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2009-0275-S

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FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91111
Folder ID Number: 91111-007

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 6/23/90 - 7/31/90

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	6/23/90	(b)(1)	✓
02. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	6/23/90	(b)(1)	✓
03. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (5 pp.)	6/27/90	(b)(1)	✓
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (2 pp.)	6/28/90	(b)(1)	✓
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Luis Alberto Lacalle of Uruguay (2 pp.)	6/28/90	(b)(1)	✓
06. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Rafail Callejas of Honduras (2 pp.)	6/28/90	(b)(1)	✓
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina (2 pp.)	6/28/90	(b)(1)	✓
08. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Wilfried Martens of Belgium (2 pp.)	7/3/90	(b)(1)	✓
09. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Poul Schluter of Denmark (2 pp.)	7/3/90	(b)(1)	✓

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 6/23/90 - 7/31/90

Pinksheet Number: cap942

OA/ID Number: 91111-007

Date Closed: 2/3/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (2 pp.)	7/3/90	(b)(1)	S
11. Telcon	Re: Telecon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (5 pp.)	7/17/90	(b)(1)	S
12. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (5 pp.)	7/17/90	(b)(1)	S
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	7/26/90	(b)(1)	S
14. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	7/28/90	(b)(1)	S
15. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	7/31/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

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Date Closed: 2/3/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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5000 ADD ON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
John Montgomery, Notetaker

DATE, TIME June 23, 1990, 7:36 - 7:42 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call to King Hussein to thank him for his birthday message and to discuss the Middle East Peace process. (C)

The President: Hello, Your Majesty? (U)

King Hussein: Good morning, how are you? (U)

The President: Well, I am all right. I am calling on a couple of matters. The first one is very brief and pleasant. Thank you for your thoughtful birthday greeting. I passed this 66-year old mark. It was a very nice greeting. (U)

King Hussein: Thank you, Mr. President and I hope you have many, many more happy and productive years. (U)

The President: I am very lucky here. I am calling you on your recent call to our Ambassador about the PLO. Our Ambassador sent in a very factual report explaining that this is a matter that complicates your life and that troubles me very much. I wanted to tell you from our standpoint, given the predicament that it started, it was very difficult to continue status quo. I had to go forward to let the PLO know they must reiterate their position that Arafat opposes this terrorism against another country. Let me make two points. We have not cut off the dialogue; we have suspended it. We now have to move forward and push Israel to meet with a Palestinian delegation that includes deportees and people tied to Jerusalem. You have seen the row about our position on settlements. We are not going to change our policy. We also hope that the Palestinians will not reject out of hand meeting with the Israelis and turn to violence. I don't know if

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there is anything you can do on that score. I understand we are entering a difficult period of time. Any thoughts and suggestions you may have would be appreciated and please send them along. Your views on these decisions and your help will be appreciated. We are weighing it here. I don't think the Israeli's are happy with our approach. We need minimum reassurance from Arafat. (C)

King Hussein: Thank you very much, indeed. We very much appreciate your call. I will try to write you right away sir about my ideas on peace in this area in a great period of difficulty. There is much anger and it is very, very difficult and frustrating. (C)

The President: I would appreciate such a personal message. We are trying with Israel to get talks going. I sent Shamir a very long message. I asked him for clarification of where the peace process stands. We are also pushing for a decision from Arafat. We have not been overly successful. We were pursuing Jim Baker's proposals to move the process forward and then this stupid terrorist raid. (C)

King Hussein: Yes, there are extremists on both sides that you can't control. There have been warnings from the beginning of extremists on both sides who want to disrupt the process. (C)

The President: I know that this step may be playing into the hands of the extremists. I now need some help and advice. The U.S. position greatly depends on a statement Arafat makes on terrorism. I want to get back in business with them. I don't want to end all talks. I just want to suspend them. If Arafat rejects terrorism and meets the other requirements on which the dialogue was based, I will resume dialogue. Arafat needs to give me minimum reassurance. Please send me your thoughts. (C)

King Hussein: OK, I will do that right away. (U)

The President: I hope this suspension does not get between the U.S. and Jordan. I will do my best to get back on track with the peace process. Give my bestfelt wishes to Queen Noor. (U)

King Hussein: The best to you and Barbara. (U)

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4999 ADD ON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak
of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
John Montgomery, Notetaker

DATE, TIME June 23, 1990, 8:10 - 8:16 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President telephoned President Mubarak to discuss the Middle East Peace process. (U)

The President: Hello, Hosni? (U)

President Mubarak: Hi, George, how are you? (U)

The President: All right. I am calling you on the recent difficulty and wanted to talk to you about a minute if you have a minute here. We heard from Frank Wisner about your concern and disappointment and let me start by saying I do understand this. I hope you know, given the history, I could not act otherwise as the talks are predicated on a renouncement of terrorism. I left the door open by not ending the talks, but just suspending them. I am willing to resume talks if Arafat and the National Council do what we asked. It has to happen. Arafat must simply say this attack is not good and here's the action taken to do something about it. Having left it at that, I hope the Palestinians will not reject out of hand talking to Israel and turn to violence. I just don't know where to go. Please send me your personal update giving me your frankest feelings. I just now talked with King Hussein on these complicated things. I want to find a way to press forward with the Baker plan. I want to keep relations with Egypt on track. I know I made your life more difficult. I appreciate your willingness to be involved and being a voice of reason. I made a difficult decision. I waited, and waited, and waited for Arafat to renounce the attack. I hope to continue the peace process and find a way to get it moving forward. (U)

President Mubarak: I don't want you to take the statements on the talks personally. I realize your difficult situation. I also am keen on the peace process. I will send my Foreign Minister with my thoughts on what to do next. (U)

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The President: I will be glad to see Meguid. I will tell Jim Baker who gets back today. I just wanted you to know I know this had made things difficult for you. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Yes. There is much going on. I have contacted the PLO. Good things are coming ahead. (Ø)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Mubarak: If somebody could condemn the attack on the Palistinian the process would not suffer. (Ø)

The President: We could work on something like that. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Meguid will be coming on Tuesday and Al Baz will be with him. (U)

The President: All right. I appreciate the phone call. (U)

President Mubarak: My best wishes to you. (U)

The President: Same to your family. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
F. W. de Klerk of South Africa (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
F. W. de Klerk, President of South Africa
Notetaker: John M. Ordway

DATE, TIME June 27, 1990, 9:00 - 9:24 a.m.
AND PLACE: White House Situation Room

The President telephoned President de Klerk concerning the Mandela Visit.

