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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91112
Folder ID Number: 91112-001

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/2/90 - 8/20/90

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt (3 pp.)	8/2/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Telcon	Re: Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (4 pp.)	8/2/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	8/3/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom (2 pp.)	8/3/90	(b)(1)	S
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand of France (4 pp.)	8/3/90	(b)(1)	S
06. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan on August 3, 1990 (3 pp.)	8/3/90	(b)(1)	S
07. Telcon	Re: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (6 pp.)	8/4/90	(b)(1)	S
08. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 4, 1990 (4 pp.)	8/4/90	(b)(1)	S
09. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey on August 5, 1990 (3 pp.)	8/5/90	(b)(1)	S
10. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 5, 1990 (2 pp.)	8/5/90	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/2/90 - 8/20/90

Pinksheet Number: cap943

OA/ID Number: 91112-001

Date Closed: 2/3/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan, August 5, 1990 (2 pp.)	8/5/90	(b)(1)	C
12. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 6, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/6/90	(b)(1)	C
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy (2 pp.)	8/6/90	(b)(1)	C
14. Telcon	Re: Telecon with President Ali Abdallah Salih of the Republic of Yemen (5 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	C
15. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 7, 1990 (2 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	S
16. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hassan of Morocco (2 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	C
17. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Sheikh Zayyid of the United Arab Emirates (2 pp.)	8/8/90	(b)(1)	C
18. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman (3 pp.)	8/8/90	(b)(1)	C
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (1 pp.)	8/8/90	(b)(1)	
20. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom (3 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	S

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21. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Bob Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia on August 9, 1990 (4 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	✓
22. Telcon	Re: Telcon Call to Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (3 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	✓
23. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 10, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/10/90	(b)(1)	✓
24. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Sheikh Issa of Bahrain (2 pp.)	8/11/90	(b)(1)	✓
25. Telcon	Re: Telecon with President al-Assad of Syria (2 pp.)	8/12/90	(b)(1)	✓
26. Telcon	Re: Telcon with F.W. de Klerk of South Africa on August 13, 1990 (3 pp.)	8/13/90	(b)(1)	✓
27. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (3 pp.)	8/13/90	(b)(1)	✓
28. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	8/13/90	(b)(1)	✓
29. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (1 pp.)	8/13/90	(b)(1)	✓
30. Telcon	Re: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan on August 13, 1990 (3 pp.)	8/13/90	(b)(1)	✓
31. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	8/14/90	(b)(1)	✓

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32. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	8/16/90	(b)(1)	C
33. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (3 pp.)	8/20/90	(b)(1)	S
34. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom (3 pp.)	8/20/90	(b)(1)	C
35. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (4 pp.)	8/20/90	(b)(1)	S

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6235

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan
and President Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
President Mubarak
C. David Welch, NSC Staff, Notetaker

DATE, TIME August 2, 1990, 12:17 - 12:31 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Aboard Air Force One enroute Aspen, Colorado

The President initiated the calls to King Hussein and President Mubarak, who were together in Alexandria, Egypt. The President spoke serially with each one.

The President: Good afternoon, your Majesty. How are you? (U)

King Hussein: Good afternoon, sir, it's very good to hear your voice. (U)

The President: I'm calling from the plane on the way to Aspen, Colorado, where I'm going to that studies institute there, with a meeting with Maggie Thatcher as well. I wanted to talk to you about these most, most disturbing events. I was wondering if you had any thoughts about what can be done. You know the area so well. We're just very surprised at this outrageous invasion.
(Ø)

King Hussein: I'm here with President Mubarak, and I think he would like to speak to you afterwards. I felt it looked ominous yesterday because of the lack of any progress in the talks. I will be going to Saudi Arabia and to Iraq, sir, in an effort to dampen the situation at the highest levels. That is our objective, hopefully by putting it on that level we can make progress. (Ø)

The President: Does our friend Mubarak feel the same way? (Ø)

King Hussein: Yes, and he also wants to talk to you. (Ø)

The President: I'm worried about the danger to the lives of Americans. Most important, acceptance of this invasion is bad for other countries in the area. (Ø)

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
Ø1 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

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2

King Hussein: Yes, sir. I am starting shortly to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. They are also upset that things have reached this point. I really implore you, sir, to keep calm. We want to deal with this in an Arab context, to find a way that gives us a better foundation for the future. (Ø)

The President: I'm also worried about Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and about our other friends. The world should not accept the status quo now and consider this a fait accompli. It is unacceptable to the United States. I'm sure that Saddam Hussein knows this but you can tell him that from me. (Ø)

King Hussein: They are determined to pull out as soon as possible, maybe in days. We will push for it. (Ø)

The President: Well, that sounds optimistic, but if it happens it would be very good. I respect you and your views on this; they are really valuable. We will try to remain calm but we cannot acquiesce in the status quo. We are doing certain things to express our position. (Ø)

King Hussein: I spoke to your Charge d' Affaires in Amman this morning, and I hope he has sent you a full report. (Ø)

The President: Good. Jim Baker also saw Shevardnadze; they had a very positive meeting. (Ø)

The President and King Hussein then chatted about social and family matters, until President Mubarak came on the line at 12:26. (U)

President Mubarak: How are you? (U)

The President: Great. How's my good friend? I had a call into to you so I'm delighted that you are together with King Hussein so we can all talk. I wanted your advice on these terrible events. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I agree it's terrible. We are trying hard to solve this, to find a good solution for withdrawal and not throwing away the regime. (Ø)

The President: I had all kinds of requests from Kuwait. I wanted to get your thoughts about this. (Ø)

President Mubarak: George, give us two days to find a solution. (Ø)

The President: OK. I have taken some actions regarding economic issues, on aid, CCC credits, Ex-Im financing. The only exception is of course if there are threats to Americans -- that would be a whole new ballgame. (Ø)

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President Mubarak: I agree with you about the sanctions and the American lives. King Hussein will try to get a withdrawal and restoration of the regime. (Ø)

The President: I realize the dangers of precipitate action. Let's stay in close touch. I would appreciate your constant advice. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will talk to Saddam Hussein right now. I am also in contact with the Saudis. (Ø)

The President: That is very important. Please tell Saddam Hussein that the United States is very concerned about this action. We are very concerned that other forces will be released -- you know what that means, my friend. Tell Saddam that if you like. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will do so. King Hussein will press for withdrawal and restoration of the Kuwaiti regime -- or this will be an even bigger disaster. (Ø)

The President: Good. Love to all of your family. I think if anyone can do it, you can be successful. (U)

President Mubarak: I'm used to these disasters in our area. (U)

The President: I'll pray for you, and you get your diplomacy going. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

SALIH

AUG 2 - PRESIDENTIAL CALL TO PRESIDENT SALIH OF
YEMEN -- FROM AIR FORCE ONE - (LANDED AT ASPEN
COLORADO AS PLANE CALL ENDED) - SANDY CHARLES
MONITORED.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

#6296

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd

Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME August 2, 1990, 6:43 - 7:21pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Your Majesty, how are you? (U)

King Fahd: I am sorry to be so late taking your call. (U)

The President: That's OK. I wanted to tell you our thinking and more importantly hear your views regarding the terrible invasion. (S)

King Fahd: First thank you for your interest in this most serious matter in the Middle East from a country that doesn't understand what it means to be a neighbor. My opinion of this situation is that it is very difficult. It must be stopped soon in any way because it is a very serious principle when a country with arms attacks a small neighbor. (S)

The President: Exactly. (S)

King Fahd: This attack took place at 2:30 am Saudi time. As you know representatives from Iraq and Kuwait were here with me two days ago. I tried to reconcile matters, and both expressed willingness to do so. It was decided a delegation from Kuwait would go to Iraq and another session would be held in Kuwait so that an agreement could be reached. But unfortunately, although Saddam assured us he had no interest to attack Kuwait, the opposite happened. (S)

The President: Exactly. (S)

King Fahd: This is because he is conceited. He doesn't realize the implications of his actions are upsetting the world order. He seems to think only of himself. He is following Hitler in creating world problems with one difference -- one was conceited, and one is both conceited and crazy. I believe nothing will work with Saddam but use of force. (S)

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8/21/2009
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I spoke with Saddam at 4:00 Saudi time and told him he was making a mistake and with what law and logic can you attack a small country with force of arms? And I reminded him that during the Arab Summit in Baghdad he suggested a nonaggression pact among the Arab countries, agreeing not to intervene in each others affairs. He is a liar. My conversation with him today was strict and strong and I asked him to withdraw from Kuwait now, and that we would not consider any regime a representative of Kuwaiti public opinion or Arab public opinion. And Saddam told me he tried to reach agreement with Kuwait, but Kuwait not responsive. I told him that was an unacceptable excuse -- if he had found Kuwait unresponsive, he could have contacted us and we would have done what we could to reach an understanding. He had no excuse to use in his conversation. That is why I say he is arrogant. He believes what he has done will pass easily. And then he told me let me ask you to allow me to send my Vice President to meet you at 11:00 am Saudi time tomorrow. Then I told him if you realize your mistake, and withdraw from Kuwait, then it is possible to see and meet your Vice President. So he asked me again to receive his representative tomorrow and maybe we will find a solution. And I told him that I hold him responsible for the safety for all people in Kuwait -- Kuwaiti or not. (S)

Mr. President, we will see his representative tomorrow and will speak briefly to him. Either he must understand Iraqi troops are withdrawn and things smoothed or we will tell his representative to return quickly. Saddam will either withdraw from Kuwait into Iraq quickly or the only other solution is the use of force. Mr. President, this is a matter that is extremely serious and grave. It involves a principle that can't be approved or condoned by any reasonable principle or moral. Mubarak contacted me about requesting an Arab Summit be held. I told him it was a good move. Arab leaders must be convinced what has happened is a poor move and through Mubarak and me, we will convene an Arab Summit the day after tomorrow. Tomorrow Saddam's representative will let me know if he will rectify matters and withdraw from Kuwait or not. And any information from Saddam's representative will be relayed to you. Mr. President what Saddam has done, we can't possible remain silent about. (S)

I hope matters can be resolved peacefully. If not Saddam must be taught a lesson he will not forget the rest of his life if he remains alive. (S)

I want to thank you and the American people, and Europe and the world for your firm stand against Iraq action to make Saddam realize his grave mistake against Kuwait. Also allow me to propose preparedness because we don't know what Saddam will do. This information is for you; now do you have any questions? Please ask as a friend -- and I will answer as a friend. (S)

The President: I have one question, are the Kuwaiti leaders in Saudi Arabia, the Crown Prince and the Amir, safe and well? (S)

King Fahd: Many people from the royal family in Kuwait are safe here and welcome. (S)

The President: Very good. We will be making a joint statement with the Soviets condemning the Iraqi invasion when Baker is in Moscow for a few minutes to make a strong statement between us and the Soviets. (S)

King Fahd: This is very good news. (S)

The President: Our goal like yours is to get Iraq out and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. (S)

King Fahd: I told Saddam that we don't buy this national government in Kuwait. We know no one in Kuwait who agrees to the removal of the legitimate ruler. If they brought Iraqis in place in the leadership, which is possible, then that is totally unacceptable. (S)

The President: Total fraud. (S)

King Fahd: At any rate from now until tomorrow we will find out what the situation is. (S)

The President: Thanks. In the meantime, we are doing what you expressed an interest in. We are making preparations in my government on diplomatic, military, economic options. We should consider additional diplomatic, economic and military options as well. We have implemented comprehensive economic sanctions, and are now considering other economic measures against Iraq in conjunction with Chapter 7 sanctions at the UN. Another would be to consider closing down his oil export capability, either by cutting off pipelines or an embargo of Iraq. Obviously we need to talk further to consider a wide array of options, but I hope Arab efforts succeed on a withdrawal and to restore the legitimate government to Kuwait. (S)

King Fahd: We too hope Arab efforts are successful but all the measures and options you mentioned are measures that would be helpful in deterring Saddam. (S)

The President: On Saudi Arabia, we believe we should consider deploying TACAIR which we need to discuss with you because your security is important to us and want to do everything possible to deter any Iraqi aggression against the Kingdom, and to work with you to take whatever steps are necessary to convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you for what you said about Saudi Arabia. In view of what happens tomorrow, I would be delighted to discuss this further. (S)

The President: You should know we are moving our carrier nearer to the Gulf. We think collective Arab action would be good. We salute your efforts, and hope tomorrow is successful. I look forward to hearing the results. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you for your interest, and I thank you on behalf of the Saudi people. (S)

The President: I have one other favor. Please convey to the Amir, Sheik Jaber, my personal regards and tell him how deeply I despise this outrageous, brutal act against his country, and tell him that he has our support. I would appreciate your conveying this to the Amir. (S)

King Fahd: I will convey it to Amir. (S)

The President: Thank you. Blessings to you and the Saudi people. Good luck with your heroic efforts toward peace. (S)

King Fahd: Thank you. Thanks for friendship between the Kingdom and the United States for more than 60 years. (S)

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6349

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 3, 1990, 1:58 - 2:11 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office (U)

The President: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you. (U)

The President: I have been thinking about you and wanted to call. If you have one minute, I would like to compare notes on Iraq and Kuwait. (U)

President Ozal: Yes. I was going to call you. (U)

The President: Good. I have no talking points, but if it is agreeable to you I will tell you how we look at the situation. First, it is very, very serious. The interest of NATO countries and the West generally are tied up in a peaceful resolution in which Iraq goes back and Kuwait's rulers are restored. There are also keen strategic interests that go way beyond that, regarding the integrity of the Gulf states and the principle of the matter. (U)

I view you as a friend and an important member of NATO. In your geostrategic location you occupy a key position because of the pipeline going to Iran and Iraq. I wanted to know the conditions under which you might close it. I also talked with King Fahd regarding the Saudi pipeline. I wanted to hear your views -- not just about the pipeline but regarding the overall situation. (U)

President Ozal: When I spoke with you in January I talked about Saddam Hussein and said he is the most dangerous man in the area. When we spoke by telephone on the 26th of last month I said the same thing. I asked whether he would pull out and you said he is going to pull out. (U)

He should get his lesson. If anything happens we have to solve it. If he stays, then the problem will pop up again. (U)

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The President: Let me tell you, my friend, that you and I look at the situation in exactly the same light. Now the question is, where do we go from here? (Ø)

President Ozal: I talked to King Fahd one hour ago to discuss the situation. I told him that if the solution is that Iraq pulls back and Kuwait pays, that is not a solution but would be another Munich. (Ø)

The President: Right. What worries me is that Iraq may go further down the Gulf. Do you worry about that? (Ø)

President Ozal: Yes. From satellites, we have detected more forces being moved. (Ø)

The President: We are reviewing all options, including military options, though I know there will be some criticism here. Several years ago our countries stood side by side in Korea. In some ways this is more serious. This is the first call I have made to any NATO leader except Thatcher, whom I was with in Colorado. We are doing contingency planning regarding economic sanctions, including a total cutoff, and other measures, such as moving forces to protect against further aggression. I agree with you that a handwringing deal, in which Kuwait has to pay Iraq off, would lead down the road to further aggression. (Ø)

President Ozal: The solution is not only an embargo. (Ø)

The President: What do you recommend? (Ø)

President Ozal: The NATO Allies should come together. You've probably already consulted with the Soviet Union. (Ø)

The President: We had some encouraging talks. That is one new ingredient. We can now work with the Soviets to help resolve the issue. (Ø)

President Ozal: I will talk to Rafsanjani and the Iranians. (Ø)

The President: I was wondering about that. Maybe we could all work together, including Iran. Tell him that. When will you call? (Ø)

President Ozal: Tonight or maybe tomorrow. (Ø)

The President: If you have anything to report, call me at any time day or night. We're viewing this as a grave national emergency for us and our friends. (Ø)

President Ozal: We should not repeat the mistakes made at the beginning of World War II. (Ø)

The President: I spoke to Fahd.... (Ø)

President Ozal: I am not sure they will take the proper action.

