy Bearg Dyke (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 28, 1990, 6:15 - 6:22 pm EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned UNSYG de Cuellar concerning the latter's trip to Iraq. (U)

The President: Javier, how are you, my friend? How's the traveler? Nice to talk to you. (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: I am leaving tomorrow. Then I will be in Jordan in the evening. I'm glad to have this opportunity to hear your views before I leave. (U)

The President: I am grateful that you are undertaking this critical mission on behalf of the world community. I am pleased that your skills will be put to this big trust. I hope you make headway in resolving this crisis. There are reports that Saddam Hussein is still locked in to annexation of Kuwait. I am pleased that you are doing this. I'm not particularly optimistic. You know them, though, and will know what to say. Saddam Hussein has said Kuwait is a province now. I really called to wish you well on your mission. (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: I'm not very optimistic. My role is to negotiate the Security Council resolutions. I'll see if there is a way out and to implement the resolutions. Actually, George, when I go, I will be exposing them. If they don't show good will, they will expose themselves to the world. (U)

The President: Will you see Saddam Hussein too? (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: Only Tariq Aziz at this point. What would you like me to keep in mind in my discussions? (U)

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The President: The Security Council resolutions. Also, he wants it to be Iraq versus the US, but it's not that. It would be helpful if you could make the point that it is not just the United States. (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: Certainly. You are kind to wish me well. I don't expect miracles. We will show if they are in good will or not, whether they will implement the resolutions or not. I don't want to raise hopes. (U)

The President: I'll appreciate anything you can do to convince him that using American citizens, British citizens and others as shields is so brutal and increases anger against him. (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: UNSC Resolutions 661 and 664 will be my priorities. I'll discuss them with him. (U)

The President: I'm very proud of the UN. The UN has taken its role seriously, and I am glad we waited to have the Soviets come along on the resolution (on enforcing sanctions). I am so proud of Ambassador Tom Pickering too. (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: We have shown the world that the UN exists. Yes, Ambassador Pickering's diplomacy has been marvelous. (Also comment on President's leadership.) (U)

The President: How are things down in Peru? (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: We have a courageous new President. He is tough and firm. He told me he will implement everything he promised. I told the World Bank. The IMF is delighted with the man. We need to provide food assistance now, including milk. Public opinion shows incredible serenity(?). I would appreciate anything you can do to provide anything -- food: sugar, rice, milk; medicine. (Ø)

The President: Medicine? (Ø)

Secretary General de Cuellar: Medicine, yes. The former regime was a shame. The new president is not a demagogue. (Ø)

The President: We'll see what we can do. Do you want the fact of this call to be private or public? (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: It would be normal for people to know because you have people there and you are a key figure in this. (U)

The President: I'd like to say I called you and wished you well on your mission. (U)

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Secretary General de Cuellar: Perfect. I would like to be able to say we talked. (U)

The President: We'll tell our press here, and you can of course talk to the UN press and others up there. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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6954

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan on
August 29, 1990

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Kaifu
Interpreter: Francis Seeds
Notetaker: Peter Watson

DATE, TIME August 29, 1990, 7:02 - 7:17 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Toshiko, how are you? (U)

PM Kaifu: Fine, thank you. (U)

The President: Delighted to hear from you, what's on your mind?
(U)

PM Kaifu: At the outset, once again let me express my highest respect for the way you have been handling Iraq. We understand the fact that the United States people are now trying to defend freedom with their youth and exposing many lives to danger and incurring great financial difficulties. (U)

During our last call, I understood the seriousness of your commitment to the situation - which I understand further from the visit of Foreign Minister Nakayama to the region, who also advised me of the expectations of the front-line states. I have just been briefed by my Ambassador to Washington who has advised me of the situation in the United States. Accordingly, we have considered all of the options open to us to see how we can help, with the exception of sending our self-defense forces, which has significant constitutional limitations. Following this review, we have decided on a number of measures, and I will announce those at a press conference today. (U)

The first measure we are taking is to provide assistance to the United States and the Multi-National Forces ("MNF") in areas of transportation, equipment, medical supplies and medical personnel. In particular, we will be supplying materials and equipment such as shelter and water supply to the MNF. In this respect, we will exert maximum effort to ensure the means of transportation and financial assistance to the MNF. (U)

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We will also extend a substantial scale of economic support to the negatively-effected states such as Jordan, Turkey and Egypt, as well as bearing substantial assistance for the flood of refugees. (Ø)

Also, while there are political and legal difficulties, I will try to increase public support to formulating a new law to allow our self-defense forces to play a role in global situations. (Ø)

I am fully aware of the need for the Japanese contribution to be very visible. Actually this is not at all easy, and I have to give serious thought as to how I implement the initiatives I have described. (Ø)

But I must stress that I must strongly condemn the taking by Iraq of our citizens, and I look forward to our continued close cooperation to obtain the release of our people. (Ø)

The President: When will you be announcing publicly your initiatives? (Ø)

PM Kaifu: I will announce these in a press conference I am holding in less than an hour. (U)

The President: Good. These are helpful first steps and will be well received. Later today, I will be meeting with my senior advisors to review total overall needs, both our own - the U.S. has expended many resources - but also looking at more global needs. Though I think your initiatives are well received, I will be back in contact with you after we have adopted our plan of assistance with additional ideas for your help. In this respect, it would be helpful if you could describe your package as an initial one so we could consult to determine what additional assistance Japan and the United States can provide. (Ø)

I think Japan's role, globally, and that of the United States, is being carefully watched, and I want to be sure nothing comes out of this that will allow criticism of the U.S./Japan relationship, which both of us consider to be so important. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: I fully agree. I wish to continue to exert utmost efforts to avoid any such criticism and to obtain the understanding of the American people. Accordingly, we will be considering additional financial support for the MNF. (Ø)

The President: We are pleased with this - we appreciate the close cooperation between us; it is very important that we stay together. I hope that the sanctions are very effective; however, the jury is still very much out on that. (Ø)

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PM Kaifu: I agree, and hope that the economic sanctions can be effective to bring peace back to the region. And again, we deeply appreciate your dedicated efforts in maintaining peace in the region. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. We will be watching your announcement and how it is received. Thank you for the courtesy of this call. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: Thank you. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Bendjedid of
Algeria (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Bendjedid of Algeria
Intepreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 29, 1990, 3:37 - 4:10 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: Hello, my friend, how are you? Can you hear me?
(U)

President Bendjedid: (In English) Hello, Mr. President, I am
fine. How are you? (U)

The President: Mr. President, it is good to talk to you again.
I know that my Ambassador, Chris Ross, has spoken with your
people about the Gulf crisis, but really I'm calling to solicit
your personal views and some advice from an old friend. With
your permission, a couple of points, and then I will ask your
advice that you can share with me. (Ø)

President Bendjedid: Please. (U)

The President: It looks like we share the same goal, laid out in
Security Council Resolution 660: get Iraq out of Kuwait. Our
best instrument is strict compliance with the sanctions. We feel
international support is very solid. Shortly, 22 countries are
going to be on the ground and at sea, and that's a truly
impressive demonstration of international, but also, we think, of
Arab solidarity. What is lacking is any sincere Iraqi interest
in an acceptable diplomatic solution. And, Foreign Minister
Ghozali's trip was really illuminating to me. I read the report
from our people with great interest. It showed that Saddam
Hussein is not yet ready to listen to reason. Let me tell you,
we would prefer a viable negotiation, not a military solution,
but given the UN actions, any negotiation must be based on Iraq
getting out and Kuwait's legitimate government coming back. Last
point, sir -- the question of the hostages. Saddam Hussein calls
them guests. This treatment of innocent civilians is really
brutal and again the conscience of the world. We want our people
free, but we will not trade our policies for them. The policies

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won't be held hostage because he is holding innocent civilians. I can't look at it that way. I greatly respect Algeria's positions. I appreciate your decision to explore Iraqi thinking. Very constructive effort. Well, I've done all the talking, and I would appreciate any advice or thoughts that you have. (Ø)

President Bendjedid: I thank you for the confidence you placed in me and Algeria and I am happy to share views on the dangerous situation in the Gulf area. I do not wish to address the UN resolutions because we are committed to them. I would like to affirm Algeria's position, Mr. President, and would like to affirm that this position will not change. We continue our efforts to persuade Iraq to comply with the UN resolutions and depart Kuwait. Algeria's effort is within the framework of the UN resolutions -- Iraq should withdraw and be replaced by Arab troops who would assist in the restoration of the legitimate government. Secondary issues would be resolved in time. Most important point is for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait; all other secondary issues in the conflict would be resolved in due time. We hope the United States will show flexibility so that we can have time to deal with the parties involved and the main issue, because our preference is for a peaceful solution. We should do all we can; if we reach a dead end, the situation will become more difficult. If that should happen, the Algerian position will be clarified more at that time. (Ø)

The President: That's very interesting. What do you mean, sir, by U.S. flexibility? (Ø)

President Bendjedid: What I mean is that we do everything we can for a peaceful solution to the crisis. What I am saying is try to avoid any action leading to armed conflict. (Ø)

The President: Certainly we are trying to do that. We have a collective obligation to enforce sanctions, not just us, but all the countries that subscribe to the sanctions should do their part to see that they are enforced. I would hope Saddam Hussein will not resist the implementation of sanctions, not only on the sea but elsewhere. (Ø)

President Bendjedid: What I mean by flexibility is we avoid any military explosion in the area because it would impede all efforts for a political solution. (Ø)

The President: I see that. Will he continue to hold the Americans, Brits, Germans, Japanese, Arabs, and others? Or, will he free them, do what is civilized and decent? (Ø)

President Bendjedid: I have had contacts with numerous Arab and non-Arab officials and delegations. As a result of those contacts, I still see a glimmer of hope that Iraq will comply with international resolutions. As long as there is hope I still see a role for Algeria to persuade Saddam Hussein to abandon its

radical policies and turn to the other issues that remain unresolved in the area. (Ø)

The President: I hope that is right. Last question -- I am worried about an old friend, King Hussein. He came to see you; I saw some beautiful pictures of your meeting. I wonder how his pulse is and how you see his dilemma at this point? (Ø)

President Bendjedid: He is in fact in a difficult position. But however, I have found that he remains resolute and committed to his position, which is a just position. He is not inclined to favor the Iraqi position and there may be some personal factors involved in that. I do think Jordan's position is reasonable and constructive because it is designed to deal with the question in depth, that is the question of Kuwait. (Ø)

The President: Well, that's good to hear. For understandable reasons he has been portrayed as on Saddam Hussein's side. He has hurt himself in the west, here to some degree as well, and in the Gulf. He is a good man, and I want to see him come out of this in good shape. (Ø)

President Bendjedid: The way Jordan is pursuing finding a peaceful solution is not the only way. There are many approaches being pursued. What I would like to say is that we will continue our approach and will continue our contacts with you, particularly if something develops of an important nature. We will contact you and exchange views on these matters because it is important to do so to keep peace and avoid international catastrophes. (Ø)

The President: I was confident you would feel this way. We will try to show what you call flexibility but I am increasingly concerned about events. It is almost inconceivable what he is doing to innocent civilians. But I'll try to show what you call flexibility. (Ø)

President Bendjedid: I share your concern for the innocent civilians. I will do everything we can to resolve their plight peacefully and satisfactorily. We are not only concerned about the Arabs but about all foreign nationals. We will do all we can. (Ø)

The President: Good luck, my friend. Very nice talking to you again. (U)

President Bendjedid: I thank you too. It is good we talked. Thank you for your confidence in me. We will continue our efforts for the cause of peace. (U)

The President: Good luck, sir. Thanks. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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6955

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan on
August 29, 1990

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Kaifu
Interpreter: Francis Seeds
Notetaker: Peter Watson

DATE, TIME August 29, 1990, 8:39 - 8:44 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I appreciate your call. What is happening? (U)

PM Kaifu: I wanted to let you know that, since our last conversation, I have worked through the night with my Minister of Finance and my Minister of Foreign Affairs to take specific actions, and I wish to advise you of those. (Ø)

The President: Good. (U)

PM Kaifu: We have decided two things. With respect to assistance to the Multi-National Force ("MNF"), following my instruction to my Minister of Finance to exercise maximum cooperation, we have decided to extend \$1 billion out of this year's fiscal budget for assistance to the MNF for such items as transportation, supply of materials, and the like. Secondly, we will be shortly concluding a package of assistance to the front-line states. Accordingly, I have instructed Mr. Utsumi of the Ministry of Finance to consult with your advisors to try and finalize this package as soon as possible. (Ø)

The President: We are very pleased with that, and we are also pleased about the first point as well. This is very prompt action, and will be very much appreciated in the United States. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: We look forward to staying in close touch with you, and I would appreciate your explaining our position to Congress. (Ø)

The President: Well, most congressmen are not in town now, but I will advise them of your assistance when they come back. Thank you again for your quick response. Good luck to you, sir. (Ø)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Stephen E. Benko, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 30, 1990, 2:45 p.m. - 2:55 p.m.
AND PLACE: White House Situation Room

The President: Helmut, how are you? Well, I'm calling to give you an update on the Gulf. I believe we're in pretty good shape. The world is demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf and at the UN, to resist aggression. Now we have to wait to see whether sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait. (S)

