

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91111
Folder ID Number: 91111-006

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 3/15/90 - 6/22/90

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President-elect Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (5 pp.)	3/15/90	(b)(1)	✓
02. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	3/17/90	(b)(1)	✓
03. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	✓
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (4 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	✓
05. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Chnacellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	3/23/90	(b)(1)	✓
06. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Fernando Collor of Brazil (2 pp.)	3/23/90	(b)(1)	✓
07. Telcon	Re: Telcon of Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (2 pp.)	3/23/90	(b)(1)	✓
08. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia (2 pp.)	3/29/90	(b)(1)	✓

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 3/15/90 - 6/22/90

Pinksheet Number: cap941

OA/ID Number: 91111-006

Date Closed: 2/2/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Cable	Re: Memorandum of Conversation of President Bush's Telephone Call to President Aylwin (2 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	✓
10. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	4/2/90	(b)(1)	✓
11. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	4/6/90	(b)(1)	✓
12. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar (2 pp.)	4/11/90	(b)(1)	✓
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (3 pp.)	4/17/90	(b)(1)	✓
14a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for a Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	4/18/90	(b)(1)	✓
14b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made in Telephone Call to Helmut Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
15. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	4/23/90	(b)(1)	✓
16. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria (4 pp.)	4/23/90	(b)(1)	✓
17. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Virgilio Barco of Colombia (2 pp.)	4/27/90	(b)(1)	✓

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18. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (3 pp.)	5/4/90	(b)(1)	✓
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (3 pp.)	5/23/90	(b)(1)	✓
20. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (2 pp.)	5/25/90	(b)(1)	✓
21. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Guillermo Endara of Panama (2 pp.)	5/25/90	(b)(1)	✓
22. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)	5/30/90	(b)(1)	✓
23. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (3 pp.)	5/31/90	(b)(1)	✓
24. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	6/1/90	(b)(1)	✓
25. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)	6/3/90	(b)(1)	✓
26. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom (3 pp.)	6/3/90	(b)(1)	✓
27. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan (4 pp.)	6/4/90	(b)(1)	✓

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28. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (3 pp.)	6/6/90	(b)(1)	C
29. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (3 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	C
30. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica (2 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	C
31. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (2 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	C
32. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	C
33. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (3 pp.)	6/22/90	(b)(1)	C

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2080

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President-elect
Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President-elect Violeta Chamorro
Notetakers: David Pacelli/Don Johnson

DATE, TIME March 15, 1990, 7:30 - 7:56 PM
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President called President-elect Violeta Chamorro to discuss the process of demobilization and demilitarization of Nicaragua.
(U)

The President: Hello. (U)

President-elect Chamorro: How are you? (U)

The President: How are you feeling? (U)

President-elect Chamorro: Better, better; I'll be out of the hospital tomorrow. (U)

The President: Oh, wonderful. It's good talking to you. I'm very pleased with the reaction to my proposal for a Fund for Democracy. It has been pretty good on Capitol Hill. It has gotten a good reception. (U)

President-elect Chamorro: Thank you very much, my dear Mr. President. In the first place, I want to thank you for your request of the emergency package of aid for \$300 million dollars, and also the \$30 million dollars for demobilization of the Resistance and their relatives. At the same time, thank you for lifting the embargo, a measure which has been well received by all the political sectors of Nicaragua. (U)

The President: I'm glad to hear it. If you've got a minute, I'd like to talk to you about demobilization. (U)

President-elect Chamorro: Yes, sir. I had some ideas also, which I would like to read to you. (U)

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2000-0429-F
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The President: I would like to read you some ideas. (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: Yes, sir, as you wish. (U)

The President: In the first place, demobilization is a complex issue. We are working on a strategy for achieving demilitarization. Jack Leonard will give you a detailed plan in a few days, but we need to agree on a framework for the immediate future. (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: Yes, sir. (U)

The President: I realize that you and your UNO partners must take the lead, but I propose the following outline for you to consider. First, get both sides to commit themselves publicly to a formal cease-fire that would go into effect as soon as possible. Second, have both sides agree to freeze themselves in place. This would mean having the Resistance move to enclaves, and the Sandinistas staying in garrison. Third, ask the UN for expanded authority for ONUCA, so it can monitor the ceasefire and confirm that both sides are abiding by the freeze in place. Finally, number four, get both sides to agree to the principle of simultaneous steps for demobilization. If we can get them to agree, then we can start putting proposals for simultaneous action on the table. (Ø)

It would be good if you could appoint an authoritative representative who could talk to the Resistance along with Cardinal Obando. Violeta, this is the short run, the immediate task, stopping armed acts on both sides, giving ONUCA a mandate, and ending the present stalemate where each side wants the other to go first. Once confidence has been created, we can proceed to larger steps, such as repatriation, disarmament of combatants, and destruction of weapons, which we want. But it is our view that we have to get the fighting stopped and the parties separated. These are just a few ideas, and we want to hear your views. Jack Leonard will have all the details on this, just as soon as you get back to Nicaragua. These are just our suggestions. (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: Perfect, my dear George, Mr. President. I also have some ideas. Maybe they're not identical. (Ø)

The President: That's fine. Do you want to go ahead now or later? (U)

President-elect Chamorro: Now, I don't have a FAX machine near, but I want to read a list of ideas, sir. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

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President-elect Chamorro: I am aware that some Resistance combatants are entering Nicaragua. They are entering armed, and this is dangerous. This is not tolerable. It increases the level of tension and makes difficult the transition to democracy. (Ø)

I support the idea of putting the Resistance in enclaves, but they have to be unarmed. Second, only by demobilization of the Resistance can I control the Sandinistas and reduce the size of the Army gradually. I think the Sandinistas would no longer have an excuse to engage in military activities and would have to demobilize. (Ø)

Moreover, I request your support in helping us with a massive program that would give implements of work instead of weapons to the Army and the Resistance. I wish strongly, sir, to be the first president of a democratic nation that will throw weapons into the sea, as I said during my campaign. The U.S. can contribute toward this effort. They can encourage big corporations to donate tools they don't use to Nicaragua. (Ø)

I wish that the Resistance would have laid down their weapons before my inauguration on April 25. Fourth, if it is something you can do, I request that you send to Nicaragua paramedics as soon as my inauguration takes place, so the people can see that the U.S. is forthcoming with humanitarian assistance and that my Government, the UNO Government, can satisfy the basic needs of the Nicaraguan people. (Ø)

There are some radical elements in the Resistance that are playing a negative role as far as demobilization. They are few but speak on behalf of many. I ask that you can help so that these people, if they don't change their attitude, not be allowed back into Honduras. And with respect to your idea to ask Cardinal Obando to work for demobilization, I think that's an excellent idea. He's the most capable person in the country. We all have faith in him. (Ø)

[Interruption by Mrs. Chamorro's son, Pedro Joaquin, to say that the interpreter had made a mistake in saying that Mrs. Chamorro had said that the Resistance must have laid down its weapons by April 25. What Mrs. Chamorro had really said was that the process would have begun or would be far along by April 25.] (C)

The President: I see. (U)

President-elect Chamorro: These were the points I wanted to raise. I can send you a list or I will send them through my good friend Jack in Managua. (U)

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The President: Well, that's good. Obviously, I think you should be in the lead. I want you to know that we'll help in any way we can -- with the Contras, the UN, or with business people. (Ø)

I have one question. (U)

President-elect Chamorro: Yes, yes. (U)

The President: You mentioned the need for doctors once you come into office. What's the situation regarding medicine? (Ø)

[Interruption by Mrs. Chamorro's son, again. The interpreter had Mrs. Chamorro requesting medics, when in fact Mrs. Chamorro had asked for brigades of paramedics that would go to Nicaragua.] (Ø)

The President: I understand that. But what about medicine itself? (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: Anything, anything you or your friends could send would be welcome. Anything in that area would be most welcome from the U.S. or its allies. The drugstores are empty. The Sandinistas even threw some medicines into the sea. There's nothing. (Ø)

The President: There is a marvelous private organization here that sends medicine all over the world, called Americares. I know that they would send big planes with medicines if you wanted them. (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: Whatever you want. I don't know whether the Sandinista government would allow them into Nicaragua. It would be an excellent idea if this were done after the 25th of April. (Ø)

The President: Okay, I will get something started on that. We could have a big flight arrive the day after your inauguration. (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: Perfect. (U)

The President: All right. If you talk to Jack, I'll assign our very best people to do this. Whatever you like. I'll see what we can do with the Resistance. I'll wait till I hear from you or from the Embassy. (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: Right. Thank you for your good offices. (Ø)

The President: Okay. Listen, take care of yourself, and I'll be waiting to hear from you. (U)

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President-elect Chamorro: Right. And thank you for all these young men you have assigned to protect me. I'm not used to all this. (Ø)

The President: Everyone wants you to succeed. Everyone wants to pitch in and help. (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: Thanks very much. (U)

The President: Incidentally, Quayle saw Ortega again and they had another pleasant talk. Maybe he's getting more reasonable. (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: Maybe he wants to move to the United States. (Ø)

The President: I don't think so. I saw him giving you a big abrazo. Maybe he wants to stay in Nicaragua and be a good boy. (Ø)

President-elect Chamorro: (laughs) (U)

The President: Take care of yourself. (U)

President-elect Chamorro: Adios, mi amor. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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2111 ADD ON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Dennis W. Cheney, Situation Room, Notetaker
William Owen, Situation Room, Notetaker

DATE, TIME March 17, 1990; 7:27 - 7:32 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Hosni Mubarak initiated the call to the President. (U)

President Mubarak: George, how are you? (U)

The President: Fine Hosni, and you? I'm pleased that democracy is on the move everywhere. (U)

President Mubarak: It's due to your efforts. (U)

The President: What's going on in the Middle East? With all the changes in Israel the peace process appears to be in a hiatus.
(Ø)

President Mubarak: Peace is coming. (U)

The President: We hold to our positions. Egypt is very important to the process; you are a most reliable and sure friend to us. (U)

President Mubarak: We will continue our efforts. We consider you a sincere friend. (U)

The President: Did you get our message about that place in your neighborhood? (Ø)

President Mubarak: We told Qadhafi that the U.S. was not involved. (Ø)

The President: I wanted you to be dealing with the truth. If we were involved I would tell you. It looks like it was an accident. We didn't like the plant and believed it was producing chemicals. (Ø)

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President Mubarak: I received your message. We told Qadhafi that the U.S. was not involved even before I received the message. (C)

The President: It looks like he is now suspicious of Germany. (C)

President Mubarak: I told him not to go on suspicions without proof; he appears calmer now. After I return from Namibia, I will meet with Qadhafi. I'm trying to contain him. (C)

The President: Jim Baker is looking forward to seeing you there. (C)

President Mubarak: I saw your press conference on television. It was remarkable. How is Barbara? (U)

The President: She is fine. (U)

President Mubarak: And your family? (U)

The President: Everyone is well here. How is Susie? (U)

President Mubarak: She is well. She is coming for lunch, it is lunch time here. George, thank you for your support with the IMF and at the GATT. (U)

The President: We will keep trying on that and on the peace process. (U)

President Mubarak: Good bye, George. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME March 20, 1990, 8:31 - 8:59 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President initiated the call at 8:31 a.m. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? I called to congratulate you. You're a hell of a campaigner! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for the congratulations. It was a hard, tough time, but it was worth it. You have to bear in mind that these people [in the GDR] are in a very difficult time. The last free elections were 50 years ago. Since 1961, when the Wall went up, there have been virtually no communications with the world outside. The parties lack everything -- staff, experience, everything. They have to start from scratch. And there is even more work ahead. The most difficult problem is the lack of an experienced staff. That means twice the work for me. But I am very happy with the results. (U)

George, the most important thing for you in Washington is that before the elections everyone predicted that everyone would vote on the Left, but the results proved them wrong. The workers voted for us. If we act reasonably, in five years or so the country will have a good economy. The results are very important for the NATO question as well. I will now find totally different support than if the Left had won. So I am happy. Thank you very, very sincerely for all your help. I remember with deep gratitude the letter you sent before my trip to Moscow, and also Secretary Baker's help in Moscow. (Ø)

The President: We're very proud of you. Some press reports here say the Socialists in the GDR are adopting the position that this is all because of Helmut Kohl and are trying to take away the victory from the people. Let me just make a couple of comments about the border and the upcoming visit by Mazowiecki. (Ø)

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By 01 NARA, Date 5/11/99

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I would like to hear them. When is he coming? (Ø)

The President: He'll be here tomorrow. There will be a big state dinner. There will be great interest here. I want to be sure we are on the same wavelength. He may well ask for a larger Polish role in the Two Plus Four process. That is why I wanted to talk with you. On the border issue, I will repeat what I said in our joint press conference: "The U.S. respects the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act regarding the inviolability of current borders in Europe. And the U.S. formally recognizes the current German-Polish border." I feel compelled to repeat that with this man here. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: George, that is fine. I completely agree. (U)

The President: I will remind him of your initiative, which will lead to a treaty, fixing the current border, between a future all-German government and Poland. I will tell him that you have repeatedly assured me -- and that I believe you -- that the current GDR-Polish border should be the permanent German-Polish border. (Ø)

On Two Plus Four, I will tell him that I am pleased at the March 14 decision to invite Poland to its deliberations when the issue of Polish borders is discussed. I will remind him that we see the Two Plus Four as a process to deal with Four Power rights and responsibilities in Berlin and Germany as a whole -- not as a forum to decide the future of European security or to debate Germany's membership in NATO. If he asks, I will say that we will not support Warsaw as a site for any Two Plus Four talks, reminding him that members of the Two Plus Four agreed March 14 that talks would be held alternately in the FRG and the GDR. I will offer him intensified bilateral discussions as Two Plus Four proceeds, but I will not agree to any expanding of the Polish role in the Two Plus Four process, on the grounds that while Two Plus Four may discuss other security issues -- discuss them -- decisions will be made in other forums. I'm thinking of CFE, where Poland will have a voice. (Ø)