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They are talking about Arab unity. I told him that if he makes a decision to inform us. (Ø)

The President: They talk about Arab unity, but it's not clear what they mean. (Ø)

President Ozal: They would like your full support. (Ø)

The President: They'll get it, but so far they don't seem to support our actions. I like your ideas about getting the Allies together and also about talking to Iran. What about Syria? (Ø)

President Ozal: I will call. They are neighbors. (Ø)

The President: I am sure Syria is concerned and will be helpful. I worry that King Hussein won't be helpful because of his relations with Saddam Hussein. (Ø)

I'll be in touch. Don't hesitate to call. I appreciate your spirit and your analysis. Turkey has a key role in all this. As I made clear to the King of Saudi Arabia, we're with you -- not only to protect Turkish interests but also to encourage you to isolate Saddam Hussein. (Ø)

President Ozal: Where does Mrs. Thatcher stand? (Ø)

The President: She is with us. (Ø)

President Ozal: Does she want to finalize this thing for good? (Ø)

The President: I think so. She strongly favors standing together. (Ø)

President Ozal: Thank you for your call. (U)

The President: Thank you. What do we do without friends at times like this? I respect you and salute you and appreciate the key role Turkey is playing. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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6349

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 3, 1990, 3:03 - 3:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office (U)

The President: Margaret, I am interrupting, I know, but I am going to Camp David and wanted to fill you in. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Perhaps I could tell you what is going on at home. Shall I begin? I spoke with Douglas Hurd today. The Overseas and Defense Committee has agreed, first, to support sanctions so long as they are collective and effective, second, to freeze Iraqi assets, and third, to send two more frigates up north. It will take them five days to get there. We thought it best to move them to join HMS York off Abu Dhabi. Tomorrow we will try to persuade our European partners to adopt collective and comprehensive sanctions. (U)

The President: That is very good. Brent will be talking with Woerner. I just finished talking to Ozal. I was struck by the toughness and severity of his position. He called Saddam Hussein another Hitler who needs to be taught a lesson. I asked about the pipeline and said we would stand with him. He didn't say yea or nay, and I didn't press him. I gather he is prepared to work with us. He said he would call Fahd, Rafsanjani, and the Syrians. (U)

I have been in touch with Bandar here. You have heard about the Arab meeting. My fear is of handwringing by offering a payoff to Saddam Hussein. Shevardnadze said he had assurances from the Iraqis that they would move back. There are also stories of some Americans being held, but we have no evidence concerning American citizens or yours. (U)

We are reserving every option, because if we don't handle this properly, through a coordinated effort, we would be laying ourselves open to a bigger problem down the road. I will have a meeting in the morning with our defense experts, and I will ask about degrees of military force that might be used. Meanwhile, I hope there will be a solution. (U)

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2000-0429-F

SCS 6/6/13

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Prime Minister Thatcher: I hope so, too. But the more preparation we make, the more likely we will get Saddam Hussein out. I agree. It is so serious that we can't do anything else but get him out. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. It was good seeing you in Colorado, and I loved standing there next to you. If anything comes up, Brent is here and will get in touch. I am going to fill Kohl in and Mitterrand. I don't know where they are at the moment.... (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Genscher told Hurd that they support sanctions so long as they are comprehensive and effective. He was a bit waffly, but not bad. They've agreed, without telling anyone, to go for unification on October 1 [proposal actually was for all-German elections on October 14] instead of December 1 [elections had been set for December 2]. (Ø)

The President: That's interesting. I didn't know. Thanks for your assistance. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It was a very valuable talk we had. Thank you for all the kind things you said at Aspen. (U)

The President: It's easy when you believe them. I told Brent to keep you informed. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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6349

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Alec Toumayan (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME August 3, 1990, 4:32 - 4:57 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office (U)

The President: I am calling you because I thought it important to touch base on this serious, deteriorating situation in the Gulf. I have talked with a number of leaders about the outrageous invasion of Kuwait. We agree the status quo is totally unacceptable. It presents a grave threat to our vital interests and our friends' security in the region. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes. That's what I think. (U)

The President: I find it hard to believe that Saddam will stop with Kuwait. Even if he did, he now controls enough oil and financial assets to totally alter the geostrategic picture, affecting oil supplies and prices. So our goal must be to get the Iraqis out and restore the legitimate government of Kuwait. We believe that major economic pressure -- a complete cutoff of oil, water, and arms -- would help. I hope I can count on you to support a Chapter 7 sanctions resolution at the UN. Frankly, I'm very pleased with Soviet cooperation, which makes our efforts much easier than in the past. (Ø)

We are also considering closing down his oil pipelines or an embargo. A lot of thought by a lot of countries has been given to that. But I am worried that economic pressure alone will not force Saddam to withdraw. I have talked with Fahd and Hussein and Mubarak and Saleh of Yemen. They are pursuing a diplomatic strategy, hoping in the next 48 hours to get Iraqi troop withdrawals and the restoration of the Kuwaiti government. But I must confess I am somewhat skeptical. Saddam lied before. King Fahd told me that if he did not succeed, the only other option in his view would be to use force. (Ø)

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I spoke with Thatcher and President Ozal, and we agreed that whatever actions we took -- diplomatic, economic, or military -- we would have to act quickly, decisively, and collectively, and do whatever it takes. During the Gulf War we did cooperate, but it seems to me there are more vital interests at stake from a more serious threat. I certainly appreciate the deployment of your two warships. As you know, we have increased our ship presence in the Gulf, and a carrier will arrive in two days. We are also talking with the Saudis about doing what is needed to deter Iraqi aggression and to get Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. At some point, we should begin serious military talks, with you and members of the Atlantic Alliance. But now I'd like to have your views on all this. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. My impressions are the same as yours. To see Saddam Hussein continue his offensive would be to secure his hegemony over the Arab world. I don't know what he wants to do with Saudi Arabia, but this is a very serious area. Perhaps he thinks if no one reacts to what he has done in Kuwait, three months from now he can do something else. I gave instructions similar to yours regarding the freezing of Iraqi assets and no sales of weapons. And our representatives are working together at the Security Council. Our representatives will speak in the same manner at the meeting of the twelve members of the EC. (Ø)

If we do take measures like an oil blockade, it has to succeed. Otherwise there will be a tremendous loss of face for all Western countries. We must be careful not to create a solidarity among members of the Arab world. That, it seems to me, is the most difficult aspect. The Arabs don't have much solidarity. They are fearful but don't take courageous public stands. Pressures could also increase against Israel. The Arab countries, given their hostility toward Israel, would not break ranks with Iraq. This would encourage Saddam Hussein to take aggressive steps against Israel. (Ø)

I believe the key to the next step is Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia takes a courageous stand against the annexation of Kuwait, this would bring along others. The next question is, what will the Soviet Union do? Up to now there has been solidarity, but how far can it go? I ask you, President Bush, because you may be able to shed more light, you are more enlightened on this. (Ø)

The President: The Soviet Union just joined us in a tough statement that Secretary Baker and Shevardnadze made in Moscow. Shevardnadze announced that Saddam Hussein had told him Iraq would pull out soon, but they nonetheless condemned Iraq and cut off all arms sales. Jim Baker gets back tonight and will meet with me in the morning. Anything we consider with the Allies, we will have to convince the Soviets the nothing is directed at the Soviet Union. I think that will be fairly easy to do. (Ø)

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President Mitterrand: Let's talk about retaliation or reprisals. I believe that is an indispensable aspect. They must stay in place -- we must hold to them. If not, it is a victory for him. In the second place, if we are talking about military measures, which military measures? If we do take military measures, it will result in a break in relations. If it remains just a Platonic threat, it will not have much affect. So, how far are you going in your own thinking? (S)

The President: First, to interdict the oil, and at the same time to guarantee the security of Saudi Arabia. If Saddam Hussein keeps going he could overrun Saudi oil fields, which are in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia, very easily. So far, Saudi Arabia has not requested American or, to my knowledge, any other troops or aircraft. But serious actions would include interdiction at sea of tankers, Turkey and Saudi Arabia closing down those two pipelines, and enough force on the ground in Saudi Arabia to guarantee that an Iraqi invasion would not succeed. (S)

President Mitterrand: We really have to talk about this very seriously to gather all these efforts. (S)

The President: Exactly. The logistics are very complicated. We first need to hear from Saudi Arabia and see if others will back them up. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. The Saudis must be absolutely convinced of our support. (S)

The President: I am not sure they are. I had good talks with their Ambassador and assured him of U.S. support, but so far they haven't requested anything. They seem to be hoping those talks will succeed. Francois, from the American side, we will know a lot more by close of business tomorrow. We should stay in close touch through our people, or you and I if necessary. But I wanted to make this call so you will know our thinking. (S)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. It is really easy to reach me. I, too, wish for keeping this contact between us. But I want you to know right away that I agree with you on all the points you have mentioned. (S)

The President: Thank you. The Saudi King is very, very concerned. He equated Saddam Hussein with Hitler and called him a liar. So he is concerned. But let's stay in touch on all of this. (S)

President Mitterrand: We have to remain in close touch because very often the problem lies in the modalities, the details, of a the solution. France is in full solidarity on economic sanctions, and I think very soon we may have to discuss security measures. Saddam Hussein's progress must be stopped. (S)

The President: Certainly. (U)

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President Mitterrand: Thank you very, very much. (U)

The President: I value these conversations and consultations and pledge to stay in close contact. (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes. It is very necessary. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister
of Japan on August 3, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Douglas H. Paal, NSC

DATE, TIME August 3, 1990, 8:00 - 8:22pm EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President telephoned Prime Minister Kaifu concerning Iraq and Kuwait. (U)

The President: Toshiki, how are you, sir? (U)

PM Kaifu: Fine, thank you. How are you? (U)

The President: I am calling you because of the deep concern I know you and I share about the situation in the Persian Gulf.
(Ø)

PM Kaifu: I know it very well. (Ø)

The President: If it is agreeable with you, I would like to make a few points and then ask your opinion. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: Certainly, please go ahead. (U)

The President: I met with Prime Minister Thatcher yesterday and spoke with President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl a few minutes ago. We concluded that concerted action is needed now to reverse Iraqi actions and restore the rightful government of Kuwait. President Ozal of Turkey, incidentally, agrees with that. (Ø)

My hope is that your government will be able to join with us in emphasizing that the actions Iraq has taken are unacceptable and must be reversed. (Ø)

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One way to pressure Saddam is to bring economic pressure to bear on him. This will only be effective if the international community is on board. As you know, I have already imposed mandatory sanctions on Iraq and we have frozen both Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets because we did not want Iraq to spend Kuwait's money. In the UN we are working hard to pass a resolution that would essentially impose Chapter Seven sanctions on Iraq. It is very important that Japan and the U.S. be together. I would request that we work together on this because it is very important. (Ø)

King Fahd told me he considers Saddam Hussein like a Hitler. He called him a liar. I know you depend on Gulf oil and we have to consult on that, but we are also considering ways to stop Iraq's oil export capability. We are talking to the Turks about what they might do to close the pipeline. Also Saudi Arabia is possible, I think. American naval ships are going to the Gulf. Also U.K. ships are headed there. Fortunately there is excess capacity. If Iraq doesn't produce one drop, Saudi Arabia can make up the loss. (Ø)

Toshiki, I know Iraq is in debt to Japan, but I hope that consideration will not prevent you from joining us in showing Baghdad, as soon as possible, that it faces worldwide opposition. We have cut off all loans, credits, CC credits and all that, and I would strongly urge you to do that. (Ø)

We believe this situation is very serious. Saddam Hussein simply cannot get away with this. If he gets away with this, there is no telling what he will do with his oil and with his new-found power. The status quo really has to be reversed. I really encourage your cooperation. It is essential to the success of what we are doing. I would like to hear what you think. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: George, first of all I would like to say I can fully understand what you are doing and extend my heartfelt respect for your hard work these past few days. Let me summarize my thinking into three points. First, the Iraqi invasion is very regrettable. They should pull out the troops immediately. We have communicated in Tokyo, in Baghdad and are making the Japanese position known to the world. (Ø)

The second point is that the position the Japanese government is taking is from the same standpoint as you and the other countries of the West take. For example, we have already taken action to freeze Kuwaiti assets. (Ø)

The third point is in the event Iraqi troops are not withdrawn from Kuwait, the international community should take joint actions as appropriate. The Japanese government will take actions sincerely when agreed in Chapter Seven by the UN and the international community. (Ø)

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The President: Good. I am very encouraged by that. We should stay in touch and work together. I am very pleased, Toshiki, that the Soviets are playing a very constructive role. Let's stay in touch. If the international community acts with unity, maybe that is the best way to get Saddam Hussein to remove his troops. (C)

PM Kaifu: George, I do agree with you. We should not allow such an act contrary to justice in the world. (C)

The President: Thanks. It is awfully nice to talk to you. We should stay in touch. If anything comes up, I hope you will call me. If there are any new developments that affect Japan, then I will let you know. (C)

PM Kaifu: Yes, please. We should stay in touch. (C)

The President: We will keep working. Very nice talking to you, my friend. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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KOHL

AUG 3 - PRESIDENTIAL CALL TO CHANCELLOR KOHL OF
WEST GERMANY. MONITORED BY BOB HUTCHINGS. CALL
INITIATED AT 1801 - ENDED 1812 -- CALL MADE AT
CAMP DAVID

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd

Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME August 4, 1990, 1:50-2:42 pm
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello Your Majesty. How are you? I can hear you loud and clear. (U)

King Fahd: How are you, Mr. Bush? (U)

The President: Fine, and you? (U)

King Fahd: Fine and I want to thank you very, very much for your interest and your call. (S)

The President: I know we have both been busy this past 48 hours. I have been in touch with a number of world leaders, and they are terribly concerned and, as we told your Ambassador, we want to help in a military way. I have seen the reports but I wanted to hear from you on the state of play there. (S)

King Fahd: First, my thanks to you, Mr. President, for your interest in Saudi Arabia, a friendly country. I am thankful for our friends in Europe and everywhere for their concern about this unfortunate incident. At the same time, we are waiting for a team of Americans to come so we can organize matters in a desirable and effective fashion. (S)

The President: What is this team supposed to do? I wasn't aware of it. I am prepared to instruct General Powell to start deploying forces to the Kingdom. Is that what you are talking about? (S)

King Fahd: No, I understand from my Ambassador that a team would be sent to organize and coordinate matters that were agreed upon. (S)

The President: I was not told, but it is easily done. We'll get them on the way right away. But we need your view on a US force presence. I am very concerned about a possible Iraqi move south across your border. And I want you to know we will support you

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and stay as long as it takes to protect you, to get the Iraqis out and to restore the government of Kuwait. You referred to this guy as a Hitler and a liar. You are absolutely right.
(S)

King Fahd: I am referring to thank you for your interest in Saudi affairs. I am talking about a team that would arrive in Saudi Arabia to coordinate in a fashion that is comfortable to us and you for a resolution. (S)

The President: I understand, but I am worried that this man is talking about withdrawal but is installing a puppet government. This is unacceptable to us and other countries. I have talked with many leaders and there is much unified opinion to make a stand with our Arab friends against this naked aggression. I also want to understand your feelings on why this meeting was postponed and what you are hearing from Iraq now. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with you. I had understood a team would arrive today. That was my understanding yesterday. The team would be able to talk and to coordinate things satisfactorily.
(S)

The President: If a team is not underway, I will get it so. This is a matter of extreme urgency. I am glad you want to receive it. I will guarantee that it will be leaving soon.
(S)

King Fahd: Thank you, and I will take care of them and meet with them personally. (S)

The President: Good. But I want to know where you think matters stand on the ground. What about Iraq's statements on withdrawal? Will the Amir return? Are you worried about Iraq moving across your border? We worry about that very much. (S)

King Fahd: First, the only solution must involve the return of the Amir to Kuwait. (S)

The President: I am glad to hear you say that. We're for you and will stand with you on that as the only solution. That's good thinking. (S)

King Fahd: Second, there are no Iraqi troops near the Saudi borders, but Saddam is not to be trusted. That is why it is important for a team to come as soon as possible to coordinate matters to prevent that from happening. Regarding the Amir, his family and his government, they are all here in Saudi Arabia and we are communicating and coordinating continuously. (S)

The President: Good, but I would also like your views on this report that Saddam will withdraw tomorrow. Is there any credibility to it at all? (S)

King Fahd: I'll tell you my thinking on this report. With regard to the situation in Kuwait, we sent our people to Kuwait

and they got in. It is in complete chaos. The men in Kuwait are not responding to Saddam's request to form a government. The confirmed news we have shows Saddam may withdraw heavy troops but will organize a militia to control matters there. (S)

The President: I see.