And the UN sanctions are widespread and effective, but this invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries: you know, costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity, higher oil prices, etc. And we're spending huge sums daily, the U.S. is and other nations around the world are, to roll back Saddam. (S)

We've just enacted a new program of consultation in terms of coordinating assistance. I know Germany is helping out militarily within the terms of the constitutional constraints you explained to me. (S)

Some countries have been hit very hard -- Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, and the countries of Eastern Europe and Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan, and India. They've all been hit very hard. We have been working to develop some ideas on the needs of specific countries and how these might be met. (S)

I'm calling to ask you to see Jim Baker next week to discuss these ideas with you. I'm also asking Andreotti and Jacques Delors to meet with him. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, George, I'm glad to do it. When will he come? (S)

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The President: I'll have to get you exact dates. I'm calling Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand to see Nick Brady. So it's not just a Germany trip, but worldwide. (S)

Helmut, I'm sensitive to the burdens you face with unification. I ask that you listen to Jim with an open mind; I'm very grateful to you for seeing him. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, we don't even need to talk about it at length. First of all, I am very pleased to see Jim Baker when he comes. I will not only listen with an open mind, I will start thinking about what we can do. It is just a matter of costs. This is a problem we all have now. I only ask him to agree on dates with me so we can work things out. (S)

The President: I'll get him to get them to you right away through our Embassy. Nick Brady will be visiting the Japanese. So this is a worldwide coordinating and consultation effort right now. (S)

Thanks very much, Helmut. Good night. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, George. Good night. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/22/90 - 10/5/90

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By 32 (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(672)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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6943

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak of Egypt
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME: August 30, 1990, 2:54 - 2:56 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hosni, how's my friend? (U)

President Mubarak: I'm doing well, George. (U)

The President: You don't sound as upbeat as usual, my friend. Anyways, I just wanted to tell you that I just announced a major proposal for international compensation for countries, like Egypt, that are most affected by Iraq's invasion and sanctions compliance. I would add the comment that Egypt is at the top of our list. We will encourage others and we will help also. (C)

President Mubarak: I am relying on you mainly, George. (C)

The President: We will be talking to you about the FMS problem in the next few days. (C)

President Mubarak: On this FMS debt, I just paid you \$90 million today. (C)

The President: Your appeal is at the top of my list. I have to get it through Congress. But I thank you again for all you have done. (b)(1)

(b)(1) I have now said this publicly, that now is not the time to go, as much as I wanted to see the boys. (b)(1) (C)

President Mubarak: You know me, George, (b)(1)
(b)(1) You know you are welcome in Egypt anytime. (b)(1) (C)

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The President: Well, I must go someday to those sands of Saudi Arabia. But, I've made the decision | (b)(1)
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President Mubarak: I will call you whenever I see a need. How's Barbara? (U)

The President concluded the conversation with social remarks.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with the Amir of Kuwait (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Sheikh Jaber, Amir of Kuwait
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME August 30, 1990; 3:06 - 3:16 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello your Highness, can you hear me okay? This is George Bush. (U)

The Amir: I hear you fine. (U)

The President: I want to share our thinking on our efforts to achieve our mutual objectives in the Gulf. Frankly, I think we have made considerable progress. I think the entire world supports our efforts, and I view that as a clear tribute to the righteousness of our cause: that is in getting Iraq to withdraw and the restoration of your government in Kuwait. However, it is costly -- the invasion and sanctions -- in that it's hitting many countries hard. I know you are willing to support this. I am thinking of your prompt and generous support to Turkey. I know you have been generous in your talks with us to defray some of our costs as well. And we are grateful for this. Today, I made a proposal for international compensation for countries most affected by Iraq's invasion. I just hung up from talking to Chancellor Kohl. What I wanted to ask is if you would, I would like to send Secretary Baker to see you. He will be talking with leaders in Europe on how to coordinate our help to people requiring assistance. What I wanted to ask you is to receive him next week. We need to stay together on this. So I've asked him and Secretary Brady to go to Japan, Germany, Free Kuwait, and other countries. If you are willing to see him, I would be most grateful to you. (S)

The Amir: First, I would like to thank you for this call. Also I want to thank you for what you and the United States are doing for Kuwait. I appreciate your efforts and the Kuwaiti people appreciate your efforts on our behalf. With regard to your request, I will be happy to welcome and receive Secretary Baker. I believe we need to look into these matters and share your belief in the need for cooperation. (S)

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The President: Thank you, we will be in touch on time to find something convenient to fit into your schedule. Secretary Baker looks forward to it. I wish I were coming but he will be making this trip. (Ø)

The Amir: Thank you, Mr. President. I look forward to seeing Secretary Baker and look forward to seeing you in Washington in the future. (Ø)

The President: Well, I look forward to hearing from Jim Baker. And your Highness, any time you need to call, just pick up the phone. (Ø)

The Amir: Thank you. I wish you success and if there is anything, if I have any ideas to discuss, I will pick up the phone and do so. (Ø)

The President: Thank you, your Highness, and good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Zayyid
of United Arab Emirates (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Zayyid of United Arab Emirates
Notetaker: Sandra Charles
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal

DATE, TIME August 30, 1990, 3:20 - 3:29 pm EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Your Highness. Can you hear me? (U)

Sheikh Zayyid: Marhaba (hello), how are you? Yes I can hear you. (U)

The President: Thanks for taking my call. I am delighted to touch base with you on developments. Frankly, overall we have made good progress, a tribute to our close cooperation and the overwhelming international support for getting Iraq out of Kuwait. The invasion and sanctions are imposing real costs on many countries, however. I want to tell you we are grateful for your decision to increase oil production because that will ease the burden on all oil-importing countries. The military commanders and I very much appreciate all the support we have received from your government so far. But I must say the costs to support our forces are high. What I want to do is ask Secretary Baker to coordinate and consult with you and others on all the countries who are in need of it. Also so all the forces can logistically stay in tip top shape. (S)

Countries like Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have been hit hard. I worry if they don't get financial support, they won't be able to comply with these economic sanctions. And so I want to be sure we cooperate and consult. So I ask your Highness to receive Secretary Baker next week. He will go to Europe and to see the Amir of Kuwait and King Fahd (hopefully he'll agree), and if it would be convenient for you, I ask you respectfully to receive our Secretary of State. (S)

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Sheikh Zayyid: Yes sir. I would like to thank you for all the positions you have taken and things you have done. These efforts you have done will have a great and lasting effect on us all, those of us who are here now and those who will come after in the future. There will be a store of good will for the United States and its efforts. For the person who has perpetrated this, he is not worthy of any service, and must be put in his place. This person has not lived up to his words and cannot be trusted. (Ø)

The President: I agree. (U)

Sheikh Zayyid: I will try to do everything to please you. (Ø)

The President: Can you see Secretary Baker next week? (Ø)

Sheikh Zayyid: Yes, sir. I will be very happy to receive Secretary Baker and anyone else you send with him. (Ø)

The President: Very good. He will have a small delegation with him. But the main thing is that he has a chance to chat with you, that would be very good. Let me say how much I appreciate your cooperation and courtesy to our military people. I know it is not easy but it sends a good signal to their families in the United States. And I am very grateful as their commander in chief here. (Ø)

Sheikh Zayyid: We are the one who should thank you and be thankful to you for sending your troops and your allies' troops and rallying the world to help us with this disaster and tragedy that has hit us. (Ø)

The President: Well, good-bye and thank you. I will await Secretary Baker's report from his meeting with you. (Ø)

Sheikh Zayyid: I hope I always am able to work with you. You are a good and trusted friend. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 30, 1990; 3:40 - 3:51 p.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

President Ozal: I am fine. How are you? (U)

The President: I am delighted to hear from you. Are you calling me, or am I calling you? (U)

President Ozal: I am calling you. Did you have a good vacation? (U)

The President: Yes, I had a very good vacation. I have just announced a proposal for international compensation for those countries affected by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and by the sanctions. I will be sending Secretaries Baker and Brady to various countries next week. I've been on the phone today to Chancellor Kohl and several of the Gulf countries to encourage them to receive Baker and Brady and to ask for their help to countries, specifically Turkey. (S)

President Ozal: Thank you. I believe this is very good. It will make us strong. (S)

The President: You have been strong throughout this crisis. (S)

President Ozal: After persistent Iraqi requests, we agreed to meet them yesterday at the border. The Iraqi Oil minister met with a Turkish minister and several other officials including the Deputy Minister under Saddam Husayn's son-in-law. Our purpose in meeting was to get as much information as we could on Iraq's needs and the economic situation there. (S)

The Iraqis said the following. They wished to deal on a long-term perspective with Turkey. They are conscious of our differences on the situation and understand Turkey's position. They repeated their historical claim to Kuwait and said that was a matter for the Arabs to decide. (S)

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The President: That is what they have been saying all along.
(Ø)

President Ozal: Yes. They asked for permission for the transfer of goods that were already at Turkish ports before the embargo. Some Iraqi ships have sat in our ports since the embargo. They wanted us to agree on a formula to transfer goods that would not be a violation of the sanctions. (Ø)

They offered to pay their outstanding debt for their exports of oil through the pipeline in Turkey. The debt with Iraq is \$741 million. But the Iraqis said they would give us, say, \$2 billion. That would be a \$1.3 billion bribe! They offered additional oil to us without payment required -- it would effectively be a line of credit for Turkey. They said they would not want anything in return for oil. They also said there were many ongoing projects in Iraq, and offered them to Turkish firms. They pointed out that humanitarian foodstuffs were not covered under the UN embargo, and asked for our help. (Ø)

Our impression is that Iraq wants to set a precedent by these offers for its relations with other countries. They said they would not be the first to attack but would retaliate with every possible means they have. They reminded us of Saddam's peace proposal and were disappointed at its rejection by the West. They would like us to convince our western friends to reconsider this rejection. (Ø)

Our own impression is that Iraq is hard pressed and wants to make use of its unused oil in some way that would not violate the sanctions. We made clear that Iraqi aggression is totally unacceptable and that we wanted an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. (Ø)

The President: What did they say? (U)

President Ozal: One of Iraq's Governors told one of our Governors that they are in very difficult shape. They want anything Turkey can give them. They are squeezed by the sanctions. (Ø)

The President: Do you think the embargo is working? (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes. There is no doubt. (Ø)

The President: Well, I think we should consider this encouraging. The embargo has to work. We can't accept a watered down solution. We must prevail. I am worried that some may go for something less than our conditions, and make a deal with him.
(Ø)

President Ozal: I believe you. The Saudis want him out. (Ø)

The President: Yes, there is no question about that. It is hard to figure how to do that without sanctions or a coup. I just had

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a press conference and said that our objective was to fulfill the UN resolutions. If Saddam was removed, fine, but we can't state that publicly. (S)

President Ozal: I know. (U)

I am coming to the United States in September. (U)

The President: Yes, I want to see you. (U)

President Ozal: I will be there on September 23. (U)

The President: Let me look at my schedule. Yes, I'll be here so we can get together on Sunday. (U)

President Ozal: Is September 24 okay? (U)

The President: The 24th would be better. Yes, that is okay. (U)

President Ozal: The 24th is better for me since it will let me get some rest after the trip. We'll meet then. (U)

The President: The 24th. I'll talk to the people who handle my schedule and will let you know if there is a problem. If you don't hear from me in the next 24 hours, assume that September 24 is okay. (U)

President Ozal: I will be in Washington from September 23-26. I have a speaking engagement. (U)

The President: I want to see you. It is important, and I am sure the 24th will be okay. I don't want to inconvenience you, though. I would like to thank you for your steadfast support throughout this crisis. (U)

Did you get any feeling from the Iraqis about the "guests"-we call them hostages-when you spoke with them? (S)

President Ozal: They did not mention them. Some of our people cannot leave either. (S)

The President: Turks? (U)

President Ozal: Yes. One of our industrialists is building a dam in Iraq with 2,500 Turkish workers. 1,500 of them came back some weeks ago. But 1000 are left. (S)

The President: This is a cruel thing. It is making everybody here angry, including myself. It was nice talking to you and I look forward to seeing you. (S)

President Ozal: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	8/31/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/22/90 - 10/5/90

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By 31 (NLGB) on 10/8/10

Date Closed:	2/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(676)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME August 31, 1990, 6:07 - 6:37 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President: Your Majesty, this is George Bush. Can you hear me? (P)

King Fahd: Yes, thank you for your call. I wish you good health. (U)

The President: Thank you. I just wanted to share our thinking with you on the effects of Iraq's invasion. I think overall we have made considerable progress, and I think that is a tribute to our close cooperation and the tremendous international support we have received for our efforts to get Iraq out of Kuwait. I think the sanctions are imposing real costs on many countries, however. A decision to increase oil production on your part was very good and we are very grateful, and it will ease the burden on the oil-importing countries. The military commanders are very grateful for Saudi support for this cooperative military effort. But despite your generosity, there are huge expenses to supporting the forces involved. And I think we need a major effort to coordinate and consult on these expenses. (S)

Some countries also have been hit -- Egypt and Turkey very hard, and Jordan also, [REDACTED] (b)(1). And Morocco, Pakistan and Bangladesh come to mind as countries that have been exceptionally hurt. Yesterday, I made a proposal for international compensation for countries most affected by the invasion. And what is needed overall is consultations and a plan. I already talked with some countries and they want to be generous -- Japan and the Germans and others as well. (S)