I know I can assure him we are sensitive to Polish concerns, but I will do so in such a way that your position is not undermined. I want to stop here. I have a few other points I'd like to make, but I want to be sure that what I have said is compatible with your position. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: George, the first thing: I'm very grateful for the spirit of friendship in all that you have said. Everything you have said is absolutely okay with me. I agree with everything you have said concerning Two Plus Four. (Ø)

The President: Let me add a couple of remarks on Two Plus Four. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Just a few remarks: if you think it useful, if you want to reassure Mazowiecki, you can report to him that we have discussed the issue extensively on the phone and at Camp David. Please tell him I want to help him be successful, but I also have to be sure I am successful with my policies in my own country. I don't usually say that publicly, but the election results also have a bearing on these questions. I am firmly determined to accept the Oder-Neisse border. I am not hiding anything from here; there is no secrecy. (Q)

It is true this is a bitter burden of history, but now is the time to settle the issue definitely for the future. An all-German government and parliament must, under international law, make the final settlement. I understand the Poles. They want to know what will occur from now until then, because I don't know how long it will take -- perhaps one year, perhaps two years. This was the idea, which has become easier now after the elections. The GDR parliament and ours will have the same majority. (Q)

The President: Now that the GDR elections are over, how soon do you see a new GDR parliament and government able to adopt with you a common declaration on the Polish border? (Q)

Chancellor Kohl: At the latest, May or June, our parliament and theirs could take steps. (Q)

The President: That would be very reassuring. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: This is the earliest I could enter into a commitment. If you like, I could explain the timetable. They will need until mid-April to set up parliament. There is a legal time frame. Then the government can take office, and there are also the Easter holidays. Very quickly the government will have to take a number of priority decisions. They will need to take them if they want to be into the Deutsche Mark system by mid-year. They also have to take basic decisions regarding the social market economy; that will be mid-May. So I see that government in a position to act by the last two weeks of May, or perhaps the last week of May. (Q)

My idea is to pass declarations at the same time in the GDR and the FRG. Then the governments of the GDR and the FRG would both write letters to Mazowiecki. For example, I could write to Mazowiecki and would convey the decision and confirm once again that I recognize him as Prime Minister. Let me make a further remark, which I am not making publicly: I am ready and willing to agree on an eventual text with Mazowiecki. That is something I am not able to make public, but it may be useful to you. So until June, he can have all these assurances. (Q)

The President: I would only say that the sooner there can be some of these assurances, the better. The Soviets seem to be trying to stir up trouble on this border issue. Once the two parliaments have acted and the results are conveyed to the Poles, it will reduce the pressures on this issue enormously. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: George, just to make clear: what I said is a promise I can keep. (C)

The President: But you cannot communicate that to Poland -- the idea of a text? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, yes. That's possible. I wanted to wait until you had seen Mazowiecki before doing anything on that. (C)

The President: Should I mention this to Mazowiecki or not? I want to do whatever you want on this. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: If you think it would be useful, and if he does not make it public -- and reassures you that he will not -- then tell him I would like to proceed in that direction. (C)

The President: Good. Helmut, I heard you were magnificent at NATO in Brussels -- a command performance. I also appreciate your Government's willingness to join us in briefing NATO after the Two Plus Four meeting. Above all, your firm stand on a united Germany remaining a full member of NATO is great. The idea is even gaining acceptance among the East Europeans. I noticed the positive comments by Havel, for example. You mentioned last time that NATO membership would be an important issue in the FRG. We need to continue holding firm. This is vitally important for European security and stability and for the U.S. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: This, after all, is the main issue with the Poles. I want to get along well with them. The Polish Foreign Minister, whom I consider a very intelligent and able man, recently said he, too, wanted Germany to remain a member of NATO. This will also be of benefit to his country. But it is necessary, all the more necessary, that we all come to a mutually satisfactory settlement. It would be very beneficial if Mazowiecki could help me. I would like to help him, too. (C)

The President: We will do our best, and then debrief after the meetings. Then I'll be meeting with Thatcher and Mitterrand and will want to stay in close touch with you. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. I think together we will make it successful. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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2206

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos
Andres Perez of Venezuela (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Barbara Phillips
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME March 21, 1990, 4:31 - 4:55 pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Bush telephoned the President Perez to congratulate him on the Brady Plan agreement and to discuss Central America. (U)

The President: Hello. (U)

President Perez: Good to hear you. (U)

The President: How are you, my friend? Listen, Secretary of the Treasury Brady told me that Venezuela has worked out a debt reduction plan based on the Brady Plan. I'm very pleased and hope it's good for you. And I wanted to say congratulations.
(Ø)

President Perez: Many thanks. I had the temptation to call you yesterday, but I held off knowing how very busy you are. But in a press conference yesterday I publicly said how pleased I was for the help of the US and for your help personally. (Ø)

The President: Well, I'm delighted you feel that way. We'll continue to work closely with you to have this complied with fully and faithfully. We must follow through. I hope you'll encourage others to have the courage to take this step. Many thanks for your kind words. We think this has been an extraordinary achievement. (Ø)

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President Perez: I agree, Mr. President. We'll continue to press ahead as quickly as possible. Very soon we'll present a letter of terms to the IMF that are necessary to the implementation. I will encourage others, as well. I'll be having a talk next week with Collor, who's implemented a very strong economic program. I'll also talk to Menem. They have to be encouraged. (Ø)

The President: Well, I think that's right. Can I raise a question on Central America? (Ø)

President Perez: Go ahead. (U)

The President: Dan briefed me on the meetings he had with you during his trip. Thank you for the many courtesies you extended to him. You were extraordinarily generous with your time. (Ø)

We're trying to demobilize these contras. This is a difficult task and there is no mechanical solution in sight. We think the first step is to separate the two armies, so no new violence breaks out. ONUCA can help to carry out this effort. I hope you'll send some troops to contribute to this. (Ø)

You've been very generous with Violeta, and I hope you'll be generous with oil purchases. We're trying to get through our Congress a significant aid package that will also help her. (Ø)

We have some reports that Dona Violeta, whom we love and respect, is relying on too narrow a circle of advisers. Is this correct? If true, maybe you could help widen it. But how do you feel the process is going, and what should we be doing that we're not doing? (Ø)

President Perez: The problem has some aspects that concern me greatly. The contra has become a difficult obstacle. I spoke to Quayle during his trip, and explained to him why it is necessary that the contra begin to dissolve and that it be seen that there is US cooperation. (Ø)

Cardinal Obando, the Archbishop of Managua, is going to Tegucigalpa tomorrow together with Lacayo, to speak to contra leaders, and ask them in the name of the Nicaraguan people to disband. (Ø)

The problem of UNO is that it is a group disparate not only in terms of people, but also of parties. Dona Violeta has indeed closed her circle. The only members really close to her are Lacayo and Cesar. She does not rely on many other people. If you wanted, I could invite Lacayo and Cesar to talk about this. (Ø)

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The President: It is very important for her to rely on a broad spectrum of people, and it would help to talk to Lacayo and Cesar. (Ø)

President Perez: Venezuela is willing to send 700 troops in a battalion to support ONUCA. (Ø)

The President: That's a very generous assignment of people on your part. We respect the level of influence you have. A talk with them would be good. Dona Violeta risks isolation if she keeps her amount of close advisers only from one group. (Ø)

President Perez: Another thing I want to say is that if the contra is not disbanded by April 25, it will become the biggest problem that will face Mrs. Chamorro. The contras would try to be violent with her government. We Latins know each other well. The contras are not a threat to the Sandinistas; they are a threat to Violeta Chamorro. (Ø)

The President: I don't disagree with this. She told me that she's concerned about contra radical elements. We have no interest in them continuing in business after April 25. We'll do what we can to help. The problem is they don't want to do this unilaterally. I worry about the same problem you do. We also worry about more radical elements in Sandinismo. This is not a one-way street. (Ø)

President Perez: We have to make an effort now to obtain a withdrawal. (Ø)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Perez: The meeting on 30-31 March of the five presidents of Central America in Managua is useful. This will strengthen the peaceful transfer of power. It would allow us to be in a position to deal with the conflict in El Salvador with the FMLN. (Ø)

The President: So you'll not be going. (Ø)

President Perez: If necessary, I could participate. (Ø)

The President: Yes, let's stay in touch. I don't think we're apart at all. We've made some suggestions to Violeta which I hope she shares with you on how to separate the two forces and disband. But I think it is very difficult. (Ø)

President Perez: There is a final point I want to raise. I have a profound interest in speaking with you and visiting you. But my visit would coincide with the inauguration of Dona Violeta. I believe it would be good for me to be in Managua on the day prior to the inauguration. (Ø)

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The President: I understand. What you're doing is extremely important. We'll get our staffs to work out a convenient date. Please don't worry about the 24th. We'll work on a date that will get you and me together in a relaxed way here. (Ø)

If you could make it, we could do it on the 24th of May. But let's let our people work on a date that's convenient for you. (Ø)

President Perez: I would not like for April to go by without a chance to meet with you. (Ø)

The President: Okay, let's try to do that. (U)

President Perez: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good talking to you. Thank you, my friend. (U)

President Perez: Good-bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor
Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of
Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME March 23, 1990, 3:10 - 3:32 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call at 3:10 p.m. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine. Thank you for calling. (U)

The President: I just want to call to let you know how the Mazowiecki visit went. I like the man. I think he is serious and honest -- a man of real integrity. There is no question that he is a Polish patriot in the best sense of the term. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That is also my view. (U)

The President: The public side of the visit went very well. We had some things to offer on the economic side -- including the signing of a new Business and Economic Agreement -- that took some pressure off the border issue. He conducted himself very well in his public remarks. He made his points on the border and Two Plus Four, but in a very restrained and statesmanlike way. So I'm satisfied that we were able to project U.S. understanding for Polish concerns without in any way signalling that the President of the United States was trying to influence or pressure Chancellor Kohl. So I thought it worked out well publicly and hope you agree. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I do agree. Thank you very much. That is exactly the impression people have here. Unfortunately, this was a sharp contrast to the impression with Mitterrand. Your position was received very well indeed. I am especially grateful for your having done it that way. (Ø)

The President: Let me say just a word or two about my private meetings. We met the first day in the Oval Office and then I invited him back the second day for thirty or forty minutes. In those, he focused mainly on the border issue. The matter of a

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German-Polish treaty on the border, rather than the Polish role in Two Plus Four, was the issue for him. You know his position. He just reiterated that. He wants a treaty written and initialed before unification and then signed by an all-German government as soon as one exists. (Ø)

I took the positions that I outlined to you in our last conversation, and I explained your position and why you cannot take a position now for an all-German government that does not exist. I did my best to convince him that we have great trust for your word and that he should trust you when you say the current GDR-Polish border should be the permanent German-Polish border. He didn't argue with that. In fact, he expressed high regard for you, but he went on to say that he worried about the position a united Germany would take. That is why he wants assurances -- and wants a treaty -- before unification. (Ø)

I did not raise with him the idea of discreetly negotiating with you a text, but it does seem that I misunderstood you when you said I might raise with Mazowiecki the idea that you and he could, confidentially, work out an "eventual text." I understood you to mean the text of an eventual German-Polish treaty. But in a follow-up call Horst Teltschik made clear to Brent Scowcroft you were referring to the text of the common declaration you propose the two German parliaments to issue. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: It is not so big a misunderstanding. Let me explain it slowly, and break in if you have any questions about what I am saying. I will begin at the end, as it were. I agree that an all-German government should sign a treaty on the border and submit it to an all-German parliament for ratification. I think that will be in about two years. He has concerns, and we appreciate them. We have to get rid of them. (Ø)

A treaty will for sure contain one particular sentence. It would read approximately as follows: "The Republic of Poland and the Republic of Germany do not make any border claims on each other, and they consider the existing border to be permanent." My idea was to find some agreement [with Mazowiecki, presumably] on what that should look like. I would take the sentence and put it into the resolution of the German Bundestag. Then a sentence would say: "The Bundestag resolves that it will ask an all-German parliament to come up with a treaty as soon as possible." I would send that resolution on behalf of the Federal Government to Poland, adding a sentence that the Government supports the position taken by the Bundestag. The same thing would be done by the Volkskammer. The Poles would have at that time assurances from both freely elected German parliaments and governments, at the highest level possible. Then no person of decency can have any doubts on what the Germans think. (Ø)

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What he wants would not be binding in international law. It is not in any way more binding than the approach I have taken. It would be less binding, because the parliaments wouldn't be involved. The consequences for me would be that some group would bring a suit before the Federal Constitutional Court accusing me of taking steps even though I wasn't authorized to do so. I would be involved in all kinds of trouble for weeks. I definitely will not do that. (C)

So I have been very forthcoming in the approach I have taken. Felipe Gonzalez was just here, and we talked about this. He has no bias either way. He said very impulsively that he doesn't understand the entire debate, because what the Germans are offering is all that is conceivable. (C)

The President: Good. So there will be no further missed signals, let me tell you exactly what I told Mazowiecki on this. I asked whether he thought it would be useful if I asked you to consider working out with him the text of a treaty. I didn't say that you had mentioned the idea. And I asked him to keep the idea confidential. This was presented as a George Bush idea with no reference to the idea you and I had said anything about it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: But we could further develop this idea. (C)

The President: Exactly. Let me just make two more points. He said that his first reaction was positive but that he wanted to study the idea. That came up in our meeting on Wednesday. But then when we met yesterday -- after we learned from Horst that there might have been a minor misunderstanding -- I didn't return to the subject. Neither did he. It wasn't discussed any more. Frankly, what you've proposed here is something he might recognize as something that's as far as Germany can go. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I do think it's quite a concession. (C)

The President: I think you might find that he is receptive. He didn't seem an unreasonable man. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I just don't understand his words. I don't understand why he didn't just pick up the telephone and call me. I would have told him that I wouldn't sign a treaty earlier. No one will make me. But I do want to help him. If we have two German parliaments and two German governments saying that, it's not reasonable to assume their positions will change in two years. Now there is a new argument, coming from the election results from the GDR on Sunday. In this new Government -- I'm speaking of the GDR Government -- there are people who are close to me personally. But on this idea, I will pursue it. (C)