King Fahd: The people we've sent and the news reports we've received on the neutral zone show Saddam has some estimated numbers of troops and hardware there: 20 tanks, 30 armored vehicles and 45 trucks and jeeps. According to the information we've received and the eye witness reports we have, this force is located near Kuwaiti wells in the neutral zone. The guns are pointed out to sea. Apparently, the Iraqi fear of an attack from the sea. In Kuwait City, there is chaos as a result of the Iraqi army and militia they are trying to organize in Kuwait. They also have plundered stores, banks, jewelry stores -- any places where there are valuables, they have plundered in a strange way. (S)

The President: How terrible.

King Fahd: That is why when the team arrives quickly and soon, we can share particulars on the situation that are hard to explain over the phone to enable us to coordinate to develop a positive plan to deal with the situation. (S)

The President: Can you tell me why the Arab Summit was postponed? (S)

King Fahd: The Summit was postponed because the statements by the Gulf States, Mubarak, the Foreign Ministers, Bendjedid, King Hussein showed that if the Summit was held the outcome would not be positive. The Summit would not come out with a unanimous resolution. Because of the seriousness, the resolution should be unanimous. So we are striving to coordinate and organize matters so when the meeting is held, we will have a united resolution. (S)

The President: Let me sum up my feelings for you at this moment on this. (S)

King Fahd: I am happy to hear them. (S)

The President: First, I was disturbed by the response you got from the Iraqi Vice President. As we understand it was not nearly enough. Not only must the withdrawal be immediate, complete and unconditional, it must lead to the return of the legal Kuwait government which I am glad you agree with. It is also important for the west to keep economic sanctions on especially if there is a puppet regime there. We can't let Saddam get control of the economic resources of Kuwait. (S)

Second, I just completed at Camp David getting a total military and intelligence briefing, and in my view, we cannot wait any

longer to effectively deter an Iraqi move south and to pressure Saddam to withdraw and permit the return of the Kuwaiti government. We must now begin taking the actions we described in detail to Bandar. And we can't wait until it is too late. In that regard, the team you want will be on its way immediately. And that team is one that will do total military planning, logistics and what we are thinking in working with you on the military front, correct? (S)

King Fahd: This would be best. I agree also that is very good that the boycott continue and freezing assets and economic sanctions. I will continue my response after the interpretation. (S)

The President: On the team, it will be on its way and it will be prepared to talk about what we think is best -- all the options. I am sorry for the confusion on this. (S)

King Fahd: No, Mr. President, there is no misunderstanding. I agree with you one hundred percent on the team. I would like to add that the larger Iraqi force west of Kuwait is not near the Saudi border. It is there we believe as a precaution in case of involvement in warfare. Therefore, planning is important and needed to deal with this possibility successfully. (S)

The President: I am familiar with that force and while the force differs from the forces to the east, we still view them with great concern. Now, with your permission, I would like to make one or two more points. (S)

King Fahd: Fine. (S)

The President: The first one is a sensitive point. The Amir of Kuwait asked us for military intervention, but Iraqi troops had already occupied Kuwait city and there was nothing the US could do. It takes a long time to deploy troops. And that is why I am worried about Saudi Arabia. It was not possible to help him once they had crossed the border. Maybe we can help him down the line but now we can help Saudi Arabia, but we have long lines of supply and we have to move forces long distances. Saddam lied. He is unpredictable and ruthless. He told you, my Ambassador, Mubarak that he wouldn't attack Kuwait. He told them all and he lied. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with what you are saying. It is probable that Iraq could attack, but then an invasion may not happen. That is why it is important to work with your team on plans for all contingencies to assure success. (S)

The President: Well, we should be developing plans. But we must be viewing this with more urgency. We need to get those forces there soon or Saddam, flushed with victory, might grab the oil fields and the eastern province. We have no credible presence side by side with Saudi Arabia, and without enhanced air, there is nothing to inhibit him militarily. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with you, but my view is based on the information we have. We think we have a few days to coordinate, to make a tight, successful plan. That's all we want. A tight plan that will be successful and resolve the situation once and for all. (S)

The President: I agree. We will get the team underway. Another point I want to make here involves my word of honor. The security of Saudi Arabia is vital --- basically fundamental -- to US interests and really to the interests of the western world. And I am determined that Saddam will not get away with this infamy. When we work out a plan, once we are there, we will stay until we are asked to leave. You have my solemn word on this. I am sick and tired of Saddam and his lying to other countries. (S)

On the economic points, we need to stay together and we need to vigorously enforce this. I've talked with President Ozal and NATO is taking a collective position. Turkey is a member of NATO. And NATO views this as a matter of extreme urgency. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with everything you've said, specifically and generally. All I want is that we make a tight, coordinated plan so that the plan is one hundred percent successful. (S)

The President: I agree, and the team is on its way. We also are moving our carrier and the French and the British are moving ships into the Gulf. We need concerted action on economic sanctions. We are pushing Chapter 7 at the UN to tighten sanctions. Everyone must cooperate to economically bring this man to his knees. I've talked with the Japanese Prime Minister, the French President, the British Prime Minister and the West German Chancellor and they are all on your side. They expressed the same outrage about Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia, our valued friend. (S)

King Fahd: I agree with everything wholeheartedly. I thank you so much for everything you said. I am certain this man will come to an end with our efforts. (S)

The President: I also want you to know that I am disappointed with some of our Arab friends. I am not going to mention any names on this call. I understand that there is some pressure from Saddam Hussein on these countries. But this disappointment is being felt in the US Congress and elsewhere. And that will make it difficult to do business as usual with countries being apologists for Saddam. (S)

King Fahd: I appreciate what you've said. When things are hard, some rise to the challenge and others fail. (S)

The President: I have great respect for your leadership. That is why we are prepared to make an enormous sacrifice on the US part and to support you in any way. There is a great sense of

urgency. We will get our team of experts on the way immediately, and if necessary take the lead to show force to convince Saddam that he can't bully us. I have the greatest respect for you and I know you are in a difficult position. That is why you have the complete support of the United States. When our forces are deployed, they will not get out until justice is done. I salute you and respect you. But we must act on the economic and military front. (S)

King Fahd: I want to extend the thanks of my government and people. When we heard your statement, we realized that the United States is a good friend to Saudi Arabia. (S)

The President: Well, we want to do more and soon. I think it is in your interest and the rest of the world. Good-bye and my respects. Please call any time night or day.

King Fahd: To say thank you is not enough. I value your friendship very much. I value the friendship that Saudi Arabia has with a world leader who stands for justice and truth.

The President: God bless you and your country.

King Fahd (in English): And you my very close friend.

The President: I feel I am side by side with you as we fight this terrible problem. Thank you, and good-bye.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada on August 4, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 4, 1990, 5:38 - 5:56pm EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Fine. You've got a hot one going
there. (U)

The President: Yes, by the tail. I've just talked with the
Emir, in his bunker. He's determined to go back, and he's
willing to compensate Turkey if they get the nerve to close the
pipeline. Are you interested in a little fill? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes. (U)

The President: I've been active, making lots of calls. Helmut,
Margaret, Francois, Kaifu, King Fahd, Hussein, Salih, Ozal, and
the Emir just now. I've probably left out one or two. (S)

Our bottom line has been: All the Iraqis out, restore the Emir,
no puppet government. All agree, except for King Hussein -- he's
far over with Saddam. No one wants to acquiesce with a puppet
regime. Sanctions won't be lifted until the troops are out.
Ozal talked with Rafsanjani and Asad, they agree too. You saw
the joint statement with Moscow. If we were worried about the
Soviets supplying weapons, it would be a different situation. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: That's good news from Moscow, from
Baker. (S)

The President: We had a good meeting here today. Baker was
clearly having trouble staying awake. (S)

We're increasing our forces in the region. The British and
French are increasing their presence. We're determined to push

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for chapter VII sanctions at the UN. Countries have been receptive. It's pretty encouraging. We're pushing to put in an economic blockade: interdict oil, with the pipelines in Saudi Arabia and Turkey to be shut down. That's oil. Arms are another matter. (S)

Ozal doesn't want to be alone. I've been trying to find Manfred Woerner to work with NATO to encourage Ozal. He's not as worried about an attack as about forcing Iraq back to the status quo ante and then having to live with them in the region. (S)

I'm concerned about the military situation on the ground, so is King Fahd. He's cautious about our moving forces to support the Saudi military. We're sending a high level mission to Saudi Arabia to flesh out the options. They'll go tomorrow. That hasn't been made public. I'm determined that this man will not carry the day. (S)

Kaifu has been supportive. He's very concerned. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: This is deeply troubling. On the economic side, Canada cosponsored the resolution in the Security Council and will support all initiatives to put on economic sanctions -- where we can be more helpful. Canadian banks have been directed not to act on Kuwaiti instructions without instructions from us. That will have the same effect as a freeze. Kuwaiti assets here are quite substantial. (S)

The President: There's been good united action there. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Closing the two pipelines, wouldn't that do it? (S)

The President: Those are the two that matter. We'll see. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: How would you rate our chance of success in getting the pipelines closed? (S)

The President: On a scale of 1 to 10, about a 4. The odds will increase if we can get a sanctions resolution at the UN. Kuwait will reimburse Turkey for money they might lose. (S)

The Saudis are playing a strange, cautious game. The Arabs are reluctant to take or encourage us to take real actions. They're wringing their hands. They're scared of a madman. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Will the Saudis allow the US to land? Joint maneuvers? (S)

The President: The big question is a joint mission. They wouldn't allow it yet. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Mubarak says the Arabs can solve this alone, or it would be a great shame. (S)

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The President: That is Saddam's and Hussein's line. Mubarak wanted time to get an Arab solution. He asked for 48 hours, which passed 12 hours ago. We need a solution that reverses this thing. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Hussein was pretty chummy with Saddam. (S)

The President: It's very disappointing. He's isolated himself with other Arabs. He's apologized for this guy Saddam. He's cooked his goose with America. Kissing this guy at the height of the crisis. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I had Hussein here. We took a risk, made him the first Arab leader to address our parliament. We viewed him as moderate and reasonable. But kissing Saddam. (S)

The President: I know him well and love Hussein, but he's cooked his goose here, especially with the Congress. Israel attacked him, we defended him. Now it is too much. (S)

Fahd said there's been looting in Kuwait, houses broken into. I say we shouldn't let this happen, and he agrees. But there is still foot-dragging. (S)

I don't want reckless action militarily, but I'm worried. I don't contemplate patience with another Embassy in Iran situation. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Are American citizens in danger? (S)

The President: They're OK. There are still some unanswered things. Iraq has a powerful military, but he hasn't been involved in a fight against real power, with long supply lines. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Have you been getting good support from Mitterrand? (S)

The President: Strong and solid. I didn't talk with him about getting NATO together to encourage Ozal to close the pipeline. The rest was ok. Brent thought he was very good. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: My view is that NATO should be right with the Turks. If they cut the pipeline, it wouldn't hurt for NATO to be next to them and showing the flag. (S)

The President: Ozal's looking for something to take it out from being Turkish unilateral action. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We ought to get a communique from NATO. (S)

The President: Anything you can do. I'm trying to find Manfred Woerner. (S)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: Turkey is having trouble getting into Europe because of their Islamic background. They're good members of NATO. We must stand with them. (S)

The President: You might give Ozal a call, see if it would help to have NATO with him. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I will call. We'll support you 100% at the UN. (S)

The President: If we control Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, and can get one or both pipelines down -- it could cool Saddam down quick. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I will call friends in NATO. I'll get back to you. It's awfully difficult. Unless the Saudis let you in, it will be very hard. Congress. It would be a bloody way to do it. (S)

The President: I'm confident we can prevail. It could cost a lot of money. There are many other things we can do without matching ground troops for ground troops. Air power. We need to know the guy wants us to defend him. If he doesn't, we can do it for him. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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OZAL

AUG 4 - PRES CALLED PRES OZAL OF TURKEY AT 1635
CALL INITIATED FROM CAMP DAVID -- MONITORED BY
BOB HUTCHINGS -- TERMINATED 1702

JABIR

AUG 4 - PRES CALLED AMIR OF KUWAIT JABIR. KUWAITI
AMBASSADOR TO US PROVIDED TRANSLATION; MONITORED BY
SANDY CHARLES. CALL INITIATED 1715 - TERMINATED
1731

HUSSEIN

AUG 5 - PRES CALLED KING HUSSEIN AT 1837 FROM
WASHINGTON - MONITORED BY RICHARD HAASS. CALL
TERMINATED 1857 (PRES HAD JUST RETURNED FROM
CAMP DAVID -- PROBABLY IN RESIDENCE????)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6325

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey on
August 5, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 5, 1990 - 3:23 - 3:37pm EST
AND PLACE: White House Situation Room

The President: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: How are you? (U)

The President: Thank you, I am anxious to hear from you. (U)

President Ozal: I saw you on CNN. (U)

The President: What can you tell me about the possible Arab
Summit? (C)

President Ozal: There has been no solution. I also met with the
First Deputy Foreign Minister from Iraq today. (S)

Let me summarize. He told us that he is forming a government in
Kuwait. They are going to pull out but leave some troops behind
until they form a "peoples army" of about 25,000. I said they
should pull out from Kuwait and talk with the Emir of Kuwait.
(S)

But he told me that the Emir of Kuwait will never return to
Kuwait -- they are going to annex Kuwait as the time goes on.
They claim it was part of the province of Basrah. (S)

Then I talked to King Fahd. It was a long talk with King Fahd,
and I believe he is in line with us. (S)

The President: I hope you're right -- he has been reluctant to
take any action. (S)

President Ozal: I said you should go along with us for an oil
embargo - he said, "yes, we will go together with you." (S)

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The President: But when. (C)

President Ozal: I think they are waiting to have sanctions come from the UN. I told Mulroney of Canada. (S)

The President: He called me. (U)

President Ozal: In talks with Prime Minister Mulroney, I said the thing is more serious than you think. They are crazy -- they talk about nuclear bombs, etc. (S)

I talked to my people. We should get as soon as possible these Chapter 7 sanctions. I suggested that to Mulroney -- then the oil embargo will start with the Saudis and us. (S)