What is needed is a coordinated effort, and if you would be willing to receive my Secretary of State, Jim Baker, next week to discuss this. He is going to the EC and to the Gulf to see

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President Zayyid of the Emirates. But the main point is if you would see him next week I would be very grateful and it would be a big step in this coordination effort. Therefore, your Majesty, I would like to know how you feel things are going and whether you would be agreeable to receiving our Secretary of State. (S)

King Fahd: I think I agree with everything you said. I am happy and willing to receive Jim Baker. I would appreciate to talk to him about all these matters, and then to talk to you again. (S)

The President: Very good. Do you think these sanctions are having an effect on Iraq your Majesty? (S)

King Fahd: Yes, Mr. President. I do believe they are having an impact. From the information we are receiving, Iraq is feeling a greater impact, more than we expected. According to the information, the Iraqi people, both military and civilian, are dissatisfied with what is happening. Saddam Hussein's popularity and value for his people is declining. (S)

The President: Your Majesty, your able Ambassador here told you that I could not come at this time. I appreciate your willing to receive me. And someday I want to come. I want to see you and our troops. It is essential that I see them as their commander in chief. But it will not work now. Maybe it's better for everyone that way, but I am grateful for your willingness to talk to me in your country. Your Majesty, can you hear me? (S)

(6:24-6:33 - Break in Call)

The President: Your Majesty, now that we are reconnected, once again I am sorry I am not coming, but I appreciate your willingness to have me. (S)

King Fahd: I appreciate, Mr. President, the difficult circumstances that prevent you from visiting the Kingdom at the present time. You are always welcome to visit any time. (S)

The President: I am grateful for that. And thank you for receiving Jim Baker. Let's stay in close touch. And I want you to know I have not changed my thinking one bit on Saddam Hussein and the need for us to prevail in this confrontation. (S)

King Fahd: I appreciate what you are saying, and I too am certain we will emerge victorious. I thank you for all your efforts. (S)

The President: Good-bye, your Majesty, and thank you again for your fantastic support for our young men and women in Saudi Arabia. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you, Mr. President. And I wish you a comfortable and relaxing weekend, and I look forward to seeing you soon. (S)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Stephen E. Benko, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 31, 1990, 6:46 - 7:03 a.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Margaret, how have you been? We're back here in Kennebunkport. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Just fine, George. I'm going to see Governor Sununu today. (S)

The President: He had very good talks with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'm going to be seeing King Hussein in half an hour. (S)

The President: I wanted to share a few thoughts with you. The sanctions are having good effect. I just hung up with King Fahd. He says he has reports that people in Iraq are becoming quite dissatisfied with what Saddam has done. This is also what Ozal of Turkey told me. I'm a little disappointed with Tunisia and Libya, although not surprised. We must tighten enforcement of the sanctions. (S)

But if neither diplomacy or sanctions work, we need to review our options. I have not changed my thinking on our goals, even though we keep hearing from some of negotiating proposals that stop short of the UN mandate. I am worried by talk of elections, or anything that does not restore the legitimate rulers of Kuwait. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I agree totally. Our strategy is the same as ever. We need to maintain the sanctions and tighten them, following up with every person or country which breaks them. That's the weapon we need to get him out. We can't rule out the military option, but that's way, way ahead. In the

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meantime, we must use the embargo. We couldn't have predicted two months ago that we'd be where we are now, and we can't predict where we'll be two months from now. (S)

The President: There's another point I wanted to raise with you. I hope it doesn't complicate your life. Yesterday the hostages issue came up at a press conference, and I made the statement that our policy wouldn't change because of the hostages. This may be distressful to some of the hostage families, but I wanted you to know about it. I feel very strongly about it. It's important to get that message to Saddam Husayn. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, it's very important. There should be no negotiations. The UN has said what must be done. Saddam Husayn must get out. We must not fall into the trap of negotiations. (S)

The President: I believe Perez de Cuellar has the same views. Do you think so? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes I do. Although some of his staff has been saying to him that Saddam has released women and children and therefore there should be a conciliatory gesture on our side. They may be trying to soften him up. (S)

George, I want to tell you about some intelligence I've got. There is a ship coming down the Gulf tomorrow, the Hittin. (S)

The President: We have to stop this ship if it comes from Iraq. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, it has to be stopped. (S)

The President: What did you say the name of the ship was? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: The Hittin, H-I-T-T-I-N. It's loading up at the moment, loading up right now. We've got from the UN what we need to stop it. (S)

The President: This is very interesting. I'll tell Cheney or Scowcroft. (S)

I want to shift to King Hussein. He came here, and was very distraught -- caught. I believe he feels trapped. He called me with what he thought was good news, that is, the release of the women and children. Well, it was promised, but it hasn't happened in four days now. I don't trust Saddam Husayn. King Hussein asked me to kind of cool it and reciprocate. But I feel that when a hostage is released and people ask "what are you going to do to show good faith?" that it's impossible -- when they undo one-third or one-fourth or one-seventh of what they should never have done. I'm afraid the Gulf states, Mubarak and others, are very upset with Hussein. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: This wrong must be righted. (S)

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The President: We can't have any of these arguments about age-old decisions about Kuwait. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Absolutely. (S)

The President: Margaret, I wanted to talk about the announcement I made yesterday. Would you be willing to talk to Nick Brady? We're trying to get a coordinated approach to economic assistance. I spoke to Kohl yesterday. I saw the statement that you made up in Finland, which we all appreciated. Britain has already responded, but we'd like to explain how we want to coordinate paying for transport and other things. I don't want this mission to have the appearance that we're coming hat in hand to beg. The mission is for coordination and consultation. I'd appreciate it if you could see Brady. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, of course. It's important to coordinate aid to those states which are suffering. Others can contribute to support the military effort, for example, Saudi Arabia. But the Germans have said they are quite willing to contribute heavily financially. (S)

The President: That's good news. The Saudis and the free Kuwaitis are ready to step up now. The Kuwaitis are back in control of their financial assets, and have said they'll help. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'd be delighted to see Nick. This afternoon I will tell Governor Sununu about my meeting with King Hussein. Saddam Husayn will be the loser. (S)

The President: Thanks very much. We need to think about how we get this off dead center if there is no provocation, or if the sanctions don't hurt a lot. We can't do anything now; all our forces are not in place yet. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It won't be difficult. But if it goes on for a long time, we'll have to look at the military options. (S)

You know, George, I'll be in the States at the end of September in New York for the Children's meeting. I could stop in at Washington then if it was needed. (S)

The President: That's a must. Anthony can give us the details. I'm participating in the Children's event, although I'm not sure what it will achieve -- but it will be a good way to get some talks in. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Our strategy is absolutely right. We must stick together. (S)

The President: Tell Governor Sununu that the President said to tell you, privately, a very sensitive message. I don't want to get into it over the phone now, but get him off in a corner and ask him to tell you in person. (S)

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Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, I will. (S)

The President: All right. King Hussein is a long time friend but he's under a lot of pressure now. He promised to enforce the UN embargo but said he needed a clarification of the humanitarian clause. I'm afraid he hasn't done it yet. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, he needs to have things made quite clear to him. I'll talk to him about it and make certain he understands it. (S)

The President: I'm sure you will. Thanks so much. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: God bless. Thanks for phoning. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Francois Mitterrand,
President of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President of France
Notetaker: Stephen E. Benko, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 31, 1990, 7:12 - 7:36 a.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Francois, bon soir. Comment allez-vous? (U)

President Mitterrand: Thanks, fine. (U)

The President: May I just bring you up to date on our view of the Gulf situation? (U)

President Mitterrand: Thanks, please do so. (U)

The President: First, I believe we are in pretty good shape. Our military deployment is continuing, as you know, and your own deployment has been indispensable. And now I think we have to see whether these sanctions will persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait. (S)

I just spoke to King Fahd. Yesterday I talked with Ozal of Turkey. I asked both of them if they thought the sanctions were taking effect. Both of them, Fahd and Ozal, tell me they think the sanctions are working. Fahd told me they have reports from both military and civilian sources in Iraq of growing discontent with what Saddam Husayn has done. I hope that's true, but that's what they are reporting. (S)

Ozal also reported to me on a meeting of one of his officials with one of Iraq's officials. Iraq made several offers to Ozal which I interpreted as desperation and an indication that the sanctions are really beginning to have an effect. In essence, Iraq was trying to buy off Turkey in a very open and very embarrassing way. (S)

President Mitterrand: What can they promise Turkey? (S)

The President: As I understand it, they are offering some kind of arrangement so that oil can be delivered through this pipeline

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secretly. There may be other commodities as well, but I think the offer had to do mainly with oil. (S)

I am convinced that some are still surreptitiously and some more openly trying to violate the sanctions. I worry about Libya and Tunisia, and I am worried about overflights. Syria has been good overall, but has not been denying overflights. I'm afraid some goods are still getting through. (S)

In any event, if neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will have to review our options. But I am hopeful the reports (of the sanctions having an impact) prove accurate. We cannot let Saddam remain in Kuwait. I think we are in agreement. (S)

I talked to Perez de Cuellar before he left on his mission, which causes us no problems at all. I'm convinced he'll stay within the parameters of the UN sanctions, but I don't see a diplomatic solution yet, based on what Saddam Husayn is telling the press and other people. (S)

We are prepared to join with France and whoever is in the Gulf to stop some ships under the UN mandate. (S)

President Mitterrand: Absolutely. (U)

The President: It's very, very important. Margaret Thatcher just told me about a ship in the Gulf. I didn't know about it. I'm sure our military does, and I'll make sure they stop it if we're the ones in that sector. (S)

Francois, the real purpose of my call is to say a few words about the initiative I announced yesterday to consult and coordinate assistance for those countries that are particularly hurt, like Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, some of the countries of Eastern Europe, Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan and India. We also need to help defray the costs for those who are in the Gulf. And some of those who are being protected need to help -- here I'm talking about Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates in particular. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I have the same impression that they want to help. (S)

The President: I also talked to Toshiki Kaifu, who continues to impress me at least. I think he is willing to step up and provide support on the military logistics side, as well as helping some of the countries I mentioned here economically. (S)

In any event, I announced some coordinating measures yesterday. I'd like it very much if you could see Treasury Secretary Brady next week to discuss some of these ideas. I'm sending Brady to some other countries in Europe and Japan. I'm also sending Baker to some European countries. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, we will be in touch with him to know when I can receive him. (S)

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The President: Thanks; it's very generous of you. Now I'd like to hear your views of the Gulf. And thanks very much for the magnificent French cooperation in the Gulf. (S)

President Mitterrand: My ideas are very simple, my good friend. I do not believe a diplomatic solution is possible, and it is better to avoid a military solution -- so the embargo must succeed. In order to succeed we must spare no effort. There must be a genuine noose around Iraq and we must look at measures that can be taken against any who violate the sanctions. Our ships must be vigilant and very stern, and, as you have said yourself, we must help those countries which seem to hesitate. (S)

We must define for ourselves as a very strong goal that the embargo succeed. A large part of this has been achieved in stopping the flow of petroleum. All outlets must be closed. Tunisia doesn't amount to very much, but we will make a demarche to the Government of Tunisia. Libya is a special case. We should ask Mubarak to intervene powerfully. Both Mubarak and King Hassan of Morocco should make demarches. I don't know what other countries are violating the sanctions; what are the planes overflying Syria carrying? (S)

The President: I just saw some sensitive information of planes from Libya carrying military supplies and food. I'll check the intelligence, but one plane had to stop in Syria and was allowed to continue to Iraq. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, but why did Asad do that? (S)

The President: I don't know. He's been pretty good in working with us on the rest of the problem. (S)

President Mitterrand: I believe we have to talk to him very firmly. (S)

The President: Perhaps you'd be a better one than I to talk to him, although I certainly can do it. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I can do this. (C)

The President: I'll get the information on Syrian overflights to Nick Brady and have him give it to you next week. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, understood. (U)

The President: Francois, yesterday I made a statement which I hope doesn't cause problems for French families of hostages being held by Iraq. I made a statement that the United States will not change its policy in terms of actions I might have to take based on individuals held in Iraq. I did it because I believe we have to get the message to Saddam. But I worry about the families of those held in Iraq. (S)

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President Mitterrand: Yes, yes. I fully understood your statement. (U)

The President: Good, I just wanted to make sure. There is lots of anguish caused by his brutality in using them as human shields. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, but I really believe our entire discourse should focus on one point: the embargo must be successful. (S)

The President: I agree. He might try to use the hostages to change our views not only on military actions, but on the embargo. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, but I am not at all opposed to your making that kind of statement. Saddam Husayn must see that we are not prepared to change our views. (S)

The President: Thanks for seeing Brady. I'm grateful for the position taken by France and your magnificent leadership in all of this. France was there early and out front. (S)

President Mitterrand: We will stay the course. I am very glad to hear from you. We'll be talking again soon. (S)

The President: Thank you, and good luck. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mubarak of Egypt on
September 1, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak of Egypt
Interpreter: None
Notetaker: David Welch

DATE, PLACE September 1, 1990, 6:23 - 6:32 a.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hosni, how are you? Good morning. Where are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Fine, George, I'm in Alexandria. (U)

The President: I'm calling, Hosni, about the FMS debt. I want to tell you that as soon as Congress reconvenes, I'm recommending that the entire debt be written off, unconditionally, \$6.7 billion. Of course, we need to get Congress to approve it. (Ø)