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The President: Good. All in all, the visit went well. I think it served the purpose of reassuring the Poles that they weren't being excluded. I can't say that I changed Mazowiecki's position on the border issue, but he didn't raise the idea of a Two Plus Four meeting in Warsaw at all. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: You have been extremely helpful. I'm extremely grateful. I think we will be able to manage this in a reasonable way. The most difficult thing for him is not the border but the economy. I am very pessimistic about economic developments. (P)

The President: It is discouraging. They need structural help, and we will try to assist in that area. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: But the thing is they have to help themselves. There are legitimate concerns about that. (P)

The President: Well, my bottom line is this: he struck me as quite sincere in wanting a reconciliation between the Poles and the Germans. This, along with the confidence he expressed in you, is something to build on. If I can be helpful on any point, just let me know. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: He deserves any help he can get. What I can do, I shall do. His problems are immense, and that is why I want to help him. (P)

The President: I will be in touch. We have more work to do.
(U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President
Fernando Collor of Brazil (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Fernando Collor, President of Brazil
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME March 23, 1990, 3:38 - 3:41pm EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Bush telephoned the President Collor to congratulate him on his inauguration and the announcement of his economic plan. (U)

The President: Mr. President. (U)

President Collor: How are you? (U)

The President: Nice to talk to you. I just wanted to call you now that you're in office. First, thanks for the courtesies you extended to the Vice President during his trip. He told me that your inaugural address was forceful and inspiring. I particularly appreciate your reference to relations with the US, and also your note to me on March 6 regarding your visit to Washington. (Ø)

I've seen press reports of your dramatic announcement of an economic program for a New Brazil. I know it's difficult, but your plan is bold and comprehensive. Congratulations. (Ø)

President Collor: It is very important. The people are supporting our economic program; recent polls show that 87% of the people approve of it. (Ø)

The President: Amazing. (U)

President Collor: This is encouraging us to take these steps. (Ø)

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The President: It is a testimony to your stewardship and leadership. You've taken the initiative. I know it won't be painless. We want to do what we can to help, despite our own damned deficit. We want to maintain an active dialogue with you, and I just called to congratulate you on your magnificent start. (Ø)

President Collor: Thank you for the photos that you sent me through your Ambassador here. (Ø)

The President: That was a great visit. I look forward to my visit to Brazil in September. (Ø)

President Collor: (laughs) The Vice President was well welcomed. We had the opportunity to talk about our relations. What Brazil wants is to maintain a high level of interest in our country. I think our relations will improve very much from this dialogue. (Ø)

The President: Well, I stand ready to talk at any time. Don't hesitate to use the phone and call me directly. (Ø)

President Collor: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: My love to your wife. (U)

President Collor: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: TELCON of Conversation with Brian Mulroney,
Prime Minister of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME
AND PLACE: March 23, 1990, 8:05 - 8:13 p.m. EST,
Camp David

The President initiated the phone call. (U)

The President: Brian, how are you? I know our people have been talking, but I wanted to be sure that my idea of our getting together for a ball game in Toronto on April 10th was good for you. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I think it's a great idea. (Ø)

The President: I plan to keep my entourage small so that we can focus on our substantive discussions. My idea would be to come up to Toronto a couple of hours early so that we can have plenty of time to talk. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: That sounds like a very good idea. (Ø)

The President: I would plan to bring along Baseball Commissioner Fay Vincent, whom I've known for many years. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I want you to know that I had lunch today with ex-President Reagan. He was in Toronto for a speech to business executives to raise funds for his library. I had business in Toronto the previous day and stayed overnight so that I could introduce him and look after him while he was in Toronto. He seems to be in great shape. He is not at all envious that you are doing better in the popularity charts than he was at this stage in his Presidency. He seems in much better cheer than the last time I saw him and more physically fit. (Ø)

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The President: It was very nice of you to look after him in Toronto. I look forward to seeing you. We can spend the first couple of hours getting our business out of the way and then we can relax and enjoy the ball game. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, we will have a lot to talk about. I would like to talk to you about the economic summit meeting I just had in Mexico. (C)

The President: I understand that the ball game is at about 7:00. Therefore, perhaps we could meet at the stadium at about 3:00 or 4:00 in the afternoon, have about two hours of meetings, then spend some time visiting with the ball players and have supper before the ball game. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I was impressed with President Salinas. I think that, in June, he will propose a free trade agreement with the U.S., something like the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. He also seems very glad that Canada has joined the OAS. (C)

The President: Yes, I agree that Salinas is a good man and I will look forward to hearing about your meeting with him. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Robert Hawke of Australia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Robert Hawke, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Douglas Paal

DATE, TIME March 29, 1990, 5:58 p.m. - 6:03 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned the Prime Minister to congratulate him on his victory in the Australian federal election. (U)

The President: Bob, congratulations. I want to check in with you on the election. I would not say it was a landslide. (U)

PM Hawke: G'day, George. Actually we will end up with a very comfortable majority. We are winning all the doubtful seats. (U)

The President: Well, I heard it was a real close squeaker. The reporting had it close, according to the analysts. (U)

PM Hawke: It will be 78 to 69. The analysts often get it wrong. (U)

The President: I wish you good luck. I hope we will be able to see each other soon. (U)

PM Hawke: Thanks, George. I would like to renew our invitation for you to go to Australia for a visit. (U)

The President: I would love to do it. You know it is so darn complicated. You can see all this stuff going on. I just wanted to offer my congratulations. Will you have a chance to get some rest? (U)

PM Hawke: I am getting my ministries together, then I will take some time. I will be going to Gallipoli on ANZAC Day. It is the seventy-fifth anniversary of the 1915 landing. Some of the veterans going along are in their nineties, their last chance. It should be very poignant. (U)

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The President: Very emotional. (U)

PM Hawke: George, like you, I have been watching the Soviets and the Baltics. It is walking a tight rope. We want to give support to Gorbachev and also to the aspirations of the Lithuanian people. It is a fine line. You are doing a good job.
(C)

The President: You are kind, and you are absolutely right. Ted Kennedy was just in to see me and said Gorbachev is a little annoyed with the posture we are in and with the Lithuanians. I am a little heartened that the last few days have been less tense. You are nice to mention that. We have a lot at stake in him and lots at stake in self-determination for the Lithuanians.
(C)

PM Hawke: Yes, there are so many sinister forces arrayed against him on both sides. He needs all our support now. (C)

The President: I would hate to see his military scrunch him down. No one could do anything. It is very confrontational. Bob, if I ever see something coming up where we can work together, I will give you a call. Bar sends her love. Good-by.
(C)

PM Hawke: Good-by. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S
TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT AYLWIN

1. ☒ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BELOW IS TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF
PRESIDENT BUSH'S TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT AYLWIN.

BEGIN TEXT:

DATE, TIME MARCH 30, 1990, 9:53 - 10:00 AM EST

PRESIDENT BUSH TELEPHONED PRESIDENT AYLWIN TO CONGRATULATE
HIM ON HIS INAUGURATION AND WISH HIM WELL.

THE PRESIDENT: MR. PRESIDENT. WELL, HOW ARE YOU?

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: VERY WELL, THANKS BE TO GOD. I'M
BEGINNING THE DIFFICULT TASK IN FRONT OF ME, BUT STARTING
WITH A GREAT DEAL OF FAITH.

THE PRESIDENT: WELL, THERE WERE A COUPLE OF SMALL POINTS
I WANTED TO RAISE WITH YOU. FIRST, TO SAY IN PERSON WHAT
I SAID IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU, THAT WE'RE EXTREMELY PROUD OF
YOU AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU.

SECOND, I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR COURTESIES TO VICE
PRESIDENT DAN QUAYLE DURING HIS TRIP TO CHILE. HE SPENT A
LOT OF TIME WITH ME GIVING ME A PERSONAL DEBRIEFING ON HIS
WONDERFUL TRIP.

LASTLY, TO SAY THAT I'M VERY PLEASED WITH THE DEMOCRATIC
EVOLUTION TAKING PLACE IN CHILE; AND PLEASED YOU'RE THE
PRESIDENT OF A WONDERFUL COUNTRY. WE'RE DELIGHTED THAT
THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRACY IN YOUR GREAT COUNTRY IS BACK ON
TRACK. WE'RE LOOKING FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU.

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: IN THE FIRST PLACE, I WANT TO EXPRESS
MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR CALL. SECOND, FOR THE KIND WORDS
YOU EXPRESS AND THE GOOD WISHES, AND YOUR DESIRE FOR
COOPERATION WITH US. IT WAS A PLEASURE TO RECEIVE THE
VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE AND TO TALK TO HIM ON
MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. FINALLY, I WANT TO REITERATE
THE DESIRE OF THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT TO DO ALL POSSIBLE
TO RESOLVE QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT TROUBLE OUR RELATIONS.
WE ARE ADVANCING SERIOUSLY IN SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO
THESE PROBLEMS, AND HOPE THERE WILL SOON BE EVIDENCE OF
THIS.

THE PRESIDENT: WHAT ARE YOUR MAIN PROBLEMS? IN THE
ECONOMIC FIELD, MAINLY?

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: I WAS REFERRING MAINLY TO THE MUTUAL
PROBLEM IN CONNECTION WITH THE LETELIER CASE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS.

THE PRESIDENT: I UNDERSTAND.

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, I THINK AND HOPE
THINGS WILL MOVE WELL AND CONTINUE.

THE PRESIDENT: WELL, I DON'T WANT TO HOLD YOU TOO LONG.
YOU'VE DONE A GREAT JOB, AND ALL THAT I WANTED TO DO WAS
WISH YOU WELL. IF YOU NEED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME ON ANY
ISSUE, DON'T HESITATE TO PICK UP THE PHONE AND CALL ME
DIRECTLY.

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: I APPRECIATE THIS ENORMOUSLY, AND WANT
TO TELL YOU THAT YOUR WORDS HAVE NOT FALLEN ON DEAF EARS.

THE PRESIDENT: GOOD LUCK AND MY SINCERE THANKS AND
CONGRATULATIONS.

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PAGE 02 OF 02

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE ONE MATTER. I'VE HAD NEWS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS PROPOSING TO VISIT SOME COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR. FOR US IT WILL BE A GREAT HONOR AND WE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING YOU.

THE PRESIDENT: WELL, THERE IS DISCUSSION ABOUT A TRIP TO THE SOUTH. I'VE NEVER BEEN TO CHILE. IF YOU AGREE, WE'LL PASS THIS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, JIM BAKER, AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, GENERAL SCOWCROFT, TO WORK ON. YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING MORE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT I WOULD BE WELCOME, AND I WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO MAKE THE TRIP.

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: THIS IS VERY GOOD NEWS, AND MAKES ME VERY HAPPY.

THE PRESIDENT: GOOD LUCK, AND GOOD-BYE.

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: (IN ENGLISH) THANK YOU AND GOOD-BYE.
END TEXT.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Add-on

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson
Interpreter: Frances Seeds

DATE, TIME: April 2, 1990, 7:05 - 7:20am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Kaifu telephoned the President concerning the U.S.-Japan trade discussions. (S)

The President: Toshiki, how are you? I am glad to hear from you. (U)

PM Kaifu: I am fine and you, George? (In English) (U)

Our meetings at Palm Springs were extremely useful. Upon my return to Japan I sought to respond to you George and your expression of your concern. I have done my utmost to resolve the trade problems. With respect to individual trade problems, I have gotten the cooperation of the party leaders and the bureaucracy on supercomputers, telecommunication, satellites, and we are moving in the right direction on forest products. On telecommunications, I have made decisions necessary to put this behind us. (S)

PM Kaifu: And on the question of SII, I have invested my utmost effort and have taken my own political decisions in consultation with the LDP leaders. With the new proposals on SII, I will be required to persuade the Japanese people. There will be resistance here in Japan but this is Japan's SII proposal. It would be politically impossible to come up with anything beyond the Japanese proposal you will be seeing shortly. (S)

I have dispatched former Ambassador Matsunaga and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Owada to the United States. They will be carrying a personal letter addressed to you from me. They should also meet separately with Scowcroft and Baker to explain the Japanese proposal. (S)

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George, please appreciate the effort on my part this time around. Please make public a positive assessment on your part. (S)

The President: Well first of all, I greatly appreciate all the effort you and your colleagues have been making to follow up the Palm Springs meeting. (S)

On these categories the progress is good. I'm glad you feel forest products are moving in the right direction. (S)

I am hopeful that the SII team can achieve a good interim report. We will look very carefully at what you have fashioned. (S)

If we are totally successful on SII and Super 301, the credit will belong to you. (S)

I have great respect for the way you have handled this issue. (S)

Also, of course, I will be delighted to receive your emissaries, Ambassadors Matsunaga and Owada, who are both very well respected men. We will see them as soon as they get here on Wednesday. I will try to give as much public support from our end as possible. We want you to be successful on this matter. You have demonstrated wonderful cooperation with us. I will look forward to receiving your emissaries and I appreciate the spirit of this phone call. (S)

PM Kaifu: Well, George, before concluding, please convey my appreciation to the so-called five musketeers of SII: Mr. McCormack and the others. Without their cooperation the SII exercise would not have been a success. I will appreciate your understanding that this is our maximum possible effort on SII. (S)

The President: I am very impressed with your efforts. We would never have come this far without your personal involvement and we will look very carefully at the message being brought by your emissaries, Matsunaga and Owada. (S)

The President and the Prime Minister concluded their conversation. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2678
Add-on

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime
Minister of Japan (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME April 6, 1990, 7:36 - 7:50am EST
The Oval Office

The President received a telephone call from Prime Minister Kaifu concerning the U.S.-Japan trade discussions.

The President: Hello Toshiki. How are you?