The President: Closing the pipelines? (S)

President Ozal: Yes, even some kind of blockading. There are not only two pipelines. (S)

The President: We can help with interdiction at sea. (S)

President Ozal: We should do something on Akhba -- he will get some supplies through there. (S)

The President: We can provide coverage from sea. The problem is that Jordan has been so weak. (S)

President Ozal: A blockade will help -- we have to consider some military action, they are crazy people -- they have long range missiles and chemical weapons they may throw this at my country or some others. (S)

The President: We are doing some planning -- we are doing it with some real urgency -- I can't say on the telephone but we are doing some serious planning. Secretary General Woerner will be here and so will Thatcher. We are looking at all U.S. assets and how we can help any country that is threatened. I am not at liberty to discuss what we are doing publicly but understand that we are reviewing every single option. (S)

President Ozal: I suggested that we need to have a top meeting of NATO. (S)

The President: That might be a good idea -- we probably need to expand to Japan but we could start with NATO. Japan is doing very well. (S)

President Ozal: Yes, I heard them. (S)

The President: They are very good. (S)

President Ozal: One more problem. I know these people -- they are more dangerous than most understand. He is more dangerous than Qaddhafi. He must go. He killed 120 officials that refused to fight. (S)

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If the blockade is very effective, they may overthrow him. (S)

The President: We must have our guard up. (S)

President Ozal: We cannot stop at just seeing them pull out. (S)

The President: We have a lot at stake here -- the future of peace of the whole world is at stake. I talked with Fahd. They are scared. (S)

President Ozal: Yes. They are right to be scared. If he gets Kuwait and nothing happens he will have resources -- UAE; Saudi Arabia -- he does not even have to attack. (S)

The President: What did the Iraqi Deputy Minister ask of you? (S)

President Ozal: He said we should not close the oil pipeline. I said we would look at it but that we need to obey the UN. I did not say we wouldn't close it. (S)

The President: What did he say about the UN? (S)

President Ozal: He said they could live with it. The 1972 blockade was not successful. And he added, "we are 20 million, we will fight to the end -- your population is not 20 million." I said you already include Kuwait? (S)

The President: It is very important that we stay together. We are the largest importer of oil from Iraq. Turkey, is also a large importer. The Soviet Union is mostly a re-exporter. Third is Japan. We must stay together or the status quo will be there forever. (S)

We feel we cannot accept him there. I just had another press conference. They asked about you. I said we are on the same wavelength. They asked about the pipeline -- I said that we were on the same wavelength but did not pin it down. (S)

President Ozal: We may ask for some oil from Saudi Arabia. I asked the Iraqi, "what if Saudi Arabia and UAE increase oil production?" He said this would be considered against Iraqi interests and will hit them. (S)

The President: Kuwait is ready to compensate you for loss of revenues. If we stay against him together -- maybe he can't stay. Maybe his people will not tolerate the hardships. Thanks very much. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6324

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada on August 5, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Mulroney
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 5, 1990, 1:32 - 1:47pm EST
AND PLACE: Situation Room

Prime Minister Mulroney: Hi! (U)

The President: We're at Camp David. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I want to report on my call with Ozal. I told him that Canada views this as an unacceptable violation of international norms. Canada has co-sponsored a UN Resolution; embargoed Iraqi oil; suspended trade and economic agreements; suspended exports including grain; cancelled all export financing, and stopped cultural relations. Ozal said "I agree with you completely." I am glad there are all these steps. This is a dangerous thing for the future if this isn't stopped. Iraq should pay for this aggression. Security Council must decide on Chapter 7. We need this basis. I said that I talked to Fahd Assad, Mubarak and Fahd again this morning. My point was that we need a basis for Ozal and Fahd to close Turkish and Saudi Pipeline? Ozal said yes. He is ready to blockade all oil, but there is another source of supply through Jordan. The UN must act immediately, and he said Fahd is ready to act in parallel when there is a legal basis established at the UN. Iraq will try to ship through Kuwaiti ports. Asked about Sadaam's message, he said that Iraq has installed puppet regime and will not pull out, but instead to annex Kuwait. (S)

The President: Yesterday others were saying he would pull out. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Ozal said he told them they must pull out. But the Iraqis think the West is bluffing. He was told that Iraq had calculated everything. He thinks we're bluffing, that there will be no common action. He said Iraq's next move would be a strong move on oil prices coupled with intimidation and fear against Saudis. My interpretation of what he said is

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they would be controlling Saudi Arabia even without invasion. He said that without Western action, Iraq will probably invade its neighbors later. Ozal is convinced that we need to bring NATO together, that there is a role for NATO. I asked if the Iraqi invasion is irreversible? Ozal said "Yes: the Emirates and Saudis will be next. If the UN Security Council acts and NATO countries stand together also with Soviets and US, we can stop him." He said that he will shut off oil. He said Fahd will shut down the pipeline too (I think that is his assessment - not information that he has). I told him I would call you immediately and it would be good if you talk to him. I don't know if you planned a call? (S) [Cut-off]
[Conversation resumes]

The President: Maybe you've given Ozal more drive. We have new disquieting intelligence involving both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. We are sending a high level military mission to discuss this.
(S)

It looks worse than yesterday. Instead of pulling out, there is disturbing information to the contrary. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Ozal believes Iraq is lying. Sadaam believes the West cannot do anything collectively. If the Saudis understand that NATO and the UN are behind them, I think they will act. (S)

President Bush: To his credit Kaifu came through strongly with no credits, exports, oil. The problem has been the vacillation and reluctance of the Saudis. They are reluctant to anger this guy. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Well there is Jordan too? (S)

The President: I've always liked King Hussein, but he's sold out to Sadaam. We'll keep in close touch about the policy. This has been an extraordinarily helpful call. (S)

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6280

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan, August 5, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Douglas Paal, NSC

DATE, TIME August 5, 1990, 7:05 - 7:15am EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David

The Prime Minister telephoned the President to report on a decision of the Japanese government concerning Iraq and Kuwait.
(U)

The President: Toshiki, how are you today, sir? (U)

PM Kaifu: Good morning, George, good morning. (U)

The President: Good morning. (U)

PM Kaifu: Well, we have spoken the other day about the gravity and seriousness of the situation. There has been no change since then. Since we spoke, I have given great thought to what we should do. As a result, although this is Sunday, I had an emergency meeting with my Cabinet. We decided on measures which will be announced shortly. I wanted to inform you in advance.
(Ø)

Given the urgency of the situation, these measures were decided whether or not UN action comes into force. First, we will embargo all imports of oil from Iraq and Kuwait. Second, we will embargo exports to both countries. Third, we will take measures to suspend loans, credits and investment with respect to Iraq and Kuwait. Fourth, we will suspend economic cooperation with Iraq.
(Ø)

These four measures are what we decided today. Of course, as I told you, we have frozen their assets. Needless to say, measures that the UN will implement will be administered in good faith as well. I can assure you we will implement these measures. (Ø)

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The President: Toshiki, I am very grateful for these four important steps. They are very helpful. (U)

PM Kaifu: As you can see, these results arose from our telephone conversation the other day. I have a question for you, George. (Ø)

The President: Certainly. (U)

PM Kaifu: According to press reports on Kuwait, Iraqi forces are on the Saudi border. Is there any news? (Ø)

The President: Yes, I am informed... I just had a call and I am more concerned about the tenseness. We are not seeing Iraq going ahead with a withdrawal. Rather, we are concerned. We are in close touch with His Majesty the King. I talked with him for one hour yesterday. There is interesting diplomatic activity going on. The following countries support an immediate Iraqi withdrawal and the restoration of the Kuwait government. I will then give you the list. All our friends in the G-7. So does Syria, Iran and the GCC countries. King Hussein is almost a spokesman for Iraq. This is very troubling and will hurt him later on. When the UN acts, with China going along, to curtail exports, once there is Chapter Seven action, this will be possible. So the diplomacy is going well, but you put your finger on it, if Iraq is to go against Saudi Arabia. We are very concerned about it. (Ø)

PM Kaifu: That is the most crucial point. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. I would like to commend the Japanese government publicly. What time will you announce it? (U)

PM Kaifu: In Japan at 8:30pm, in fifteen minutes time, announced by the Chief Cabinet Secretary. (U)

The President: It certainly is viewed very favorably here. I will call the Press Office and issue praise publicly. Certainly that will go down well here. Thank you very, very much. Let's stay in close touch as this develops. (U)

PM Kaifu: Yes, let's stay in touch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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6292

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada on August 6, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 6, 1990, 10:07 - 10:10am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I had a long shot of an idea. We're meeting this afternoon with Margaret Thatcher and Manfred Woerner. Perhaps you could come down and have supper with me, or have lunch tomorrow at the White House. You've been so helpful with Ozal and everything else, I thought it just might be worth doing. If not, we can do it another time this week. Or we can just keep in touch by phone. I just thought, you've been with us shoulder to shoulder. It's Canada's business, and you're just an hour away.
(✓)

Prime Minister Mulroney: That sounds very helpful. Is Margaret coming in today? (U)

The President: She's coming through on her way to the funeral. There is no pressing agenda, but there is a lot to talk about. Her remarks yesterday were very good. Come on down and bring who you want. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'll call you back. We're talking about tonight? (U)

The President: Right. Supper at 7:00, and we might even give you a drink at 6:30. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'll be right back to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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2000-0429-F

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6349

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Sim Smiley (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME August 6, 1990, 11:33 - 11:47 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Good morning, or afternoon to you. I am calling because I thought it important to talk to you about the deteriorating situation in the Gulf. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you. (U)

The President: First, we have been following the decisions of the European Community carefully and want to commend you and thank you for your strong response. It is an extremely important element of the international pressure on Saddam. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I wanted to tell you that yesterday a there was a special session of the Foreign Affairs Council. The decisions taken have now been applied. (U)

The President: That is very good, very encouraging. I am pleased with the way most countries of the world have come out for strong pressure against Saddam Hussein. I am sure you agree that the status quo is totally unacceptable and presents a very fundamental threat to the free world and the security of our friends in the region. Everyone is threatened by what this madman has done. Our bottom line, and I think you agree, is that Iraq must withdraw unconditionally and that the legitimate government of Kuwait must be reestablished. (U)

The Community really has done a great deal to put economic pressure on Saddam, but, as we analyze the situation, I have no confidence that economic pressure alone will force him to withdraw. I have made a series of telephone calls to Thatcher, Mitterrand, Kohl, Ozal, and Mulroney and will see Thatcher this afternoon. All agree that whatever actions we take must be taken quickly. I would encourage you to keep up the pressure on Saddam and to consider other measures that the Community might take multilaterally as well as what Italy might do. Again, I salute your leadership of the EC. (U)

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It is vital from our viewpoint that Turkey knows that, as a member of NATO, it will have our support if Saddam threatens it or tries to keep it from fulfilling its international obligations to do what it can to put pressure on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Ozal is strong, and I am sure he will be very strong if NATO stands with him in the event of a threat. (Ø)

I might note, Giulio, that I am very satisfied with the position taken by Toshiki Kaifu and the Japanese. We have Dick Cheney talking with the Saudis. As you know, they are very concerned. There is incontrovertible evidence that instead of moving out, the Iraqis are moving new forces in near the Saudi border. Today, Woerner will be here, Thatcher will come on her way back from Colorado, and Mulroney is coming down for dinner. (Ø)

Let me just say that it is important to stay in close touch -- either you and I or our representatives. Once again, this is a matter of grave historic significance, not just one incident. We don't need another invasion of the Rhineland. But I am anxious to get your viewpoint, my friend. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: First, I am of the same opinion regarding the extreme gravity of the situation. I say that for another reason: in the past, in our fight against Khomeini, we may have helped Saddam too much. As far as more decisive measures, beyond the economic, the UN Security Council is moving along, because most except Cuba and Yemen agree. (Ø)

The President: I think that is true. Are you sure about China? (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: According to the last information I had, China would also take part in a general condemnation. We can also put some pressure on the Chinese. (Ø)

The President: I think that is right, but I have no direct information. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I will try to get more information and let you know. My last point is psychological. We need help in convincing world public opinion that the problem is freedom of world trade, not that we are trying to defend the riches of feudal states. The question is economic liberty, not the riches of the Emirate families. (U)

The President: That is a very important point. I agree. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I will remain in touch, so that the situation goes back to the status quo ante. (U)

The President: Thank you for your leadership in the EC. If you have any reason to call, do so. I will do the same. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Telcon	Re: Telecon with President Ali Abdallah Salih of the Republic of Yemen (5 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/2/90 - 8/20/90

Date Closed:	2/3/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(639 & 639.01)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Denied in Full	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/31/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada on August 7, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip D. Zelikow, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 7, 1990, 11:59am - 12:06pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Prime Minister Mulroney: Thanks for your hospitality. I spoke to President Mubarak this morning. Have you spoken to him lately? (U)

The President: I talked with him this morning at about 2:30am our time. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: About your visitor ... (U)

The President: Who was coming. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I spoke to him since he saw the visitor. He said Iraq came in and announced that Kuwait has \$500 million they can put their hands on. The first thing to do with that money would be to help Egypt. They were trying to tell Mubarak that there would be \$20 billion for Egypt if Egypt supported Iraq. Mubarak said we won't sell our principles. I congratulated him for being against aggression. Mubarak said he was tough on Iraq. Privately, he said, all the Arabs support Egypt on this except King Hussein and North Yemen. (S)

The Iraqi response is that they're ready to die. They are most unreasonable. Militarily, what do you expect? Mubarak had heard all kinds of rumors. He told the Iraqi he thought they would be driven out of Kuwait. The Iraqi response was that they would never accept that. Mubarak said the UN resolution should be strictly executed. He said the Soviets agree with Egypt's position. A boycott, he said, is very important. Mubarak views the UN resolution as the most significant development so far. It will provide cover for whoever wants to come on the side. Such leaders now have all the legitimacy to do it. What clearly happened is that the Iraqis have just robbed the bank and will split it up with whoever will support them. (S)

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The President: I spoke with the President of Yemen. He asked for more time, that we not enforce the UN sanctions. It was kind of a pathetic call. He and King Hussein are the only two on that wicket. I think it's money. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Mubarak told me we should make sure of the enforceability of the resolution. (S)

The President: I talked to Mitterrand. He was supportive of a NATO meeting. 'We will be there,' he said. I took the Mulroney Plan. I'm feeling a little groggy, but it worked out. Mitterrand was pleasant and matter of fact. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You're handling this situation extremely well. Keep going and God bless. (U)

The President: Thanks. Let me know if you get any more intel there. (S).