President Mubarak: George, thank you very much. I'm seeing 35 of them Monday. (Ø)

The President: Please don't mention this call. It is appropriate to mention the issue, but I need to consult with them first. Please do not say that I'm going to take this step. I got your cable last night and I realized again just how important this is to you. So, I will recommend it and push it very fast. All I ask is that you not mention this conversation. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Be sure, George, I won't speak about it. (Ø)

The President: I am confident that we will get this done. The Administration's position is that the debt should be completely forgiven. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Be sure. I will never mention it. (Ø)

The President: So, what else is going on? (U)

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President Mubarak: There is nothing new from the Arab League, but the Arab League is to meet again on September 10. (U)

The President: Perez de Cuellar is not getting anywhere. He had to listen to a long diatribe spelling out the Iraqi position. I don't think he (Saddam Hussein) will accept the UN resolutions. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I don't expect anything now from them. They are terrified now. When they withdrew from Iran, they exposed themselves to their people -- they gave up the Shatt and all those people killed, for nothing. Now, if they withdraw from Kuwait, his people will kill him. He will face his fate if they do that. He is in a tight corner, he cannot afford to pull out of Kuwait. It would be suicide. (Ø)

The President: Now, run that by me again. Because he pulled out of Iran, he can't pull out of Kuwait? (Ø)

President Mubarak: He struggled eight years for the Shatt which he claimed, saying that the 1975 treaty was wrong. Because he invaded Kuwait, he said that he would get out of Iran and accept the 1975 treaty. Then he invaded Kuwait. So, after eight years of war, \$200 billion spent, he cannot also leave Kuwait. He would look silly in front of his people. (Ø)

The President: I see. Libya, we can't really talk about it on this line, but Libya is breaking the sanctions. This is a difficult channel to discuss it. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes, I know. I'm sending him a message today. (Ø)

The President: That would be very good. We are going forward with our program for Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan now. Baker and Brady are going out. I talked to the Japanese, the Germans, and Maggie Thatcher. There is a genuine desire to coordinate, so countries like Egypt can get relief, and some help for our forces as well. We have a tremendous amount of forces over there. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Good. (U)

The President: On the other, don't worry, we will do the whole thing. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes. (U)

The President: Just a moment -- someone wants to say hello. (U)

The First Lady then speaks to President Mubarak. The remainder of the conversation concerns family and social matters.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Call from the President of Yemen (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Saleh
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME September 1, 1990; 8:40 - 9:00 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President: Hello, President Saleh. How are you? (U)

President Saleh: How are you, Mr. President? (U)

The President: We're all very busy. I'm interested in why you're calling me and pleased you called. (Ø)

President Saleh: Thank you. I hope you and Mrs. Bush and your children and grandchildren are all well. (U)

The President: They're all fine. What do you want to talk about my friend? (Ø)

President Saleh: First Mr. President, I wanted to ask about your health. Then I wanted to discuss very important matters with you. I hope if you think that it is suitable you would approve to send someone from your Administration to talk with us about security and peace, and for preserving the interests of everyone concerned and U.S. interests in the larger interest of peace and stability. I believe there is still time to do that, Mr. President. (Ø)

The President: I would be pleased to have someone there. But I must tell you I have been concerned about the demonstrations there. I understand that you can't control them. But we are bound in solidarity with the other Arabs and the world on the UN resolutions. We see no compromise on those. (Ø)

President Saleh: You know well, Mr. President, that democracies -- and being the strong advocate of democracy you are -- there is very little we can do, but we are trying to stop them. We are making an effort so that we can come to a peaceful solution with the United States. (Ø)

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The President: Good. I am glad to hear that. (U)

President Saleh: I am willing to receive your envoy as soon as possible. There is still time to do something constructive. We will talk with him about a constructive proposal to resolve the situation. (S)

The President: Is Yemen able to say that it is supporting UN sanctions? I know at one point you said you would. I just want to be sure we are together on that one important point. (S)

President Saleh: We still support the sanctions and are adhering to them. (S)

The President: That is encouraging news. It certainly gives us room to have a good discussion between you and our emissary. You know, Mr. President, we've had -- between you and me -- good relations. I am worried that we are drifting apart on the question of Iraqi aggression. I realize Yemen has close relations with Iraq, but the more I can appeal to you that it is more important for you to stay with the rest of the world and with the Arab world. Having said that I will send an emissary to discuss this with you. I have one last appeal: if you felt you could, make any appeal to Saddam Hussein to stop using hostages as a shield -- hostages from many countries -- because this concept of using innocent travelers, innocent people as pawns is making world opinion solidly opposed to Saddam. If you have any influence if he would stop doing this, it would make things better with many countries. It is brutal and in the past was brought up in many tribunals. (S)

President Saleh: First of all, Mr. President, I would like to say that relations between the United States and Yemen are good, have been good, and will continue to be good. I will never allow anything to stand in the way. I cherish them. They are based on principles. That won't change. The second point about an appeal to Saddam on the hostages, I am willing to do everything in that regard. That is why I asked for an envoy to discuss these matters with him, to have practical steps to be taken to resolve the hostage problem and to bring peace. I believe these steps can be acceptable to the United States, they can be acceptable to Iraq. We want to explore them with the envoy. We are doing this because of our friendship with the United States. We are not biased. We want to be mediators. We feel if we take sides clearly and openly in favor of UN sanctions, then our mediation role would be compromised. That is why, even though we support sanctions, we want to continue to play a role and we need to succeed with both sides. (S)

The President: All right, thank you. We will be in touch with you about the envoy and when he might arrive on the scene. And thank you for calling. (S)

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President Saleh: It would help to send the envoy as soon as possible to have your ideas and views on resolving this matter. (S)

The President: He will, but my ideas are very public. I have repeated them over again, and they are the same as the Arab countries and the UN. But the envoy will be instructed to listen carefully to your views and to explore ideas with you. (S)

President Saleh: We are certain that our ideas and efforts will work for a just peace and for preserving world interests, and to avoid an explosion in a manner that preserves and protects everyone's interests. (S)

The President: I appreciate your optimism. Thank you for your call. (S)

President Saleh: Thank you. I am sure that working together we will find a successful, just solution, and I hope you will send your envoy right away. (S)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to the UN Secretary General (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME September 5, 1990; 2:05 - 2:12 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Javier, how are you? (U)

Secretary General: Hello, George. How are you? (U)

The President: Welcome back, world traveler. (U)

Secretary General: You know by the press about my trip -- disappointing but as expected. But I wanted to expose them. (S)

The President: You did a wonderful job. As we discussed before you left, it was a difficult job. But the fact that you went communicates interest in diplomacy while keeping our principles. On the surface, we agreed you were not going to get any progress. But the fact you went shows that we were willing to follow the diplomatic route. I think you had it right. Iraq is just locked into its position. But actually, Javier, I called to get your insights and views. (S)

Secretary General: I had two objectives: not to concede a word, not even to save time. They didn't want to break the talks, but I didn't want to be used either. I didn't want to cede political points to them. I repeated to them international public opinion. I was not prepared to conceal the truth. I told him I would give him a chance to go check with his leader to see if he could get something positive. I proposed that we go to Geneva in the next 2-3 days once he had a reaction from his leader. I was persuaded that he wanted to maintain his position, but not to break the channel of communication. I told him I was at their disposal provided they did something positive. (S)

The President: I don't know where we go from here. He makes that I should talk to him. But I make that the United Nations should be the conferee and the Secretary General should keep his hands on this. I will help him to keep communications open with you. No one has been killed yet. And I think we need to continue to enforce sanctions. He gave a terrible speech today, Javier. (S)

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Secretary General: The day before yesterday I had a long discussion with King Hussein. This is for you only. I was not authorized to say anything to anyone. I listened and he said they had decided it was time to accept a withdrawal. But by who this is being said, I don't know. He is supposed to be in Baghdad today. I told him he should tell Saddam how his international position is. He is the only person who tells him the truth. (S)

The President: Do you think he will tell him? (S)

Secretary General: He is an honest man. (S)

The President: I feel sorry for him. He is caught in a difficult place. I have liked and respected him for a long time. In this case, he has lost a lot of friends in America. But I think it can be remedied. (S)

Secretary General: I know he has been hurt with you. The rest of the Arabs also have been tough on him. (S)

The President: I know. Mubarak told a group of congressmen about his disappointment in him, that it was very personal. He said he was hurt, yet he knew it was tough for Hussein. (S)

Secretary General: I told Tariq Aziz that he was doing a major disservice. You can't speak of an Arab solution when the Arabs are divided. They never were united. There is no longer an Arab solution because there is no consensus. I told him I think an Arab solution is nonsense. The international community is involved and there are principles that will not be conceded. (S)

The President: I want to thank you on the part of everyone for your leadership. If you ever want to talk to me about what we should do or shouldn't do, I would appreciate a call. Are you in New York? (S)

Secretary General: Yes, I just got back this morning. I had a difficult time with the flu. (S)

The President: One last thing, what about their guests, or the hostages, as we call them? What he is doing is a crime against humanity. (S)

Secretary General: I told him it was not sufficient to keep women and children and hinder freedom of movement. They are all human beings. I told him I can't accept this human shield concept; it is against human rights. He said they were reconsidering on the question of the embassies in Kuwait. But it is not true. There has been no give at all. I think they are starting to feel the sanctions. (S)

The President: That's encouraging. (U)

Secretary General: They asked me to convey to the Security Council -- and I will do this tomorrow -- their need. They want the paragraph in the resolution discussed so they can receive medicine. They asked me to do this. They also asked me to tell the President of the United States that they are not going to ignite a war. They asked that you withdraw immediately, and I said in the case of what. Why should they leave when they have no reason to unless you give them something in exchange? You must make the first step. (S)

Mr. President: Well done. Thank you again for your mission. Good-bye. (U)

Secretary General: Good-bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Francois Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME September 6, 1990, 7:23 - 7:43 a.m.
Oval Office

President Mitterrand: Good day how are you? I am happy to hear you. (U)

The President: Bonjour. (U)

President Mitterrand: I received your letter and saw that you would like to talk before your meeting in Helsinki. I am glad of an opportunity to do so. (S)

The President: Yes, I would like to hear your views. (S)

President Mitterrand: I spoke with President Gorbachev by phone and I wanted to tell you about it. He is very cautious about any movement toward open warfare, but he emphasized the need to maintain a common front regarding the Kuwait situation. I found him in a very positive frame of mind. He said he had a very difficult visit with Aziz. (S)

The President: So you spoke with Gorbachev after the Aziz visit? (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, and Gorbachev said that we should keep up our common front and that there should be no weakening. He is concerned that we succeed. France has specific concerns because of our hostages, but this does not alter our policy. On the contrary, this irritates us and strengthens our resolve. (S)

The President: We cannot allow our policies to be changed because of the hostages. (S)

President Mitterrand: Absolutely. Saddam Hussein is making things more difficult. I told Gorbachev that no diplomatic solution is possible unless the UN resolutions are applied. What

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do you think? (S)

The President: I think that this must be the case, but I am worried about a weakening of the sanctions. King Hussein is asking for interpretations of humanitarian assistance. Any broadening of the definition of humanitarian aid would be a bad thing. (S)

President Mitterrand: We must use common sense in setting the criteria. (S)

The President: Yes, the image of children dying of starvation would not be good. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, certainly, so we must use judgment. (S)

The President: Did Gorbachev raise the question of his military advisors in Iraq? This worries me. (S)

President Mitterrand: He did not raise it, nor did I. How many military advisors are there in Iraq? (S)

The President: We understand there are about 2,000, and that the Soviets plan to leave them there until their contracts expire. I plan to raise the issue at Helsinki. (S)

President Mitterrand: Gorbachev insisted that our common front should show solidarity, so I feel that he will be favorably disposed if you raise the issue. (S)

The President: Thank you. I will raise it. I also want to make it clear that this meeting is not an attempt by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to get together and dictate how the Iraq crisis will be managed. (S)

President Mitterrand: I am not at all concerned about that. (S)

The President: The idea is to show a common front with the Soviets, just as your telephone call with Gorbachev shows solidarity. (S)

President Mitterrand: The call was at Gorbachev's initiative. (S)

The President: That is interesting. What do you think his reaction would be if we took military action to enforce the embargo? (S)

President Mitterrand: This would be within the framework of UN resolution 665. If it is necessary to fire on an Iraq vessel, it must be done. But I don't think that, with Saddam Hussein's current posture, it will be necessary. (S)

The President: I hope this is the case. (S)

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President Mitterrand: I believe your sizeable deployment will prevent any aggression against Saudi Arabia, unless the embargo makes Saddam Hussein desperate. (S)

The President: Do you think the embargo will work? (S)

President Mitterrand: It is already two-thirds effective. Iraq is in a bad situation geographically. It is not like the sanctions against South Africa where anyone can reach there by sea. Iraq is land-locked except for Jordan. Iran is a question mark, and the Iranians may try to fool all sides. But Iraq is very dependent on oil and therefore very vulnerable. The embargo must be severe. As for humanitarian assistance, the UN Embargo Committee can assess the level of food assistance that is required. (S)

The President: What are your thoughts on King Hussein? (S)