PM Kaifu: Good Morning, George. I'm fine.

The President: I want to tell you how very pleased I am with the good news. We are very grateful to you for your leadership that has made all of this possible.

PM Kaifu: I, too, am extremely delighted that the SII interim assessment has been finalized, bringing bright prospects into our economic relationship.

And I have just heard in detail from Ambassador Matsunaga about his meeting with you, George. I appreciate the time you took to hear his message. I am deeply grateful that you have made public your appreciation of our commitments and have been kind enough to refer to my hard work on these matters.

As you know, I am now faced with the big challenge of persuading people at home of the necessity of implementing these measures. Just this morning I held a press conference in Tokyo to begin this process.

President Bush: I was just reading about your press conference with General Scowcroft. I know it is not popular to take all of these steps. We will try hard on our end on budget reduction. We know SII is a two-way street.

During our last conversation, we spoke about wood products. If we can clear this up next week in Tokyo, we can claim credit for clearing our agenda in record time.

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PM Kaifu: Yes. I understand that Finance Minister Hashimoto will have a one-on-one meeting with Brady on the fringes of the G-7 meeting. This will be another meaningful meeting.

The President: Good. Nick Brady left yesterday and I believe they are meeting tomorrow.

PM Kaifu: Well, the achievements this time have only been possible with your friendship and assistance.

The President: I am grateful to you. I told your distinguished Emissaries, Ambassadors Matsunaga and Owada, this relationship is critical to us. I will go the extra mile to keep it strong, just as you are doing.

PM Kaifu: Well, on the basis of such favorable progress on the bilateral front, I would like to join with you in tackling global problems as part of our global partnership. Please accept my best wishes for a successful Summit.

The President: Thank you. But I must tell you Lithuania is a big cloud hanging over the Summit, but I think Gorbachev wants a peaceful resolution.

PM Kaifu: Well George. Thank you very much. I very much look forward to seeing you in Houston at the Summit. I began this conversation by saying good morning. Actually it is night here in Tokyo, and I think I am going to enjoy a good night's sleep!

The President: You deserve a good night's sleep. You earned it. Let's stay in touch and thank you for this phone call.

-- End of Conversation --

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2855
ADD-ON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with UN Secretary General
Perez de Cuellar

PARTICIPANTS: The President
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar
R. Rand Beers

DATE, TIME April 11, 1990, 4:56 - 5:00 P.M. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar telephoned The President
concerning his budget. (Ø)

Exchange of hellos. (U)

Perez de Cuellar: I want to ask you a favor. I'm having
difficulties with my budget. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I'm humiliated... (Ø)

Perez de Cuellar: There is the \$60 million that the U.S. has not
paid on its 1989 commitment. I ask as a personal favor for you
to exert your influence on the Senators, especially Domenici and
[did not catch the second name], that they accept the bill for UN
funding. (Ø)

The President: I feel terrible. We're in a big fight with
Congress...I will personally do all I can to see that the bill is
passed when they get back from vacation...there is no excuse.
We've requested the funding...Congress is being stubborn.
Javier, I didn't understand what you said about the \$50
million... (Ø)

Perez de Cuellar: I wrote you a letter a few weeks ago, I don't
know if you saw it, it's about the \$60 million still unpaid on
your 1989 UN dues. (Ø)

The President: We can cover the funding if the bill gets through
the Senate. I will personally work on it when the Senators get
back...it is a priority. The U.S. ought to pay its debts...I'm
sorry we've caused you this worry. Javier, when do you come
home? (Ø)

Perez de Cuellar: I'll be in New York on Saturday. (Ø)

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The President: I don't know if you can talk on this line...have you heard anything on Iran? (P)

Perez de Cuellar: Well, there is nothing new. I keep insisting, believe me, I don't forget about it. (P)

The President: We certainly appreciate all your efforts. (P)

Exchange of Goodbyes.

End of Conversation

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2993

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME April 17, 1990, 4:20 - 4:32 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call in response to a request from Prime Minister Lubbers. (U)

The President: Hello, Ruud! How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Good. This is an easy-going country, as you know. Things are going quite all right. Of course, there are a number of problems in Europe. The Lithuanian situation is very difficult. (U)

The President: What is your public position? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: To keep quiet. This is also for formal reasons. When we recognized the USSR, we recognized the Baltic republics as part of it. The political realities are a different matter, of course, but we don't want to make life for Gorbachev more difficult than it already is. (Ø)

The President: We are in a difficult position. There is pressure for the U.S. to take leadership. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I hope the Polish Government will do something. For historical reasons, and also the Church, the Poles are better placed than we. Our involvement could be seen as interference. But we may need to do something -- perhaps together. You will be seeing Mitterrand. Will you discuss this? (Ø)

The President: Yes. We have lots to discuss, but I will take it up with him. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Maybe we could try to combine your position with a European stand. (U)

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The President: I don't know how much time we have. Have you seen this latest thing -- cutting off gas supplies? We thought this morning that we would have talks going, but it doesn't look so good now. I don't want to do anything rash. We have a big agenda and want this man to succeed, but given our historical background, we have to say something. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We should do something, too, to spread the responsibility. (U)

The President: I will talk with my experts. We have a meeting in about 30 minutes. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I hope they will start talks -- in the UN, perhaps. (Ø)

The President: Cuellar said today that it is an "internal matter." That will please them in Moscow, although not in some other places. What else do you have for me? (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I am glad the European Bank is going. We have a Dutch candidate, Onno Ruding. The French have also proposed Attali. (Ø)

The President: Ruding's a good man. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I talked to Mitterrand. He said it was hard for him not to support the candidacy of Attali, because they are so close, but he said he hates the situation in which there are so many French in high positions in international institutions. He personally likes Ruding but must support his own man. He proposed an arrangement whereby Ruding would serve for some years under Attali and then succeed him. I looked into the statutes of the Bank. There would be a Governing Board to elect its own President. It could offer Attali the post for some years, so that he could be the founder, but then turn it over so that the Bank wouldn't have someone with no banking experience. I suggested to the French that they think it over. I have had no reaction from Mitterrand yet. As long as it is clear that many countries support Ruding, they might consider this arrangement. But if big countries support the French, they might not. I wrote you a letter on this, which you will receive tomorrow. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate your views. Everybody feels Ruding is an excellent candidate. Our problem is that Treasury may have already committed to Attali. But if something is working, we will try to stay flexible. Attali has no banking experience at all. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I don't think Treasury has committed. Kohl likes Ruding; so does Thatcher. I'm not so pessimistic. You know the French like to say that other countries have supported their position. (Ø)

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The President: I am glad to know that others are for Ruding. Mrs. Thatcher is fixed on London as the site for the Bank. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: She wrote to me supporting Ruding. (Ø)

The President: That is interesting. I didn't know. We will share this with Brady and Baker. If no commitment has been made, I will make sure I get a recommendation. If I can get Mitterrand off alone, I will discuss it with him. I hope you're not getting negative feedback from this environmental conference. Your environment guy is pushing pretty hard and giving his own press conferences. I don't like to complain, but he is giving us a little grief. We are spending a billion dollars on research on global climate change. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I know your position. I will try to get him under control. (Ø)

The President: Thanks for calling. I will tell Brent about your ideas on Lithuania. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

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Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>10/18</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
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A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Tab I is w/ Pres ^{as of} 1:00pm

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 18, 1990

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APNSA Has Seen

ACTION

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM:

CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for a Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl

The talking points for the President's telephone call to Chancellor Kohl are at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the talking points for use in the President's phone call to Chancellor Kohl.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By *CA* NARA, Date *7/30/10*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE IN TELEPHONE CALL TO HELMUT KOHL

LITHUANIA

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

- I am very concerned about reports that the Soviets may be preparing to carry through on their threat of economic sanctions against Lithuania.
- Our information suggests that Moscow has not yet actually carried out these measures but we are watching the situation very closely.
- We are also starting to consider what actions we might take if the threats are carried out.
- I want to preserve the overall relationship if at all possible because so many positive developments are taking place in Eastern Europe and in arms control.
- But I have said that efforts to repress the Lithuanian independence movement would adversely affect U.S.-Soviet relations.
- We will probably look to take some action in the economic sphere. What do you think would be the best Western response to further Soviet strangulation of Lithuania?
- I think that economic steps would be appropriate given that the Soviets are using economic leverage against the Lithuanians.

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AS AMENDED

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (September 11, 2001)
By 61 NA Date 7/13/10

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MITTERRAND VISIT

- As you know, I am meeting with Francois tomorrow.
- We will talk about developments in Europe and the Soviet Union.
- Are there any issues that you would like me to raise with him?

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MULRONEY

APR 27 - PRES PLACED PERSONAL CALL TO MULRONEY AT
1405 - TERMINATED 1410

MAY 1990

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**MEMCON**

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein
of Jordan (U)PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
Notetaker: C. David WelchDATE, TIME April 23, 1990, 1:17-1:22 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval OfficeDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09The President: Hello, Your Majesty. (U)King Hussein: Sir, how are you? (U)The President: I'm just fine. Simply called to express my thanks to you for the kindness you showed to Senator Dole and Secretary Dole and the rest of that travelling group. They came back very enthusiastic and very grateful to you. (U)King Hussein: Thank you very much. It was a very, very great pleasure to meet them and have frank and open discussions, and we enjoyed having them very much. I hope it was useful. (U)The President: They enjoyed it and as Senator Dole said in public about his trip -- it seems to have helped ease the tension. I was fascinated about their visit to Iraq. We're telling Iraq that they themselves must work to create an environment in which relations can be improved. Very frankly, the recent events have hurt, but we want to stay in touch. There is no conspiracy against Iraq. Bob Dole and that group had a chance to make that point and you were helpful in this to make that clear to Saddam. (Ø)King Hussein: I will continue to do everything I can to help. That is very, very important. (U)The President: I got your letter of the 9th and I will be sending you a detailed reply. You raised a lot of questions, serious matters. I will get you a considered reply. I know of Jordan's special interest and I know what our policy has been since '67. My views are firm on this -- the settlements and all of that. All sides know that. I will try to be a reasonable proponent of American policy without changing it. I want you to know that. (Ø)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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King Hussein: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I know this is the case. I am reassured by your kindness in calling me today. We know your responsibilities are far greater than they were in the past because while the world was divided between two superpowers in the past, your responsibilities are now greater in the world. And sir, we look to you to be able to help us on the problem of great concern to us as well as to everyone. (U)

The President: We're in a hiatus because of the change of government in Israel. We still want to be helpful in getting the peace process started. Say, I heard you might be coming to the States in the fall, to New York I was told. If you are, I'd like to get together with you for quiet supper or a visit at the White House. (Ø)

King Hussein: I'd like that very much. I'm going to New York to attend a summit on the children of the world and the future. I thought it was a good idea. I hope that I'll be able to come to meet you, God willing. (Ø)

The President: Let's do that. As soon as your staff knows your exact dates, if you will let us know. I would like very much to see you. Just called to say thank you. I'd welcome any thoughts you would have -- the release of this one hostage, it's kind of a cruel procedure where one is released and they flash pictures of the others. I'm grateful if you ever get any thoughts about that situation, please get in touch. If you hear anything -- I know you're not directly involved -- I'd like to know what you think about this. (Ø)

King Hussein: I am happy to congratulate you for the release of the hostage and hope that the others will follow soon. It shouldn't have ever happened. If there is anything I can do, of course I shall not hesitate to call you. (U)

The President: My respects to Queen Noor. I'm looking forward to seeing you in the fall, if not sooner. (U)

King Hussein: Noor sends regard to you and Mrs. Bush. Best wishes on Easter. (U)

The President: Thanks to you. I hope it will be a good year. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hafiz al-Assad
Notetaker: David Welch
Interpreter: Shukran Kamal

DATE, TIME: April 23, 1990, 1:31 - 1:59 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Bush initiated the call.

The President: Mr. President, I'm George Bush. How are you?
(U)

President Assad: Greetings to you, Mr. President. Thank you very much. How are you? (U)

President Bush: Mr. President, let me say first of all that I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk to you personally. You're very kind to take my call, and I hope that in the future you will not hesitate to call me if there is something you would like to discuss. (U)

President Assad: Thank you. I'm very happy to talk with you. I will speak to you in the future if there are matters that would be helped if we were to talk together. (U)

President Bush: It is good that our first conversation comes at a moment of joy for Robert Polhill and his family. Mr. President, I want you to know how sincerely thankful I am for your personal efforts for the release of Mr. Polhill. I know that this could not have been accomplished without Syria, and I am grateful. I have said this publicly. In my public remarks, I have also signalled my appreciation of Iran's role, although I am not sure I fully understand what that was. But if they did play a helpful role, then I'm grateful. (U)

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President Bush: In my last letter to you, I wrote of the importance of the hostages to me and to my country. I just know that you took my words seriously, as demonstrated by recent events. I realize that you have the other innocent Western hostages on your mind, so I think you will understand that my thoughts have now turned to them. I would like to close this sad chapter. With mutual respect and cooperation, I think you and I can work together to do this. I have said that goodwill begets goodwill, and I mean it. As I hope was clear in my messages to you, I truly believe in the possibility of better U.S.-Syrian relations. I wanted you to hear that directly from me. I am willing to work toward this goal, with fairness and objectivity on my part. Your recent role in the release of Polhill has increased the chances for success; I believe that the chances are brighter now. And now, sir, I would be delighted to hear from you. (C)

President Assad: I share your pleasure about the release of the western hostage yesterday. I was very happy that we were able to make a contribution to this noble, humanitarian effort. Syrian officials and citizens were following all the events on the television news, regarding Polhill and his release. We appreciate the importance of the hostages question and their situation -- including Polhill but also the others. We want this situation to end. We undoubtedly realize and we hope that you recall the efforts we made in the past to obtain the release of other hostages. (U)

President Bush: I do indeed, and with gratitude. (U)