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hassan of Morocco (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hassan of Morocco
Interpreter: Alec Tumayun
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 7, 1990, 12:52 - 12:56 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Greetings to you, sir. (U)

King Hassan: Happy to hear your voice. (U)

The President: These are troubled times, Your Majesty. I just wanted to touch base. I believe that we're looking at these matters with the same degree of gravity and along the same wavelength. (Ø)

King Hassan: Absolutely and entirely on the same wavelength. (Ø)

The President: I have a special request for you. I hope that you can receive my very competent Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, on his way back from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. (Ø)

King Hassan: With great pleasure. (U)

The President: That is very generous of you. He will tell you what I'm thinking, of his talks with King Fahd, and with Mubarak, who is a good friend and who wants to be helpful. (Ø)

King Hassan: I would like to give you my brief views. First, the Arab nations demand international legitimacy to reconquer their rights, so they are under the same obligation to respect it among themselves. Second, I was sent into exile with my father because of a new king being put into power. We went into exile to resist. Saddam Hussein is a colonial occupier and Jabir must return. (Ø)

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The President: Exactly. (U)

King Hassan: Third, in general, all the world bankers never want war. The bankers must push for a return to legitimacy so all development plans can take place for the year 2000. I have one special concern that I would like to mention to you. Iraqi recruiting offices have been opened in Mauritania. They have 500 recruits already. If the Amir asks for strategic facilities to be extended to his friends, I will grant them. (Ø)

The President: That's great -- please discuss these matters with Dick Cheney. I think he's arriving about 8:30 tonight your time. (Ø)

King Hassan: No problem. (U)

The President: He is in Egypt now; maybe he has taken off. You would be very interested in his talks and then we could all be on the same wavelength. (Ø)

King Hassan: I will receive him. (U)

The President: I would be very grateful. I look forward to talking to you again. I told King Fahd that we would respond to a legitimate request to defend our friends. The United States will keep its word. The United States will do all it can to enforce economic sanctions. The whole world is ready to cooperate and I will take the lead to make sanctions effective. (Ø)

King Hassan: It is a great good fortune that you know and understand geography so well. (Ø)

The President: Well, it's a long way between the United States and the Gulf, but that won't stand in our way. (Ø)

King Hassan: Our Egyptian friends are well placed to help. (Ø)

The President: Regards from Mrs. Bush. (U)

King Hassan: I wish you the greatest happiness imaginable. (U)

The President: I still talk of the wonderful evening we had by the sea. It was very personal and genuine -- going beyond any protocol. (U)

King Hassan: We will repeat it anytime, here or in Washington. (U)

The President: Let's do it! Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

MITTERRAND AUG 7 - PRES CALL TO MITTERRAND -- MONITORED
BY CONDI RICE AT 0238 - TERMINATED 0254 --
FROM WHITE HOUSE

MUBARAK

AUG 7 - PRES CALL TO MUBARAK AT 0256 -- MONITORED
BY RICHARD HAASS - CALL TERMINATED 0303 -- CALL
FROM WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Sheikh Zayyid of the
United Arab Emirates (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Sheikh Zayyid of the United Arab Emirates
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 8, 1990, 1:36 - 2:00 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Sheikh Zayyid: Fine. (U)

The President: I wanted to share a few thoughts with you and get
your views on the situation. (U)

Sheikh Zayyid: Thank you. (U)

The President: I would like to run through a couple of talking
points, and then invite your advice, sir. As I'm sure that you
know by now, I have agreed to King Fahd's request that U.S.
forces deploy to Saudi Arabia to help in the defense of the
Kingdom in the event of Iraqi aggression. Some forces are
already there; others are on the way. I made the point in a
speech to our nation this morning that our troops would be ready
to defend themselves, Saudi Arabia, and our other friends in the
Gulf. I view the Emirates as long time friends of the United
States. I want you to know that I was thinking of you when I
made my decision. We will stand by our friends. I also know
that our mission must be successful, or Iraq will not be deterred
and kicked out of Kuwait. To some degree, success depends on
help of other countries in the area there. If you agree with
what we and Saudi Arabia have done, I would like your political
endorsement of Saudi Arabia's decision and our deployment because
this would send the right political signal of our firm solidarity
to the other Arabs and especially to Iraq. Our forces -- a long
way from home -- will also be needing considerable host nation
support, particularly access to facilities throughout the
Emirates. I hope you can ask your people to help in this regard.

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I can understand that with your responsibilities, you may have been concerned about our posture and our determination in the face of Saddam's brutal aggression. I hope it is unmistakably clear by now that we intend to stand by our friends. Iraq is not going to win this confrontation. Again, I hope that you can help politically and on the ground. If you have any specific requests or advice, or if you need special help, please feel free to ask me or Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz, who will be visiting in your area very shortly. (C)

Sheikh Zayyid: Mr. President, we welcome the presence of U.S. troops in the area and your assistance as friends. We welcome and accept everything you need in this regard. (C)

The President: That is very good to hear. I'm not surprised but I am very, very pleased. (C)

Sheikh Zayyid: Thank you. You will find our men and children by your side; we welcome your help here as friends. (C)

The President: The Kuwaiti Ambassador here told me of terrible reports of brutality, blowing up banks, plundering and stealing. Do you have any reports of that sort from Kuwait? (C)

Sheikh Zayyid: These reports are true. It is even worse than that -- they are violating people and doing terrible things to them. (C)

The President: I hope Saddam Hussein will get the word. He is so brutal and tough that his withdrawing won't be easy. But we will be there until it happens. (C)

Sheikh Zayyid: You will find us also determined to stand up to this brutal man and resist him. We offered him a lot and it did no good. (C)

The President: I appreciate these words of common purpose. I salute you and best wishes for your wonderful country. Let's stay in touch. (U)

Sheikh Zayyid: Thank you. Do not hesitate to ask for anything that you may need and your people should not either. (C)

The President: Thank you. (U)

Sheikh Zayyid: Thank you. Your generosity exceeds mine. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 8, 1990, 2:55 - 3:32 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello, how are you? I would like to pay my respects, and to share views on the recent events in the Gulf.
(U)

Sultan Qaboos: Thank you. (U)

The President: I tell you, I still remember, as does Barbara, with great fondness our visit to Oman. I will never forget your hospitality. (U)

Sultan Qaboos: We also do not forget your presence among us, and we cherish those memories. There are very good feelings in Oman about the visit. (U)

The President: I hope to see you another time soon. I have a handful of points I would like to make to you, and then I would appreciate your advice on this situation. I'm sure that you know by now, we have agreed to King Fahd's request that U.S. forces deploy to Saudi Arabia to help in the defense of the Kingdom in the event of Iraqi aggression. In my speech to the American people this morning, I said that our troops would be ready to defend themselves, Saudi Arabia, and our other friends in the Gulf that might need support. Oman has long been a friend of the United States. I want you to know that when I made that statement, I had Oman in mind. We will stand by our friends. Our mission -- not just military, but UN sanctions also -- must be successful, or Iraq will not be deterred or removed from Kuwait. I would like to encourage your political endorsement of Saudi Arabia's decision and our deployment. More than anything else, this would send the right political signal of our firm solidarity. That signal would go out to the other Arabs and

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especially to Iraq. Our forces will also be needing considerable host nation support, perhaps access to facilities in Oman. We've had such good cooperation from you, I hope that I can count on you to instruct your people to give us this cooperation. Over the past few days, you may have been concerned about the resolve of the United States or our willingness in the face of Saddam's brutal aggression to do anything. I hope our actions make it unmistakably clear by now that we intend to stand by our friends. Iraq will not win this confrontation. I welcome your comments and your assessment of the situation right now. (Ø)

Sultan Qaboos: Thank you for the call and for your explanation of the situation. Second, we are pleased with the firm stance the United States has taken alongside Saudi Arabia, which is what we expected. We support and strongly endorse this stand. Third, I talked to our Foreign Minister and told him to clarify Oman's position in support of U.S. policy and Saudi Arabia's request to the United States to help it defend itself. Our friends will not stand with their hands tied behind their backs. (Ø)

The President: Well, that is a very direct and very strong statement of support. Thank you very much. I would like your advice on the issue; you are closer to it. How do you see Iran's stance? What's its position now? (Ø)

Sultan Qaboos: Before that, with regard to the request to facilitate and support the troops, there are agreements between us. Whether to do with the agreements or not, everything needed to support Saudi Arabia and U.S. troops to defend Saudi Arabia, there should be no doubt that we are willing to do everything. (Ø)

The President: Thanks, that is very forthcoming. (Ø)

Sultan Qaboos: Regarding Iran, our information is that they did not issue a public statement of support to indicate their feelings. But our understanding is that they aren't unhappy with what is happening as long as Western ships do not go over into Persian waters. They informed us that they will stand alongside the Gulf countries and will do anything asked if there is a need for it. But in order to do that they need parts and equipment they do not have. If they get this in adequate amounts, then they're in a better position to do what is asked of them. We have also learned that Iraq has talked to Iran and is now ready to solve their problems -- they want to neutralize Iran in this matter. I would like to assure you that they are doing this so that if they have an agreement with Iran, and Iran is weak, then they can use the troops on that border elsewhere. It is important for you to know this. (Ø)

The President: I agree 100 per cent. Your analysis is correct. (Ø)

Sultan Qaboos: If I may advise you, the United States and the West should take advantage of developing an understanding with Iran so that the balance in the area is not lost. (Ø)

The President: I agree with your thinking. There have been great differences between us and Iran, but I am interested in what you have said. If you have any specifics on this, call me or have your able Foreign Minister be in touch. Two points: first, we want Iran to keep the pressure on; and second, in the long run, we want better relations with Iran. (Ø)

Sultan Qaboos: I understand the obstacles to bettering relations; those are understood. I also understand Iran must do something in order to improve relations -- it must turn a new leaf. We are doing our best to help. I have heard that Iranians are saying "do not beat a dead horse." (Ø)

The President: We would welcome that, but I'm not quite sure how to get there. Rafsanjani seems to be reasonable; on the extreme, there are others. It seems any move that Rafsanjani makes, the Minister of Interior shoots down. But that is long-range. I welcome your further advice anytime, not only on the Gulf but also on wider issues, especially relations with Iran. (Ø)

Sultan Qaboos: We will collect our information and our thoughts, push the matter of improved relations, and relay them to you, also on relations with Iran and between Iran and other Western countries. We will call you or go through the Foreign Minister. Before concluding, I understand time is involved but don't lose the opportunity we have now, so that Iran does not fear its talks with Iraq. (Ø)

The President: I welcome any details. I would not like them to make an un-called for deal with Iraq because of their concerns about us. We might provide certain assurances perhaps through you, regarding relations with Iran. Tell them that you talked to me and that we want to assure Iran. Thank you for your observations. (Ø)

Sultan Qaboos: I would like to thank you. I will let you know that when we have information, we will inform you. I will talk to Iran, say you're an open-minded and willing to consider new ideas regarding relations. (Ø)

The President: Thank you for your support. I send you my best personal regards. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Turgut Ozal of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 8, 1990, 3:38 - 3:40 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Ozal initiated the call.

President Ozal: I saw you on CNN. You were very good.

The President: I hope I didn't embarrass you by singling out Turkey.

President Ozal: Not at all, Mr. President. You looked tired.

The President: Not really. I'll be all right. As you know, Jim Baker will be coming to Turkey.

President Ozal: I will be looking forward to it.

The President: He'll be there to give our steadfast assurance of support.

President Ozal: I will welcome his ideas. We can also talk about future steps.

The President: Right. He will also want to hear your views. But I feel fine. I'm going out now to get a little exercise, to play some tennis. I am also strengthened by your courageous stance in all this.

President Ozal: Thank you, Mr. President.

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom (3 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/2/90 - 8/20/90

Document Partially Declassified
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Date Closed:	2/3/2009	OA/ID Number:	91112-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1998-0099-F/3(25)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	12/15/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Thatcher
of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 9, 1990, 10:02 - 10:16 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Thatcher initiated the call. (U)

The President: Margaret, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Fine, and you? (U)

The President: Fine. I was so pleased with your announcement.
Things appear to be in very good shape. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I agree. What I want to say is
congratulations on your operation. I saw your broadcast on
television. It was marvelous. It is getting very good press in
the UK. (U)

The President: Aren't you intrigued by the Arab League Summit
today? I hope Mubarak gets the votes necessary to get the other
Arab states involved. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b) (1)
(b) (1)

The President: (b) (1)
(b) (1)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b) (1)
(b) (1)

The President: Maybe he will come around. I've been very
pleased with Ozal. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes. Congratulations. He has been
marvelous. (U)

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The President: Your visit here really helped. It gave the whole situation an ecumenical look. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: No one can be alone on this. | (b)(1)
(b)(1)

Then my Tornados will go where your ships are in Dharan. I am also sending three minesweepers. They will be ready by Monday. Our people are coming over tomorrow to discuss the complicated issue of rules of engagement. (Ø)

The President: It is very important. Will they be going to DoD? (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes. In our last operation, we didn't have to think about confronting these enormous tankers, about what to do if they don't stop. (Ø)

The President: We were talking this morning about getting on with the interdiction problem. The Pentagon is working on it. I had a long talk with Qaboos yesterday. He was very forthcoming. He said he would deliver anything we need. I suspect your talks with him will also go well. (Ø)

(b)(1)

The President: I agree. (The President asks Brent Scowcroft whether we have an answer yet.) We have not gotten a definitive answer but we will try to get one. (Ø)

(b)(1)

The President: Good. Let me pass this along and make sure we are on the same wavelength. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Another worry is chemical weapons. I thought you gave a good, strong warning to Iraq. (Ø)

The President: Yes, though I left it vague. But the man is irrational. Fortunately, some of our men have experience operating in great heat with this heavy protective clothing. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Thatcher:

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: We need that. The press is already asking where the Arabs are. King Hassan was very forthcoming. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes. He is enormously courageous. (U)

(b) (1)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It won't be long. The action you took so quickly achieved the first objective, of stopping the Iraqis from moving farther south, brilliantly. (Ø)

The President: I agree. They are digging in, but there are no signs of moving down. One other thing: I have two reports of enormous brutality in Kuwait, one from a member of the royal family and another from one of the Sheiks. What they described was brutal, ugly. If your people have any contacts there and can get this word out, it would help our cause. They have also broken into the vaults in Kuwait and taken the gold out. If you can confirm these reports, it might be good to make them public. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Our press this morning reported that a British Air stewardess was raped by an Iraqi soldier, so we can confirm this brutality. We made a demarche to the Iraqis and were told the man had been shot, but they seem to be glorying in brutality. (Ø)

The President: If we could get the word out, it would solidify world opinion. Thanks for your leadership. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It was your leadership. I was just a chum. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Bob Hawke, Prime Minister of
Australia on August 9, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Bob Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia
Notetaker: Douglas H. Paal, NSC

DATE, TIME August 9, 1990, 5:15 - 5:40pm EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Bob, how are you? (U)

PM Hawke: Hello, how're you holding out? (U)

The President: Hanging in, hanging in, I have been concentrating on this somewhat intense and frustrating situation in the Middle East. I assume that's what you are calling about. (Ø)

PM Hawke: Specifically, there have been some raisings by your people to join this naval multinational task force, because it has become current with the press here and caused one way or another national concern here and I thought it best if I spoke directly to you to see what you think is on your mind, if we can decide on how best to contribute, to join the multinational national defense force. I will be having a press conference today. (Ø)

The President: Bob, I think that's wonderful. I think there would be great interest in your participating. We are very much concerned with the multinational force. We are pleased to hear this -- we will get our people in touch right away. I am glad you are so open-minded. (Ø)

PM Hawke: We are more than open-minded. If the request comes, we are prepared to send three ships. If it is to be productive we need to qualify certain standards for the command and composition of the force. We think it may be under UN auspices right now. We want to look at the status, membership, command and purpose of the task force. By status, I mean whether under UN command or not, who will control communications and all of this, so that we can get the UN flag over all of this. (Ø)

The President: This might be difficult to get under UN auspices. My UN people advise it will be difficult. With this positive indication, let's get our people in touch. France, Britain,

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Germany, you, and others as well. I am skeptical we can get the UN flag over all of this. The Soviets, I am pleased to say, are interested. It is good not to have them working against us this time in this sort of crisis. But, Bob, I am advised it is very hard to get the UN flag over the interdiction effort. (S)

PM Hawke: What about Japan, George? (S)