President Mitterrand: I just saw him a couple of days ago. It was an interesting meeting. He says he is joining the embargo -- I didn't know that he was doing so. His peace plan is interesting; it is similar to the Tunisian plan. He proposes an Arab peace-keeping force under a UN mandate, provided that Iraqi troops withdraw from Kuwait. Perhaps the Arabs could reconcile the differences between themselves at least for this purpose. But Hussein said that this would only be possible if Saddam evacuates Kuwait. He is taking a more reasonable approach now. (S)

The President: I worry about the reestablishment of the status quo ante, even if Saddam does withdraw from Kuwait. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, but we must be clear about what we are trying to achieve. The primary goal is Iraq departure from Kuwait. (S)

The President: I hear disturbing reports that Saddam Hussein is dismantling Kuwait, taking whole factories back to Iraq and leaving Kuwait a wasteland. (S)

President Mitterrand: In that case we would have to move quickly. I understand that Saddam has already taken \$2 billion from Kuwait. In a way, his "hold-up" has already succeeded. If he evacuates Kuwait there must be international safeguards to prevent a recurrence. (S)

The President: I will let you know about my meeting with Gorbachev. I am very encouraged by the positive attitude that Gorbachev conveyed to you in your phone conversation. I appreciate your phone call, and we will stay in touch. (S)

President Mitterrand: I would like to repeat that Gorbachev is concerned, but he does not conclude any weakening is justified. Rather, he is open to a common, united front by the signatories of the UN resolutions. You will see for yourself, but I wanted

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to tell you directly about my phone conversation. (S)

The President: Thank you for the "heads up," as we say. Let's stay in touch. (S)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME September 6, 1990, 8:06 - 8:25 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am very glad to hear your voice. (U)

The President: I am very glad to hear yours, and delighted to
receive your call. What's happening? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for your letter of September 5
regarding preparations for your meeting with Gorbachev. First,
let me tell you, with reference to the call we had last week,
that we now have agreed on dates for a meeting with Jim Baker
next week. (Ø)

The President: Very good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We will discuss what the Federal Republic can
do to help along the lines you described, regarding economic
assistance to Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. Apart from that, we are
working on how we can help the U.S. with the shipping of cargo.
(Ø)

The President: That would be very helpful, very constructive.
(U)

Chancellor Kohl: We are thinking about other things. We are
talking about detection vehicles, which can detect nuclear,
biological, and also chemical weapons. Those we sent could stay
with American forces there. Generally, we will look into all
these things and do our best to help. I very much regret that so
far we have not been able to change the constitution before
unification. (Ø)

The President: We understand that fully. (U)

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Chancellor Kohl: It is intolerable that the Germans, who have been shown so much solidarity by the Americans, cannot play a greater role. (U)

Regarding Helsinki, I have one piece of information, one request. I would be glad to see all things put into effect that will lead to a rapid conclusion of CFE. This is very important for the November CSCE Summit. (Ø)

The President: I hope so, too, Helmut. I don't have a feeling as to how far we can go, but our feeling is the same as yours. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. Regarding the Two Plus Four, so far we have made good progress. Mr. Seitz, who is leading your team, is doing a very good job. Apparently, the Soviet Union had a problem actually achieving the withdrawal of troops by December 31, 1994. I don't think it means bad will on their part. They apparently do have enormous problems finding housing for all these troops. But I told my people that for me the date is non-negotiable. After all, that will mean they have stayed in Germany for 50 years. In 1944 they reached the territory of the then German Reich. 50 years is long enough. (Ø)

Let me say, regarding bilateral negotiations between our side and the Soviet Union, progress is being made. They have unrealistic expectations concerning financing, and I will have to call Gorbachev personally, but I think we will achieve a solution. During these negotiations, I have been able to see how catastrophic the situation is there. It makes it all the more important for him, from a psychological viewpoint, that the meeting in Helsinki give him a good image. (Ø)

The President: I agree. We have some differences on the Middle East, but they are overridden by our common interests. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me raise one different question and address it in a frank and open manner, because this may possibly also be a subject of your meeting with Gorbachev. I am talking about the October 3 date of our national unity. Of course, we would like to see the President of the United States in Berlin, if only for a few hours, if possible. I have the impression from what we have been hearing informally from Moscow that Gorbachev would be quite interested in such a meeting. I know you have a very heavy schedule. That is why I have been reluctant to mention this to you. The day before yesterday, for the first time we heard something from Moscow through a public announcement. I did not talk to the Soviets about this, but that announcement triggered a discussion here, and your press spokesman made some friendly noises regarding the announcement in Moscow. But I want to clarify this with you before I ask the Federal President to issue formal invitations. (Ø)

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The image of you, Gorbachev, Thatcher, and Mitterrand in Berlin would be a very impressive image and would also send very important messages, including to the Middle East. George, let me say again that I hesitated for a long time, but knowing that we are friends, I thought I would just say what we are thinking about. I completely understand your position and will understand whatever you decide. You may want to discuss this with Gorbachev in Finland. (C)

The President: Let me tell you my problem. It is a very complicated time. One month from then will be our national Congressional elections. I have been spending all my time, to the exclusion of domestic problems, on international problems. Therefore, from a scheduling standpoint, it is extremely complicated. On the other hand, I will consider it and will be glad to discuss it with Gorbachev. But I want to be frank. Strictly from a scheduling standpoint, it may be very difficult. I totally agree with you on the symbolic value and agree that it could also show solidarity regarding the Middle East. And with each decision I make, I want to be sure it is helpful to you with your elections coming up. (C)

I will get back early next week with a definite answer. I don't want to mislead you. I am not optimistic, but since you have personally raised the issue I will give it every consideration. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Please, I don't want to put you in any difficulty. Be very free to decide what is right for you to do. I already told you the issue entered into public debate because of information from Moscow. I made no statement at all, but I can't exclude that Gorbachev may raise it with you. (C)

The President: If he does, I will tell him it is a good idea, but that I have problems concerning my schedule. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay. We will talk again next week. (U)

The President: Yes. There is one last point. On this Two Plus Four, we have a problem. I don't want to raise it with you now but will ask Jim Baker to do so when he meets with you. It concerns restrictions that would forbid U.S., British, and French forces to enter the GDR even after, even after, Soviet forces leave. There is a new Soviet demand that causes us problems. Rather than talk now, I will ask that you discuss it with Jim Baker when you see him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will be glad to talk with him. (C)

The President: Okay. It is complicated, but we've got difficulties with it. Thanks for your call. I will give you a full report of my meeting with Gorbachev. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call to President Assad of Syria (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Assad
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME September 6, 1990, 8:29 - 8:44 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Assad: Welcome, how are you? (U)

The President: It's good to hear your voice again. Good morning. Let me say at the beginning that I am greatly impressed by your resolute response to Iraqi aggression, and the fact that Syrian soldiers now stand on Saudi soil sends a powerful signal to Saddam Hussein that he has alienated much of the world and simply cannot benefit from his aggressive action. I've recently been talking with some optimism that, from the outcome of the Gulf crisis, will emerge some new world order. And part of it would be better and improved relations between the United States and Syria that I know you want and that I want. And let me add, Mr. President that I am very sincere in my desire to visit Syria and to speak to you directly. As you know from my recent letter, I'm not making a trip to the area within the next few weeks although I had some discussions on it. But in the meantime, and only if it is convenient for you, I have asked Secretary of State Baker to be prepared to stop in Damascus to meet with you on his current trip, but again only if it is convenient. I would like you to see him, but don't want to impose it on you. But if it is convenient, it would send a good signal. That was the purpose of my phone call. (S)

President Assad: Thank you very much Mr. President. As we spoke previously, Mr. President, on the situation about the invasion, Syria's position on the invasion remains unchanged. As I said before, no country can or should be allowed to wipe out of existence another country that is a member of the UN and the Arab League, or a country that is an independent and sovereign state. When our fellow Arabs in Saudi Arabia and the UAE became concerned and worried and requested our help, we responded and

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complied and gave them assistance. We also emphasized that at the Arab Summit meeting. I share your wishes for improved relations between the United States and Syria and it would only be natural that matters would improve. During this lengthy period, there have been several discussions -- direct, indirect and numerous -- and I informed your Ambassador here a few days ago when I gave him my reply to your letter, Mr. President, I told him we welcome your visit to Syria. I also said the same to our other fellow Arabs with whom we were talking about the same subject. I said the same to them. I understand all these circumstances because I had discussions with my fellow Arabs not long ago about them. With regard to Secretary Baker's visit, I would welcome seeing him. (S)

The President: Thank you, that gracious of you. I know there will be a fruitful discussion. I'll ask our embassy there to coordinate the timing most agreeable to you. (S)

President Assad: Thank you. I was just thinking that our Minister of Foreign Affairs was going to Italy, but I'm not sure if it was on the 13th or 14th. But that should be no problem anyway, we should see him. (S)

The President: It's very nice of you. I appreciate your taking this call, and I will look forward to a personal debrief from Secretary Baker when he gets back. (S)

President Assad: Thank you Mr President. I look forward to seeing Secretary Baker and hearing the results of the Summit from him. (S)

The President: That's right. He will be able to debrief you on what transpires with Gorbachev. We look forward to a solid Summit where we all stand together -- Syria, the United States and Soviet Union -- on the Middle East. That's what I hope comes out of my Summit with Gorbachev. And let me guarantee you and our other Arab friends who have stood behind the UN resolutions that there will be no secret deals or back room dealings with the Soviet Union that would undermine the solid front that Syria joined with so many other countries. (S)

President Assad: Thank you Mr. President, I wish you success and good health. (U)

The President: Thank you, sir, and good bye. (U)

President Assad: Good bye. Thank you. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Ozal
Stephen Benko, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

TIME, DATE September 6, 1990, 8:45 a.m. - 9:00 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: How are you, sir? I'm glad to hear your voice.
(U)

I am calling because I understand you have some thoughts to share before my meeting with Gorbachev in Helsinki. (S)

President Ozal: I received your letter. First of all, I think this is a very important meeting. The Gulf crisis has come at a time when the East-West dialogue was going forward, when we were helping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We should stop the crisis as soon as possible. (S)

The President: I agree with you on that. I do think this diverted attention from what we were doing. We'll be talking about that with Gorbachev. What do you think about the Gulf situation? (S)

President Ozal: Many innocent people are being hurt. Thousands and thousands of people are in camps in Turkey and Jordan. There are up to one and a half million. The number will increase in case of armed conflict. The plight of these people should cause further action. We are providing shelter and hot food for those coming from Iraq. We have provided flights for Bangladeshis, Turkish Air is flying people and we are chartering other flights. We are doing better than Jordan. (S)

The President: It doesn't surprise me. Some of our Congressmen just returned yesterday, and they emphasized the human tragedy of it all. (S)

President Ozal: I suggest you emphasize with Gorbachev all the tragedy caused by the invasion of Kuwait. There are many Bangladeshis, Indians, Pakistanis; they are all poor people. Saddam has to pay for this. (S)

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The President: I agree, and I think Gorbachev will agree. (S)

President Ozal: This is the biggest issue since World War II.
(S)

The President: As we discussed last week, I'm looking forward to seeing you when you are in the U.S. (S)

President Ozal: There is another point. The embargo will yield results, and it looks like it is working now. Some Iraqi soldiers came to us. They said that eight years of war were for nothing, and they say that if the U.S. attacks all Iraqi soldiers will come to Turkey. (S)

The President: Is that right? Will they be willing to make public statements in Turkey? (S)

President Ozal: I don't know. They can if they want. (S)

The President: It might be an interesting signal to the world. If they make the view known that they're tired of war and they're demoralized, maybe Saddam Hussein will change. (S)

President Ozal: We will look at it. There is another point you could raise with Gorbachev which is whether it is possible to make a UN resolution enabling military intervention. We wouldn't have to use it, but it would be like a Damocles sword over Iraq and would help bring a peaceful solution. (S)

The President: Gorbachev has been opposed publicly to military intervention. I have no problem raising it with him. Saddam Hussein has to know that the status quo will not last with us or the world. (S)

President Ozal: Yes, the status quo is not good. We need to make a resolution to see what Iraq will say. If not, you have the legal right. (S)

The President: Up to now Gorbachev has been reluctant to go along with a military resolution, but I'll raise it with him.
(S)

President Ozal: We could also give him time, say, two months. This sword and the embargo could win. (S)

The President: We need to convince him in some way. I am concerned that he will do something stupid, with terror, or something stupid with the hostages. Then we would have to respond. (S)

President Ozal: Or he may do something else, throw something at Israel. (S)

The President: Do you think so? (S)

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President Ozal: He could. He has been talking about a holy war and is anti-Israel. It is all coming together, and he wants to be the hero of the Arab world. (S)

The President: That question was raised by some of our Congressmen with the Arab leaders. They said they'd stand by us if he attacked Israel. I don't know -- you'd be a better judge. (S)

President Ozal: If he thinks he has no hope he might. But if the UN would adopt this resolution and then wait a month or two, then he would yield. (S)

The President: I like the idea, and I will raise it with Gorbachev. But I can assure you that I will make no deal with Gorbachev that will undermine the position that Turkey and others have taken. (S)

President Ozal: Just one more point. As a neighbor of Iraq, that country is of interest to us. We will discuss it in Washington. (S)