President Assad: In every instance, we felt happy to offer our assistance. Of course, I read with care your letter. The letter strengthened the impression I had of the importance of the hostage question, not just to you but to the U.S. people and to the world. I agree that we must work together to get this matter to the best resolution. I also want to affirm that with regard to your comment on Iran, Iran played a very important role and we cooperated closely with Iran. Iran and Syria have been looking into the matter for some time. We sensed on their part earnestness and sincerity regarding this matter. An agreement between us was necessary to achieve successfully the result that was achieved. I wanted to make this clear to you, Mr. President, so that the picture would be clear to all of us at this time. I repeat that we will work with you to alleviate the pain of the families and to relieve it altogether. (C)

President Bush: I'm convinced that a new day is possible -- at least from the American standpoint -- with Iran if all the hostages are out. We can then open a new book and turn a fresh leaf. But we must get them out. I have said that goodwill

begets goodwill, and I was serious when I said that, but I cannot operate on a piecemeal basis. I cannot relax as long as one American is held. When no Americans are held, then relations will be instantly improved. You can pass this on through your Foreign Minister or others. (Ø)

President Assad: That's true. Our conversation between us now is an important conversation. It will help all the parties, especially Iran. I have my impression and I know that you are serious when you speak to me about these matters. The spirit and atmosphere of this conversation will help us and those who will be working with us in achieving what we want to achieve. This matter requires patience, persistence and wisdom. We all must have these three requirements, but the most important thing is that we should persevere. (Ø)

President Bush: We appreciate the cooperation of your Foreign Minister, Mr. Shara', who personally helped and was very cooperative with our Ambassador. I hope you will convey my respects and gratitude to him. I know Secretary Baker sent him a message. If you don't mind, please tell him I noted his role and I'm grateful. (U)

President Assad: Thank you. The Foreign Minister informed me this morning that Secretary Baker had called him last night. Actually, the Foreign Minister was very delighted with the release of Polhill. There is no doubt that he has the enthusiasm to continue his efforts in this matter. (U)

President Bush: Thank you for the time that you gave to Senator Dole and his colleagues. They gave me a debriefing of their visit and their meeting with you, and I thank you for seeing them. (U)

President Assad: Thank you. Senator Dole left a good impression in Syria. The impressions and good feelings he left were different than the impressions and feelings left by other U.S. official visitors. I hope that his views are not far from your views. (U)

President Bush: He's a good man. He knows you have an important role to play in the quest for an overall peace in the Middle East and Dole made that clear to me after he met with you. (U)

President Assad: I'm certain that Senator Dole conveyed the spirit of our talk. We agreed regarding the importance of peace in the area. We also agreed on the interest of all parties inside and outside the area to reach a comprehensive peace settlement. Peace cannot be complete unless it is comprehensive, and there will be no stability without comprehensive peace. (U)

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President Bush: I understand. I wish you well, Mr. President, and I have great gratitude to you for the significant role you played in freeing this man. If you have any ideas on how to get the others out, I would welcome hearing from you directly or through Ambassador Djerejian, my able Ambassador in whom I have full confidence. (U)

President Assad: God willing. Thank you. I hope we will talk again in the future and I hope that we will achieve more success in the future. (U)

President Bush: Thanks. I would like to wish you and the Syrian people a blessed 'Id holiday. (U)

President Assad: If necessary, we will continue our communications through the channels you have suggested. I wish you good health. Good-bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Virgilio Barco of Colombia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Virgilio Barco Vargas, President of Colombia
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME April 27, 1990, 11:25 - 11:30 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President telephoned President Barco to express his condolences over the Pizarro killing and to reaffirm our support. (U)

The President: Mr. Barco, Mr. President, sir. (U)

President Barco: I am very glad to hear you. (U)

The President: I'm calling because I wanted to say how outraged we are over the murder of Pizarro. Just when it seems the drug lords have gone to the outer limits of brutality, they carry out some even more terrible act. I just wanted to know that we are thinking of you. We wanted to convey our condolences to Pizarro's family. Obviously we did not share a common ideology, but Pizarro had renounced violence and was working within the democratic system. And, it was through your leadership that he had been convinced to compete through the polls and not through bullets. We applauded that and I feel very badly for the people of Colombia. (Ø)

President Barco: It was very bad because it was an example of how we had changed. He had many enemies, but we are almost sure that it was done by the narcotraffickers. (Ø)

The President: But they claimed it, didn't they? (Ø)

President Barco: The killer was only 19. Sometimes they claim and sometimes we are not sure. Now they are using this as a form of paid suicide. They pay him some money and they say to him, "Give it to your mother or girlfriend," and ask him to commit suicide and carry out this killing. (Ø)

The President: Paid suicide, isn't that terrible. The guy must have known he couldn't get out of the airplane. (Ø)

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President Barco: Yes. (U)

The President: I wanted to call and give my condolences and let you know we've had a good visit here with Carlos Andres Perez. We talked about this last night at dinner. I wanted to call and pay my respects and say we are sorry. (C)

President Barco: His (Pizarro's) people are being helpful. He will be buried tomorrow. (C)

The President: I hope they don't have some big demonstration or anything like that which will cause embarrassment to you. Are you saying publicly that he was doing the right thing and that his people have been helpful? (C)

President Barco: He had changed completely. He and his people turned in their armaments. This was a case in which there were five generals from Europe and elsewhere and they witnessed the destruction of the weapons. They started to play the political game everywhere. (C)

The President: This was a good job. It's a shame that the killing happened. I hope his people will continue working in the democratic system. (C)

President Barco: I really appreciated that and hope that his people continue his party. They will continue this policy to play in the democratic way. They only have about six percent in the polls, but this was very important because of the great change of position that they represented. (C)

The President: That is wonderful and I just wanted to identify with you on this. (C)

President Barco: I think it was very much because of the great change they have made as a people and became convinced of the democratic way. I appreciate your call. I saw the Vice President in Managua. It was wonderful what happened there. They had difficult problems the night before, but it was very good how Carlos Andres Perez helped to resolve them. (C)

The President: The Vice President reported back to me and said he had a good visit. I think he (Perez) did help. We are concerned over the Ortega matter, but we are going to support Violeta and hope this works out well. (C)

President Barco: I think (unintelligible). (U)

The President: Okay, sir, good luck, nice talking to you! Thank you, good bye. (U)

President Barco: Thank you, good bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak
of Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Richard N. Haass, NSC, Notetaker

DATE, TIME May 4, 1990; 10:29 - 10:36 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call to President Hosni Mubarak. (U)

The President: Hello, Hosni. I hear it's your birthday and I wanted to call and wish you a happy birthday and wish you all the best. Wish I were as young as you. (U)

President Mubarak: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Listen, I was just checking in with you and following your travel. I just got your recent letter and I'll get back to you formally on that. But I was interested in wishing you a happy birthday and wanted to stay in touch and would like you to share your assessment of Assad. The guy's been helpful on the hostages and I wondered if you had talked to him. (U)

President Mubarak: I spoke to him about the hostages and he promised he's doing the maximum. If he rushes them, they may kill them. He's doing as much as he can. (U)

The President: He's dealing in good faith and I told him that. (U)

President Mubarak: He told me and he's very pleased and doing every effort. (U)

The President: And the rest of your visit went okay? Looks like you moved him in the peace process. (U)

President Mubarak: Very good and he agreed with me. Very good progress. (U)

The President: That's great. Sorry we haven't moved forward on your 10 points. It's very difficult with no government in Israel. (U)

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President Mubarak: We're waiting until there's a government, but we're working with the Arabs to prepare the ground for the next move, with the cooperation of the United States of course. (U)

The President: We'll try to facilitate things. We're proud of your leadership. Hang in there. How are you doing? Any vacation this year? (U)

President Mubarak: There is no vacation in this troubled area. I'm going to Moscow and Peking. (U)

The President: Give my respects to Gorbachev. When are you going? (U)

President Mubarak: I will be in Peking next Friday and Moscow on the 14th. (U)

The President: You know of our difficulties with China. We're trying to keep our relationship, so if you could, advise them to move forward. It's getting difficult for me to hold a relationship with no response. I'm under fire here in the United States. (U)

President Mubarak: If you have any points, send them to me. (U)

The President: Do you think you will see Deng? I hear he's on the sidelines. (U)

President Mubarak: I will see everybody. Tell me who you want me to speak to and I will speak to him. (U)

The President: I have great respect for Deng. If you talk to him, tell him we're trying to keep the relationship on track but it's getting increasingly difficult. (U)

President Mubarak: I will tell him public opinion in the United States is very important. I will tell them it's not the same as China or the Soviet Union. (U)

The President: Hope you have a good trip to Moscow. It's a difficult time for Gorbachev. Tell him I'm looking forward to seeing him despite our problems with Lithuania. (U)

President Mubarak: I'll tell him. (U)

The President: More important, give our love to your beautiful wife. (U)

President Mubarak: She sends wishes to you and Barbara. (U)

The President: How are your sons? (U)

President Mubarak: They are fine, they are sitting here. (U)

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The President: Sitting there? Why aren't they working? We need them to add to the gross national product in Egypt. (U)

President Mubarak: Now my son. (U)

Son: How are you, Mr. President? (U)

The President: How are you these days? (U)

Son: We are well. We are celebrating my father's birthday. (U)

The President: I told him I'd like to be as young as he is. I'd really like to be as young as you are. (U)

Son: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Where's your brother? (U)

Son: He's in London. (U)

The President: All my best to you boys. Tell your dad goodbye for me. (U)

Son: I'll let him tell you. (U)

President Mubarak: Thank you. We'll see you. (U)

The President: All right, so long. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak
of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
C. David Welch, NSC, Notetaker

DATE, TIME May 23, 1990; 9:33 - 9:40 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call to President Hosni Mubarak. (U)

The President: Hello, Hosni, how are you? Where are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Hello, George. I'm fine. I'm in Cairo. How are you? (U)

The President: Jim Baker filled me in on the good conversation you had in Moscow last week. As I expect you know from Jim's conversation with my good friend Abdel Meguid, we are very concerned about the increase in violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories. I am also worried about this long break in the peace process. I wonder if I can go through a couple of points on this, and get your ideas. (P)

President Mubarak: Go ahead, please. (P)

The President: We are somewhat relieved that Arafat has chosen on his own not to come to New York, because frankly, in my view, his coming would only play into the hands of those Israelis who are looking for excuses even now not to move on peace. A point might come when Arafat's visiting here would help but I am pleased that he decided not to do it now. We don't want to play into the hands of the radicals. We are concerned about Geneva as well, given the cost -- you know what we owe the U.N.; I'm embarrassed about it -- and the unhelpful rhetoric; so, there are misgivings about Geneva, but we will not pose a formal objection. I realize that passions and emotions are high. (P)

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The President: I would also appreciate anything you can do to keep things calm and moderate in Baghdad (at the Arab Summit). I realize it might be a stormy session. But words count for a lot in the Middle East, and the last thing we all need are any more complications. I hope that any criticism of Soviet Jewish immigration can distinguish between people going to Israel and those settling in the Occupied Territories. That's one suggestion. I hope that you can make clear that the United States is opening up its doors to Soviet citizens. We are up from 20,000 two years ago to 70,000 this year. That's a little fact that you can use. I also hope that the Summit does not come out against what you and we have been trying to do in the peace process. We face enough challenges as it is. Those are just some of the points that I thought of. (Ø)

President Mubarak: These points I know very well, George. I realize your position on the immigration; we never speak of immigration in this way (i.e., to oppose Soviet Jews going to Israel). I am lobbying my brothers on these matters. (Ø)

The President: That is encouraging, Hosni. On the UN resolution, as we have mentioned to you we are prepared to vote "yes" on a simple, clean Security Council resolution that deplores Israeli settlement activity in the territories occupied since 1967. If we can get wording that is simply a reiteration of U.S. policy, then we are not the obstacle, we would even be prepared to table our own text given my own concerns. But we can't be pushed beyond U.S. policy. If a statement of that nature helps... (Ø)

President Mubarak: Be sure that I am doing my best. I am going to meet with Arafat and the others and we hope that the Summit comes out well. I expect so. (U)

The President: We will try hard with Gorbachev next week, but there are some serious concerns with the Baltic states, financing arrangements, and Germany. Thank you for your cable about China. (Ø)

President Mubarak: You are welcome. I had a good talk and they are pleased. I welcome your decision yesterday. (U)

The President: Well, it's not quite all done yet. If you are talking to them, we need something from them -- they are holding a lot of dissidents and they should release them. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will speak with their Ambassador. (U)

The President: So how are you doing? (U)

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President Mubarak: Things are going well. We are going to have elections for the Parliament in the fall. Everything is going smoothly. (U)

The President: Well, it was good to talk to you. If you ever want to talk to me, just pick up the phone. I appreciate your friendship and talking to you. (U)

President Mubarak: Thank you. Our best to Barbara and the family. (U)

The President: My regards to the boys and Suzanne. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon btw Pres & Mulroney on May 24, 1990

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Violeta Chamorro, President of Nicaragua
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli
Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg

DATE, TIME May 25, 1990, 9:33 - 9:38 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President telephoned President Chamorro to congratulate her on the passing of the legislation for aid to Nicaragua. (U)

The President: Senora Presidente, como esta (Mrs. President, how are you), how are you Violeta? (U)

President Chamorro: How are you, dear Mr. President? (U)

The President: I am calling you to say that finally we have approved the aid bill. It has not been signed yet but it will be later today or tomorrow. It is strictly a question of paperwork now. But the bill has been approved and the money will be on its way very, very soon. (U)

President Chamorro: Thank you very much, Mr. President. God bless you. And I hope that the signature can come this afternoon. (U)

The President: Well, if not this afternoon then tomorrow; and it is strictly paperwork. I am going up to see Barbara in Maine this afternoon and they will send the paperwork to me when it's done and I will sign it then. I see that the Senate has also approved my new Ambassador. They acted very fast, it all came at the same time. I wish they would have gone as fast on the aid bill. Listen, we are all proud of you. When you get the money, if you have anything you need to talk to me about, any additional problems, please do not hesitate to give me a call. I am looking forward to seeing you some time along the way. (U)