The President: Hello. (U)

President de Klerk: Good afternoon, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good morning, Mr. President. It's nice to talk to you. (U)

President de Klerk: It's good to hear your voice again. (U)

The President: I wanted to call to let you know about my meeting with Mr. Mandela. First, though, I want to say I appreciate the thoughts you expressed in your letter on my meeting with Mandela. I will send a written response shortly. But I wanted to take this opportunity now to let you know how it went. (Ø)

President de Klerk: Thank you very much for that. I would appreciate first-hand information. (Ø)

The President: I noted with interest and was struck by the number of times Mandela went out of his way in his talks with me and my people to support you and your efforts. Much of our discussion was private with me. But also in our other larger meeting and with me and our top people at lunch, we were very pleased that he seemed to speak highly of you. He constantly returned to the theme that you are a man of honor that could be trusted, and could work actively to get support among the blacks and whites of South Africa. He particularly felt your visit to the States would be of great help to all concerned, and should happen soon. (Ø)

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President de Klerk: In your future communications with them, directly and indirectly I think this is a matter which needs emphasizing in terms of your legislation. I believe that this stand has a policy bearing, both positive and negative for how you, as a government, handle sanctions against South Africa. (Ø)

The President: I may not have raised it in the sense of an alliance with the South African Communist Party. I raised it more in terms of worldwide communism. (Ø)

President de Klerk: Well, the percentages differ from time to time but at the last check 50% - 80% of the National Executive Committee of the ANC were full members of the South African Communist Party which is a telling fact. There is good reason to believe that the Communist Party has a strangle hold on policy making. (Ø)

The President: I did not know that, and that fact would not be well received in this country. (Ø)

On negotiations, the ANC position was confusing since they seem to favor an interim government during the negotiating process. We had very lively discussions on this. Jim Baker took them on. (Ø)

On sanctions there was some confusion. When he came he talked about stepping them up. I told him we were not interested in that. Instead, I said I hoped that we could lighten them up when the conditions of our law were met. (Ø)

President de Klerk: I would say congratulations to you that you got him to get down from stepping them up. (Ø)

The President: He reiterated if the United States reduced sanction this would play into the hands of some of your political opponents, who would see you as being controlled by the US and the UK. He made that point twice. Did he ever talk to you about that? (Ø)

President de Klerk: No, he did not. It is not a very valid argument. The use of sanctions by the right wing is quite the opposite. In fact, I could find it quite useful as an argument to show we are on the right track. What I would agree with is that if this were interpreted as a method to interfere in the internal affairs of South Africa, yes. But, with respect, I would say that sanctions were an interference. The lifting would be a withdrawal from interfering in our affairs. I could handle that quite well. Relief from sanctions would be accepted very positively, as proof that the initiatives I have taken are the right ones. (Ø)

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I hope you will come here. I was embarrassed by comments here, in the press, about who should come here first. You are President of the country. It would be useful for you to come here, and he and I agreed on that. Perhaps with these visit out of the way, if it fits in with your schedule. I just wanted to let you know that the invitation still stands. (Ø)

President de Klerk: I am looking at the agenda. I have been out of South Africa for quite a while, with my trip to Europe. The tempo is kind of fast at the moment. I have to space overseas visits so as not to create within South Africa an appearance of concentrating on international relations. We have to take a balanced approach, particularly while there is such a dynamic situation here at home. I'll take note. Thank you very much, and let me reiterate that I am anxious to take it up. We will start negotiations through normal channels. (Ø)

May I return to one point. Your said there was a lot of emphasis on interim government. I would appreciate it if you could inform me of the discussion on an interim government. And also, did he raise the question of a constituent assembly? Because these two matters are a problem for us, since it brings into play the sovereignty of South Africa. (Ø)

The President: That was raised, but very indirectly. I was confused by that, but let me ask Brent Scowcroft or Secretary Baker to send you a cable on what was agreed to, on what the man was saying. I must confess I was confused. It was not dwelled on, but I would prefer to let Brent Scowcroft convey to you a cable with our collective thinking. There may have been conversations at the State Department or with other members of the National Security Council that will clarify the confusion I have in my mind. (Ø)

President de Klerk: That would most useful. I appreciate that. It will be most useful, and we will then furnish to you our views on that. That, not sanctions, is going to become the crucial issue in times ahead. On receipt of your cable, I will convey our viewpoints in this regard, emphasizing our view on those two crucial points which will be the subject of great debate in the months ahead. (Ø)

The President: There seems to be some differences between Mbeki and Mandela but let Scowcroft pull it together. To be honest, it was quite confusing. But I will be watching. (Ø)

It was nice talking to you. I hope the visit is now in better perspective. My respects to you for what you are trying to do. Please stay in touch. (U)

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KAIFU

JUNE 27 - KAIFU CALLED PRESIDENT AT 0941 -
CALL TERMINATED 0948. MONITORED BY KARL
JACKSON

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Add On

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
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2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Fernando Collor de Mello
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME June 28, 1990, 8:06 - 8:10 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Señor Presidente, como está? (U)