The President: I will be very interested to hear your views. Good luck. I appreciate your calling. The visit with Gorbachev should go well, but we need to bring the Soviets in line with what Turkey is doing. (S)

President Ozal: We are very close to the Soviets, especially in the economic area. (S)

The President: All right. Thank you, and goodbye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME September 7, 1990, 7:29 - 7:45 a.m.
AND PLACE Oval Office

The President: Margaret, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Fine; I've just come from a debate in the House of Commons. There is strong support for our policy toward Iraq, with little difference between the two sides. Everyone is supportive of what we have done, but Labor as usual is shying away when there is a prospect of use of force. Therefore, Labor is asking that we go to the U.N. for further authority before taking any military action. I told them that we already have the authority and don't need to go back to the U.N. We may want another letter from the Emir, but we should not go to the U.N. and risk a split vote which would weaken our position. It took five days to get Resolution 665, and even then we couldn't get the word "force" into the text. (S)

The President: Ozal has suggested that we could use a new resolution as leverage on Saddam -- as a sword of Damocles. Gorbachev is also speaking about a U.N. resolution. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I was going to comment on Gorbachev. He made a strong speech condemning Iraqi actions, but then he spoke of using "diplomatic means" to solve the problem. (S)

The President: I am glad to hear your views as I prepare to leave for Helsinki. Have you heard complaints about the Soviets retaining military advisers in Iraq? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, and you should have a report on your desk this morning regarding the role of the Soviet military. I have a copy in front of me; it is very interesting. I don't want to say more on the phone, but you will remember that the Soviets launched two satellites right at the start of the conflict. They may be routinely providing the Iraqi military with information from the satellites. (S)

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The President: I will get the report and read it before I leave for Helsinki. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: The Soviets get along well with their Iraqi counterparts and may be passing them information. (S)

The President: Ozal says he has reports that the morale of the Iraqi military may be quite low, with questioning of what Saddam Hussein has done. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Charles will have a word with Brent, in case you have trouble finding the report. (S)

The President: The Israeli (Foreign Minister) was in to see Jim Baker, and I saw him for five minutes. He was pleased with our actions and very grateful. They don't want to disrupt things. I had been concerned about the visit, but it seems to have turned out well. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I think we are up against the same old problem with Gorbachev. He is not telling us everything. One other thing: we need to send more forces into the region, and I have decided to do so. (S)

The President: Have you had any criticism?

Prime Minister Thatcher: No, but there were questions regarding command and control arrangements. I said there was no problem. For example, I was sure General Schwarzkopf and the Saudis were consulting without problems. (S)

The President: Yes. The Washington Post story which reported that I had had to have a talk with Bandar to resolve a problem there was absolutely false. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It's a matter of common sense. If you have troops on their soil and are planning to use them, you consult. (S)

I saw Nick Brady and heard his presentation of your plan. We will cooperate; it is a very good initiative. Now we are getting calls for refugee assistance. We have pledged \$5.4 million. (S)

I am scheduled to be in Eastern Europe for about a week, and I plan to go ahead with it -- but I can be reached. I want to urge all of them to enforce the embargo strictly. (S)

The President: I am worried, in advance of Helsinki, about the issue of humanitarian aid. At first, it was just a Jordanian idea, but now others are picking it up. For example, the Indians now want to ship food. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: The matter is clear. Medical supplies are outside of the sanctions. But, as for food, I hope they'll interpret it narrowly, such as food for the sick. Pressure on

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food is part of the sanctions. If Saddam wants food, he should get out of Kuwait. The way we should handle the food issue is to ask the International Red Cross to take an inventory of the food stocks and then (we) decide what is needed. If any aid is needed, it should be handed out by the Red Cross, as in Ethiopia, directly to the starving. If we were to agree that food was not embargoed, then Saddam would keep us there forever. (S)

The President: That is our position too, and I will make that point to Gorbachev. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Food sanctions are a legitimate form of pressure; if he wants food, let him get out of Kuwait. (S)

The President: Yes. Another thing that worries me is the talk of U.N.-supervised elections. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I agree. It is not for us to deal with the internal situations of these countries. I was struck by Jim Baker's comment, when he talked about regional ideas, that perhaps something like a Helsinki statement on human rights might be appropriate. (S)

The President: Yes, but I wonder what meaning human rights would have within the Arab culture. (S)

I am leaving tonight, but will have part of a day in Helsinki on Saturday before I see Gorbachev on Sunday. Please don't hesitate to call me if something important comes up. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I won't hesitate. (S)

The President: I worry that something will happen requiring quick action. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I don't think that our response to an urgent event would pose a problem. But, for now, Saddam Hussein is lying low. He is trying to undercut the embargo and has launched a major propaganda campaign. (S)

The President: Thanks for your call, and let's stay in touch. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We will, as always. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME September 10, 1990, 10:08 - 10:19 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

After opening greetings, the President reviewed his meetings with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. (U)

The President: Let me stress that no behind-the-scene deals were struck during the meeting. I was pleased that the Soviets were on board but found them reluctant to use force. I explained that force must be an option, but the Soviets maintained that they did not want force to be employed. Gorbachev was frank in his criticism of Saddam, and I believe he wants to get his military observers and advisors out. All in all, the meeting went as well as we could have hoped. It sent a signal to you and others that the Soviet Union will not oppose our common effort. They did not try to back down from sanctions. Regarding food aid, they accepted our definition of humanitarian assistance. So, the meeting sent a strong signal to Saddam Hussein that his once strongest ally is no longer dependable. (U)

President Ozal: I noticed from the television coverage that he was very good. I am looking forward to my meeting with you. Maybe I will have some information regarding the visit of Tariq Aziz in Iran. (U)

The President: I would be very interested in that. We need all the information we can get. What do you think will come out of it? (U)

President Ozal: It is a very difficult situation. The Iraqis are knocking on every door. I will learn what they have talked about. (U)

The President: I am interested in that. You have told me that the sanctions will have an effect. Indications like that suggest the sanctions are really biting. (U)

President Ozal: Yes. People in Iraq are not really able to talk, but they are not thinking favorably about Saddam. (U)

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The President: I hope not. I don't want Iran breaking off. I think it would be hard for them to do so, after their long war with Iraq. (Ø)

President Ozal: I don't think that will happen. They will get what they want. But they told my very clearly they are very much against Saddam. (Ø)

The President: If they just stay firm, that will be good. I wanted to give you this first-hand report and let you know I am very encouraged. There were differences: they are very reluctant to talk about the use of force. I didn't push, but said we would have to talk further if the situation changed. I assured him we didn't want to use force, but who knows? There could be some terrorist act that compels us to respond. (Ø)

President Ozal: We will see. Your meeting with Gorbachev sent a very clear signal to Saddam Hussein and Iraq, that they will have to accept the UN Security Council decisions. It may take some time before the sanctions really begin to bite. (Ø)

The President: That is encouraging. We will have to think about international organizations to supervise food deliveries to children under "humanitarian" assistance, so he won't just appeal for food and then give it to his troops. (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes. Who will send the food, and who will be paid for it? I have some doubts about medical and food aid. I saw a member of the royal family of Jordan, who told me that no ships are coming in to Aqaba because they are afraid to do so. (Ø)

The President: That's good. It shows it's working. The Indians and Brazilians are trying to get food in. If it is a legitimate question of the starvation of children, we could react. But it would need international supervision. Anyway, I hope Saddam Hussein will withdraw, but he say's he can't withdraw and still stay in power. Do you agree? (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes. How could he explain his position after his long war with Iran? (Ø)

The President: That's his problem. This is my first report. I will be calling Mitterrand and Mubarak later, but this is my first call. I would be very interested in learning about the Aziz visit to Iran and any other ideas about how to keep Iran in the game. (Ø)

President Ozal: I called Rafsanjani and asked him to send someone to Turkey, so I will have a report before I come to Washington. (Ø)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on
September 10, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME September 10, 1990, 1030 - 1100 EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Your Majesty, I wanted to give you a call to provide a readout of my meetings with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: With your permission, I'd like to mention one or two points. And I'd be glad to get your reaction. Although we spent some time on economic matters concerning the Soviet Union internally, most of our time was spent on the Gulf. There were no side agreements, no suggested agreements, and nothing on the table other than what was said at the press conference yesterday. In short, I am very pleased with the statement -- the joint statement is nothing short of historic. In our view, and I'd like to hear your view, this will send a powerful signal to Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait. This way he can't divide us and play off the Soviets and the United States against one another. (S)

I've been worried about what I felt might be a weakening of the economic blockade by some countries, even countries who support us, to permit food to go inside of Iraq unfettered -- that is without controls. The statement makes clear there should be no wholesale shipment of food there. Humanitarian -- and that is the word that is used by the UN Security Council -- humanitarian exceptions should be monitored by a force outside Iraq to be sure it gets to those truly in need, such as children. (S)

It also states that we will consider additional measures consistent with the UN charter to accomplish what we should, but that was left very vague. I think that also sends a useful signal to Saddam. Gorbachev did repeat several times that he would like this solved without violence. I said we would too, but this would require a Soviet effort to make sure sanctions worked. (S)

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So I am pleased with the meeting and lastly I want to thank you for your warm reception to Jim Baker and your support, generosity and hospitality shown to our people there. But I would like very much your views and how you felt our meeting played in the Gulf.
(Ø)

King Fahd: First of all, I am pleased with what was accomplished with the meeting of President Bush and President Gorbachev. Most people in the area, in the Gulf especially, had not expected such a positive outcome from the meeting, and for you, Mr. President, to get as much as you did. Our inquiries about the statement and reactions to it follows: everyone in the Gulf was pleased with what happened, and there is agreement that other measures are possible if Iraq doesn't heed the warning and does not decide to withdraw from Kuwait. It seems to me that Iraq is now surrounded in a significant and tremendous way. Iraq is surrounded psychologically and socially and can do nothing but yield to world opinion. Otherwise, it will bring harm to itself. There is evidence for that, Mr. President, that precedes your meeting with Gorbachev. I have seen pictures of Saddam Hussein, and in those pictures, he is unable to complete a sentence and continue his discourse. (Ø)

The President: That's very interesting. (U)

King Fahd: We believe the man is unbalanced and are confident by this in our contacts with him and by what we've seen in his interviews with the US press. I am sure in the interview with Saddam Hussein and a member of the US press corp -- I believe it was Dan Rather -- I am not sure whether you saw it -- but it shows Saddam is not normal in his movements, behavior and speaking. (Ø)

The President: No, I didn't see that one. I will get them to play it for me. (U)

King Fahd: I hope you would see that so it will be clear to you that the Saddam we know is not the same Saddam who exists now. A report we received from inside Iraq indicates that there is lots of resentment in the army and the people. And, Mr. President, you may also have heard that he killed many officers close to him recently. (Ø)

The President: Has that been confirmed? (U)

King Fahd: They are confirmed because we heard it from our sources and the BBC and other broadcasts. We know it is true because I know Saddam and it is as easy for him to kill one as one hundred. Several broadcasts have statements about explosions in chemical plants near the border. Iraq has denied them, but I believe the reports are true. What matters now is the man is in a situation in which all he has to do is yield, in my judgment, which should be in one to two weeks. (Ø)

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The President: But Your Majesty, do you think it is possible that the pressure will be such that he can say okay, I will leave Kuwait and let the rulers back in? Can he do that and remain the dictator of Iraq? (S)

King Fahd: I think he has to withdraw, that has to happen. But I think and I am confident that he has lots of opposition in Iraq because Iraq gave Iran everything without taking back anything in return. (S)

The President: Yes, exactly. (U)

King Fahd: At the same time, lots of people will expect answers to the mistakes made, people who suffered 8 years of war, if they are not willing to fight, and he gave back all the gained, then why make them fight now? I believe, I think because only God knows, that as soon as he withdraws from Kuwait (and he does so completely), he will come to an end, he will no longer exist by a coup or other means. (S)

The President: I wish it would happen soon to spare the world and the Iraqi people more suffering. There is total world concern. It would be nice if the Iraqi people would move sooner. But there is nothing to do on that. I am pleased you think the sanctions are working and solidarity between us will help get him out of there. (S)

King Fahd: Mr. President, I share your feeling that I'd rather have an end to Saddam Hussein come sooner rather than later. I would like to say, Mr. President, that you may have heard it before but I'll say it in any case, that a large number of Iraqi officers and soldiers have sought refuge in the Kingdom. They relate and report many stories of tragedies that happen to them. Iraq had difficult experiences in the desert when they were invaded. We will continue to debrief them and get information from them and provide it to you. (S)

The President: Thank you. Turkish President Ozal told me some of them were coming his way with the same story. (S)

King Fahd: This is good, Mr. President. It would enable us to collect information from the soldiers coming to us and Turkey and find out exclusive information on chemical plants and products and actions that are banned and share them with one another. (S)

The President: That's right. I am very worried about the nuclear and chemical weapons capability of this madman. (S)

King Fahd: Yes, he has been working on improving these capabilities in the last few years during the war between Iran and Iraq. People were not attentive to it. (S)

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The President: Now we all are alert to it. The Soviet visit went very well. After you've had a chance to analyze the statement, I would be happy to discuss it with you, respond to your questions, and discuss any suggestion you might have. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you Mr. President for your offer. I now have the joint statement, and I will read it and study it and consider it carefully. Let me tell you again what you did in your meeting with Gorbachev will have universal impact. Most did not expect you to accomplish what you did and get what you got from Gorbachev. (S)