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President Chamorro: I understood everything you said, even in English. I would like you to give Barbara a big hug for me. It's a miracle, it really does seem like a miracle that all the Democrats and the Republicans have come together to approve the aid to Nicaragua and Panama today because it is the 30-day anniversary -- one month -- for me and my government. I am going to take advantage of this and go public to appeal to the Nicaraguan people. This will be a stimulus for the people of Nicaragua to work hard on agriculture and humanitarian activities. It will really be an encouragement for the people of Nicaragua. (U)

The President: Well, keep up the good work. Barbara and I take great pride in what you are doing and Jebbie does too. We are all proud of you. From all the Bush family, and the whole country, we are proud of you. We are all pulling for you, and good luck. (U)

President Chamorro: Muchas gracias. I want to send you a hug and a kiss. Thank you and God bless you all. With friends like you, I am always thinking of you. (U)

The President: Muchas gracias, mi amiga. Good bye and good luck. (U)

President Chamorro: God bless. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Guillermo Endara of Panama (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Guillermo Endara, President of Panama
Notetaker: Cornelius F. O'Leary

DATE, TIME May 25, 1990, 10:09 - 10:13 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President telephoned President Endara to inform him of the passing of the appropriation for Panama. (U)

The President: I was calling to tell you that the Congress passed the appropriation for Panama last night. I intend to sign it as soon as it reaches my desk; probably today while I'm in Maine or maybe tomorrow. I'm sorry it took so long. (U)

President Endara: Thank you for the effort. We were confident that this was going to go through, we know there are delays in a democracy, where you have two parties -- we were very, very confident of the U.S. (U)

The President: Well, it was a bipartisan effort. Good luck. I don't know exactly when the funds get transferred, but we'll speed that up. I hope to get the paper signed today, it is a done deal. (U)

President Endara: Very good. Vice President Billy Ford would like to say hello to you. (U)

The President: Wonderful, would love to say hello to him. (U)

Vice President Ford: Mr. President -- God bless you for all your support. (U)

The President: Well, thank you -- I'm just embarrassed that it took so long. I appreciate your understanding. I'm just glad it's finished. God bless you and keep up the good work. If there is anything we can do from here, let us know.

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Vice President Ford: Wonderful, we will make proper use of the funds. We won't let you down. I'll talk to the other members. You've been a real leader. (C)

The President: Your visit and the President's visit here also helped. Good luck! Keep up the great work for democracy. (C)

Vice President Ford: Thank you very, very much and give my best to Mrs. Bush. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon btw Pres & Mulroney on May 29, 1990

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon btw Pres & Mulroney on May 30, 1990

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME May 30, 1990, 7:34 - 7:43 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office (C)

The President: Helmut! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good morning! How are you? (U)

The President: I am getting ready for the big visit. I am glad to hear your voice. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That is why I am calling. I wanted to exchange views for a couple of minutes. One thing, George: you can rely on our fullest support. I acknowledge very much what you have done for us and appreciate your friendship and reliability. One thing that is very important for Gorbachev to understand is that irrespective of developments, we will stand side by side. And one sign of this cooperation are the links between us by the future membership of a united Germany in NATO without any limitations. You should make this clear to him, but in a friendly way, and also make it clear that is the view I hold. There should be no doubt about that. A second point: we can find a sensible economic arrangement with him. He needs help very much. He should also know that we have no intention of profiting from his weakness. A final point: it is of immense importance that we make further progress in disarmament. (C)

The President: I appreciate your comments very much. On the German Question, as it is called, I don't expect much breakthrough. I won't change my views, but I will assure him we are side by side. We will lay out our views on the Two Plus Four, including the need to terminate Four Power rights at the time of unification, with no new constraints on German sovereignty. We want him to come out feeling he has had a good Summit, even though there are no major breakthroughs. I think we can do it. We have a wide range of agreements to sign. On the economic side, I remember your private conversation with me. Subsequently, that has been raised, with Jim Baker. We have problems with that, related to Lithuania. But I will take your advice. I don't want him to think we are taking advantage of him

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because of his weakness. We will move the arms control agenda forward, but he must realize that on conventional forces, those are Alliance decisions. We can talk about this in general terms, but on matters like the levels of German forces, beyond those already on the table, we cannot make commitments. We really appreciated your offer to help on levels of the Bundeswehr, but we feel it is a little premature. Brent Scowcroft has gotten to Horst Teltschik on that. But it was a very generous offer on your part. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: George, to make this very clear: the wind blew some rumors my way, and I instructed Teltschik to approach Brent Scowcroft. I said we can discuss everything, but we have to agree beforehand before we reach agreement. Nothing is going to change on that. You can rely on it. (C)

The President: Good. I think we are up to date. I look forward to seeing you next week. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am very much looking forward to it. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (Ø)

Participants: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME May 31, 1990, 9:00-9:13 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Good morning, Brian. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'm sorry to interrupt, George, because I know Gorbachev is arriving shortly. (U)

The President: I'm here with John, the Vice President, Brent and Bob Gates. We're having a brief review before we see Gorbachev. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I neglected to mention when we spoke last night two points that I had raised with Gorbachev, probably because I'm so preoccupied with the domestic situation here. (Ø)

The President: I'll have Brent listen in. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I talked to Henry, Brent. (Ø)

The President: Did I misunderstand? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: No, I clarified it. Gorbachev misunderstood. (Ø)

On Cuba, I said to Gorbachev "you must understand that Cuba represents an unacceptable situation for George Bush. You continue to fund this little dictatorial regime with \$6 billion per year. You must understand this creates a problem for George Bush. You must also understand that Cuban-Americans play a big role in the Republican party. You have to understand that this is a fundamental issue for George Bush and Jim Baker". (Ø)

The President: That's very helpful, Brian. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I reminded Gorbachev he had said that your understanding of his problems on the German question would be a litmus test of the success of the summit. I said I

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assumed he was also talking about his readiness to support you on other questions such as U.S. policy in the Middle East. Gorbachev said he was. I said that I didn't know if there had been an American President in recent memory who was more even-handed on the Middle East than George Bush. I told him that anything he could do to help George Bush break new ground on the Middle East at the summit would help. Gorbachev said he was impressed by that. (S)

The President: Let me make an important point. The PLO attack today is a new level of futility. It was a stupid damn thing. Arafat has to denounce it. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He's undermining your efforts and playing into Shamir's hands. (S)

The President: I appreciate the call and the way you've handled Gorbachev. The fascinating part was that Gorbachev felt the U.S. was leading a NATO-led conspiracy. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He was intense. Just the two of us were in the office. I told him that if he thought a couple of us had produced the events in Germany, he was giving us more credit than we deserved, or that our own publics were giving us. I said that democracy had produced those events in Germany. I brought up Cuba again and said he had to understand. (S)

The President: Listen, Brian, I want you to know that when Mulroney calls, I listen. You suggested I take a look at Article II of the NATO Treaty and the words of Lester Pearson (President read aloud text of Article II). I think this is damn good language that could help convince Gorbachev not to see NATO as a threat. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He appears to see NATO as an institution with long-term survivability. (S)

The President: Brian, we want to support you on EXPO 2000. On the bigger question, just call me if there is something I can do to help. Anything our side can do to strengthen your hand, we'll do. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I appreciate it. (U)

When the question of the Baltics came up in our press conference, I said the creation of Canada's union had been led by Quebec and that there could be no comparing Canada to the Baltics. I said we were moving on domestic constitutional reform. (S)

General Scowcroft: That was a great statement of yours. (S)

The President: What do you make of this military aide thing? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I really don't know. He came to lunch without his military aide. (S)

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The President: I told my guys how beneficial your conversations with him were. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Raisa and Mila got along well. She is very influential with him, and there is clearly a lot of mutual respect there. She told Mila that, contrary to some previous visits, she was looking forward to Washington and to spending time with Barbara. There was a clear implication there that Mila didn't touch. Raisa is a key to his moods. (C)

The President: Barbara will treat her well and make sure she is comfortable with her. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I would suggest you get together with them casually, be informal and even digress from the program. (C)

The President: We'll do two things differently. First, Barbara will take Raisa upstairs after their coffee this morning. We've not done that before. Second, we'll have the Gorbachevs upstairs before the State dinner tonight. And, we'll also spend a day with them at Camp David. I think the mood we'll set should dispel any feelings of hostility. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: On the personal side, let me make a suggestion. You have that lovely daughter in Maine--this guy loves kids and grandchildren; it's genuine. You might bring her down with her kids to loosen things up. (C)

The President: Okay. Thanks so much. If you need a shoulder to cry on, let me know. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We'll struggle through, George. (C)

The President: I just ache for your problems. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We're proud of what you are doing. Hang in there. (U)

Good luck. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME June 1, 1990, 4:03 - 4:23 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office (U)

The President: Helmut! How are you doing? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine, thanks. How are you? (U)

The President: I am calling to give you a play-by-play, an up to date report. I thought you'd be interested in where we stand. We talked about German unification for about two hours yesterday afternoon. In the first place, Gorbachev seemed very personable. He was animated, but not confrontational. I made the point very clearly that a united Germany is no threat to anyone, including the Soviet Union, and I told him that Germany, in our view, has earned its place in the new Europe, that it will work for the collective good, and that Germany wanted good relations with the Soviet Union. I told him that right from my heart, knowing that you believe that. I of course supported your position very steadily that a united Germany should remain a full member of NATO, and that was our strongly held position. I did tell him that Germany is a democracy and it will be up to them to choose its alliance arrangements, but that our position is the same as yours -- that a united Germany should be a full member of NATO. I told him the German sovereignty must be complete at the time of unification, and I stressed that Germany should not be singled out for special status after unification. We used the word "singularization." (Ø)

He came back with the screwy idea that Germany should belong to both alliances -- have two anchors, as he put it. He returned to this several times, referring to a long transition period. He started off this discussion, Helmut, by saying that a united Germany in NATO would upset the balance. But actually, his comments seemed directed at NATO itself as much as Germany's

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membership in NATO. So he came back to the idea of a transition period as "new European security structures" are developed. He wasn't clear on what these structures might look like -- he was much more focused on getting through the transition. I had the sense that he was still feeling his way and that his position is not totally fixed. And he seemed to accept my argument that Germany should not be singled out, although he didn't specifically agree to that. Near the end of the thing, I thought he kind of agreed with my position that I support Germany's full membership in NATO but that it was up to Germany to decide. But then he returned to the idea of a transition period. (C)

He also took a strong interest in how NATO might change its doctrine, and I read him Article 2 of the NATO Charter, which Brian Mulroney had called to my attention, just to show him NATO's political character. And he took an interest in how NATO might evolve to become more a political alliance and how NATO and the Warsaw Pact might cooperate. In my view, it will be vitally important that we take steps at the NATO Summit to convince him that NATO is changing in ways that do not threaten Soviet security. (C)

We had no agreement at all, but then there was no hostility. And I had an opportunity to say Germany had earned its place and must not be singled out. So let me call you on Sunday or maybe Monday to let you know what else comes up today and at Camp David on Saturday. But I'm not even sure we will get back to that. (C)

One final point, Helmut: de Maiziere, the new East German Prime Minister, will be coming here on June 11. I'm going to have a meeting and a working lunch with him. He will bring his Foreign Minister, Meckel, with him. I think it will be a good opportunity to push our case with them. I would welcome a cable from you with any advice you have. And I look forward to seeing you on June 8, before that visit, so we can talk. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We will be meeting before the de Maiziere visit. (U)

The President: Yes, on the 8th. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Then we can talk about the visit. (U)

The President: Okay. If you have any questions, just ask. I think we made headway, though there was no agreement. But when we have a press conference, he won't try to make it a big difference. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Have you made progress in other areas? (U)

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The President: It has been difficult on Lithuania, and thus on a trade treaty. On arms control, we will sign some agreements on START -- nothing spectacular -- and a good one on chemical weapons. The one that's causing him heartburn, though, is the trade agreement. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Did he say anything about economic aid? (Ø)

The President: Not yet. I think he'll hit me with that tomorrow at Camp David. I told him that would be the time for frank talks. There have been some hints, but nothing as definite as in your discussions with him, or Baker's in Moscow. I expect to hear more tomorrow. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: George, on the German issue once again: I firmly stand by our position, and I would like to repeat once again why. Isolating Germany would have disastrous consequences for developments in Europe. If a united Germany is not in NATO, you and I know the U.S. would not remain in Europe, because there would be no more NATO. Then we would come to a point in Europe, a situation where the two nuclear countries -- France and Great Britain, would move closer together -- and the smaller nations would fall out of the security structure. Denmark, the Benelux, even Spain, Portugal, and Italy -- where would they go? (Ø)

There is another problem, which people here aren't thinking of. Because we will continue to expand the EC, destroying NATO would have disastrous consequences for unifying Europe through the EC. Therefore we are not willing to discuss Germany's not being in NATO. Give some thought to the following. I'll probably meet him pretty soon. (I'll go into details when we talk on Friday, in a small group.) We should tell him that's not the way to go. We are quite willing to move to quite close cooperation with the Soviet Union once unification is complete, but we are not willing to pay any price for singularization. This was disastrous for Weimar Germany, and it would be disastrous today. Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia -- they don't want it, either. (Ø)

The President: I told him that, and I think he understands. I also think he understands the singularization point. He just didn't agree. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: We have to change his mind. (Ø)

The President: You have no problem saying that Germany, under Helsinki, has the right to belong to NATO or not belong? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Precisely. We believe that. But we still have to change his mind. George, I do think the economic side is more important. (Ø)

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The President: I thought I had gotten him to agree, first, that Germany should be in NATO if it wants to be, and, second, if Germany decides not to be in NATO, that should be Germany's choice. I thought he agreed to that, but then he got into the transition stuff. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: I think when he talks about the transition, he is talking about the economic side. I don't think he can solve his economic problems without help. (P)