The President: Japan has been very cooperative on the economic side with four prospective economic sanctions. I have not talked to Kaifu in the last few days. They can contribute in some way. (U)

PM Hawke: I think it would be useful. For reasons I think you would understand, George, we would like to have Canada and Japan join, too. A number of European countries are in place now. I think we would be particularly interested to see Canada as part of it. They are somewhat interested in it. I talked to Brian Mulroney yesterday, who indicated a supportive role in the same way that we did. If he were to get a request from you, to Canada and Australia, then we could simultaneously announce... (S)

The President: That is easily arranged. I was talking with Mulroney last weekend, when he came down here. We did not discuss Canada in a multinational force at that time. I certainly will make a simultaneous announcement. With this very positive phone call, I will get with the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor. We will not discuss this outside and will arrange a simultaneous approach. You will see other participants on land and sea. There will be some Arab participation. Saddam will say this is a Western effort to beat down the Arabs. But it is not just Canada, Australia, Great Britain and France. There is much further participation here. (S)

PM Hawke: Good, George. Obviously, we would see the multinational force as primarily for blockade and sanctions. (S)

The President: Precisely, to enforce the blockade and protect the free flow from the oil producers. Can we go back to Japan? (S)

PM Hawke: We had the feeling that because of the importance to Japan of the Middle East it would be appropriate to have some important Japanese presence. You and I want to see that the Japanese have a role commensurate with their importance. To some extent, they have had an easy ride, an easy ride from you. I do not say this critically; this is as it has evolved in the post-war era. They are perceived not to have as large a role when it comes to defense, but to be big in the economic dimension. Their participation will have the benefit of... (S)

The President: If that's a possibility, they can pitch in one way or another. They may be limited in any defensive capability but they have a lot of money. Incidentally, the Turks have been stalwart in all of this. Jim Baker is over there. I have heard from him, talks with Ozal have been quite productive. The initial reports have been very positive. (L)

PM Hawke: I have met Ozal when I was over there. He is an impressive fellow. He runs the place when it comes to decisions; the others are just supernumeraries. As for the Japanese, they certainly have a lot of money. They also have a navy of quality. (L)

The President: On Japan, they do have some forces. I have no hesitancy to ask Japan for support. This is a timely and very important call. (L)

PM Hawke: Let me indicate what we would be able to provide: two FFGs and one supply ship, an oiler. (L)

The President: I repeat, that would be very helpful. Let me pass that along then. It is encouraging in terms of ships and people in that part of the world, positive response not just for the Saudis. It is positive for Oman. Oman is standing tall. You can tell your commanders they will have ports, and our forces will use their support for various vessels. (L)

PM Hawke: Which country would do much? (L)

The President: Oman. Positive support from the Emirates. We haven't had a chance to call them all. (L)

PM Hawke: At the press conference, I can say you will have your people talking with us on a more definite basis as, I understand, participation is concerned. For presentation, you called me, we had a yarn, we will be working our participation. We indicated our willingness to be a part of it. (L)

The President: Is it alright to say that now? (L)

PM Hawke: I think it will be within 7 hours from now. (L)

The President: I'll be glad to mention it earlier or wait until you make a statement. (L)

PM Hawke: I would like to make a statement, first, George. (L)

The President: We will say that I called you to request if Australians could participate. You were positive. Details will be worked out by others. We will, in seven hours, watch for the take, then we'll make a positive suggestion. We would try to organize a response, this is a positive development. (L)

PM Hawke: Excuse me just a minute, George. (Pauses to speak with aides.) George, I think given the circumstances we could arrange to make a statement earlier. Two and a half hours from now? Could you ring Brian Mulroney and ask him for support. If you can ring Brian now, then I'll call him and work out the details. (Ø)

The President: That is perfect. I will call him, sure. We will wait. I would like to say something after you do. (Ø)

PM Hawke: I am very grateful and want to say that we can call Canada and, if you would want, it would be a similar request, Canada has been invited, if that would be helpful. (Ø)

The President: We should get it out fairly soon, but I want to get it out the way you want it. Our evening news goes to bed here pretty quick. (Ø)

PM Hawke: Ring Brian Mulroney and get it going. If you could ring Brian Mulroney now and tell him of our conversation, I will have a conference with him. (Ø)

The President: I will call right now. Thank you, you are a good friend. (Ø)

PM Hawke: George, I want to say something, and it is not just gratuitous. Australians are enormously impressed by the way you have handled this, with maturity and intelligence. (Ø)

The President: Well thank you very much. I have good people doing most of the work. (Ø)

PM Hawke: Goodbye, George. (U)

The President: Bye, Bob. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 9, 1990, 5:40 - 5:52 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office (U)

The President: Brian, I just got through talking with Bob Hawke, who asked me to call you to discuss a naval presence in the multilateral force. He said he could provide two frigates and a supply vessel and indicated you had talked and that there would probably be Canadian involvement. He wants to go forward. We will sort out the command and control mechanisms. He also asked about the force being under a UN flag. I talked to Brent about UN flagging, and we think that it is not very hopeful. Hawke would like to do this with Canadian participation and asked me to call you now, prior to his press conference in several hours. It would be wonderful to have some vessels from Canada involved, and I was enthusiastic when I heard Australia wants to participate. He said he will also call you on this. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: George, he called me last night. He thought it would be multinational, under UN auspices. He wanted to know, if he were invited by the Saudis or the UN, what our reaction would be. I said, Bob, we are by no means a superpower, but I could understand the benefit to the President of the United States. I said we will join in and support the effort. I told him that whatever his decision, we would support it. Let me tell you, George, what we're looking at, but don't hold me to it. (Ø)

The President: No, no. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We're looking at a squadron of 12 CF-18s with about 200 service personnel, two destroyers, helicopters, and a major naval supply ship with another 800 Canadian sailors. We could make this force available in short order. (Ø)

The President: It would be a very significant force. You referred to an invitation by the Saudis or the UN. Clearly, an invitation could come from the Saudis. They are looking for help. I didn't touch on that with Bob. (Ø)

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Another encouraging thing: Oman and the UAE have been very forthcoming regarding porting and supply vessels at their ports. They are the only two I have talked to -- the Sultan of Oman and the Sheik -- but they are very supportive. It is encouraging -- not surprising, but encouraging. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I felt, George, that as the coordinator of the multinational force you would be happy if the Canadians and Australians joined. (Ø)

The President: I would be more than happy; I would be delighted. It would strengthen the multilateral aspect. We are taking some shots here, though they don't worry me. Brent was asked some questions like, where is this multinational force? There will be others. Confidentially, the Moroccans will be joining. But it would be a very, very good signal if you and Australia joined. So color me enthusiastic, and grateful as well. Brian, do you want to coordinate with Hawke? More important than my hogging all the credit, you should announce this any way you want. He said he would announce in two hours. I said that was fine and that we would just say that we welcomed the announcement. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The first thing after our meeting the other night, I got together with our people to go over what we could do if asked. I readily understand the merits of a multinational force. I will coordinate with Hawke and then later with you. (Ø)

The President: Okay. I may be out, but Brent will be here. Barb and I are going out for Mexican food with some of the grandkids, but I can come back. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Not at all. I will be happy to talk to Brent. (U)

The President: I can be reached within three minutes, anyway. I am very, very pleased. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: How are things going generally? (U)

The President: Very, very well, although there are uncertainties, of course. We have heard terrible stories of brutality in Kuwait, from one of the Sheiks and also from Thatcher, who said that a British stewardess had been raped. I think we will have more reports of this kind. The Arab Summit is interesting, but I have no knowledge of what will happen. King Hussein might go along. He has pulled back from his isolated and rather pathetic position. Turkey is standing tall. The military side went smoothly. We have no information of forward movement by the Iraqis, but they are digging in. So that's where we are. Saddam Hussein is trying to portray this as the Arabs against the rest of the world, and Dan Rather had a silly report about the haves versus the have nots. But generally speaking I think there will be a strong condemnation from the Arab League. There ought to be. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: I am pleased. We will do what we can.
(U)

The President: It is very helpful. Your visit here was very important. It emphasized the multinational aspect. This sends a good signal, that it is not just the U.S. taking some kind of vengeance against Iraq. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'll be back as soon as I can. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of
Canada on August 10, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 10, 1990, 1:08 - 1:12pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

(Conversation began prior to monitoring.)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I have advised Brent of this but
wanted you to know. (U)

I am dispatching between 800-1000 personnel to the area. --
two destroyers and supply vessels -- combat personnel and people
to look after the ships. We have also arranged for a squadron
of CF-18s to be available for Saudi Arabia with the necessary
personnel -- 200 further personnel. (S)

Here is my problem -- Under the National Defense Act -- Canadian
law -- an order must be tabled in the House of Commons within 10
days of its execution. If it is not sitting, it must be
recalled. (S)

If we dispatched the CF-18s - I'd have to recall the House of
Commons in special session. I don't want to do that and give the
Liberals and Socialists a chance to take shots at me. (S)

I plan to recall them for 24th of September anyway and I can
dispatch the planes 10 days before that. With the ships it isn't
a problem because of the time required to get them to the Gulf.
(S)

The President: I understand not wanting to have a special
session. Thank you very much for these very cooperative moves.
Saddam Hussein gave a rampaging speech today calling for a Holy
War. I hope the Arab summit stays firm. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I think the symbolism of more and more
countries joining will be a signal to the Arab Summit that the
pressure is getting more intense. I will make a statement within
an hour. (S)

The President: Thanks for your forthright action. King Fahd
will appreciate it too. (U)

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"Issa" is the
correct spelling

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Sheikh Issa of Bahrain
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Sheikh Issa
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 11, 1990; 9:01 - 9:05 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello, sir. (U)

Sheikh Issa: Greetings. We are very proud of your support and grateful for your understanding of the situation. (U)

The President: Well, you should be very proud of the unified stand at the Arab League Summit. You are standing with Saudi Arabia and others who are determined that Saddam Hussein will not prevail. We should all stay together in making sanctions work.
(✓)

Sheikh Issa: We stand with the United States. We are very proud of our long friendship. (U)

The President: Saddam Hussein has tried to turn the Arab world against us. The results of the Arab League Summit are so good, that he is even more isolated. (✓)

Sheikh Issa: With the help of the United States, we are stronger. We will help you as much as we can. (✓)

The President: I am grateful for that. I still remember my visit with you, together with Barbara. Your friendship and hospitality still mean a great deal to me. (U)

Sheikh Issa: I hope your family is well. (U)

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The President: Well, we are trying to get some vacation. I just wanted to pay my respects to you, sir, and I appreciate discussing these matters with you. Please feel free to call anytime. (U)

Sheikh Issa: Thank you. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MUBARAK

AUG 11 - PRES CALL TO MUBARAK INITIATED 0548
FROM KENNEBUNKPORT -- ERIC JOHNSON/SITRM
MONITORED -- CALL TERMINATED AT 0552

KHALIFA

AUG 11 - PRES CALL TO AMIR KHALIFA OF QATAR.
MONITORED BY RICHARD HAASS. CALL INITIATED
AT 1204 - TERMINATED 1214 -- CALL FROM
KENNEBUNKPORT

FAHD

AUG 11 - PRES CALL TO KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA
INITIATED AT 1239 FROM KENNEBUNKPORT -- TERMINTED
1251. HAASS MONITORED.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with President al-Assad of Syria

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hafiz al-Assad

Interpreter: Shukran Kamal
Notetaker: David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME August 12, 1990, 6:13 - 6:28 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

President Bush initiated the call. President Assad exchanged greetings in English, but worked through the translator for the substantive exchange.

The President: Good morning, Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Assad: (In English) Good morning, sir, how are you? (U)

The President: I wanted to call to tell you how pleased I am at the outcome of the Arab League Summit. I am pleased that Syria took a very appropriate and strong leadership role in trying to undo the injustice done by Saddam Hussein. I wanted to assure you as I have other leaders in the area that the United States wants to implement UN sanctions and restore the rightful leaders to Kuwait to bring peace to that part of the Gulf. I would be very interested, sir, to have your views on how this situation looks now. (Ø)

President Assad: (In Arabic) Thank you Mr. President. Actually, we were shocked at what happened to Kuwait. We know nations do have different views and opinions about things in the world; sometimes these can be sharp. But it is not right or permissible as a result of these differences -- regardless of who might be right or wrong -- that a nation should attack with arms and result in a country going out of existence. And especially at this time in world history, one nation cannot remove or eliminate another nation with force of arms, against the will of the people. That is why we emphasized our views since the first day. Kuwait is a member of the United Nations and the Arab League; it is an independent, sovereign state. Iraqi troops must be withdrawn and the legitimate government must be restored. No one else can change Kuwait's government. That is an internal matter, up to the Kuwaitis. Our position is based on principle, regardless of our bilateral relations with either Iraq or Kuwait. That was the basis for our position at the Arab League Summit in Cairo. The outcome of the Summit was positive. (Ø)

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President Bush: Very positive. I wonder this will make Saddam feel more isolated, or will it result in some other tactic, something more drastic? (Ø)

President Assad: Yes, there will be an effect, but it is difficult to define the effect, its size, and its depth. But it is an appropriate step. (Ø)

President Bush: The Arab League's decision is the single most significant step since the invasion of Kuwait. Because even though the United States had responded to the legitimate appeal from King Fahd, the worst thing would be to make this an Arab versus United States issue. But now other Arabs have pitched in -- Egypt, Morocco, and yourselves -- so now it is the world versus Saddam Hussein. (Ø)

President Assad: Our fellow Arabs discussed this at the Summit. Some took that position at the Arab League Summit; others took another position similar to your interpretation. This is based on the view that Saudi Arabia is a sovereign state and legally has the right to request assistance if in danger and need of defending itself. (Ø)

The President: I agree with that. Well, I wanted to call and wish you well. I am pleased that we are of the same view on this. Be assured that the United States will stand by the UN sanctions. I hope this means that down the road we will be working closer together. (Ø)

President Assad: Thank you very much. I too am pleased that we had this exchange. (Ø)

The President: We will talk again in the future. (U)

President Assad: (In English) I wish you good health. (U)

President Bush: Thank you and good luck. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with F.W. de Klerk of South Africa on
August 13, 1990

PARTICIPANT: The President
F.W. de Klerk, State President of
South Africa
Notetaker: David C. Miller, Jr.