The President: Let's stay in close touch until we win what is happening out there. (S)

King Fahd: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this call. I want to tell you that as we are talking I see you getting off your plane in Helsinki. (S)

The President: It truly is a small world. (U)

King Fahd: I agree, Mr. President, it is a small world because of satellites. Through satellite communications I follow everything. (S)

The President: Tomorrow night I am giving a speech to the American people, but I hope the message will be received well around the world, and it will certainly be a message of solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you, Mr. President. That pleases me very much. (U)

The President: Good-bye, and my respects. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you, Mr. President. Good-bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Francois Mitterrand,
President of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Alex Toumayan

DATE, TIME September 10, 1990, 1:34 - 1:43 p.m.
PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Francois, comment allez vous? (U)

President Mitterrand: Good evening, dear George. (U)

The President: I would like to tell you about my meeting in Helsinki. I am sure you have seen the communique. I think the meeting was nothing short of historic. It sent a powerful signal. Saddam Hussein knows he cannot play off the U.S. against the Soviet Union. (S)

Gorbachev was in a good frame of mind and we were in agreement on the general approach to take in this crisis. Gorbachev is wary of the use of force, however. (S)

President Mitterrand: Undoubtedly. (U)

The President: Regarding the economic sanctions, Gorbachev agrees that food itself should be embargoed. However, if people are truly starving, especially children, then there should be a mechanism to get food to them. There were no side deals at Helsinki nor any request on my part for the Soviets to intervene militarily. (S)

Gorbachev was embarrassed by the fact that the press tried to tie his policies toward Iraq with the Soviets' need for economic assistance. It was the way the question was phrased. (S)

Thank you for the meetings that Nick Brady had with your top finance people. We are close together on that issue. (S)

I have spoken to King Fahd. Like the others in the region, he says that the sanctions are already working. Fahd is too optimistic; he says Saddam Hussein will need to make some

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decisions in the next two weeks. Gorbachev also thought that the sanctions were working. (S)

President Mitterrand: Thank you for informing me. It is important to remain in touch. You understand Gorbachev's personality well: he doesn't want to stay alone in his corner. (S)

I think that Gorbachev is personally in agreement with us, but he has so many other forces to contend with inside the Soviet Union. The fact that you took the trouble to go to Helsinki, which is so far away, was a good thing. (S)

Now we must assess Saddam Hussein's ability to withstand the economic sanctions. A UN committee exists and should be asked to oversee them. (S)

The President: Yes, but aren't they already at work? (S)

President Mitterrand: It is important that we take a hard line in order for the embargo to succeed. (S)

The President: I agree totally. Some countries want all food shipments let into Iraq. (S)

President Mitterrand: I don't want to be cruel, but the most genuine cruelty is war, and that is what we want to avoid. (S)

The President: King Fahd says that there are many defections from the Iraqi military and that the defectors tell of shortages. (S)

President Mitterrand: We have to stay in touch; circumstances require it. The risk remains high and we must therefore remain vigilant. (S)

The President: Yes, indeed. (U)

President Mitterrand: Until soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Brian Mulroney,
Prime Minister of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: September 10, 1990 2:10 -2:18 p.m.
PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Brian, how are you? I'm just checking in to tell you about the my meeting in Helsinki. I think our joint statement touched all the right bases. Gorbachev is worried about the use of force, as we all are, but we've agreed on all the right points. As far as food is concerned, we agreed that it had to be based on humanitarian criteria and that we would need to have mechanisms to ensure that it reaches the right people. Ozal, Mubarak, and Fahd are very pleased with the message that our Helsinki meeting sent. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I was so impressed with the message that I saw conveyed when I watched your press conference on TV. You have been building an image of measured seriousness over the past 18 months and it came across at Helsinki. Do you have any private insights on Gorbachev's thinking? (S)

The President: Gorbachev thought that the sanctions were working. Fahd thought so too and he said something strange. He said that Saddam Hussein will have some difficult decisions to make in the next two weeks. Then he corrected himself. He said that Saddam Hussein was acting strangely of late. (S)

Gorbachev didn't have any other special insights. I feel that he will bring his advisors out. He was cooperative and in a good mood, but he seemed overwhelmed by his problems at home. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The fact that you were able to do this kind of a meeting on such short notice shows that there is a new relationship. (S)

The President: On arms control, although we did not work on the details, we did agree to give the negotiations a push. (S)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: Helsinki was very impressive. It should have an impact on Saddam Hussein. (S)

The President: How are things at home? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You are aware that we have decided to go forward with you on the Mexican trade agreement. (S)

The President: Do you feel that we should have a trilateral agreement? I thought that it was better if we negotiated our own bilateral agreement first and then came back to you. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I would be very grateful if we could be at the table from the start. We won't delay things or get in the way. I would appreciate your giving the Mexicans a push on this. I believe that Carla Hills and Jim Baker are in favor of this approach. If Canada were left out, we could get whipsawed domestically. We would have a political problem. (S)

The President: I may be behind the curve, but I thought that it was best for us to go for a bilateral agreement first. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I don't want to misquote anyone but it was my understanding that Baker and Hills were in agreement. I think that Crosbie talked to Hills. (S)

The President: If Jim Baker and Carla Hills agree, there is no problem. Let me look into it. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

MULRONEY

SEP 10 - PRES CALL TO CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER
MULRONEY INITIATED 1410 - TERMINATED 1420.
MONITORED BY ADRIAN BASORA.

MITTERRAND SEP 10 - PRES CALL TO FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND.
TRANSLATED BY ALEC TOUMAYAN; MONITORED BY
ADRIAN BASORA. INITIATED 1334 - TERMINATED 1345.

MUBARAK

SEP 10 - PRES CALL TO EGYPTIAN PRES MUBARAK.
MONITORED BY O'LEARY. INITIATED 1133 - TERMINATED
1142

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME September 11, 1990, 12:36 - 12:46 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut! How are you? I wanted to give you a report on my meetings in Helsinki. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It made an excellent impression. I spoke with Gorbachev yesterday on the telephone. We talked about other things, but also about this. He is very pleased. (U)

The President: I am glad. He came across with a stronger statement than we had anticipated. We got everything we wanted. He is very concerned about the use of force, but I had a very frank and open discussion with him about what might happen if there should be a provocation. We addressed ourselves to the food question also. I think he agrees with us that regular shipments of foodstuffs are banned by the UN sanctions. However, some kinds of humanitarian shipments, especially for children, could be considered so long as there are international observers to ensure that the food gets to the children. (U)

He thinks the sanctions will work. I am beginning to think so, too. Yesterday, Fahd, Ozal, and Mitterrand all told me the sanctions are having a serious impact on Iraq. So I am basically pleased and just wanted to touch base with you. (U)

A second issue: I am very sorry I won't be able to come on October 3. Brent has already conveyed that to Horst Teltschik. It is a horribly complex time for me. I hope you understand. I hate letting you down like this. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, let me say on that last point that of course I have total understanding for your position. I indicated that when we last spoke. (U)

The President: I know you did. I appreciate your understanding. (U)

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24 8/21/2009
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Chancellor Kohl: Among friends, it must be possible to say when there are problems without creating a big hubbub. We have come a long way together and have a long way to go. Let me suggest on that day that you send a message to the Germans. (Ø)

The President: Absolutely. Would you like a televised or a written message? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: A televised message would be very good. (Ø)

The President: We will get a tape and have our people contact your Embassy to get the right size and specifications. I will get that out well in advance. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That is a very good idea. As to Helsinki and what you told me about the Gulf situation, I totally agree with you. I welcome it if sanctions are taking effect. In my discussions with Jim Baker I will try to work together with him as to what we Germans can do. At the very latest, in one week's time we will be able to say what the Germans can do and will do. I want to help, but you know the limits we have. But under no circumstances do I want a situation in which the Germans are made out to be the number one exporter, but when responsible action is required they are not there. That is not our policy. (Ø)

The President: We understand that. Don't worry about that. Maybe things are moving out there. I still worry about terrorist acts, but I am encouraged that those close to the scene think the sanctions are taking hold. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I hope so, too. (U)

The President: It was good talking to you, Helmut. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan, September 13, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Douglas Paal, NSC

DATE, TIME: September 13, 8:20 - 8:35 pm EDT
AND PLACE: The Residence

The Prime Minister telephoned the President to report on a decision of the Japanese government to increase its contribution to the multinational Persian Gulf effort. (U)

The President: Toshiki, how are you, sir? (U)

PM Kaifu: This is Toshiki speaking. (U)

The President: I am so glad to hear your voice. (U)

PM Kaifu: Me, too, I am very glad to hear your fine voice. You sound as if you enjoy good health. (U)

The President: I am sitting here at dinner at the table. Barbara and I are having dinner. (U)

PM Kaifu: I am sorry to interrupt you in the middle of dinner. Because what I have to tell you is important, I hope you will excuse me if I continue to interrupt your dinner. (U)

The President: I have been expecting your call. I know it is important. (U)

PM Kaifu: First, I am very pleased that the summit meeting in Helsinki was very successful. I received your letter, George, and I am very pleased it went so well. I very much appreciate that we were able to give such a strong signal to Saddam Hussein and all are able to stand together. I also heard your address to Congress. I was very impressed with your strong determination. (U)

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The President: Thank you very much. (U)

PM Kaifu: I also want to thank you very much for sending Secretary Brady to brief me on the situation. I have come to understand fully your thinking on the multinational force and the frontline states. I met with the ministers of MITI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance, and we decided the following. With respect to the frontline states, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, we will provide assistance of \$2 billion. We will divide it into \$600 million for the short term and \$1.4 billion for the mid-term, as Secretary Brady suggested. (Ø)

With respect to our assistance to the multinational force, in addition to the \$1 billion already decided under a different situation, we have agreed to an additional \$1 billion. With respect to timing, we would like to give it extra thought due to budget constraints. (Ø)

The President: I understand that. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: With respect to the contribution measures just mentioned to you, George, I will tell the Cabinet members soon. We will then make these measures concrete in a prompt manner. We want to keep solidarity with the U.S. and with the international community to show resistance to aggression. (Ø)

The President: Toshiki, one, I am very pleased with this. This is along the lines of what Secretary Brady discussed with you and with Hashimoto (Minister of Finance). And there is already feeling in the U.S., in Congress, that somebody else should do more. But I will be glad to announce, when you think it is correct, that Japan is doing its part. If it is okay to comment, I am willing to comment to the press tomorrow. If there is a need to wait until after the Cabinet meets, I can wait. What is your desire? (Ø)

PM Kaifu: The Cabinet is meeting one half hour from now. The Cabinet Secretary will announce the decision in one and one half hours. (Ø)

The President: Tomorrow I will find an occasion to tell the press that I am grateful for this support. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: Please do. (Ø)

The President: Let's stay in touch. I am so pleased we are staying together, very, very pleased with this phone call. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: I would like to stay in close touch so as to make in concrete terms, in a prompt speeded-up fashion (sic). (Ø)

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The President: Toshiki, let me tell you this. In Congress there are always people trying to blame Japan, Germany or somebody else. They see us spending large amounts of money and sending fine young people to the Middle East, where they might be in harm's way. So I can understand why Congress wants others to do more. But I don't want any scapegoats. And you and I work closely together. And I will make clear to the American people that Japan is trying very hard to do its part. (Ø)

I don't know what lies ahead. It is very complicated. There may be fighting, though I hope we can resolve the crisis peacefully. I want to stay in close touch with you as we go ahead. So thank you for this phone call, my friend. I am very glad we have a relationship where we can talk very frankly like this. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: George, I hope you will continue to exercise leadership and we will be able to resolve the issue peacefully. We will stay in close touch and cooperate. I look forward to seeing you in New York, after which I will visit the five countries in the Middle East that I originally planned to visit. (Ø)

The President: Thank you for this phone call. (U)

PM Kaifu: Thank you. (U)

The President: We send our best wishes to your family. (U)

PM Kaifu: Please say to Barbara that I am sorry to interrupt your dinner. (U)

The President: That's alright. She is sitting right here and is glad we are having this phone call. Thank you, my friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
of the United Kingdom on September 14, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
Notetaker: Philip D. Zelikow

DATE. TIME September 14, 1990, 7:29 - 7:42am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Margaret, I'm delighted to hear from you. What's on your mind? (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I have a couple of things I wish to talk to you about. But first I want to congratulate you on your speech to the Congress. It was terrific. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. I tried not to be too strident about Saddam. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Thanks also for your message about your meeting with Gorbachev. I'm glad he came. (U)

The President: He wanted to be there, for a lot of reasons, some of them economic. There were some differences I could tell you about, but personally the meeting went well. You know him well; there was no rancor, a good discussion. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Well the reaction and the publicity was just superb. There was wisdom in the results. (U)

I want to tell you that we just finished a meeting this morning of our Overseas and Defense Committee. We have decided to send a full armored brigade to Saudi Arabia. That will include 120 tanks, armored infantry with their Scorpions and other armored vehicles, helicopters, workshops, support facilities, everything -- a full brigade, just as General Schwartzkopf wanted. Plus we are sending more helicopters that can attack tanks. Plus we will be sending more Tornados specialized for ground attack, and more air defense Tornados. It will be a total of 7500 ground forces. Like you, we will be picking up ships to take them to Saudi Arabia. (S)