The President: Yes. If you would like, I'll call on Sunday. I think we've pretty much covered European security. The next step will be up to you or whoever sees him next. But I'm not worried about this. I'm not discouraged. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm not discouraged, either. George, I would be happy for you to call Sunday night, the same time as now. I will be at home, in Ludwigshafen. You know the number. (P)

The President: Okay. Good luck. We'll keep your interests in mind. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I know that. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME June 3, 1990, 3:39 - 3:48 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Helmut! How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine. How are you? (U)

The President: Good. We have had good meetings.... (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I saw the coverage on television. Everything
looked good; it left a good impression. (U)

The President: I'm delighted to hear that. There was a good
mood yesterday at Camp David. It was very relaxed, with a very
good ambience. We sat on the terrace and talked for hours. I
will be sending you a letter, probably tonight, on my meetings
with Gorbachev, but I wanted to fill you in on a couple of
specific points. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: One thing, George: I am most interested in how
he sees his position at home. (U)

The President: He seemed to radiate confidence. He didn't seem
concerned about Yeltsin. He tells me there will be a federation
meeting, at which he will have a discussion with Yeltsin and
others on the whole question of the union. Overall, despite his
problems, he seemed confident. A couple of points: Gorbachev
and I didn't return to the question of German unification, except
briefly, but it did come up in our press conference, which you
may have seen. (U)

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Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I saw it. (U)

The President: We left it there. You and I can talk about it next week, but I do want to read you one passage from my statement at the press conference. This is Bush speaking: "I stressed that the long held aspirations of the German people should be met without delay. On the matter of Germany's external alliances -- I believe -- as does Chancellor Kohl and the members of the Alliance -- that the united Germany should be a full member of NATO. President Gorbachev does not hold that view. But we are in full agreement that the matter of alliance membership is -- in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act -- a matter for the Germans to decide." That was in front of the whole world press, and Gorbachev didn't object when I read that last sentence. So the meeting would end up on a pleasant and upbeat note, I had sent my press statement, including that formulation, to Bessmertnykh the night before, and he came back before the press conference to say the Soviet side had no objections. We, of course, will have to see whether this reflects any flexibility on their part. (Ø)

In any event, we still have a lot of work to do. And I think a lot will depend on having a successful NATO Summit, which shows that the Alliance is changing in ways that can reduce the understandable concerns of the Soviet Union. So our NATO meeting takes on more importance. Lastly, he did raise the matter -- but only briefly -- of major Western economic assistance to the Soviet Union. I prefer not to talk about that on the open line, but I told him that I wanted to help. You and I can talk about this next week. So, that's where we stand. I'll send a letter and we can talk in more detail when we get together on June 8. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Many thanks, and thanks especially for your kind support. (U)

The President: It's easy for me to do. We feel strongly about this, too. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: One request: I would like to have received your letter prior to 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday. My plane leaves for New York at noon. (U)

The President: Yes. I'll be sure you get that. I think we'll be getting it out tonight. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4857

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME June 3, 1990, 3:58 - 4:08 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Margaret! (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: How nice of you to ring. It has been a very interesting few days. It came across marvelously. (U)

The President: I'm glad. That's our feeling, too, and I think the Soviet side was also satisfied. I asked Gorbachev how it would play at home, and he said he was pleased. We had good discussions on matters of direct interest to you. We didn't resolve issues of British defenses, and we didn't try to. I'm going to send you a report, but there was nothing new in his position concerning British defenses and START. But he was quite optimistic that we could conclude a START agreement. On the German Question, I don't know if you have seen a transcript of our press conference. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: No, not yet. (U)

The President: Let me read you three sentences from my opening statement, which we had sent over to the Soviet Embassy out of courtesy, to give them an opportunity to modify it or tone it down. They did not object to it. Let me just read it to you. "I (that's George Bush) stressed that the long held aspirations of the German people should be met without delay. On the matter of Germany's external alliances -- I believe -- as does

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Chancellor Kohl and the members of the Alliance -- that the united Germany should be a full member of NATO. President Gorbachev does not hold that view. But we are in full agreement that the matter of alliance membership is -- in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act -- a matter for the Germans to decide." He didn't object when he had a chance at the press conference. In our meeting, I said Germany should be in NATO, but it's their right to decide, in keeping with the Helsinki Final Act. He said fine, but then he got into this stuff about a transition period. So there was little change on Germany. (Ø)

On regional issues, we had a very open discussion on a wide array of topics, including a joint effort to help the people starving in Ethiopia. It's a small thing, compared to all the world events we discussed, but I see it as a good sign. Yesterday, we went to Camp David, sat on the terrace -- you've been there -- and took our ties off. It was just the two of us, with Baker and Scowcroft on our side. He had Akhromeyev and Shevardnadze with him. We talked for hours, with no structure. So the mood and ambience was very positive. He is not overly concerned about his domestic problems. I do have problems on Lithuania, as you do, and I told him where I stand. He knows I will be criticized for signing the trade agreement. I was trying to send Gorbachev the message that we're going to try to help him where we can. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: But there was no movement on Germany?
(Ø)

The President: No, except on the point that a united Germany could be in NATO, but they have the right to decide. He said okay, but then talked about transitional arrangements. But we will keep at it. Who will see him next -- Kohl, or is it you?
(Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'm the next. But you have given him a big boost. (Ø)

The President: Oddly, the trip that Barb and Raisa took up to Wellesley -- it sounds like a small thing, but it was very well received here. The Soviet side said the same. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, I thought it was terrific. She gave a marvelous speech. (U)

The President: Yes, she didn't let those little Yuppies get her down. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Thatcher: I think it was terrific. We were very impressed. This couldn't have happened two years ago. (C)

The President: I will send you my report. Call if I can be of any help. We should stay in close touch. At one point he said, what about our being in NATO? I said we can talk about anything. I told him plans to have a broad agenda at NATO, and I read him Article Two to show that the Alliance doesn't have to be seen as threatening to him. We had a long talk. He wants an expanded CSCE. He also talked about his economic problems.. I'll report on that over the cable line. But generally, it was a good meeting. (C)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Good. Many congratulations, George, and thank you very much for phoning. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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4471 Add-On

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson, NSC

DATE, TIME June 4, 1990, 7:08 - 7:36pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned Prime Minister Kaifu to bring him up-to-date on the Summit meetings with President Gorbachev. (U)

The President: Toshiki, good morning, its good evening over here. I am just calling to report on meetings with Gorbachev. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Hi Georgie! Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Let me just give you some background and I will be glad to answer some questions. The meetings went well, particularly the relaxed exchange at Camp David. The atmosphere was positive, candid but not confrontational in any way. (U)

There were no breakthroughs on issues such as German unification and Lithuania but we made some progress on narrowing our differences. We made more progress on arms control, on CFE, on strategic arms reduction (START), and on chemical weapons (which is good for the whole world). (U)

On the Asian issues, Roh is meeting with Gorbachev. I have not heard how it went but Gorbachev was pleased to do this although he expects some complaints from North Korea. (U)

I specifically raised the question of the Northern Territories but we did not get any positive movement. However, the matter was strongly raised with him. I told him that we strongly support your position. Maybe when they send someone over for the Gorbachev visit, you can make some progress then. (U)

Incidentally, Gorbachev did share our concern about the lack of a North Korean IAEA agreement and I think that was encouraging. I am seeing Roh Tae Woo at the end of the week and may have more information then. (U)

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On Cambodia, Gorbachev described himself as slightly optimistic. He felt that China was being a little more positive on that, and I am inclined to agree with him. Those were the main issues but there was also a whole lot of other discussion. The mood was pretty good. We now have a flap because of something he said about the Jews from the Soviet Union resettling in the occupied territories which, he said, would cause the Soviets to curb immigration. (Ø)

Those are the main issues. While I have you on the telephone, I want to make a comment on the Final SII Report, which is scheduled for July. (Ø)

I am still very grateful to you for your leadership on this whole trade issue, and the American people now understand that you took a very courageous stand. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: That is a wonderful thing to hear. (U)

The President: Our respective SII teams have met again and I have heard that concern exists on both sides as to the Final Report. Both countries must strengthen our commitments in at least a few areas to ensure that we get a good reception for this Final Report. Any assistance you can give us on this will help. I will try to do my best too. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kaifu: May I ask you two or three questions? (Ø)

The President: Please do. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Well, first of all I would like to extend my congratulations for the U.S.-Soviet Summit that just took place. Did the Soviet Union raise its position on regional security? There was no discussion of broad security guarantees per se. We talked mainly about security as it related to the various countries. We talked about Cambodia and Korea, and I reaffirmed our position with Japan on security. I told Gorbachev we would not be concerned about greatly improved relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. I made clear to him that with China we did not want to play a China card. If China and the USSR had better relations, it did not mean that we wouldn't also. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kaifu: The next question is regarding the Korean peninsula. Overall, I feel the North Koreans are sending out very positive signals to the U.S. right now, for example, by returning the remains of American soldiers that are still over there. The North Koreans seem quite upset about the meeting between South Korea and the Soviet Union. But they are sending positive signals to the U.S. How do you feel about that? (Ø)

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The President: We still do not want to have direct consultations with them. We want to make clear to North Korea that signing an IAEA agreement is absolutely essential before we begin to normalize in any way. (P)

The President: I would like to talk to you in detail about that. Maybe we can have a nice, private visit at the time of the Houston Summit. (P)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Actually I would like to take this opportunity to visit you before the summit to discuss these problems. (P)

The President: Well, that would be fine, but we have a scheduling problem. We go out to NATO and then I fly directly from NATO down to Texas. But maybe we could meet before the NATO meeting or on the Saturday or Sunday before the Houston summit. I will juggle my schedule around to accommodate whatever you have in mind. (P)

PM - Thank you very much. I will have Ambassador Murata contact you regarding this. (P)

The President: Fine, and I will tell General Scowcroft about this conversation. Before the Summit in Houston, we have a lot of things to discuss -- no hidden agenda or secret problems but I just wanted to be sure to stay in touch. (P)

Prime Minister Kaifu: That would be wonderful. Another thing I want to mention is Cambodia. Right now there is a meeting going on in Tokyo bringing together the Cambodian factions. I, myself, have met with Prince Sihanouk. There seems to be a problem from the Pol Pot faction represented by Khieu Samphan. However, the talks are going on right now. And, of course, there is a problem with the Hun Sen regime also. Khieu Samphan is expressing his irritation with Hun Sen's participation in the meeting. (P)

As far as SII is concerned, I am personally involved. We are working hard at this, and I would like you to know that. (P)

The President: Again, we are very grateful to you for what has taken place. (P)

The President: Do you have any other subjects you need to talk about? (U)

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Prime Minister Kaifu: That it is it for now. I must run. It is now time to go to the Diet for a session with the financial committee. (U)

The President: OK, Good Luck. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Would it be alright for me to mention that we have had this telephone conversation? (U)

The President: Yes. It would be most appropriate. I think you should say something and we will here because it shows that we keep close consultation. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Good luck my friend. Bye Toshiki. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon btw Pres & Mitterrand on June 5, 1990

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Fernando Collor de Mello, President of Brazil
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME June 6, 1990, 5:37 - 5:46 P.M. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Collor: Mr. President, nice to talk to you. Good of you to call. (U)

The President: Good to hear your voice. I was worried about your little accident. I hope it was not serious. (U)

President Collor: It was the press that saw this happen. Everything is all right, no problem. (U)

The President: I'm pleased to hear that. The reason I am calling is to give you some comments about Gorbachev's visit, nothing you probably haven't read in the newspapers. With your permission, I will tell you. Basically the visit went well. (U)

President Collor: Good. (U)

The President: He of course recalls with fondness the visit you made. He considers you a good friend; he mentioned that. I think it is to our advantage if the Soviets improve relations in this hemisphere. In the meeting itself we talked about these issues, but no decisions came out of it. One was conventional forces in Europe and the German question. All the world has an interest in these. To a certain degree there is a linkage on those questions. Good discussion, Gorbachev is not objecting to the U.S. troop presence in Europe. He agrees with the East and West, that our presence is a stabilizing presence. We didn't have to argue about keeping U.S. forces in Europe. I understand that he has difficulty with a united Germany in NATO, but we may

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have made some headway on this. Countries have the right to choose what alliance they want to belong to. Hungary says it wants to be in NATO. There was much more interest in how you deal with European unification. We are going to expand the NATO missions, to include political and economic aspects. We will meet at the NATO summit to do that. He seemed quite agreeable.

(Ø)

President Collor: I think your actions on proximity with Gorbachev are fundamental for the world and for the occidental world. (Ø)

I think we can't leave Mr. Gorbachev alone. The psychological support you are giving him is very, very important. In my point of view you are conducting your foreign policy very, very well and we in Brazil agree with this scenario and are very enthusiastic. We feel that the occidental world is in good hands -- your hands. We are trying in Brazil our best efforts to introduce Brazil into the new world. We want to show people of the world who don't agree with market economy and market forces.

(Ø)

The President: We are going to keep on working on this. I appreciate your kind comments about that and we will keep going. That man has enormous economic problems. We are trying to treat him with a certain respect. We don't want to show that we won and they lost. (Ø)

The man has got big problems and we want to deal with him from a position of dignity. (Ø)

I appreciate your kind words. (U)

President Collor: This morning I was with Carla Hills. (Ø)

The President: Thank you for mentioning that. I view her trip as very important. (Ø)

President Collor: She is in Brazil and we had good talks. (Ø)

The President: She is a strong woman, and economic and trade wise that is very well. I made a note to ask you to talk to her. She is very close to me and will report personally. I hope the talks were productive. (Ø)

President Collor: Of course. All of your team is very good and close to Brazil and close to my government too. (Ø)

The President: On the rest of the summit, we have differences on Lithuania which we discussed frankly. The U.S. has the position that we never recognized their incorporation into the Soviet Union. Lithuania should be free and have the right to self determination. Gorbachev spoke eloquently, saying that under the

Soviet constitution republics can secede, but they have to follow legal procedures. Lithuania says procedures take too long. We can discuss that kind of thing without anybody getting mad. They know our position, and how strongly I feel. Maybe that will make a difference. (Ø)

President Collor: Fantastic, fantastic it is great. Thank you very much for calling. (Ø)

The President: One thing -- this is your business -- we are interested in (nuclear) safeguards but do not see any movement. This is something we're in agreement with the Soviets. It causes us difficulty. Let me reiterate the importance of the Tlatelolco Treaty to us. (Ø)

President Collor: What? (U)

The President: Tlatelolco. (U)

President Collor: Tlatelolco; oh, yes. (U)

The President: We're interested in seeing Tlatelolco waived into force with full scope safeguards. There is great interest in that up here. (Ø)

President Collor: If you agree, you can give instructions to your Ambassador to talk with us. (Ø)

The President: All right, we can do that, I will take care of that tonight to present our case to the foreign minister.