DATE, TIME August 13, 1990, 9:31 - 9:41 A.M. EST
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President telephoned State President F. W. de Klerk concerning the end of the armed struggle in South Africa. (Ø)

President de Klerk: Good afternoon, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Mr. President, how are you? Good to hear from you again. (U)

President de Klerk: It is nice to hear from you. (U)

The President: I simply wanted to call and congratulate you and your delegation on the apparent progress made in Pretoria. It does sound like a breakthrough and I am especially happy about suspension of violence and an end to the armed struggle. As you know I strongly urged Mandela on that subject but I am sure that it was your diplomacy that has brought an end to this internal conflict. (Ø)

President de Klerk: Thank you very much. We also regard it as a real breakthrough and no doubt your influence, and that of European leaders, played a constructive role in the process. No doubt that Mandela means what he says but he has problems with his middle management because this is really a quantum jump. He is standing fast. Even his wife tried to interpret it in a limited way but she was repudiated by Sisulu himself. They have argued in middle ranks but the top executives are strongly behind this. (Ø)

The President: This is a very productive role. I welcome the fast and orderly procedure for the release of political prisoners. I wanted to be sure we were interpreting it the

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same as you. There are still a lot of problems and we are encouraged with this week's events. We share this view of Mandela which backs up what you have begun thinking. I hope the negotiating process goes forward. (Ø)

We are still looking forward to having you here and hope that the damn problem in the Gulf doesn't complicate it too much. I am calling to pay my respects. (Ø)

President de Klerk: I think continuing... not pressuring... continued monitoring on your side to not let them play politics will be helpful with the cessation to end the violence is very important. Some of the underlings are trying to reduce this strategic move Mandela made. (Ø)

The President: And some of the underlings are using the word suspense to mean a temporary suspension? (Ø)

President de Klerk: Mandela used suspension meaning cessation of violence, but the underlings are trying to use suspension as a tactical move and not cessation. Mandela used the word suspension but he did not mean it in a conditional manner. Yes, we are going to bring back prisoners and exiles, in an orderly manner and now we are conducting good, practical working relations. The talks were carried out in an orderly and well-planned manner. We will be able to manage it so that in a month or two or three, we will be able to show further progress. Thanks for calling in that regards. (Ø)

As for the visit, my Minister of Foreign Affairs has been in contact with Brent Scowcroft and they are trying to work something out. (Ø)

The President: I have one last question. I want to raise the question of the Communist Party. When Mandela was here I touched on it and reported to you that I raised it with him. I noticed a big gathering with the Communist leaders. What is the state of play with the Communist Party and an end of violence? (Ø)

President de Klerk: When Mandela was asked that question he said that the South African Communists who were in the ANC were bound by the Pretoria agreement. Those members of the Communist Party share in the structure of the ANC and regard themselves as bound. The political background is that the alliance is coming under stress. The Communist Party is a full-fledged established party. They will have to adopt their attitudes and relations with each other. There is a lot going on under the surface. (Ø)

This process is taking place and is debated internally and publicly the wisdom of continuing the alliance as in the past is

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very much a subject which is alive. I think the Communists will become an albatross around their neck. My biggest problem with the moderates is not the ANC but the Communist factors in the ANC that cause a disbelief among the South Africans that this can work and I think Mandela has become sensitive to it and further sensitivity to this aspect is necessary. (Ø)

The President: I do plan to mention to him that we were pleased. We thought your talks productive. And specifically for the U.S., we were delighted to see this changed position by them and maybe that conversation will help. (Ø)

Thanks for your update and congratulation. (Ø)

President de Klerk: I fully realize that you have a tremendous responsibility, vis-a-vis Iraq, and the whole world is looking to you to take the lead and we think of you in these difficult days. (Ø)

The President: Thank you, we are doing our best. So far we are pleased with the world opinion but I shouldn't be talking to you about difficulties, you handle it very well and we are grateful. (Ø)

Good luck, Mr. President. (U)

President de Klerk: Everything of the best. Thank you for the call. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Lilian Nigaglioni
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME August 13, 1990, 9:59 - 10:19 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President telephoned President Perez to thank him for his statement about increasing oil supplies, review the Iraq crisis, express appreciation for support on the Haitian elections, and express concern about Nicaragua. (U)

The President: How are you, sir -- Mr. President? (U)

President Perez: It is a great pleasure to hear you. (U)

The President: I'm delighted to talk to you. I haven't called you for some time, and I want to thank you for your strong statement of support for stabilizing these damned world oil supplies. And Dan Quayle has filled me in in great detail on your positive approach to the crisis. (U)

I'm sure I don't need to brief you in detail about our approach, but we can't let Hussein's aggression stand. We can't let him get so much control over world oil that he drives other countries to their knees. (U)

I'm pleased that we have gotten a lot of international support. And I'm pleased that the Arab summit did what it did, agreeing to send military assistance to Saudi Arabia. But basically I called to thank you for your help, and ask you if you had anything you wanted to tell me. (U)

President Perez: I have some news for you. First, I'm sorry that you couldn't come to visit us in September, but I understand fully the reasons for postponement. (U)

The President: I really want to come visit. I don't want you to let me off the hook. So I want you to invite me. (U)

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President Perez: You have a standing invitation. (U)

The President: Thanks, my friend. (U)

President Perez: I told Vice President Quayle I was sending the Foreign Minister of Venezuela on a mission to the Middle East. His meeting yesterday with King Fahd was very positive. The result was that a meeting of OPEC oil ministers will be called immediately. This will include the legitimate representatives of Kuwait. If we can't convene this meeting, then all countries will be meeting to see whether we can raise production quotas. (Ø)

The President: That's very positive. (Ø)

President Perez: King Fahd's position is very firm and resolute. Our Foreign Minister is meeting with Rafsanjani in Iran today, then he will be flying to Algeria, to meet with their oil minister, as he is the head of OPEC right now. Then he will go to Nigeria, to try to unite African and Asian oil-producing countries' support. The objective is to prevent speculation, on one hand, and to assure the oil supply, on the other. (Ø)

The President: That's a very important diplomatic mission, and I'm delighted to know you've sent him. I'm anxious to know how he fares, how he makes out. (Ø)

President Perez: I'll keep you posted at all times, Mr. President. We're cooperating with the position taken by the United States, which we share one hundred percent. We need to find a way to solve the crisis. But we can't let Hussein get away with his folly. (Ø)

The President: Do you have time for one more question? (U)

President Perez: Of course. (U)

The President: Vice President Quayle gave me a briefing in detail on your conversations on Haiti. I want to thank you for the positive help in getting UN action to guarantee free elections in Haiti. Quayle said you'd been a major factor in getting Andean country help for Haiti's request. (Ø)

The question I have relates to our favorite subject -- or maybe I should say our unfavorable topic -- the situation in Nicaragua. I'm still worried about developments there. We worry that the Sandinistas are helping FMLN guerrillas and that they are resisting Mrs. Chamorro's efforts to reform the economy. (Ø)

I don't think we see eye to eye on some of this. I'm still worried about Humberto Ortega. Maybe you could either tell me

now or you could send me a private message. But I'd be interested to know what you think. (C)

President Perez: On Haiti, I feel relatively optimistic about the outcome there. Both visits -- Vice President Quayle's and mine -- were very positive. We won't stop our efforts. On oil, today I'm convening a ministerial meeting to consider what we can do. (C)

On Nicaragua, I'm very concerned about the development of the situation. I'm following the situation closely. I plan to send someone I trust to Nicaragua to sound out different sectors, and tell me what is going on. There are several factors -- one is the great amount of disparity among those who support Violeta. (C)

The President: I agree with that. I want to stay in close sync. I respect you, and you've been right on this. And as I told you, I'm concerned. (C)

President Perez: Thanks for your trust. I am also not satisfied with the conduct of the Sandinistas as an opposition. This responds to conflicts in the ranks of Sandinismo. But Humberto Ortega has not been a strong negative factor. We shouldn't personalize the conflict. The problem is very complex and we can't over-simplify it. We should remember that it wasn't productive to focus all attention on Noriega in Panama. (C)

The President: I appreciate your thoughts. You know the players better than I do. We would hate to see Dona Violeta fail. That's our bottom line -- we want to see her succeed. (C)

President Perez: We are in agreement that the risks are substantial, and we want to prevent things from being worse. We want to avoid failure of the Chamorro government. Your concern is justified. But there is no other course-- we need to follow events closely and shouldn't confuse over individuals. (C)

I'm sorry your trip to Maine has been complicated by difficult world events, but I want to wish you a good vacation. (U)

The President: Thank you. I go back to Washington for a few hours tomorrow. But I am getting some rest here. Barbara sends her respects and love, too. (U)

President Perez: Thank you, Mr. President, and my respects to your wife. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 13, 1990; 6:02 - 6:05 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

King Hussein initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello, Your Majesty, how are you? (U)

King Hussein: Very well. Are you enjoying the sea? (U)

The President: Greatly. How are things? (U)

King Hussein: We are still running around, trying to do the best we can. I thank you for your letter, it was really very good, sir. The reason for my call is that I would like to see you as soon as possible. I will do so quietly, or in any way you like.
(S)

The President: That could be very useful. Would you like to suggest a time? (S)

King Hussein: Anytime, sir. (S)

The President: I will call you back tomorrow. I'm unsure about the timing because I don't have a sense of my schedule and I'll be heading back to Washington. But let me check, and we'll get word back to you tomorrow. (S)

King Hussein: All right, sir. (U)

The President: We could talk then about the sanctions and the difficult position you are in now. We are prepared to talk with others about how we can help. Provide some support to cushion the costs for Jordan and make up the losses. (S)

King Hussein: Fine. That's only one aspect and maybe the least worrying. I want to put my thoughts and all the background before you. (S)

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The President: Are you flexible on the timing? (U)

King Hussein: Yes. (U)

The President: We sent some points through Roger Harrison that the American side would want to raise. (U)

King Hussein: Fine, sir. I will look forward to your call. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 13, 1990, 6:18 - 6:20 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Back again, sir. If you can come fairly soon, we can have lunch in Washington on Wednesday (August 15) or meet in the afternoon. If that's not convenient, we will have to get back to you with some alternative suggestions. (Ø)

King Hussein: Can I look at that possibility and call you back tomorrow? (Ø)

The President: If that's not convenient, we'll work something out for another time. (Ø)

King Hussein: I'll get back to you or leave a message, as soon as possible. (Ø)

The President: If I'm not here, talk to Brent Scowcroft in Washington. (Ø)

King Hussein: Of course. You know, it's 1:20 a.m. here -- I'll need to check a few things in the morning. (Ø)

The President: OK, goodbye. (U)

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WASHINGTON

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Add-On

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
on August 13, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME August 13, 1990, 6:55 - 7:15pm, EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President telephone Prime Minister Kaifu concerning the
Middle East and Persian Gulf. (U)

The President: Toshiki. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Yes, George. (U)

The President: Toshiki, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: I am fine. (U)

The President: Well I just wanted to call you on one or two
points, and I know that you are sending Foreign Minister Nakayama
to the Middle East to express your support for the Gulf states
and I understand why you could not go. We will be interested in
the results of that trip. First, I wanted to just thank you for
your very strong leadership and support for sanctions in the UN
Security Council. I am very pleased that we are rallying
wonderful international support for the sanctions, diplomatic,
economic and military support, so the opposition to Saddam
Hussein will be truly global opposition. (U)

I wanted to touch base with you on the economic side and military
side. Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Australia have
agreed to contribute naval forces. I also think that Spain and
Italy will do the same. I would certainly encourage as much
support as Japan can give on the economic and military side. One
thing we are looking at is giving help to the countries that are
making the largest sacrifices: Turkey, Jordan and Egypt. (U)

Any support you can give on the military side would be helpful.
I know in the last Persian Gulf crisis Japan helped to defray

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some of the costs. Anything that Japan can do would be appreciated. I would like you to consider a direct Japan contribution to the multinational naval force. I realize that would be a watershed event in the post World War II history of Japan, but if it could be worked out it would really send a signal that Japan was a full participant in the western alliance. This would protect our common interests and would show Japan in a common alliance to protect against Saddam Hussein. (Ø)

The multinational peacekeeping effort will probably be coordinated through the UN military staff committee and perhaps Japan could participate in those consultations. Although these issues require further consultation, initial ideas being kicked around are mine sweeping and ships to carry equipment to Saudi Arabia -- something of that nature. The big thing is, the more that Japan can do to emphasize Japan making a full commitment, the better for everybody. Regardless of what Japan does financially, I hope that you would be able to consider some of these thoughts and that we could talk more about them. (Ø)

These are some of the ideas I wanted to talk to you about. We think the Soviets might participate on the naval side of things. We see this as a positive development. I would like to have your thoughts on this or you might like to think about it and contact me later. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kaifu: First of all, I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to you, George, for your endeavors to maintain peace and stability in the Gulf region today and I sincerely hope that our endeavors will be successful. (Ø)

With respect to what you have said about Japan's contribution, as you already know, I have decided to stay in Japan to exercise leadership from the top, and we have already started to consider what additional forms of cooperation we can extend. (Ø)

The people here on our side have already agreed to extend as much cooperation as possible in the economic field, especially for Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt. These countries will be visited by Foreign Minister Nakayama, and I have already instructed the Foreign Ministry to explore what cooperation would be possible at this stage. (Ø)

With respect to the military side that you have touched upon, because of our constitutional constraints and Diet resolutions, it is almost a national policy in this regard so it would be next to unthinkable to participate directly in the military

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sphere. Perhaps this point is already known to the military people concerned in your government. It is not immediately possible to take part in the multinational naval force. You have also mentioned the case of previous times. In view of the previous experience, we are now currently exploring in what form we can cooperate further. (Ø)

The President: Well this is good. I just was not fully aware of your constitutional problem but take a look to see whether there is something that can be done, perhaps on the logistic side, that will not put you in conflict with Diet resolutions. Shipping would be helpful in all of this. If it fits in fine; if not we will talk some more. You have done so well with the leadership over there, I would love to see Japan, side-by-side with us as much as possible. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kaifu: George, I understand you very well. Regarding the constraint on Japan, what I mentioned was actually of Diet deliberations. In the previous case, with respect to the Persian Gulf, Japan contributed financially and economically to the safe passage of ships through the Gulf. In view of this fact and current circumstances, I would like to explore what we can do this time. (Ø)

The President: Well that's fine. My bottom line is that when this chapter of history is written, Japan and the U.S. and a handful of other countries will have stood side-by-side as much as possible. We were so impressed by how you rapidly moved on the economic sanctions, that I wanted to discuss these things with you. (Ø)

I wish you well, Toshiki. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Thank you very much for your call and I hope you will continue to exercise great leadership and we will continue to explore how we can contribute. (U)

The President: Thank you, good luck, and we will be talking before too long. Goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Goodnight. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 14, 1990, 5:28 - 5:35 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Ozal initiated the call. (U)

President Ozal: I saw your press conference on CNN and wanted to call. (U)

The President: How are things with you? (U)

President Ozal: Everything is all right. Let me tell you about the embargo. I believe there is some misunderstanding. The pipelines in Turkey and Saudi Arabia are closed. If they are stopped, that means there is no oil revenue for Iraq, and no money to pay for food shipments. If there are some ships coming into different ports, they may be those underway before the embargo. Maybe your quarrel with the French and Soviets is a misunderstanding. (Ø)

The President: We don't really have a quarrel with them. The press is making too big a deal over this. We are having very friendly talks with the Soviets and the French, so that story from my perspective is projecting more opposition than exists. I think we're looking at this pretty much the same way. As far as I am concerned, the French have been very cooperative. I don't think we're having a dispute with them. (Ø)

President Ozal: One other thing: the Kuwaiti Prime Minister visited us today and brought with him letters from the Emir regarding Article 51. (Ø)

The President: Yes, that is what gives us legal authority. (U)

President Ozal: I told him we already have legal embargo measures in place. Turkey is the key country, because it is the only country that has enough goods inside the country to give Iraq. If we stop, Iraq cannot buy from others. We are also blocking goods coming from Europe by highway and shipping through our ports. There is already news from Baghdad that they have prohibited the sale of sweets and pastries. (Ø)

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The President: Right. Maybe the embargo is making a difference sooner than we expected. (Ø)

President Ozal: I think so. When you talk to King Hussein, be careful. He shouldn't side with Iraq. (Ø)

The President: Yes. The press is talking about a letter from Saddam Hussein, but we don't know about that. (U)

President Ozal: Before Washington he was in Baghdad, so maybe he is bringing news, either orally or in a letter. (U)

The President: Perhaps. He didn't say anything about it to us. Let's stay in touch. I have great respect for the actions Turkey is taking, and I hope you are right that the sanctions are taking a bite much sooner than we thought. (U)

President Ozal: I hope so. There is Aqaba and Kuwait harbor, but if they don't have money, how will they pay? (Ø)

The President: That's encouraging. I hope the Emir will follow through and support you on the financial side, as he said he would. (Ø)

President Ozal: I hope so. We need to show our people that we are not just doing this for Kuwait. We need a strong hand to show our people. (Ø)

The President: That is a good point. Thanks for your call. Is there anything else we should discuss? (U)

President Ozal: No, that's all. Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME August 16, 1990; 5:28 - 5:35 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hosni, I just finished a couple of interesting meetings; thought I'd fill you in with a quick readout. First, King Hussein. You know of the strains between Jordan and the United States. We had a very frank discussion about things. You know, I've always liked him, and I still do. But the key thing is that there was no letter, no proposal (from Saddam Hussein); the whole thing was a big media hype. I told him of the essentiality of our objectives: Iraq must get out; and the legitimate rulers must be restored. He mentioned an election, but did not push it. I said no. He said Jordan was/would support international sanctions -- and he said so in public. That was positive and will help Jordan in the United States. (U)

President Mubarak: I heard it. (U)

The President: I was encouraged in that. He still talks of an Arab solution. He said Arab opinion is against the United States. I said let's figure out how to make it better. I told him I'm committed to our policy. We had a really long talk. Also, he talked to Jim Baker on the plane ride up. He was worried, but he was pleasant. He thinks we've done the wrong thing. The press had it there was a letter. I told him that we had lost confidence in anything Saddam Hussein says. He told me a long story about the Arab League Summit. We discussed the Saddam Hussein story about pulling out of Kuwait when in fact another whole division was going in. He was very gracious; he always is. There was no hidden agenda, secret mission, or special message. I also had a good visit with Saud and Bandar. They wanted to thank us and think of next steps. But no one is really in a position yet to discuss next steps -- we need to see how sanctions work. We talked at length; no decisions were made.