The President: Why that is just marvelous. My heavens, I already felt you were doing your share. This will be so well received. This is icing on the cake. (U)

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Prime Minister Thatcher: I felt we ought to commit ground forces. Our people asked General Schwartzkopf what he needed. His preference was for an armored brigade, with tanks and armored infantry. We will take an armored brigade that is now in Germany -- lifting the whole thing out. I will be asking Kohl if our Tornadoes can do low flying practice and if our tanks can exercise before they come. It's a famous brigade in our army. It fought in the desert in the last war, and was known as the 'Desert Rats.' (S)

The President: I remember the name. My gosh, that is so superb. I hope you didn't mind my quoting you in the speech to the Congress. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Not at all. It was very nice. (U)

The President: We edited it a bit, using the term 'bargaining chip' instead of 'bargaining counter.' We took a little liberty there, using a phrase more people would recognize here. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: You were very kind. (U)

We'll be making our statement in about two hours. (U)

The President: It will be big news. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: There are two other things I wish to mention. First, while we support the embargo on air traffic, we must work it out and get the authority to enforce it and know how we're going to enforce it. Our people will be in touch with you on this. Our previous experience has shown that we must not only know what we want to stop, but get the authority to use force to get it. They're putting equipment into civil airliners. (S)

The President: I'm embarrassed to say that I'm not very familiar with where we stand on this matter. We do need authority to back the sanctions up. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: This was discussed with Gorbachev in Moscow, all of our thinking about this. (S)

Also, on the Kuwaiti letter, the one we think is necessary to allow us to take the military option if need be along with Article 51. I heard the Emir is planning to send around letter of request to recapture Kuwait to all the countries that are helping in the region. This alarmed us. If it is done, the letter must be prepared using the strict legal terms so that he doesn't go around with this and then we have to go back later to make it right. (S)

I got our Attorney General to work on the letter. We've worked out a simple form which says what is necessary and no more. On a contingency basis I think we can agree with it. We got this done before contacting you because we did not want the Emir to dash around with a whole lot of letters before we had agreed on the text. (S)

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I understand we're holding it up now. Some of your people feel it is not the right time for such a letter. I feel we need it quickly. When the time comes and we are ready to go, we do not want to have to go and then get such a letter from the Emir. This sudden effort would become known, and it would be a signal to Saddam. (S)

I feel we should have all the contingency planning done in advance. This will enable us to say, without contradiction, that with Article 51 and this specific request of the Emir, there is no need to go back to the Security Council. It would be most unwise to do so. Our people will get in touch with yours and work on the draft. (S)

The President: I have not heard anything about this. Bob Gates is here with me and I think he knows something about it. I see no reason to delay on this matter. It is important for every contingency to be taken care of. I feel Article 51 and Kuwait's original letter gave us the authority to use force. I will talk to Scowcroft -- Baker is halfway around the world -- and we will work to get a text and go forward on this. Anything we can get to enhance our legal authority, the better it is. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We'll be in touch about that and about the embargo on air traffic. On burdensharing, we will work with the ideas Secretary Brady discussed with us. I'm very pleased with the Japanese. Have you heard yet about their decision? (S)

The President: Prime Minister Kaifu called me last night. I know his decision will be well received here. Congress is now seized with the idea of wanting everybody else to do everything. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Well, you have done so much. They're entitled to ask that. (U)

The President: This will calm them. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Support from Congress and the public has been marvelous. Both in the States and here. (U)

The President: How is it with the Labour Party? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: They don't dare do anything other than support us. They want us to go back to the Security Council if we decide on the military option. We couldn't possibly do that. We have the legal authority. We risk putting that in issue if we go back to the Security Council, and will only give aid and comfort to Saddam and make us liable to a veto. Once having got it, we should not risk it again. We have the authority to do whatever is necessary. (S)

The President: I agree. We may be on the phone again late some night with a situation that must be answered without delay. We cannot let Yemen and Cuba hold us up in UN debates. (S)

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Prime Minister Thatcher: It took five days to get the last resolution through, and they wouldn't even mention the word "force" then. (S)

The President: The Soviets have been very careful on the issue of use of force. We'll have to run this down to the end. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'm coming to the United Nations from September 29 to October 1, and I will be in touch before then to see about the possibility of a trip to Washington. (S)

The President: Why not look at a meeting in New York? I will be at the UN for two or three days. I think the NSC has been working on some ideas, like dinner on Sunday night. I'll check to be sure. It shouldn't complicate our schedules. Either way we have to get together. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: New York would be superb if we can do it. (S)

The President: I'll work it out. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Tell Barbara she was on the radio here this morning with an interview she gave. It was terrific. (U)

The President: I'll tell her. Thanks for calling. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Alec Toumayan

DATE, TIME September 14, 1990, 12:02 - 12:07 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Mitterrand placed the call at the President's initiation. (U)

The President: Francois, I wanted to talk with you about the situation involving your Embassy in Kuwait. I simply wanted to say to you that we view this very seriously. I look at it almost as some incident against our common effort there. If there is anything I can do -- I have no idea what that might be -- but if there is anything, don't hesitate to call on me. (U)

President Mitterrand: I thank you for this, for your initiative. As you know, I am in Czechoslovakia right now. (U)

The President: I won't keep you. I just wanted to call about this. Please understand, Francois, anything you want of me, just pick up the telephone. He must know that this is unacceptable behavior. (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes, yes. I will be very glad to do so. (U)

The President: I am sorry to bother you in Czechoslovakia. I didn't realize you were there. But I am very glad to have talked with you. (U)

President Mitterrand: Let us continue. Tomorrow in Paris, I will have a cabinet meeting and will discuss this matter in detail. A number of decisions will be taken -- political and military. May I call you sometime tomorrow afternoon to let you know what we discussed? (U)

The President: It would be very useful. I am available any time night or day. I would appreciate it very much. (U)

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President Mitterrand: We are meeting at 10:30 a.m. Paris time with our cabinet. There will be a meeting Monday morning of the foreign ministers of the EC twelve. The countries of the Western European Union will meet Tuesday at 6:00 p.m. Paris time to take up that issue among others. I probably will call you tomorrow to discuss it with you. I am very, very touched that you called me. (C)

The President: Thank you. I will await your call. If anything else comes up, Francois, don't hesitate to call any time day or night. And good luck in Czechoslovakia. (U)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

The President: Au revoir, mon ami. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Alec Toumayan

DATE, TIME: September 16, 1990, 3:17 - 3:23 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Mitterrand initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you, Francois? It is good to hear your voice. (U)

President Mitterrand: I promised to call you, though I haven't very much to tell you that you don't already know, because our decisions were taken yesterday. We decided to send an important number of troops, both land and air, to Saudi Arabian territory. The French Defense Minister has met King Fahd, and our discussions are underway. I wanted to give you a feeling for our decision. It is very difficult to understand Iraqi attitudes toward France, because, like the Soviet Union, we helped them a lot. Each time we did not send them arms they had requested, the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Kuwait sent us letters asking why we had not sent arms to Iraq. It is bizarre. As to why they have taken this step, we have no explanation. Perhaps like all love affairs that turn sour, passion turns to violence. It will be important for us to talk, because our armies will be side by side. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate your call. We have watched with admiration as you handled this difficult situation. The sending of forces will be well received in various places. I agree we will stay in close touch, especially because we will have forces side by side. I appreciate the phone call and your update. I must say I am confused at some of Iraq's almost irrational actions. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I agree. (U)

The President: In any event, thank you for the update. Let's stay in touch. (U)

President Mitterrand: I wanted also to thank you very much for your very friendly phone call while I was in Prague. (U)

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31 8/21/2009
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The President: Have a nice remainder of your Sunday. We will talk soon. (U)

President Mitterrand: Tomorrow I will be in Germany with Chancellor Kohl. (U)

The President: You are on the road all the time. You must be tired. (U)

President Mitterrand: I do travel too much, but then there are twelve in the Community. (U)

The President: Exactement. Au revoir. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME September 25, 1990, 6:02-6:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hey, Brian, how are you doing? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'm struggling. (Ø)

The President: I am calling on the trade deal, the Free Trade Agreement. I know our people have been talking, but I wanted to get to you personally. Maybe I had not been clear enough, but I had made a commitment to Salinas for a bilateral agreement on a fast track. But I am sensitive to your interest in the agreement and I have told Congress that Canada wishes to participate actively. This would mean that our negotiators would talk over the next few months to see if there was a basis for a trilateral agreement. I realize that this may not be all you might want, but I hope that this gives you the cover that you need. (Ø)

There are two key points, however. The first is that, if we do go trilateral, we would stick to the same timetable that we already have in mind. The second is that, if our ministerial level consultations show that a trilateral agreement is not practical, then we would go ahead bilaterally. I wanted to get back to you on this. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I think, to use your term, that it gives me enough cover. I appreciate it. I know you are on a fast track for the negotiations, and I know that Jim Baker and others have been working on this in order to take account of the political problems that this could cause here. (Ø)

The President: I know. (U)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: Is there anything new on the Gulf? (Ø)

The President: I've just had an important visit with Ozal. Ozal had said at the beginning that the sanctions would begin to have an effect in ten days, and now he says that they are in fact biting. He also says that Saddam Hussein is not ten feet tall and that he will begin feeling the sanctions increasingly. Meanwhile our troops continue to arrive. For the present, however, I do not plan any military action, assuming there is no provocation. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I sent you a note about your handling of the Gulf crisis. You may not have seen it yet. (Ø)

The President: No, darn it! (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I have also talked to our Parliament and praised your leadership in the Gulf. (Ø)

The President: Are you getting flak on this issue? I have read that you are. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, but that comes with the job. (U)

SALINAS

SEP 25 - PRESIDENT CALL TO MEXICAN PRES
SALINAS. TRANSLATED BY DON JOHNSON,
MONITORED BY BILL PRYCE. CALL INITIATED
1725 - TERMINATED 1729

OCTOBER 1990

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7952

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MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the ANC, South Africa, on October 5, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the ANC
Notetaker: Robert C. Frasure

DATE, TIME: October 5, 1990, 10:10 - 10:21 am EST

LOCATION: The Oval Office

The President telephoned Nelson Mandela to give him an overview of the de Klerk visit. (U)

The President: I told you I would report back to you after my meeting with de Klerk. I apologize for not having done so up to now. We had the intervening problem of the UN meetings and we have been caught up in a budget battle back here. Only now am I getting back to you. (U)

Mr. Mandela: That's very understandable. Thank you very much for calling. (U)

The President: Let me make a few points. (U)

Mr. Mandela: You are welcome. (U)

The President: I found President de Klerk to be a decent man, a man of integrity, as you said he is. He gave me the impression of someone trying to do the right thing but with many problems.
(Ø)

I offered to play any useful role in this process. I didn't push it. But if there is some role, we want to help, despite the fact we are half way around the world. We have no colonial past. I told de Klerk as I told you to pick up the phone, if he needs me.
(Ø)

We did talk about the violence. We are very concerned about it. I stressed to him that the government has a special responsibility to maintain order. (Ø)

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Sanctions were peripheral to our discussions. But they did come up. I told de Klerk that the conditions in our law are pretty specific. Only when they are met and in consultation with Congress will we lift sanctions. There is some small sentiment in Congress to increase sanctions but I won't do that. (Ø)

In my departure statement, I did use the word irreversible to describe the process. It was based on my conviction that we want it to be so. I understand that it may have caused some consternation or misunderstanding with you. I hope I'm right in saying it. They cannot go back to old style apartheid. What comes next is the real question. (Ø)

There was some reference by de Klerk to one man, one vote with constitutional guarantees. (Ø)

There we are. (U)

We met for about three hours. We went over and had lunch together. (U)

I came away impressed by the man. (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: Thank you very much. I appreciate it very much. (U)

It is true that the word irreversible is not one to which we subscribe. I have no doubt about the integrity of Mr. de Klerk. I'm happy you had that same impression. (Ø)

When we say we have reservations about the word irreversible, it is not referring to you. We are indicating it is not our perception. (Ø)

The President: Are you worried that it might go back? (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: It will be irreversible when there is an agreement on a constitution. (Ø)

The President: So it is a question of timing then? (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: Yes. Maybe, however, the mutual trust between the two sides may become so strong that a mere mutual declaration is enough. That is my personal point of view. (Ø)

The President: I was trying to be encouraging on it. (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: It is not an important point between us. I wanted to clarify it. But it is a thing of the past between us. (Ø)

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3

The President: It shows the need to stay in touch like this. We cannot let misunderstandings develop. I thank you for your frankness. (Ø)

Is your health okay now? (U)

Mr. Mandela: Yes. And I'm looking forward to my trip. I get more sleep when I travel. (U)

The President: I feel the same way. (U)

Mr. Mandela: I raised one problem with Ambassador Swing that I want to mention to you. I urged him to help us find a way of securing premises for our organization, of getting a building. We are consuming our capital on rent. We need help. (Ø)

The President: I've been tied up on the budget and other issues and haven't seen that. I will ask my National Security staff to look into it. I'm delighted that you raised it. (Ø)

Mr. Mandela: Thank you, Mr. President. My best wishes to your wife and family. (U)

The President: The same to you. It was good talking to you. Goodby, Sir. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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