President Collor: Very well, and you? (U)

The President: I'm fine, thank you. What can I do for you? (U)

President Collor: I was very glad and received with much
enthusiasm the measures you announced yesterday. (U)

The President: Now we have to follow up to make certain that
they produce results. (U)

President Collor: I remember in our last meeting at the White
House that you told me you would construct a "Bush Plan," not
just a "Brady Plan" for Latin America. Yesterday you gave to us
many instruments to be more hopeful for the future. (U)

The program you announced is comprehensive, innovative, and bold.
The program goes in the same directions that we are going in
Brazil to put our economic policies in the free market. I'm very
satisfied with the program. (U)

The President: Thank you so very much. Our people will be
following up. I appreciate very much this phone call. (U)

On another subject. I wanted to commiserate with you over
Brazil's World Cup soccer loss. Our team got clobbered early on,
but I know Brazil is in a different category and that you take
this game seriously. But as we say, "There always next year."
(U)

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President Collor: As you know, the U.S. will be the host in 1994. (U)

The President: I hope we will see more emphasis on soccer, or football as you call it before then. I know there will be a hospitable environment and we're looking forward to hosting it. (U)

We will work hard to make this program work. If you like, I'll see that more details get to you through our Ambassador. (U)

President Collor: We will do it. I'm very grateful for your program. We will continue here in Brazil in improving our relationship. I'm sure we will construct a new Latin America with you as President. (U)

The President: Thank you very much for your thoughtfulness. Good luck to you and my love to your family. (U)

President Collor: Good-bye, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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2000-0429-F
Jr 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Luis Alberto Lacalle of Uruguay (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Luis Alberto Lacalle
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME June 28, 1990, 8:28 - 8:33 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Señor Presidente, como está? (U)

President Lacalle: Very well, Mr. President. (U)

The President: How nice of you to call. (U)

President Lacalle: I wanted to tell you that we are so enthusiastic about your initiative. I decided to telephone you, because I thought a telegram would be cold. (U)

The President: It's very nice of you to call. I hope when all the details are put in place, it will help our hemisphere. (U)

President Lacalle: It is a very bold and important initiative. You've put things in the right direction, especially when you said that the U.S. would not overlook this hemisphere. (U)

The President: I'm glad you noticed that because I've had questions from many people in Latin America about us shifting our interest to Europe. I wanted to send a clear message to our hemisphere, as well as to Europe. I'm glad you picked up on this point. We realize this is important. (U)

President Lacalle: The message is loud and clear, Mr. President. (U)

The President: We'll follow up with the European people as best we can. You know that the Europeans are on me all the time to help Eastern Europe. I'm going to keep after them to give attention to the very important events taking place in our hemisphere. (U)

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President Lacalle: On the perspective of your trip, it is good to prepare the climate. In this regard, I only yesterday sent you a letter putting into perspective our ideas about it and what could be accomplished in Uruguay. You will be receiving it soon. (P)

The President: I look forward to seeing it. General Scowcroft is here with me, and he will be alert to get it. We will see that he and the Secretary of State have the opportunity to study it. (P)

President Lacalle: I was sending the letter yesterday, when you were making your speech. It was a providential thing. (P)

The President: It is very thoughtful of you to call and I appreciate your thoughts. (U)

President Lacalle: I thought it was more personal than a telegram. (U)

The President: Best respects to your and your family. (U)

President Lacalle: I'm looking forward to September. (U)

The President: So am I. So am I. (U)

President Lacalle: Good-bye, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Add On

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Rafael Callejas of Honduras (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Rafael Callejas
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli
William T. Pryce

DATE, TIME June 28, 1990, 4:33 - 4:36 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Callejas: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

President Callejas: Oh, fine. Very happy. (U)

The President: I was so glad to hear from you. How are you?
(U)

President Callejas: I was very pleased to hear about your economic initiative for Latin America. I was going to sit down and write you a letter, but decided to express myself personally to you. (U)

The President: I am so glad that you decided to call. I am hopeful that it will be helpful to Honduras and to the other countries as well. The reaction so far has been good. But I am delighted to hear from you. (U)

President Callejas: I was very happy with my meeting with Secretary Baker in Guatemala. I watched your speech on television and was very impressed. We are very hopeful and confident that in the long term it will provide us relief. (U)

The President: Well, we'll have results in the long term. And we hope that it will bring short-term relief as well, including to your country, Honduras. (U)

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President Callejas: Well, thank you very much. We are very confident in your leadership. And we are so pleased that you came through with the bridge loan. Honduras has a new perspective on economic issues now and we appreciate your government's support. (P)

The President: That was very kind of you to say that. How is the problem with outside forces in Honduras? Are the Contras still a problem? (P)

President Callejas: No. That is outside of our perspective now. We are working on economic problems. We are going ahead slowly but I think we will come out with good results possibly over the next 36 to 48 months. (P)

The President: Good. [Few words not heard.] I appreciate hearing from you and thank you for the call. (U)

President Callejas: [Few words not heard.] (U)

The President: Thanks a lot. You are a very thoughtful guy. Good luck and good-bye. (P)

President Callejas: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
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2000-0429-F
31 08/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Carlos Saúl Menem of Argentina (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Carlos Saúl Menem
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME June 28, 1990, 5:08 - 5:12 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Menem: Hello. (U)

The President: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Menem: Very well. I send you a strong abrazo and my greetings to your wife. (U)

The President: She just left here. But she heard you were calling and sends you her best. (U)

President Menem: Thank you. I want to greet and congratulate you for the speech you gave yesterday to the Ambassadors of the Americas. Regarding a free trade area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, this encourages us to continue our efforts toward continental integration. (U)

When you come down in September we'll discuss this more in depth.