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He's going to Washington for some briefings. They were very pleased and grateful. And that's the report on that one. I also talked to Ozal. The Turks feel confident that sanctions will have a major effect on Iraq. Ozal says ten days is what it will take. Zero is going in and out, he says, and that will have an effect on Saddam Hussein. (Ø)

President Mubarak: If sanctions are well and firmly done, it will have an effect. (Ø)

The President: There was no secret mission; I guess that all started with the press speculation. He wants more support for Jordan's position in the United States, and I'd be willing to help but our positions are different. (Ø)

President Mubarak: About Saddam Hussein and the witnesses, we were alone, George. Only the two of us worked on this; we negotiated it alone. (Ø)

The President: I missed that part. (Ø)

President Mubarak: He said he would do nothing until the first meeting. I don't believe him any longer. (Ø)

The President: Well, I just wanted to give you those reports.
(U)

President Mubarak: Thank you. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal
of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 20, 1990, 9:02-9:16 a.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

President Ozal: How are you? (U)

The President: I am all right and pleased and proud of Turkey's
actions in this conflict. (U)

President Ozal: Our Foreign Minister was in Tehran last week
with Rafsanjani and I have some information to relay to you. (S)

The President: Please go ahead. You said your Foreign Minister
was in Tehran? (S)

President Ozal: Yes. Ali Bozer. The Iranians asked him to go to
Tehran. The situation is as follows. The Iranians said they are
firmly committed to sanctions. They see the Iraqi return of
their land and the 1975 Algiers Treaty and the current crisis in
the Gulf as completely separate. They are concerned that others
may violate the sanctions. They said the Soviets had sought
permission to evacuate 4,500 Soviets by air from Iran. They fear
the Soviets may be planning to send spare parts or even troops to
Iraq. (S)

The President: That would be a direct contravention of what the
Soviets have told us. (S)

President Ozal: Yes. I think the likelihood of spare parts is
greater than their sending troops. The Soviet request to
evacuate their citizens involved bringing them to Iran from Iraq
by bus for travel back to the Soviet Union by air. (S)

The Iranians said their public position on the crisis would be
that they are opposed to any foreign presence in the region. But
privately, they say they are not opposed to the U.S. presence
until there is no longer a need for it. (S)

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The President: That is encouraging. (U)

President Ozal: The Iranians reminded us that Sadaam is an animal who will not be silenced until he is suffocated. The Iranians also said they will maintain their state of alert on the border with Iraq. They fully expect that Iraq will withdraw from their territory and repatriate their prisoners. The Turkish delegation found the Iranians to be relaxed about Iraq. (S)

The Iranians said they are not yet ready for a better relationship with the U.S. Our representatives offered to help in communication between Iran and the U.S. as a conduit. (S)

The President: That is reassuring. I have been concerned about a possible unholy alliance between Iran and Iraq. I am also increasingly concerned about the Iraqi ships in the Gulf. We cannot permit them to go forward. (S)

President Ozal: Yes. We have been following the situation. What is the situation with the U.S. and UK citizens in Kuwait and Iraq? (S)

The President: This is of grave concern to me. We have information the Iraqis are moving some of them to strategic locations. It is uncivilized and hardly believable. But we have information they are being moved to targets like gas manufacturing plants. I am increasingly concerned they are hostages. The Iraqis are making unacceptable diplomatic demands. We won't do what they want or give in. I have been told by my Ambassador to the UN that there is a possibility of UN action in just a few hours that has to help. But I am increasingly concerned. We can't be silent or inactive in the face of provocation and I hope you and others will understand. (S)

President Ozal: They are blackmailers. (S)

The President: Yes, it is blackmail. We can't pay off blackmailers. They have put U.S. lives at risk. I would welcome your judgment on this. We just cannot sit there forever, and I hope again that people would understand this. (S)

President Ozal: We could help to take your people out of Iraq, if they are let go. (S)

The President: Any verbal, public assistance would be very much appreciated. (U)

President Ozal: We'll do that. We can also help you if you have an operation. (S)

The President: That is a very helpful statement. Thank you. We don't doubt your friendship. (U)

President Ozal: How many U.S. citizens are in Kuwait and Iraq? (S)

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The President: Wait just a minute. Bob Gates is here, I'll check. We have 2500 people in Kuwait and 500 in Iraq. (S)

President Ozal: Have they not rounded up your people in Kuwait? (S)

The President: Not yet. But there is a report that they are going house to house searching for them. The world is outraged. (S)

President Ozal: The Iranians think that conflict is imminent. (S)

The President: I wonder if they think Sadaam wonders the same thing. (S)

President Ozal: I don't know. The Iranians said that seventy Iraqi planes are loaded with chemical weapons. (S)

The President: We know they have made preparations. We'll continue to check on them. We have got air power and interceptor power. The man is ruthless. Do you think there is a chance he will move against Saudi Arabia? (S)

President Ozal: I don't think so. (U)

The President: We don't believe so either. (U)

President Ozal: He'll wait and try to bargain. If he was interested in Saudi Arabia, he would have done so ten days ago. We will continue to talk to the Iranians. (S)

The President: It is important that you do so. (S)

President Ozal: We also met the Pakistanis in Tehran. We'll listen to your speech today. (U)

The President: There is nothing that is really new in it. Your favorite station and mine, CNN, is carrying it. Thanks very much for your call. (U)

President Ozal: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher of
the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME August 20, 1990, 9:16 - 9:26 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Hello, George. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine. I am delighted to hear your voice. I just wanted to call to mention one or two things and compare notes.
(U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We are both thinking in the same direction. I just had some political and military advisors here.
(U)

The President: Our ambassador to the United Nations tells me that we may be in reach of a new resolution that would endorse the use of force. I hope he is successful. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It is absolutely vital. Otherwise there will be no way to enforce the sanctions, and we would look foolish. (U)

The President: On the question of those ships refusing to stop, it is my view, Margaret, that we must stop them. We cannot permit the first challenge to be breached. We would have to do it under Article 51, with the Emir requesting to have UN sanctions enforced. Even absent UN action, we cannot permit those ships to go by. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I agree. We were saying this morning that the UN must agree to the use of force. It is the only way to bring Saddam Husayn to task. (U)

The President: I agree. I hope you are working with the Soviets and especially the Chinese so that they will instruct their representatives to support the resolution. Our ability to deal with the Chinese, thanks to Congress, is greatly diminished. But it is very important. I hope all friendly governments will agree. (U)

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Prime Minister Thatcher: I asked the Chinese Ambassador in this afternoon. He used to be in America and is a very able man. He was born and brought up in America, so he will be the first to understand. (Ø)

The President: That is very good news, knowing that you can be very persuasive. It would be a very timely message, but if the talks in the UN stall, we cannot permit those two ships into port. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I accept that. You and I take the same view that having 51 and the Emir's request, we have the authority. It would be better with a UN approach. (Ø)

The President: Right. It would be much, much better. We are stepping up our numbers over there. Something has to happen. We cannot just stand pat. I have heard different views regarding how long it will take for sanctions to take hold. Ozal thinks they will have an effect soon. What are your views? (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It depends on how well the sanctions are enforced. It will take some time, but the action itself is important and has an effect on the Iraqi people. We must have full authority to use force. It is the only way to bring Saddam Husayn to task. (Ø)

The President: Is your UN Ambassador optimistic? Ours seems to be. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: He wasn't on the first resolution, which was too wide. He thinks we can win the second. Two things need to be kept in mind: to protect the oil supplies of the West and the security of the region. The rulers of the Gulf states are pretty concerned. We're going to send more, and I gather you are sending more to the Emirates. (Ø)

The President: Yes. We have some there and have gotten assurances that they will be cordially received. But there are still questions as to what Saddam Husayn will do. Husayn is nutty. It wouldn't be prudent for him to attack Saudi Arabia, but it's hard to know what he will do. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: He is playing psychological warfare with his broadcasts. We need to make the case that after eight years of war with Iran, he is one Moslem who attacks another. He did so with Iran. He would do it with Saudi Arabia, as he did with Kuwait, and he will do it again. For us, protecting our oil supplies means doing all we can to keep friendly governments in place. (Ø)

The President: I am pleased that we look at it the same way. I wanted you to know that we are encouraged about the UN; but regardless, we cannot let ships skip through. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Thatcher: I agree. We would all look stupid. I don't like bothering you, but I do believe that we must stay in close touch. So I may be calling again. (Ø)

The President: Do, do. I am available any time night or day.
(U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We will be sending a few more things to the Gulf. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Francois Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Carol Walters, Interpreter
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 20, 1990, 3:59 - 4:28 p.m.
AND PLACE Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Francois how are you? I am sorry to call you so late.

President Mitterrand: It's fine like this.

The President: These are complicated times.

President Mitterrand: Yes, they are.

The President: I want to make a few remarks and to ask your advice, but first I want you to know how much we appreciated your firm response against Iraq. I am told by our Ambassador at the UN, Tom Pickering, that it looks as if we are within reach of a UN Security Council resolution which would call for the use of force to enforce the embargo. Our lawyers tell me that the existing UN resolutions and the letter from the Amir of Kuwait give us the legal authority we need. But it would help to have a UN resolution as well. I am not sure when the UN Security Council vote will take place because I have been traveling all day, but if it is not too late, any help that the French Ambassador at the UN can give would be welcomed. However, I believe that we do have the authority to stop them and I do not think we can let these two ships continue on their route. This would be the first U.S. use of force in this crisis, but if we let the ships go on, the economic isolation policy under Chapter 7 would unravel.

One final point, and then I would like to hear your views. I am increasingly concerned about the detained Americans. I am now convinced that they are hostages, because the Iraqis have made demands for their release. For my country, we cannot endure another prolonged situation like the one in Iran which lasted 500

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days. We cannot permit the continuing exploitation of these people. Those are my remarks. Now, I would like to hear your views.

President Mitterrand: On the last point, it is evident that your nationals and the others are hostages. Therefore, Iraq is exposing itself to the laws of war. It is not possible for countries with citizens in Iraq to go on for long accepting this situation. Time is critical to the handling of this issue, but are you, or are we, able to act quickly? This is a question that I am asking; I don't know the answer.

The President: We think that the Iraqis have already dispersed many of the people there, at least the Americans. Therefore, we cannot take a single, concentrated action to liberate them. But we do have the means to take action to punish Husayn severely.

President Mitterrand: On the other issue of the UN Security Council resolution regarding the Iraqi ships, it would be (and I am using the conditional) desirable to get a new resolution as soon as possible because this would give the actions a basis in international law.

The President: Yes, I hope that the UN Security Council will do this but, even if not, we will need to take action.

President Mitterrand: Yes, but in any case it would be preferable to have the UN resolution.

The President: Yes, I agree. Therefore, we are closely tracking the two ships that we highly suspect.

President Mitterrand: Where are they now?

The President: One is enroute to Aden in South Yemen. For the other, we don't know its destination. We think that both ships are at least two days from any possible destination. One of them has been moving in and out of Oman's territorial waters. One of the captains says he would like to comply with our demand that he stop, but he has strict orders to continue. The other tanker is low in the water. The captain says he has a ballast of water, but I think we have confirmation that he is carrying petroleum. We have a real problem, however, because stopping this one will require a significant use of force. Since the ship is low in the water, we cannot use the usual technique of shooting out its rudder.

President Mitterrand: You could stop (arraisonner) them though, couldn't you?

The President: Yes, I think they will stop. We believe that their crews are principally Filipinos. I think they will prefer to go home rather than engage in hostilities.

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President Mitterrand: Everything should be done to stop those ships.

The President: On another subject, I have been very impressed with the actions taken by the Turkish President Ozal.

President Mitterrand: Yes.

The President: Ozal has told me that Rafsanjani told a high Turkish official who visited Tehran that, despite the peace settlement with Iraq, he is still supportive of the UN resolutions. Also, I have been impressed by the actions of the USSR. This is a tough problem, but it helps that the Soviets are being so understanding.

President Mitterrand: Yes, this is very important.

The President: I am convinced that we cannot sit forever without taking action. Ozal is optimistic that the economic sanctions are having an effect, but if we wait too long to take action, the situation will get worse.

President Mitterrand: I think like you do.

The President: Let's stay in touch, Francois. I welcome all your views on the policies to follow. We agree regarding the UN Security Council resolution.

President Mitterrand: To end, let me sum up my views.

First, regarding the embargo, we have at least 24 hours to get full international guarantees. If not, we will have to act, but that we will know tomorrow, once a decision is reached at the UN. We must take action because, otherwise, the call for an embargo would be absurd. But we have 24 hours before we need to take military measures.

In contrast, the issue of the hostages is an immediate problem. The taking of hostages is an act of war. France has been through two wars, in 1914 and in 1940. When you go to war, foreign nationals are put into camps and then evacuated gradually. They are never put in dangerous locations, and they are evacuated under international controls. The current situation is one of neither peace nor war. Therefore, we need to clarify the situation as quickly as possible. The use of hostages in war is an act of unacceptable barbarism which we cannot tolerate. Therefore we have the right to take action. This second point is the most urgent.

The President: Yes, but I must tell you frankly that on the ships, we see a course of action that we can take this minute -- whereas on the hostages we do not yet see such a course of action.

President Mitterrand: I understand.

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The President: I don't know what we can do right now unless there would be some benefit from a broad statement by a number of nations making it clear to Saddam Husayn that he will pay a heavy price if he goes beyond a certain point. This might be a possibility.

President Mitterrand: I think a declaration would be useful. You can't be at peace and at the same time take actions that are forbidden under the code of war.

The President: Why don't we reflect on this possibility of a declaration, and then we can consult after the UN Security Council resolution.

President Mitterrand: Yes, and we can talk again tomorrow or the day after.

The President: Yes, that is good. We can stay in touch. Thank you for your views. Our views are very similar.

President Mitterrand: Thank you.

The President: Merci and au revoir.

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