President Collor: Perfect. (U)

The President: On a personal note, how is your beautiful wife? (U)

President Collor: Fine, thank you very much. Mrs. Bush, how is she? (U)

The President: She has this funny disease called Graves Disease but she is doing well. She swims a mile a day and is feeling better. (U)

President Collor: Nice to talk to you. (U)

The President: Best of luck. (U)

President Collor: Thank you very much. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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4584 ADD ON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak
of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
C. David Welch, NSC, Notetaker

DATE, TIME June 8, 1990; 10:33 - 1042 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Iowa

President Mubarak initiated the call; the President, traveling in Iowa, was patched through by White House Signal. (Ø)

The President: Hello, Hosni, how are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Hello, George, how are you? (U)

The President: I'll bet I know what you're calling about. Well, I'm worried about the same thing, the dialogue with the PLO. But I'm delighted to hear from you -- I followed your role in Baghdad, and I want to tell you how much I appreciated it. (U)

President Mubarak: I sent you a message two hours ago outlining the situation. Did you receive it? (Ø)

The President: No, I didn't see it, but I am in Iowa. When did you send it? (Ø)

President Mubarak: I sent it about four hours ago. Please read it. It is regarding the U.S.-PLO dialogue. It is very important to keep it (the dialogue) now; if it is cut, it will create a hell of a problem. (Ø)

The President: I realize that but there's another side. We have concerns about these acts of terrorism. The PLO has renounced terror but can't bring itself to denounce it. If they (the PLO) don't denounce this terrorist action now it will be difficult to maintain a dialogue with them. Have you got any idea what he (Arafat) will do? (Ø)

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President Mubarak: It is very difficult for Arafat. There are different Palestinian factions that want to destroy peace. These groups, like Abul Abbas and Habash, want to destroy Arafat, so they are doing this to corner him. (Ø)

The President: Is he so weak that he can't condemn it? (Ø)

President Mubarak: There is a balance of factions. Some do not want to put it (terrorism) to an end. (Ø)

The President: Hosni, let me add something. We have other serious concerns about the PLO and terrorism beyond this event alone. I think the bottom line is clear: We would prefer to keep the dialogue going but the PLO needs to make its choice also. I think that they think they are not getting anything for these talks. There is a need to push the peace process. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I am trying, but it is difficult. There is a great benefit for your friends in the Arab world from the dialogue. (Ø)

The President: I agree -- but this thing was so obvious. Did you see that kid on TV talking about shooting up hotels and vacationers? It would be hard to sustain the dialogue if Arafat won't denounce that. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I'll try and will do what I can to get him to make a statement. I'm doing a big effort with my neighbor (Libya). They are in a terrible mess. You know he came here right from Yemen. He's sending them out of Libya (the PLF) -- the whole Abul Abbas group. I am also telling Shamir not to retaliate now. (Ø)

The President: Your message is not here yet. There is a need to denounce the act; then everything can be sustained. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I am pressuring my neighbor. Really, I am putting a hell of a pressure on him. He's sending those people out. (Ø)

The President: I hate this situation. I agree the talks have been very good for the other moderates, the reasonable countries. But this goes against the covenant he made. If he could denounce it, then we could hold the line. I'm getting pressure from a lot of quarters. (Ø)

President Mubarak: The composition of this council (the PLO Executive Committee) is terrible. It is very difficult for him to control. (Ø)

The President: I saw that one member of the committee denounced it. Arafat should say so himself. If he denounces Abul Abbas, then that gives us something to work with. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will try; I'll do it today. (U)

The President: We see that a new government is being formed in Israel. There are difficulties ahead... (Ø)

President Mubarak: That's life. (U)

The President: We will push ahead for the peace process. (U)

President Mubarak: I will wait for a few days until the new government settles in. I'll try contacting Shamir again. (Ø)

The President: That's helpful. I must say, he says the right things. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Well, goodbye George. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Michael Manley
Notetaker: David Pacelli

DATE, TIME June 8, 1990, 10:58 - 11:01 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office/Miami Heart Institute

The President called Prime Minister Manley at the Miami Heart Institute, Florida, to check on his progress, assure him of his personal concern, and offer assistance if needed. (U)

The President: (Call in progress -- not heard.)

Prime Minister Manley: Can I congratulate you on your superb performance during the Gorbachev visit? (U)

The President: Thank you. We still have big problems of course. I was impressed with him. We'll try to keep on an even keel on Lithuania. I am seeing Kohl on the German situation today. (Missing words.) Thanks for your kind words. I am determined to see these things through. (Missing words) (✓)

Prime Minister Manley: Well, the whole world is behind you. (U)

The President: Nice of you to put it that way. Tell me how you are doing, and then I'll let you go. (U)

Prime Minister Manley: Well, I am shut up here with double pneumonia. I really did not take very good care of myself. Everyone at the hospital has been terribly kind, terribly kind. I have to get ready for the middle of next week. I have this damn operation to get ready for. (✓)

The President: Do you have to have an operation? (✓)

Prime Minister Manley: Yes, I have cancer of the prostate. (✓)

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The President: Yes, Yes. (U)

Prime Minister Manley: I have to get in shape for it, like Mike Tyson getting in shape for a fight. (Ø)

The President: We are all rooting for you -- anything we can do, medical, anything at all, you just pick up the phone and we'll take care of it. (Ø)

Prime Minister Manley: That is very nice of you. I know you will lick the German question. (Ø)

The President: [Not heard.] Well, we're all wishing you all the best. (U)

Prime Minister Manley: I want you to know how very important this call was to me. God bless you. (Ø)

The President: Thank you very much. Take care of yourself. Goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister Manley: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC staff

DATE, TIME June 8, 1990, 6:35 - 6:45 p.m.
AND PLACE: Situation Room

The President initiated the telephone conversation, which occurred shortly after the news that Prime Minister Mulroney had successfully completed his negotiations to keep alive the Meech Lake Accord. (Ø)

The President: Brian, you must be feeling a lot better. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We got it done. It took seven days and nights but I got the First Ministers of Newfoundland and Labrador to go along. I will be going back to the Cabin for further negotiations, but I feel a hell of a lot better. (Ø)

The President: I sighed with relief after I learned the result of your all-night session. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I hope you got our message. Barbara's speech last night was a work of art. She was terrific. Her message was eloquently done; she's a real orator. (U)

The President: Well we don't want to overdo the praise, but I agree that she was good. Another thing I wanted to mention was that I will be seeing President Salinas for supper tonight. I will be telling him that we are prepared to go forward on the discussions towards a US-Mexican Free Trade Agreement, although I do not think the pace that he wants to set is realistic. In principle, however, I am for it and a number of Senators agree. We will have problems with labor and with others, however. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I had encouraged Salinas to go ahead with his plans for a Free Trade Agreement, but I told him that he should be realistic and understand the problems that he is going to have in selling it. (Ø)

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The President: Brian, once again, well done! It is wonderful what you have been able to do. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I have never had a more difficult or wrenching time. I will be happy when it's over. (U)

The President: Good luck, and it was nice talking to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MULRONEY

JUNE 10 PRESIDENT CALLED MULRONEY AT 1834 FROM
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak
of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
C. David Welch, NSC, Notetaker

DATE, TIME June 12, 1990; 12:43 - 12:49 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Mubarak initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hi, Hosni, how are you doing? (U)

President Mubarak: Hello, George. Happy Birthday to you! (U)

The President: Let me tell you, Hosni, don't turn 66 -- it makes you feel old! Thanks for your birthday wishes. (U)

President Mubarak: My whole family extends congratulations. George, I'm trying hard with these people, with the PLO. (U)

The President: Any luck? (U)

President Mubarak: Nothing new. There is the statement of two days ago. They are forming a committee for investigation. The committee should finish its investigation in two to three weeks. (U)

The President: Well, I hope they speed it up; the committee should report more quickly. The pressure here is mounting. (U)

President Mubarak: I know; I assure you I am trying my best. George, I want to tell you something -- some factions in the PLO want the dialogue to be frozen. This is my concern. (U)

The President: I agree. There is a problem there with the factions and there is a problem in the other country as well. I agree with you about the factions. That's why we have called for certain actions that would facilitate keeping the dialogue. A statement by Arafat publicly condemning the attack would help. (U)

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President Mubarak: Most of the Executive Committee want it to end. Some of them want this to hurt Egypt, so that we are in a bad situation with Israel. (Ø)

The President: That is a problem. We are trying to keep things on track, but it is pretty difficult. The (PLO's) June 11 statement was helpful on terrorism and on the PLO's December 1988 commitments. But the statement ignored the two critical points I mentioned in my message to you: one, specific denunciation of the PLF attack; and, some disciplinary action against Abul Abbas. I know you are working very hard, but the PLO must be more explicit and public on these points. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I'll try to do my best. (U)

The President: I know. Our friends are getting hurt -- you, the Saudis, and the Israelis. I don't think it's even in Israel's interest to see this happen. We need a good faith effort from them, since we have information about other concerns in the area of terrorism that has me very worried. I just hope they are restrained and don't go off and do something else now. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I'll do my very best, don't worry. (U)

The President: Thank you very, very much; I don't know where we would be without friends like you. We are running out of time on this thing. I think that unless the PLO position changes, that by Friday I will have little choice but to suspend the dialogue. Maybe you can tell Arafat that and it will help. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Thank you, George. Again, Happy Birthday, and I wish you well. (U)

The President: Thank you for your call. Goodbye. (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Add-On

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Toshiki Kaifu,
Prime Minister of Japan (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: Frances Seeds
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME: June 22, 1990, 8:06 a.m.-8:19 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Kaifu telephoned the President concerning commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

The President: Hello. Toshiki? (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Good morning, George. (U)

The President: Good morning, Toshiki. How are you today? (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: This is Toshiki speaking. (U)

The President: How are you Toshiki? (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: I am fine thank you. (U)

The President: Okay. Go ahead please. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Georgie, I called you this morning on this very special commemorative day, the 30th Anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, to celebrate together the peace and prosperity that the 30 years of the security treaty have provided for us. Looking back, 1960 was the year when I first became a member of Parliament of Japan, so the 30 years of the security treaty cover exactly the years of my political life. These thirty years under the security treaty are ones in which Japan has prospered as well as the region. On this very day I would like to extend respect to the wise decisions and judgment of our predecessors. (C)

The President: I appreciate very much the call. I agree with you on the importance of this treaty. I think it is very special that it is the year you came into the Diet and assumed public life. I think that this is very symbolic. Lastly, I want to thank you for your emissary, Mr. Abe. You couldn't have sent a better emissary to celebrate this treaty. We received him

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yesterday and had a very warm meeting with him, to thank him and to reiterate the importance we place on the mutual security treaty. (C)

Prime Minister Kaifu: George, thank you very much for receiving and meeting with Minister Abe. I learned from him as well that he had useful and significant discussions with you. I would like to thank you once again for that and take this opportunity to say that I do hope, on this occasion of commemoration of the 30th anniversary, that the two peoples of Japan and the United States will be reminded of the closeness and importance of the relationship between our two countries. (C)

The President: I think they will. On another subject, you and I had talked about meeting together before the Houston Economic Summit. I will have time there on Saturday or Sunday, substantial time, for a substantial visit. If you have something else in mind, let me know, but I think we need a good bilateral meeting. (C)

Prime Minister Kaifu: As it happens, I am planning to arrive in Houston on Saturday morning, so any time on Saturday or on Sunday when it is convenient to you, would be most welcome to me to have a substantial discussion with you. (C)

The President: I will ask General Scowcroft to contact your Ambassador and work out a satisfactory time. Let's do it in a nice relaxed setting so we can have a nice frank discussion. I look forward to that. (C)

Prime Minister Kaifu: I'm very much looking forward to it. At the Houston Economic Summit (on the basis of Japan-U.S. global partnership) I am looking forward to coordinating our position and cooperating with you. And at our meeting before the Houston Economic Summit, because you're coming in from the NATO meeting, I will be interested in hearing your views on the European security situation and other subjects such as our approach to the Soviet Union and to China. I will have Ambassador Murata get in touch with General Scowcroft to arrange a mutually satisfactory convenient time. (C)

The President: I just received, on June 19, your June 14 letter and like its very cooperative tone on SII. We will have a lot to talk about there as well as on subjects such as the Soviet Union and China. I'm anxious to get your views. I'm pleased with the way our relationship is developing. Thanks for this wonderful phone call about the Treaty. (C)

Prime Minister Kaifu: I, too, agree with you and do hope to keep in close touch with you on various subjects and I'm looking forward to contributing to the peace and cooperation in Asian countries and indeed the world. (C)

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The President: One last comment from a politician. I can't help but notice the strong support you are receiving from the Japanese people, and that is very good. We take great pride in what you're doing there. I mention this as one politician to another, since this is your 30th year of service. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: It is thanks to you, George. I'm very pleased with the way you have assisted me, formally and informally. I learned from Mr. Abe that you asked everyone in the LDP to support Kaifu. I am very appreciative of this. Thank you very much. (U)

The President: I look forward to seeing you in Houston. Thank you for the call. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- END OF CONVERSATION --

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