The President: I appreciate your phone call, and look forward to seeing you in September. (U)

President Menem: We do also. The government and people of Argentina are waiting for you with open arms and thank you. Many thanks for turning your eyes to the Americas. (U)

The President: We can't forget our own neighbors in this Hemisphere. I appreciate your kind words. I understand you are having a birthday soon. (U)

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President Menem: Many thanks. Monday is my birthday. I value this greeting from you very much. (Ø)

The President: Well, that's great. You're still a young guy. I wish I were as young as you are. (Ø)

President Menem: You carry your years better than I do. (Ø)

The President: I don't know about that. I'm off tomorrow for the seaside to finish my briefings for the NATO Summit and the Houston Summit. (U)

President Menem: I wish you, dear George, the best success. You can count on our support and collaboration. I wish you the best of success. (U)

The President: Thanks a million for this phone call, and I look forward to seeing you in September. Good-bye. (U)

President Menem: Good-bye, good night, and good luck. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MANDELA

JUN 30 - ANC LEADER NELSON MANDELA CALLED THE
PRESIDENT FROM SAN FRANCISCO AT 2010 - CALL
TERMINATED AT 2015 - PRESIDENT AT KENNEBUNKPORT -
JOHN ORDWAY MONITORED.

JULY 1990

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2000-0429-F
31 08/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Wilfried Martens
of Belgium.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Wilfried Martens
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME July 3, 1990, 8:44 a.m.-8:51 a.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President: Wilfried, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Martens: Fine, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I'm up in Maine at my house by the sea. I'll be coming to London tomorrow night and thought I should call to make some observations on the Summit. (S)

I hope you received my letter which presents some ideas on making the Summit a success. We tried to draw on thinking from around the alliance. The Summit comes at a turning point in the history of the alliance. Now is the time for us to show that NATO will play its part in shaping the new Europe. There is a lot of interest in the declaration. The Summit will be important for the Soviets. Gorbachev is trying to decide about the concept of Germany in NATO. It will be important also for the East European leaders who are deciding whether NATO is an exclusive club or something that is good for all Europe. (S)

The Summit will also be critical for our publics. I'm a believer in NATO and think we should stay on the continent. I do worry about the future, though, and want to shape a new NATO to keep us there. Some of the proposals are controversial. I want to show that NATO is ready to adapt. (S)

Prime Minister Martens: I think this is a crucial moment. I favor an important document. Perhaps we could strengthen the role of the community in the document. That would be my sole observation. (S)

The President: I know that some will have problems with this or that point. We can't start peeling away everything or we'll be

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in trouble. We have got to show that the alliance can adapt. We will need strong allied support for a strong declaration. I would appeal to you that we keep adjustments to a minimum. I don't want a watered-down declaration. (S)

I mentioned the Soviets a moment ago. We are watching the party congress on television--it looks like Gorbachev is having a tough time. Shevardnadze told Jim Baker recently four times how important the NATO Summit will be to Moscow. I also had a good chat with Gorbachev on this at Camp David when he was here. So, I hope we can stay together and show a broad definition of NATO. I think that would help the Soviets acquiesce in a unified Germany in NATO. (S)

Prime Minister Martens: I agree on a strong document. I agree Germany should be in NATO. Your document could give confidence to Gorbachev and I hope the result is that Germany will be in NATO. (S)

The President: I also feel confident. There are a lot of bumps in the road but we'll get there. I wanted to touch base with you today personally on this. (S)

When are you going to London? (U)

Prime Minister Martens: I am going to Luxembourg tomorrow and to London tomorrow night. (S)

The President: I look forward to seeing you. I had no special agenda in calling. I just wanted to touch base. It's good we are on the same wavelength. Okay, see you on Thursday. (S)

Prime Minister Martens: See you Thursday or Wednesday night? (S)

The President: Thursday morning. (U)

Prime Minister Martens: Thursday. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

Prime Minister Martens: Good-bye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Poul Schluter of Denmark

Participants: The President
Prime Minister Poul Schluter
Nicholas Burns, NSC staff (notetaker)

Date, Time July 3, 1990, 10:52 a.m.-10:57 a.m.
and Place Kennebunkport

The President: Hello Poul. How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Schluter: Hello, George. I've just been golfing but I'm afraid it wasn't the best day for me. (U)

The President: I've been having a few bad days on the links myself. I'm here in Maine at my house and wanted to touch base with you before the London Summit. (S)

First, I think it will be an important Summit and a real turning point for the alliance. Now is the time for us to show that NATO will play its part in shaping the new Europe. It's a chance for NATO to adapt. Without NATO, it is hard to visualize a role for the U.S. to provide stability in Europe. We view NATO with a redefined posture, and with Germany in it. That is essential. (S)

Prime Minister Schluter: I totally agree. I read your letter. The basic philosophy is completely in accord with what I would like it to be. (S)

The President: It is important that our publics see NATO as adapting to new realities. I don't think our declaration will be viewed as a bombshell, but it will show the changes people are looking for, that NATO is willing to adapt. We will need strong allied support to achieve a strong declaration. I hope we can keep adjustments to a minimum to avoid a watered-down document. (S)

Prime Minister Schluter: This declaration must be different from the ordinary. We have seen drama in Europe and NATO must respond to it. NATO must stay and play a different role. It must change in a more political direction. (S)

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The President: I am delighted, but not surprised, that we're on the same wavelength. (S)

Prime Minister Schlueter: We, the leaders, must take care we don't get too much involved in the detail on the wording of the declaration. We should leave that to the ministers. (S)

The President: I, too, am concerned about this. I'll make sure Secretary Baker know of this. I wanted to touch base. I leave from here tomorrow. When will you be leaving. (S)

Prime Minister Schlueter: I'll be at the Rebuild Festival on the 4th of July. I'll give a speech as will the American actor, Richard Chamberlain. You remember him from Shogun and other films. We'll fly directly from there to London and to see you. (S)

The President: How is the Queen, her Majesty? (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: She is fine. She is a fantastic personality. She's really great. (U)

The President: She's supportive of you, I hope. (S)

Prime Minister Schlueter: You can be sure. (S)

The President: Great. I look forward to seeing you. (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME July 3, 1990, 1:28 p.m.-1:35 p.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

Prime Minister Lubbers: This is Ruud speaking. (U)

The President: Ruud, how are you? It's nice to hear your voice. I am looking forward to seeing you in person soon. I'm making a few calls today before the Summit. The big thing from our standpoint is that we demonstrate that this Summit comes at a turning point in alliance history and will have an important role in shaping the future of Europe. Our paper was worked out with that in mind. (S)

The Summit will also be crucial for the Soviets. They will have to see something to agree with to go along with Germany in NATO. We tried to make it possible for them to see changes. And for the U.S., we need a reason to remain as a stabilizing influence in Europe. That is the background. Some of our proposals may be seen as bold or controversial. But we thought we needed those kinds of proposals. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I've read the document. We Dutch agree fully with it. If I think of possible objections from other countries, the French will be the most difficult. The multinational unit is excellent to me. But the French will find it hard to go along with one commander. As you know, they have wanted to preserve their autonomy. But I think a solution can be worked out. (S)

The President: I've not talked to Francois Mitterrand. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Me neither. The French have also always objected to what we call forward defense. Now that we have changed that policy, the French will see the change as a plus. (S)

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The President: That's interesting. I hadn't thought of it that way. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: The French will select that as positive on strategy. It would be useful if they did not make problems on the other aspects of the document. Besides that, some countries may have difficulty with the speed of the changes. At NATO headquarters, the Ambassadors made a document which was not very good. So, there could be some problems there from those people. (S)

I don't know if you have heard that Manfred Woerner asked Hans van den Broek to preside over a committee to review the last details on the declaration. (S)

The President: That's good, right? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Some of the countries have not had a chance to discuss it with each other for security reasons and because they just got the text. So, Woerner asked van den Broek to preside over a meeting of foreign ministers on the text. van den Broek has just spoken to Jim Baker on his plane so that is good. (S)

The President: That is good and could iron out any difficulties. I just talked to Jim Baker yesterday, and he didn't mention it. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: No, Woerner just called van den Broek this morning to ask him to do it. (S)

The President: Okay, Ruud. I look forward to seeing you, my friend. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Right. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl
of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns,
NSC Staff

DATE, TIME July 17, 1990, 8:48-9:17 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: Hello. (U)

The President: Helmut, congratulations to you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. I wanted to call you immediately late last night. Do you have time to discuss my trip for a few minutes? (Ø)

The President: Yes, I do. I am very anxious to hear what happened over there. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: George, first of all, Gorbachev is in excellent shape. He has managed to get through the hard work at the party congress. I think his success there gave him a push. The situation is also extraordinarily difficult for him. Legally speaking, he has tremendous powers and some of his opponents blamed him for this at the Party congress. (Ø)

The President: Helmut, the translation is fading out. Perhaps your interpreter could get closer to the phone. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Perhaps we should have had a test call. (U)

The President: I can hear her loud and clear now. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, our interpreter is a charming lady, more charming than myself. (U)

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The President: I'm glad you haven't changed, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Gorbachev is aware of his special situation and of his responsibilities. And he is aware he has to act quickly, to get through pluralism, to change society, and to get through the necessary legislation by the end of this year. And I told him to be aware that there would be no chance to receive Western aid if he doesn't get these reforms through. He said he understood this, and I also told him he can't expect to continue beyond the DM five billion credit given by us without reforms. I also think the people surrounding him are aware of this. (S)

My impression is that we cannot exclude a change in his staff. (S)

The President: Oh, really. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm speaking about his economic people, not his foreign policy advisors. But he is dissatisfied with his economic people and some of the advice he has been getting. In my presence he told Ryzhkov that they had to get going by September and to use the governmental apparatus to get the party to withdraw from the day-to-day running of the economy (translator faded out). He said he would make greater use of the powers of his state office. (S)

One aspect that was interesting to me was -- and we also discussed this extensively -- to see his determination to pursue the modernization of his country. (S)

He said something I had never heard before. He told me his grandfather was tortured and imprisoned under Stalin. His wife said her grandfather was liquidated under Stalin--remarkable. (S)

He was very happy to talk about President Bush. He mentioned you in warm and friendly terms. (S)

We established excellent contacts this time, after his visit to Bonn last year. I do believe the situation has changed. (S)

I also told him about problems with the U.S. on Cuba (translator faded out). (S)

The President: Helmut, could you please repeat what you said on Cuba. I couldn't catch it. (S)

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Chancellor Kohl: I indicated these questions had to be settled. He said we would have to wait and see. I told him if he wants to improve relations with the U.S., he would have to change his policy on Cuba. He didn't shirk the issue but he didn't say he would do something soon. I think he realizes that Cuba is important for the U.S. and for George Bush and that there is a connection to U.S. assistance. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We talked about the London Summit and Gorbachev acknowledged the importance of the Declaration. He wants to see Vienna II follow immediately after Vienna I. As for Central and Eastern Europe, he seems to be preoccupied with the USSR and seems to have little interest in the situation of some of his colleagues. He has a fatalistic attitude about Romania. On Poland, one thing is obvious--he doesn't want to see the Poles cause problems between the two Germanys. He spoke about this when we were with Shevardnadze. Our discussion was not different than the U.S. position that the border issue must be clearly resolved but that no further difficulties should arise beyond this issue. (S)

On German issues, we had a one-on-one. After many hours, we made clear progress. The first point in his position was that he recognized there would be German elections by the end of the year. He also said that German sovereignty should be returned completely and unequivocally. I used your formula from Camp David that a sovereign country, under the CSCE, can decide for itself its alliances. And I explained that the Germans would vote unequivocally for NATO, including articles five and six. I told him he had to exert strong pressure on his staff on this issue. He took that position as obvious. (S)

We then discussed the treaty between the unified Germany and the USSR on troops. He accepted, although his staff had a different schedule, a period of three to four years. This was agreed between us. We also agreed that pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the GDR, no NATO troops would be stationed there, although German troops not belonging to NATO could be there. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in three to four years, only German NATO troops could be stationed there. (S)

Then I said, and this surprised him because we hadn't discussed it before, that I intended to propose to the U.S. and the U.K. a new basis for relations between us in treaties that would terminate four power rights, and maintain their troops in Berlin until the withdrawal of Soviet troops. I said this would be important for psychological reasons, and very helpful to the German people. (S)

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On troop ceilings, I told him clearly that Soviet figures were unacceptable, and that on the basis of our tradition of twelve-month conscription, we would have to have 370,000 troops. (S)

On economics, we now have to negotiate issues pending from the treaties between the USSR and the GDR. This is a very important issue, but we have not yet reached any agreement. (S)

One final point, I told him it was in our interest, because we have linked this and have no intention of giving up our NATO membership, to develop a reasonable relationship with the USSR over the long-run. We intend to conclude a comprehensive treaty governing all aspects of our relations, but this can only be done after unification. (S)

One other interesting thing: we talked about German-U.S. relations in our one-on-one. I told him this relationship was of great importance. And I told him that if the Soviets try to undermine it, this would affect German relations with the USSR. His reply will be of interest to you. He said they had learned a lesson that it was wrong to try to make the U.S. withdraw from Europe, and that they hadn't succeeded in this in the past. I touched upon this repeatedly, and I think he was serious in his reply. We talked about improving our economic relationship, but he knows good relations will prosper only if the U.S.-German relationship continues. (S)

Finally, his impression on me is a man who knows himself well, and who has a sense of self-irony. He has burned all his bridges behind him. He can't go back, and he must be successful. (S)

The reaction of the population in Stavropol--his turf-- was good. The people were not ordered to be there, but they applauded him. These simple people seem to be aware of the need to open up the USSR. (S)

We visited that region where there were many battles in World War Two. We met veterans with decorations on their lapels. But the general mood was toward compromise. (S)

A final point. I said in the press conference that, without our friends, we could not have experienced this day--that is the U.S. and you, Mr. President, in your performance in the past few months. (S)

Before you called today, I was speaking to a friend. I said we must bear in mind that the first Soviet soldiers reached the border of the German Reich in November 1944, and that Soviet troops could finally withdraw from Germany by November 1994, exactly fifty years, a half century, after they first came. This gives you an idea of our feelings. (S)

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The President: That was very moving, Helmut. Thanks for the report. I may get back to you with some questions. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Of course. (U)

The President: The only question I have now is the question of parallel withdrawal of forces. I hope there won't be an effort to equate U.S. forces in Europe and Soviet forces which could cause our troops to be pulled out at the same time. That would be bad for NATO. This question concerns me and the timeframe could allow the Soviets to build public opinion to get our forces out. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, this issue didn't play any part whatsoever, nor did Gorbachev mention it. I mentioned it and said I took for granted that U.S. forces would remain in Germany. He didn't refute this. (S)

The President: Congratulations. We welcome your leadership and the outcome. We are proud of you. It was a stimulating performance which we watched with great interest. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Give my love to Barbara. (U)

The President: The same to Hannelore. Thanks for the full report. I will talk to Gorbachev about the Houston Summit to give a formal Chairman's report. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, he told me about the call. Good, I told him I would call you. Give him my best regards. (U)

The President: Good-bye and thank you. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of
the Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME July 17, 1990, 9:26-10:06 a.m.

AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Gorbachev: Hello. Good afternoon, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good afternoon, or good morning from here.
Congratulations on the success of the Kohl visit. (U)

President Gorbachev: Thank you. (U)

The President: As a matter of fact, I just talked to Chancellor Kohl and he is pleased. He thinks the agreements you reached are good not just for Soviet-German relations, but for U.S.-Soviet relations too. Needless to say, we are pleased with your comments that a unified Germany has the right to choose its alliance membership. This showed great statesmanship on your part, and we feel good about it. I hope we can make similar progress on CFE and on START in the months ahead. (S)

But the main purpose of my call, as Chair of the Houston G-7 Summit, is to give you a brief report on that meeting. I will follow-up in writing. I also know that Kohl discussed this issue with you, too. (S)

President Gorbachev: Thank you. (U)

The President: I hope you noticed from our communique that we all stressed our willingness to help the Soviet Union, but that perestroika will depend on the success of your reforms. So, we tried to include positive language on that and hope you noted it. We made the point that western technical assistance should be provided now, which is something you mentioned in your letter to me. I think the U.S. can play an important role here. I hope we can get our people together so that we can intensify this technical cooperation. (S)

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We have in mind focussing on one particular area where we could work together--on transportation and food distribution. We could perhaps work together in that area. As you know, we have legal obstacles in providing credits, but we did agree that some of the western countries could provide credits now to the Soviet Union.

(S)

The communique called for asking the IMF to convene a study with the World Bank, the OECD and the EBRD on the Soviet economy, if that would be welcomed by you, and to make recommendations on how our assistance could be most helpful to your reforms. All the Houston participants agreed we wanted the Summit to give momentum to assistance to the USSR and to your own reform efforts. (S)

So, it is our collective view that the Houston and London summits should make clear to public opinion everywhere that the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is over, and that, working together, we'll make a peaceful post-war world. Now if you have a minute more, I would like to tie this in to the NATO Summit. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes. I agree. (U)

The President: I know you already received my message. I was gratified by your and Shevardnadze's comments on the actions taken in London. I remember your telling me when you were here in Washington that you would be watching the outcome of the NATO Summit. I hope you have seen the transformation of the NATO Alliance, and hope that is the way it was read in the Soviet Union. (S)

So, what we tried to do was to take account of your concerns expressed to me and others, and we did it in the following ways: by our joint declaration on non-aggression; in our invitation to you to come to NATO; in our agreement to open NATO to regular diplomatic contact with your government and those of the Eastern European countries; and our offer on assurances on the future size of the armed forces of a united Germany--an issue I know you discussed with Helmut Kohl. We also fundamentally changed our military approach on conventional and nuclear forces. We conveyed the idea of an expanded, stronger CSCE with new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe. (S)

We tried to shift the emphasis in the document to envisioning a Europe in which no power feels isolated. You know my view that NATO is a stabilizing force, especially with a unified Germany not isolated but as a full member. So what I tried to do there, and in our talks, and in my previous talks with Akhromeyev, was to show an Alliance adapting to new realities and not a threat to anyone. I should also mention that the paper from which NATO worked was a U.S. paper, and I am proud of my colleagues for this U.S. role. I hope that you can study it and that we can discuss it. (S)

So, may I make two points in conclusion? As a politician, I watched with awe and respect the way you concluded and handled the party Congress. In Houston, we were supposed to be working on economic matters, but all of us watched with fascination your efforts to move on political and economic reform with perestroika. It is fair to say that all of us want you to succeed. (S)

And a last point on economic matters. To coin a phrase, I don't want the Soviet people licking sugar through a glass. We have some constraints but we do want to help. I really mean that. I want you to get the benefit of the reform process. I think you know what I mean about licking sugar through a glass. That's my report. (S)

President Gorbachev: Thank you, Mr. President. I thank you for what you have said. I will give a short response. (U)

I would start with an issue you mentioned in the latter part of your talk-- the results of the party Congress. I believe that through reasons you understand that the Communist Party remains a powerful political organization. Its position and actions will largely determine the course of events in our country. And it is only natural given the new situation and the period we are going through that the Communist Party has renounced its monopoly on power. New parties will emerge and new political public organizations will be created. (S)

And my task, and that of my close colleagues on perestroika, was that this position taken by the Communist Party be more in line with the aims we have set in these reforms. At the moment, we have reached a stage when we are about to embark on major reforms on the economy and on a new federation between the republics. I have in mind new relations with the republics on economics and other matters. (S)

I have to say, all-in-all, it was not an easy period for me. They were not easy days and nights. It was perhaps the most difficult and important period in my political life, but we have now achieved the tasks we set for ourselves. (S)

And as a result of this, we now have a profound understanding in the party and in society of the need to have new, major changes. The most important aspect is that we create a social environment to undertake these reforms. (S)

And I am also relating this to the results of the Houston meeting and the things you have just said. That is to say, we have to have ready by the end of the summer and early fall, a broadly defined program for transition to a market economy which could be begun as early as January 1, 1991. We'll have to make great efforts and perhaps in this sense we count on your cooperation. (S)

There are two schools of thought. The one more current in the U.S. is that the less help given the Soviets, the better they will be able to carry out reforms. The other, to which we subscribe, is that if we have enough resources, including financial resources at this important stage in the development of a market economy,-- enough resources, then we could move to a market economy. If we find we do not have enough resources and financial reserves, we will have to rely more on state-regulated measures. But I believe the second school of thought is more reasonable and substantiated. In this respect, I greet the positive tone of Houston under your Chairmanship. (S)

Let me also say some words on the Kohl visit. We managed to bring our points of view closer together. And, in fact, the results take into consideration our common interests--of Germany, yours and ours. I believe that without the meeting in Washington and at Camp David, without the results of the NATO Summit and the London Declaration, without the major work in my conversation with Kohl and your talks with Kohl, without the activities of our foreign economic agencies, without this real political action it would have been difficult to arrive at the proximity in our points of view. We achieved all this because we understood each other's position. We tried to take into account each other's views. I consider the results of my conversation with Kohl to be quite positive. (S)

I hope that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Baker will discuss specifically this particular subject. I believe they will discuss these specific points which are best not discussed in this phone conversation. If these agreements are respected, we could achieve positive results. (S)

That is all I wanted to add. I agree with you that the development of this process make us hopeful that positive results will be achieved in Vienna and on the CSCE process and that there are good prospects for the CSCE meeting we have discussed. (S)

And in conclusion, let me say I am glad to hear the voice of George Bush over the phone. Our conversation makes me hopeful for the future. (S)

The President: Let's stay in touch. Congratulations with your agreement. I'll tell the press we had a constructive discussion about the Houston and NATO Summits. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes. I think we can do this in a short way--these two topics. (U)

The President: All right, sir. Let's do it and it is nice to speak to you. (U)

President Gorbachev: All the best, Mr. President. Good-bye. (U)

The President: My best to Raisa. (U)

President Gorbachev: Also, my best to Barbara. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6024

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Robert L. Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME July 26, 1990, 7:24 - 7:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: It is good to hear your voice. How is your health? (U)

President Ozal: It is good. I am fine. I saw you running on television a few days ago. (U)

The President: I am calling because I had a good talk with Dick Cheney and wanted to tell you about the U.S.-Greece Bases Agreement. As you know, we signed the agreement on July 8 and the Greek Parliament voted to ratify it on July 24. I am convinced it is a good agreement for both the U.S. and for Greece. But I understand, and Dick told me, that there are some in your government who somehow think it contains an anti-Turkish clause, or is in some way aimed against Turkey. I just want to tell you as a friend, and as the President, to set the record straight and make it unmistakably clear that the Bases Agreement does not contain any security assurance against Turkey, direct or indirect. (Ø)

I know you personally have been restrained, but I hope you will be able to use what I have just told you to convince some of your government officials and your public that the United States would never contemplate some kind of anti-Turkish agreement. As Dick Cheney told you, and everyone else he saw during his recent visit, Turkey is too good a friend and too important an ally for us to ever contemplate doing anything to harm our relations.

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Look, we don't want to put ourselves into the position of choosing sides between allies. We will do whatever we can to promote a peaceful settlement of the problems between Turkey and Greece. (U)

I hope we can get this issue behind us and concentrate on our own bilateral relationship. And lastly, I know that we've had a few hurdles during the past year. I think we ought to put our efforts into strengthening our friendship and our alliance. As you said on July 17, NATO has not disappeared and should not in the future. The Soviet Union is still strong, right there next door, and I remain convinced that Turkey still has a key role to play in NATO and in assuring stability. So, I am calling just to assure you, knowing you have problems out there. (U)

President Ozal: Mr. President, I have no doubt there was no intention in that regard. What happened was that there were Greek claims, and reports in Greek newspapers, that put pressure on our side. I accept what you told me. I wonder if you could put those assurances in writing in a letter to me. (U)

The President: Okay, I'll get that off in a couple of days, repeating what I told you just now. (U)

President Ozal: Do you have any news on the Persian Gulf? (U)

The President: I understand OPEC has reached an agreement, but Iraq is pulling back some. What's your judgment? (U)

President Ozal: When we met in Washington, I told you about Saddam Hussein. Do you remember that? (U)

The President: I remember it very, very well. (U)

President Ozal: We need to be firm with him. (U)

The President: If you have other thoughts, please let me know. We are worried about the situation generally. But that was an important point you raised. It was very nice talking to you. I'll get the letter off. I don't like seeing you under pressure, but if a letter can help, I will do that. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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6116

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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JL 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
C. David Welch, NSC Staff, Notetaker

DATE, TIME July 28, 1990, 2:04 - 4:07 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport

King Hussein initiated the telephone call to the President. (U)

The President: Your Majesty, how are you? (U)

King Hussein: I'm very well, thank you very much, sir. I appreciate your taking the call. (U)

The President: Well, I'm sitting here by the shore in Maine, just had lunch with Barbara, my daughter, and Brent Scowcroft. The seashore reminds me of Aqaba. Where are you? (U)

King Hussein: I'm in Amman. George, I would like to thank you for your recent letter. It was most reassuring and most encouraging. Really, it was very good. (Ø)

The President: Well, you know we are with you. Jordan is a good friend. I hear you are off on another mission. (Ø)

King Hussein: Yes, I'm going to Baghdad tomorrow and Kuwait the day after. I hope we can make some progress. (Ø)

The President: I certainly hope that that situation doesn't get out of hand. We are very worried about possible escalation. (Ø)

King Hussein: Really, sir, there is no possibility of that happening. It will not come to that. (Ø)

The President: I wish you good luck. There are some problems with Iraq's behavior that I could tell you about, but I'd rather not do it over this line. Perhaps we can talk again after your trip so we can share your observations. You remember our Congressional delegation that went there -- we tried to send some signals to Saddam Hussein with that delegation. I would love to talk to you when you return. (Ø)

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King Hussein: I will call you as soon as I get back. (U)

The President: Best wishes to you and best regards from Barbara to you and the Queen. Brent says hello, too. (U)

King Hussein: Our love and best wishes to everyone. Please tell Scowcroft hello. Goodbye, sir. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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6144

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
C. David Welch, NSC Staff, Notetaker

DATE, TIME July 31, 1990, 9:47 - 9:50 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

King Hussein initiated the telephone call to the President. (U)

The President: How are you, your Majesty? (U)

King Hussein: Really very well, sir, and you? (U)

The President: Very anxious to get this call; what's happening?
(U)

King Hussein: Well, sir, they are meeting -- I think right now or soon -- in Saudi Arabia. On the Iraqi side, they send their best regards and highest esteem to you, sir. They are a bit angry about the situation, but I believe that hopefully something will be worked out to the benefit of greater cooperation and development in the area. (Ø)

The President: Without any fighting? (Ø)

King Hussein: Oh yes, sir, that will be the case. (Ø)

The President: I see... (U)

King Hussein: If you will permit, sir, some thoughts on the future as they see it. They have been through a war of eight years, a terrible experience for the country. They need to repair and for that, stable oil prices are necessary. You know, some of our other brethren, oil-producers, also blame the two countries involved for over-producing. The atmosphere in Kuwait is good. They will seek to arrange things in a way that is satisfactory to all. Iraq feels a need for a broader plan for the area, in which a way can be found to help out those nations that are less fortunate -- for the haves to help the have-nots. Iraq will even pitch in as the first donor, perhaps to a development fund to meet the needs of others with larger populations and less resources. (Ø)

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The President: Well, I appreciate this call. I take it you've just been to both places? (U)

King Hussein: Yes. Going in and out of the heat and air-conditioning I caught a terrible cold. I was going to call you last night but thought better of it. But the atmosphere is good. It looks tense but it will ease up. (Ø)

The President: Thanks very much for the call. (U)

King Hussein: I'll put down some thoughts in the next few days and maybe I'll have a chance to present them to you personally. (Ø)

The President: Would you object if we put out a release on this call; I always like to publicize these things if it's all right with you. (Ø)

King Hussein: No -- no objection. Best regards from Noor to Barbara, and all our love for everyone. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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DE CUELLAR JUL 31, 1989 -- SECURE CALL FROM AIR FORCE ONE - CALL
INITIATED 1305 - ENDED 1309